Guanzon v. De Villa
Chief of Staff
GR 80508, 181 SCRA 623 [Jan 30, 1990]
Facts. The 41 petitioners are suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
Petitioners allege that in 1987, Metro Manila, 12 saturation drives or
areal target zonings were concertedly conducted by the military and
police represented here by respondents Maj. Gen. de Villa et al. in a manner
flagrantly violative of express guarantees of the Bill of Rights such as
freedom from illegal searches and seizures.173 De Villa et al. allege that
the accusations about the deliberate disregard of human rights are total
lies. They cite Art VII, sec 17 and 18174 as legal bases for the drives.
Petitioners seek to prohibit the respondents from further conducting these
drives.
Issue. May the police conduct such drives in violation of human rights under the
pretext of Art VII, sec 18 (xxx preventing or suppressing lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion xxx)?
Held. No. If the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to
flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with
the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such
actions. There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the
authority of the Chief Executive to order police actions to stop unabated
criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. However,
all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. 175
Courts martial are simply instrumentalities of the executive power provided
by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief. Their only object: to aid
the President in commanding and enforcing discipline in the Armed Forces.
Ruffy v.
No. L-533, 75 Phil 875 [Aug 20, 1946]
Facts. Lt. Col. Jurado was Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in
Mindoro when he was murdered. Maj. Ruffy et al. were charged therefor
before the General Court Martial. Having resulted in the conviction of 4 of
them, they now pray to prohibit the Chief of Staff and the Gen. Court Martial
from further proceeding. They aver, among others, that the 93 rd Article of
War, which states that any person subject to military law who commits
murder in time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the
court martial may direct, contravenes Art VIII, sec 2(4) of the 1935
Constitution176 in that it provides no review to be made by the SC.
Issue. Is the 93rd Article of War unconstitutional?
Held. No. The petitioners error arose from failure to perceive the nature of
courts martial and the sources of the authority for their creation. Courts
martial are agencies of executive character. Unlike courts of law, they are
not a portion of the judiciary. And they may be convened by the President
as Commander-in-Chief independently of legislation. They are, in fact,
simply instrumentalities of the executive power provided by Congress for the
President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein. In the British law: "xxx the
only legitimate object of military tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain
the discipline and government of the Army. Petition dismissed.
Military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for
alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.
111
ARTICLE VII. Executive Department
 Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34
No. L-54558, 150 SCRA 144 [May 22, 1987]
Facts. Olaguer et al., civilians, were arrested by military authorities and
were charged with subversion and, later, with conspiracy to assassinate
Pres. Marcos and the First Lady, among others. Respondent Military
Commission No. 34 was created to try their criminal case. Olaguer et al. went
to this Court, but their trial nonetheless proceeded and eventually they
were convicted with the penalty of death by electrocution. They now seek
to enjoin the respondents from implementing the Commissions judgment
for the reason that the same is null and void. They contend that Military
Commissions do not have jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses allegedly
committed during martial law when civil courts are open and functioning.
Issue. Do Military Commissions have jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses
allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts are open and
functioning?
Held. No. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to
due process of the civilian concerned. Due process of law demands that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to a trial. The trial
contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution is a trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military commissions
are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. Under the principle of
separation of powers, judicial power is not, and cannot, be the function of
the Executive Department through the military authorities. Whether or not
martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part
thereof is of no moment. The imprimatur for this observation is found in Art
VII, Sec 18 of the Constitution.177 The creation of Military Commission No.
34 to try civilians is declared unconstitutional and all its proceedings null and
void.
Criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts (as the character of the PNP is civilian)
Quiloa v. General Court Martial
GR 96607, 206 SCRA 821 [Mar 4, 1992]
Facts. Policeman Quiloa of the WPD was charged before the respondent
General Court Martial with murder on 2 counts. At the scheduled
arraignment on 15 Dec 1990, he manifested his desire not to be arraigned
and his desire to be tried by a civilian court pursuant to the PNP Law178
which at that time has just been approved by the President (on 13 Dec
1990). Arraignment was rescheduled on Dec 28. Quiloa moved to inhibit
the Court Martial from proceeding and to have his case tried by a civilian
court. Said motion was set for oral argument on 3 Jan 1991 but the Court
Martial had it argued on the same day. And after a ten-minute closed-door
deliberation, it resumed session and denied the motion. Notwithstanding
Quiloas refusal to enter a plea, the Court Martial entered for him a Plea
of Not Guilty and set the trial on 25 Jan 1991. He now comes to this Court
seeking to restrain the Court Martial.
Issue. Should the criminal case of Quiloa, a member of the PNP, be tried in a
civilian court?
Held. Yes. Although the PNP Law was not yet in effect when Quiloa was
arraigned, nevertheless, the Court Martial knew or should have known it
had already been approved by the President, that it was already published
and that it would take effect on 1 Jan 1991. It is precisely for this reason that
the Court Martial decided to have the Quiloas Motion to Inhibit argued on
28 Dec 1990 and thereafter arraigned him on the same day despite his
vehement refusal to enter a plea. Clearly, under the circumstances
obtaining, the Court Martial acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment.
Moreover, the civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is
declared by the PNP Law as paramount, and thus it mandates the transfer
of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts.
112
ARTICLE VII. Executive Department
The President as Commander-in-Chief may prevent a member of the AFP from A mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
appearing in legislative inquiries; however, Congress may seek recourse with Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, in the absence of any
the SC. constitutional basis.

Gudani v. Senga The filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action
GR 170165, 498 SCRA 670 [Aug 15, 2006] should NOT stop or abate any inquiry in aid on legislation.
Facts. Allegations of massive cheating over the 2004 presidential elections and
the Hello Garci scandal103 had just emerged, and the Senate resolved to The right to privacy may NOT preclude one from testifying in a legislative
investigate the matter. Petitioners B/Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan were inquiry over matters involving a compelling State interest. The right against
invited by the Senate to appear in its inquiry. Gudani and Balutan were
self-incrimination may be invoked in a legislative inquiry only when the
designated respectively as commander and member of the Joint Task Force
Ranao which was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during incriminating question is being asked.
the elections in Lanao del Norte and del Sur. The night before the hearing,
AFP Chief of Staff Senga ordered (per instruction of Pres. Arroyo) that no
AFP personnel shall appear before any Congressional or Senate hearing An actual invasion or rebellion is not required in the exercise of the calling out
without her approval. Gudani and Balutan testified before the Senate power. The only criterion is: whenever it becomes necessary x x x to prevent
nonetheless. They were charged before General Court Martial for willfully or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
disobeying a superior officer, and now they file this petition.
Issue. May the President prevent a member of the AFP from appearing in a
legislative inquiry?
Held. Yes, but Congress may seek recourse with the SC. The President could,
as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval
before appearing before Congress. This is based foremost on the notion that
a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogative of the President as
commander-in-chief. However, the Constitution also recognizes as one of
the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. We
hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries
even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the
Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief: the remedy lies with
the courts.104 If the President refuses to allow a member of the AFP to
appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may
seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action should be
directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces, the
persons who wield authority and control over the actions of the officers
concerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any
defenses against the same would be accorded due judicial evaluation. And
once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no
option but to comply for the Judicial branch of the government is
empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the
other branches.

SANLAKAS v. Reyes
GR 159085 [Feb 3, 2004]
Facts. In the wake of the so-called Oakwood Mutiny,179 Pres. GMA issued
Proc. No. 427 and Gen. Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and
calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By the end of the same
day the Mutiny commenced, the Oakwood occupation had ended; but it was
not until 5 days after that Pres. GMA lifted the declaration of a state of
rebellion.
Fearing that the declaration of a state of rebellion would open the door to
violation of constitutional rights of civilians, such as warrantless arrests for the
crime of rebellion, petitioners argue: Sec 18, Art VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. The
proclamation is thus unwarranted. It is an abusive exercise of a martial law
power in circumvention of the report requirement180 or an exercise of
emergency powers for which Congress has not made any delegation pursuant
to Sec 23(2), Art VI.
Issues.
Is the declaration of a state of rebellion necessary for the exercise of
the calling out power of the President?
Does the mere the declaration of a state of rebellion diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights?
Does the declaration of a state of rebellion amount to a declaration of
martial law?
Is the declaration of a state of rebellion an exercise of emergency
powers?
Held. The Court ruled that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting
of the declaration. However, it decided this case holding, courts will decide
a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading
review.181
No. An actual invasion or rebellion is not required in the exercise of the
calling out power. The only criterion provided by Sec 18 is: whenever it
becomes necessary x x x to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.182 The declaration of a state of rebellion in this
case is thus an utter superfluity, devoid of any legal significance.
Nevertheless, the President is not prohibited under Sec 18 from doing
so. The Constitution vests the President not only with commander-in-
Chief powers but also with executive powers. In declaring a state of
Davis vs arroyo
GR 171396 may 3,2006
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
[calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of
the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for
the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct injury
resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give
full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out
the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions,
thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the
decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section
4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words
of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In
these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.
Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing
or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of
national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared
by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is
just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it refers
to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such
power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo
in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her
during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public
interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority
to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of
an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP
and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering
that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use
of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in
the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise,
their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of
the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task
of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Fortun and Angeles vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, ABAD, J
Facts:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan
family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a
highway in Maguindanao.
In response to this, on November 24, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in
Central Mindanao.
On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959
declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
that province except for identified areas of the MILF.
Two days later, December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress in accordance with sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person
or in writing of her action. In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based
on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen
against the government. The President described the scope of the uprising, the
nature,
quantity, and quality of the rebels weaponry, the movement of their heavily
armed units in strategic positions, the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol,
Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal
halls, and the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with
unauthorized "PNP/Police" markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to sec. 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents action.
But, two days later or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners contention:
Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners brought the present actions to challenge
the constitutionality of President Arroyos Proclamation 1959 affecting
Maguindanao on the following grounds:
1. For gross insufficiency of the factual basis in proclaiming a state of martial law
and suspending the [writ] in the Province of Maguindanao.
2. It is patently illegal and unconstitutional for lack of any factual basis.
3. The validity of Proclamation No. 1959, declaring a state of martial law in the
province of Maguindanao, except for the identified areas of the MILF, and
suspending the writ in the same area.
Respondents contention:
President Arroyos issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the
present petitions moot and academic. Respondents maintain that the petitions have
ceased to present an "actual case or controversy" with the lifting of martiallaw and
the restoration of the writ, the sufficiency of the factual basis of which is the subject
of these petitions. Proclamation No. 1963 is allegedly a "supervening event" that
rendered of no practical use or value
the consolidated petitions.
Issue:
Respondents also questioned the legal standing of the petitioners.
WON the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the petitions moot
and academic.
Held:
Yes. The court said that Proclamation No. 1963 in the petitions raised moot and
academic because the court has nothing to review. The Proclamation on Martial Law
and Writ of habeas corpus was already lifted through Proclamation No. 1963 before
the Congress could perform its duty to review and validate.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a
sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.