G.R. No.
150175 March 10, 2006 development in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Donata;
ERLINDA PILAPIL, HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES,
namely: ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA
SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO
MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and
PACITA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S.
BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR., ANITA
TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES,
FUGURACION MEDALLE and MERCEDES
LAGBAS, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, seeking the annulment and the setting aside
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194,
dated 31 August 2001,1 affirming the decision of the Cebu City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, in Civil Case No. CEB-5794,
dated 28 September 1986.2
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata),
consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina);
Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews
and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who
had also passed away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the
heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of his
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in
representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino.
The facts that gave rise to the petition at bar are recounted as
follows.
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted
intestate proceedings to settle her husbands estate with the Cebu
City Court of First Instance (CFI), 14th Judicial District, designated as
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued
Letters of Administration3 appointing Donata as the administratrix of
Maximinos estate. She submitted an Inventory4 of Maximinos
properties, which included, among other things, the following parcels
of land
1. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-599, acquired
by Maximino prior to his marriage (now covered by TCT No.
21546);5
2. TCT No. RT-600, acquired by Maximino prior to his
marriage (now covered by TCT No. 21545);6
3. TCT No. 220, acquired by Maximino during the marriage
(now covered by TCT No. 21543);7
4. TCT No. 221, acquired by Maximino during the marriage
(now covered by TCT No. 21544);8 and
5. TCT No. 702, acquired by Maximino during the marriage
(now covered by TCT No. 21542).9
The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952,
awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata.
On 27 June 1960, Donata had the said CFI Order recorded in the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, 10 and by virtue thereof,
received new TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces,
instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the
intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were
appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donatas intestate estate.
Controversy arose among Donatas heirs when Erlinda claimed
exclusive ownership of three parcels of land, covered by TCTs No.
21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds of Donation, both
dated 15 September 1977,11 allegedly executed in her favor by her
aunt Donata. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlindas claim. This
Court, however, was no longer informed of the subsequent
and as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata,
including Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of
Maximino, filed a Petition12 with the RTC for Letters of
Administration13 for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was
initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5
December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximinos
properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set
Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said
properties were already under his and his wifes administration as
part of the intestate estate of Donata.14 Silverios Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently
set aside by the RTC.15
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint 16 with the
RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of real property, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-5794. They later filed an Amended Complaint, 17 on 11
December 1992. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the
estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach
of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in
registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate
estate of Maximino.
In their Answer18 to the Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the
heirs of Donata raised, as affirmative and special defenses, the
following
1. The complaint does not state a sufficient cause of action
against the defendants;
2. That the titles to the lots in question were legally
transferred to the name of the late Donata Ortiz Briones
since 1952 when the surviving heirs of Maximino Briones
sold their rights over the said properties to the late Donata
Ortiz Briones;
3. That even granting arguendo that plaintiffs have the right
to question the transfer to the name of the late Donata Ortiz
Briones the titles of the said lots any action of that effect
has definitely prescribed for more than 30 years have
already occurred when the titles to said lots were
transferred to the name of the late Donata Ortiz Briones;
4. That moreover, even granting arguendo that there is an
implied trust, an implied trust prescribed in 10 years from
the day titles to said lots have been transferred to the name
of the late Donata Ortiz Briones. Consequently, the
plaintiffs action to enforce an implied trust has definitely
prescribed;
5. Be that as it may, plaintiffs whose claim is merely in a
representative capacity acquires no better right or title than
that of their predecessor-in-interest.
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April
1986, in favor of the heirs of Maximino,19pertinent portions thereof
are reproduced below
When Donata Ortiz Briones filed Special Proceedings No. 928-R she
was fully aware of the existence of the hereditary rights of the
brothers and sisters of her husband Maximino S. Briones and their
surviving heirs and it was her duty to have informed the Court of such
fact instead of asking the Court to have her declared as the sole heir
of her deceased husband in the alleged order mentioned by the
defendants which was never presented at the trial but was made the
basis of the transfer of all the titles of the real properties left by
Maximino S. Briones to the name of Donata Ortiz Briones to the
prejudice of the heirs of the brothers and sisters of Maximino S.
Briones.
xxxx
By having the immovable properties of the deceased Maximino S.
Briones transferred in her name as the sole heir of the said deceased
despite her knowledge of the existence of other co-heirs like the
plaintiffs, Donata Ortiz Brioness alleged ownership and possession
of the subject properties in question was that of a trustee in an
implied trust under Article 1451 of the New Civil Code x x x.
xxxx
In the absence of partition of the estate of Maximino S. Briones all
the properties left upon his death remained owned in common by his
heirs consisting of his surviving spouse and the heirs of his deceased
brothers and sisters the herein plaintiffs. Donata Ortiz Brioness
possession and transfer of the title in her name of her late husbands
properties was no more than that of a co-owner and no prescription
shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership (Last paragraph, Art. 494, New Civil Code). Such titles
cannot be used as a shield to perpetrate fraud.
xxxx
Since the inventory filed by Donata Ortiz Briones (Exhibit B) has
been adopted as Exhibit 3 by defendants Erlinda Pilapil, Rizalina
Ortiz Aguila and the Mendozas, said defendants are bound by the
contents thereof. Defendants, however, failed to show the order of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu dated October 2, 1952 mentioned
in the primary entry book (Exhibit 4) and marked as Exhibit 4-C, an
omission which amounts to suppression of evidence which is
presumed adverse to the defendants interest when produced. This
supposed declaration of heirs declaring the late Donata O. Briones
as the sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the late Maximino S.
Briones entered in the primary entry book in the office of the Register
of Deeds of Cebu City has been made thru Donata O. Brioness
misrepresentation to the Court as Administratrix of the estate of her
husband Maximino S. Briones by failing to honestly disclose to the
Court that the decedent was survived not only by his widow but also
by his brothers and sisters and/or their children by right of
representation which fact was known to her at the time of her
husbands death.
Hence, the RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to
of the real properties covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544,
21545, 21546, and 58684. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the
heirs of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of
the fruits thereof.
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986,
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision,20 promulgated on 31 August 2001, affirmed the RTC
Decision, ratiocinating thus
The contentions of defendants-appellants are devoid of merit.
At the outset, the proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration was invalid. Firstly, Donata did not include in her
petition for letters of administration the names, ages and residences
of the heirs as required by Rule 79, Section 2(b) of the Rules of
Court. Secondly, the court failed to give notice to the known heirs
that a petition has been filed, and the time and place for hearing
thereof as provided in Section 3 of the same rule, to give them ample
opportunity to oppose it, if warranted. Thirdly, the court failed to do its
specific duty to require proof, at the hearing of the petition, that the
aforementioned notice has been given to the heirs in accordance
with Section 5 of the same rule.
Consequently, the Order declaring Donata as the sole and exclusive
heir would not be binding against herein plaintiffs-appellees.
xxxx
It should be noted that plaintiffs-appellees cause of action was not
based merely on fraud but was primarily anchored on their right to
inheritance and to have a partition of the same, both of which are
imprescriptible as a general rule. With marked relevance is the fact
that their Complaint is for Partition, Annulment and Recovery of
Possession of Real Property.
With respect to the argument on implied trust, We subscribe to the
view that there existed an implied/constructive trust where, through
fraudulent representations or by pretending to be the sole heir of the
deceased, an heir succeeded in having the original title of a land in
the name of the deceased cancelled and a new one issued in his
name thereby enabling him to possess the land and get its produce.
[Baysa vs. Baysa, [CA] 53 O.G. 7282, October 1957]
This being so, the trustee may claim title by prescription founded on
adverse possession where it appears that: (a) he has performed
open and unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the other co-owners; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the other co-owners; and (c) the evidence thereon
should be clear and convincing; and (d) the period fixed by law has
prescribed. [De Leon, Partnership, Agency and Trusts, 4th Edition,
1996]
These conditions were not complied with in the case at bench.
Assuming arguendo that the issuance of the TCT would constitute an
open and clear repudiation of the trust, it is well to note however that
the required period has not yet elapsed. Article 1137 [New Civil
Code] provides that, "ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith." This period should be counted from the date the adverse title
was asserted, that is, from the registration of the title. The TCTs
covering the property in question were registered in 1960 or 27 years
at the time of the filing of the Complaint in 1987.
Moreover, there is neither an adverse possession to speak of since
Donata and the Heirs of Briones are deemed co-owners of the
property in question in accordance with Article 1078. [New Civil
Code] Hence, mere actual possession by Donata will not give rise to
the inference that the possession was adverse. This is because
Donata after all is entitled to possession of the property as a co-
owner.
xxxx
Furthermore, it is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that a co-
owner may not acquire exclusive ownership of common property thru
prescription. [Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, L-18046, March 31, 1964]
xxxx
In determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right
constitutes laches, the existence of a confidential relationship
between the parties is an important circumstance for consideration.
The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives,
and the fact that parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage
tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay. [Gallardo vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67742, 29 October 1987]
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals,
the heirs of Donata filed the present Petition, 21raising the following
errors:
I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
CASE AS HAVING BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION;
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
CASE AS HAVING BEEN BARRED BY LACHES; AND
III. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
ALL THE PROPERTIES, WHETHER CAPITAL PROPERTIES OF
MAXIMINO OR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF MAXIMINO AND
DONATA BRIONES, BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN
PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS.
Contrary to the conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the RTC in
their respective Decisions, this Court finds the Petition at bar
meritorious and dismisses the Complaint for partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession of real property filed before the RTC by
the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. Not only is the
Complaint barred by prior judgment, the complainants therein, the
heirs of Maximino, failed to satisfactorily establish their right to the
remedies prayed for therein.
Maximino left no will at the time of his death, on 1 May 1952, and his
estate was to be settled in accordance with the rules on legal or
intestate succession. The heirs of Maximino, respondents in the
Petition at bar, claimed the right to inherit, together with Donata, from
the estate of Maximino, based on the Articles 995 and 1001 of the
New Civil Code, which read
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants,
and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate,
without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
The heirs of Maximino asserted that Donata had fraudulently
excluded them from the intestate proceedings of the estate of
Maximino before the CFI . They were not given notice of the
institution of Special Proceedings No. 928-R and the scheduled
hearings therein. When Donata was declared the "sole, absolute,
and exclusive heir" of Maximino in the CFI Order, dated 2 October
1952, and when she managed to have the real properties of
Maximino registered in her own name on the basis of the foregoing
CFI Order, she should be deemed to have held the said properties in
trust for her other co-heirs.
The RTC in its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, justified its finding of
implied trust on Article 1451 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that, "When land passes by succession to any person and he causes
the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established
by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner." This Court,
though, believes that Article 1451 is not applicable to the instant
Petition considering that it refers to a situation wherein the heir
himself causes the registration of his legal title under the name of
another; the heir, by his voluntary action, establishes the implied trust
and constitutes himself as the trustee. In contrast, in the Petition
herein, Donata managed to have the real properties belonging to the
estate of Maximino registered under her own name to the supposed
exclusion of all other legal heirs of her deceased husband. In such a
case, implied trust may be more appropriately in accordance with
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which declares that, "If the
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it
is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes."
Now the foremost question that needs to be answered is whether an
implied trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code had been
sufficiently established in the instant Petition. This Court answers in
the negative.
Since it was the respondents, heirs of Maximino, who claimed the
existence of an implied trust, they bear the burden of proving that
Donata registered in her own name the real properties belonging to
the estate of Maximino either by fraud or mistake, pursuant to Article
1456 of the New Civil Code. The heirs of Maximino never contended
that Donata may have registered the real properties in her name by
mistake, but repeatedly maintain that she did so by fraud. Both the
Court of Appeals and the RTC, in their respective Decisions, found
that Donata secured the CFI Order, dated 02 October 1952, and the
new TCTs covering the real properties in her name fraudulently.
While it is true that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the
RTC are binding and conclusive upon this Court, such is not
absolute, and there are recognized exceptions thereto. This Court
justifies its departure from the general rule and the conduct of its own
review of the evidence and other records in the Petition at bar, given
that (1) the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the RTC
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made were manifestly mistaken; and (3) the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals and the RTC are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based. 22
At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to
secure the TCTs covering the real properties belonging to the estate
of Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is
undisputed that the said CFI Order was issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted by Donata herself, to settle the
intestate estate of Maximino. The petitioners, heirs of Donata, were
unable to present a copy of the CFI Order, but this is not surprising
considering that it was issued 35 years prior to the filing by the heirs
of Maximino of their Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 on 3
March 1987. The existence of such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot
be denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register
of Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. 23 It was
annotated on the TCTs covering the real properties as having
declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino.
The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the
cause of the heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and
contents were never questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs
of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or
procedure by which it was issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the
non-presentation of the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration by the
RTC, does not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would
give rise to the presumption that it would be adverse to the heirs of
Donata if produced.24 As this Court already expounded in the case
of People v. Jumamoy25
x x x We reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a
suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression
is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely
corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of
both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure to present the other
witnesses was because their testimonies would be unfavorable to the
prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by
compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as
hostile witnesses.
If there is indeed a surviving copy of the CFI Order, dated 2 October
1952, then there is no reason to believe that it would be exclusively
available only to the heirs of Donata and not to the heirs of Maximino.
It is important to note that two of the documents relating to Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, namely, (1) the Letters of Administration
issued in favor of Donata by the CFI, and (2) the Inventory submitted
by Donata to the CFI, were actually produced before the RTC in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794 by the heirs of Maximino. It only goes to show
that the heirs of Maximino did have access to the records of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R in which the CFI Order, dated 2 October
1952, was issued. If there was still a copy of the CFI Order, dated 2
October 1952, in the records of Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and
the contents of such Order were truly adverse to the heirs of Donata,
then it would have been more compelling for the heirs of Maximino to
present it before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, with the aid of
the appropriate court processes if necessary.
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R, effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by
declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her
deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as
well as its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
enjoy the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n)
of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced below
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines
or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in
the absence of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, that
the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction of the
subject matter and the parties, and to have rendered a judgment
valid in every respect;26 and it could not give credence to the
following statements made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision 27
At the outset, the proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration was invalid. Firstly, Donata did not include in her
petition for letters of administration the names, ages and residences
of the heirs as required by Rule 79, Section 2(b) of the Rules of
Court. Secondly, the court failed to give notice to the known heirs
that a petition has been filed, and the time and place for hearing
thereof as provided in Section 3 of the same rule, to give them ample
opportunity to oppose it, if warranted. Thirdly, the court failed to do its
specific duty to require proof, at the hearing of the petition, that the
aforementioned notice has been given to the heirs in accordance
with Section 5 of the same rule.
There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing
pronouncements. First of all, the Petition filed by Donata for Letters
of Administration in Special Proceedings No. 928-R before the CFI
was not even referred to nor presented during the course of the trial
of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the RTC. How then could the
Court of Appeals make a finding that Donata willfully excluded from
the said Petition the names, ages, and residences of the other heirs
of Maximino? Second, there was also no evidence showing that the
CFI actually failed to send notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R
to the heirs of Maximino or that it did not require presentation of proof
of service of such notices. It should be remembered that there stands
a presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his duties
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included sending out of
notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service of such
notices; and, the heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient
evidence to debunk such presumption. They only made a general
denial of knowledge of Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until
1985. There was no testimony or document presented in which the
heirs of Maximino categorically denied receipt of notice from the CFI
of the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The only
evidence on record in reference to the absence of notice of such
proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia Briones (Aurelia), 28 one of
the heirs of Maximino, to wit
Q When the husband of defendant Erlinda Pilapil was presented
before this Court he testified that when the late Donata Ortiz filed a
petition to be declared sole heir according to him the brothers and
sisters of the late Maximino Briones were notified of the said hearing.
What can you say about this, Ms. Witness?
A No, I dont think they were notified. They would have contested
their right to inherit their brothers property because he had no issue
with his wife.
Q Likewise the same witness testified that at the time the petition
was granted there was no opposition from the heirs. What can you
say about this, Ms. Witness?
A I dont think they were notified because I know they will contest that
declaration.
Aurelias testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was
not testifying on matters within her personal knowledge. The phrase
"I dont think" is a clear indication that she is merely voicing out her
opinion on how she believed her uncles and aunts would have acted
had they received notice of Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of
Maximino even emphasized that Donata lived along the same street
as some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet, she failed to inform
them of the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R, and the issuance in her name of new TCTs covering the
real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino. This Court,
however, appreciates such information differently. It actually works
against the heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby,
Maximinos siblings had ample opportunity to inquire or discuss with
Donata the status of the estate of their deceased brother. Some of
the real properties, which belonged to the estate of Maximino, were
also located within the same area as their residences in Cebu City,
and Maximinos siblings could have regularly observed the actions
and behavior of Donata with regard to the said real properties. It is
uncontested that from the time of Maximinos death on 1 May 1952,
Donata had possession of the real properties. She managed the real
properties and even collected rental fees on some of them until her
own death on 1 November 1977. After Donatas death, Erlinda took
possession of the real properties, and continued to manage the same
and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently,
Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of ownership over the
real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already
put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still
had rights thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even
attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they
had waited 33 years from Maximinos death before one of them,
Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After learning that the
intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two years, before
instituting, on 3 March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the
Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property
belonging to the estate of Maximino. The heirs of Maximino put off
acting on their rights to the estate of Maximino for so long that when
they finally did, attributing fraud to Maximinos wife, Donata, the latter
had already passed away, on 1 November 1977, and was no longer
around to explain and defend herself. The delay of the heirs of
Maximino is not without consequence, as this Court explained
in Ramos v. Ramos29
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the filing of the instant case long
after the death of Jose Ramos and other persons involved in the
intestate proceeding renders it difficult to determine with
certitude whether the plaintiffs had really been defrauded - What
Justice Street said in Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507, 518-9 is relevant
to this case:
"In passing upon controversies of this character experience
teaches the danger of accepting lightly charges of fraud made
many years after the transaction in question was accomplished,
when death may have sealed the lips of the principal actors and
changes effected by time may have given a totally different
color to the cause of controversy. In the case before us the
guardian, Emilio Tevez, is dead. The same is true of Trinidad Diago,
mother of the defendant Agueda Longa; while Agapito Longa is now
living in Spain. It will be borne in mind also that, insofar as oral proof
is concerned, the charge of fraud rests principally on the testimony of
a single witness who, if fraud was committed, was a participant
therein and who naturally would now be anxious, so far as
practicable, to put the blame on others. In this connection it is well to
bear in mind the following impressive language of Mr. Justice Story:
"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human
evidence; and as it thus removes from the parties all the
immediate means to verify the nature of the original
transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in favor of
innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It would be
unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact proof of all
the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a
satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with
which it may be encumbered. The most that can fairly be expected,
in such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and
human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be given with certainty
to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest
in confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is
to arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute general
presumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach of
trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the legal
presumption is the other way; as to the dead, who are not here
to answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and
cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the
grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a
reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498)."
It is granted that the heirs of Maximino had rights to his intestate
estate upon his death on 1 May 1952, by virtue of Articles 995 and
1005 of the New Civil Code. Nonetheless, the CFI, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, had declared Donata as the sole, absolute,
and exclusive heir of Maximino in its Order, dated 2 October 1952.
This Court, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, can only
presume that Special Proceedings No. 928-R was fair and regular,
which would consequently mean that the CFI complied with the
procedural requirements for intestate proceedings such as
publication and notice to interested parties, and that the CFI had
carefully reviewed and studied the claims of creditors, as well as the
rights of heirs to the estate, before issuing the Order, dated 2
October 1952. There is no showing that the Order, dated 2 October
1952, had been appealed and had, therefore, long attained finality,
which even this Court would be bound to respect. Without doubt, if
the action for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession
instituted by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794
succeeds, then, it would be a circumvention of the finality of the CFI
Order, dated 2 October 1952, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
because, necessarily, a recognition of the rights of the other heirs to
the estate of Maximino would violate the sole, absolute, and
exclusive right of Donata to the same estate previously determined
by the CFI. As this Court had discussed in Ramos v. Ortuzar30
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally
intervene, still they would be concluded by the result of the
proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of
the estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47
Phil. 938, "The proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc.,
1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons
interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by
sec. 630 C. P. C.; and any order that may be entered therein is
binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil. 156) "A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees."
(Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil.
895) There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutory
doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the
better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by
proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an
independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be,
as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a
decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have
the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino,
registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was
established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real
properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to
an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and
regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and
exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular
owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties,
and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased
husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of
Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been
dismissed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming
the Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794,
dated 28
September 1986, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed
by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25, 2013
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P)
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant,
vs. NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV), Respondent.
The present administrative case stemmed from a sworn letter-
complaint1 dated May 29, 1999 filed before this Court by Rodolfo C.
Sabidong (complainant) charging respondent Nicolasito S. Solas,
Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City
with grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression and
abuse of authority.
The Facts
Trinidad Sabidong, complainants mother, is one of the longtime
occupants of a parcel of land, designated as Lot 11 (Lot 1280-D-4-11
of consolidation-subdivision plan [LRC] Pcs-483) originally registered
in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Barangay San Vicente,
Jaro, Iloilo City.2 The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion
of Lot 11 of the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion
was occupied by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an
ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil Case No.
14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4 ("Rosita R. Natividad in her
capacity as Administratrix of C.N. Hodges Estate, plaintiff vs. Priscila
Saplagio, defendant"). On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in
said case ordering the defendant to immediately vacate the portion of
Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorneys
fees, expenses and costs.3 At the time, respondent was the Clerk of
Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to
Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. In a letter dated January 7,
1986, the Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondents
offer in view of an application to purchase already filed by the actual
occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to
give priority to the actual occupants in awarding approval of Offers".
While the check for initial down payment tendered by respondent
was returned to him, he was nevertheless informed that he may file
an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if he could put up a sufficient
down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for approval
of the Probate Court so that the property can be awarded to him
"should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them." 4
The following day, January 8, 1986, respondent again submitted an
Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square meters for the
amount of 35,100. Under the Order dated November 18, 1986
issued by the probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27)
in Special Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late Charles
Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"), respondents
Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the courts observation
that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their
desire to purchase the lots they are occupying up to this date and
considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in
favor of the x x x offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x". On
January 21, 1987, the probate court issued another Order granting
respondents motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor.
The writ of possession over Lot 11 was eventually issued on June
27, 1989.5
On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot
11 was executed between respondent and the Hodges Estate
represented by its Administratrix, Mrs. Ruth R. Diocares. Lot 11 was
thereby conveyed to respondent on installment for the total purchase
price of 50,000.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11836 in the
name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled and a new certificate of title,
TCT No. T-107519 in the name of respondent was issued on
December 5, 1994. Lot 11 was later subdivided into two lots, Lots 11-
A and 11-B for which the corresponding titles (TCT Nos. T-116467
and T-116468), also in the name of respondent, were issued on
February 28, 1997.6
On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of the Hodges Estate,
a writ of demolition was issued on March 3, 1998 by the probate
court in favor of respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot
11.7
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint
asserting that as court employee respondent cannot buy property in
litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit
deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority.
Complainant specifically alleged the following:
3. Complainant and his siblings, are possessors and
occupants of a parcel of land situated at Brgy. San Vicente,
Jaro, Iloilo City, then identified as Lot No. 1280-D-4-11,
later consolidated and subdivided and became known as
Lot 11, then registered and titled in the name of Charles
Newton Hodges. The Sabidong family started occupying
this lot in 1948 and paid their monthly rentals until
sometime in 1979 when the Estate of Hodges stopped
accepting rentals. x x x
4. Upon knowing sometime in 1987 that the property over
which their house is standing, was being offered for sale by
the Estate, the mother of complainant, TRINIDAD
CLAVERIO SABIDONG (now deceased), took interest in
buying said property, Lot 11;
5. TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG, was then an
ordinary housekeeper and a laundrywoman, who never
received any formal education, and did not even know how
to read and write. When Trinidad Claverio Sabidong,
together with her children and the complainant in this case,
tried to negotiate with the Estate for the sale of the subject
property, they were informed that all papers for transaction
must pass through the respondent in this case, Nicolasito
Solas. This is unusual, so they made inquiries and they
learned that, Nicolasito Solas was then the Clerk of Court
111, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City and
presently, the City Sheriff of Iloilo City;
6. The respondent Nicolasito Solas, then Clerk of Court III,
MTCC, Iloilo City, has knowledge, by reason of his position
that in 1983 Hodges Estate was ejecting occupants of its
land. x x x Taking advantage of this inside information that
the land subject of an ejectment case in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Iloilo City, whom respondent is a Clerk of
Court III, the respondent surreptitiously offered to buy the
said lot in litigation. x x x
7. Complainant nor any member of his family did not know
that as early as 1984, the respondent had offered to
purchase the subject lot from the estate x x x. After
receiving the notice of denial of his offer to purchase, dated
January 7, 1986, respondent made a second offer to
purchase the subject property the following day, January 8,
1986, knowing fully well that the subject property was being
occupied. x x x
8. Because of this denial, respondent met with the family of
the complainant and negotiated for the sale of the property
and transfer of the title in favor of the latter. Respondent
made the complainant and his family believed that he is the
representative of the estate and that he needed a
downpayment right away. All the while, the Sabidong family
(who were carpenters, laundrywomen, a janitor, persons
who belong to the underprivileged) relied on the
representations of the respondent that he was authorized to
facilitate the sale, with more reason that respondent
represented himself as the City Sheriff;
9. That between 1992-1993, a sister of the complainant
who was fortunate to have worked abroad, sent the amount
of Ten Thousand (10,000.00) Pesos to complainants
mother, to be given to respondent Nicolasito Solas. x x x
After receiving the money, respondent assured the
Sabidong family that they will not be ejected from the lot, he
being the City Sheriff will take care of everything, and
taking advantage of the illiteracy of Trinidad Claverio
Sabidong, he did not issue any receipt;
10. True enough, they were not ejected instead it took the
respondent some time to see them again and demanded
additional payment. In the meanwhile, the complainant
waited for the papers of the supposed sale and transfer of
title, which respondent had promised after receiving the
downpayment of 10,000.00;
11. That sometime again in 1995, respondent again
received from the mother of complainant the amount of Two
Thousand (2,000.00) Pesos, allegedly for the expenses of
the documentation of sale and transfer of title, and again
respondent promised that the Sabidong family will not be
ejected;
12. To the prejudice and surprise of the complainant and
his family, respondent was able to secure an order for the
approval of his offer to purchase x x x in Special
Proceedings No. 1672 x x x;
13. Worse, respondent moved for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession in his favor, which the probate court acted
favorably x x x. A writ of possession was issued on June
27, 1989 x x x;
14. x x x respondent took advantage of the trust and
confidence which the Sabidong family has shown,
considering that respondent was an officer of the court and
a City Sheriff at that. The complainant and his family
thought that respondent, being a City Sheriff, could help
them in the transfer of the title in their favor. Never had they
ever imagined that while respondent had been receiving
from them hard-earned monies purportedly for the sale of
the subject property, respondent was also exercising acts
of ownership adverse to the interest of the complainant and
his family;
15. Being an officer of the court and supposed to be an
embodiment of fairness and justice, respondent acted with
malice, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit when he
represented that he can facilitate the sale and titling of the
subject property in favor of the complainant and his family;
16. That when several thousands of pesos were given to
the respondent as payment for the same and incidental
expenses relative thereto, he was able to cause the transfer
of the title in his favor. x x x;
17. After the death of Trinidad Claverio Sabidong x x x the
respondent received from the complainant the amount of
Five Thousand (5,000.00) Pesos x x x When a receipt
was demanded, respondent refused to issue one, and
instead promised and assured the complainant that they
will not be ejected;
xxxx
19. The complainant again, through his sister-in-law,
Socorro Sabidong, delivered and gave to the respondent
the amount of Three Thousand (3,000.00) Pesos as
expenses for the subdivision of the subject lot. The
respondent facilitated the subdivision and after the same
was approved, the complainant did not know that two (2)
titles were issued in the name of the respondent. x x x;
20. Meanwhile, respondent prepared a Contract to Sell, for
the complainant and his neighbor Norberto Saplagio to affix
their signatures, pursuant to their previous agreement for
the buyers to avail of a housing loan with the Home
Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG). Complainant
attended the seminar of the HDMF for seven (7) times, in
his desire to consummate the sale. However, when the
complainant affixed his signature in the contract, he was
surprised that the owner of the subject property was the
respondent. When complainant raised a question about
this, respondent assured complainant that everything was
alright and that sooner complainant will be the owner of the
property. Complainant and his family, all these years, had
believed and continued to believe that the owner was the
estate of Hodges and that respondent was only the
representative of the estate;
21. The Contract to Sell, appeared to have been notarized
on June 3, 1996, however, no copy thereof was given to the
complainant by the respondent. Respondent then, took the
papers and documents required by the HDMF to be
completed, from the complainant allegedly for the purpose
of personally filing the same with the HDMF. Complainant
freely and voluntarily delivered all pertinent documents to
the respondent, thinking that respondent was helping in the
fast and easy release of the loan. While the said documents
were in the possession of the respondent, he never made
any transaction with the HDMF, worse, when complainant
tried to secure a copy of the Contract to Sell, the copy given
was not signed by the Notary Public, x x x;
22. The complainant [was] shocked to learn that
respondent had canceled the sale and that respondent
refused to return the documents required by the HDMF.
Respondent claimed that as Sheriff, he can cause the
demolition of the house of the complainant and of his
family. Respondent threatened the complainant and he is
capable of pursuing a demolition order and serve the same
with the assistance of the military. x x x;
23. After learning of the demolition order, complainant
attempted to settle the matter with the respondent,
however, the same proved futile as respondent boasted
that the property would now cost at Four Thousand Five
Hundred (4,500.00) Pesos;
24. The threats of demolition is imminent. Clearly,
complainant and his family were duped by the respondent
and are helpless victims of an officer of the court who took
advantage of their good faith and trust. Complainant later
was informed that the subject property was awarded to the
respondent as his Sheriffs Fees, considering that
respondent executed the decisions in ejectment cases filed
by the Hodges estate against the adverse occupants of its
vast properties;
25. A civil case for the Annulment of Title of the respondent
over the subject property is pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 37 and a criminal complaint for
Estafa is also pending preliminary investigation before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City, known as I.S. No.
1559-99, both filed [by] the complainant against the
respondent.8
Acting on the complaint, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo
issued a 1st Indorsement9 dated July 8, 1999, requiring respondent
to file his comment on the Complaint dated May 29, 1999. On
October 21, 1999, respondent submitted his Comment. 10
In a Resolution11 dated July 19, 1999, Public Prosecutor Constantino
C. Tubilleja dismissed the Estafa charge against respondent for
insufficiency of evidence.
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo issued an
Evaluation and Recommendation12 finding respondent guilty of
violating Article 149113 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the
purchase by certain court officers of property and rights in litigation
within their jurisdiction. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended
that:
1. this administrative complaint be treated as an
administrative matter;
2. respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, OCC,
MTCC, Iloilo City be SUSPENDED for six (6) months, with
warning that a repetition of the same offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely;
3. inasmuch as there are factual issues regarding the
delivery of substantial amounts which complainant alleged
and which defendant denied, this issue should be
investigated and the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City should be designated to hear the
evidence and to make a report and recommendation within
sixty (60) days from receipt.14
In a Resolution15 dated January 22, 2001, this Court adopted the
recommendation of the Court Administrator to treat the present
administrative action as a regular administrative matter and to
designate the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City to hear the
evidence of the parties.
The Court, however, noted without action the Court Administrators
recommendation to suspend respondent for six months.
On March 13, 2001, Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao
forwarded the records of this case to Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo
of the Iloilo City RTC.16 In a Resolution17 dated July 18, 2001, the
Court referred this case to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo
City for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days
from notice. By Order18 dated August 30, 2001, Executive Judge
Gustilo set the case for reception of evidence.
On March 19, 2004, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 37, dismissed the case
for annulment of title, damages and injunction against respondent for
lack of merit.19
In a Resolution20 dated June 15, 2005, the Court resolved to reassign
the instant administrative case to Executive Judge Rene S. Hortillo
for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from
notice. In a Letter21 dated September 15, 2005, Executive Judge
Hortillo informed the Court that per the records, the parties have
presented their testimonial and documentary evidence before retired
Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo.
On September 12, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo required the
parties to file their respective memoranda within 60 days from notice,
upon submission of which the case shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.22
In his Memorandum,23 respondent maintained that his purchase of
the subject land is not covered by the prohibition in paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code. He pointed out that he bought Lot 11-A
a decade after the MTCC of Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the
ejectment of Priscila Saplagio and Trinidad Sabidong from the
subject lot. He insisted that public trust was observed when
complainant was accorded his right of first refusal in the purchase of
Lot 11-A, albeit the latter failed to avail said right. Asserting that he is
a buyer in good faith and for value, respondent cited the dismissal of
the cases for Estafa and annulment of title and damages which
complainant filed against him.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from
service. Prior to this, he wrote then Senior Deputy Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, requesting for the release of his
retirement benefits pending resolution of the administrative cases
against him.24 In a Memorandum25 dated September 24, 2007,
Senior Deputy Court Administrator Elepao made the following
recommendations:
a) The request of Nicolasito S. Solas, former Clerk of Court,
MTCC, Iloilo City for partial release of his retirement
benefits be GRANTED; and
b) Atty. Lilian Barribal Co, Chief, Financial Management
Office, Office of the Court Administrator be DIRECTED to
(1) WITHHOLD the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (200,000.00) from the retirement benefits of
Nicolasito S. Solas to answer for any administrative liability
that the Court may find against him in A.M. No. P-01-1448
(Formerly Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 99-664-P);
OCA IPI No. 99-659-P; OCA IPI No. 99-670-P; and OCA
IPI No. 99-753-P; and (2) RELEASE the balance of his
retirement benefits.26
Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio, the
new Executive Judge of the Iloilo City RTC for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and
Recommendation27 finding respondent liable for grave misconduct
and dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel. Based on the evidence presented, Judge
Patricio concluded that respondent misappropriated the money which
he received for the filing of complainants loan application. Such
money could not have been used for the partition of Lot No. 1280-D-
4-11 since the same was already subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B
when respondent presented the Contract to Sell to complainant. And
despite respondents promise to keep complainant and his family in
peaceful possession of the subject property, respondent caused the
issuance of a writ of demolition against them. Thus, Judge Patricio
recommended the forfeiture of respondents salary for six months to
be deducted from his retirement benefits.
28
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2008, the Court noted Judge
Patricios Investigation Report and referred the same to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum29 dated January 16, 2009, then Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent liable for serious and
grave misconduct and dishonesty and recommended the forfeiture of
respondents salary for six months, which shall be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
The Court Administrator held that by his unilateral acts of
extinguishing the contract to sell and forfeiting the amounts he
received from complainant and Saplagio without due notice,
respondent failed to act with justice and equity. He found
respondents denial to be anchored merely on the fact that he had
not issued receipts which was belied by his admission that he had
asked money for the expenses of partitioning Lot 11 from
complainant and Saplagio. Since their PAG-IBIG loan applications
did not materialize, complainant should have returned the amounts
given to him by complainant and Saplagio.
On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution30 requiring the
parties to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings and records already filed with
the Court. However, the copy of the Resolution dated February 11,
2009 which was sent to complainant was returned unserved with the
postal carriers notation "RTS-Deceased." Meanwhile, in a
Compliance31 dated August 24, 2009, respondent expressed his
willingness to submit the case for decision and prayed for an early
resolution of the case.
Our Ruling
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers
such as clerks of court from acquiring property involved in litigation
within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another:
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy
disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship
involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar
control exercised by these persons. 32"In so providing, the Code tends
to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for
fraud, which is what can and must be done."33
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property
must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property.34 Where the property is acquired after the termination of the
case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code
attaches.35
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on
November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was
promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it
may, it can not be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at
that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under
settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or
litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes
subject to the judicial action of the judge. 36 A property forming part of
the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of
litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the
order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated.37 The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same.38 Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672
in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and
terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With
Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in
litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil
Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of
respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to purchase
property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before
another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for
dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross
negligence by a public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous
and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not
a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officers official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. 39
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or
betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or
integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness." 40
In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who were led
to believe that he is the legal representative of the Hodges Estate, or
at least possessed of such power to intercede for overstaying
occupants of the estates properties like complainant. Boasting of his
position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainants family
completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be
ejected from the premises. Upon learning that the lot they were
occupying was for sale and that they had to negotiate for it through
respondent, complainants family readily gave the amounts he
demanded and, along with Saplagio, complied with the requirements
for a loan application with PAG-IBIG. All the while and unknown to
complainants family, respondent was actually working to acquire Lot
11 for himself.
Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the Hodges Estate for
the sale of the property to him, he collected as down payment 5,000
from complainants family in July 1986. Four months later, on
November 18, 1986, the probate court approved respondents offer
to purchase Lot 11. The latter received further down payment from
complainant in the amount of 10,000 between 1992 and 1993, or
before the Deed of Sale with Mortgage41 dated November 21, 1994
could be executed in respondents favor.
Thereafter, respondent demanded 3,000 from complainant
supposedly for the subdivision of Lot 11 between the latter and the
Saplagios. Yet, it was not until respondent obtained title over said lot
that the same was subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B. The
records42 of the case show that the Subdivision Plan dated April 25,
1996, duly approved by the Land Management Services (DENR)
subdividing Lot 11 into sublots 11-A and 11-B, was inscribed on
February 28, 1997 two years after TCT No. T-107519 covering Lot
11 was issued in respondents name on December 5, 1994.
Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount of 2,000 to defray
the expenses for documentation and transfer of title in complainants
name. In the latter instance, while it may be argued that respondent
already had the capacity to sell the subject property, the sum of all
the circumstances belie an honest intention on his part to convey Lot
11-A to complainant. We note the inscription in TCT No. T-1183643 in
the name of C.N. Hodges that respondent executed a Request dated
February 19, 1997 "for the issuance of separate titles in the name of
the registered owner."44 Soon after, TCT No. T-11646745 covering Lot
11-A and TCT No. T-11646846 covering Lot 11-B were issued in the
name of respondent on February 28, 1997 only eight months after
he executed the Contract to Sell47 in favor of complainant on June 3,
1996.
Respondents bare denials were correctly disregarded by the Court
Administrator in the light of his own admission that he indeed asked
money from both complainant and Saplagio. The evidence on record
clearly established that by misrepresenting himself as the estates
representative and as a court officer having the power to protect
complainants family from eviction, respondent was able to collect
sums totaling 20,000 from complainants family. Even after the
latter realized they were duped since respondent was already the
owner of Lot 11, they still offered to buy the property from him.
Respondent, however, changed his mind and no longer wanted to
sell the property after nothing happened to the loan applications of
complainant and Saplagio. This subsequent unilateral cancellation by
respondent of the contract to sell with complainant may have been
an afterthought, and plainly unjustified, based merely on his own
assumption that complainant could not make full payment. But it did
not negate the deception and fraudulent acts perpetrated against
complainants family who were forced into submission by the
constant threat of eviction. Such acts constitute grave misconduct for
which respondent should be held answerable.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna
Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and Bonifacio G.
Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya,48 the Court stressed that to preserve decency within the
judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual
obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that
case, we said that court employees are expected to be paragons of
uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in their official conduct but
also in their personal dealings, including business and commercial
transactions to avoid becoming the courts albatross of infamy. 49
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 6713 50 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall
remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness
and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially
the poor and the underprivileged.1wphi1 They shall at all times
respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public
safety and public interest.
Under Section 52,51 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and grave misconduct are
classified as grave offenses with the corresponding penalty of
dismissal for the first offense. Section 58(a) states that the penalty of
dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service.
Section 53 further provides that mitigating circumstances attendant to
the commission of the offense should be considered in the
determination of the penalty to be imposed on the erring government
employee. However, no such mitigating circumstance had been
shown. On the contrary, respondent had been previously held
administratively liable for irregularities in the performance of his
duties as Clerk of Court. In A.M. No. P-01-1484,52 this Court imposed
on respondent a fine of 5,000 for acting imprudently in notarizing
documents and administering oath on matters alien to his official
duties. And in A.M. Nos. P-08-2567 (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-670-P)
and P-08-2568 (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-753-P),53 respondent was
found liable for simple misconduct and ordered to pay a fine
equivalent to his three (3) months salary to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
Since respondent had compulsorily retired from service on
September 10, 2007, for this additional administrative case he should
be fined in an amount equivalent to his salary for six months which
shall likewise be deducted from his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Nicolasito S. Solas,
retired Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City,
LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY.
Respondent is FINED in an amount equivalent to his salary for six (6)
months to be deducted from his retirement benefits. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,
vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA.
TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L.
MERCADO, Respondents.
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership
of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination
shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of
the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of
each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991,
survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and
their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado,
Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita
M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas
(Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He
owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty)
and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He
assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of
Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdios estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-
CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no
opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were
issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of
Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval
by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his
death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal
properties" worth 6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of
32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth 20,000.00; pieces of
jewelry valued at 15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir
Realty worth 6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth 22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were
excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct
Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it.
The RTC granted Thelmas motion through the order of January 8,
1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of
January 8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three
certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock;4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10,
1991 involving real properties with the market value of 4,440,651.10
in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par
value of 4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock issued on
January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth
30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be
allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or
comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita
had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need
for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to
enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. 7
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory,
and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court on the issue of what properties should be included in or
excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on
that issue.8
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC
issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the
inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should
be included, and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and
considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrixs motion
for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said
administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are supposed
to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by
including therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately
preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory
within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of
her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which
had come to her possession. She must render such accounting
within sixty (60) days from notice hereof. SO ORDERED. 9
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely
sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the
ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located
in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the
parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come
into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir
Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for the
reconsideration, and that the movants agreement as heirs to submit
to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or
excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning
its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
 Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as
administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to
Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson
Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on
March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL
PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE
CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL
PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND
ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE
CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION
IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD
BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari,
disposing as follows:13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
petition is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as
the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at
Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated
February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to
be submitted by the administratrix is concerned and affirmed in all
other respects. SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for
certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of
properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil
Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold "shall be
transferred to the vendee" upon its "actual and constructive delivery,"
and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made
through a public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the
object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred
the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of
absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized;
that Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot
3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty
as early as February 17, 1989 "for the purpose of saving, as in
avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of Assignment
dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were
included"; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment,
Mervir Realty had been "even at the losing end considering that such
parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated
February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through
shares of stock"; that even if the assignment had been based on the
deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land
could not be included in the inventory "considering that there is
nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate planning scheme";
that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered
in the name of third persons or corporation; that a property covered
by the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the
presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law and
infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also
gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were
estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement
included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that
petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering
that they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction
of determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from
the inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually,
a reading of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26,
2001 filed before public respondent court clearly shows that
petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which
it was exercised for which they are not estopped, since that is their
right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the administratrixs motion for
approval of the inventory of properties which were already titled and
in possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a
private corporation, which under the law possessed a personality
distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation
should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no
authority to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the
veil of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not
merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, private
respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that
would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction
because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a
corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly
established since it cannot be presumed. 14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing
the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding
that such properties had been either transferred by sale or
exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the
resort to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of
the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.
Thelmas contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy
depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or
interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court
distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is
well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to
be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case
but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order
deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not
an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or
judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application
for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final,
order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for
disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends
the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the
pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of
time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as
there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order
being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresitas motion for
the approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001
denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is
because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a
final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the
inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as
basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional
and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 17 the Court, in
affirming the decision of the CA to the effect that the order of the
intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory
was interlocutory and could be changed or modified at anytime
during the course of the administration proceedings, held that the
order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order "in the
sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo
Village lots." The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination
is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3
Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9
and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 19 where the
Court declared that a "probate court, whether in a testate or intestate
proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally," and
reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the "patent reason
is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate
action." Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of
Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties
and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for
Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment
rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of
Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings,
stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a
court of law "that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may
be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that
an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals
with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical
recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally
determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1,
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in
which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings,
viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. -
An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an
order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased
person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such
person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim
against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against
it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator,
trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a
trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal
shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and
affects the substantial rights of the person appealing,
unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new
trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not
come under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are
permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion for including properties in the inventory
notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by
Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of
the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying
the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in
reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully
warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the
surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the
person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the
estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty
and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from
the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three
months. Within three (3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which
has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of
such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax
appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion
of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which
has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the
decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1
allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from
the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another
person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and
appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising
the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the
administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution
(partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration
of the estate."23Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration
of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta
v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant
that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or
excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of
discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased
persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the
appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the
action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a
positive abuse of discretion."25 As long as the RTC commits no
patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as
part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an
intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to
belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the
estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All
that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties
to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is
provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v.
Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to
do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent
rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and
limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in
charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses
no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases
for its directive for the inclusion of the properties in question in its
assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that
Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who,
upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of
properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306-R
which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The
administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the
counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory
submitted by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the
said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties
constituting Emigdio Mercados share in the estate of Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties required to
be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio
Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not include in the
inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in
her name and which were paid by her from money derived from the
taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a
conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being
conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof should
be included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in her name at
Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive.
Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in
character, and so, one-half thereof should be included in the
inventory of the properties constituting as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this
case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in Badian, Cebu
containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described in and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of
Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil Case
No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the
estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner
thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case
in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard
Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said
property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory
in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of
land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on
January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him
on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the
administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made
two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in
contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the
transferor has not long to live and made in place of a testamentary
disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his
death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death.
So, the inventory to be approved in this case should still include the
said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in
contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually
appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at
least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the certification
issued by the Cebu City Assessors Office on October 31, 1991
(Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court
and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the
inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations
indicated that the directive to include the properties in question in the
inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from
whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from
Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory because
Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being
inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime
was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the
settlement of Emigdios estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to
include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party
asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime
did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden
of proof, and that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of
them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. 30 In the
absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal
partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated
to establish who the real owners of the affected properties
were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the estate of
Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must
be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in
the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in
dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that had involved the
ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of
Emigdio, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in
Emigdios name.1wphi1 Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of
March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had
remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No.
CEB-12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB-12692 was
susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect that
the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out their
differences with the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation
was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was
managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as
its President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family
corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in
favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently
justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A
notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in
favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the
legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the
contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the
Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals: 33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in
its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the
function of the notary public to validate and make binding an
instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding
legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still
and always is the primary consideration in determining the true
nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock
of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still
have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of
assignment two days prior to his death was a circumstance that
should put any interested party on his guard regarding the exchange,
considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick
of cancer of the pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the
CA correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an estate
planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be
established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in
the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately
excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances
admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This
is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is
merely a system of registration of titles to lands.1wphi1However,
justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to
bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the
States agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or
of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens
system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question
as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the
certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever
be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed
their duties.35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of
assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in
the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the
assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the
validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court might have constricted the determination of the rights
to the properties arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the
RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of
the properties subject of that deed. This is because the RTC as
intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited jurisdiction,
was still "deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdiction to make it effective."37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and
submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of
collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code
required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein
Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during
the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by
the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings,
and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the
special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about
the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by
authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or
bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the
decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or
included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the
authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making
its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded
under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in
the possession of the administrator or were known to the
administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties
that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long
as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders
must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent
judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as
when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39
In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu;
DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch
in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the
late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the
case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B.
SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA,
Petitioners,
vs. MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA
ALARAS, Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 and Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009 and April 23,
2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
107347, Which affirmed the Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil
Case No. 217.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving
several heirs, including his_ children with his first wife, respondents
Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties
including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No.
51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and
a family home, the land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos.
40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of
Title and Recovery of Possession 5 dated September 15, 1993,
respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered
that their co-heirs, Pedros second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other
children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses
Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and
substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge
and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged
the same, showing respondents a document she believed evidenced
receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any
sort of sale but to a previous loan obtoiined by Pedro and Benita from
a bank. 6 The document actually evidenced receipt from Banco
Silangan of the amount of 87, 352.62 releasing her and her late
husbands indebtedness therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the Register of
Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of
any transaction involving the subject properties, giving them certified
true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to the
subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the
resort had been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter
as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of
an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was published
in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, They caused the
annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before
the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying,
among others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the
subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued
pursuant thereto. 8
In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint
on the groun_d of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in
acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony during
trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased
was only the resort. 10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights
and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs
sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia
Bondoc for Pl million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold
the resort to petitioners for 650, 000.00. 11
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject
Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in
the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioners .as well as the
circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically,
the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public that
was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was
executed. 12 The Deed of Sale was Undated, the date of the
acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the Typewritten name
"Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of the document Was not
signed. 13 The trial court also observed that both documents were
Never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for
registration and That the titles to the subject properties were still in
the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita. In addition, the
supposed notaries and buyers of the Subject properties were not
even presented as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the
signing and execution of the documents of conveyance. 14 On The
basis thereof, the triaI court ruled in favor of respondents, in its
Judgment, the pertinent portions of its fallo provide:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is Hereby
rendered as follows:
xxxx
4. A) Declaring as a nullity the ~'Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Ex. "l ",
Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public Antonio
G. Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No. IXII,
Series of 1991. .
b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Ex. "2",
Villafria), purportedly executed by Benita T. Rifioza in favor
of spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong,
purportedly notarized by one Alfredo de Guzman marked
Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141, and Book. No. XXX, Series
of 1991.
c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements
introduced By defendants Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong in the properties Covered by TCT No. 40807,
40808, 51354 and 51355 of the Register of Deeds for
Nasugbu, Batangas. .
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose
Occupancy within the premises of the four- (4) parcels of land
described in Par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest of
defendant Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver possession
thereof, and all improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in
behalf of the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza.
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended
Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza,
each in the capacity and degree established, as well as their direct
successors-in interest, and ordering the defendant Registrar of
Deeds to issue the co1Tesponding titles in their names in the
proportion established by law, pro in division, in TCT Nos. 40807,
40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after restoration) within ten (10)
days from finality of this Decision, 4pon payment of lawful fees,
except TCT No. 40353, which shall be exempt from all expenses for
its restoration. With no costs. SO ORDERED. 15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts Judgment in its
Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006 in the following wise:
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo
de Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to
July 3, 1991, the date the certification was issued. Such being the
case, the resort deed is not a public document and the presumption
of regularity accorded to public documents will not apply to the same.
As laid down in Tigno, et al. v. Aquino, et al.:
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the
authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public docs net have the
capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the
document should be treated as A. Unnotarized. The rule may strike
as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in
good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the
person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render
merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order
that a lawyer may receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule,
The notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public will
have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer
engaged in pretense. The notarization of a document carries
considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document converts
such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an
empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a
substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires
preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as
notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.
Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be
considered a public document. This is because the following cast
doubt on the document's authenticity, to wit: .
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu,
Batangas for annotation; and
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or the
purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc,
were presented as witnesses. Concededly, the absence of
notarization in the resort deed and/or the lacking details in the
settlement/family home deed did not necessarily invalidate the
transactions evidenced by the said documents. However, since the
said deeds are private documents, perforce, their due execution and
authenticity becomes subject to the requirement of proof under the
Rules on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132 of which provides: Sec. 20.
Proof of private document. - Before any private. Document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution a"Q.d.
authenticity must be proved either:
(a). By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the
resort deed are void, as their signatures thereon are forgeries as
opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds' enforceability. After
the Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that
their signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias
to disprove the ~ame2 or conversely, to prove the authenticity and
due execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in this regard.
As forestalled, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the
notary public who purportedly notarized the questioned instrument,
(b) the witnesses who appear [Ed] in the instruments as
eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert to prove the authenticity
and genuineness of all the signatures appearing on the said
instruments. Verily, the rule that, proper foundation must be laid for
the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and
authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a
pre requisite to its admission, was prudently observed by the lower
court when it refused to admit the settlement/family home and the
resort deeds as their veracity are doubtful. 17
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial
courts lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for
Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession
was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate,
determination as to the nature thereof, nor was there an identification
of the number of legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the
settlement of the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction
when the action filed was for Judidal Partition. Considering that the
instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial
court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of forgery and ownership.
Thus, petitioner argued that. Said ruling is void and has no effect for
having been rendered without jurisdiction. The Motion for
Reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate court on
February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition
for Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the petition, a
certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that
failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding
competent evidence of affiant' s identities. 18 In its Resolution 19 dated
September 26, 2007, this Court also denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in the absence of any compelling reason to warrant
a modification of the previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007
Resolution became final and executors on October 31, 2007 as
certified by the Entry of Judgment issued by the Court. 20 On January
16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner' s motion for leave to
admit a second motion for reconsideration of its September 26, 2007
Resolution, considering that the same is a prohibited pleading under
Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthennore, petitioner's letter
dated December 18, 2007 pleading the Court to take a second. Look
at his petition for review on certiorari and that a decision thereon be
rendered based purely on its merits was noted without action. 21
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed
to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the
case be rendered based on the. Merits and not on formal
requirements "as he stands to lose everything his parents had left
him just because the verification against non-forum shopping is
formally defective." However, in view of the Entry of Judgment having
been made on October 31, 2007, the Court likewise noted said letter
without action. 22
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Part
Writ of Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the
portions disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 200 a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Order before the CA
assailing October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27,
2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. In Decision dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA
dismissed the petition a affirmed the rulings of the trial court in the
following wise: Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has
already become final and executory and in fact entry of judgment
was issued on 31 October 2007, supra, nevertheless, to put the
issues to rest,We deem it apropos to tackle the same.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the
Court a quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded.
xxxx
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment
of a judgment may "be based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho Magdato, the High
Tribunal stressed that: There is extrinsic fraud when "the
unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his
case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, ... or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; ... "
Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud,
which prevents the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting
his case to the court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair
submission of the controversy. This refers to acts intended to keep
the unsuccessful party away from the courts as when there is a false
promise of compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit.
The pivotal issues before us are (1) whether. There was a time
during the proceedings below that the Petitioners ever prevented
from exhibiting fully their case, by fraud or deception, practiced on
them by Respondents, and (2) whether the Petitioners were kept
away from the court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the
Respondent?
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what we deduced as We
carefully delved. Into the evidentiary facts surrounding the instant
case as well as the proceedings below as shown in the 36-page
Decision of the Court a quo, is that the Petitioners were given ample
time to rebut the allegations of the Respondents and had in fact
addressed every detail of. Respondent's cause of action against
them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation of the Court a quo s lack of
jurisdiction is misplaced.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling
of the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus: It
is elementary that' the active participation of a party in a case
pending against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of
that court's jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the courts
jurisdiction. ' In fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this case
the Petitioners are stopped from assailing the Court a quo 's lack of
jurisdiction. Too, We do not find merit in the Petitioners' second
issue, supra. As mentioned earlier, entry of judgment had already
been made on the assailed Decision and Order as early as 31
October 2007.
xxxx
It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain
equitable remedies such as a petition for annulment. But the I. Rules
are clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial
Courts is resorted to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner, supra.
If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate
remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court, that is their own look
out. The High Tribunal has emphatically pointed out in Mercado, et
al. v. Security Bank Corporation, thus:
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment
of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy
ofappeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for
new trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can
prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting
from his inaction or negligence. Also, the action for annulment of
judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process. Having failed to avail of the
remedies and there being 'a Clear showing that neither of the
grounds was present, the petition must be dismissed. Only a
disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition unacceptable. 23
When the appellate court denied Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009,
invoking the following ground:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14,
NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDCITION IN
ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF PEDRO RINOZA AND THE CIVIL
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND THIRD
PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING. 24
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was
captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery
of Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of action
is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro.
Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding
cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while judicial
partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are
ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it
was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the
prohibition found in the Rules on the joiner of special civil actions and
ordinary civil actions. 25 Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling of the
trial court is void and has no effect for having been rendered in
without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate
court that since the finding of forgery relates only to the signature of
respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented to the
conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as to them.
Petitioner also denies the indings of the courts below that his parents
are builders in bad faith for they only took possession of the subject
properties after the execution of the transfer documents and after
they paid the consideration on the sale.
The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since.
Respondents complaint alleged the following causes of action, the
same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial
partition: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu,
Batangas at the time of his death, died intestate on
November 16, 1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto
attached as Annex "A";
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated
from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only known heirs of the
above-mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the
Defendants Rolando, Rafael, Antonio, Angelita, Loma all
surnamed Rifioza, and Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R.
Rogador, Epifania Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are
the decedents legitimate children with his first wife, while
Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedents widow and
Bernadette Rifioza, the decedent's daughter with said
widow. As such, said parties are co-owners by virtue of an
intestate inheritance from the decedent, of the properties
enumerated in the succeeding paragraph;
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all
located in Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no
known legal indebtedness;
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it
will be to the best interest of all heirs that it be partitioned
judicially. 26.
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of
action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro,
his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon
may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a
complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on
the nature of the suit, the llegations therein, and the reliefs prayed
for, the action, is clearly one for udicial partition with annulment of
title and recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court proyides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If
the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age5 or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled
in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an Extrajudicial
settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a
pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the
entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the
public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the
affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said
register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the
personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties
concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that
may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. 27
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property. 28
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of
respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory,
to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint
alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together
with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who
is represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the
purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of
Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real
properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no known
indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the
decedents estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance
with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the
allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That
the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not
perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies
intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. Fails to
furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's
estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall
appoint a qualified administrator the order established in Section 6 of
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this rule, however,
is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a
decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may
divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or
partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor
applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court. 30The
reasons that where the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the. Estate for hem and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled. 31
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not
isputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without any
ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioners contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of
intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by ereira v. Court of
Appeals: 32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if
the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort
for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1
allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may
see fit, qr. to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said
provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons
to take a different course of action. It should be noted that recourse
to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an
action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of
court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly 4eld that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration,
which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such
case the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. 33
Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial
partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate
as law expressly permits the same.1avvphi1 That the complaint
contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate
does not. Mean that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action
for questions as to the estate's properties as well as a determination
of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their
titles to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition
proceedings alone.34 In fact, a complete inventory of the estate may
likewise be done during the partition proceedings, especially since
the estate has no debts.~5 Indeed, where the more expeditious
remedy 9f partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be
compelled to submit to administration proceedings, dispensing of the
risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated. 36
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the
annulment of title and recovery of possession does not strip the trial
court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the
annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be
achieved in an action for partition, 37 as can be seen in cases where
1-ourts determine the parties' rights arising from complaints asking
not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles
and recovery of ownership and possession of property. 38 In fact, in
Bagayas v. Bagayas, 39wherein a complaint for annulment of sale
and partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety
of an action for annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on the
certificates of title of the respondents therein, this Court found the
dismissal to be improper in the following manner:
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action. For
partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a
resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens
title issued over the disputed realties 'to a collateral attack. It must be
borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not
the title itself. The' certificate referred to is that -document issued by
the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title
referred to by law means ownership, which is, more often than not,
represented by that document. Petitioner c.pparently confuses title
with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not
be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership
although both are interchangeably used. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for
annulment of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack
since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's title to the
subject lands and not any Torrens certificate oftitle over the same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the
issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the existence of
the same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as
held in Municipality of Bifzanv. Garcia: 40
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with
the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and
a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may
be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is_ legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand,
with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition
is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order.
xxx
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that
event [,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c] ourt with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second
stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself
and its approval by the [c] ourt after the. Parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard Thereon, and an award for the recovery by
the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and
profits of the real estate in question. xx x. 41
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties. 42 Unless and until
the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of an estate. 43
In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial court
acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of settlement of
estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly
erroneous for the instant complaint is precisely one for judicial
partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession, filed
within the confines of applicable law and jurisprudence. Under
Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas
Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not
merely for partition and recovery of ownership but also for annulment
of title and documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that
the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the
instant petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title
alone, without the prayer for judicial partition, the requirement of
instituting a separate special proceeding for the determination of the
status and rights of the respondents as putative heirs may be
dispensed with, in light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the trial court and had already presented
evidence regarding the issue of heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-
Beltran, 47 the Court explained:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15,
1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said
rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies
leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in
case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
xxxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of
the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the evil case - subject of the present case, could
and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs
could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court
should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial, x x x. 48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes
of action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the trial court, in
arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more than ample opportunity
to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be permitted to allege
lack of jurisdiction just because the judgment rendered was adverse
to them. To repeat, the action filed herein is one for judicial partition
and not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that
respondents also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of
possession in the same proceeding does not strip the court off of its
jurisdiction for asking for 'the annulment of certain transfers of
property could very well be achieved in an action for partition.
than ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the
appellate courts, as well as unbiased judgments rendered after a
consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at
hand, the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts
below in the absence of any showing that the same were rendered
with fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid
as to the heirs who assented to the conveyance as well as their
allegation of good faith, this Court does not find any compelling
reason to deviate from the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently
found by both courts below, the authenticity and due execution of the
documents on which petitioners claims are based were inadequately
proven. They were undated, forged, and acknowledged before a
notary public who was not commissioned as such on the date they
were executed. They were never presented to the Register of Deeds
for registration. Neither were the supposed notaries and buyers of
the subject properties presented as witnesses.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is DENIED.
The Decision and Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23,
2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals for CA-G.R. SP No. 107347,
which affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217,
insofar as it conce1ns the resort covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title No. 513 54 and No. 51355, and family home covered by TCT
No. 40807 and 40808, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the estate,
actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the circumstances
surrounding the same militate against the fact of its occurrence. Not
only was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by Benita undated
and unsigned by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly
evidencing her receipt of her share in the sale, did not refer to any
sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from
a bank.

Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate courts

observations as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the transactions
alleged herein are concerned. First, they were seemingly uncertain
as to the number and/or identity of the properties bought by
them. 49 In their Answer, they gave the impression 'that they bought
both the resort and the family home and yet, during trial, Francisco
Villafria claimed they only bought the resort. In fact, it was only then
that they presented the subject Extra Judicial Settlement and Deed of
Sale. 50 Second, they never presented any other document which
w0uld evidence their actual payment of consideration to the selling
heirs. 51 Third, in spite of the. Blatant legal infirmities of the subject
documents of conveyance, petitioners still took possession of the
properties, demolished several cottages, and introduced permanent
improvements thereon.

In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that petitioners failed
to adequately substantiate, with convincing, credible and
independently verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact,
purchased the subject properties. The circumstances surrounding the
purported transfers cast doubt on whether they actually took place. In
substantiating their claim, petitioners relied solely on the Extra-
Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly failed to prove their
authenticity and due execution. They cannot, therefore, be permitted
to claim. Absolute ownership of the subject lands based on the same.

Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and

builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of title builder
that the land the latter is building on is one's own without knowledge
of any defect or flaw in one's. Title. 52 However, in view of .the
manifest defects in the instruments conveying their titles, petitioners
should have been placed on guard. Yet, they still demolished several
cottages and constructed improvement on the properties. Thus, their
claim of. Good faith cannot be given credence.

Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable

and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect
except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between
the parties being deemed resolved and. laid to rest. 53 it is a
fundamental principle in our judicial system and essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment
has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 54 Exceptions to the
immutability of final judgment is allowed only under the most
extraordinary of circumstances. 55 Yet, when petitioner is given more