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Causal Relata: Tokens, Types, or Variables?

Author(s): Daniel Murray Hausman


Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jul., 2005), pp. 33-54
Published by: Springer
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Erkenntnis (2005) 63:33-54 Springer 2005
DOI 10.1007/sl0670-005-0562-6

DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES?

ABSTRACT. The literature on causation distinguishes between causal claims

properties or types and causal claims relating individuals or tokens. Many


relating
authors maintain that corresponding to these two kinds of causal claims are two

different kinds of causal relations. Whether to regard causal relations among vari
ables as yet another variety of causation is also controversial. This essay maintains
that causal relations obtain among tokens and that type causal claims are general
izations concerning causal relations among these tokens.

0. INTRODUCTION

People make claims about causal relations among entities of different


kinds or at different ontological "levels". Token-level causal relations
apparently link particular events. The shriek of my alarm-clock at
6:30 this morning apparently bore a token-level causal relation to
the wounded groan that emerged from me slightly later.1 There are
well-known controversies concerning the nature of events, but there
is general agreement that they are particulars occupying spatio
temporal regions, that they can occur only once, and that they do not
have instances and cannot be instantiated. I shall refer to event to
kens with lower-case italicized letters from near the beginning of the
alphabet.
Type-level causal claims in contrast apparently link properties or
kinds of events. Consuming too many chocolates unfortunately often
bears this kind of causal relation to stomach aches. I shall assume
- - are
here that kinds of events event types properties and shall
speak indifferently of properties, kinds of events and event types.
Properties are not particulars located in space and time, and they can
have many instances. The instantiation of a property at a particular
time and place is a "trope". Like events, tropes are particulars located
in space and time, and they may be token causes or effects; but, unlike
events, tropes have only one constituent property. I shall refer to
properties, kinds or types with upper-case italicized letters from near
the beginning of the alphabet.

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34 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

As Christopher Hitchcock points out, there are two different


contrasts between "token-level causation" and "type-level causa
tion". The first contrast is between a causal tendency and a causal
outcome (an "actual causal relation"). This distinction is salient in
causation. Even though the token event a increases the
probabilistic
probability that a token event b will occur, b may fail to occur. In that
case, a tends to cause b but a does not actually cause b. Good noted
this contrast in his work on probabilistic causation (1961), and Eells
interpreted it as a contrast between type and token causation. The
second contrast lies between causal generalizations and singular
causal claims. What I call "token causation" is actual causation, and
it occurs only if both cause and effect occur. I shall argue that

type-causal claims concerning causal tendencies are generalizations

concerning actual or possible token-causal relations.


Scientists often
speak relations
of causal among variables. As I
shall use the
term, a variable is not a symbol, such as "X", but a
feature of the world denoted by the symbol, such as the resistance in
a circuit or atmospheric pressure. So one may speak of the current
in a circuit, /, as causally depending on the resistance in the circuit, R,
and the voltage in the circuit, V. This way of speaking about causal
relations has become increasingly important within philosophy as a

consequence of developments in causal modeling. Causal relations


are now often represented by means of directed acyclic graphs or
structural equations.
For example, the causal relation between the current in a circuit
and the voltage and resistance might be represented by the causal
in Figure 1. Arrows (directed edges) are drawn from causes to
graph
their direct effects. A "direct" cause is a cause that does not go

through any other variable in the set of variables


represented. Causal
are acyclic in the sense that following a sequence of directed
graphs
from tail to head (a causal "path") never passes through any
edges
variable (node) more than once. The structural equation associated
=
with Figure 1 is a formulation of Ohm's Law: (O) I V/R. (O)

Figure 1.

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 35

expresses both a functional relation


and, by convention, a causal
relation:There are edges in the associated graph from each variable
on the right-hand-side of a structural equation to the left-hand-side
variable. Exogenous sources of variation can also be represented by
"error variables" in structural equations and in associated directed
graphs, but I left them out of this illustration.
Figure 1 and (O) are representations of causal relations among
variables, and (O) also specifies the functional relation among the
variables. Scientists also speak of causal relations among the values
of variables. I shall use italicized capital letters from near the end of
the alphabet to refer to variables and lower-case letters from near the
end of the alphabet to refer to their values.
One way to interpret this varied causal talk would be to maintain
that there are as many varieties of causal relations as there are ways
of talking about causal relations. So one might maintain that there
are token-causal relations, type-causal relations, causal relations
among variables, and causal
relations among values of variables. One
would then face the problem of explaining how these four causal
relations are related to one another. Do any of these relations depend
on the others, or are there multiple independent varieties of causa
tion? Alternatively, and to my mind more plausibly, one might
maintain that causation is just one relation, which can be represented
and discussed in many ways.
One finds several views in the literature. Some prominent philos
ophers maintain that type-level and token-level causation are distinct
and largely independent. Sober (1985, 1986) and Eells (1991) make
the most extensive case for a view such as this, and Eells offers
strikingly different theories
type of and token causation. Hausman
(1998) and Woodward (2003) maintain in contrast that causal rela
tions obtain between particular events, and type-level causal claims
are generalizations concerning those (token) relations. Tooley (1987)
may be a proponent of the view that token and type relations are not
independent and that type-level relations are fundamental. Hoover
(2001) maintains that causal relations are fundamentally relations
among variables, which are "exemplified" in causal relations among
particular events.
These are complicated issues, and the increasing reliance on causal
graphs and structural equations has intensified the problems. Con
sider the following remarks of Woodward:

Although there is a distinction between type- and token-causal claims, it does not
- - or
follow that there are two kinds of causation type and token that in addition to

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36 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

token-causal relationships involving particular values of variables possessed by


particular individuals, there is a distinct variety of causal connection between

properties or variables that is independent of any facts about token-causal rela

tionships. In my view, a claim such as "X is causally relevant to Y" is a claim to the
effect that changing the value of X instantiated in particular, spatiotemporally lo
cated individuals will change the value of Y located in particular individuals. (2003,
p. 40)

In this passage, Woodward takes causation to be token ("actual")


causation (see Pearl 2000, ch. 10;Halpern and Pearl 2001; Hitchcock
2001). Yet the account of actual causation Pearl, Halpern, Hitchcock,
and Woodward defend apparently defines actual causation in terms
of type-causal statements concerning the causal graph and structural
equations. If the truth conditions for actual causation consist of type
causal claims, can type-causal claims be merely generalizations con

cerning token causal relations? I shall show that contemporary causal


modeling presents no challenge to the view that the relata of the
causal relation are tokens and that one can give truth conditions for

type-causal claims in terms of generalizations concerning token


causation. These theses leave
open deeper questions concerning the
nature of laws and causation, which are suggested by doubts about
whether type-causal claims are "merely" generalizations. What re
mains (and shall remain) unanswered is whether generalizations
concerning token causation are true in virtue some nomological
of
relation among properties or whether nomological relations among
properties can be analyzed in terms of regularities and counterfac
tuals concerning token causation.
In this paper, I am going to sketch a position that, I hope, brings
order to this confusing state of affairs. Everyone in this debate has had a

grip on one piece of the truth, but no one has assembled the pieces. In

particular, I shall reaffirm the view defended in Chapter 5 of my Causal

Asymmetries (1998) that causal relations are relations among concrete


(tokens), though I shall correct some details.
particulars

1. A CRITIQUE OF EELLS'S ARGUMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF TOKEN


AND TYPE CAUSATION

The first and most important question I shall address concerns


whether type-causal and token-causal claims are logically indepen
dent of one another. Eells
argues forcefully that they are (see also
Sober 1985, 1986). Eells presents his argument for the existence of a
distinct causal relation in the context of a theory of
type-level
probabilistic causation, but this essay will discuss only deterministic

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 37

causal relations. Although the central arguments he makes translate


to deterministic causation, probabilistic causal relations may give rise
to further complications, which I shall not address here.
Eells motivates the distinction between type and token causation
by pointing out that the Surgeon General's type-level claim that
smoking is a positive causal factor for lung cancer leaves the facts
about the token-level effects
of smoking and the token-level causes of

lung cancer almost completely open. This is a claim about the logical
independence of propositions concerning type and token causation,
not an epistemic claim. Eells maintains that smoking can be a cause
of lung cancer without ever causing any individual to get lung cancer:

Consistent with human physiology being just as it actually is (so that the Surgeon
General's claim is still true), is the possibility that everybody's causal field happens
(improbably enough) to be such that, if they were to become smokers, they would,
just before the time lung disease had a chance to develop, die from some other cause

that, given the causal field, is deterministically token causally related to smoking.
(1991, p. 11)

Smokers might, for example, wind up burning themselves to death


smoking in bed or dying of heart attacks before the physiological
damage caused by smoking has advanced far enough to cause lung
cancer.

Eells then offers the following arguments against the claim that
type-causal claims are generalizations concerning token causation.

First, it is consistent with a type-level causal claim, as I understand such


probabilistic
claims, that the cause and effect factors involved never in fact happen to be exem
as I understand
plified. Thus, type-level probabilistic causal claims, they are not
generalizations over instances of token causation. ... I have described
Second,
examples, possiblesituations, in which the Surgeon General's type-level claim is
intuitively true, yet in which there are no cases in which a token of the cause type ever
causes, or even would cause, a token of the effect In these cases, there are no
type.
instances of the relevant kind of token causation to generalize over. Finally, there is a
problem for the suggestion that type-level causal claims be understood as general
izations over instances of token causation: What are the formal of the
properties
generalizations? (1991, pp. 15-16).

One can summarize and extend Eells's case for the existence of a
distinct type-causal relation as follows. If a is a token cause of b, then
(a) a occurs, (b) b occurs, and there is in fact a causal connection
(c)
between z's (of some kind) occurring and 's (of some kind) occur
ring. Given this characterization of token causation, type causation is
not sufficient for token causation, because a type A may be a cause of
a type B even though (a) no token a of kind A occurs, (b) no token b
of kind B occurs, or (c) tokens of kind A that do occur are never

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38 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

causes of occurrences of tokens of kind B. Type causation also seems


not to be necessary for token causation: suppose that one fateful
evening George's smoking in Pat's bar led him to meet Jim, who later
found George a job in an asbestos factory, which caused George to

get lung cancer. Though causation is not always transitive, it is


plausible to maintain that George's smoking that evening is a token
cause of his contracting lung cancer. But it would be misleading to
take this chain of events as establishing the Surgeon General's

warning about the dangers of smoking. In addition, Eells challenges


those who hold that type causation derives from or bears some logical

relationship to token causation to specify exactly what the relation

ship is.
In contrast to Eells, in Causal Asymmetries I argued that type-level
causal claims are generalizations concerning causal relations among
tokens (1998, ch. 5*). In particular, I defended the following thesis:
CG (Counter/actual generalization view) A is a cause of B in cir
cumstances K if and only if inK each (token) event of kind A that
might occur would cause some (token) event of kind B (1998, p.
87).2

If CG is correct, then token and type causation are not independent.


Since CG does not preclude the possibility of providing truth con
ditions for token causation in terms of type causal relations, its
correctness by itself does not establish that token-causal-relations are
in any sense more fundamental than are type relations. What is at
issue in this section and the next is mainly Eells' claim that type and
token causation are independent relations. Section 3 explores the

possibility of giving truth conditions for token causation in terms of

type-causal relations.
CG purports to provide truth conditions only for deterministic
causation. It offers only a necessary and sufficient condition for the

claim, "A is a cause of B in circumstances K ", not for "A is a cause of


i?" full-stop. Causal generalizations must always be relativized to
some set of background circumstances. For example, if medical
researchers find some
that prevents
drug lung cancer, then smoking
will not be a cause lung cancer
of among those who take this drug,
while it will still be a cause of lung cancer among at least some of
those who do not take this drug. Causal claims relating types are not
well-defined until the surrounding circumstances are specified. Eells

agrees, though he relativizes causal claims to populations rather than


to circumstances.

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 39

CG gives truth conditions for type-causal claims in terms of causal


relations among possible event tokens. It takes type-causal claims to
be generalizations about what causal relations would obtain among
tokens, not as de facto summaries concerning what causal relations
actually obtain. Its truth condition for "A causes B (in circumstances
K)" is "(in K) each event of kind A that might occur would cause
some event of kind i?." So A causes B (inK) does not imply that any
event of kind A or of kind B ever in fact occurs. Moreover, CG allows
for the possibility that even though A's cause B's and events of kind A
occur, they never cause events of kind B, because the background
circumstances K are not propitious. According to the CG, the Sur
geon General's type-causal claim that smoking causes lung cancer
does not imply that are ever in fact token-level
instances
of smoking
causes of instances
lung cancer, both
of because it might be that
nobody smokes and because the smoking that does take place might
not occur in the right circumstances.
What about the possibility that George's smoking may cause him to
get lung cancer (via his employment in an asbestos factory) without it
being the case that smoking causes lung cancer. Though this is no
counterexample to CG, it would seem that if token causal relations are
instances of type relations and George's smoking caused him to get lung
cancer, then smoking ought to be a cause of lung cancer.

Suppose one adopts the following necessary condition on token


causation:

NR (Nomic Regularity) If a causes b, then there is some property A


instantiated by a, some property B instantiated by b, and some true
characterization K of the circumstances in which a causes b such that
if A&K then B is true as a matter of natural law.

NR maintains that a nomic relationship between relevant properties


of cause and is a necessary
effect condition on causation.3 This
plausible and widely accepted necessary condition does not rule out
the possibility that George's smoking in Pat's bar caused him to get
lung cancer, even
though smoking is not a cause of cancer.
lung
Let W be a description of the relevant circumstances in which
George's smoking in Pat's bar caused him later to contract lung
cancer at the asbestos factory. NR that in
implies George's smoking
Pat's bar that night instantiates some property that is bears a lawful
relationship to some property of his later lung cancer, but that
property need not be "smoking". The token-causal facts here might
instead by explained by a generalization such as "Befriending

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40 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

someone working at an asbestos factory that is looking for employ


ees, when one is looking for work leads to lung cancer".
It might however be that George's smoking in Pat's bar (as op
posed to his merely being there and incidentally smoking) is causally
relevant to his befriending Jim. In that case, a lawful relation between

smoking and lung cancer will be presupposed by the token-causal


claim. This might seem objectionable, since the story of George and
Jim does not establish the Surgeon General's claim. But the type
causal claim, "Smoking causes lung cancer" that is implied by the
story of George and Jim is not the Surgeon General's warning. Ex

actly what the Surgeon General is claiming is a long story for another
occasion (Hausman 2005), but on any plausible interpretation, the

warning maintains that smoking causes lung cancer in a different and


broader set of circumstances than those in which George's smoking
set in motion the chain of events that led to his contracting lung
cancer. Although NR
implies that token causal relations imply lawful
relations
among relevant properties of cause and effects, it does not
commit one to the view that the story of George and Jim establishes
that smoking causes lung cancer, both because George's smoking
might not
be nomically relevant, and, even when it is, because the

generalization that follows pertains to a different set of background


circumstances than the Surgeon General's warning.
In addition to Eells'
arguments for the independence of type and
token causal
relations, one might also question CG on the grounds
that token-level causal claims, unlike type-level claims, appear to be
extensional. For example, it is a tragic fact that an early-morning event
near Sumatra on Christmas in 2004 caused more than 100,000 deaths.
Yet CG had better not license the mistaken generalization that

early-morning events near Sumatra cause massive casualties. Fortu

nately, it doesn't. Claims about actual causation need only pick out the
actual cause
and effect, not those properties or types in virtue of which
actual and possible tokens are causally related. Type-level claims, in
contrast, need to specify which properties are causally relevant.

2. THE CASE FOR THE COUNTERFACTUAL GENERALIZATION VIEW

What can be said on behalf of CG and against the view that token
and type causation are independent of one another? Here are three

arguments:
First, if there are type-causal relations, then it seems that their
relata should be types or properties. But what philosophers take to be

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 41

type-causal relations are in fact relations among particulars that are


located in space and time. Virtually all theorists of causation, even if

(unlike Eells) they countenance simultaneous causation or causality


backwards in time, believe that itmakes sense to discuss the temporal
relations between cause and effect. If causation were a relation among
- -
properties which are not located in time all parties to this debate
would be badly confused: It would not make sense to ask whether
causes always precede their effects. Nor could one raise
questions
about whether cause and effect need to be linked by a chain of
spatio-temporally contiguous intermediaries. Rather than relating
properties or event kinds, type-causal claims relate actual or possible
spatio-temporally located instantiations of their types (that is, tropes).
Eells attempts to address this objection special proper
by defining
ties that refer to times (1991, ch. 5). Let st be a temporal "slice" of an
individual substance or set-up s at time t, and suppose that s has the
property A at t, which is equivalent to st having the property A. Eells
defines the time-dependent property At\ (x)[At(x)+*A(xt)]. George has
the property of smoking-at-/ if the t time slice of George has the
property of smoking. The asymmetry of causation is secured by stip
ulating that At causes Bt> only if f is later than /. At remains a property,
not a particular. Suppose George smokes at 11p.m. on Tuesday, Sep
tember, 1997. That means that the llp.m-Tuesday-September-9-1997
time slice of George has the property of smoking. So in addition to
having at that time the property of smoking, George has, throughout
his entire life, the property of llp.m-Tuesday- September-9-1997
smoking. And if he develops lung cancer during 1998, then, throughout
his life, he has the property of during-1998-developing-lung cancer.
As a property, At is not literally located in space and time,
and it cannot precede the property Bt>. The property llp.m of
Tuesday-September-9-1997-smoking not precede
does the property of
during-1998-developing-lung cancer. Whether they make references
to times or not, properties are not located in time. They may be
instantiated at particular times, and in this case both properties are
continuously instantiated during George's life span. The temporal
asymmetry between cause and effect that Eells insists on rests on the
time reference of At preceding -
the time reference of Bf in other
words on the instantiation of smoking the instantiation of
preceding
developing lung cancer.
This account of the relata of
type-causal relations con
implicitly
cedes that type-causal claims concern relations among instantiations
of properties, q has the property At if and only if its -slice has the
property A, which is to say that A is instantiated by q at t. So the

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42 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

causal relation between


At and Bt> obtains if and only if there is a
causal relation between the actual or possible instantiation of A at t
and the instantiation of B at f. Relations between Eells' time-indexed

properties always run in tandem with token-level relations.

Metaphysical niceties aside, a statement such as "llp.m.-Tuesday

September-9-1997-smoking-in-bed caused 11:15p.m-Tuesday-Sep


tember-9-1997-bed-burning" seems just a fancy-dress version of a
token-causal claim.
Unlike this example, the type-causal claims Eells set out to analyze
are claims about tendencies or generalizations such as (t)(t-smoking
in-bed in circumstances ^causes +
(t u)-bed-burning). So type-causal
claims can be expressed as generalizations, even on Eells' construal.

Indeed, one might charitably suggest that in speaking of "type-level


causation", Eells is not referring to a relationship among types, but to
a relationship among tokens that holds in virtue of lawful relation

ships among types. Although only Humeans would take generaliza


-
tions as constituting these lawful relations the "necessary
-
connections" in deterministic causation deterministic necessary
connections obtain if and only if counterfactual generalizations are
true. In that case, why not take type-causal claims as generalizations
relations among possible events or property instantia
concerning
tions, rather than, as Eell's urges, generalizations over relations be
tween time-indexed properties (which seem in any case to involve a

surreptitious reference to particulars). A second consideration in


defense of CG is thus that type-causal claims can be expressed as

generalizations over tokens or over particularized properties that


serve as surrogate tokens.
In chapter 5* of Hausman 1998, I made a mistaken third argu
ment in defense of CG, which will be discussed in Section 4 in con
nection with Kevin Hoover's critique. Although this argument is
-
mistaken, I shall argue below that its conclusion that causal rela
-
tions must be located in space and time is correct.

3. TYPE VERSUS TOKEN CAUSAL RELATIONS: ARE THEY INTERDEFINABLE?

Although CG maintains that type-causal claims are generalizations

concerning actual or possible token causal relations, it does not imply


that token-causal claims are more important than type-causal claims.
On the contrary, in many scientific contexts, interest centers on laws
or on causal generalizations. Notice also that CG does not rule out

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 43

the possibility that there are truth conditions for token causation in
terms of type-causal relations.
CG says that A is a cause of B in circumstances K if and only if in
K each event of kind A that might occur would cause some event of
kind B. Suppose that (i) an event a of kind A does occur, (ii) A is a
cause of B
in circumstances K and (iii) the circumstances are of kind
K. Given these premises CG implies that there is some event b of kind
B such that a causes b. This apparently provides a sufficient condition
for token causation in terms of type causation plus the occurrence of
a token of the cause type in the right circumstances. Conversely if a
occurs and causes b, then according to NR, there is some property A
that a instantiates that bears a nomic relationship in the circum
stances to some property B that b instantiates. Taking some short
cuts, one might then offer the following truth condition for token
causation:

AI (actual instantiation view) a causes b if and only if (1) a and b


occur and (2) for some properties A and B instantiated by a and b
and some kind of circumstances K instantiated by the circum
stances in which a occurs, As cause Bs in circumstances K.

In place the nomological


of necessary condition for token causation
given by NR, AI offers necessary and sufficient conditions for token
causation in terms of type causation and the occurrence of the
cause and effect. The contrast is important. Consider, for example, a
token-causal relation between the temperature of a sealed gas cylin
der and the pressure of the gas inside. As NR states, this causal
relation implies that there are nomological relations between
temperature and pressure. But the nomological relations need not be
causal relations. The relations
captured by the ideal gas law and its
various refinements are
symmetrical and apparently not causal. The
nomological connections NR demands between relevant properties
of cause and effect need not be asymmetrical type-level causal
connections.

Although suggested by CG, the sufficient condition stated by the


actual instantiation view is not entailed
by CG, and it is false. It fails
because types or properties, unlike causal relata, are not located in
time. The claim that the property or event type A causes the property
or event type B (in K) does not imply that there is a causal rela
tionship between every instantiation of A that occurs in circum
stances K and every instantiation of B. It implies instead that there is
a causal relationship between those instantiations of A and B that
stand in the "right" spatio-temporal relations to one another. So, for

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44 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

example, suppose a particular tire is slashed (a) and deflates (b) in


circumstances like those in which slashing tires (A) causes them to
deflate (B). AI implies that a causes b. But if b takes place a week
before a (after which the tire is pumped up again), a obviously does
not cause b.

One might attempt to repair AI as follows:


LI (located instantiation view) a causes b if and only if (I) a and b
occur and (2) for some properties A and B instantiated by a and b
and some kind of circumstances K instantiated by the circum
stances in which a and b occur, instantiations of A in K that bear
the proper spatio-temporal relations to instantiations of B cause
those instantiations of 5's.

LI says that a is a token cause of b if and only if a and b occur and a's are
token causes of Z/s in these circumstances. This is not trivial, because it
makes the substantive claim that token-causal relations are always
instances of causal generalizations. But the only type-causal causal
claims CG and LI countenance are generalizations concerning token
causation. Type and token-causal claims are both concerned with to
ken causation. Type causal claims are generalizations about actual or

possible token relations.

4. CAUSAL RELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES AND THEIR VALUES: HOOVER'S

CRITIQUE

Let us turn now to causal claims


concerning variables or values of
variables, such as those implicit in structural equation models or
causal graphs. Both variables and their values appear to be proper

ties, with variables the determinables of which their values are the
determinants (Hausman 1998, p. 87; Hoover 2001, p. 71; Woodward
2003, pp. 40-^11). One can express the fact that a particular gas
sample g is odorless and has a temperature of 20 C, by saying that
the value of the qualitative variable "odor" that g takes is "odorless"
= variables
and that Tg 20 C. Claims about causal relations among
and among values of variables are claims about causal relations
among types or properties. If the counterfactual generalization view
is correct, statements concerning causal relations among variables are

generalizations over events or tropes, which include variables having


or changing specific values at particular places and times.
Hooverargues that thinking in terms of variables enables one to
see that my earlier argument (Hausman 1998, ch. 5*) in defense of

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 45

CG relies on an indefensible implicit premise (Hoover 2001, ch. 4). He

apparently grants my claim that cause and effect must be located in


space and time, but argues that this claim does not count against his
view that causal relations among variables are fundamental:

we shall take it for granted that causes are local and question instead Hausman's
claim that variables or properties are not local. This appears to rest entirely on a

stipulative definition of variable. For sometimes elliptically, sometimes explicitly,


variables are often localized: U.S. GDP in 2010 or oil pressure in my Dodge Caravan
next week are located variables (2001, p. 83).4

Hoover is right to distinguish token events from a localized variables


such as U.S. GDP in 2010. Although localized variables have only
one real value, these variables (like Eell's time-indexed properties) are
still properties, not particulars, and they have a range of possible
values. Yet, as Hoover maintains, variables such as U.S. GDP in
2010 seem to be sufficiently localized to be causal relata. Let us call
-
variables such as these variables that characterize some concrete

particular at a specific time, and which thus have only one actual
-
value "concrete variables." Concrete variables may be qualitative as
well as quantitative.
Causal claims concerning relations among concrete variables are
- -
not token-causal claims, because variables even concrete variables
are properties, not particulars. Just as counterfactual dependence
involves a family of conditionals, so causal relations among concrete
variables (unlike causal relations among tokens) involve a family of
relations amongpossible their
values.5 Since concrete variables
specify a spatio-temporal location, they are not ruled out as candi
dates for causal relata. Hoover takes variables to be causal relata, and
he maintains that laws are abstractions from type-causal relations
among variables, while causal relations among tokens are "exempli
fications" of causal relations among variables (2001, pp. 88-89).
Though concrete variables point to definite locations in space and
time, taking them to be causal relata is subject to the objections Imade
to Eell's time-indexed properties. Consider a structural equation such
as (O) I= V/R or the causal graph in Figure 1 above with arrows from
V and R are concrete
to /. If the variables in the sense defined above,
they refer to properties of a particular circuit at a particular time. As in
the discussion of Eells'time-indexed properties, Hoover could in this
-
way win the metaphysical battle the relata are indeed variables, not
-
tokens but he would, I believe, lose the war, since these are just
fancy-dress token relations. As we shall see below, these are not the sort
of type relations that Hoover is in fact concerned with.

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46 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

Despite the passage quoted above, Hoover is concerned with


generalizations or tendencies, not with one concrete variable causing
another. Consider for example the following remarks, which are di
rected toward a variant of the example in which I argued (mistakenly)
that referenceto a particular set-up is needed to determine whether
the temperature of a gas depends on its pressure or its pressure de
pends on its temperature:

On this view, the two examples of the cylinders of gas can each be thought of as
concrete causal structures, where ... there is enough localization and
defining
instantiation of variables that we are able to say that it is this cylinder and not some
other one. Given that the causal structure is concrete in this sense, it nevertheless
embodies type-level causal relations in its dispositions. So in the case of cylinder (b)
in our previous example, in the manner it is actually configured, increasing the

temperature would increase the pressure, whether or not the temperature were

actually increased. (2001, p. 87)

These remarks suggest that rather than focusing on what I called


"concrete variables" that pertain to a particular system and time,
Hoover focuses on what I shall call "system-specific" variables.
These are partly particularized, since they pertain to a particular

"system",6 but they are not located in time. Instead they have
values at times, which can change over time. The temperature of
the gas in a particular cylinder is a system-specific variable, but not
a concrete variable, since it may have different values at different
times.

By the term "system" in the last paragraph, Imean something like


a gas enclosed in an insulated cylinder that can be compressed by a
piston. Particular systems and kinds of systems can be described more
or less abstractly and more or less vaguely. One's causal interest may
be focused on a particular system that exists at some place over some
time period, or one may be interested in all systems of a particular
kind. Simple electric circuits, each with a battery and a resistor, all

belong to the same


vaguely-specified kind. There are narrower
characterizations of electric circuit systems too, and one can also limit
one's concern to some particular circuit sitting on a laboratory table
in Appleton North High School. Simple electric circuits are governed
approximately by Ohm's law, but one can read a structural equation
such as (O) above (I= V/R) as stating functional and causal relations
-
among system-specific variables the voltage and the resistance in
this circuit. Causal models and structural equations typically relate

system-specific variables. Systems are ensembles of things "out


there". Structural equations and causal models represent systems
rather than constituting them.

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 47

Hoover is right to maintain that type-causal claims, including claims

concerning causal relations among system-specific variables, are not


reducible to claims concerning causal relations among actual tokens.
Increases in the pressure of a gas in an insulated cylinder compressed by
a piston would cause the temperature of this gas to increase, whether or
not the pressure is ever in fact increased. Since CG does not maintain
that type-causal claims are generalizations concerning actual causal
relations, Hoover's observation is fully compatible with CG.
Where Hoover goes wrong is
in arguing that system-specific
variables such as "temperature of this gas sample" are the relata of
causal relations.
System-specific variables, like ordinary properties,
have valuesthat change over time. As argued above, their values or
changes in their values at specific times, like instantiations of prop
erties, may be causes and effects, but properties and system-specific
variables are not themselves causes or effects. It seems that CG (and
LI) stand.

5. DO ACTUAL CAUSAL RELATIONS PRESUPPOSE TYPE-CAUSAL RELATIONS?

case survives Hoover's -


My critique causation is a relation among
tokens. Type causal claims are generalizations concerning token
causation. Yet this conclusion requires some reconsideration and
restatement in the light of contemporary work employing structural
equations and causal graphs to represent type and token causal
relations. In particular, these representations construe the back
ground circumstances with respect to which type causal generaliza
tions are made rather differently and demand a more complicated
formulation of the counterfactual generalization view. In addition,
the accounts of actual (token) causation due to Pearl and Halpern,
Hitchcock, and Woodward (PHHW), which are the most sophisti
cated theories currently available, raise doubts about whether it can
be true that type causal claims are merely generalizations about ac
tual causal relations, since their truth conditions for actual causation
apparently involve type-causal relations. The doubts I am concerned
-
with are not epistemological presumably intervening and bringing
about an event a and then observing that some event b ensues can
sometimes provide good reason to believe that a is an actual cause of
b. The puzzle is instead whether reference to type-causal relations in
the account of actual causation undercuts the view that type-causal
claims are merely generalizations concerning causal relations among
tokens or concrete variables.

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48 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

To tackle this issue and the task of reformulating CG, I shall focus
upon Hitchcock's (2001) and Woodward's (2003) formulation of the
PHHW view of actual causation. Consider the following example: A
boulder falls and bounces toward a hiker, who ducks and goes on

safely (Hitchcock 2001, p. 276;Woodward 2003, p. 79). Let X be a


dichotomous variable representing whether the boulder falls: X= 1 if
the boulder falls; X=0 if it does not. Let Y represent whether the
hiker ducks: Y= 1 if the hiker ducks; Y= 0 if the hiker does not duck.
Finally Z= 1 if the hiker survives, and Z=0 if the hiker dies. The
causal relations among these variables may be represented by the

following structural equations:

(1) Y=X,

(2) Z = max{l-X, Y}.

Equation (1) says that the hiker ducks if and only if the boulder falls.
Equation (2) says that the hiker survives if and only if the boulder
does not fall or the hiker ducks. The causal graph associated with this
case is shown in Figure 2.
The causal graph and the structural equations concern a particular

system. In the terminology of the last section, the variables are sys

tem-specific, but not concrete. The arrows are supposed to represent


direct relations, where, recall, whether a causal relation is
type-causal
direct depends on which variables are included in the graph. There is
an arrow from X to Y in a causal graph if and only if X appears on
the right-hand-side of the structural equation for Y. X should appear
on the right-hand-side of a structural equation for F if and only if, for
some fixed values of the other variables and some values of X, a

change in the value of X would be an actual cause of a change in the


value of Y. So the arrow between X and Z in the causal graph of the
boulder scenario means that for some assignment of a value to Y and
some values of X, the value of Z depends (functionally or counter

factually) on the value of X. This is indeed the case. In a circumstance

Figure 2.

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 49

-
in which the value of Fis constrained to be zero that is, in which the
hiker does not duck - Z= 1 if and only ifX= 0 - that is, a boulder
falling would cause the hiker to die. In the actual story, the hiker does
duck, and the hiker survives regardless of whether the boulder
falls,
and so the boulder falling is not an actual cause of the hiker sur

viving. Similarly, there is a causal arrow from Y to Z in the graph of


the boulder scenario because for X= 1 (the boulder drops) the value
-
of Z depends on the value of Y that is, whether the hiker survives
would causally depend on whether the hiker ducks. Y is both a type
level direct cause of Z and in this particular episode, the hiker's
ducking is an actual cause of his or her survival.7
Here is one way to reformulate the causal generalization view of
type causation in terms of variables and structural equation systems:

CG* A variable X is a direct cause of another variable Y in a


system S if and only if for some assignment of admissible values to
all variables in the system other than X or Y there are at least two
admissible values of X, x and x such that any change in the value
of X from X=x to X=xf that might occur would be an actual
cause of a change in Y.

Like CG, CG* is not


an analysis of causation. It is neutral among
many competing theories of causation. It attempts instead to give
truth conditions for a particular kind of type-level causation or causal
- -
generalization direct causation among variables in terms of facts
about causal relations among possible (token) changes in values of
variables.
CG* makes four
substantial changes in CG. First, the causal
relation between X and Y is relativized to the causal system S and to
the existence of some assignment of values to other variables in S,
rather than to the "circumstances" K. For example, whether the hi
ker's survival
actually depends on his or her ducking depends on the
set up and on whether the boulder actually drops. Second, though
whether changes in the value of X actually cause changes in the value
of Y depends upon what admissible values other variables in the
system have, the type-level claim that X is a direct cause Y is not
relativized in this way. It depends instead on whether there exists any
assignment of admissible values to the other variables such that some
change in the value of X causes or would cause a change in the value
of 7.8 CG* thus, third, makes clear that there may be changes in the
value of X that are irrelevant to the value of Y (given fixed values of
the other variables). What matters is whether the value of Y is ever
sensitive to the value of X. Finally, whereas CG purported to give

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50 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

truth conditions for "Xcauses Fin K\ circumstances


CG* only gives
truth conditions for "JYis a direct cause
of Y in system "'. One might
attempt to strengthen CG* by adding that X causes Y in system S
whenever there is a chain of direct causal relations running from X to
Y. But this addition seems to be false.9
In this way, it is possible to reformulate the counterfactual gen
eralization view so as to render it compatible with structural equation
and graphical representations of causal relations. But doubts may
remain about whether relations among variables are merely gener
alizations concerning actual or possible token-causal relations, since
the characterization of actual causal relations appears to depend on

type-level relations embodied in the structural equations. For exam


=
ple, the conclusion that the hiker ducking (Y(t) 1) is an actual cause
of his or her surviving (Z(t')=l) rests on the following three pre
mises:
= 1 = 1.
(a) Y(t) andZ(0
(b) Z = max{l-X, Y}
= \.
(c) X{f)
In addition t, f, and t* must bear the right relations to one another,

(a) states that the cause and effect occur. Given the value of X stated
by (c), (b) then expresses both a functional and a causal relationship
between the values of Y and Z. So it seems that among the truth
conditions for an actual causal relation between Y and Z lies the

proposition that F is a type-level cause of Z.


What is at issue arrows, not how one
is the meaning of the causal
finds out what causes what.
cases, one In
might some
infer that

ducking causes survival from (a) to (c) above, while in other cases one

might draw the causal graph on the basis of one's knowledge of


actual causes. Two questions are at issue. First, can the type-level

claim, "The variable Z directly causally depends on the variable Y"


be understood as a generalization concerning actual and possible
token causal relations
along the lines of CG*? Second, are there truth
conditions for "F(t)= 1 is an actual cause of Z(t')= 1" that do not
-
include the type-level claims that is, can the type-level claim be

analyzed or understood in terms of independently understood claims


about actual causation?
The answer to the first question, is "Yes". There is nothing in
PHHW's characterization of causal
graphs, structural equations and
actual causation that is incompatible with CG*. The second question
is much trickier, and it seems to me that contemporary representa

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 51

tions of causal relationsby means of causal graphs and structural

equations leave it open. Humeans and counterfactual theorists would


answer it affirmatively, while theorists such as Cartwright (1989) who
emphasize causal capacities would insist that regularities are only
evidence for underlying causal capacities.

6. CONCLUSIONS

CG is a bit simple, and one of the arguments


too I gave on its behalf
was a blunder.But this essay has argued that causal relata are par
ticulars located in space and time and that type causal claims are
generalizations concerning actual or possible token causal relations.
CG* provides plausible truth conditions for claims about direct
causal relations among variables in terms or possible
of actual causal
relations among tokenchanges in the values of variables. Hoover is
to insist on -
right the importance of what he calls causal structure
that is on the importance of causal relations among variables, which
indeed provides an epistemically crucial backdrop to investigations
into actual causation. But there is no challenge here to the theses that
causal relata are spatio-temporally located particulars and that claims
about causal relations among variables or properties are generaliza
tions concerning relations among actual and possible tokens.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This essay and the sections of Causal Asymmetry from which it draws
could not have written without many detailed and helpful criticisms
and suggestions from Ellery Eells. Elliott Sober was also a tre
mendous help with the essay, commenting on multiple drafts. Thanks
also to Luc Bovens, Juan Comesawa, Kevin Hoover, Steven Leeds,
Anya Plutnski, Carolina Sartoria, Wolfgang Spohn, and James
Woodward for their comments on earlier drafts. The arguments in
section 4 reply both on published work by Halpern and Pearl,
Hitchcock, and Woodward and on conversations with Hitchcock and
Woodward.

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52 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

NOTES

1
Many philosophers maintain that there are token-causal relations among facts in
addition to token causal relations among events (see for example Bennett 1988).
Some, such as Mellor (1995) maintain that the relata of causal relations are always
facts. In this essay I shall assume that the relata of token-causal relations are
events. For arguments in defense of this assumption, see for example Hausman

(1998, ch. 2).


2
I have omitted a redundant phrase in the original concerning temporal relations.
3
Although espoused by Humeans, non-Humeans might also accept NR, since
it leaves open whether regularities constitute or merely manifest nomological
relations.
4
The variable in the first example could be GDP, which takes different values for
different countries at different times, U.S. GDP, which takes different values at
different times, or U.S. GDP in 2010, which has only one real value, which is, let
us suppose N trillion dollars. Having a GDP of N trillion dollars is a property or
type, which is true of the U.S. in 2010. Having a GDP of N trillion dollars in 2010
is another property, which is instantiated by the U.S. throughout its existence.
5
The causal relation between the variables X and 7 will typically hold only for some
limited range of possible values. For example, the relation between the temperature
and the pressure in a sealed cylinder will break down when the temperature is so high
that the cylinder melts or explodes.
6
It may be that system specific variables need make reference only to a kind of
rather than to a particular system. In that case, they are not localized in time
system
or in space.
7
It is worth emphasizing that causal graphs represent only possible causal relations

among variables, and they do not in general provide enough information to


determine whether one token is an actual cause of another. For example, suppose
one were to replace equation 1 with Y. Y=\-X and equation 2 with 2'.
= X= 1 if a trainee 0 otherwise. 7=1 if a backup
Z max{X,7}. (Suppose shoots;
shoots; 0 otherwise. Z= 1 if the victim dies; 0 otherwise. When the trainee shoots
and the backup doesn't, the trainee causes the death, even though if he hadn't shot,
the backup would have (Hitchcock 2001, pp. 281-282).) Changing the equations
this way changes what they permit one to infer about actual causal relations without

changing the causal graph.


8
An "admissible" value of a variable is a value that does not disrupt the causal

system. Consider for example a simple system consisting of a spring attached to the

wall. the to some distance X causes a restoring force of -kX,


Stretching spring
-
that X is not stretched too far. If X is stretched too far that is, if the value
provided
of X is no longer admissible, the spring will be deformed or break, and the causal
system will be changed.
9
Consider the following system of structural equations:
1" 7=X + 1
=
2"Z min(7,l).
X is 1 if a dog bites a terrorist in the right hand, and 0 if the dog does not bite. 7 is 0
if the terrorist does not push the detonator, 1 if the terrorist pushes itwith her right
hand, and 2 if the terrorist pushes itwith her left hand. Z is 1 if the bomb explodes
-> Y -> Z. X is a direct
(Hitchcock 2001, pp. 290-93). The causal graph is simply X
cause of 7, and 7 is a direct cause of Z, but X is not a cause, whether direct or

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CAUSAL RELATA: TOKENS, TYPES, OR VARIABLES? 53

indirect, of Z. To give truth conditions for claims about indirect causation among
variables is more complex, and there is no pressing reason to do so, since knowledge
of direct causation suffices to determine the structural equations and causal graph.
Nevertheless, here is a suggestion:

CG** X is a cause of Y in system S if and only if either (a)X is a direct cause of Y in


S or (b) in S there is a chain of direct causes running from X to Y and for some
possible assignment of values to variables that are not on the chain and some pos
sible values of X, X would be an actual cause of Y.

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54 DANIEL MURRAY HAUSMAN

Tooley, M.: 1987, Causation: A Realist Approach, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

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Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Department of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin-Madison
5185 Helen C. White Hall
600 N. Park Street
Madison, WI 53706
U.S.A.
E-mail: dhausman@wisc.edu

Manuscript submitted 7March 2004


Final version received 13 January 2005

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