1. G.R. No. 202303. June 4, 2014.

GERARDO R. VILLASEOR and RODEL A. MESA, petitioners, vs. OMBUDSMAN

and HON. HERBERT BAUTISTA, City Mayor, Quezon City, respondents.

Administrative Cases; Ombudsman; The Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases

may either be unappealable or appealable.The Ombudsman decisions in administrative
cases may either be unappealable or appealable. Unappealable decisions are final and
executory, and they are as follows: (1) respondent is absolved of the charge; (2) the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month; and (4) a
fine equivalent to one months salary. Appealable decisions, on the other hand, are those which
fall outside said enumeration, and may be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, within 15 days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the
motion for reconsideration. Section 7 is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory, and that such shall be executed as a matter of course.

Remedial Law; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules of Procedure; As a general

rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules, hence,
retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected.Article 4
of the Civil Code does indeed provide that laws shall have no retroactive effect. Rules
regulating the procedure of courts, however, are retroactive in nature, and are, thus, applicable
to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. As a general rule, no vested right
may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules, hence, retroactive application does not
violate any right of a person adversely affected.

Same; Same; Same; Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman; The Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and therefore, may
be applied retroactively to petitioners cases which were pending and unresolved at the time
of the passing of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17.The Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and therefore, may be applied retroactively to
petitioners cases which were pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No. 17.
No vested right is violated by the application of Section 7 because the respondent in the
administrative case is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the
event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal. It is important to note that there is no such thing
as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases shall be executed as a matter of course under Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman.Petitioner Villaseors filing of a motion for reconsideration
does not stay the immediate implementation of the Ombudsmans order of dismissal,
considering that a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
executed as a matter of course under Section 7. As already explained, no vested right of
Villaseor would be violated as he would be considered under preventive suspension, and
entitled to the salary and emoluments he did not receive in the event that he wins his eventual
appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 8 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, the
Hearing Officer shall decide a motion for reconsideration within 5 days from the date of
submission for resolution.The Court notes, however, that under Section 8 of Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, the Hearing
Officer shall decide a motion for reconsideration within 5 days from the date of submission for
resolution. Petitioner Villaseor filed his motion for reconsideration on December 13, 2004, on
the same day as petitioner Mesa, whose motion was duly resolved. Whether by oversight or
negligence, a period nearly 10 years has elapsed without action on Villaseors motion for
reconsideration. The Office of the Ombudsman is called upon to be more vigilant in carrying
out its functions and in complying with the periods laid down in the law.

2. G.R. No. 204964. October 15, 2014.*

REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU and NOEL AGUSTIN, petitioners, vs. LUTGARDA TORRES

DEL ROSARIO, represented by SYLVIA R. ASPERILLA, respondents.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; De Facto Officers; Words and Phrases; A de facto
officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint,
if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.In Funa v.
Agra, 691 SCRA 196 (2013), a petition was filed against Alberto Agra for holding concurrent
positions as the acting Secretary of justice and as Solicitor General. This court, while ruling that
the appointment of Alberto Agra as acting Secretary of Justice violated Article VII, Section 13
of the Constitution, held that he was a de facto officer during his tenure in the Department of
Justice: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its
face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under
color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular
or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned. In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds
that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his
later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the
sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from
the State. Agras official actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not limited to the
promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice, and the
issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal
cases. (Emphasis supplied) Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the
President after his appointment to the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he
renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and effective.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; The presumption of regularity of

official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform
a duty.With Gaite being a public officer, his acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity,
thus: The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption in
[sic] rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of
the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.

Agrarian Reform; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657); Republic Act
(RA) No. 6657 became effective on June 15, 1988, and it covered all public and private
lands, including lands of the public domain suited for agriculture.Republic Act No. 6657
became effective on June 15, 1988, and it covered all public and private lands, including lands
of the public domain suited for agriculture. Upon its enactment, questions arose as to the
authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to approve or disapprove applications for
conversion of agricultural land to nonagricultural. Then Agrarian Reform Secretary Florencio
B. Abad (Secretary Abad) was of the opinion that laws prior to Republic Act No. 6657
authorized the Department of Agrarian Reform, together with the Department of Local
Government and Community Development and the Human Settlements Commission, to allow
or disallow conversions.

Same; Same; Requisites for Exemption from the Coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).Lands are considered exempt from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657 if the following requisites are present: 1. Lands were zoned for
nonagricultural use by the local government unit; and 2. The zoning ordinance was approved by
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board before June 15, 1998.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The factual findings of administrative agencies
are generally given great respect and finality by the courts as it is presumed that these
agencies have the knowledge and expertise over matters under their jurisdiction.The
factual findings of administrative agencies are generally given great respect and finality by the
courts as it is presumed that these agencies have the knowledge and expertise over matters
under their jurisdiction. Both the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Office of the
President found respondents lands to be agricultural. We see no reason to disturb these
findings.

3. G.R. No. 199027. June 9, 2014.*

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF
SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR, respondents.

Administrative Agencies; Office of Solicitor General; The Office of Solicitor Generals

(OSGs) powers and functions are defined in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Administrative Code), particularly in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12
thereof.The OSGs powers and functions are defined in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Administrative Code), particularly in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, which
reads: Sec. 35. Powers and Functions.The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-
owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer.
It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in
all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his
official capacity is a party.

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Local Government Units; For local government units, the
Local Government Code (LGC) limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them
in court actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local government units legal
officer.On the matter of counsels representation for the government, the Administrative
Code is not the only law that delves on the issue. Specifically for local government units, the
LGC limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in court actions, as the law defines
the mandate of a local government units legal officer.

Same; Same; Same; Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is
exclusively made applicable to local government units, the Local Government Code (LGC)
must prevail over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a
general law on the subject matter.Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies
the powers and functions of a local government units legal officer. It also restricts, as it names,
the lawyer who may represent the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings.
Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable to
local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the Administrative Code,
which classifies only as a general law on the subject matter.

Same; Same; Office of the Solicitor General; In Urbano v. Chavez, 183 SCRA 347 (1990),
the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) could not
represent at any stage a public official who was accused in a criminal case.It bears
mentioning that notwithstanding the broad language of the Administrative Code on the OSGs
functions, the LGC is not the only qualification to its scope. Jurisprudence also provides limits
to its authority. In Urbano v. Chavez, 183 SCRA 347 (1990), for example, the Court ruled that
the OSG could not represent at any stage a public official who was accused in a criminal case.
This was necessary to prevent a clear conflict of interest in the event that the OSG would
become the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines once a judgment of the public
officials conviction was brought on appeal.

4. G.R. No. 190147. March 05, 2013.*

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. PILILLA WATER DISTRICT,

respondent.

Civil Service; Appointments; Appointments in the civil service may either be of

permanent or temporary status.Under Section 13, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws and
CSC Resolution No. 91-1631 issued on December 27, 1991, appointments in the civil service
may either be of permanent or temporary status. A permanent appointment is issued to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed/pro-moted,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules
and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof, while a temporary appointment may be
extended to a person who possesses all the requirements for the position except the appropriate
civil service eligibility and for a limited period not exceeding twelve months or until a qualified
civil service eligible becomes available.

Same; Same; Confidential Employees; Proximity Rule; A position is considered to be

primarily confidential when there is a primarily close intimacy between the appointing
authority and the appointee, which ensures the highest degree of trust and
unfetteredcommunication and discussion on the most confidential of matters.A position
is considered to be primarily confidential when there is a primarily close intimacy between the
appointing authority and the appointee, which ensures the highest degree of trust and unfettered
communication and discussion on the most confidential of matters. Moreover, in classifying a
position as primarily confidential, its functions must not be routinary, ordinary and day to day in
character. A position is not necessarily confidential though the one in office may sometimes
hold confidential matters or documents.

Same; Same; Same; The tenure of a confidential employee is coterminous with that of the
appointing authority, or is at the latters pleasure.We stress that a primarily confidential
position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of the appointer and appointee
as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship. The tenure of a
confidential employee is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latters
pleasure. However, the confidential employee may be appointed or remain in the position even
beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65 years.

Same; Same; Same; Security of Tenure; The right to security of tenure is not available to
those employees whose appointments are contractual and coterminous in nature.It is
established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled
that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are
contractual and coterminous in nature. Since the position of General Manager of a water district
remains a primarily confidential position whose term still expires upon loss of trust and
confidence by the BOD provided that prior notice and due hearing are observed, it cannot
therefore be said that the phrase shall not be removed except for cause and after due process
converted such position into a permanent appointment. Significantly, loss of confidence may be
predicated on other causes for removal provided in the civil service rules and other existing
laws.

Same; The Civil Service Law classifies the positions in the civil service into career and
non-career service positions.The Civil Service Law classifies the positions in the civil
service into career and non-career service positions. Career positions are characterized by: (1)
entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to
higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure.

Same; Coterminous Employees; A coterminous employment falls under the non-career

service classification of positions in the Civil Service, its tenure being limited or specified
by law, or coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or at the latters pleasure.
As can be gleaned, a coterminous employment falls under the non-career service classification
of positions in the Civil Service, its tenure being limited or specified by law, or coterminous
with that of the appointing authority, or at the latters pleasure. Under R.A. No. 9286 in relation
to Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987,
the coterminous appointment of the General Manager of a water district is based on the majority
vote of the BOD and whose continuity in the service is based on the latters trust and confidence
or co-existent with its tenure.

5. G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000. July 17, 2013.*

DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO, petitioners, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Remedial Law; Courts; Sandiganbayan; Under the Rules of Sandiganbayan, effective

January 10, 1979, a petition for reconsideration of a judgment or final order may be filed
upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial
in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.Under the Rules of Sandiganbayan,
effective January 10, 1979, a petition for reconsideration of a judgment or final order may be
filed upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial in
criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. In the case of Alvarez v. Sandiganbayan,
201 SCRA 557 (1991), decided in 1991, the Court upheld the Sandiganbayan in not considering
the failure of the movant to fix the place, date and time of the hearing of his motion a
substantial defect, for instead of giving the motion a short shrift, it set the incident for hearing,
and even granted the prosecution ten days from [notice] within which to oppose/comment. The
Court noted what was then the practice of the Sandigabayan itself, rather than the movant, to
determine the date and time of hearings of motions. The peculiar circumstances of said case
heavily weighed in favor of relaxation of the rules, with the Courts finding that the evidence
presented against the petitioner does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and may not be
deemed sufficient to support a conviction. Hence, the Court was not prepared to declare that
[petitioners] omission to set his motion for hearing is so grievous an error as to foreclose the
award to him of the relief to which he is otherwise entitled.

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Elements of.The
essential elements of the crime defined in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, are: 1. The accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. That his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

Same; Bad Faith; Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of
the accused to do wrong or cause damage.Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some
motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.

Same; Injury; Words and Phrases; In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116 (1994), the
Supreme Court en banc defined injury as any wrong or damage done to another, either
in his person, or in his rights, reputation or property; the invasion of any legally protected
interests of another.In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116 (1994), the Court en banc
defined injury as any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, or in his rights,
reputation or property; the invasion of any legally protected interests of another. It must be
more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal. It is required that the undue injury
caused by the positive or passive acts of the accused be quantifiable and demonstrable and
proven to the point of moral certainty. Undue means illegal, immoral, unlawful, void of
equity and moderations.

Administrative Law; Appointments; Coterminous Employees; Under Section 2(d), Rule

III of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions,
appointments of personnel under Foreign-assisted projects shall be issued and approved
as coterminous with the project.Under Section 2(d), Rule III of the Revised Omnibus Rules
on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, appointments of personnel under Foreign-
assisted projects shall be issued and approved as coterminous with the project. The MOA itself
provides that the services of the contractual personnel of the University for the Project shall be
discontinued upon its completion or termination. The appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC
Project Director falls within the prohibition against holding of multiple positions since there is
no distinction in Section 7, Article IX-B as to the employment status, i.e., whether permanent,
temporary or coterminous. Petitioners failed to cite any law to justify Dr. Posadas holding of
concurrent positions as Chancellor and TMC Project Director.

Same; Civil Service Rules; Under civil service rules, appointments of personnel under
foreign-assisted projects shall be issued and approved as coterminous with the project,
that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project, in which case, the
name of the project and its completion date shall be indicated in the appointment.The
status of Dr. Posadas employment as TMC Project Director is a coterminous one. Under civil
service rules, appointments of personnel under foreign-assisted projects shall be issued and
approved as coterminous with the project, that is, they are considered employees for the
duration of the project, in which case, the name of the project and its completion date shall be
indicated in the appointment. This status of employment is to be distinguished from contract of
services which covers lump sum work or services such as janitorial, security or consultancy
services, whose appointments need not be submitted to the CSC for approval.

Same; Consultancy; Consultancy is deemed private practice of profession.Consultancy is

deemed private practice of profession. Under CSC Resolution 021264 dated September 27,
2002, accepting a consultancy job under a part-time status is subject to the following conditions:
1. It must not violate the rule against holding multiple positions; 2. The employee/officer must
obtain permission or authority from his/her head of agency as the same constitutes private
practice of profession; 3. The consultancy job must not conflict or tend to conflict with his/her
official functions; and 4. It must not affect the effective performance of his/her duty.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy; A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of

acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or
concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it.A conspiracy is
proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common
purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and
actually pursue it. For the accused to be held as conspirators, it is not necessary to show that
two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details
of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
Therefore, if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy may be inferred though
no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved.

Same; Penalties; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713;
Penalties for Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.Any person guilty of violating
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is punishable with imprisonment for not less than six (6) years
and one (1) month nor more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from public
office. Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which is an indeterminate penalty of
nine (9) years and one day as minimum and twelve (12) years as maximum, with the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office, is in accord with law. Petitioners shall
also indemnify the Government of the Republic of the Philippines the amount of THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P336,000.00) representing the
compensation/salaries paid to Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director. As to the offense defined
in Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713, Section 11 of said law provides that violations of Section 7
shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court, disqualification to hold
public office. The Sandiganbayan imposed the maximum penalty of five (5) years imprisonment
and disqualification to hold public office.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Our Constitution stresses that a public office is a
public trust and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.This Courts mandate is to uphold the Constitution and the
laws. Our Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. These constitutionally-
enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic
sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public service.

6. A.M. No. P-12-3089. November 13, 2013.* (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3591-P)

HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES, represented by PAUL JOHN TEVES ABAD, ELSA C.

AQUINO and FELIMON E. FERNAN, complainants, vs. AUGUSTO J. FELICIDARIO,
SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondent

Administrative Law; Dishonesty; In Villordon v. Avila, 678 SCRA 247 (2012), the
Supreme Court defined dishonesty as intentionally making a false statement on any
material fact; and a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.In Villordon v. Avila, 678
SCRA 247 (2012), the Court defined dishonesty as intentionally making a false statement on
any material fact[;] and a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It is true that respondent did not
have a hand in the resurvey conducted by the DAR in 2003 which resulted in the increased land
area of his Lot 189. Nonetheless, respondents actuations thereafter displayed his lack of
honesty, fairness, and straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the
concerned government agencies/officials.

Same; Court Personnel; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; Sheriffs;
Respondent appears to have illegally forced his way into the disputed area. As a Sheriff,
he is expected to be familiar with court procedure and processes, especially those
concerning the execution of orders and decisions of the courts.Respondents deportment
under the circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. In addition to being dishonest, respondent appears to have illegally forced his way into
the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court procedure and processes,
especially those concerning the exe cution of orders and decisions of the courts. It is difficult for
the Court to believe that respondent is completely unaware that even as the registered owner of
the real property and with the barangay officials assistance, he cannot simply enter and take
possession of the disputed area and destroy complainants improvements thereon. He must first
initiate an ejectment case against complainants before the appropriate court and secure a court
order and writ of possession.

Same; Same; Same; The Civil Service law and rules do not give a concrete description of
what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the
Court defined such an offense in Ito v. De Vera, 511 SCRA 1 (2006), as acts or omissions
that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of
the people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of the administration of
justice.The Civil Service law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific
acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the Court defined such
an offense in Ito v. De Vera, 511 SCRA 1 (2006), as acts or omissions that violate the norm of
public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary,
thereby prejudicing the best interest of the administration of justice. In Government Service
Insurance System v. Mayordomo, 649 SCRA 667 (2011), the Court further declared that the
administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service need not be
related to or connected with the public officers official functions. As long as the questioned
conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be
meted on the erring public officer or employee.

Same; Penalties; Aggravating Circumstances; Rule 10, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) additionally provides that if the civil
servant is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should
be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as
aggravating circumstances.Rule 10, Section 50 additionally provides that if the civil servant
is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that
corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating
circumstances. Based on the foregoing rules, the Court shall apply the penalty for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, it being the more serious offense. The Court then
considers for purposes of determining the proper penalty, respondents simple dishonesty as an
aggravating circumstance; while respondents 43 years in government service, 32 of which had
been in the judiciary, as mitigating circumstance. The Court likewise takes into account, for
humanitarian reasons, that respondent is almost of retirement age at 64 years. Consequently, the
penalty of suspension without pay for six (6) months and one (1) day is appropriate under the
circumstances.

7. G.R. No. 157383. August 10, 2010.*

WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of GSIS,

petitioner, vs. MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M. VELASCO, respondents.

G.R. No. 174137. August 10, 2010.*

WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the

Government Service Insurance System, petitioner, vs. MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT
M. VELASCO, respondents.

Civil Service Law; The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with
original charters, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), or those created
by special law.The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like
the GSIS, or those created by special law. As such, the employees are part of the civil service
system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC
on discipline, attendance and general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC has
jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees.

Same; The Civil Service Commission (CSC) Rules does not specifically provide that a
formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void; Upon
receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority
shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under
oath within three days from receipt.The CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a
formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void. However, as
clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance,
the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-
Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word shall quite
obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his
side.

Administrative Law; Due Process; The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation
of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction; Where the denial
of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of
that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of
a partys right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally
true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no
man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type
of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.
Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; Administrative proceedings are not exempt
from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings; What Includes Due Process in Administrative Proceedings.
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles,
such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. In particular, due process in
administrative proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual
or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which
is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained
in the records or made known to the parties affected.

Same; Same; It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab
initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate
action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.It is
well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked
at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in
any action or proceeding where it is invoked. Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before
the GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation, records show that in their Urgent Motion to
Resolve (their Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC, respondents
questioned the validity of their preventive suspension and the formal charges against them for
lack of preliminary investigation. There is, thus, no waiver to speak of.

8. G.R. No. 149999. August 12, 2005.*

THE NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD (NAB) OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM), petitioner, vs. P/INSP. JOHN A. MAMAUAG, SPO2
EUGENE ALMARIO, SPO4 ERLINDA GARCIA and SPO1 VIVIAN FELIPE,
respondents.

Administrative Law; Philippine National Police (PNP); Appeals; Under Section 45 of R.A.
6975, a disciplinary action is appealable only if it involves either a demotion or dismissal
from the servicea decision imposing suspension on a PNP member is not subject to a
higher authority.Section 45 of RA 6975 provides that a disciplinary action imposed upon a
member of the PNP shall be final and executory. Under Section 45, a disciplinary action is
appealable only if it involves either a demotion or dismissal from the service. If the
disciplinary action is less than a demotion or dismissal from the service, the disciplinary action
shall be final and executory as Section 45 of RA 6975 expressly mandates. Thus, a decision
impos ing suspension on a PNP member is not subject to appeal to a higher authority.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Administrative disciplinary action connotes
administrative penalty.Administrative disciplinary action connotes administrative penalty.
If the decision exonerates the respondents or otherwise dismisses the charges against the
respondents, there is no disciplinary action since no penalty is imposed. The provision that a
penalty less than demotion or dismissal from service is final and executory does not apply to
dismissal of charges or exoneration because they are not disciplinary actions. This gives rise to
two crucial questions. First, can a party appeal from a decision of the disciplining authority
dismissing the charges against a PNP member? Second, if a decision dismissing the charges
against a PNP member is appealable, who can appealthe PNP or the private complainant, or
both?

Same; Same; Same; Parties; Case law holding that the private complainant has no right to
appeal the decision of the disciplining authority remains good law.Dacoycoy allowed the
Civil Service Commission to appeal dismissals of charges or exoneration of respondents in
administrative disciplinary proceedings. However, Dacoycoy maintained the rule that the
private complainant is a mere government witness without a right to appeal. Thus, case law
holding that the private complainant has no right to appeal the decision of the disciplining
authority remains good law. As explained by Justice Jose Melo in his concurring opinion in
Floralde v. Court of Appeals: However, in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy (306 SCRA
425 [1999]), which incidentally is another ponencia of Mr. Justice Pardo, the majority, with
undersigned ponente dissenting, modified the above doctrine by allowing the CSC to appeal in
cases where the respondent is exonerated of the charges. Nevertheless, in both cases, the Court
did not deviate from the doctrine that the complainant, being a mere witness for the
government, cannot appeal the decision rendered in the administrative case. In Paredes, we
declared that the complainant is not the party adversely affected by the decision so that she has
no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the CSC. In an administrative case, the
complainant is a mere witness. No private interest is involved in an administrative case as the
offense is committed against the government.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the
Civil Service Law also applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings against
Philippine National Police (PNP) members.Section 91 of RA 6975 provides that the Civil
Service Law and its rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.
Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law
also applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP members. Even without
Section 91, case law on the civil service necessarily applies to PNP members who are embraced
in the phrase civil service under Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The government party that can appeal is not the
disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the
penalty of demotion or dismissal from the serviceit must be one that is prosecuting the
administrative case against the respondent.RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private
complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975
authorize either party to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the
PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority
imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is
the proper penalty. However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining
authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the
administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where
the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached,
becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A private complainant is not one of
either party who can appeal under Sections 43 and 45 of R.A. 6975she has no legal
personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP).A private complainant like Judge Angeles is not one of either party who can
appeal under Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975. The private complainant is a mere witness of the
government which is the real party in interest. In short, private complainant Judge Angeles is
not a party under Sections 43 and 45 who can appeal the decision of the disciplining authority.
Thus, Judge Angeles has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against
Mamauag, et al. by the CPDC District Director in the Resolution of 10 April 1995. The motion
for re-investigation filed by Judge Angeles with the PNP Chief is in substance an appeal from
the decision of the CPDC District Director. The PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain
Judge Angeles appeal in the guise of a motion for re-investigation. Since the PNP Chief had no
jurisdiction, all actions taken by the PNP Chief pursuant to the appeal is void. Thus, the
Decision of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against Mamauag, et al. stands
and is now final and executory.

Same; Same; The National Appellate Board of the NAPOLCOM is a higher disciplining
authority than the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief.The NAB, which is a higher
disciplining authority than the PNP Chief, found that the same grave misconduct charged
against all the respondents never happened. Thus, the NAB exonerated and reinstated Ganias,
Billedo and Cario, whom the PNP Chief dismissed from the service in his original Decision of
7 June 1996. The NAB decision became final and executory on 28 February 1998. Ironically,
Mamauag and Almario, whom the PNP Chief originally meted out a lesser penalty of 90-day
suspension but subsequently dismissed on motion for partial reconsideration, have not been
reinstated to their positions up to now. Garcia and Felipe, whom the PNP Chief originally
exonerated but subsequently dismissed on motion for partial reconsideration, have also not been
reinstated to their positions. And yet, as found by the NAB, the appellate disciplining authority
superior to the PNP Chief, the same offense of grave misconduct charged against all
respondents, including Mamauag, et al., never happened.

9. G.R. No. 188487. February 14, 2011.*

VAN D. LUSPO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 188541. February 14, 2011.*

SUPT. ARTURO H. MONTANO and MARGARITA TUGAOEN, petitioners, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 188556. February 14, 2011.*

C/INSP. SALVADOR C. DURAN, SR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Two ways for a public official to
violate Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions; Essential
Elements of the Offense.In Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, 441 SCRA 377 (2004), we explained
that there are two ways for a public official to violate this provision in the performance of his
functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the government; or (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. In that case, we
enumerated the essential elements of the offense, viz.: 1. The accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused undue
injury to any party, including the govern ment, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

Same; Same; Second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be
committed, which are manifest partiality, Evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; Definitions of such Modalities.The second element provides the different
modes by which the crime may be committed, which are manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Manifest partiality and evident bad faith connote that
the crime is committed by dolo, while gross inexcusable negligence indicates its commission
through culpa. In the recent Albert v. Sandiganbayan, 580 SCRA 279 (2009), we reiterated the
definitions of such modalities, viz.: There is manifest partiality when there is a clear,
notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.
Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive
or ill will. Evident bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. Gross
inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons
may be affected.

Same; Same; Generally; Factual findings of the anti-gaft court are conclusive upon the
Supreme Court, Exceptions.Generally, factual findings of the anti-graft court are conclusive
upon the Supreme Court, except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and the
findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by evidence on record.

Same; Same; Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence; It is a
manifest deliberate intent on the part of an accused to do wrong or to cause damage.To
repeat, bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. It is a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of an accused to do wrong or to cause damage. There is nothing on
record to show that Luspo was spurred by any corrupt motive or that he received any material
benefit when he signed the ASAs.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Splitting; Meaning of Splitting in Its Literal Sense;
Within the sphere of government procurement, splitting is associated with requisitions,
purchase orders, deliveries and payments.As defined in COA Circular No. 76-41 dated
July 30, 1976, splitting, in its literal sense, means dividing or breaking up into separate parts or
portions, or an act resulting in fissure, rupture, or breach. Within the sphere of government
procurement, splitting is associated with requisitions, purchase orders, deliveries, and payments.
One form of splitting is the breaking up of payments which consist in making two or more
payments for one or more items involving one purchase order. Splitting is intended to do away
with and circumvent control measure, such as the reviewing authority of a superior official. In
this case, the ASA of P10,000,000.00 was split by Duran and Montano into 100 checks of
P100,000.00 each to elude the reviewing authority of Director Sistoza.

10. G.R. No. 170463. February 2, 2011.*

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President and General
Manager, petitioners, vs. ALBERT M. VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA, respondents.

Administrative Law; Civil Service; Not all rules and regulations adopted by every
government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center.Not all rules and regulations
adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of
general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines
for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and
not the public, need not be filed with the UP Law Center.

Same; Same; Step Increment; A grant of step increment on the basis of length of service
requires that an employee must have rendered at least three years of continuous and
satisfactory service in the same position to which he is an incumbent.A grant of step
increment on the basis of length of service requires that an employee must have rendered at
least three years of continuous and satisfactory service in the same position to which he is an
incumbent. To determine whether service is continuous, it is necessary to define what actual
service is. Actual service refers to the period of continuous service since the appointment of
the official or employee concerned, including the period or periods covered by any previously
approved leave with pay.

Same; Same; Same; Suspension; If an employee is suspended as a penalty, it effectively

interrupts the continuity of his government service at the commencement of the service of
the said suspension.If an employee is suspended as a penalty, it effectively interrupts the
continuity of his government service at the commencement of the service of the said
suspension. This is because a person under penalty of suspension is not rendering actual service.
The suspension will undoubtedly be considered a gap in the continuity of the service for
purposes of the computation of the three year period in the grant of step increment.

Same; Same; Preventive Suspension; Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a

penalty.Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended
to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the
latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is
not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and
the respondent will automatically be reinstated.

Same; Same; Same; Step Increment; The grant of step increment will only be delayed for
the same number of days, which must not exceed 90 days, that an official or employee was
serving the preventive suspension.If an employee is preventively suspended, the employee
is not rendering actual service and this will also effectively interrupt the continuity of his
government service. Consequently, an employee who was preventively suspended will still be
entitled to step increment after serving the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending
administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed. The grant of step
increment will only be delayed for the same number of days, which must not exceed 90 days,
that an official or employee was serving the preventive suspension.

11. G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.*

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.,

respondent.

Ombudsman; Administrative Investigations; Prescription; Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does

not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation after the
lapse of one year reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed.Section 20 of
R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation
after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without
doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section
20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative
investigation.

Same; Same; Same; The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case
against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was
filed.Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from
conducting the investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case
against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.

Same; Same; Same; A public officials resignation does not render moot an administrative
case that was filed prior to the officials resignation.To recall, we have held in the past that
a public officials resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to
the officials resignation.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Threefold Liability Rule; Under the threefold liability
rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability.The State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public
official who committed violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom.
Under the threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give
rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an
administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the
Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutans alleged
transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsmanthrough the FFIBfiled a criminal case for
Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of
imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation
or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.

12. G.R. No. 183445. September 14, 2011.*

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION,

petitioners, vs. CALIXTO R. CATAQUIZ, respondent.

Appeals; Only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Exceptions.As a general rule, only questions of law can be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Since this Court
is not a trier of facts, findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and conclusive upon this
Court. There are, however, several recognized exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) When the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case, and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs, are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

Judgments; Decisions of courts must be able to address the issues raised by the parties
through the presentation of a comprehensive analysis or account of factual and legal
findings of the court.Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that
decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Decisions
of courts must be able to address the issues raised by the parties through the presentation of a
comprehensive analysis or account of factual and legal findings of the court. It is evident that
the CA failed to comply with these requirements. PAGC, in its Resolution dated December 5,
2003, discussing each of the twelve allegations against Cataquiz, determined that he should be
dismissed from the government service and that he could be held liable under Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, in relation to Section 46(b)(27), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O.
No. 292.

Same; Administrative Law; Words and Phrases; Substantial Evidence, Defined; The
one-paragraph pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that the respondent public officer
had authority to perform the acts complained of is grossly insufficient to overturn the
determination by Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) that he should be punished
for acts prejudicial to the government agency committed during his service as General
Manager of said agency; Findings of fact of administrative agencies will not be interfered
with and shall be considered binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court provided
that there is substantial evidence to support such findings.The one-paragraph
pronouncement of the CA that Cataquiz had authority to perform the acts complained of is
grossly insufficient to overturn the determination by PAGC that he should be punished for acts
prejudicial to the LLDA committed during his service as General Manager of the said agency. It
should be emphasized that findings of fact of administrative agencies will not be interfered with
and shall be considered binding and conclusive upon this Court provided that there is
substantial evidence to support such findings. Substantial evidence has been defined as that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs. After a diligent review of the evidence presented and the pleadings filed, this Court
finds that there is substantial evidence to justify the conclusion of PAGC that Cataquiz should
be punished with the penalty of dismissal, along with its accessory penalties, for committing
acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for giving undue advantage to a
private company in the award of fishpens.
Appeals; Due Process; Issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time
on appealto consider such issues and arguments belatedly raised by a party would be
tantamount to a blatant disregard of the basic principles of fair play, justice and due
process.Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him
constitutes the law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the
petition before this Court. At the outset, the Court would like to highlight the fact that Cataquiz
never raised this issue before the CA, despite having had ample time to do so. The records show
that the Ombudsman promulgated its resolution on November 30, 2004, more than three months
prior to the filing by the respondent of his petition before the CA on March 2, 2005.
Nevertheless, he only chose to mention this after the CA had rendered its decision and after the
submission of his comment on the petition at bench. This is evidently a desperate effort on his
part to strengthen his position and support the decision of the CA exonerating him from any
administrative liability. The Court has consistently ruled that issues not previously ventilated
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Otherwise, to consider such issues and arguments
belatedly raised by a party would be tantamount to a blatant disregard of the basic principles of
fair play, justice and due process. Therefore, this issue does not merit the attention of the Court.

Administrative Law; It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under
a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission,
such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act;
The dismissal of the criminal case against a government official by the Ombudsman does
not foreclose administrative action against the same official; The very purpose of
administrative proceedings is to protect the public service and uphold the time-honored
principle that a public office is a public trust.It is a basic rule in administrative law that
public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a
wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively
liable for the same act. Obviously, administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal
and civil liability. In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, 623 SCRA 47 (2010), the Court
elaborated on the difference between administrative and criminal liability: The distinct and
independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the following: first, the
difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and
sanctions imposed; and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more
distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as
administrative liability. Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does
not foreclose administrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is
not conclusive upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The
pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from further
administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would undermine the
very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public service and uphold the
time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.

Same; Resignation; Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of

administrative liability.Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of
administrative liability. Despite his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held
administratively liable for acts committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA
and he can be made to suffer the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP
that Cataquiz is guilty of the charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
and its corresponding accessory penalties is valid.

Same; Presidency; Termination of Employment; It is a well-established principle that the

Presidents power to remove is inherent in his power to appoint.It cannot be disputed that
Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the direct disciplining authority of
the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from service. This is pursuant to the
well-established principle that the Presidents power to remove is inherent in his power to
appoint. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the President to order the respondents
dismissal.

Same; Termination of Employment; The accessory penalties of disqualification from re-

employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can still be
imposed on a government official notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the
principal penalty of dismissal because of his earlier removal from office.In the case of In
Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, 615
SCRA 186 (2010), despite the resignation from government service by the employee found
guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government. Similarly
instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., 533 SCRA 622 (2007), where the Court held
that: The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation from
government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctionsthat of separation
from servicemay no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may
be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her,
namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. Based
on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment
in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can still be imposed on the
respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the principal penalty of dismissal
because of his removal from office.

Judgments; Clerical errors or any ambiguity in a decision can be rectified even after the
judgment has become final by reference to the pleadings filed by the parties and the
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the court.It is clear from the pleadings submitted
before PAGCparticularly in the Affidavit Complaint filed by CELLDA against Cataquiz and
in the Counter-Affidavit submitted by the latterthat the resolution referred to as having been
violated by the respondent was Board Resolution No. 28, and not No. 68, as was erroneously
indicated in the PAGC Resolution. Thus, pursuant to the rule that the judgment should be in
accordance with the allegations and the evidence presented, the typographical error contained in
the PAGC Resolution can be amended. Clerical errors or any ambiguity in a decision can be
rectified even after the judgment has become final by reference to the pleadings filed by the
parties and the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the court.

13. G.R. No. 187858. August 9, 2011.*

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. RICHARD G. CRUZ, respondent.

Civil Service Law; Suspension Pending Appeal; Back Salaries; The issue of entitlement to
back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal, of a government employee who
had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction.The
issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal, of a
government employee who had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled in
our jurisdiction. The Courts starting point for this outcome is the no work-no pay principle
public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service. We have excepted from
this general principle and awarded back salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed
or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that no officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law;
to deny these employees their back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment after they have
been exonerated from the charge that led to their dismissal or suspension.

Same; Back Salaries; Conditions; The Court crafted two conditions before an employee
may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges
and b) his suspension must be unjustified.To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court
crafted two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee
must be found innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The reasoning
behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive
suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive
suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and
must be compensated.

14. G.R. No. 184980. March 30, 2011.*

DANILO MORO, petitioner, vs. GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO, JR., respondent.

Quo Warranto; An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be
filed against one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office.An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against
one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. It may be
brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such
office.

Same; In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he
is entitled to the subject public office.In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in
his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who
holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be
dismissed. Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007,
months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. As
explained above, that dismissal order was immediately executory even pending
appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the
position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.

15. G.R. No. 178021. January 31, 2012.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. MINERVA M.P. PACHEO, respondent.
Administrative Law; Civil Service; Public Officers; Transfers; Reassignments; While a
temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his
removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation.While a temporary
transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees prior consent, it
cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure
him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his
service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.

Same; Same; Same; Termination of Employment; Constructive Dismissals; Constructive

dismissal is a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency heads
unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work
impossible.Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines
constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency
heads unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work
impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur
although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from
one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job.

Same; Same; Same; Detail, Defined; Words and Phrases.A detail is defined and
governed by Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), thus:
(6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the
issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of
employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes
that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending
appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the
Commission.

Same; Same; Same; Reassignment, Defined; Words and Phrases.A reassignment is

defined and governed by E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7), thus:
(7) Reassignment.An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another
in the same agency; Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank,
status or salaries.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary
violate an employees security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees security of
tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed
without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount
to illegal/constructive removal.

16. G.R. No. 191560. March 29, 2011.*

HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission,

petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, in his capacity as the new appointee vice
herein petitioner HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, National Police Commission,
respondent.

HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission, petitioner,

vs. President GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, thru Executive Secretary LEANDRO
MENDOZA, in Her capacity as the appointing power, HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, in His
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and as Ex-Officio
Chairman of the National Police Commission and HON. EDUARDO U. ESCUETA,
ALEJANDRO S. URRO, and HON. CONSTANCIA P. DE GUZMAN as the midnight
appointees, respondents.

Administrative Law; Appointments; Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to

its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made.Appointments may be
classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made.
Under the first classification, appointments can either be permanent or temporary (acting). A
basic distinction is that a permanent appointee can only be removed from office for cause;
whereas a temporary appointee can be removed even without hearing or cause. Under the
second classification, an appointment can either be regular or ad interim. A regular appointment
is one made while Congress is in session, while an ad interim appointment is one issued during
the recess of Congress. In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no confirmation
from the Commission on Appointments cannot be properly characterized as either a regular or
an ad interim appointment.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The power to appoint vested in the President includes
the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited
by the Constitution or by the law.Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President
includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically
prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the
nature of the office involved. The Presidents power to issue an acting appointment is
particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).

Same; Same; The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in

the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions
pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.The purpose of an acting or
temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or
another appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall
surrender the office once he is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of
office is not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Same; Same; A staggered term of office is not a statutory prohibition against the issuance
of acting or temporary appointment.Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of
office is to minimize the appointing authoritys opportunity to appoint a majority of the
members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its
policies. A staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect,
against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to
issue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants.
Same; Same; National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM); Nothing in the enumeration of
functions of the members of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) would be
subverted or defeated by the Presidents appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee.We find
nothing in this enumeration of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be
subverted or defeated by the Presidents appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner
pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee. Viewed as an institution, a
survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that the NAPOLCOM has always
remained as an office under or within the Executive Department. Clearly, there is nothing
repugnant between the petitioners acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the
functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the
other.

Quo Warranto; Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a
public office.Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public
office. Generally, quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper
party-plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may
commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by
another.

Same; The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office,
on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office
for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.Since the petitioner merely holds
an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to
maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its
consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo
warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal
deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his
petition must fail.

17. G.R. No. 184219. January 30, 2012.*

SAMUEL B. ONG, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL., respondents.

Administrative Law; Civil Service; Termination of Employment; Public Officers; No

officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions for
it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose
appointments are contractual and co-terminous in nature. In the case at bar, Ongs appointment
as Director III falls under the classifications provided in (a) Section 14(2) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code, to wit, that which is co-existent with the
tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure; and (b) Sections 13(b) and 14(2) of Rule
V, CSC Resolution No. 91-1631, or that which is both a temporary and a co-terminous
appointment. The appointment is temporary as Ong did not have the required CES eligibility.

Same; Same; Career Executive Service (CES); The appointment of non- Career Executive
Service (CES) eligibles to CES positions in the government in the absence of appropriate
eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the
government.The case of Amores v. Civil Service Commission, et al., 587 SCRA 160 (2009),
is instructive anent the nature of temporary appointments in the CES to which the position of
Director III held by Ong belonged. The Court declared: An appointment is permanent where the
appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including
the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the
requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility. x x x x x x x
Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an
appointment in the career executive service a permanent one. x x x Indeed, the law permits, on
many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the government in
the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service
to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely
temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES
eligibility. x x x x x x Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a
permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the
CES Board. x x x.

Same; Same; Temporary Appointments; Words and Phrases; Temporary appointments

are made if only to prevent hiatus in the governments rendition of public service.The
Court is categorical in the Amores case that an appointee without the requisite CES eligibility
cannot hold the position in a permanent capacity. Temporary appointments are made if only to
prevent hiatus in the governments rendition of public service. However, a temporary appointee
can be removed even without cause and at a moments notice. As to those with eligibilities,
their rights to security of tenure pertain to ranks but not to the positions to which they were
appointed.

Same; Same; Same; The acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of

the right to security of tenure against removal without cause.Both Section 14 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code and Section 14 (2) of Rule
V, CSC Resolution No. 91-1631 define a co-terminous appointment as one co-existent with the
tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure. In Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, Inc., 112 SCRA 243 (1982), cited by the CA in its decision, we sustained
the replacement of an incumbent, who held an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing
authority. Such appointment was in essence temporary in nature. We categorized the
incumbents replacement not as removal but rather as an expiration of term and no prior notice,
due hearing or cause were necessary to effect the same. In Decano v. Edu, 99 SCRA 410
(1980), we ruled that the acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the
right to security of tenure against removal without cause. Further, in Carillo vs. CA, 77 SCRA
170 (1967), we stated that one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of
office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing authority, there being
no need to show that the termination is for cause.

Same; Same; Co-terminous Appointments; Words and Phrases; A co-terminous

appointment is defined as one co-existing with the tenure of the appointing authority or
at his pleasure.Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Revised Administrative Code
and CSC Resolution No. 91-1631, a co-terminous appointment is defined as one co-existing
with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure. Neither law nor jurisprudence
draws distinctions between appointments co-existing with the term of the appointing authority
on one hand, and one co-existing with the appointing authoritys tenure on the other. In the
contrary, under the aforecited rules, tenure and term are used rather loosely and
interchangeably.

18. G.R. No. 178454. March 28, 2011.*

FILIPINA SAMSON, petitioner, vs. JULIA A. RESTRIVERA, respondent.

Administrative Complaints; Ombudsman; Even if the complaint concerns an act of the

public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are
unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or
employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be
related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.

Same; It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal

proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.It is wrong
for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed, she cannot be found
administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of
criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.

Administrative Law; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (R.A. 6713); Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of
R.A. No. 6713 is not a ground for disciplinary action.In Domingo v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 577 SCRA 476 (2009), this Court had the occasion to rule that failure to abide by
the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its implementing
rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action

Same; Misconduct; Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is
only simple.

Same; Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer; Unbecoming conduct means improper

performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social
behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.For reneging
on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public
officer. x x x Recently, in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v.
Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., 628 SCRA 626 (2010), we said that unbecoming conduct means
improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of
social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.

19. G.R. No. 169042. October 5, 2011.*

ERDITO QUARTO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON
MARCELO, CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO
M. TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and LUIS A. GAYYA, respondents.

Special Civil Actions; Appeals; Mandamus; Certiorari; As extraordinary writs, both

Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-
condition for these remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3
(mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that
there be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Same; Same; Same; In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,
mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be
used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised.Mandamus
is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the
respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only
be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or
the particular way discretion is to be exercised.

Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman
arbitrarily excludes from an indictment some individuals while impleading all others, the
remedy of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include in the information
all persons who appear responsible for the offense involved.If, on the basis of the same
evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an indictment some individuals while
impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include
in the information all persons who appear responsible for the offense involved.

Immunity from Suit; The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a
legislative prerogative.The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a
legislative prerogative. The exclusive power of Congress to define crimes and their nature and
to provide for their punishment concomitantly carries the power to immunize certain persons
from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state interests, among them, the solution and
prosecution of crimes with high political, social and economic impact.

Same; The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a
constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function.While the
legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to implement is lodged
elsewhere. The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a
constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function.

Same; Ombudsman; An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this
Court of the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion.An immunity statute does not, and
cannot, rule out a review by this Court of the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion. Like all
other officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all their acts must adhere to the
Constitution.

Administrative Proceedings; An administrative case is altogether different from a

criminal case, such that the disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the
same disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts.The
fact that the respondents had previously been found administratively liable, based on the same
set of facts, does not necessarily make them the most guilty. An administrative case is
altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the former does not
necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same
set of facts. The most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents have
been found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidencethe quantum of proof
required in an administrative proceeding.

Immunity from Suit; Ombudsman; The Court reiterates its policy of non-interference
with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers and respects
the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public
service.Consistent with this purpose and subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the
Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers (among them, the power to
grant immunity to witnesses), and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of
the integrity of the public service.

20. G.R. No. 166495. February 16, 2011.*

ROQUE C. FACURA and EDUARDO F. TUASON, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, RODOLFO S. DE JESUS and EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO, respondents.

G.R. No. 184129. February 16, 2011.*

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, EDUARDO

F. TUASON, LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA), represented
by its new Administrator Orlando C. Hondrade, respondents.

G.R. No. 184263. February 16, 2011.*

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO, and

the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former 7th Division), respondents.

Remedial Law; Ombudsman; Injunction; Execution; The decision of the Ombudsman is

immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or
the issuance of an injunctive writ.The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman
decision in an administrative case carries with it the immediate suspension of the imposed
penalty has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego,
632 SCRA 140 (2010), where this Court held that the decision of the Ombudsman is
immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the
issuance of an injunctive writ

Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule applies to the appealable decisions of the
Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or
reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
more than one months salary.Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in
providing that an appeal shall not stop an Ombudsman decision from being executory. This rule
applies to the appealable decisions of the Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty
imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to more than one months salary. Hence, the dismissal of De Jesus
and Parungao from the government service is immediately executory pending appeal.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In case the penalty is removal and the respondent wins his
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be
paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
removal; there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or an absolute right to
hold office, except constitutional offices with special provisions on salary and tenure.The
aforementioned Section 7 is also clear in providing that in case the penalty is removal and the re
spondent wins his appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension
and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
removal. As explained above, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or an
absolute right to hold office, except constitutional offices with special provisions on salary and
tenure. The Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman being procedural, no vested right of De
Jesus and Parungao would be violated as they would be considered under preventive
suspension, and entitled to the salary and emoluments they did not receive in the event that they
would win their appeal.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court of Appeals, even on terms it may deem just, has no
discretion to stay a decision of the Ombudsman, as such procedural matter is governed
specifically by the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.The ratiocination
above also clarifies the application of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 7 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The CA, even on terms it may deem
just, has no discretion to stay a decision of the Ombudsman, as such procedural matter is
governed specifically by the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; Two main rules laid down under the principle of res
judicata; the first rule is referred to as bar by former judgment while the second rule is
known as conclusiveness of judgment.The principle of res judicata lays down two main
rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes
the litigation between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of
an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two
suits are the same. The first rule which corresponds to paragraph (b) of Section 47 above, is
referred to as bar by former judgment; while the second rule, which is embodied in paragraph
(c), is known as conclusiveness of judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or
issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Simply put, conclusiveness of
judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same
parties on a different claim or cause of action.

Same; Same; Same; The finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers
constitutes an absolutely false narration of facts is binding on this case but, only insofar as
the issue of falsification of public documents is concerned.The finding that nothing in the
two sets of appointment papers constitutes an absolutely false narration of facts is binding on
this case, but only insofar as the issue of falsification of public documents is concerned, and not
on the other issues involved herein, namely, the other acts of De Jesus and Parungao which may
amount to dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as charged in the complaint.

Same; Same; Same; The doctrine in Montemayor v. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264 (2003),
that res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the
exercise of administrative powers, has been abandoned in subsequent cases which have
since applied the principle of res judicata to administrative cases.Meanwhile the doctrine
in Montemayor v. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264 (2003), that res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise,e of administrative powers, has been
abandoned in subsequent cases which have since applied the principle of res judicata to
administrative cases. Hence, res judicata can likewise be made applicable to the case at bench.
Thus, given all the foregoing, the factual finding in De Jesus that there was no false statement of
facts in both sets of appointment papers, is binding in this case.

Same; Same; Same; The existence of malice or criminal intent is not a mandatory
requirement for a finding of falsification of official documents as an administrative
offense.Even granting that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable to the
case at bench, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings in De Jesus
based on a careful review of the evidence on record. The existence of malice or criminal intent
is not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of official documents as an
administrative offense. What is simply required is a showing that De Jesus and Parungao
prepared and signed the appointment papers knowing fully well that they were false.

Administrative Law; Dishonesty; Meaning of Dishonesty.Dishonesty refers to a persons

disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.

Same; Simple Neglect of Duty; Definition of Simple Neglect of Duty.Simple neglect of

duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an employee
resulting from either carelessness or indifference. In this regard, the Court finds Parungao, as
HRMO, guilty of simple neglect of duty. Given her duties under the CSC Accreditation
Program, she should have been aware of the reportorial requirements, and of the fact that it is
the CSC which has authority over appointments, and not the DBM. Had she given the proper
attention to her responsibility as HRMO, the first set of appointment papers would never have
been issued, thereby avoiding the present predicament altogether.

Same; Same; Simple neglect of duty is classified under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as a less grave offense punishable by suspension
without pay for one month and one day to six months.Simple neglect of duty is classified
under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as a less grave offense
punishable by suspension without pay for one month and one day to six months. Finding no
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of six months, and considering
her demonstrated good faith, the Court finds the imposition of suspension without pay for one
month and one day as justified.

21. G.R. No. 188630. February 23, 2011.*

FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.

Remedial Law; Appeals; An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.This was strictly
applied by the Court in the cases of Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, 554 SCRA 345 (2008), and
Estarija v. People, 604 SCRA 464 (2009), where it ruled that the CA committed no grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the petitions erroneously filed before it. Thus, in this case, the CA
was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court provides, among others, that an appeal erroneously taken to the Court
of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
This has been the consistent holding of the Court.

Same; Same; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Attorneys; The rule which states
that the mistakes of counsel bind the client may not be strictly followed where observance
of it would result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or where the
interests of justice so inquire.In light of what has been shown, the Court is inclined to
suspend the rules to give the petitioner a chance to seek relief from the Sandiganbayan. The
Court likewise makes exception to the general rule that the mistakes and negligence of counsel
bind the client. Doubtless, the filing of the appeal before the CA by the petitioners former
counsel was not simple negligence. It constituted gross negligence. It bears stressing at this
point, that the rule which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client may not be strictly
followed where observance of it would result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or
property, or where the interests of justice so require. In rendering justice, procedural infirmities
take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants. Corollarily, if the strict application of the
rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is not without power to
exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of procedure.

Same; Same; Same; Other elements that are to be considered to warrant suspensions of
the rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact.Aside from matters of life, liberty,
honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory
character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings of
fact, the other elements that are to be considered are the following: (1) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. All these factors are attendant in this case.

Attorneys; Duties of Counsel; The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients in
their counsel requires from the latter is high standard and appreciation of his duty to his
clients, his profession, the courts and the public.At this juncture, the Court takes
opportunity to state that it is not countenancing the inexcusable negligence committed by
petitioners former counsel, Atty. Santos M. Baculi, in handling petitioners case. He is,
accordingly, warned to be more careful and meticulous in the discharge of his duties to his
clients. It need not be overemphasized that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients in their counsel requires from the latter a high standard and appreciation of his duty to
his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every lawyer should, therefore, serve his
client in a meticulous, careful and competent manner. He is bound to protect the clients
interests and to do all steps necessary therefor as his client reasonably expects him to discharge
his obligations diligently.

22. G.R. No. 187107. January 31, 2012.*

UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN), represented by its

representative BIENVENIDO R. LEAL, in his official capacity as its President and in his
own individual capacity, EDUARDO R. LACSON, ORENCIO F. VENIDA, JR.,
THELMA V. OGENA, BOBBY M. CARANTO, MARILOU B. DE JESUS, EDNA G.
RAA, and ZENAIDA P. OLIQUINO, in their own capacities and in behalf of all those
similarly situated officials and employees of the National Electrification Administration,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA), NEA
BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS (NEA BOARD), ANGELO T. REYES as Chairman of
the NEA Board of Administrators, EDITHA S. BUENO, Ex-Officio Member and NEA
Administrator, and WILFRED L. BILLENA, JOSEPH D. KHONGHUN, and FR. JOSE
VICTOR E. LOBRIGO, Members, NEA Board, respondents.

Courts; Hierarchy of Courts, Explained.We explained the principle of hierarchy of courts

in Mendoza v. Villas, 644 SCRA 347 (2011), stating: In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, a petition for certiorari filed
under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the
principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit: Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,
citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following pronouncements: This Courts
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judi cial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
Same; Same; The principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and
important reasons.Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC.
However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set
aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it
does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who
were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court
entails its attention.

Civil Procedure; Judgments; Moot and Academic; A moot and academic case is one that
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.In Funa v. Executive Secretary,
612 SCRA 308 (2010), the Court passed upon the seeming moot issue of the appointment of
Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry
Authority (MARINA) while concurrently serving as Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications. There, even though Bautista later on was appointed as
Administrator of MARINA, the Court ruled that the case was an exception to the principle of
mootness and that the remedy of injunction was still available, explaining thus: A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, as we held in
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar, and public. As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot
if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Electric Industry; Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) Law; Reorganizations;
Termination of Employment; All National Electrification Administration (NEA)
employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a
reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5)
of PD 269 through which the reorganization was carried out.Under Rule 33, Section
3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all NEA employees
shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization program
pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the
reorganization was carried out, viz.: Section 5. National Electrification Administration; Board
of Administrators; Administrator. (a) For the purpose of administering the provisions of this
Decree, there is hereby established a public corporation to be known as the National
Electrification Administration. x x x x x x x The Board shall, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, have the following specific powers and duties. x x x x 5. To establish policies
and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical competence and moral character,
and, upon the recommendation of the Administrator to organize or reorganize NEAs staffing
structure, to fix the salaries of personnel and to define their powers and duties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of reorganization includes the power of removal.
In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, 658 SCRA 420 (2011), the
Court upheld the dismissal of all the employees of the NPC pursuant to the EPIRA Law. In
ruling that the power of reorganization includes the power of removal, the Court explained:
[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of ones
position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the
purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test
of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. Evidently, the termination of all the employees of
NEA was within the NEA Boards powers and may not successfully be impugned absent proof
of bad faith.

Evidence; Burden of Proof; Bad Faith; The burden of proving bad faith rests on the one
alleging it by clear and convincing evidence.It must be noted that the burden of proving
bad faith rests on the one alleging it. As the Court ruled in Culili v. Eastern
Telecommunications, Inc., 642 SCRA 338 (2011), According to jurisprudence, basic is the
principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the
same. Moreover, in Spouses Palada v. Solidbank Corporation, 653 SCRA 10 (2011), the
Court stated, Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Here, petitioners have failed to discharge such burden of proof. In alleging bad faith,
petitioners cite RA 6656, particularly its Sec. 2, subparagraphs (b) and (c) Petitioners have the
burden to show that: (1) the abolished offices were replaced by substantially the same units
performing the same functions; and (2) incumbents are replaced by less qualified personnel.