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3. Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank versus Felonia (GR no.

189477, Feb. 26, 2014)

FACTS:
Felonia and De Guzman mortgaged a parcel of land to Delgado to secure a loan.
However, instead of a real estate mortgage, the parties executed a deed of absolute
sale with an option to repurchase thus Felonia and De Guzman filed an action for
reformation of instrument.

Inspite of the pendency of the Reformation case in which she was the defendant,
Delgado filed a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership of Property Sold with an
Option to Repurchase and Issuance of a New Certificate of Title. The RTC declared
Delgado the absolute owner and ordered the Registry of Deeds to issue a new
certificate of title in the name of Delgado.

Delgado mortgage the property to Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank (HSLB)
using her newly registered title. Felonia and De Guzman subsequently caused the
annotation of a notice of lispendens on Delgados title. On November 1997, HLRB
foreclosed the property and later consolidated ownership in its favor.

Felonia and De Guzman instituted a complaint before RTC of Las Pinas for
reconveyance of possession and ownership of the subject property in their favor. As
defendant, HLRC contended that it was a mortgagee in good faith. RTC ruled in favor
of Felonia and De Guzman. CA affirmed the RTC decision

ISSUE: Whether or not HSLB is a mortgagee and a purchaser in good faith

HELD: No. Decision of CA sustained.

Although the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith, upon which petitioner relies, was
clarified as "based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by the
Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond
what appears on the face of the title. In turn, the rule is based on public interest in
upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of lawful ownership
of the land or of any encumbrance thereon."

Insofar as the HSLB is concerned, there is no longer any public interest in upholding
the indefeasibility of the certificate of title of its mortgagor, Delgado. Such title has
been nullified in a decision that had become final and executory. Its own title,
derived from the foreclosure of Delgado's mortgage in its favor, has likewise been
nullified in the very same decision that restored the certificate of title in
respondents' name. There is absolutely no reason that can support the prayer of
HSLB to have its mortgage lien carried over and into the restored certificate of title
of respondents.
Moreover , HSLB utterly failed to take the necessary precautions. At the time the
subject property was mortgaged, there was yet no annotated Notice ofLis Pendens.
However, at the time HSLB purchased the subject property, the Notice ofLis
Pendenswas already annotated on the title. When a prospective buyer is faced with
facts and circumstances as to arouse his suspicion, he must take precautionary steps
to qualify as a purchaser in good faith.

Indeed, at the time HSLB bought the subject property, HSLB had actual knowledge of
the annotated Notice of Lis Pendens. Instead of heeding the same, HSLB continued
with the purchase knowing the legal repercussions a notice of lis pendens details.

4. PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD,


INC., Petitioner,
vs.
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND HECTOR I. GALURA

Facts: Bonier, then the President of petitioner corporation (Pinausukan), executed


four real estate mortgages in favor of Far East Bank and Trust Company (now BPI)
which was registered in name of Pinausukan. After Pinausukan defaulted, bank
commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages.
Pinausukan brought an action for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC,
averring that Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and had
constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset without Pinausukans consent
through a board resolution.

The counsels of the parties did not appear in court on the hearing scheduled. RTC
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal attained finality.
Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of
the order dismissing the Civil Case salleging that its counsel had been guilty of gross
and palpable negligence in failing to keep track of the case he was handling
amounting to extrinsic fraud. CA dismissed the petition for annulment.

Issues: (a) WON counsels failure to apprise Pinausukan of the developments in the
case constitutes extrinsic fraud.

(b) WON it is the CA that has jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment.

Held:

(a)The allegations do not speak of the extrinsic fraud contemplated by Rule 47. The
petition suggests that the negligence of counsel may constitute professional
misconduct (but this is a matter for lawyer and client to resolve). What is certain, for
purposes of the application of Rule 47, is that mistake and gross negligence cannot
be equated to the extrinsic fraud that Rule 47 requires to be the ground for an
annulment of judgment.

By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in character.
Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless the fraud is committed
by the adverse party, not by ones own lawyer. In the latter case, the remedy of the
client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re-litigate the case where
judgment had been rendered.

(b) The Legislature has enacted Batas Pambansa Blg.129 (Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980). Among several innovations of this legislative enactment was the formal
establishment of the annulment of a judgment or final order as an action
independent from the generic classification of litigations in which the subject matter
was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original
jurisdiction over such action in the CA. The action in which the subject of the
litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced the CFI as the court of general
jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over an action to annul
the judgment of the RTC, eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To
implement this change, the Court introduced a new procedure to govern the action
to annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under
Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that the annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

5
G.R. No. 199595 April 2, 2014
PHILIPPINE WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS FOUNDATION,
INC., Respondent.

Facts:
Philanthropist Teodoro R. Yangco (Yangco) donated on May 19, 1934 a 14,073-square
meter parcel of land (subject property) located at 21 Boni Serrano Avenue, Quezon City
in the following manner,8 viz:
a) the property shall be used as a site for an institution to be known as the
Abierrtas House of Friendship the purpose of which shall be to provide a Home
for needy and unfortunate women and girls, including children of both sexes and
promote, foster all efforts, work and activities looking toward their protection
from the ravages of all forms of immoralities;
b) Should the property herein be used for any other purpose or purposes not
herein specified, the present gift shall become ipso facto null and void and
property given shall automatically revert to the donor, his heirs and assigns, but
any improvement or improvements placed, constructed and/or maintained on
said premises by the Donee, shall remain the property of said Donee to be by it
removed there[f]rom (sic) at its expense after reasonable notice from the donor,
his heirs and assigns.9
The property was registered in the name of PWCTUI by virtue of TCT No. 20970 at the
back of which the above-quoted conditions of the donation were annotated. PWCTUI is
a non-stock, non-profit corporation originally registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1929.
PWCTUIs corporate term expired in September 1979. 11 Five years thereafter, using the
same corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SEC Registration No. 122088 12 and forthwith
applied for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970 over the
subject property thru LRC Case No. 22702. The application was granted and PWCTUI was
issued a new TCT No. 20970 T-2270213 which, however, bore only the first condition
imposed on the donation.
Recounting the foregoing episodes, TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of
PWCTUIs corporate term in 1979 effectively rescinded the donation pursuant to the
"unwritten resolutory condition" deemed written by Article 1315 of the Civil
Code14 prescribing that the Corporation Code, specifically Section 122 15 thereof, be read
into the donation.
Being comprised of the heirs of the donor, TRY Foundation claimed that it is entitled to
petition for the issuance of a new title in their name pursuant to Section 108 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.16 TRY Foundation prayed for the issuance of a new
title in its name after the cancellation of PWCTUIs TCT No. 20970 T-22702.
PWCTUI opposed the petition.
RTC denied the Opposition18 of PWCTUI. According to the trial court, when the corporate
life of PWCTUI expired in 1979, the property ceased to be used for the purpose for
which it was intended, hence, it automatically reverted to Yangco. As such, TRY
Foundation, being composed of his heirs, is considered "other person in interest" under
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 with a right to file a petition for the issuance of title over
the property.
The RTC granted TRY Foundations petition by ordering the cancellation of PWCTUIs TCT
No. 20970 T-22702 and the issuance of a new title in the name of TRY Foundation.
PWCTUI appealed the decision but CA denied the appeal and the assailed decision was
affirmed in toto.

Issue:
WON the judgment was proper.

Ruling:
the RTC, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the actual subject
matter contained in TRY Foundations petition for issuance of a new title. TRY
Foundation cannot use the summary proceedings in Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to
rescind a contract of donation as such action should be threshed out in ordinary civil
proceedings. In the same vein, the RTC had no jurisdiction to declare the donation
annulled and as a result thereof, order the register of deeds to cancel PWCTUIs TCT No.
20970 T-22702 and issue a new one in favor of TRY Foundation.
The RTC, acting as a land registration court, should have dismissed the land registration
case or re-docketed the same as an ordinary civil action and thereafter ordered
compliance with stricter jurisdictional requirements. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the action for revocation of donation disguised as a land registration case, the
judgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) is null and void. Being void, it cannot be the
source of any right or the creator of any obligation. It can never become final and any
writ of execution based on it is likewise void.48
Resultantly, the appellate proceedings relative thereto and all issuances made in
connection with such review are likewise of no force and effect. A void judgment cannot
perpetuate even if affirmed on appeal by the highest court of the land. All acts pursuant
to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. 50
the petition is GRANTED and All proceedings taken, decisions, resolutions, orders and
other issuances made in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04), CA-G.R. CV No. 90763 and G.R. No.
190193 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to CANCEL any Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in the name of Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation
Heirs Foundation, Inc. as a consequence of the execution of the disposition in LRC Case
No. Q-18126(04), and to REINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20970 T-22702 in the
name of Philippine Womans Christian Temperance Union, Inc.

6
G.R. No. 182908 August 6, 2014
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA IMBORNAL and PEDRO
FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-
REGACHO, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, and EDUARDO, all
surnamed IMBORNAL,Respondents.

Facts:
Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Pangasinan which she conveyed to
her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in
1920.
Meanwhile, Catalinas husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a
homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the
Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan.14 He was eventually awarded Homestead
Patent No. 2499115 therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued in his
name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 10149516 was issued in the name of Ciriacos heirs, namely: Margarita
Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio, marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta
Corpuz; Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; Dominador Abrio;
Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco).

Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the Motherland, while
respondents occupied the southern portion.17
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the
southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in
the name of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First
Accretion.18 Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of
32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion. 19 On
November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents
covering the Second Accretion.
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra
and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an Amended Complaint 20 for reconveyance,
partition, and/or damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They
anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina,
urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property.

Likewise, Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and
misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and the
respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the
said accretions in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian
owners (as they did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely formed
adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their
inheritance claims over the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they
respected respondents rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have
repudiated their (Francisco, et al.s) shares thereon. 22 Thus, bewailing that respondents
have refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland, but also to the
subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance of said properties,
or, in the alternative, the payment of their value, as well as the award of moral damages
in the amount of P100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00, including
attorneys fees and other costs.23
On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision 26 in favor of Francisco, et al. and
thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective
portions in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent;
and (b) pay actual damages in the amount of P100,000.00, moral damages in the
amount ofP100,000.00, and attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00, as well as costs of
suit.
On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision 29 reversing and setting aside the RTC
Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco as the
exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano asthe
exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e.,
respondents collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.
At odds with the CAs disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for reconsideration
which was, however denied by the CA in a Resolution 35 dated May 7, 2008, hence, this
petition taken by the latters heirs as their successors-in-interest.

Issues:
(a) WON the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b)
WON the descendants of respondent Victoriano are the exclusive owners of the First
Accretion; and
(c) WON the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of
the Second Accretion on the basis of the following grounds:
(1) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as an affirmative
defense in the Amended Answer, and
(2) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.

Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.
At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and
the First Accretion are barred by prescription.
To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the Motherland, alleging that
Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trust for their predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and
Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents
acquired the First and Second Accretions by means of fraud and deceit.

When property is registered in anothers name, an implied or constructive trust is


created by law in favor of the true owner.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The


reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed
or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need
to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of
the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does
not run against him.

Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the
registration of the respective titles covering the disputed properties within which to file
their action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were never in
possession of the said properties. Hence, with respect tot he Motherland covered by
OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for
reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5, 1943; with respect to
the First Accretion covered by OCT No. P-318 issued on August 15, 1952 in the name of
respondent Victoriano, an action of the same nature should have been filed until August
15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481
issued on November 10, 1978in the name of the respondents, a suit for reconveyance
therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988.

A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended
Complaint42 covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed only on February 27,
1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which to
seek the reconveyance of two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the
First Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the Second Accretion
having been seasonably filed.

B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.

The main thrust of Francisco, et al.s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had
arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with
respect to the Motherland.

a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent
conditions48 set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes
actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the homestead. It must be
presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the
strict conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead patent application. As such, it
is highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquired and registered by mistake
or through fraud as would create an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and
Ciriaco.

Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to
Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December 15, 1933, Ciriacos title to the Motherland
had become indefeasible. It bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration
that led to the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in
Ciriacos name are presumptively regular and proper, 49 which presumption has not been
overcome by the evidence presented by Francisco, et al.

Consequently, as Francisco, et al. failed to prove their ownership rights over the
Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily,
the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A further exposition is apropos.
As regards the third issue, being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area,
respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the
foreshore area.
Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form
part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of
the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is
that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.53
In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners are not the
riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence,
they cannot assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second
Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the
Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these properties
through prescription as it was not established that they were in possession of any of
them. Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the
discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the
First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties
cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so since on the other end of the
fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering the First and
Second Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give rise to the
superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for reconveyance with
respect to both accretions must altogether fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.


9.) Banguis-Tambuyat versus Balcom-Tamboyat, GR no. 202805,
March 23, 2015;

The Facts:

Adriano and Wenifreda (Tambuyat), married since 1965, owned several properties,
among them a parcel of lot bought by Adriano. The deed of sale was signed by
Adriano as vendee, while Rosario (Baguis) signed as one of the witnesses. When the
title to the lot was issued (TCT No. T-145321(M), however, it was registered in the
name of ADRIANO TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BAGUIS. When Adriano died
intestate in 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321, alleging
that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; TCT T-145321 was erroneously
registered; that Rosario is married to one Eduardo Nolasco; and the registration was a
result of the insidious machination of Rosario with the assistance of the broker. She
prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled and a new one issued indicating her as the
spouse married to Adriano. Opposing, Rosario denied that the property was acquired
by the spouses Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage; that it was she who
bought it using her personal funds; she and Adriano were married on September 2,
1988 and lived together as husband and wife, producing a son named Adrian; that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the proceeding as it is merely a summary
proceeding and a thorough determination will have to be made if the property is
conjugal or personal.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Wenifreda. It ordered the
cancellation of TCT T-145321 and issuance of a new one indicating Wenifreda as
married to Adriano, as well as the payment of damages in her favour. It ruled that
Section 1081 of PD 1529 required court authorisation for any alteration or amendment
if any mistake, error or omission was made in entering a certificate of title. It was
proved that Wenifreda is the surviving spouse of Adriano; that Rosario had a prior
subsisting marriage to Nolasco, and TCT No. T-145321 was issued with her erroneously
indicated as Adrianos spouse. Adrians filiation may not be proved in a land
registration case.

On appeal to the CA, the later ruled that a separate and different proceeding is not
necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in the case as she in effect
acquiesced and freely submitted her issues to the court to prove her allegations; the
distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and as a general
court had been eliminated by PD 1529; Adriano and Rosario were not co-owners of the
property as both of them had prior subsisting marriages at the time of their adulterous
relations; Adriano alone was the vendee in the deed of sale and no evidence was
proved that Rosario contributed to the purchase of the property.

Rosario elevated her case to the Supreme Court. She argues that the case is
essentially a partition of Adrianos estate which deprives her and her son of their
share; Section 108 cannot apply to the case as there were contentious issues which
need to be resolved by a court of general jurisdiction; based on the evidence, she
acquired the property using her own funds.

The Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in allowing the cancellation of TCT T-143521 to indicate
Wenifreda as the surviving spouse of Adriano.

The Courts ruling:

The Court denies the Petition.

The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was not precluded from resolving the
objections raised by Banguis in her opposition to the petition for cancellation; a
separate action need not be filed in a different court exercising general jurisdiction.
Banguis should be considered to have acquiesced and freely submitted the case to the
trial court for complete determination on her opposition, when she went to trial and
adduced and submitted all her relevant evidence to the court. The active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his
failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action
is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the
court or bodys jurisdiction.2

Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or
amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2) when new interests have arisen or been
created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3) when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has been
changed; (5) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married,
the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will
thereby be affected; (6) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has
been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and
(7) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.3 The
present case falls under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan
committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat
married to Rosario E. Banguis when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda and
not Banguis is Adrianos lawful spouse.

Proceedings under Section 108 are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or


insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.4
Banguiss opposition to the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised controversial
issues involving her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights of Adrian, which she
claims to be her son by Adriano. However, apart from the fact that evidence of
Banguiss ownership is irrelevant in Wenifredas petition, the evidence apparently
indicates that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a
resolution of the issue of succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete
determination of Wenifredas petition. The Court is thus led to the conclusion that the
Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in TCT T-145321 as
Adrianos spouse.

As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the
fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence
among others, the parties respective marriage contracts, which, together with
marriage certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a marital union5
indicates that Adriano was married to Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to
Nolasco and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the
subject property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said
that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said
that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis cannot be
included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adrianos spouse; the right and privilege
belonged to Wenifreda alone.

x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such
form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr.
Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and
Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: Be it noted however that
with respect to spouse, the same must be the legitimate spouse (not common-law
spouses).

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term spouse
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple
whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at
bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a spouse contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.6 (Emphasis
supplied)
The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is who should be
included in the title to the subject property as Adrianos spouse, Banguis or
Wenifreda? Was there error in placing Banguiss name in the title as Adrianos spouse?
If Banguis is Adrianos spouse, then there would be no need to amend or even cancel
the title. On the other hand, if Wenifreda is Adrianos spouse, the inclusion of Banguis
would then be erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would have to be cancelled. All that is
required in resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adrianos spouse;
it was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property.
Title to the property is different from the certificate of title to it.

x x x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between
title and the certificate of title:

The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as
the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is
represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title.
Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate
of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named
in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may
have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat,
registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as
a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence
of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x x.

Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration
laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.7
Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the
true owner of the subject property in order to convince the trial court that there is no
need to cancel TCT T-145321, then she was not precluded from presenting evidence to
such effect. Understandably, with the quality of Wenifredas documentary and other
evidence, Banguis may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the certificate of title,
she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for her, this Court is not convinced of
her claimed ownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and
Adriano could not have been co-owners of the subject property as she failed to
present sufficient proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property,
while the deed of sale covering the subject property showed that Adriano alone was
the vendee. This Court is not a trier of facts, so it must rely on the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals, which are thus considered conclusive and binding.8 Moreover,
the Court notes that while Banguis claims that she alone paid for the property using
her own funds and money borrowed from her sister, she nonetheless acknowledges
that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its
acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim; basically,
if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be logical and natural for
her to require that her name be placed on the deed of sale as the vendee, and not as
mere witness which is what actually occurred in this case. On the other hand, if
Adriano contributed to its purchase, Banguis would have required that her name be
placed on the deed as a co-vendee just the same. Her failure to explain why despite
her claims that she is the purchaser of the property she allowed Adriano to be
denominated as the sole vendee, renders her claim of ownership doubtful. Where a
party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced
against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong
inference against him.9 One cannot also ignore the principle that the rules of
evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense.10

Neither can the Court believe Banguiss assertion that Wenifredas petition for
cancellation of TCT T-145321 is in reality a partition of Adrianos estate which in effect
transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests Banguis and her son
Adrian of their rights and interests therein. LRC Case No. P-443-99 is simply a case for
the correction of the wrongful entry in TCT T-145321; it simply aims to reflect the truth
in the certificate of title that Adriano is married to Wenifreda and nothing else. It
would have been a summary proceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting
her claims of ownership, which are irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier stated,
registration is not the equivalent of title.
Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other
issues raised by the petitioner, particularly those relating to the trial courts March 30,
2004 Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, as well as the
April 14, 2004 Writ of Execution issued, as they have become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012 Decision and July 26, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R.No.163928,January21,2015MANUELJUSAYAN,ALFREDOJUSAYAN,
ANDMICHAELJUSAYAN, Petitioners, v.JORGE

SOMBILLA, Respondent. DECISIONBERSAMIN,J.:

The Court resolves whether a lease of agricultural land


between the respondent and the predecessor of the
petitioners was a civil law lease or an agricultural lease.
The resolution is determinative of whether or not the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had original exclusive jurisdiction
over the action commenced by the predecessor of the
petitioners against the respondent.cralawred

TheCase

Under review on certiorariis the decision promulgated on


October 20, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the judgment in favor of the petitioners rendered
on April 13, 1999 in CAR Case No. 17117 entitled Timoteo
Jusayan,ManuelJusayan,AlfredoJusayanandMichaelJusayanv.JorgeSombilla
by the RTC, Branch 30, in Iloilo
City.2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Antecedents

and would deliver 110 cavans of palay annually to Timoteo


without need for accounting of the cultivation expenses
provided that Jorge would pay the irrigation fees. From 1971
to 1983, Timoteo and Jorge followed the arrangement. In
1975, the parcels of land were transferred in the names of
Timoteos sons, namely; Manuel, Alfredo and Michael
(petitioners).

Wilson Jesena (Wilson) owned four parcels of land situated


in New Lucena, Iloilo. On June 20, 1970,

Wilson entered into an agreement with respondent Jorge


Sombilla (Jorge),3 wherein Wilson designated

Jorge as his agent to supervise the tilling and farming of his


riceland in crop year 1970-1971. On August

20, 1971,

before the expiration of the agreement,

Wilson sold the four parcels of land to Timoteo Jusayan

(Timoteo).4 Jorge and Timoteo verbally agreed that Jorge


would retain possession of the parcels of land

terminating his administration and demanding the return of


the possession of the parcels of

In 1984, Timoteo sent several letters to Jorge


land

against Jorge in the RTC

Timoteo filed on June 30, 1986 a complaint for recovery of


possession and accounting

In his answer,6 Jorge asserted that he enjoyed security of


tenure as the agricultural lessee of Timoteo;

and that he could not be dispossessed of his landholding


without valid cause

.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Due to the failure of Jorge to render accounting and to


return the possession of the parcels of land despite
demands,

(CAR Case No. 17117). Following Timoteos death on October


4, 1991, the petitioners substituted him as the plaintiffs.

RulingoftheRTC

.cralawred

In its decision rendered on April 13, 1999,7 the between


Timoteo and Jorge; and petitioners.cralawred

JudgmentoftheCA

Jorge appealed to the CA.In the judgment promulgated on


October 20, 2003,8 the

; and that the demand of Timoteo for the delivery of his


share in the harvest and the payment of irrigation fees

constituted an agrarian dispute that was outside the


jurisdiction of the RTC, and well within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DAR) pursuant
to Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657

RTC upheld the contractual relationship of agency

ordered Jorge to deliver the possession of the parcels of


land to the

declaring that the contractual relationship between the


parties was one of agricultural tenancy

CA reversed the RTC and dismissed the case,

(ComprehensiveAgrarianReformLawof1988).cralawredIssuesThe
petitioners now appeal upon the following issues,
namely:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Whether or not the relationship between the petitioners and


respondent is that of agency or

agricultural leasehold;

a.)

and

b.) Whether or not RTC, Branch 30, Iloilo City as Regional


Trial Court and Court of Agrarian Relations, had jurisdiction
over the herein case.9

RulingoftheCourt

The petition for review lacks merit.

To properly resolve whether or not the relationship between


Timoteo and Jorge was that of an agency or a tenancy, an
analysis of the concepts of agency and tenancy is in order.

r.1011 the elements of which are, namely: (a) the relationship


is established by the
parties consent, express or implied; (b) the object is the
execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (c)
the agent acts as representative and not for himself; and (d)
the agent acts within the scope of his authority.12 Whether
or not an agency has been created is determined by the fact
that one is representing and acting for another.13

.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The claim of Timoteo that Jorge was his agent contradicted


the verbal agreement he had fashioned with Jorge. By
assenting to Jorges possession of the land sans accounting
of the cultivation expenses and actual produce of the land
provided that Jorge annually delivered to him 110 cavans of
palay and paid the irrigation fees belied the very nature of
agency, which was representation. The verbal agreement
between Timoteo and Jorge left all matters of agricultural
production to the sole discretion of Jorge and practically
divested Timoteo of the right to exercise his authority over
the acts to be performed by Jorge. While in possession of
the land, therefore, Jorge was acting for himself instead of
for Timoteo. Unlike Jorge, Timoteo did not benefit whenever
the production increased, and did not suffer whenever the
production decreased. Timoteos interest was limited to the
delivery of the 110 cavans of palay annually without any
concern about how the cultivation could be improved in
order to yield more produce.

On the other hand, to prove the tenancy relationship, Jorge


presented handwritten receipts15 indicating that the sacks
of palay delivered to and received by one Corazon Jusayan
represented payment of rental. In this regard, rental was the
legal term for the consideration of the lease.16 Consequently,
the receipts substantially proved that the contractual
relationship between Jorge and Timoteo was a lease.

In agency, the agent binds himself to render some service or


to do something in representation or on
behalf of the principal, with the consent or authority of the
latte

agency is representation,

The basis of the civil law relationship of


The law does not presume agency; hence, proving its
existence,

nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging it

Yet, the lease of an agricultural land can be either a civil


law or an agricultural lease.

the members of his immediate farm household,

and of
17

In the civil law lease,

one of the parties binds himself to give to another the


enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and

for a period that may be definite or indefinite.

In the agricultural lease, also termed as a leasehold

tenancy, the physical possession of the land devoted to


agriculture is given by its owner or legal

possessor (landholder) to another (tenant) for the purpose of


production through labor of the latter

in consideration of which the latter agrees to share the

harvest with the landholder, or to pay a price certain or


ascertainable

, either in produce or in money, or in both.18 Specifically, in


Gabrielv.Pangilinan,19 this Court differentiated between a
leasehold tenancy and a

civil law lease in the following manner, namely: (1) the


subject matter of a leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land, but that of a civil law lease may be rural or
urban property; (2) as to attention and cultivation, the law
requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to and
cultivate the agricultural land; the civil law lessee need not
personally cultivate or work the thing leased; (3) as to
purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture; in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any
other lawful pursuits; and(4) as to the law that governs, the
civil law lease is governed by the CivilCode, but the leasehold
tenancy is governed by special laws.

The sharing of the harvest in proportion to the respective


contributions of the landholder and tenant, otherwise called
share tenancy,20 was abolished on August 8, 1963 under
Republic Act No. 3844. To date, the only permissible system
of agricultural tenancy is leasehold tenancy,21 a relationship
wherein a fixed consideration is paid instead of
proportionately sharing the harvest as in share tenancy.

In Teodorov.Macaraeg,22 this Court has synthesized the


elements of agricultural tenancy to wit: (1) the object of the
contract or the relationship is an agricultural land that is
leased or rented for the purpose of agricultural production;
(2) the size of the landholding is such that it is susceptible
of personal cultivation by a single person with the
assistance of the members of his immediate farm
household; (3) the tenant- lessee must actually and
personally till, cultivate or operate the land, solely or with
the aid of labor from his immediate farm household; and (4)
the landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owner or the
legal possessor of the land, leases the same to the tenant-
lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in an
amount of money or produce.

It can be gleaned that in both civil law lease of an


agricultural land and agricultural lease, the lessor gives to
the lessee the use and possession of the land for a price
certain. Although the purpose of the civil law lease and the
agricultural lease may be agricultural cultivation and
production, the distinctive attribute that sets a civil law
lease apart from an agricultural lease is the personal
cultivation by the lessee. An agricultural lessee cultivates
by himself and with the aid of those of his immediate farm
household. Conversely, even when the lessee is in
possession of the leased agricultural land and paying a
consideration for it but is not personally cultivating the land,
he or she is a civil law lessee.

The only issue remaining to be resolved is whether or not


Jorge personally cultivated the leased agricultural land.

Cultivation is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the


land, but includes the various phases of farm labor such as
the maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies and
irrigation canals in the landholding. Moreover, it covers
attending to the care of the growing plants,23 and grown
plants like fruit trees that require watering, fertilizing,
uprooting weeds, turning the soil, fumigating to eliminate
plant pests24 and all other activities designed to promote the
growth and care of the plants or trees and husbanding the
earth, by general industry, so that it may bring forth more
products or fruits.25 In Taronav.CourtofAppeals,26 this Court ruled
that a tenant is not required to be physically present in the
land at all hours of the day and night provided that he lives
close enough to the land to be cultivated to make it
physically possible for him to cultivate it with some degree
of constancy.
Nor was there any question that the parcels of agricultural
land with a total area of 7.9 hectares involved herein were
susceptible of cultivation by a single person with the help of
the members of his immediate farm household. As the Court
has already observed, an agricultural land of an area of four
hectares,27 or even of an area as large as 17 hectares,28
could be personally cultivated by a tenant by himself or with

help of the members of his farm household.It is elementary


that he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proof.29 Hence,

His ability to farm the seven hectares of land despite his


regular employment as an Agricultural Technician at the
Municipal Agriculture Office32 was not physically

impossible for him to accomplish considering that his


daughter, a member of his immediate farm household, was
cultivating one of the parcels of the land.33 Indeed, the law
did not prohibit him as the agricultural lessee who generally
worked the land himself or with the aid of member of his
immediate household from availing himself occasionally or
temporarily of the help of others in specific jobs. 34 In short,
the claim of the petitioners that the employment of Jorge as
an Agricultural Technician at the Municipal Agriculture
Office disqualified him as a tenant lacked factual or legal
basis.

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides that once there


is an agricultural tenancy, the agricultural tenants right to
security of tenure is recognized and protected. The
landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land
unless authorized by the proper court for causes provided by
law. Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, enumerates the several grounds for
the valid dispossession of the tenant.35It is underscored,
however, that none of such grounds for valid dispossession
of landholding was attendant in Jorges case.
Although the CA has correctly categorized Jorges case as
an agrarian dispute, it ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
over the case based on Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657,
which vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and the exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform except disputes falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

We hold that the CA gravely erred. The rule is settled that


the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of an action.36 In
1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary
ReorganizationAct), the Courts of Agrarian Relations were
integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction
of the Courts of Agrarian Relations was vested in the
Regional Trial Courts.37 It was only on August 29, 1987, when
Executive Order No. 229 took effect, that the general
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to try agrarian
reform matters was transferred to the DAR. Therefore, the
RTC still had jurisdiction over the dispute at the time the
complaint was filed in the RTC on June 30,
1986.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTSthe petition for review on


certioraribyand ORDERSthe petitioners to

pay the costs of suit.The parties are ordered to comply with


their undertakings as agricultural lessor and agricultural
lessee. SOORDERED.
G.R. No. 206599, September 29, 2014

680 HOME APPLIANCES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE MARYANN E. CORPUS-MAALAC, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 141, ATTY.
ENGRACIO ESCASINAS, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF/CLERK OF
COURT VII, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY,
FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT (SPV-AMC), INC. AND ALDANCO MERLMAR,
INC., Respondents.

FACTS:

The case arose from the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings commenced by the
creditor of 680 Home, Deutsche Bank AG London, after the former defaulted in paying a
loan secured by a real estate mortgage over its commercial lot and building.

In the foreclosure sale, the respondent, First Sovereign Asset Management,


Inc. (FSAMI), emerged as the highest bidder of 680 Homes mortgaged properties. A
certificate of sale was issued to FSAMI on March 13, 2009, which was registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City on March 16, 2009 and annotated on 680 Homes
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 138570. Three months after, or in June 2009, FSAMI
consolidated its ownership after 680 Home failed to redeem the property. A new
certificate of title (TCT No. 227316) was issued in FSAMIs name.

The RTC, in its order dated December 20, 2011, denied 680 Homes petition to cancel
the writ; this was affirmed in its order dated March 23, 2012 denying 680 Homes
motion for reconsideration. 680 Home thereafter assailed these
orders via a certiorari petition with the CA.

The CA affirmed the RTC ruling and declared 680 Homes petition to cancel the writ
as prematurely filed. The CA ruled that under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, a judgment
debtor may file a petition for cancellation of the writ of possession within 30
days only after the purchaser has obtained possession of the property. Although a writ of
possession was issued, the property remained in the possession of Aldanco as 680
Homes lessee. Since FSAMI did not obtain possession of the property, the 30-day
period to file a petition to cancel the writ under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 has not yet
commenced. The CA relied on the Courts ruling in Ong v. CA, which held that the
purchaser must first be placed in possession of the mortgaged property pending
proceedings assailing the issuance of the writ of possession.

ISSUE:
WON 680 Homes certiorari petition is procedurally erroneous because of
the availability of the remedies of reconsideration and appeal

HELD:

We do not find the petition meritorious. 680 Homes certiorari petition is procedurally
erroneous because of the availability of the remedies of
reconsideration and appeal

Procedurally, we observe that 680 Home availed of the wrong remedy to question the
CA decision before this Court. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is availed of only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.8 Unfortunately, 680 Homes resort to
a certiorari petition could not be justified by the unavailability or insufficiency of other
remedies.

A motion for reconsideration is recognized as an adequate remedy against a decision,


resolution, or order of a lower court, as it provides the court opportunity to correct any
error it might have committed.9 Hence, the filing of a motion for reconsideration was
made a pre-requisite to the filing of a certiorari petition. The availability of the remedy
of reconsideration generally precludes immediate recourse to a certiorari petition.10 680
Home, however, never moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, and offered no
explanation for its failure to comply with the requirement.

Also, the remedy provided under the Rules of Court from a decision of the CA is an
appeal by certiorari under its Rule 45.11 Instead of instituting a certiorari petition, 680
Home should have filed an appeal under Rule 45, especially considering that the issue
raised here is primarily legal in nature. 12cralawlawlibrary

Indeed, we find 680 Homes resort to a certiorari petition rather dubious. After receiving
on February 25, 2013 a copy of the CA decision, 680 Home filed neither a motion for
reconsideration thereof nor an appeal therefrom. Instead, it waited 58 days after
receiving the assailed decision on April 24, 2013 to institute a certiorari proceeding.
Although the petition was filed within the 60-day period to institute
acertiorari proceeding, the long delay negates 680 Homes claimed urgency of its cause
and indicates that it resorted to the present petition for certiorari as a substitute for its
lost appeal.

The law is clear that the purchaser must first be placed in possession of the mortgaged
property pending proceedings assailing the issuance of the writ of possession.

Aldancos continued possession of the property prevented FSAMI from taking over
despite having a writ of possession issued in its favor. Since the writ was not enforced,
the CA concluded that 680 Home could not avail of the remedy under Section 8 of Act
No. 3135 and petition for its cancellation.

However, upon the lapse of the redemption period without the debtor exercising his
right of redemption and the purchaser consolidates his title, it becomes unnecessary to
require the purchaser to assume actual possession thereof before the debtor may
contest it. Possession of the land becomes an absolute right of the purchaser, as this is
merely an incident of his ownership. In fact, the issuance of the writ of possession at this
point becomes ministerial for the court.20 The debtor contesting the purchasers
possession may no longer avail of the remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, but
should pursue a separate action e.g., action for recovery of ownership, for annulment of
mortgage and/or annulment of foreclosure. FSAMIs consolidation of ownership
therefore makes the remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 unavailable for 680 Home.
680 Home cannot assail the writ of possession by filing a petition in LRC No. M-5444.
G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014

RAUL V. ARAMBULO AND TERESITA A. DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. GENARO NOLASCO


AND JEREMY SPENCER NOLASCO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother
Rosita Vda. De Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana
Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo
Nolasco (Iraida) are coowners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila, with
an aggregate size of 233 square meters. When Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by
her husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and their children, Iris Abegail Nolasco, Ingrid
Aileen Arambulo and respondent Jeremy Spencer Nolasco.

On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief under Article 491 of the Civil
Code with the RTC of Manila, alleging that all of the coowners, except for respondents,
have authorized petitioners to sell their respective shares to the subject properties; that
only respondents are withholding their consent to the sale of their shares; that in case
the sale pushes through, their mother and siblings will get their respective 1/9 share of
the proceeds of the sale, while respondents will get share each of the 1/9 share of
Iraida; that the sale of subject properties constitutes alteration; and that under Article
491 of the Civil Code, if one or more coowners shall withhold their consent to the
alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.

In their Answer, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for being premature.
Respondents averred that they were not aware of the intention of petitioners to sell the
properties they coowned because they were not called to participate in any
negotiations regarding the disposition of the property. 5

ISSUE:
Whether respondents, as coowners, can be compelled by the court to give
their consent to the sale of their shares in the coowned properties.

HELD:

The Court of Appeals held that the respondents had the full ownership of their
undivided interest in the subject properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell their
undivided shares in the properties. It referred to the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil
Code. However, the Court of Appeals, implying applicability of Article 491 also observed
that petitioners failed to show how respondents withholding of their consent would
prejudice the common interest over the subject properties.

At the core of this petition is whether respondents, as coowners, can be compelled by


the court to give their consent to the sale of their shares in the coowned properties.
Until it reached this Court, the discussion of the issue moved around Article 491 of the
Civil Code. We have to remove the issue out of the coverage of Article 491. It does not
apply to the problem arising out of the proposed sale of the property coowned by the
parties in this case.

The Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of Article 493 of the Civil Code,

That a sale constitutes an alteration as mentioned in Article 491 is an established


jurisprudence. It is settled that alterations include any act of strict dominion or
ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of
alteration.9 Alienation of the thing by sale of the property is an act of strict
dominion. However, the ruling that alienation is alteration does not mean that a sale of
commonly owned real property is covered by the second paragraph of Article 491, such
that if a coowner withholds consent to the sale, the courts, upon a showing of a clear
prejudice to the common interest, may, as adequate relief, order the grant of the
withheld consent. Such is the conclusion drawn by the trial court, and hinted at, if not
relied upon, by the appellate court.

Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to be heard, the
denial of which was raised as a defense by respondents for opposing the sale of the
subject properties.
13. Roque vs. Aguado

G.R. No. 193787

April 7, 2014

Facts: On July 21, 1977, spouses Roque and the original owners of the then
unregistered Lot 18089 Rivero, et al. executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of
Real Property over a 1,231-sq. m. portion of Lot 18089 for a consideration
of P30,775.00. The parties agreed that Sps. Roque shall make an initial
payment of P15,387.50 upon signing, while the remaining balance of the
purchase price shall be payable upon the registration of Lot 18089, as well as
the segregation and the concomitant issuance of a separate title over the
subject portion in their names. After the deeds execution, Sps. Roque took
possession and introduced improvements on the subject portion which they
utilized as a balut factory.

On August 12, 1991, Sabug, Jr., applied for a free patent over the entire Lot
18089 and was eventually issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-
5955 in his name on October 21, 1991. On June 24, 1993, Sabug, Jr. and Rivero,
in her personal capacity and in representation of Rivero, et al., executed a
Joint Affidavit, acknowledging that the subject portion belongs to Sps. Roque
and expressed their willingness to segregate the same from the entire area of
Lot 18089.

On December 8, 1999, Sabug, Jr., through a Deed of Absolute Sale, sold Lot
18089 to Aguado) for P2,500,000.00, who, in turn, caused the cancellation of
OCT No. M-5955 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-
96692 dated December 17, 1999 in her name. Thereafter, Aguado obtained loan
from Land Bank secured by a mortgage over Lot 18089. When she failed to pay
her loan obligation, Land Bank commenced extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings and eventually tendered the highest bid in the auction sale. Upon
Aguados failure to redeem the subject property, Land Bank consolidated its
ownership, and TCT No. M-115895 was issued in its name on July 21, 2003.
Sps. Roque filed a complaint for reconveyance, annulment of sale, deed of real
estate mortgage, foreclosure, and certificate of sale.

Issue: Whether or not petition for reconveyance by Spouses Roque has merit.

Held: The petition lacks merit. The essence of an action for reconveyance is to
seek the transfer of the property which was wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another persons name to its rightful owner or to one with a
better right. Thus, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he
has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and
that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value.

The 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in the nature of a contract to


sell and not one of sale contrary to Sps. Roques belief. In this relation, it has
been consistently ruled that where the seller promises to execute a deed of
absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the
purchase price, the contract is only a contract to sell even if their agreement
is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, as in this case. Here, it is
undisputed that Sps. Roque have not paid the final installment of the purchase
price.

Sps. Roque failed to establish that the parties who sold the property to them,
were indeed its true and lawful owners. In fine, Sps. Roque failed to establish
any superior right over the subject portion as against the registered owner of
Lot 18089, thereby warranting the dismissal of their reconveyance action,
without prejudice to their right to seek damages against the vendors.

14. FORTUNA vs.REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 173423

March 5, 2014

Facts: In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for


registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457. Spouses
Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola,
upon whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria
Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication, Emeteria renounced all her
interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in
favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the
spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and
submitted as evidence the lots survey plan, technical description, and
certificate of assessment.

Issue: Whether or not Spouses Fortuna sufficiently prove their compliance


with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public
domain.

Held: The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and


disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established.

It is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through
a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the
land. The PLA provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable public lands,
specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find application only from the time that
a public land has been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and
disposable.

Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of


title acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible
evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by
establishing the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute.

In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was
established by the notation in the survey plan. Mere notations appearing in
survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties alienable and
disposable character. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the
President.

For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been
reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a
positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortunas claim of title
through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied.

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