People v.

Pimentel subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession of

Facts:
As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion
under RA 1700 ( Anti-Subversion Law) as amended
before the RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest was
issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not
be found.
Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of
warrant of arrest in the subversion case. When arrested,
an unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live ammunition
was found in his possession. On June 1990, Tujan was
charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion under PD No.
1866 before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a motion to quash
the information invoking protection versus double
jeopardy since he claims that alleged possession of
firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was granted by
RTC and CA.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA 1700)
should be applied retroactively to Tujan.
Held:
Yes, RA 7363 should be applied retroactively. The
repeal by said law of RA 1700, as amended was
absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal.
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and
absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law
ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous
offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this
jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged
with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of
subversion against the accused-private respondent has
no more legal basis and should be dismissed.
People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)
FACTS: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA
1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5, 1990,
Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver.
On June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of
subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion to quash
invoking protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III,
Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile v. Salazar:
alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was
granted by the trial court and the court of appeals.
ISSUE: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on
ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge
under RA 1700.
Ratio: No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised
Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to occur,
acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must
have occurred. In this case, first case was not even
arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes
firearms.
However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or
RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the accused, we
can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they
didnt raise this issue. PD 1866 should be amended to
mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance
of subversion
Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700
charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release
Tujan.
People vs Ferrer Case Digest
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, 27 December 1972
FACTS:
Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag, together with five others,
were charged with violation of R. A. No. 1700 or the Anti-
Subversion Law which outlaws the Communist Party of
the Philippines and other subversive associations, and
punishes any person who knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a
member of the Party or of any other similar subversive
organization. Both accused moved to quash the
informations on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Law
is a bill of attainder. The trial court agreed, and
thus, dismissed the informations against the two accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature
of a Bill of Attainder
HELD:
No. Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that
No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of
a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be
seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to
be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed
organization. The term Communist Party of the
Philippines issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact,
the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also to any other organization having the
same purpose and their successors. Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct.
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it
would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in
court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to
secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that
their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive
character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by
force deceit, and other illegal means and place the
country under the control and domination of a foreign
power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is
nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of
knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is
precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been
referred to as a dragnet device whereby all who
participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The
contention would be correct if the statute were construed
as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific
intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the
statute specifically required that membership must be
knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal
objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means
when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be
shown to have been acquired knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts. The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the
unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by overt acts.
This constitutes an element of membership distinct from
the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires
proof of direct participation in the organizations unlawful
activities, while the latter requires proof of mere
adherence to the organizations illegal objectives
PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-
14; 27 DEC 1972]
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court
judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of
1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the
information of subversion against the following: 1.)
Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford
impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people
to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government.
Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed
Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.)
The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of
the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial.
3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by
being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved
20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar
associations penalizing membership therein, and for
other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being
although a political party is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and
present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section
4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal
acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due
investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary
of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court.
Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court
for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8
allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP
through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under
freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post
facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of
expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-
Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes
without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of
judicial determination to a legislativedetermination of
guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of
attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The
statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is
applied retroactively and reach pastconduct. (A bill of
attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of
the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to
other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not
person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it
must be shown thatmembership was acquired with the
intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts.
This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE
that is punishable. This is the required proof of a
members direct participation. Why
is membership punished. Membership renders aidand
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes
himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature.
Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the
act. The members of the subversive organizations before
the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape
liability by renouncing membership in accordance with
Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis
mutandis or that the necessary changes having been
made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government
should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a
basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise
of Freedom of Expression andAssociation in this matter.
Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the
preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were
done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in
freedom of speech and association is excluded in the
prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak
considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the
prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving
circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following
elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be
proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the
present Government of the Philippines and establish
a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its
subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the
accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
People vs. Ferrer (48 SCRA 382)
Facts:
On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed against
Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance in Tarlac
concerning the Anti-Subversion Act. He was accused of
being an officer or a ranked leader of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to overthrow the government of the
Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion or any other illegal means. Co claimed that
the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. On May 25,
1970, Nilo Tayag and five others were also charged in
the same court with subversion. Tayag copied Cos
attack on the law. The court ruled the statute void on the
grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague
overbroad. Government appealed to the SC as a special
civil action for certiorari.
Issues:
Relevant: WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder
Irrelevant: WoN it is vague and overbroad
Irrelevant: WoN it denies the defendants the due
process of the law
Held and Ratio:
Relevant: No. Only when a statute applies either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of
a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
(US v. Lovett 328 US 303 1946)
Irrelevant: No. The contention about the word
overthrow regarding the government (peaceful
overthrowing) is clarified by the provision of the clause:
by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any
other illegal means.
Irrelevant: No. The freedom of expression and freedom
of association is superseded by the right of the state to
self-preservation.
Decision: The questioned resolution is set aside.
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January
28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested
by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an office of protocol from the DFA stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under
section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the
ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the
MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the
criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied,
the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings
and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest
it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation
was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with
immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation
was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered
by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court
needs to protect the right to due process not only of the
accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity
under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the acts must be done in
official capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our
 laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in
cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely
a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked
only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is
required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.
FACTS:
2 criminal informations for for grave oral defamation were
filed against Jeffrey Liang, a Chinese national who was
employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), by Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of
ADB
MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed
immunity from legal processes
RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
the People of the Philippines annulled and set aside the order
of MTC
SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that the
immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not
absolute and is limited on the official capacity and immunity
CANNOT cover the commission of a crime such as slander or
oral defamation in the name of official duty
A motion of reconsideration is filed
ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys immunity
HELD: NO
slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed
in an official capacity
issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted
oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine
PUNO, J., concurring:
the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who
the recipient is
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and
hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any
offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is
waived. On the other hand, officials of international
organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only
those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the
organization and the fulfillment of its purposes.
o officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the
jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts,
notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity
o If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify by the
DFA
Liang vs. People, 323 SCRA 652 (2000)
FACTS: Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was charged
by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong city for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against her fellow
worker with two
counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC judge then received
an office of protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs,
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the agreement bet ADB and the
government. MeTC judge, without notice, dismissed the two
criminal cases. Prosecution filed writ of mandamus and
certiorari and ordered
the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner is covered by immunity
under the agreement and that no preliminary investigation
was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
RULING: He is not covered by immunity because the
commission of a crime is part of the performance of official
duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that a certain person is covered
by immunity. That
a person is covered by immunity is preliminary. Due process
is right of the accused as much as the prosecution.
Slandering a person is not covered by the agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime such as
defamation in the name of official duty. Under Vienna
convention on Diplomatic Relations, commission of a crime is
not part of official duty.
On the contention that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by
the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory
right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is
clear than no preliminary investigation is required in cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the
absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the
courts jurisdiction nor does it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.
DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was
disqualified by the Commission on Elections from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in
the May 8, 1995 elections. The ground cited by the
COMELEC was Section 40(a) of the Local Government
Code of 1991. Said section provides that those
sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more imprisonment within two (2) years after
serving sentence are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. It was established by the
COMELEC that the petitioner was found guilty by the
Municipal Trial Court for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law. It was contended by the petitioner that Section
40(a) is not applicable to him because he was granted
probation by the MTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral
turpitude.
 2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section
40(a)s applicability.
Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge
by the fence of the fact that property received is stolen
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of
ones rightful property as that which animated the
robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes
of moral turpitude. Anent the second issue, suffice it to
say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend
the execution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of
fencing which already declared as a crime of moral
turpitude and thus falling squarely under the
disqualification found in Section 40(a), subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation.
DELA TORRE V. COMELEC (G.R. No.
121592; July 5, 1996)
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified from
running as mayor of Cavinti Laguna on the ground that
he was convicted of violation the Anti-Fencing Law.
He argues that he should not be disqualified because he
is serving probation of his sentence and hence, the
execution of his judgment was suspended together with
all its legal consequences.
ISSUE:
WON Dela Torre is disqualified to run for public office.
HELD:
Sec.40 of LGC provides:
Disqualifications.
The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
Moral turopitude is considered as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the "fence"
of the fact that property received is stolen displays the
same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful
property as that which animated the robbery or theft
which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude. Hence Dela Torre is disqualified from seeking
public office.
With regard to his argument that he is under probation,
the court ruled that the legal effect of probation is only to
suspend the execution of the sentence.
Dela Torre's conviction subsists and remains totally
unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In
fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso
facto attains finality when the accused applies for
probation, although it is not executory pending resolution
of the application for probation.
Dela Torre vs COMELEC [258 SCRA 485]
Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime
becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any
elective local position i.e. when the conviction is for an
offense involving moral turpitude.
Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution,
declared petitioner disqualified from running for the position of
Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was
found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law,
an offense whose nature involves moral turpitude.
Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government
Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation
granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the
judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences
flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.
However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.
Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the
coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude.
Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.
From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element
of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that the accused
knows or should have known that the said article, item, object
or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the
fence of the fact that property received as stolen displays the
same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property
as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very
nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the
participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point
in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual
perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful
dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging the process
private duties they owe their fellowmen in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty and good morals.

Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral

turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general principle
that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes
mala prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as
mala prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude
is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all
the circumstance

Republic v. De Gracia
G.R. No. 171557; February 12, 2014

FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15,
1969 at a church in Zamboanga Del Norte. On
December 25, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint
for the declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that
Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations. Petitioner
furthered that he was forced to marry her barely 3
months into their courtship in light of her accidental
pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad left their
conjugal abode and sold their house without his
consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain Engineer
Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a
second marriage with another man. Dr. Zalsos stated
that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
incapacitated finding that both parties suffered from
utter emotional immaturity.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTCs
finding of psychological incapacity?

HELD:
The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient
factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual
promiscuity, can be equated with psychological
incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos
testimony which does not explain in reasonable detail
how Natividads condition could be characterized as
grave, deeply-rooted and incurable within the
parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.
The petition is, therefore, granted and the decision of
CA reversed and set aside.