3 Illegal Recruitment

1
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 123146 June 17, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ALONA BULI-E and JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO, Appellants.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Appellants Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino assail the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 15, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale and eight counts of estafa.
On March 16, 1993, the following information was filed against Jose Alolino and appellants,
Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino:
The undersigned accuses ALONA BULI-E, JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO and JOSE ALOLINO for
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38 (b), PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED BY P.D. 1920
FURTHER AMENDED BY P.D. 2018, committed in large scale, which is an act of economic
sabotage, and by a syndicate, committed as follows:
That during the period from March 1991 to July 1992, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused representing
themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and hire and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment / job placement to the following persons:
1. Constancio Macli-ing
2. Jesssica Estay
3. Sidolia Fias-eo
4. John Mangili
5. Nieva Lampoyas
6. Sabado Agapito
7. Joseph Oratil and
8. Joel Oratil
in Taiwan without first obtaining or securing license or authority from the proper government
agency
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On the same day, eight separate informations for estafa were also filed against Jose Alolino
and appellants Alona Buli-e (Buli-e for brevity) and Josefina Alolino (Josefina, for brevity).
Except as to the dates, amounts involved 2 and the names of complainants, the following
information in Criminal Case No. 11123-R typified the seven other informations for the crime
of estafa:
That on or about the 12th day of July, 1992, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
one Constancio Macli-ing by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully
2
well that they are not authorized job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad
convinced said Constancio Macli-ing and pretended that they could secure a job for him/her
abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of 15,000.00 when in truth and in fact they could
not; the said Constancio Macli-ing, deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed
by the accused, parted away the total sum of 15,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Constancio Macli-ing in the aforementioned amount of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (15,000.00), Philippine Currency.3
Jose Alolino was never apprehended and remains at large. Upon arraignment, appellants
pleaded not guilty to each of the nine informations filed against them. A joint trial ensued
since the cases involved the same factual milieu.
Evidence for the prosecution showed that on various dates from June 1990 to July 1992,
complainants went to the house of appellant Buli-e at No. 63 Sanitary Camp, Baguio City
upon learning that she was recruiting workers for overseas employment. A cousin of
complainant Lampoyas, whom Buli-e helped deploy abroad, introduced Lampoyas to Buli-e in
1990.4 The brothers Oratil went to see Buli-e about possible overseas employment in April
1992.5 Mangili inquired from Buli-e if she was recruiting workers for overseas employment
also in April 1992.6Sabado and Macli-ing approached Buli-e for possible overseas work in May
1992,7 while Estay, accompanied by her sister, went to see Buli-e on June 17, 1992.8 Fias-eo
approached Buli-e on July 13, 1992, accompanied by Lampoyas.9
Buli-e confirmed to complainants that she was, in fact, recruiting contract workers for Taiwan
and that, although she did not have a license of her own to recruit, her boss in Manila who
was a licensed recruiter, was in the process of getting her one which would soon be
issued.10 Buli-e identified her superiors in Manila to be the spouses Jose11 and Josefina Alolino.
Josefina was connected with Rodolfo S. Ibuna Employment Agency (RSI for brevity), a private
employment agency licensed to recruit overseas contract workers. Buli-e informed
complainants that requirements for application of overseas work included submission of bio-
data, passport, NBI clearance, and medical examination clearance to show that the applicant
is physically and mentally fit. There was also a placement fee of 40,000 of which 15,000
must be paid in advance. Buli-e told complainants that if they were interested in applying,
they may submit to her said requirements which she, in turn, will submit to her boss who was
in charge of processing the necessary documents.
In the case of complainant Lampoyas who originally applied with Buli-e for employment in
Kuwait, she was informed by Buli-e that the latter was working for a certain Jessie
Agtarep.12 Lampoyas gave Buli-e 4,000 on March 14, 1991 as downpayment for the
placement fee and 5,000 on August 24, 1991. Lampoyas application papers were processed
by Jamal Enterprises in Makati, Metro Manila but in 1992 , Buli-e transferred Lampoyas
application to appellant Josefina, whom Buli-e referred to as her new boss.13 Lampoyas was
enticed to work in Taiwan instead of Kuwait and was assured that her deployment papers
would be processed more quickly.14
From March to August 1992, Buli-e accompanied complainants, on separate occasions, to

Manila where they had their medical check-up at Saints Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita.
Lampoyas had her medical check-up in March 199215 while Mangili and Joseph Oratil had their
medical check-up in May 1992.16 On June 20, 1992, Estay had her medical check-up,17 while
Agapito and Macli-ing had their medical examination on July 5, 1992. 18 Fias-eo had her
medical examination on July 20, 1992 while Joel Oratil had his medical examination in August
1992. Complainants paid for the medical examination, the results of which were given to Buli-
e.
Immediately after complainants had undergone medical examination, Buli-e brought them to
No. 11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila purportedly to introduce
them to her boss, the spouses Alolino. Complainants, except for Macli-ing and Agapito, were
able to meet only Jose Alolino on the same day that they had undergone medical examination.
Jose Alolino allegedly told complainants that his wife, Josefina, was in Taiwan following up
applications but he assured them that they too would be deployed abroad in a matter of
months.19Mangili, Estay, and the brothers Oratil were able to meet Josefina personally when
they returned to the residence of the Alolinos in Manila to follow up their applications. 20 Fias-
eo and Lampoyas, on the other hand, never met Josefina personally although they were able
to talk to her over the telephone several times when they were following up the status of their
applications.21 It was during these telephone conversations that Josefina instructed Fias-eo
3
and Lampoyas to have their medical examinations and secure their NBI clearance in Manila
accompanied by Buli-e whom she identified as her agent.22
Complainants were assured by one or both of the spouses that they were licensed to recruit
overseas contract workers and that they can deploy workers within two to three
months.23 Complainants were informed by Buli-e and Josefina that deployment for Taiwan is
on a first-come, first-served basis and that those who can comply with the requirements,
particularly the advance payment of 15,000, shall be deployed first. 24
On different dates from May 1992 to July 1992, complainants handed to Buli-e at Sanitary
Camp, Baguio City their advance payments of P15,000 for which they were issued
receipts.25 Mangili paid 11,000 on May 22, 1992 and 4,000 on June 18, 1992. 26 The Oratil
brothers paid 15,000 each in installments from May 1992 to July 15, 1992. 27Macli-ing paid
15,000 on July 12, 1992.28 Fias-eo gave Buli-e 15,000 on July 13, 1992.29 In addition to her
previous payments amounting to P9,000, Lampoyas paid Buli-e 5,000 also on July 13,
1992.30 Estay gave 15,000 on July 21, 199231 while Agapito paid Buli-e 15,000 on July 22,
1992.32 Buli-e assured complainants that she delivered the payments to Josefina. Aside from
giving the downpayment of the placement fee, complainants complied with the rest of the
requirements which included submission of pictures, bio-data, passports, NBI clearances and
medical examination reports.
After months of waiting and despite compliance with all the requirements, complainants were
not deployed abroad as promised by appellants. From August 1992 to February 1993,
complainants trooped to Buli-es house but Buli-e merely kept on telling them to wait. When
complainants called up Josefina by long distance telephone, they were also told just to wait.
Weary of the interminable waiting, complainants went to the POEA office in Baguio City on
February 2, 1993, to check whether appellants were indeed licensed to recruit overseas
contract workers. They were dismayed to find out that appellants had no license to recruit in
Baguio City or any part of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). On the same day,
complainants filed their complaints with the POEA-CAR and the Prosecutors Office of Baguio
City.
After appellants were apprehended and during their detention at the Baguio City Jail, Josefina,
through counsel, refunded complainant Fias-eo 15,000 for his downpayment on the
placement fee.33 Complainant Mangili also demanded a refund and he was paid by Josefina,
again through her counsel, the sum of 25,000 for his advance payment of 15,000 and as
reimbursement of the actual expenses he incurred for his application.34
During trial, Buli-e testified that she worked for RSI and had been referring applicants to the
agency before 1991. She met Josefina a year after she resigned from RSI. 35 In 1990, Buli-e
had an applicant for Singapore, a certain Prescilla Laoayan from Baguio City. Buli-e referred
Prescilla to RSI which, through Mrs. Fe Go, handled the processing of her application. As part
of the requirements of the agency, Prescilla had to undergo training at the house of Josefina,
who was then the Marketing Director of RSI. In 1991, Josefina sent Buli-e a note, through
Prescilla, telling her to go to the house of Josefina at No.11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village,
Las Pias, Metro Manila to discuss matters about recruitment of workers. Buli-e went to the
house of Josefina as requested and it was then that she was appointed as an agent of
Josefina.36 Buli-e was tasked to find job applicants for Taiwan, Korea or Singapore whom she
can refer to RSI through Josefina. Buli-e would then be paid for each referral. When Buli-e
asked Josefina if the latter was authorized or had any license to recruit for overseas
placement, Josefina answered in the affirmative.37
Thereafter, Buli-e started recruiting job applicants for Taiwan, Singapore and Korea at her
house in No. 63 Sanitary Camp, Baguio City. Complainants sought her of their own accord
and Buli-e informed them of the requirements for job application which consisted of
submission of bio-data, passport, NBI clearance and placement fee of 40,000 of which
15,000 must be paid in advance upon instructions of Josefina. Josefina allegedly instructed
Buli-e to accompany complainants to Sts. Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila for
medical check-up.38 Buli-e was likewise instructed by Josefina to accompany some of the
complainants in securing their NBI clearance and to receive whatever documents
complainants will be submitting including the 15,000 advance payment, all of which should
be submitted to Josefina. Buli-e said that she submitted the documents and the payments
either to Jose Alolino or to Josefina.39 She clarified that she did not have a hand in securing
4
the passports of complainants40 and received instructions from Josefina only when she
communicated with Josefina through the telephone or went to Manila. She averred that she
and several members of her family also tried to apply for overseas work with Josefina and
paid the latter 100,000. 41
Buli-e presented Mrs. Nonette Legaspi-Villanueva, Unit Coordinator of POEA-CAR, to testify

that RSI was a licensed employment agency and that Josefina was a licensed recruiter at the
time that Buli-e had dealings with her co-appellant. Mrs. Villanueva testified that she has been
with the POEA since 1985. Part of her functions included administrative and technical
supervision of the staff regarding employment, facilitation, licensing, investigation and
monitoring of the provincial recruitment authority as well as issuance of authorization to
personnel to conduct inspection of licensed agencies in the City of Baguio. 42 Mrs.Villanueva
said that, as per the certification of the Chief of the Licensing Branch of the POEA, RSI was a
private employment agency with a license which expired on July 14, 1992. Josefina Alolino
was included in the list of the personnel submitted by the agency in July 1990 as Marketing
Consultant.43 Mrs. Villanueva, however, clarified that licenses or permits to recruit workers
are territorial in nature so that an agency licensed in Manila can only engage in recruitment
activities within the place specified in the license although the applicants may be non-
residents of Metro Manila. She further testified that she cannot remember if Buli-e was given
any authority to recruit in Baguio City.44
Josefina, on the other hand, testified that on September 16, 1987, she was appointed as one
of the four Marketing Directors of RSI which was located in 408 Jovan Condominium, Shaw
Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. RSI, represented by Rodolfo S. Ibuna as proprietor,
was a private employment agency with a license which expired on July 14, 1992. As Overseas
Marketing Director of RSI, Josefina was tasked to represent the agency in negotiating with
employers in Taiwan, Malaysia, United States and Singapore45 for said employers to avail of
the services of RSI in recruiting, hiring, processing and deploying Filipino contract workers.
She was also authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement through advertisements,
referrals, walk-ins, etc., and to undertake screening, evaluation and final selection of
applicants. As per agreement with RSI, Josefina was entitled to a certain share for each
successful negotiation with a foreign employer.46
Josefina denied that Buli-e was her agent and insisted that she never gave Buli-e authority to
recruit for RSI. On the contrary, Buli-e allegedly informed Josefina that she was an agent of
Mrs. Fe Go, another marketing Director of RSI. Sometime in 1991, Mrs. Go referred to Josefina
a certain Prescilla Laoayan, who wanted to apply as a domestic helper in Taiwan. Upon being
told that she could not be deployed unless she would give a downpayment of 15,000 for the
placement fee, Prescilla informed Josefina that she already gave 15,000 to an agent whom
she identified to be Buli-e. Josefina then wrote a note for Buli-e informing her that there was
a problem regarding the processing of Prescillas application. Prescilla delivered the note to
Buli-e who in turn went to see Josefina at her house in No. 11 Concorde Street, Airmans
Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila. Josefina said that she and Buli-e merely talked about
Prescillas application and that was the first time that Josefina met and talked with Buli-e
although she had already seen her before in the office of Mrs. Fe Go. 47
Josefina testified that herein complainants were originally referred by Buli-e to Mrs. Fe Go
who, in turn, referred them to her. Josefina said that she accepted referrals from Buli-e even
though the latter was not her agent nor connected with RSI because their agency accepts
referrals from everyone. In 1992, Buli-e, claiming that complainants authorized and
designated her to act as their spokesperson, went to the house of Josefina several times to
follow up the progress of their applications.48
Josefina denied having given Buli-e instructions to accompany complainants to Saints Peter
and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila. She also denied having an understanding with Buli-
e to receive payments from each of complainants and to bring them to her house in Las Pias,
Metro Manila.49 Josefina explained that the deployment of complainants was delayed because
the Taiwanese government changed its previous policy of allowing foreign employment
agencies like RSI to negotiate directly with prospective employers in Taiwan. Foreign
employment agencies were instead allowed to negotiate only with local employment agencies
in Taiwan, which, in turn, were responsible for negotiating with the Taiwanese employers. The
change in the policy caused delay in the deployment of complainants since the local
employment agencies in Taiwan demanded additional requirements such as additional fees.
5
Josefina said she informed complainants of the delay and the reason for it but complainants
could not wait to be deployed and, instead, demanded the refund of their payments.50
On March 2, 1993, Josefina allegedly gave Buli-e 75,000 with the instruction that she was
to give complainant Lampoyas 5,000 as refund, and 10,000 each to complainants Macli-
ing, Estay, Fias-eo, Mangili, Agapito, and the Oratil brothers. Upon having been approached
by complainants for the refund of their money, Josefina informed them that she already gave
their refunds through Buli-e. Complainants, however, claimed that they did not receive their
refunds from Buli-e. When complainants could not wait for the refund of their payments and
failed to see Josefina who was always out of the country due to her work, they filed the
present cases.51
Emelita Racelis testified that she was an employee of RSI from 1989 to 1992 and was one of
the two persons assigned to Josefina.52 Ms. Racelis said that Buli-e frequently went to the RSI,
bringing applicants with her three times a month. Among the applicants whom Buli-e referred
to RSI through one of the marketing directors, Mrs. Fe Go, was a certain Prescilla Laoayan.
Racelis said that Laoayan was endorsed by Mrs. Go to Josefina because it is the practice that
when the applicant of one of the marketing directors cannot be deployed, the applicant will
be endorsed to another marketing director with a job opening. Josefina, however, had trouble
deploying Ms. Laoayan whose placement fee had not been forwarded by Buli-e to RSI.53
On July 4, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11122-R, the Court finds the accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina
(Josie) Alolino guilty beyond reasonable doubt, by direct participation and in conspiracy
with each other, of the crime of illegal recruitment in a large scale as defined and
penalized under Article 38(b) in relation to Article 39 of PD 442 as amended by PD
2018 and sentences each of them to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of 100,000.00
each, and to pay the costs.
2. In Criminal case No. 11123-R to 11130-R (8 counts), the court finds the accused
Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino guilty beyond reasonable doubt by direct
participation and in conspiracy with each other of the crime of Estafa as charged in the
Informations in the aforesaid 8 cases as defined and penalized under Article 315 first
paragraph in relation to No. 2 (a) of the same article and sentences each of them,
applying the indeterminate sentence law, to an imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum in each of the aforesaid
8 cases; to indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties Constancio Macli-ing,
Jessica Estay, Sidolia Fias-eo, John Mangili, Sabado Agapito, Joseph Oratil and Joel
Oratil the sum of 15,000.00 each and Nieva Lampoyas the sum of 14,000.00 as
actual damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
The accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino being detention prisoners are entitled
to be credited 4/5 of their preventive imprisonment in the service of their sentence in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.54
In rendering the decision, the trial court ruled that by their acts, Buli-e and Josefina, conspired
and confederated with one another in the illegal recruitment of complainants for overseas
employment. Buli-e performed the recruitment activities in Baguio and Josefina, in Manila.
The trial court specifically noted Buli-es acts of accompanying the complainants to Manila for
their medical examinations, securing complainants NBI clearances and passports as well as
receiving complainants downpayments for the purported placement fee as an indication that
she directly participated in the recruitment of all complainants. The trial court observed that
Buli-e practically confessed her acts of recruitment in open court and justified the same by
claiming that she was just acting as an agent of Josefina or was authorized to act in behalf of
the latter.
6
As regards Josefina, the trial court held that she directly participated in the recruitment of
complainants even if she did not personally go to Baguio City since she received the
applications and other requirements such as NBI clearances, passports, bio-data as well as
the advanced payments of complainants from Buli-e. Either she or her husband Jose, or both
of them, entertained complainants who were brought by Buli-e to their home at No. 11
Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila. The spouses repeatedly promised
to work or make arrangements for complainants deployment abroad.
The trial court ruled that the authority given to Josefina as Overseas Marketing Director of
RSI, a duly licensed employment agency, was confined to negotiating with foreign employers
in Taiwan and she was not supposed to recruit overseas Filipino workers. The court stressed
that assuming Josefina was authorized to recruit in Manila, she had no authority to do so in
Baguio City. Citing Article 29 of the Labor Code which states that no license or authority shall
be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued
or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or
authority be transferred or conveyed to any other person or entity, the trial court ruled that
appellants could not use the RSI license in Manila to recruit overseas contract workers in
Baguio City.
The trial court further noted that the license of RSI employment office was already suspended
on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992. Consequently, the authority given by RSI to
Josefina was likewise suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992.
Finally, the trial court said that Josefinas act of returning the advanced payments of some of
complainants would not exculpate her and only proved that she had in fact received money
from complainants who were made to believe that they would be deployed abroad at the
soonest possible time.
With regard to the eight charges of estafa filed against appellants, the trial court convicted
them on the ground that all the elements of estafa were present under each of the eight
charges filed. The trial court held that appellants through false pretenses and fraudulent acts
represented to complainants that they had the power, authority and capacity to deploy
workers abroad for a fee of 40,000, of which 15,000 should be paid as advance payment.
The false pretenses and fraudulent acts were executed prior to or simultaneous with
appellants taking the sum of 15,000 as advance payment from each of private
complainants55 which were received by Buli-e in Baguio City and turned over by her to Josefina
in Manila. Complainants relied on the pretenses and misrepresentations of appellants and
parted with substantial sums of money as advance payments of their placement fees. As a
result of the false pretenses and misrepresentations, complainants were damaged and
prejudiced to the extent of the sums they had given as downpayment since appellants failed
to send them abroad as promised.
In her appeal before us, appellant Buli-e contends that the trial court erred:
I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE DEFENSE OF THE CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E THAT SHE
MERELY REFERRED THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES TO CO-ACCUSED SPOUSES JOSE AND
JOSEFINA ALOLINO, WHOM SHE HONESTLY BELIEVED TO BE BONA FIDE OVERSEAS JOB
RECRUITERS;
II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HEREIN APPELLANT BULI-E AND
SPOUSES ALOLINO IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES OF LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA; AND
III. HOLDING CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E LIABLE FOR ESTAFA WHEN THERE WAS NO
SHOWING THAT SAID ACCUSED BENEFITED FROM THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION.
Appellant Josefina, on the other hand, presents the following assignments of error:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING JOSEFINA ALOLINO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E
OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED
UNDER ARTICLE 38[b] IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 39 OF P.D. 442 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 2018
7
AND IN SENTENCING EACH OF THEM TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF

100,000.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED JOSEFINA ALOLINO GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED
ALONA BULI-E OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IN THE
AFORESAID 8 CASES AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 315 FIRST PARAGRAPH
IN RELATION TO NO. 2[A] OF THE SAME ARTICLE.
We shall discuss the interrelated issues together.
Under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refer to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
include referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not; provided that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment or placement.
The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are (1) the accused
engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13(b) or in
any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied
with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect
to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or
overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.56 When illegal recruitment is committed in large scale or when it is
committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another, it is considered as an offense involving
economic sabotage.
The factual backdrop shows that appellants engaged in recruitment activities involving eight
persons. The recruitment activities were made by appellants without having the license or
authority to do so as evidenced by the certification issued by Legal Officer of the POEA
Regional Extension Unit, Cordillera Administrative Region, which stated that Alona Buli-e,
Hilario Antonio,57 Josie Alolino and Jose Alolino were not licensed nor authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or in any part of the region. 58
Appellant Buli-e herself does not deny that she had no license or authority to recruit workers
for overseas employment. She, however, insists that she had never directly participated in
recruiting complainants since it was in fact complainants who sought her help in applying for
overseas employment. Buli-e explained that she merely "referred" complainants to the
spouses Alolino whom she honestly believed to be bona fide overseas job recruiters and, since
she, herself, had intentions of applying for overseas work, she tagged along with complainants
to Manila to see the spouses Alolino. Inasmuch as she and complainants were all from Baguio
City, complainants allegedly designated her to conduct all negotiations and follow up of their
applications with the spouses.
Buli-es claim deserves scant consideration. It is true that Buli-e did not actively seek
complainants to recruit them for overseas employment. It was complainants who sought her
out. Nevertheless, when complainants approached her, Buli-e gave complainants the
impression that she had the ability to send workers abroad by saying that although she did
not have a license of her own to recruit, her boss, who was a licensed recruiter, was already
in the process of securing her a license. 59 She not only informed complainants of the
requirements in applying for overseas employment and even accompanied them to Manila to
procure the necessary documents such as passport, medical and NBI clearances.60 It was she
who brought them to the house of the spouses Alolino and it was also she who received from
complainants advanced payments for placement fee which she handed over to the spouses.
Her claim that she and her relatives were also victims of illegal recruitment by the spouses
Alolino is not substantiated.
We also find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that Josefina Alolino conspired
and confederated with Buli-e in recruiting applicants for overseas employment from Baguio
City although neither she nor Buli-e had license or authority to do so. Her claim that she did
not have a direct participation in the recruitment in Baguio City and that she merely assisted
8
the complainants by referring them to RSI to facilitate their papers does not merit credence.
There is no showing that complainants ever set foot in the RSI office. They were always
brought by Buli-e to the house of the spouses Alolino in Las Pias after their medical check
up. Complainants, who were with other applicants, were entertained and generously fed
breakfast or dinner by one or both of the spouses who assured them that they would be able
to fly to Taiwan in just a matter of months.61 Although Josefina alleged that the documents
and payments were handed by Buli-e to the RSI office, Josefina could show no proof to
substantiate her claim. It is significant to note that after the informations for illegal
recruitment and eight counts of estafa were already filed in court, some of the complainants
were given a refund of their advances for the placement fees by Josefina herself, through
counsel, and not by RSI.
Josefinas acts clearly show that she and Buli-e acted in concert towards the accomplishment
of a common felonious purpose which was to recruit workers for overseas employment even
though they had no license to do so. Settled is the rule that if it is proved that two or more
persons, aimed, by their acts, at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing
a part so that their acts, although apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred even though no actual meeting between or among them to
coordinate ways and means is proved. 62
Josefina, however, maintains that as Overseas Marketing Director for RSI, she was authorized
to solicit applicants for overseas placement through advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc.
and to undertake screening, evaluation and final selection of applicants.
Apart from her bare testimony, there is nothing on record to corroborate Josefinas claim that
as Marketing Director she was authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement through
advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc. Josefina did not bother to formally offer as evidence
the document allegedly supporting her claim that part of her duties as Marketing Director
included recruitment of overseas contract workers. The document not having been formally
offered in court cannot be considered, pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Licensing Branch of the POEA confirmed that the license of RSI had already
been suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992.63 Consequently, even if
Josefina was licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment, her authority to do so
ceased when the license of her agency, RSI, was suspended and when it eventually expired.
Josefina, however, despite the suspension and expiration of the RSI license, continued to
engage in recruitment activities for overseas employment. Except for Lampoyas who met Jose
Alolino at the latters house in March 1992, and Mangili and Joseph Oratil who met Jose Alolino
in May 1992, complainants were entertained at the house of the Alolinos after the license of
RSI had already been suspended. Lampoyas, Macli-ing and Mangili completed the 15,000
downpayment of the placement fee after the license of RSI had already been suspended. The
rest of complainants gave payments for the placement fee after the license of RSI had already
expired.
Furthermore, Josefinas alleged authority to recruit applicants for overseas employment as

Marketing Director of RSI was only confined to Metro Manila. Article 29 of the Labor Code
provides:
Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority No license or authority shall be used

directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued or at any
place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be
transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business
address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the
establishment of additional offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the
Secretary of Labor.
We are not persuaded by Josefinas claim that no recruitment activity was being done outside
of the territorial permit of RSI and it was only incidental that complainants who were referred
to her by Buli-e were residents of Baguio City. As earlier discussed, there is no indication that
complainants ever set foot in the RSI office. They were always brought by Buli-e to Las Pias,
Metro Manila where they were entertained by one or both of the spouses Alolino who
repeatedly assured them that they would be able to fly to Taiwan in a matter of months.
Josefina, who claims to have authority to recruit applicants for overseas employment in behalf
9
of RSI, should have known that licensed agencies are prohibited from conducting any
provincial recruitment, job fairs or recruitment activities of any form outside of the address
stated in the license, acknowledged branch or extension office, without securing prior
authority from the POEA.64 Pursuant to the POEA rules and regulations, Josefina could recruit
applicants for overseas employment and process their applications only at the RSI office in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila since there was no showing that RSI had an acknowledged branch
or extension office in Baguio City or that the prior approval of the POEA for provincial
recruitment or recruitment activities outside the RSI office was obtained.
Finally, the trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of eight (8) counts of
estafa.1wphi1 It is settled that a person convicted of illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code can also be convicted of violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa
provided that the elements of the crime are present.65 The elements for estafa are: (a) that
the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.66
Appellants deceived complainants into believing that they had the authority and capability to
send them to Taiwan for employment. By reason or on the strength of such assurance,
complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees. Since the
representations of appellants proved to be false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code is applicable. Buli-es claim that she did not benefit from the money collected from
complainants since she gave the payments to Josefina is of no moment. It was clearly
established that she acted in connivance with Josefina in defrauding complainants. As regards
Josefina, the fact that she returned the payment of some of the complainants will not
exculpate her from criminal liability. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise
or novation, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
government on its own motion even though complete reparation has been made of the
damage suffered by the offended party.67
The actual damages in the sum of 15,000 awarded to each of complainants Fias-eo and
Mangili, however, should be deleted inasmuch as said amounts have already been reimbursed
by Josefina during her detention.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 15, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the actual damages awarded to Fias-eo and Mangili in Criminal
Cases Nos. 11125-R and 11126-R are deleted. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Vol. I Records, p. 1.
2
All complainants, except for Lampoyas, gave Buli-e the total sum of 15,000 each
as downpayment for the placement fee. Lampoyas gave Buli-e a total of 14,000 as
downpayment.
3
Records, Criminal Case No. 1123-R, p. 1.
4
TSN, October 11, 1993, p. 3.
5
TSN, November 19, 1993, p 5; TSN, March 15, 1994, p. 3.
6
TSN, September 16, 1993, p. 4.
7
TSN, September 30, 1993, p. 5; October 15, 1993, p. 3.
10
8
9
TSN, August 26, 1993, pp. 4-5.
10
TSN, September 17, 1993, pp. 15-16; TSN, October 1, 1993, p. 19.
11
Identified by Buli-e to complainant Mangili as a retired general named Felipe
Alolino; TSN, September 17, 1993, p. 13; TSN, October 15, 1993, pp. 40-41.
12
TSN, October 14, 1993, p. 5.
13
TSN, October 11, 1993, pp. 7-8; TSN, October 14, 1993, p. 6.
14
TSN, October 11, 1993, p. 11; TSN, October 14, 1993, p. 6.
15
TSN, October 11, 1993, p. 14.
16
TSN, September 16, 1993, p. 5; TSN, November 19, 1993, p. 12.
17
TSN, September 3, 1993, pp. 17-18.
18
TSN, September 30, 1993, pp. 10-11; TSN, October 15, 1993, pp. 9-11.
19
TSN, August 26, 1993, p. 15; TSN, September 3, 1993, pp. 38-39; TSN,
September 16, 1993, p. 8.
20
21
TSN, August 26, 1993, pp. 16-17; TSN, October 14, 1993, pp. 9-11.
22
23
TSN, September 30, 1993, p. 12; TSN, October 15, 1993, pp. 15-16.
24
25
Exhibits "CC," "D," "HH," "II," "J," "K," "O," "X," "Y," Folder of Exhibits.
26
27
TSN, November 19, 1993, pp. 9, 17.
28
TSN, October 15, 1993, p. 7.
29
TSN, August 26, 1993, p. 6. The receipt which was marked as Exhibit "D,"
however, shows that Fias-eo gave Buli-e 15,000 on July 3, 1992.
30
TSN, October 11, 1993, pp. 6-7.
31
32
33
TSN, August 26, 1993, pp. 42- 43.
34
TSN, September 17, 1993, pp. 9-10, 19.
35
TSN, August 19, 1994, pp. 21-22.
36
TSN, August 19, 1994, pp. 15, 17-18.
11
37
TSN, August 16, 1994, p. 9.
38
TSN, August 19, 1994, pp. 25-26.
39
TSN, October 24, 1994, p. 18.
40
TSN, August 17, 1994, p. 17
41
TSN, August 17, 1994, pp. 22-23.
42
TSN, October 25, 1994, pp. 2-3.
43
TSN, October 25, 1994, pp. 3-5.
44
TSN, October 25, 1994, pp. 6-7, 9.
45
TSN, November 11, 1994, p. 10.
46
TSN, December 7, 1994, p. 7.
47
TSN, November 11, 1994, pp. 11-17.
48
TSN, November 11, 1994 p. 19.
49
TSN, December 7, 1994, pp. 19-21.
50
TSN, November 24, 1994, pp. 20-22.
51
TSN, November 24, 1994, pp. 24-26.
52
TSN, January 11, 1995, pp. 10-11.
53
TSN, January 11, 1995, pp. 7-9.
54
Rollo, p. 100.
55
Complainant Lampoyas gave a total of 14,000 to Buli-e as downpayment.
56
People v. Ladera, 344 SCRA 647, 657 [2000]; People v. Chowdury, 325 SCRA 572,
581 [2000]
57
Hilario Antonio is the common-law spouse of appellant Buli-e. Although initially
included as respondent, the prosecutor recommended the dismissal of charges
against him during the preliminary investigation for want of probable cause. The
prosecutor stated that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that Hilario had in
any way participated in the transactions entered into between complainants and
appellants including Jose Alolino. Vol. I, Records, p. 5.
58
Exhibit "A," Folder of Exhibits.
59
TSN, October 1, 1993, p. 19.
60
TSN, October 15, 1993, pp. 33-34.
61
TSN, September 16, 1993, pp.7-8; TSN, March 15, 1994, pp. 10-11.
62
People v. Mateo, 179 SCRA 303, 320 [1989].
63
Exhibit "C," Folder of Exhibits.
64
POEA Implementing Rules and Regulations, Book II, Rule II, Section 16.
12
65
People v. Banzales, 336 SCRA 64, 77 [2000]; People v. Ong, 322 SCRA 38, 56
[2000]
66
Article 315, par 2[a], Revised Penal Code.
67
People v. Moreno, 314 SCRA 556, 566 [1999], citing People v. Benitez, 108 Phil.
920, 922 [1960].
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150530. February 20, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX BAYTIC, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ALEX BAYTIC appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City[1] finding him guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing him to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Accused is further ordered to reimburse
complaining witnesses Ofelia Bongbonga, Millie Passi and Nolie
Bongbonga P3,500.00, P4,000.00 and P4,000.00, respectively, representing the amounts
fraudulently taken from them.
On 24 September 1998 Kennedy Hapones accompanied by accused Alex Baytic went to
the house of his aunt Ofelia Bongbonga at 514 Tabigo Street, Manggahan, Quezon City. There
they found Ofelia, Nolie and Zenaida, all surnamed Bongbonga, together with Millie Passi,
Yolanda Barrios and Elvira Nacario. Accused Alex Baytic told the girls that he was looking for
workers willing to work in Italy as utility personnel. He explained that interested applicants
should give him money for processing of their medical certificate, certificate of employment
and other travel documents. Since the offer appeared to be a good opportunity to work
abroad, Ofelia Bongbonga on the same day gave the accused P3,500.00, followed by Millie
Passi with P4,000.00 the next day, and Nolie Bongbonga with P4,000.00 on 5 October as their
placement fees. All these transactions were evidenced by receipts issued by accused Alex
Baytic.
According to private complainant Ofelia Bongbonga, accused Baytic promised her and her
two (2) co-applicants an interview by his cousin, a doctor from Italy, on 7 October 1998 at
the Corinthian Gardens. However, on the appointed date of their interview, the accused failed
to appear. Ofelia, Millie and Nolie frantically searched for him but he was nowhere to be
found.Ofelia further testified that sometime in January 1999 they heard over the radio that
accused Baytic was arrested in Pasig City for illegal recruitment activities. Upon inquiry from
the radio station, she learned that the accused was already detained at the Pasig Provincial
Jail, so she followed him there. Thereafter, she and her two (2) other companions, Millie and
Nolie, who were likewise victimized by the accused filed the instant case against him.
On the witness stand, both private complainants Millie Passi and Nolie Bongbonga
corroborated the testimony of Ofelia Bongbonga on every material point. In particular, Millie
Passi recounted that she was also enticed to part with P4,000.00 when Baytic promised her a
good paying job abroad. According to her, there was no reason for her to be suspicious of the
identity of the accused as well as of his representations since he was a good friend of her
cousin Kennedy Hapones.
Like the two (2) other complainants, Nolie Bongbonga averred that the accused through
misrepresentations persuaded her to give him P4,000.00 for the processing of certain travel
13
documents. As proof thereof she presented a receipt dated 5 October 1998 purportedly signed
and issued by the accused.
Accused Alex Baytic, testifying in his defense, not only denied the accusations against
him but also insisted that it was actually Kennedy Hapones, a new acquaintance, who was the
illegal recruiter. He recounted that sometime in November 1999, he went to the house of
Hapones who was trying to recruit him for deployment abroad. According to the accused,
Hapones told him to prepare P250,000.00 although the former eventually accepted an initial
advance payment of P4,500.00. He again met Hapones the following month when the latter
told him and a group of other applicants, including Ofelia Bongbonga, that their requirements
were ready. That was the last time he saw Hapones who, he later learned, had already left
for abroad. He was suspected of being in cahoots with Hapones because whenever the latter
and the applicants talked, Hapones would always point at him, although he never had the
opportunity to know what Hapones had actually said to them.
But the trial court sustained the complaining witnesses and gave more credence to their
straightforward and consistent testimonies. It opined that all the essential requisites of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale as defined in Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor
Code[2] were present -
x x x x The accused made representations to each of the complainants that he could send
them to Italy as janitor/utility aides through direct hiring, which constitutes a promise of
employment which amounted to recruitment as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code. The testimonies of the three prosecution witnesses that they were actually recruited
for overseas employment by the accused and were induced by him to part with their money
retain undiminished probative worth and weight. The receipts (Exhibits A, C, and D)
respectively issued to the complainants are sufficient proofs of his guilt as against accuseds
mere denial of the signatures appearing therein. The modus operandi of the accused was
well established by the corroborative testimonies of the witnesses. [3]
Accused-appellant now prays that the Court to take a second hard look at his conviction
in view of the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
takes exception to the finding of the trial court that all the elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale are present. He argues that the first element, i.e., the accused
engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, defined under Art. 13, or in any
prohibited activities under Art. 34, of the Labor Code, is not present because he did not solicit
any money from the complainants nor did he promise them employment in Italy. The truth
of the matter, according to him, is that he himself was victimized by Kennedy Hapones, the
real illegal recruiter. He explained that when Hapones could not be contacted, the
complainants vented their anger towards him, being Hapones constant companion.
Such being the case, accused-appellant insists that the second element, which is the
absence of license or authority to recruit, could not have been present because there was in
fact no need for him to apply for the license as he was not in the recruitment business.
We are not impressed. Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements
concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to
engage lawfully in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either
any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Art. 13, par. (b),
or any prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal
recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused commits the acts against
three or more persons, individually or as a group.[4]
The first element is present. POEA representative Flordeliza Cabusao presented in
evidence a certification from one Hermogenes Mateo, Director III, Licensing Branch, showing
that accused-appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment.[5]
The second element is likewise present. Accused-appellant is deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement under Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code when he made
representations to each of the complainants that he could send them to Italy for employment
as utility personnel. Prosecution witness Ofelia Bongbonga categorically stated that accused-
appellant promised her employment for a fee, a testimony corroborated by both complaining
witnesses Nolie Bongbonga and Millie Passi. His promises and misrepresentations gave the
complainants the distinct impression that he had the authority to engage in recruitment, thus
enabling him to collect from them various amounts for recruitment and placement fees
without license or authority to do so.
14
Accused-appellants vain attempt at exculpating himself by pinpointing Hapones as the

culprit cannot mislead this Court from his transparent and obvious machinations. His self-
serving statement that he himself was a victim of Hapones wilts in the face of the complaining-
witnesses testimonies that he made promises of employment, solicited money from them and
even signed receipts as proof of payment. His protestations notwithstanding, he failed to
prove that the complaining witnesses were incited by any motive to testify falsely against
him. It is contrary to human nature and experience for persons to conspire and accuse a
stranger of a crime, or even a casual acquaintance for that matter, that would take the latters
liberty and send him to prison just to appease their feeling of rejection and assuage the
frustration of their dreams to go abroad.[6] His denials cannot prevail over the positive
declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Accused-appellant's unsubstantiated denials cannot
be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters.[7]
There is therefore no discernible reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, which is
in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate complainants' candor
and truthfulness.[8]
Accused-appellant recruited at least three (3) persons, giving them the impression that
he had the authority to deploy people abroad. As such, his crime of economic sabotage can
be categorized as illegal recruitment in large scale punishable by life imprisonment and a fine
of P100,000.00, now increased to a minimum of P500,000.00 by virtue of Rep. Act No. 8042,
also known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995." [9]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant ALEX BAYTIC guilty of
illegal recruitment in large scale, sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00 as well as reimburse complainants Ofelia Bongbonga, Millie Passi, and Nolie
Bongbonga the amounts of P3,500.00, P4,000.00 and P4,000.00, respectively, is
AFFIRMED.Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Decision penned by Judge Estrella T. Estrada, RTC-Br. 82, Quezon City.
[2]
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are: 1) that the offender undertakes any
recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated
under Article 34 of the Labor Code; 2) that the offender does not have a license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and 3) that
the offender commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.
[3]
Rollo, p. 145.
[4]
People v. De La Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 24 January 2001, 350 SCRA 163.
[5]
Original Records, p. 102.
[6]
People v. Librero, G.R. No. 132311, 28 September 2000, 341 SCRA 229.
[7]
People v. Icalla, G.R. No. 136173, 7 March 2001, 353 SCRA 805.
[8]
People v. Minanga, G.R. No. 130670, 31 May 2000, 332 SCRA 558.
[9]
Complete Title - An Act to Institute the Policies of Overseas Employment and Establish a
Higher Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, their
Families and Overseas Filipinos in Distress, and for other purposes.
15
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 95207-17 January 10, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ENRIQUE TAGUBA AND MIRAFE TAGUBA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Mirafe Taguba.
Public Attorney's Office for Enrique Taguba.
CRUZ, J.:
Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba were both charged with eight counts of illegal recruitment
and three counts of estafa in separate informations1 commonly worded (except only as to the
date of the offense, the name of the complainant and the amount involved) as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C. TAGUBA, MIRAFE

TAGUBA and JANE DOE, true name, real identity and present whereabouts of
the last-mentioned accused still unknown, of the crime of "ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT", committed as follows:
That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro manila, Philippines and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, representing themselves
to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment
abroad did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee recruit
and promise employment/job placement to one (name of complainant), without
first securing the required license or authority from the Ministry of Labor and
Employment.
Contrary to law.
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C. TAGUBA, MIRAFE

TAGUBA and JANE DOE, true name, real identity and present whereabouts of
the last-mentioned accused still unknown, of the crime of "ESTAFA," committed
as follows:
That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, the above-named

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, defrauded and deceived
one (name of plaintiff ) in the following manner, to wit: said accused, by means
of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which they made to said
complainants to the effect that they have the capacity or power to recruit or
16
employ complainant abroad and could facilitate the necessary papers in

connection therewith if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, knowing said manifestations and representations to be false and
fraudulent and were made only to induce said complainant to give and deliver,
as in fact the latter did give and deliver to said accused the amount of
P________ ,but said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with
intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misapply, misappropriate and convert to their on personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned amount of
P__________ .
Contrary to law.
Trial of the cases was held jointly.
The complainants, namely, Jesus Garcia, Gilbert Fabrigas, Josefina Sarrion, Myrna Roxas,
Elena Santiago, Federico Sagurit, Manuel Aquiban, Violeta Porte, Renelito Cerbito, Danilo
Pacheco, narrated almost identical versions of the deception practiced on them by the
accused.
These witnesses testified that Enrique an Mirafe approached them on separate occasions
and assured them that upon their payment of a specified sum of money they would be sent
to Korror, Palau, to work variously as a waiter,2fisherman,3 master
cutter,4 dressmaker,5 farmer,6 laborer,7 mason carpenter8 or macho dancer. 9
The consideration for their recruitment ranged from P2,200.00 to P20,000.00 while the
promised monthly wages ranged from $300.00 top $500.00.
The required payments were made by them from loans they had contracted or from the
proceeds of the sale of their properties. However, no overseas employment materialized. Only
Gilbert Fabrigas and Norman Sarrion (the son of Josefina Sarrion) were able to reach Korror
but after three months, during which they were not given any work, they were deported to
Manila for expired visas. 10 The rest of the complainants were never even able to leave the
Philippines.
In his defense, Enrique Taguba first claimed that he merely happened to be at RAY/DECO
office when the complainants submitted their papers. RAY/DECO is a corporation licensed to
recruit workers for employment abroad with which he had entered into a joint venture. From
the office, the documents were submitted to the foreign employer, who brought them to
Korror. 11
He later declared that a special power of attorney issued to him by RAY/DECO authorized him
to recruit and hire contract workers. It was by virtue of this authorization that he recruited
the complainants. At the same hearing, however, he retracted his statement, reiterating his
earlier claim that he had no participation in the complainants' transactions with the company.
The sole exception was when he accompanied Gilbert Fabrigas and Norman Sarrion to Korro
upon RAY/DECO's request. 12
Mirafe, on the other hand, averred that she was working as a domestic helper in Korror when
the alleged irregularities happened. She presented a round-trip Continental Airline ticket
issued in her name on May 3, 1985, for Manila - Korror - Manila 13 and a certification issued
by the Manager of Air Nauru that on March 3, 1986, she was a passenger of Air Nauru Flight
No. 420 bound for Manila from Korror. 14
After trial, Judge Adoracion C. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City declared
them guilty of all the charges in a decision dated June 4, 1990. 15
For the offense of illegal recruitment on a grand scale, each was sentenced to a penalty
of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P100,000.00. They were also held jointly and severally
liable for the reimbursement of the money they received from the complainants. 16
17
For each of the three counts of estafa, they were both meted the penalty of four years, two
months and one day ofprision correccional. In addition, they were held solidarily liable for the
return of the money given them by the complainants. 17
In their challenged to the decision, the appellants stress that they call the failure of the
prosecution to prove that they were not holders of licenses to engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers abroad; the unrebutted evidence of Marife Taguba's absence in the
Philippines during the commission of the alleged crimes; the imposition of a penalty which
was not yet in effect and the alleged crime of illegal recruitment on a grand scale were
committed; and the lack of sufficient evidence to support their conviction for estafa.
The appellants argue that before one can be held guilty of illegal recruitment, two elements
have to be established, to wit, that (1) the offender is not a licensee or holder of authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offender undertook
the recruitment activities defined under Article 13(b) or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. Their argument is that the prosecution has
the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each of the elements of the offense charged
and that this burden had not been discharged in the cases against them.
The appellants also contend that the penalty of life imprisonment for illegal recruitment
committed on a large scale is not applicable to them because the presidential decree imposing
this penalty was published in the Official Gazette only on February 10, 1986. P.D. 2018 was
thus not yet effective at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes imputed to them.
Only two of the eight complainants for illegal recruitment testified that they were recruited
after February 10, 1986. If at all, therefore, the appellants can only be convicted of eight
separate counts of illegal recruitment under Art. 39 (c) of the Labor Code, which is subject to
a lesser penalty.
Regarding the charges of estafa, the appellants' claim they had made no representation they
had the capacity to recruit and send the complainants abroad. This is clear from the testimony
of Josefina Sarrion herself, who declared as follows:
Q. The accused in this case did not say that they had (a)
recruitment office to you (sic)?
A. They did not, sir.
Q. The accused did not say to you or represent to you that they
had (a) permit to recruit?
A. They did not, sir. 18
The Solicitor General maintains in the appellee's brief that it was incumbent on the accused
to prove that they were licensed to recruit workers, conformably to the well-settled rule that
any party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the burden of presenting evidence
required to obtain a favorable judgment. 19 He agrees, however, that PD 2018 is inapplicable
and that the appellants can only be held guilty of eight counts of illegal recruitment and
penalized in accordance with Sec. 39 (c) of the Labor Code.
Our rulings follow.
The record shows that the prosecution indeed failed to establish that the appellants had not
been issued licenses to recruit for overseas employment. It had moved to present Cecilia E.
Curso, Chief of the Licensing and Evaluation Division of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency, so she could testify that the accused were not licensed recruiters, but this was never
done.
Rule 131 Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases. In criminal cases the burden of

proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. A negative fact alleged
by the prosecution need not be proved unless it is an essential ingredient of
the offense.
18
Non-possession of a license to recruit is an essential ingredient of the crime of illegal

recruiting. As it is an indispensible requisite for the conviction of the pretended recruiter, the
burden of establishing this element is upon the prosecution. In the case before us, the
prosecution cannot deny its failure to show that no license had indeed been issued to either
of the appellees by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
This would have been a fatal omission under ordinary circumstances. Fortunately for the
prosecution, however, this flaw was repaired by appellant Enrique Taguba himself when he
testified as follows:
Q. In connection with the operation of your office, do you have

the authority to recruit?
A. I have a special power of attorney issued by the general

manager of Ray/Deco, International Development Corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. Taguba you stated that you were clothed with a special
power of attorney, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And according to the special power of attorney you were

then authorized as attorney-in-fact of Ray/Deco to recruit and
hire Filipino contract workers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this is the only evidence or authority for your having

recruited Filipino contractual workers?
A. I have submitted several papers, sir.
Q. By virtue of the special power of attorney you recruited all

these complainants namely: (At this juncture, the prosecuting
fiscal read the names listed in the information)?
A. Yes, sir. 20
The special power of attorney 21 granted to Enrique by RAY/DECO did not operate as a license
to recruit workers on his own behalf, which is what he did. Besides, the special power of
attorney only authorized him:
1. To represent our Agency, RAY/DECO International Development and

Employment Corporation, and to negotiate and deal with any person, company,
Employer or Principal in foreign countries who may be interested in engaging
the services of and appointing our Agency in the recruitment and hiring of
Filipino contractual workers for employment abroad.
2. To enter into such negotiations he may deem proper, reasonable and

advantageous to the Agency and to see to it that all documents and papers
necessary, required and proper in the appointment of our Agency by the
Principal or Employer as well as in the recruitment and hiring of the workers
are all in proper order; and
3. Finally, it is a condition of this Power of Attorney that our aforesaid Legal

Representative shall not demand, collect and receive from the Principal or
Employer any fee or sums of money without our prior consent and approval.
It is clear from the above-quoted document that Enrique's authority was confined to
negotiating with foreign employers for the appointment of RAY/DECO as their agency in the
19
recruiting of Filipino workers for employment abroad. What he was supposed to recruit was
not Filipino overseas workers but the foreign employers to which the workers were to be
assigned.
It is significant that the only authority the appellants could invoke was this special power of
attorney although he did not speak of "several papers". These did not include any license. It
strikes us that if they had been issued a license to recruit, there would have been no reason
why they did not present it in evidence to exculpate them from liability under the Labor Code.
Mirafe's defense of alibi is not acceptable either. The fact that she left for Korror on May 3,
1985, and arrived in Manila on march 3, 1986, does not prove that in between these dates,
she did not come back to the Philippines to practice her deceptions. The tickets and
certification she submitted were not the best evidence to establish her absence from the
Philippines on the dates the offenses were committed. What she should have submitted to
the trial court was her passport, where the holder's departure/arrivals are officially indicated.
Curiously, the ticket issued to her on may 3, 1985, by Continental for

Manila - Korror - Manila was used by her in going to Korror but not in coming back to Manila.
She claims to have returned to Manila on March 3, 1986, but via Air Nauru instead. Why she
did not avail herself of the pre-paid Continental return trip ticket to Manila raises some doubt
on her credibility. Could it be that she had earlier used her return ticket in coming back to
Manila and that she went back later to Korror, from which she returned to the Philippines on
March 3, 1986, on board Air Nauru Flight 420? At any rate, the certification by the manager
of Air Nauru is hearsay and inadmissible because he was not presented at the trial to affirm
it.
The appellees argue that they cannot be held liable for estafa because they were prevented
from complying with their promise due to their incarceration. This is not true. Enrique Taguba
accompanied Norman Sarrion and Gilbert Fabrigas to Korror on December 29, 1985. After a
week, Taguba came back to the Philippines, leaving the two to stay there for three months
and fend for themselves without any work. All this happened before Enrique and Marife were
arrested and detained on March 9, 1986 and March 10, 1986, respectively. 22
In the case of Jesus Garcia, the promised employment on March 2, 1986, never came.
Learning that Enrique had been apprehended, Garcia even gave him money for his bail. The
money was an additional consideration for his overseas employment, but even after Enrique's
release, Garcia remained unemployed. In fact, Enrique cannot validly argue that his detention
prevented him from fulfilling his obligation because he had in fact already defaulted prior to
his arrest.
The appellants' claim that they had made no representation that they could send
complainants abroad is belied by the following testimonies of the complainants:
Myrna Roxas:
Q. Did you talk with the two accused at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you talk about?
A. They told us, sir, that they are having us employed as

dressmakers at Palau.
Q. Who is this who told you that you would be employed at

Palau?
A. Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba, your Honor.
Q. What was or what were the conditions for your employment

at Palau, Guam?
20
A. They told us sir that if we give P5,000.00 we will have

medical examination, NBI clearance and then passport. 23
Gilbert Fabrigas:
Q. Did he tell you how you were supposed go for employment

abroad?
A. Yes, sir. He told me as long as I pay.
Q. For how much did he require you to pay for your

employment abroad?
A. P20,000.00, sir.
Q. Were you able to comply with that requirement to pay

P20,000.00 in order to go abroad for employment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you pay that or give that amount of P20,000.00 to

Atty. Taguba?
A. On November 23, 1985, I gave him P10,000.00 and on

December 27, 1985, I gave him another P10,000.00, sir. 24
Substantially similar narrations were made by other complainants.
The indisputable fact is that the appellants gave the distinct assurance that they had the
ability to send the complainants abroad, employing false pretenses and imaginary business
transactions to beguile their victims. The complainants willingly gave their hard-earned money
to the appellants in hopes of the overseas employment deceitfully promised them by the
latter.
It is also evident from the testimonies of the complainants that the deceptions were practiced
on them by both appellants, who cooperated with each other in fleecing the complainants of
their money. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 25 It is clear from the evidence of record
that appellants, who were live-in partners, were moved by a common design to victimize the
complainants. As a consequence, they are enmeshed in the same criminal liability for their
conspiracy, which make the act of one the act of both.
The Court agrees that the appellants cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment on a large
scale because only two of the complainants, Jesus Garcia and Elena Santiago, categorically
testified that their recruitment came after February 10, 1986. This was the date when P.D.
2018, the law defining and penalizing illegal recruitment in a large scale, took effect.
P.D. 2018 has amended Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code by providing inter alia as
follows:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. . . .
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in a large scale shall

be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized
in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group

of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another
in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under this first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group.
21
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of the imprisonment and a fine of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this
Title found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and
regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than
P20,000 nor more than P100,00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the
discretion of the Court.
P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be an ex post facto law to
them. A law is ex post facto if it refers to a criminal act, punishes an act which was innocent
when done, and retroacts to the disadvantage of the accused. 26 Prior to the said date,
recruiting on a large scale was not yet punished with the penalty imposed in the said decree.
Moreover, each of the eight informations for illegal recruitment charged the appellants with
illegally recruiting only one person. It is a basic right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him and, if he is found guilty, to be penalized only
for the offense specified in the information or necessarily included in such offense. 27 Under
the decree, illegal recruiting on a large scale can take place only when it is committed against
three or more persons, individually or as a group.
The proper penalty for the illegal recruitment committed by appellants is provided for in Art.
39 (c) of the Labor Code, to wit, imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight
years or fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the court's discretion. We hereby fix the penalty at from four to
eight years and a fine of P50,000.00 for each of the eight charges. The amounts ordered
reimbursed to the complainants are affirmed except the amount reimbursable to Manuel
Aquiban, which was reduced form P10,000.00 to P6,000.00, the amount actually delivered by
him to the appellants.
Regarding the estafa, we shall accept the modification of the penalty as suggested by the
Solicitor General, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to two years, eleven
months and ten days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and
twenty days of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of the offense. The monetary
awards by the trial court are affirmed.
Duplicity is condemnable under any circumstance but it becomes doubly deplorable when
exercised on the poor and unemployed, as in the case before us. The complainants were
desperate for a living and were willing to work even away from their families so they could
lift themselves from their penury. The appellants took advantage of their plight and enticed
them with dollar earnings. The complainants succumbed to their wiles and raised the money
demanded of them, borrowing what they could and selling what little they had. All they got
was disenchantment. The appellants were like vultures preying on the victims and feeding on
their broken dreams.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, but with the following modifications:
(1) For each of the 8 counts of illegal recruiting in Criminal Cases

Nos. C-26359; C-26364; C-26367; C- 26370; C-26371; C-26374 and C-26389, the appellants
are sentenced to a penalty of four to eight years imprisonment and a fine of P50,000.00. The
amounts ordered by the trial court to be reimbursed to the respective complainants are
affirmed except the amount reimbursable to Manuel Aquiban, which is reduced to P6,000.00.
(2) For each of the three counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos.
C-26343; C-26347 and C-26348, the appellants are sentenced to two years, eleven months
and ten days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and twenty days
22
of prision mayor, as maximum. The amounts ordered reimbursed to the respective

complainants are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 5-15. The complainants in the informations for illegal recruiting
were Jesus Garcia, Violeta Porte, Federico Sagurit, Jr., Manuel Aquiban, Elena
Santiago, Renelito Cerbito, Danilo Pacheco and Myrna Roxas. The complainants
in the informations for estafa were Jesus Garcia, Josefina Sarrion and Gilbert
Fabrigas.
2 TSN, March 30, 1987, p. 18.
3 TSN, March 18, 1987, p. 13.
4 TSN, June 15, 1990, p. 5.
5 TSN, February 11, 1987, p. 4.
6 TSN, October 13, 1986, p. 7.
7 February 11, 1987, p. 12.
8 Ibid., p. 18.
9 TSN, July 28, 1987, p. 6.
10 TSN, March 30, 1987, p. 20.; TSN, March 18, 1987, pp. 18-19.
11 TSN, July 3, 1989, pp. 5, 7, 8.
12 TSN, Jan. 15, 1990, p. 6; TSN, July 3, 1989, pp. 2-3.
13 Exhibit 1, for Marife Taguba.
14 Exhibit 2, for Marife Taguba.
15 Rollo, pp. 28-40.
16 Garcia, P18,000.00; Aquiban, P6,000.00; Roxas, P5,000.00; Porte,

P5,000.00; Cerbito, P8,000.00 and $40.00; Pacheco, P5,000.00 and $50.00;
Fabrigas, P20,000.00; Sarrion, P15,000.00; Santiago, P5,00.00; Sagurit,
P8,000.00.
17 Garcia, P18,000.00; Fabrigas, P20,000.00; Sarrion, P15,000.00.
18 TSN, March 30, 1987, p. 30.
19 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 290.
20 TSN, July 3, 1989; TSN, January 15, 1990, pp. 4-5.
21 Exhibit 1, Enrique Taguba.
22 Exhibit B & B-1.

23
23 TSN, February 10, 1987, p. 3.
24 TSN, March 18, 1987, pp. 9-10.
25 Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
26 Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74, In re: Kay Villegas Kami Inc., 35 SCRA 429;
Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686.
27 Rule 120 Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 105204 March 9, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THELMA REYES and NICK REYES, accused, THELMA REYES accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, Branch 35, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused

Thelma Reyes beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment defined and
penalized under Article 38, P.D. No. 442 as amended, the Court hereby
sentences said accused to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a
fine in the amount of P100,000.00 and to indemnify Rosalino Bitang and Fabian
Baradas, Mr. de Castro, Lorenzo Blanza and Ramon Mendoza the sum of
P45,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Appellant Thelma Reyes was charged together with her husband Nick Reyes, but the latter
was at large and so has remained up to now. Consequently, the trial proceeded only with
respect to Thelma Reyes in view of her plea of not guilty.
The prosecution's first witness, Rosalino Bitang, testified that sometime in 1985, he and five
others (Lorenzo Blanza, Fabian Baradas, Edgardo Garcia, Ramon Mendoza and Dionisio de
Castro) went to the house of the appellant in Los Baos, Laguna, to apply for employment
abroad; that he gave P5,000 to Nick Reyes as downpayment for the recruitment fees; that
Nick Reyes handed the money to his wife Thelma Reyes, and afterward issued a receipt (Exh.
A), which reads:
RECEIPT
RECEIVED from MR. RIZALINO BITANG the amount of FIVE THOUSAND

(P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
Manila, September 19, 1985.

24
(SGD.) NICK N.
REYES, SR.
Bitang testified that on January 14, 1986, he and his companions paid P34,000.00 more to
the spouses through Dionisio de Castro. Of this amount, P8,500.00 was for his (witness
Bitang's) placement fee, while the balance was for payment of his companions' fees. As before
Nick Reyes received the amount and gave it to his wife, Thelma Reyes, after which he issued
a receipt (Exh. B) which reads:
RECEIPT
RECEIVED from MR. DIONISIO DE CASTRO the amount of THIRTY FOUR

THOUSAND (P34,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency for the following:
Edgardo Garcia Ramon Mendoza Lorenzo Blanza, Fabian Barradas, and
Rosalino Bitang.
Manila, January 14, 1986.
(SGD) NICHOL
REYES SR.
According to complainant, Nick Reyes promised to notify them as soon as they were accepted
for employment so that they could leave for abroad, but this promise was not fulfilled. He
said that he checked with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and
found out that the spouses were not licensed recruiters. A certification to this effect was issued
to him by the POEA. (Exh. C)
The other complainant Fabian Baradas also testified. He stated that he was introduced to
Thelma Reyes sometime in September, 1985 at Lemery, Batangas, while the latter was
recruiting workers for deployment in Saudi Arabia.
On several occasions between September and December, 1985, he and several others went
to appellant's house at Junction, Los Baos Laguna for overseas employment and were
required to submit travel documents, such as passports, birth certificates and NBI clearances
and to pay various amounts of money.
On January 9, 1986, he gave P6,000.00 to Nick and Thelma Reyes, through his godfather
Dionisio de Castro, for which Nick Reyes issued to him a receipt (Exh. E), reading:
RECEIPT
Received from Mr. Dionisio de Castro the amount of Six Thousand

(P6,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency.
Manila, January 9, 1986.
(SGD.) NICK N.
REYES
On January 14, 1986, he paid the additional amount of P12,000.00 to Reyes through Dionisio
de Castro as evidenced by Exh. B. The money was supposed to cover the cost of the
processing papers. However, as no job was forthcoming, he went to the POEA to inquire, and,
like Rosalino Bitang, he learned that the spouses were not licensed recruiters.
The complainants both testified that as soon as they obtained the POEA certification that
appellant and her husband were not licensed to recruit, they demanded from the spouses the
return of their money and when the latter did not give back their money, they filed the
complaint in this case.
Only the appellant Thelma Reyes testified in her behalf. She claimed that she met the
witnesses Bitang and Baradas only when they were looking for her husband at their house in
Los Baos, Laguna, between March and May of 1986. She denied having met them before.
25
She admitted that the receipts (Exhs. A, B and E) were all written and signed by her husband,
but she denied she had anything to do with her husband's activities. She said they had been
estranged since March 1986 precisely because she did not approve of her husband's illegal
activities. She claimed that she had told her husband that, even though they were poor, they
could live on their earning and the monthly support of P10,000.00 which they were receiving
from her mother-in-law who lived in the United States.
According to appellant, she and her husband saw each other only occasionally, whenever they
visited their children in Los Baos where they were studying because she lived in Singalong,
Manila. She presumed that her husband had told complainants to go to the house in Los Baos
which they were merely renting for their children and that she was included in the complaint
only because her husband could not be located.
On cross-examination she admitted that there were fourteen (14) other cases of Illegal
Recruitment filed and/or pending against her and her husband in different courts of Manila
and claimed that some of the cases had been dismissed or settled after she had refunded the
money of the complainants.
Testifying on rebuttal for the prosecution, Rosalino Bitang stated that it was Thelma Reyes
herself who gave the job applicants the address and sketch of their house in Los Baos,
Laguna, and that she represented to him that she was negotiating for job placements abroad.
Bitang reiterated that money paid to Nick Reyes was given to Thelma Reyes who counted it
before Nick Reyes issued receipts.
On the basis of the parties' evidence, the trial court found Thelma Reyes guilty of illegal
recruitment and sentenced her as stated in the beginning. Hence this appeal.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred
1. IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS MARSHALLED THE QUANTUM

OF EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNDER ARTICLE 38, P.D. NO. 442.
2. IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THERE ARE ONLY TWO

COMPLAINANTS IN THE INFORMATION FILED ON DECEMBER 11, 1986
AGAINST THE ACCUSED HENCE THEY CANNOT BE PROSECUTED UNDER
ARTICLE 38, P.D. NO. 442.
3. IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE VERBAL TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE

COMPLAINANTS RATHER THAN THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.
We shall now deal with these contentions of appellant.
First. Appellant contends that the testimonies of Bitang and Baradas are insufficient to sustain
conviction. She contends that Dionisio de Castro, who allegedly advanced P34,000.00 for the
complainants and their companions, should have been presented to corroborate the claim of
the claimants.
The contention is without merit. To be sure, an accused can be convicted on the strength of
the testimony of a single witness, if such testimony is credible and positive and produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.1 That the witness is also the complainant in a case
makes little difference as long as the court is convinced beyond doubt that the witness is
telling the truth. For instance, in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals2 this Court held:
Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not supported by the
evidence, which is contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that said
decision is "in accordance with law and the evidence" (Rollo,
p. 12). He points out that the appellate court should not have believed the trial
court's conclusion that "the sole testimony of the offended party would have
sufficed to sustain her assertions" (Rollo, p. 47). He claims that self-serving
declarations of a party favorable to himself are not admissible and that none of
the alleged witnesses to the transactions were presented.
26
The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because almost

all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is "hearsay"
(Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving

statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those
made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include
a party's testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given
the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage
fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's testimony in court
made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for
cross-examination.
It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions was
presented in court (Rollo, p. 13). Yolanda Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to some
of the transactions, testified for the prosecution. Assuming that Dela Rosa was
not presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon sufficed to sustain the
conviction of petitioner. The conviction of an accused may be on the basis of
the testimony of a single witness (People v. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]).
In determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be
weighed, not counted (People v. Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304 [1992]).
In the case at bar, the trial court gave weight to the testimonies of complainants because,
Except for the denial of accused Thelma Reyes that she has nothing to do with
the recruitment of the complaining witnesses as well as the collection of the
amount from them, said accused failed to sufficiently overthrow the convincing
testimony of the complaining witnesses that accused Thelma Reyes was present
and even counted the money evidenced by Exhibit[s] "A" and "B" after her
husband hands it to her and that her husband Nick Reyes who issued the
receipts to the complainants.
Moreover, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will in general not
disturb the findings of the trial court unless certain facts or circumstances of weight have
been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if considered, might affect the result of
the case. This is because the trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.3
With respect to the fact that Dionisio de Castro was not presented to testify, it is sufficient to
say that there was no necessity for this because there is no question that the amount of
P34,000.00 which he had advanced for the complainants and others was received by Nick
Reyes.
Second. Appellant contends that the receipts constitute the best evidence to show that only
Nick Reyes received the amounts stated therein because only his signature appears on the
receipts. That the receipts were signed by Nick Reyes alone only proves that it was to him
that the amounts were paid. What, on the other hand, complainants are saying is that
appellant is guilty because she and her husband, conspiring together, acted and made them
believe that they were licensed recruiters. If so, the acts of the husband were likewise those
of her. Indeed, the evidence shows that after receiving the amounts from complainants, Nick
Reyes handed the money paid to the appellant and that Nick Reyes issued the receipts in
question only after appellant Thelma Reyes had counted it.
Appellant claims that she and her husband separated in 1985 precisely because she did not
want to be involved in his illegal activities. This seems to be us to be a convenient way to
dissociate herself, but her mere claim is not enough to overcome the evidence of the
prosecution. If there was anyone whose testimony needed corroboration it was appellant.
Taking another tack, appellant points out that complainants cannot explain why the purpose
for which payment was made is not stated in the receipts nor why the receipts purport to
27
have been issued in "Manila" and not in Los Baos where they said they had made all the
payments. She argues that if the illegal recruitment was made in Manila, then the Regional
Trial Court of Laguna had no jurisdiction to try the case.
The circumstances pointed out by appellant only underscores the deviousness of appellant
and her husband. Complainants have an elementary education only. It is not for them but
for appellant and her husband to explain these circumstances because it was the latter who
made-the receipts. It is not far fetched that they made the receipts this way precisely to
create doubt as to their real import. It is enough that complainants positively identified the
appellant and her husband as having illegally recruited them and collected money from them.
Their testimonies have not been successfully rebutted by the lame denial of appellant.
Third. Appellant contends that in any event the testimonies of the two complainants could not
be the basis for a finding of illegal recruitment on a large scale and for imposing the penalty
of life imprisonment on her. The Labor Code prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment for
illegal recruitment when committed on a "large scale." Art. 38 (b) of the Code provides:
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be

considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
And Art. 39 (a) provides:
Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
We agree with this contention.
In this case the information against appellant mentioned only the two complainants Fabian
Baradas and Rosalino Bitang as having been illegally recruited by appellant and her husband.
The trial Court, however, held appellant guilty of illegal recruitment on a large scale because
aside from Baradas and Bitang, appellant and her husband allegedly recruited others, namely,
Lorenzo Blanza, Edgardo Garcia, Ramon Mendoza, and Dionisio de Castro.
This is error. To be sure, Blanza and Garcia, according to complainant Baradas were able to
obtain overseas employment. On the other hand, with respect to De Castro there is no
evidence that he, too, had been illegally recruited by the spouses. What appears in the record
is that he advanced the amount of P34,000.00 in behalf of the complainants and the three
others. Only two, therefore, had been illegally recruited.
There are, it is said, 14 other cases filed pending in the courts against the accused for illegal
recruitment. These cases cannot be taken into account for the purpose of Art. 38(b). When
the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment "committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group," it must be understood as referring to the number of complainants
in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for single crimes of illegal
recruitment can be cummulated to make out a case of large scale illegal recruitment. In other
words, a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case
of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group.
Moreover, even it Blanza and Garcia had been illegally recruited so as to make the number of
persons illegally recruited four and make the crime that of illegal recruitment on a large scale,
since this was not alleged in the information and this is the more serious offense which
includes that which was charged, the appellant can only be found guilty of the less serious
offense charged, pursuant to Rule 120, 4.
Accordingly, appellant must be punished under Art. 39(c) of the Labor Code which provides:
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this
Title found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and
regulations shall upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than
28
P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the
discretion of the court.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered, finding
appellant Thelma Reyes guilty of illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is hereby sentenced
for each crime to suffer imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years and pay a fine of
P50,000.00; and ordered to indemnify Rosalino Bitang in the amount of P13,500.00 and
Fabian Baradas in the amount of P18,000.00 and pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 People v. Mendoza, 223 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 97931, (1993).
2 228 SCRA 429, 436-7 (1993).
3 People v. Hangad, 227 SCRA 244 (1993).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 112175 July 26, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ENGINEER RODOLFO DIAZ, accused-appellant.
TORRES, JR., J.:p
Rodolfo 'Erwin' Diaz seeks the mandate of this Court to review the decision dated
September 2, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Davao
City, 1 in Criminal Case No. 26, 993-92 convicting him of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale, and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 plus the costs.
In an Information dated August 15, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor David W. Natividad of
Davao City charged appellant of violating Articles 38 (a) and 38 (b) in relation to Article 39
of the Labor Code, as amended, as follows:
That sometime in the month of July 1992, in the City of Davao, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, purporting
himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers
for employment abroad, particularly Brunei and Japan, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
Mary Anne Navarro, Maria Theresa Fabricante and Maria Elena Ramirez,
without first securing the required license and/or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment.
29
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
The antecedent facts found by the Court a quo reads:
Mary Anne Navarro was 22 years old, single and a student of the University of
the Immaculate Concepcion in 1992, taking up bachelor of science in music,
Davao City.
Maria Theresa Fabricante was 23 years old, single and jobless in 1992. She is
accordingly a commerce graduate of the Notre Dame University in Cotabato
City.
Maria Elena Ramirez was 27 years old, married and a businesswoman in

1992. She is accordingly a college graduate of the University of Mindanao in
Davao City where she finished the course of bachelor of science in commerce,
major in management.
From the combined testimonies of these three complainants, the Court has
gathered that this is what happened, which gave rise to this case:
In June 1992 they were all enrolled at the Henichi Techno

Exchange Cultural Foundation in Davao City, studying
Niponggo. Their teacher was Mrs. Remedios Aplicador.
One day Mrs. Aplicador told them that if they wanted to go and
work abroad, particularly Brunei where they could earn a salary
of "$700.00 for four hours daily work," she would refer them to
Mr. Paulo Lim who knew one Engr. Erwin Diaz who was
recruiting applicants for Brunei (tsn 9-7-92 pp. 10-11 & tsn 9-
8-92 p. 34).
Accompanied by Mrs. Aplicador, the three complainants went to

Mr. Paulo Lim who explained to them that he was not the one
recruiting workers but Engr. Diaz (tsn 9-8-92 p. 34). Mr. Lim
informed them that his children had already applied with Engr.
Diaz and that the requirements were bio-data, passport,
medical checkup, I.D. and income tax return, and P2,500.00 for
processing of their papers (tsn 9-7-92 pp. 11 & 23-24 & 9-8-92
pp. 46 & 58). Telling them that he knew "pretty well the
recruiter" Engr. Diaz and that "We don't have to worry we can
really go abroad and as a matter of fact he said that his three
children were applying (to go) to Brunei," he offered to
accompany them to Engr. Erwin Diaz at the office of the CIS
(tsn 9-7-92 p.11). They asked Mr. Lim when he was available,
and he said July 18 (1992), Saturday morning (tsn 9-8-92 p.
34).
On July 18, Mr. Paulo Lim and Mrs. Remedios Aplicador

accompanied the three complainants to Engr. Diaz who was
then being detained in the CIS Detention Center in Davao City
and introduced them to him. The complainants asked Engr.
Diaz why he was "inside the cell." and he explained that four
applicants had filed a case against him "because they could not
accept that they were sick of hepatitis and that the CIS
elements are just making money out of it" (tsn 9-8-92 p. 35).
They asked him if he was "recruiting applicants for Brunei" and
"he said yes"; they also inquired what were the requirements,
and he said four passport size pictures of each applicant, bio-
data, income tax return, medical certificate, NBI clearance,
passport, P2,500.00 for processing of the papers of each
applicant, and P65,000.00 as placement fee, but only
P20,000.00 for plane fare was to be paid by each applicant, the
balance of P45,000.00 was to be paid by means of salary
30
deductions (tsn 9-7-92 p. 12; tsn 9-8-92 p. 35 & p. 59). The

P2,500.00 for processing of their respective applications was to
be paid at the house of Engr. Diaz at 14 Aries Street, GSIS
Heights, Davao City, with telephone no. 8-46-71 (tsn 9-7-92 p.
12).
Mary Anne Navarro paid P2,300.00 to Engr. Diaz at his

residence on July 22, 1992 (Exh. "C"). There is no explanation
by her why she paid only P2,300.00 and not P2,500.00.
Maria Theresa Fabricante paid only P2,000.00 to Engr. Diaz also

on July 22, 1992 (Exh. "E"). She paid only that amount
because, according to her testimony, she already had a
passport and Engr. Diaz said she was required to pay only
P2,000.00 (tsn 9-8-92 p. 35).
Maria Elena Ramirez paid to Engr. Diaz P2,500.00 but she lost
her receipt (tsn 9-8-92 p. 59). However, it was returned to her
by Engr. Diaz on August 17, 1992 (Exh. "G").
Exhibit "G" is a RECEIPT signed by the three complainants

acknowledging the return to them respectively of the amounts
of P2,300.00, P2,000.00 and P2,500.00 by the accused and his
wife who also signed it as witnesses (tsn 9-8-92 p. 43).
After submitting to the accused all the required papers and

undergoing medical examination (before the return of said
amounts to the complainants), they asked him when they could
leave. The accused told them to wait for three to four weeks as
his papers were still being processed by the CIS (tsn 9-7-92 p.
15). During this period when the accused had already been
released from detention (testimony of the accused, tsn 4-27-93
pp. 16-17), the complainants kept inquiring from him when
they would be leaving for Brunei, going to his house several
times where they saw many other applicants like them. But the
accused just kept saying that his papers were still with the CIS
(tsn 9-7-92 p. 15).
When he was still detained, he told the complainants that "the

name of his agency is confidential but the owner thereof is
Erlinda Romualdez" who "used to be her (sic) mistress"
assuring them that "we don't have to worry about it because he
said it is government project and then he said he will escort us
to Philippine Plaza Hotel for briefing before leaving for abroad
and after the briefing at the Philippine Plaza Hotel we will
proceed to POEA where we will sign a contract that is the time
we will give him the amount of P20,000.00 and then we will
proceed to the residence of Erlinda Romualdez where we will be
staying for three days" (tsn 9-8-92 pp. 40-41).
Mary Anne Navarro asked her father for P20,000.00 for her
plane fare, and so they mortgaged their piano for P30,000.00
to Serve Loan Mart as evidenced by a promissory note for
P30,000.00 (Exh. "D" & tsn 9-7-92 p. 16).
From the borrowed P30,000.00, Mary Anne Navarro set aside

P20,000.00 "for placement fee and the remaining P10,000.00 I
used in buying travelling bag, dresses, shoes and of course
make up (sic) because we were told that we will be working
there as salesgirls. Then hairband, pair of earrings and ring"
(tsn 9-7-92 pp. 16-17). It was the accused who told them that
they would be working in one of the department stores in
Brunei and receiving a monthly pay of $700.00 for working only
31
four hours a day (tsn 9-7-92 p. 17). Earlier, she said Engr. Diaz
told her and her co-complainants herein that the P20,000.00
was for plane fare (tsn 9-7-92 p. 12).
Maria theresa Fabricante went home to Cotabato to secure the

required P20,000.00. Her father sold a horse for P5,000.00. As
for the balance of P15,000.00 "Our plan was to mortgage our
five hectare land to a friend of my father."
Q Was the land actually mortgage?
A The money was ready for release.
Q Now, was the money release?
A No sir.
Q Why?
A The money was supposed to be released on August 6, but

before that date August 3, I came back to Davao and went to
the office of POEA and verify whether Engr. Diaz was indeed a
licensed recruiter.
Q What did you find out when you go there?
A He is not registered or in the list. His name does not appear

on the list.
Q With whom did you talk to with the POEA?
A Atty. Evangelio.
Q Now, upon learning that Mr. Diaz is not included in the

masters list, what did you do?
A After knowing that I went to my two companions Ma. Elena

Ramirez and Mary Anne Navarro and informed them of what I
found out that the agency represented by Engr. Diaz was a fake
agency and I advised them they too should follow it up by
themselves.
Q Now, of your own knowledge, did they do?
A Yes sir.
Q What about you?
A Yes sir, we set a date to go to the POEA but before that we

agreed that we will go and see Engr. Diaz to get back the
money that we paid as well as the papers.
Q Did you actually go to Engr. Diaz?
A Yes sir.
Q What happened?
A We went to see Eng. Diaz and when we met him, he greet us

by saying: "If you are ready to leave?" But we told him that we
are not going to leave and we are withdrawing our applications
32
because we found from the office of the POEA that he is a fake

recruiter and so he got angry and said that if our purpose in
going there was to withdraw, he said we can and we can get
back our documents the next day but he said we will have to
pay him charges. And we said, what for? He said for labor
because he already secured a plane ticket for us and when I
asked where the plane tickets are? He said it is in Cagayan (tsn
9-8-92 pp. 38-39)
At the POEA the three complainants learned that the "agency represented by Engr. Diaz was
a fake agency" (tsn 9-8-92 p. 38). The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
issued a CERTIFICATION (Exh. "A") which reads:
This is to certify that Eng'r. Diaz a.k.a. Erwin, Rudy, Edwin, Rodolfo, Ariel
Mateo of Aries St., GSIS Subd., Matina, Davao City; Mr. Paulo Lim and
Remedios Aplicador both of Sto. Rosario St., Buhangin, Davao City were
never granted an authority to conduct recruitment for overseas employment
in Davao City or in any part of Region XI, and that the agency of the former
known as Phil Jap Constr'n and Tanaka and Diaz Asso. were never been a
licensed agency for overseas recruitment.
This certification is being issued upon the written request of Ma. Elena
Ramirez, Mary Anne Navarro and Ma. Theresa Fabricante for whatever legal
purpose it may serve them best.
14 August 1992 Davao City, Philippines.
(Sgd)
GAUDE
NCIO
DELA
PEA
Unit
Coordi
nator
The three complainants withdrew their applications from Engr. Diaz without
paying his charges. The mounts they paid for processing fees were all
returned to them by Engr. Diaz (Exh. "G"). 3
On September 2, 1993 the trial court rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty of the
crime charged, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Rodolfo "Erwin" Diaz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of large scale illegal recruitment and
sentences him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00,
plus the costs.
Accused appellant Diaz predicated the instant appeal on the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED NOT ONLY
CONFINED HIMSELF TO FACILITATING THE PASSPORT AND MEDICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINANTS BUT ALSO PROMISED THEM
EMPLOYMENT ABROAD.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS
MERELY A FACILITATOR OF TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND NOT AN ILLEGAL
RECRUITER.
33
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME

CHARGED. 4
The foregoing assigned errors, being intertwined, shall be discussed together.
The crime of illegal recruitment, as defined under Articles 38 (a) in relation to Articles 13 (b)
and 34 and penalized under Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential
Decree 1920 and Presidential Decree 2018, is any recruitment activity, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34, undertaken by a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority.
Thus, in People v. Cabacang 5 this Court ruled that the crime of illegal recruitment is
committed when two elements concur, namely:
1] That the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to

enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and,
2] That the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, provides for the statutory definition of "recruitment and
placement", as follows:
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which
in any manner offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
In People v. Panis, 6 we made the pronouncement that any of the acts mentioned in Article
13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is
involved. The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement.
Article 38 (a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense which is essentially
committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which

has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by
the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or
cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. 7
Moreover, recruitment and placement activities of agents or representatives whose

appointments by a license or holder of authority were not previously authorized by the POEA
shall likewise constitute illegal
recruitment. 8
We ruled in People vs. Goce, in this wise:
"Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides
that any recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of
said Code, undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 thereof. The same article further provides that illegal
recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any of the
qualifying circumstances exist, namely,
34
a] when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate, that is, if carried out

by a group of three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another; or,
b] when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, that is, if committed

against three or more persons individually or as a group. 9
Considering the clear import of the foregoing doctrine which spells the unmistakable intent
of the specific provision applicable at bar, the instant case without doubt involves illegal
recruitment in large scale.
The elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, which are undoubtedly
present in this case are:
1] the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to engage in

recruitment and placement activity,
2] the offender undertakes recruitment and placement activity defined under

Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34, and
3] illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons individually

or as a group. 10
As can be ascertained after a thorough reading of the records, appellant Diaz was neither a
licensee nor a holder of authority to qualify him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement activity.
Pursuant to the Certification issued by the POEA dated 14th of August 1992, 11 duly signed
by Gaudencio de la Pena, Unit Coordinator, appellant was never granted an authority to
conduct recruitment for overseas employment.
As to the third element of the crime, there were obviously three persons who were victims
of the appellant's nefarious act of large scale illegal recruitment.
Relative to the question of whether or not appellant Diaz was engaged in recruitment
activity, it is clear from the testimonies of the three complaints that appellant undertook to
recruit them, thus:
Maria Elena Ramirez testified in the following tenor:
Q: When you went to see Mr. Diaz, what happened?
A: We were introduced by Mr. Lim to Diaz, and then we asked

Diaz if it is true that he's recruiting applicants for abroad. He
said that he is recruiting applicants for Japan or Brunei and if
we have P20,000 we can go to Brunei and we will be given
priority if we have the amount.
Q: What else did you ask Mr. Diaz?
A: We asked him what were the requirements.
Q: And what did he answer?
A: Well, he told us that we are required to submit 8 copies of

passport, ID photos, income tax return, passport, medical
certificate and the the amount of P2,500 and he further said
that our placement fee will be P65,000 but all we have to pay in
advance is the amount of P20,000 and the remaining balance of
P45,000 shall be given through salary deductions. 12
Maria Theresa Fabricante testified in the following manner:

35
She declared:
Q: What else did you ask Mr. Diaz?
A: We asked him if he is indeed recruiting applicants for Brunei.

And he said, Yes. After that we asked him what are the
requirements and he told us that we need passport, four
passport size ID pictures, income tax return and NBI clearance,
and if we have diplomas to attach with the other documents.
Q: What else did Mr. Diaz tell you to do?
A: He said that if we are interested, he will take care of the

processing of the documents by giving him the amount of
P2,500, and that he explained that our placement fee will be in
the sum of P65,000 and we will just have to raise P20,000 for
the processing of our visa, plane tickets and POEA expenses. 13
She continued:
Q: What about your work in Brunei, what did you ask him?
A: I asked Engr. Diaz whether our work would be contract

worker and he said yeas and we did not have to worry about it
because he said it was a government project and then he said
he would escort us to Philippine Plaza Hotel for briefing before
leaving for abroad and after the briefing we will proceed to the
POEA where we would sign our contract and after signing that
is the time we would give the amount of P20,000 and then we
would proceed to the residence of Erlinda Romualdez where we
would be staying for three days. 14
The same thing was testified to by Mary Anne Navarro. Appellant told her that he was
recruiting contract workers for abroad, particularly Brunei, and promised her a job
opportunity if she can produce various amounts of money for expenses and processing of
documents. 15
Testifying in his behalf, appellant denied these complainants' allegations. He asserted that
he never made a promise in favor of complainants for employment abroad but assisted
them in the procurement of passports and medical certificates.
This Court is not, however, persuaded by appellant's bare denials.
Evidently, greater weight must generally be given to the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant in weighing contradictory
declarations and statements. 16 We stated this rule with curt emphasis in Goce (supra) that
The lame defense consisting of such bare denials by appellant cannot

overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution proving her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 17
The acts of the appellant, which were clearly described in the lucid testimonies of the three
victims, such as collecting from each of the complainants payment for passport, medical
tests, placement fee, plane tickets and other sundry expenses, promising them employment
abroad, contracting and advertising for employment, unquestionably constitute acts of large
scale illegal recruitment.
Appellant sought refuge in the testimonies of his three witnesses that would give credence
to the claim that he was only a facilitator of travel documents and not a recruiter.
The trial court did not give weight to appellant's allegations.

36
As observed by the trial court, the testimony of Edgar Macomao, is incredible which would
raise serious doubts about his motive as a witness. 18 It also describes the testimony of
Paulo Lim as unclear and confusing. 19 Neither was the testimony of Abednigo Neri given
much credit by the trial court.
Admittedly, the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are to be given
great weight and a high degree of respect by the Appellate Court.
In People vs. Reyes (242 SCRA 264), we enunciated the rule that
When the issue is the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will in general
not disturb the findings of the trial court unless certain facts or circumstances
of weight have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. This is because the trial court
heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during trial. 20
In the case at bar, we see no reason to disturb these observations of the trial court. A
careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no facts or circumstances had been overlooked
or misapplied by the trial court which might affect the result of the case when considered.
As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, to wit:
With the evidence on record, it is hard to believe that services promised by

the appellant to the three complainants were to consists only of his assistance
in the procurement of passports and medical certificates for each of them for
they themselves could have easily secured these documents at a lesser cost.
Moreover, the fact that the appellant still collected P2,000 from Theresa
Fabricante who already had a passport belies his claim that his services were
limited only to procuring a passport and medical certificate. 21
The accused's assertion that he only assisted in the processing of passport and medical
certificate is nothing more than a frivolous excuse to divert the truth.
Likewise, it is the settled rule that a person is guilty of illegal recruitment when he gives the
impression that he has the power to send workers abroad. 22 Appellant Diaz manifestly gave
that impression to the three complainants that he had the ability to send workers abroad.
Misrepresenting himself as a recruiter of workers for Brunei, he promised them work for a
fee and convinced them to give their money for the purpose of getting an employment
overseas.
The findings of the trial court, to which we agree, were arrived at with meticulous care, to
wit:
There is no direct and express denial by Mr. Diaz of the following testimonies
of the complainants:
1] That they had asked Mr. Diaz if he was "recruiting applicants for Brunei"
and he said "Yes".
2] That when asked what his requirements were, he said four passport size
pictures, bio-data, income tax returns, medical certificates, NBI clearance,
passport, P2,500 for processing fee, and P65,000 as placement fee, but only
P20,000 for plane fare was to be paid as the balance of P45,000 was payable
by salary deductions.
3] That he was asked by the complainants as to what agency he would be

referring them, he said "the name of the agency is confidential but the owner
thereof is one Erlinda Romualdez, who used to be his mistress"; that the
complainants did not have to worry because "it is a government project and
then he said he'd escort us to the Philippine Plaza Hotel for briefing before
leaving for abroad and after the briefing we will proceed to POEA where we
will sign our contract and after the signing that is the time we will give the
37
P20,000, and then we will proceed to the residence of Erlinda Romualdez

where we will be staying for three days."
4] That Mr. Diaz told me the complainants that they would be working "as
salesgirls in one of the department stores in Brunei, that they will be getting
$700 a month and they will be only working four hours a day"
These are definitely prohibited practices or activities constituting large scale

illegal recruitment according to the above quoted provisions of the law. There
is no denial of these by the accused. 23
This Court is aware of a new law, RA 8042, otherwise known as Migrant Workers for
Overseas Employment, which was approved on June 07, 1995. It is An Act to Institute the
Policies of Overseas Employment and Establish a Higher Standard of Protection and
Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, their Families and Overseas Filipinos in
Distress and for Other Purposes. This new law, amends the pertinent provisions of the Labor
Code of the Philippines and gives a new definition of the crime of illegal recruitment and
provides for its higher penalty.
We are not in anyway applying the otherwise restrictive provisions of this new law as it is
not applicable in the case at bar, considering the rule that crimes are punishable by the laws
in force at the time of their commission.
In synthesis, considering the positive testimonies of the complainants against the negative
bare denials of accused-appellant, no other conclusion could be arrived at but to sustain the
conviction of accused-appellant finding the latter guilty of large scale illegal recruitment
beyond reasonable doubt.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the Decision appealed from dated September 2,
1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects, with costs against accused-appellant Rodolfo Diaz.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120389. November 21, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEXANDER ALEX BENEMERITO

and PRECY BENEMERITO (at large), accused.
ALEXANDER ALEX BENEMERITO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by accused-appellant Alexander Alex Benemerito from a Joint

Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 91, convicting him of illegal
recruitment and three counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

38
1. Finding accused Alexander Alex Benemerito guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as

principal, of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale, as defined in Article
38, in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 2018 in
Crim. Case No. Q-93-51511 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and to pay the cost;

principal, of the crime of estafa in Crim Case No. Q-93-51513 and sentencing
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum; to indemnify Benjamin Quitoriano in the amount of P50,000.00 and
to pay the cost;

principal, of the crime of Estafa in Crim. Case No. Q-93-51514 and sentencing
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
to indemnify Fernando Arcal in the amount ofP50,000.00 and to pay the costs;

principal, of the crime of estafa in Crim. Case No. Q-93-51515 and sentencing
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify Carlito Gumarang in the amount of P95,000.00 and to
pay the costs; and,
5. Acquiting accused Alexander Alex Benemerito of the crime of Estafa in Crim. Case
No. Q-93-51512 for lack of evidence.[2]
The amended information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-51511 charged the accused-
appellant and his sister, Precy Benemerito, with the crime of large Scale Illegal Recruitment
allegedly committed, as follows:
That sometime during the months comprised from February to August 1993 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit and promise employment to Brunei to the persons of FERNANDO ARCAL,
ROLANDO ESPINO, CARLITO B. GUMARANG, BENJAMIN J. QUITORIANO, JULIO CABALLA and
JOSE AQUINO, JR., by then and there requiring them to submit certain documentary
requirements and exacting from them the total amount of P583,000.00, Philippine Currency
as recruitment fees without the required necessary license or authority from the Department
of Labor and Employment.
That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated
against six (6) persons individually or as a group as penalized under Article 38 in relation to
Article 39 as amended by P.D. No. 2018 of the labor Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The amended information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-51512 charged them with Estafa
allegedly committed, thus:
That sometime during the months comprised from February to August 1993 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JOSE N. AQUINO,
JR. in the following manner, to wit: representation which they made to said JOSE N. AQUINO,
39
JR. to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ JOSE N. AQUINO,
JR. as worker and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced
and succeeded in inducing said JOSE N. AQUINO, JR. to give and deliver, as in fact gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P17,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations
and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and
were made solely to obtain, as in fact did obtain the amount of P17,000.00 which amount
once in possession, with intent to defraud him, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said JOSE N. AQUINO, JR. in the aforesaid amount of P17,000.00
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-51513, Q-93-51514 and Q-93-51515,

charging the accused-appellant and Precy Benemerito with Estafa in each case, contain
substantially the same allegations as that in Criminal Case No. Q-93-51512, except as to the
names of the complainants and the amounts involved viz., (a) Benjamin Quitoriano
and P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-51513;[5] (b) Fernando Arcal and P50,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. Q-93-51514;[6] and (c) Carlito Gumarang and P105,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-51515.[7]
Only the accused-appellant was arrested, while Precy Benemerito has remained at large
up to the present. These cases were consolidated and joint trial thereon was had only against
the accused-appellant after he entered a plea of innocence in the five cases on 27 April 1994.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were complainants Bejamin Quitoriano,

Fernando Arcal and Carlito Gumarang; and Graciano Oco, the Senior Labor and Employment
Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Fernando Arcal was
recalled as a rebuttal witness.
The trial court summarized the evidence for the prosecution as follows:
Benjamin Quitoriano claims to have known both Alex and Precy Benemerito since birth as
they are townmates in Gonzaga, Cagayan. Sometime in February, 1993, he met Alex and
Precy Benemerito in Gonzaga, Cagayan and the two offered him a job as helper mechanic
in Japan and Alex said that they would leave together as he was also applying for a job
there. Alex told him to prepare his passport, pictures and certificate of former
employment. On March 8, 1993, he went to the residence of Alex and Precy Benemerito at
150-A Scout Hernandez, Kamuning, Quezon Cityand he submitted the papers to them. Precy
told him to pay a placement fee of P100,000.00 but he said that he had only P50,000.00,
which he gave to Precy. Precy asked Alex to count the money and told him to deposit the
same in the bank and she issued a receipt for said amount (Exh. A). With respect to the
balance of P50,000.00, Benjamin Quitoriano requested that he be allowed to pay the same in
installment by way of salary deduction. Precy then asked him to sign a two-year contract
which provided for a salary of one lapad or 10,000 yen a day and medical and housing
benefits.Precy gave him a referral for medical examination and told Alex to accompany him
to the clinic. Alex accompanied him to the clinic and assured him of the promised job as they
would leave together.
Carlito Gumarang, another townmate of Alex and Precy Benemerito, was told by the latters
mother sometime in February, 1993 that her children were recruiting people for employment
and gave him their address at 150-A Scout Fernandez, Kamuning, Quezon City where he
could see them if he was interested. He went to said address and talked to Alex and Precy
who told him that he could leave for Japan to work as helper mechanic within forty-five (45)
days after full payment of the placement fee of P105,000.00. He paid the amount
of P105,000.00 in four (4) installments to Precy in the presence of Alex, who counted the
money, and Precy gave him the corresponding receipts (Exh. H, I, J and K). He also submitted
40
the necessary documents, such as application form, passport, NBI clearance and certificate
of employment to Alex. He was asked by Alex to sign a contract of employment as helper
mechanic which provided for a salary of one lapad or the equivalent ofP2,500.00 a day.
Fernando Arcal was accompanied by his friend, Marcelo Leal, to the house of Alex and Precy
at 150-A Scout Fernandez, Kamuning, Quezon City sometime in August, 1992 but the two
told him that there was no available job. He returned to said place in March, 1993 and he was
shown by Alex and Precy a job order for fifty (50) mechanic helpers for Japan with a salary
rate of one lapad orP2,500.00 a day. Alex told him to have a medical examination and
accompanied him to the clinic in Malate. After three days, Alex and Precy told him that he
passed the medical examination and to raise money for the processing of his application. He
paid the total amount of P50,000.00 in five installments, as evidenced by four (4) receipts
issued by Precy (Exh. C, D, E, and F), while his last payment in the amount of P5,000.00
on June 15, 1993 was received by Alex who issued the corresponding receipt (Exh. G), as
Precy had already left for Brunei. Alex asked him to sign the contract, attended to the
processing of his papers, counted the money given by him as placement fee and assured him
that he would be able to leave.
As the complainants were not able to leave for Japan as promised, Benjamin Quitoriano,
Carlito Gumarang and Fernando Arcal, together with other job applicants, filed a complaint
against Alex and Precy Benemerito before the NBI. They likewise secured a Certification from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration that Alexander Benemerito and Precy
Benemerito are not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment (Exh.
B and B-1), which was confirmed in open court by Graciano Oco, Senior Labor and
Employment Officer who personally verified the same from the records of the Office. [8]
The defense presented the accused-appellant whose testimony is summarized by the trial
court as follows:
Alexander Benemerito tried to show that after graduating from high school, he worked as
jeepney conductor in his hometown, Binaga, Gonzaga, Cagayan. In December, 1992, his
sister Precy visited their place and convinced him to work abroad. On January 7, 1993, he
went to the apartment at 150-A Scout Fernandez, Kamuning, Quezon City, which Precy was
sharing with the owner, Mrs. Susie Mana and the latters son and four maids. He applied for a
janitorial work in Brunei and submitted the required documents to Precy, who offered to
shoulder the expenses. Precy likewise told him to stay in said apartment while his papers
were being processed and he helped in the household chores and in the store of Susie Mana
located at Agham Road, Quezon City, for which he was paid P50.00 a day by the latter. He
admitted having seen Benjamin Quitoriano, Carlito Gumarang and Fernando Arcal in said
apartment when they talked to Precy in connection with their application for overseas
employment and that he accompanied Benjamin Quitoriano to the clinic upon the latters
request. However, he denied having participated in the transaction of Precy with the three
complainants or having issued the receipt in favor of Fernando Arcal (Exh. G) as he was
outside the apartment cleaning the vehicle of Susie Mana or watering the plants while they
talked with Precy. He further claimed that the complainants admitted before the NBI agents
who arrested him that he had nothing to do with their transaction with Precy Benemerito, who
left for Brunei in August, 1993, and that it was only before the Inquest Fiscal that the
complainants pointed to him as the one who received the money, which he denied. Jaime
Roblegado claimed to have gone to the house of Precy Benemerito in Fedruary, March and
April, 1993 in connection with his application for employment as computer programmer in
Brunei, that it was only Precy who entertained him and the other applicants, including
Fernando Arcal, whom he saw in the house and although Alex Benemerito was also in said
place, he did not see the latter entertain any applicants as Alex was either cleaning a car or
the living room of the house; and that he had a chance to ask Alex why he was in said place
and the latter told him that Precy is his sister and that he was also an applicant and following
up his papers.[9]
41
In its Joint Decision[10] dated 2 May 1995 and promulgated the following day, the trial
court declared that the testimonies of the complainants were positive and credible, and found
that accused Alex Benemerito, together with his sister Precy Benemerito, [was] positively
identified by Benjamin Quitoriano, Carlito Gumarang and Fernando Arcal as having promised
them employment abroad for a fee [and that] [a]s shown by a Certification of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, both Alex and Precy Benemerito are neither licensed
nor authorized by said office to recruit workers for overseas employment (exhibits B and B-
1).
The trial court further observed that accused Alex Benemerito has not denied that he is
a townmate of both Benjamin Quitoriano and Carlito Gumarang and it is difficult to believe
that said complainants would fabricate a story that would result in the imprisonment for life
of the accused. With respect to Fernando Arcal, while he did not know the accused personally,
it was against human nature and experience for a stranger to accuse another stranger of a
most serious crime merely to mollify his hurt feelings.[11]
The trial court debunked the accused-appellantss testimony as inherently weak for being
a mere denial and that Susie Mana did not corroborate his claim that he worked as her
houseboy and stayed in her apartment.[12]
The trial court then concluded that the evidence for the prosecution established all the
elements of the crimes charged, thus:
Thus, the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when a person (a) undertakes
any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated
under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage
in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (c) commits the same against three or
more persons, individually or as a group. (People vs. Coronacion, 237 SCRA 227, 239).[13]
On the other hand, the elements of estafa in general are (1) that the accused defrauded
another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit, and (2) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party (People vs. Ong,
204 SCRA 942).
In the cases at bar, accused Alex Benemerito and his sister Precy gave the complainants the
impression that they could give them employment abroad so that the complainants were
convinced to give them the money they demanded in their desire to be able to earn one lapad
or the equivalent of P2,500.00 a day as represented to them. Benjamin Quitoriano and
Fernando Arcal each gave accused Alex Benemerito and his sister the amount of P50,000.00,
as evidenced by the receipts issued to them (Exh. A, C to G). With respect to Carlito
Gumarang, he presented receipts evidencing his payment of a total amount of P95,000.00
(Exh. I, J and K). The receipts dated August 24, 1992 for the amount of P10,000.00 (Exh. H)
is in the name of Shally Flor Gumarang, a sister of Carlito Gumarang and likewise an applicant,
and cannot thus be considered as part of the payment of Carlito Gumarang. The fact that the
receipts were signed only by Precy Benemerito is of no moment, in view of the insistence of
the complainants that the money was given by them to both Alex and Precy Benemerito in
consideration of their promise of overseas employment as the money was counted first by
Alex Benemerito after which Precy Benemerito issued the receipts to the complainant. Thus,
the acts of accused Alex Benemerito and his sister establish a common criminal design
towards the accomplishments of the same unlawful purpose, evidencing conspiracy between
them.[14]
The complainant in Civil Case No. Q-93-51512, however, was unable to testify; hence the
trial court declared that the case must perforce fail for lack of evidence. [15] The trial court then
rendered judgment as quoted in the opening paragraph of this ponencia.
In due time, the accused-appellants filed his appeal and in his Appellants
Brief[16] contends that the trial court committed the following errors:
42
I.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT A CONSPIRACY EXIST BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT

ALEX BENEMERITO AND HIS CO-ACCUSED SISTER PRECY BENEMERITO; AND IN
CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME AS PRINCIPAL.
II.
x x x IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANT ON GROUNDS OF

REASONABLE DOUBT BY APPLYING THE EQUIPOSE RULE.[17]
As to his first assigned error, the accused appellant maintains that his conviction was
based mainly on his association with Precy Benemerito, his sister and co-accused, which the
trial court appreciated as evidence of conspiracy. He claims such a conclusion to be erroneous
for even assuming he helped his sister entertain the complainants, he did so only because,
like the complainants, he was also an applicant eager to work abroad, and his sister promised
to pay for his placement fee. Further, he had no knowledge of his sisters criminal intent and
might even be considered a victim of his sister.
The accused-appellant also argues that some of the complainants knew that he was not
a part of any conspiracy, hence they did not include his name in the complaint filed with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and if he were, he would have gone into hiding instead
of facing his accusers.[18]
In the second assigned error, the accused-appellant assert that he should be acquitted
under the equipoise rule in view of the doubts as to his guilt as shown in his arguments under
the first assigned error, and that the evidence points in fact to his sister Precy Benemerito as
the recruiter who received the money from the complainants.[19]
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, disagrees with the accused-
appellant and recommends that we affirm in toto the impugned decision.
A careful review of the record discloses that the trial courts findings of fact are supported
by the evidence and its conclusions are in accord with the law and jurisprudence. We hold,
therefore, that the crimes of large scale illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa were
committed, and that the accused-appellant is guilty thereof beyond reasonable doubt. We
have no alternative but to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment, subject to
modifications on the penalties imposed in the cases for estafa.
Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly established the fact that both the accused-appellant
and his sister Precy Benemerito were engaged in the business of illegal recruitment.In their
testimonies, Fernando Arcal and Carlito Gumarang were positive, categorical and firm, even
under grueling cross-examination, that the accused-appellant actively participated in the
recruitment process. The latter was present when each complainant was offered a job in
Japan, and the accused-appellant even made representations as to the existence of such
jobs[20] and accompanied the complainants for their medical examinations. [21] The accused-
appellant likewise received installment payments from the complainants. [22] These acts
demonstrated beyond doubt that the accused-appellant was not merely an applicant for a job
or an unwitting victim of his sister; on the contrary, he was a knowing and willing participant
in the recruitment activities, which were obviously conducted for profit. We do not then
hesitate to rule, as did the trial court, that the accused-appellant and his sister Precy
Benemerito, who is still at large, were co-conspirators in the recruitment business which, as
hereunder discussed, was illegal and on a large scale. Conspiracy exist when two or more
people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.[23] It can be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. [24] Once conspiracy is
established, the act of one conspirator is the act of the others.[25]
That the accused-appellants name was not included in the sworn statement of Fernando
Arcal filed with the NBI is of no moment. As correctly ruled by the trial court, this omission
was satisfactorily explained by complainant Fernando Arcal; moreover, all the complainants
43
identified [the accused-appellant] before the Inquest Fiscal as the one who received the
money from them.[26]
Neither are we persuaded by this plea of innocence allegedly evidenced by non-flight. This
converse of the evidentiary principle of flight as indicative of guilt,[27] does not necessarily
hold true.[28] Non-flight may not be positively construed as an indication of innocence. [29]
The accused-appellants plea for the application of the equipoise rule must likewise
fail. This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused.[30] There is, therefore, no equipose if the evidence is not evenly balanced. Not even
a semblance of parity is present in this case. Against the direct, positive and convincing
evidence for the prosecution, the accused-appellant could only offer a mere denial and the
incredible claim that he was an unwitting victim of his sister Precy Benemerito. He miserably
failed to overcome the prosecutions evidence, hence the rule is unavailable to him. [31]
We now turn to the criminal liability of the accused-appellant.
Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. -- (a) Any recruitment activities including the prohibited
activities including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to
be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any
law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be

considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance
with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three

(3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out
any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Article 13(b) of the same Code defines recruitment and placement as:
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring

workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
To prove illegal recruitment, only two elements need be shown, viz., (1) the person
charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities (or any of the activities
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended); and (2) the said person does not
have a license or authority to do so. It is not required that it be shown that such person
wrongfully represented himself as licensed recruiter.[32] A license is a document issued by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a
private employment agency, while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing
a person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private
recruitment agency.[33]
There is large scale illegal recruitment if it is committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group; its elements, therefore, are the two above mentioned plus the fact
that it is committed against three or more persons.[34]
44
Large scale illegal recruitment involves economic sabotage,[35] and is penalized by Article
39(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, with life imprisonment and a fine ofP100,000.00.
The accused-appellant having recruited at least three persons, giving them the
impression of his ability to send workers abroad, assuring them of their employment in Japan,
and collecting various amounts for alleged processing and placement fees, without license nor
authority to so recruit or offer job placements abroad, thus committed large scale illegal
recruitment.
It is settled in our jurisdiction that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa under paragraph 2(a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as the former is malum prohibitum where the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in sewhere the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. [36] In short, a conviction for offenses
under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other laws. [37]
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another: (a) by
abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[38]
All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant deceived the
complainants into believing that he had the authority and capability to send them abroad for
employment; that there were available jobs for them in Japan for which they would be hired;
and that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with their
money in payment of the various processing and placement fees. As all these representations
of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
is thus applicable.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. The opening paragraph of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
[T]he penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such a case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed, and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The amount proved to have been defrauded in Criminal Case No. Q-93-51513 and
Criminal Case No. Q-93-51514 was P50,000.00 in each case. Hence, the penalty prescribed
above should be imposed in its maximum period. The maximum period thereof following the
rule prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code [39] ranges from
six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days to eight (8) years. We add to it two
(2) years and nine (9) months for the amount beyond the firstP22,000.00 (at the rate of one
(1) year for every P10,000.00 and nine (9) months for the remaining P8,000.00 by ratio and
proportion). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellant can be
sentenced to an Indeterminate penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law, viz.,prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods (six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months) and whose maximum shall be the abovementioned imposable penalty. The
indeterminate penalty can range, therefore, from two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten
(10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and nine (9) months
of prision mayor, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-51515, the amount proved to have been defrauded is
only P85,000.00, as the receipt for the P10,000.00 is in the name of Shally Flor Gumarang,
not the complainant Carlito Gumarang. The principal penalty imposable is likewise the
maximum of the prescribed penalty provided for in article 315 as stated in the immediately
45
preceding paragraph, plus six (6) years and three (3) months for the amounts beyond the
first P22,000.00 (at the rate of one (1) year for every additional P10,000.00 and three (3)
months for the remaining P3,000.00). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and the
foregoing disquisition, the accused-appellant can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and three (3) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-51511, Q-93-51512, Q-

93-51513, Q-93-51514 and Q-93-51515 is AFFIRMED, except as to the penalties imposed in
the last three cases which are modified, as stated above. As modified, accused-appellant
ALEXANDER ALEX BENEMERITO is thus sentenced in the said cases to suffer, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-93-51513, an indeterminate penalty ranging from Two (2)
years, Eleven (11) months and Ten (10) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to a total of Ten (10) years and Nine (9) months of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Benjamin Quitoriano in the amount
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos;
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-93-51514, an indeterminate penalty ranging from Two (2)
years, Eleven (11) months and Ten (10) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to a total of Ten (10) years and Nine (9) months of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Fernando Arcal in the amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos; and
3. In Criminal Case No. Q-93-51515, an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4)
years and Two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to a total of
Fourteen (14) years and Three (3) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify complainant Carlito Gumarang in the amount of Eighty-Five
Thousand (P85,000.00) Pesos.
Cost against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
[1]
Original Record (OR), 161-169. Per Judge Marina l. Buzon.
[2]
OR, 168-169.
[3]
Id., 78; Rollo, 13.
[4]
Id., 80-81; Id., 15-16.
[5]
OR, 82-83 Rollo, 17-18.
[6]
Id., 84-85; Id., 19-20.
[7]
Id., 86-87; Id., 21-22.
[8]
OR, 162-163; Rollo, 47-48.
[9]
Id., 163-164; Id., 48-49.
[10]
See footnote 1.
46
[11]
Citing People v. Coronacion, 237 SCRA 227, 239 [1994]; OR, 167; Rollo, 52.
[12]
Id., 165; Id., 50.
[13]
Id., 167; Id., 52.
[14]
Id., 167-168; Id., 52-53.
[15]
OR. 167-168; Rollo, 52-53.
[16]
Rollo, 62-84.
[17]
Id., 71.
Citing People v. Javier, 229 SCRA 638 [1994]; People v. Galit,

[18]
230 SCRA 486
[1994].
[19]
Citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 [1924].
[20]
TSN, 4 July 1994, 21; TSN, 11 July 1994, 4; TSN, 25 July 1994, 4-5. 15-17.
[21]
TSN, 11 July 1994, 7-8; TSN, 25 July 1994, 5.
[22]
TSN, 4 July 1994, 6, 28; Id., 6-11, 26-29; Id., 6-7, 21.
[23]
Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
People v. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712, 732 [1992]; People v. Canillo, 236 SCRA 22, 41-
[24]
42 [1994].
[25]
People v. De Leon, 225 SCRA 651, 662 [1993].
[26]
OR, 166; Rollo, 51.
[27]
See People v. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164, 177 [1992].
[28]
People v. Comia, 236 SCRA 185, 195 [1994].
[29]
People v. Enciso, 223 SCRA 675, 688 [1993].
[30]
Federico B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary [1991-1992 supplement], 30.
See Corpuz v. People, 194 SCRA 73 [1991]; People v.

[31]
Deunida 231 SCRA 520
[1994].
[32]
People v. Cabacang, 246 SCRA 530, 537 [1995].
[33]
Article 13(d) and (f), Labor Code, as amended.
[34]
People v. Comia, supra note 28, at 193; People v. Bautista, 241 SCRA 216, 222 [1995].
Section 38(b), Labor Code, as amended; People v. De

[35]
Leon, supra note 25, at
658.
[36]
People v. Manungas, 231 SCRA 1, 8 [1994].
People v. Bautista, supra note 34, at 222, citing People v.

[37]
Turda, 233 SCRA 702
[1994]. See also People v. Alforte, 219 SCRA 458 [1993].
[38]
People v. Ong, 204 SCRA 942, 955 [1991].
[39]
It provides: Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms
specially provided for in this Code, the periods shall be distributed, applying by analogy
the prescribed rules.
47
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107084. May 15, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DELIA SADIOSA y

CABENTA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Accused-appellant Delia Sadiosa was charged with illegal recruitment in an information

that reads:
That on or about and during the period comprise (sic) from January 1992 to March 1992, in
Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused Delia Sadiosa y Cabenta, well knowing that she is not a duly licensed
job recruiter, by means of false representations and fraudulent allegations to the effect that
she could secure employment as domestic helpers abroad for Benilda Sabado y Domingo,
Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, Erly Tuliao y Sabado and Cely Navarro y Manzano, did then
and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously recruit aforesaid persons and collected from
them the amount of P8,000.00 each, which amount were given to the accused by the
aforesaid complainants upon receipt of which, far from complying with her obligation
aforestated, accused appropriated for herself the said amount and failed to deploy
complainants abroad.
Contrary to law.[1]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[2] At the trial that ensued, the
prosecution proved the following operative facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime:
Arsenia Conse went to Bayombong, Nueva Ecija in early 1992 where she met the four
complainants, Cely Navarro, Marcela Manzano, Erly Tuliao and Benilda Domingo. She enticed
the four to apply for overseas employment informing them that she had a cousin who could
send them to Kuwait as domestic helpers. Apparently convinced by Arsenia Conse, the four
went with her on February 5, 1992 to Manila. Upon arrival, they proceeded to Room 210,
Diamond Building, Libertad St., Pasay City where Arsenia Conse introduced the group to
accused-appellant Delia Sadiosa. The four then applied for work as domestic helpers.[3]
On that occasion, accused-appellant assured the four that she could dispatch them to
Kuwait[4] and forthwith demanded P8,000.00 from each of them for processing fee
and P1,000.00 for passport (P1,500.00 from complainant Cely Navarro).[5] She assured the
group that she would facilitate the processing of all the necessary documents needed by
them. She further promised them that upon payment of the required fees, they would be able
to leave for Kuwait immediately.
The four did give accused-appellant the money demanded although on different dates. The
latter issued the corresponding receipts[6] therefor. Again, she assured them that they could
leave for Kuwait on different dates: Cely Navarro and Erly Tuliao on February 17, 1992 which
was rescheduled twice on February 19, 1992 and on February 25, 1992, [7] and Benilda
Domingo and Marcela Manzano on March 17, 1992 which was moved twice on February 24,
1992 and on March 17, 1992.[8] However, not one of them was able to leave for Kuwait. When
they asked for the return of their money, accused-appellant refused and ignored their
demand. Consequently, the four filed the complaint for illegal recruitment against accused-
appellant.
48
In addition to the complainants testimonies, the prosecution presented Virginia Santiago, a

Senior Officer in the Licensing Branch and Inspection Division of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). She testified that accused-appellant was neither licensed
nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.[9]
Accused-appellant herself took the witness stand and testified in her defense. She resolutely
denied having a hand in the illegal recruitment, claiming that she merely received the money
on behalf of one Mrs. Ganura[10] who owned the recruitment agency called Staff Organizers,
Inc. She accepted the money in her capacity as an officer of the said recruitment agency. To
bolster this claim, she presented evidence that she remitted the money to Mrs. Ganura
worth P25,000.00[11] although she failed to remit the remaining amount of P8,000.00 since
she was already in detention.[12] Accused-appellant further claimed that although she was not
listed in the POEA as an employee of the recruitment agency of Mrs. Ganura, she had a special
power of attorney issued by her employer to receive payments from applicants.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale defined
by Article 38 (b) and penalized under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 1920 and 2018 and disposed of said case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge in the
information and is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and pay a fine of P100,000.00. The
accused is hereby ordered to indemnify Benilda Sabado y Domingo, the sum of P8,000.00;
Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00; Erly Tuliao y Sabado, the sum
of P8,000.00 and Cely Navarro y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00. To pay the costs.[13]
Accused-appellant now assails the trial courts Decision with the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT STATING CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND
THE LAW ON WHICH ITS JUDGMENT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
BASED;
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING MOTU PROPRIO THE INFORMATION FOR
NOT CONFORMING SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE PRESCRIBED FORM, PARTICULARLY AS TO
THE DESIGNATION OF THE OFFENSE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION;
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING MOTU PROPRIO THE INFORMATION IN
VIEW OF ITS INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY, CONFLICTING AND
IRRECONCILABLE CHARGES OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315,
PARAGRAPH 1(b) AND ESTAFA UNDER THE SAME ARTICLE BUT UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(a)
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND IN CONDUCTING TRIAL THEREUNDER;
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND IN

CONVICTING HER OF THE THE CHARGE IN THE INFORMATION;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT, IF ANY, IS ONLY CIVIL, NOT CRIMINAL IN NATURE;
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE

PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS THE SUM OF P8,000.00 EACH.
49
Appellant clearly focuses on the validity and sufficiency of both the information filed
against her and the decision rendered in due course by the trial court. She asserts that there
was a violation of the constitutional mandate that a judgment of conviction must state clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. With regard to the information filed
against her, appellant contends that it did not substantially conform to the prescribed form,
particularly as to the designation of the offense and cause of accusation. It should be observed
in the aforequoted information that its caption indicates that she is being charged with illegal
recruitment only while the allegations therein substantiate the crimes of illegal recruitment
and estafa committed by fraud or deceit.
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that the information is sufficient where it clearly
states the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense.[14] However, there is no need to specify or refer to the particular
section or subsection of the statute that was violated by the accused. No law requires that in
order that an accused may be convicted, the specific provision penalizing the act charged
should be mentioned in the information.[15] What identifies the charge is the actual recital of
the facts and not that designated by the fiscal in the preamble thereof. It is not even
necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of the accused, nor the effective
preparation of his defense, that the accused be informed of the technical name of the crime
of which he stands charged. He must look to the facts alleged.[16]
In the instant case, the information filed against accused-appellant sufficiently shows that
it is for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor
Code and penalized in Art. 39 of the same Code although it is designated as for illegal
recruitment only. Under the Code, the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment
in large scale are as follows:
(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under
Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit
and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as
a group.[17]
All these elements are to be found in the information. It alleges that accused-appellant,
knowing fully well that she was not a duly licensed job recruiter, falsely represented that she
could secure employment as domestic helpers abroad for the four complainants.
As such, the purpose of the requirement under Sec. 8, Rule 110 [18] to inform and apprise
the accused of the true crime of which she was charged,[19] has been complied with. The main
purpose of the requirement that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting an offense
must be stated in ordinary and concise language is to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged so that he could suitably
prepare for his defense. It is also required so that the trial court could pronounce the proper
judgment.[20] This gives substance to the constitutional guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.[21]
In the instant case, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant
was fully accorded the right to be informed of the charges against her. The fact that she put
up the defense of having accepted the money only in her capacity as an officer of the
recruitment agency shows that she fully understood the nature and cause of the accusation
against her.
Furthermore, it is incorrect for accused-appellant to maintain that the information filed
against her contained conflicting and irreconcilable charges of illegal recruitment, estafa under
Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code and estafa under the same article but under
par. 2 (a) thereof. While on its face the allegations in the information may constitute estafa,
this Court agrees with the Solicitor General that it merely describes how accused-appellant
was able to consummate the act of illegal recruitment - through false and fraudulent
representation by pretending that she was a duly-licensed recruiter who could secure
employment for complainants in Kuwait. These allegations in the information therefore do not
render the information defective or multiplicitous.
50
It is apropos to underscore the firmly established jurisprudence that a person who has
committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code and estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. [22] The crime
of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused
is necessary for conviction.[23]
In other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code may be convicted of offenses
punishable by other laws.[24] However, any person or entity which in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.[25] When the persons recruited are three or more, the crime
becomes illegal recruitment in large scale under Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code. In both bases,
it is the lack of a necessary license or permit that renders such recruitment activities unlawful
and criminal.[26]
In the case at bar, accused-appellant could have been validly charged separately with
estafa under the same set of facts in the illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate
enough not to have been so charged. Nevertheless, there is no doubt from a reading of the
information, that it accurately and clearly avers all of the ingredients that constitute illegal
recruitment in large scale. The prosecutor simply captioned the information with
the generic name of the offense under the Labor Code illegal recruitment. No misconceptions
would have been engendered had he been more accurate in the drafting of the information
considering that there are at least four kinds of illegal recruitment under the law.[27] One is
simple illegal recruitment committed by a licensee or holder of authority. The law penalizes
such offender with imprisonment of not less than two years nor more than five years or a fine
of not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000, or both such imprisonment and fine. Any
person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority commits the second type of illegal
recruitment. The penalty imposed for such offense is imprisonment of not less than four years
nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both
such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court. The third type of illegal recruitment
refers to offenders who either commit the offense alone or with another person against three
or more persons individually or as a group. A syndicate or a group of three or more persons
conspiring and confederating with one another in carrying out the act circumscribed by the
law commits the fourth type of illegal recruitment by the law. For the third and fourth types
of illegal recruitment the law prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P100,000.
Hence, to avoid misconception and misinterpretation of the information, the prosecutor
involved in this case should have indicated in its caption, the offense he had clearly alleged in
its body, that the crime charged was for illegal recruitment in large scale. However, such
omission or lack of skill of the prosecutor who crafted the information should not deprive the
people of the right to prosecute a crime with so grave a consequence against the economic
life of the aggrieved parties. What is important is that he did allege in the information the
facts sufficient to constitute the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale.
As regards accused-appellants contention that the questioned decision is void because it
failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based, this Court is
not inclined to grant credence thereto.
The constitutional requirement that every decision must state distinctly and clearly the
factual and legal bases therefor should indeed be the primordial concern of courts and
judges. Be that as it may, there should not be a mechanical reliance on this constitutional
provision. The courts and judges should be allowed to synthesize and to simplify their
decisions considering that at present, courts are harassed by crowded dockets and time
constraints. Thus, the Court held in Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals:
It is understandable that courts with heavy dockets and time constraints, often find
themselves with little to spare in the preparation of decisions to the extent most desirable. We
have thus pointed out that judges might learn to synthesize and to simplify their
pronouncements. Nevertheless, concisely written such as they may be, decisions must still
distinctly and clearly express at least in minimum essence its factual and legal bases. [28]
In Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court states the reason for the
constitutional requirement thus:
51
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y
and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for
review by a higher tribunal.[30]
Under Art. X, Sec. 9 of the 1973 Constitution that contained a provision similar to Art.
VIII, Sec. 14 of the present Constitution, the Court expresses in Bernabe v. Geraldez the
following rationale as to the wide discretion enjoyed by a court in framing its decision:
x x x In the x x x case of Mendoza v. Court of First Instance of Quezon City, (L-5612, June
27, 1973, 51 SCRA 369) citing Jose v. Santos, (L-25510, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 538) it
was pointed out that the standard expected of the judiciary is that the decision rendered
makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established.
Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement
of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not
unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form or words which he must use
upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs. (51
SCRA 369 at 375)[31]
After careful reflection, this Court finds that the questioned decision of the court a
quo explained the factual findings and legal justifications, at least in minimum essence, which
led to the conviction of accused-appellant. Thus, the subject decision of Judge Baltazar
Relativo Dizon, after quoting the information for Illegal Recruitment and stating accuseds plea
of not guilty, goes on to summarize the evidence for the prosecution and the defense as
testified to by their respective witnesses. Before drawing a conclusion, it gives an ANALYSIS
OF EVIDENCE ON RECORD as follows:
The testimony of the four complaining witnesses are found to be credible and reliable
observing that they answered the questions propounded by the prosecutor and the defense
counsel in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and they remained
consistent, calm and cool on cross-examination. That even with the rigid cross-examination
conducted by the defense counsel the more their testimonies became firmer and clearer that
they were victims of false pretenses or fraudulent acts of the accused. The herein accused
falsely pretended to have possessed power, influence and qualifications to secure employment
as domestic helpers abroad. And because of her fraudulent acts accused was able to collect
from the four victims the sum of P8,000.00 each [Exh. A, C, E, F (4)].
Verily, the accused admitted that she managed a consultancy firm under the business name
of DCS Service Management and the nature of her work is to recruit domestic helpers for
employment abroad. She further admitted having received the amount of P8,000.00 from
each of the complainants as processing fee, although she is shifting responsibility to a certain
Mrs. Ganura to whom she delivered the sum of P25,000.00 (Exh. 1, 1-A). She miserably failed
to present this Mrs. Ganura to testify in this regard despite all efforts exerted by this court,
hence, such assertion of the accused is disregarded, not being reliable. The fact remains that
it was she who transacted with the complainants, and that accused is neither licensed nor
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment (Exhibit G). [32]
While it may be true that the questioned decision failed to state the specific provisions of
law violated by accused-appellant, it however clearly stated that the crime charged was Illegal
Recruitment. It discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense of illegal
recruitment in large scale that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a
verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty. The dispositive portion of the decision quoted
earlier, clearly states that appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge
in the information. As earlier stated, the charge in the information referred to by the decision
could mean only that of illegal recruitment in large scale and not to any other offense.
The situation would have been altogether different and in violation of the constitutional
mandate if the penalty imposed was for illegal recruitment based on established facts
constituting simple illegal recruitment only. As it is, the trial courts omission to specify the
52
offense committed, or the specific provision of law violated, is not in derogation of the
constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly state the factual and
legal bases for the conclusions reached by the trial court. The trial courts factual findings
based on credible prosecution evidence supporting the allegations in the information and its
imposition of the corresponding penalty imposed by the law on such given facts are therefore
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
This Court agrees with the trial court that the prosecution evidence has shown beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement
activities. Accused-appellant promised the four complainants employment as domestic
helpers in Kuwait. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as
referring to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment locally or abroad whether for profit or not; provided that any person or entity
which in any manner offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall
be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.[33] All the essential elements of the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale, which we have enumerated above, are present in this
case.
The prosecution clearly established the fact that accused-appellant had no license to
recruit from the POEA. Yet, the latter entertained the four complainants when they applied,
promised them jobs as domestic helpers in Kuwait, and collected fees from them for
processing travel documents only to renege on her promise and fail to return the money she
collected from complainants despite several demands.
As with the trial court, this Court entertains serious doubts regarding accused-appellants
claim that she was only acting in behalf of a certain Mrs. Ganura. Accused-appellant failed to
present evidence to corroborate her testimony.Neither did she present Mrs. Ganura despite
several opportunities given her by the trial court. The undisputed fact is that appellant was
positively identified as the person who transacted with the four complainants, promised them
jobs and received money from them. On this score, the court a quo found the prosecution
evidence credible and reliable and observed that the complaining witnesses testified and
answered questions in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner. [34] As
this Court has consistently held in a long line of cases, the trial court was concededly in the
best position to test the credibility of appellant. Since the trial court did not give credence to
accused-appellants version, this Court is not persuaded by her arguments.
For engaging in recruitment of the four complainants without first obtaining the necessary
license from the POEA, accused-appellant, therefore, is guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale, an offense involving economic sabotage. She should, accordingly, be punished with life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000 under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
In light of the above disquisition, there is no more need to resolve the other assigned
errors.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
113 finding appellant Delia Sadiosa y Cabenta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale and imposing on her life imprisonment, the payment of
the fine of P100,000.00 and the reimbursement of the amounts defrauded from complainants
is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129577-80. February 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BULU CHOWDURY, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
53
PUNO, J.:
In November 1995, Bulu Chowdury and Josephine Ong were charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale committed as follows:
"That sometime between the period from August 1994 to October 1994 in the
City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, representing themselves to have the capacity to
contract, enlist and transport workers for employment abroad, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit the herein complainants: Estrella B. Calleja,
Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis, individually or as a group for employment
in Korea without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration."[1]
They were likewise charged with three counts of estafa committed against private
complainants.[2] The State Prosecutor, however, later dismissed the estafa charges against
Chowdury[3]and filed an amended information indicting only Ong for the offense. [4]
Chowdury was arraigned on April 16, 1996 while Ong remained at large. He pleaded "not
guilty" to the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale.[5]
Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: private complainants Aser Sasis, Estrella Calleja
and Melvin Miranda, and Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla.
Sasis testified that he first met Chowdury in August 1994 when he applied with Craftrade
Overseas Developers (Craftrade) for employment as factory worker in South Korea.
Chowdury, a consultant of Craftrade, conducted the interview. During the interview,
Chowdury informed him about the requirements for employment. He told him to submit his
passport, NBI clearance, passport size picture and medical certificate. He also required him
to undergo a seminar. He advised him that placement would be on a first-come-first-serve
basis and urged him to complete the requirements immediately. Sasis was also charged a
processing fee of P25,000.00. Sasis completed all the requirements in September 1994. He
also paid a total amount of P16,000.00 to Craftrade as processing fee. All payments were
received by Ong for which she issued three receipts.[6] Chowdury then processed his papers
and convinced him to complete his payment.[7]
Sasis further said that he went to the office of Craftrade three times to follow up his application
but he was always told to return some other day. In one of his visits to Craftrades office, he
was informed that he would no longer be deployed for employment abroad. This prompted
him to withdraw his payment but he could no longer find Chowdury. After two unsuccessful
attempts to contact him, he decided to file with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) a case for illegal recruitment against Chowdury. Upon verification with
the POEA, he learned that Craftrade's license had already expired and has not been renewed
and that Chowdury, in his personal capacity, was not a licensed recruiter.[8]
Calleja testified that in June 1994, she applied with Craftrade for employment as factory
worker in South Korea. She was interviewed by Chowdury. During the interview, he asked
questions regarding her marital status, her age and her province. Toward the end of the
interview, Chowdury told her that she would be working in a factory in Korea. He required her
to submit her passport, NBI clearance, ID pictures, medical certificate and birth certificate.
He also obliged her to attend a seminar on overseas employment. After she submitted all the
documentary requirements, Chowdury required her to pay P20,000.00 as placement fee.
Calleja made the payment on August 11, 1994 to Ong for which she was issued a
receipt.[9] Chowdury assured her that she would be able to leave on the first week of
September but it proved to be an empty promise. Calleja was not able to leave despite several
follow-ups. Thus, she went to the POEA where she discovered that Craftrade's license had
already expired. She tried to withdraw her money from Craftrade to no avail. Calleja filed a
complaint for illegal recruitment against Chowdury upon advice of POEA's legal counsel. [10]
54
Miranda testified that in September 1994, his cousin accompanied him to the office of
Craftrade in Ermita, Manila and introduced him to Chowdury who presented himself as
consultant and interviewer. Chowdury required him to fill out a bio-data sheet before
conducting the interview. Chowdury told Miranda during the interview that he would send him
to Korea for employment as factory worker. Then he asked him to submit the following
documents: passport, passport size picture, NBI clearance and medical certificate. After he
complied with the requirements, he was advised to wait for his visa and to pay P25,000.00
as processing fee. He paid the amount of P25,000.00 to Ong who issued receipts
therefor.[11] Craftrade, however, failed to deploy him. Hence, Miranda filed a complaint with
the POEA against Chowdury for illegal recruitment.[12]
Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla of the Licensing Branch of the POEA testified
that she prepared a certification on June 9, 1996 that Chowdury and his co-accused, Ong,
were not, in their personal capacities, licensed recruiters nor were they connected with any
licensed agency. She nonetheless stated that Craftrade was previously licensed to recruit
workers for abroad which expired on December 15, 1993. It applied for renewal of its license
but was only granted a temporary license effective December 16, 1993 until September 11,
1994. From September 11, 1994, the POEA granted Craftrade another temporary authority
to process the expiring visas of overseas workers who have already been deployed. The POEA
suspended Craftrade's temporary license on December 6, 1994.[13]
For his defense, Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990
until 1994. His primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee,
he only followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agencys
President and General Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the agency's Managing Director.
Chowdury admitted that he interviewed private complainants on different dates. Their office
secretary handed him their bio-data and thereafter he led them to his room where he
conducted the interviews. During the interviews, he had with him a form containing the
qualifications for the job and he filled out this form based on the applicant's responses to his
questions. He then submitted them to Mr. Utkal Chowdury who in turn evaluated his findings.
He never received money from the applicants. He resigned from Craftrade on November 12,
1994.[14]
Another defense witness, Emelita Masangkay who worked at the Accreditation Branch of
the POEA presented a list of the accredited principals of Craftrade Overseas Developers [15] and
a list of processed workers of Craftrade Overseas Developers from 1988 to 1994.[16]
The trial court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale. It sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P100,000.00. It further ordered him to pay Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00, Estrella
Calleja, P20,000.00 and Melvin Miranda, P25,000.00. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the prosecution having

proved the guilt of the accused Bulu Chowdury beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 under Art. 39 (b) of the
New Labor Code of the Philippines. The accused is ordered to pay the
complainants Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00; Estrella Calleja the amount
of P20,000.00; Melvin Miranda the amount of P25,000.00."[17]
Chowdury appealed.
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:
(1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Article 13
(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a

group.[18]
55
The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 8042 [19] states who shall be held liable
for the offense, thus:
"The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers
having control, management or direction of their business shall be
liable."
The Revised Penal Code which supplements the law on illegal recruitment [20] defines who are
the principals, accomplices and accessories. The principals are: (1) those who take a direct
part in the execution of the act; (2) those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
and (3) those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which
it would not have been accomplished.[21] The accomplices are those persons who may not be
considered as principal as defined in Section 17 of the Revised Penal Code but cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous act. [22] The accessories are those
who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated
therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner: (1) by profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the
effects of the crime; (2) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) by harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse
of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt at the life of the chief executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime.[23]
Citing the second sentence of the last paragraph of Section 6 of RA 8042, accused-appellant
contends that he may not be held liable for the offense as he was merely an employee of
Craftrade and he only performed the tasks assigned to him by his superiors. He argues that
the ones who should be held liable for the offense are the officers having control, management
and direction of the agency.
As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable
for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. An employee of a
company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal,
together with his employer,[24] if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment.[25] It has been held that the existence of the corporate
entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally
causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only
by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The
employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in
the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the
business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and
promotion, however slight his contribution may be.[26] The law of agency, as applied in civil
cases, has no application in criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he
participates in the commission of a crime upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent
of any party.[27] The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the
offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the employee
was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts
constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of
his employer.[28]
The fundamental issue in this case, therefore, is whether accused-appellant knowingly and
intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged.
We find that he did not.
Evidence shows that accused-appellant interviewed private complainants in the months of

June, August and September in 1994 at Craftrade's office. At that time, he was employed as
interviewer of Craftrade which was then operating under a temporary authority given by the
POEA pending renewal of its license.[29] The temporary license included the authority to recruit
workers.[30] He was convicted based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as
employee of Craftrade. Neither was he, in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas
workers. Section 10 Rule II Book II of the Rules and Regulation Governing Overseas
Employment (1991) requires that every change, termination or appointment of officers,
56
representatives and personnel of licensed agencies be registered with the POEA. Agents or
representatives appointed by a licensed recruitment agency whose appointments are not
previously approved by the POEA are considered "non-licensee " or "non-holder of authority"
and therefore not authorized to engage in recruitment activity.[31]
Upon examination of the records, however, we find that the prosecution failed to prove that
accused-appellant was aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and
that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation to register its
personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. [32] A mere employee of the
agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The evidence at
hand shows that accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing
that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his
agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions
to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the
requirements for deployment but he never received money from them. Their payments were
received by the agency's cashier, Josephine Ong. Furthermore, he performed his tasks under
the supervision of its president and managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant's conscious and active
participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction, therefore,
is without basis.
This is not to say that private complainants are left with no remedy for the wrong committed
against them. The Department of Justice may still file a complaint against the officers having
control, management or direction of the business of Craftrade Overseas Developers
(Craftrade), so long as the offense has not yet prescribed. Illegal recruitment is a crime of
economic sabotage which need to be curbed by the strong arm of the law. It is important,
however, to stress that the government's action must be directed to the real offenders, those
who perpetrate the crime and benefit from it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to RELEASE accused-appellant unless he is being held for some other cause, and to
REPORT to this Court compliance with this order within ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of the Department of Justice
for his information and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1]
Information, Original Records, p. 2.
[2]
Original Records, pp. 16-23.
[3]
Resolution dated March 20, 1996, Original Records, pp. 63-69.
[4]
Amended Information for Criminal Case No. 146336, Original Records, pp. 61-62;
Amended Information for Criminal Case No. 146337, Original Records, pp. 89-90.
[5]
Original Records, p. 95.
[6]
Exh. "A", "B" and "C".
[7]
TSN, May 14, 1996, pp. 5-17.
[8]
Id., pp. 19-22.
[9]
Exh. "E".
[10]
TSN, May 15, 1996, pp. 6-21.
[11]
Exh. "L", "M", "N".
[12]
TSN, October 23, 1996, pp. 6-19.
[13]
TSN, July 2, 1996, pp. 8-32.
[14]
TSN, December 17, 1996, pp. 4-30.
[15]
Exh. "7".
[16]
Exh. "8".
[17]
Rollo, p. 24.
57
[18]
People vs. Peralta, 283 SCRA 81 (1997); People vs. Villas, 277 SCRA 391 (1997);
People vs. Santos, 276 SCRA 329 (1997); People vs. Garcia, 271 SCRA 621 (1997).
[19]
Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
[20]
Article 10, Revised Penal Code.
[21]
Article 17, supra.
[22]
Article 18, supra.
[23]
Article 19, supra.
[24]
The corporation also incurs criminal liability for the act of its employee or agent if (1) the
employee or agent committed the offense while acting within the scope of his employment
and (2) the offense was committed with at least some intent to benefit the employer. The
liability is imputed to the corporation not because it actively participated in the malice or
fraud but because the act is done for the benefit of the corporation while the employee or
agent was acting within the scope of his employment in the business of the corporation, and
justice requires that the latter shall be held responsible for damages to the individual who
suffered by such conduct. [New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. vs. US, 212 U.S.
481, 53 L. ed. 613 (1909); US vs. Basic Construction Co., et al., 711 F.2d 570 (1983);
US vs. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399 (1985)].
[25]
See People vs. Goce, 247 SCRA 780 (1995); People vs. Alforte, 219 SCRA 458 1993).
[26]
State vs. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010 (1977); Wainer vs. US, 82 F.2d 305 (1936).
[27]
People vs. Mc Cauley, 561 P.2d 335 (1977).
[28]
US vs. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (1984); La Vielle vs. People, 157 P.2d 621 (1945).
[29]
Exh. "K", Certification dated July 1, 1996 signed by Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, Manager,
Licensing Branch, POEA, Original Records, p. 147.
[30]
Testimony of Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla, TSN, July 2, 1996, pp. 27-28.
[31]
Abaca vs. CA, 290 SCRA 657 (1998).
[32]
Supra at 30.

3 Illegal Recruitment

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

3 Illegal Recruitment

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1

G.R. No. 123146 June 17, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

7. Joseph Oratil and

From March to August 1992, Buli-e accompanied complainants, on separate occasions, to

Buli-e presented Mrs. Nonette Legaspi-Villanueva, Unit Coordinator of POEA-CAR, to testify

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

AND IN SENTENCING EACH OF THEM TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF

We shall discuss the interrelated issues together.

Furthermore, Josefinas alleged authority to recruit applicants for overseas employment as

Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority No license or authority shall be used

[G.R. No. 150530. February 20, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX BAYTIC, accused-

Accused-appellants vain attempt at exculpating himself by pinpointing Hapones as the

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 95207-17 January 10, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Mirafe Taguba.

Public Attorney's Office for Enrique Taguba.

The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C. TAGUBA, MIRAFE

That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro manila, Philippines and

xxx xxx xxx

The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C. TAGUBA, MIRAFE

That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, the above-named

employ complainant abroad and could facilitate the necessary papers in

Trial of the cases was held jointly.

A. They did not, sir.

A. They did not, sir. 18

Our rulings follow.

Rule 131 Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases. In criminal cases the burden of

Non-possession of a license to recruit is an essential ingredient of the crime of illegal

Q. In connection with the operation of your office, do you have

A. I have a special power of attorney issued by the general

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And according to the special power of attorney you were

Q. And this is the only evidence or authority for your having

A. I have submitted several papers, sir.

Q. By virtue of the special power of attorney you recruited all

1. To represent our Agency, RAY/DECO International Development and

2. To enter into such negotiations he may deem proper, reasonable and

3. Finally, it is a condition of this Power of Attorney that our aforesaid Legal

Curiously, the ticket issued to her on may 3, 1985, by Continental for

Q. Did you talk with the two accused at that time?

Q. What did you talk about?

A. They told us, sir, that they are having us employed as

Q. Who is this who told you that you would be employed at

A. Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba, your Honor.

Q. What was or what were the conditions for your employment

A. They told us sir that if we give P5,000.00 we will have

Q. Did he tell you how you were supposed go for employment

A. Yes, sir. He told me as long as I pay.

Q. For how much did he require you to pay for your

Q. Were you able to comply with that requirement to pay

Q. When did you pay that or give that amount of P20,000.00 to

A. On November 23, 1985, I gave him P10,000.00 and on

Substantially similar narrations were made by other complainants.

Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. . . .

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in a large scale shall

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(1) For each of the 8 counts of illegal recruiting in Criminal Cases