Journal of Russian & East European Psychology

ISSN: 1061-0405 (Print) 1558-0415 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mrpo20

The Structure of the Individual Mental Lexicon

from the Standpoint of L. S. Vygotsky's Ideas

T. V. Akhutina

To cite this article: T. V. Akhutina (2003) The Structure of the Individual Mental Lexicon from
the Standpoint of L. S. Vygotsky's Ideas, Journal of Russian & East European Psychology, 41:3-4,
115-128

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/RPO1061-0405410304115

Published online: 08 Dec 2014.

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 Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. 41, nos. 314,
May-JunelJuly-August, pp. 115-28.
0 2003 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
ISSN 1061-040512003 $9.50 + 0.00.

T.V. AKHUTINA

The Structure of the Individual

Mental Lexicon from the Standpoint
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of L.S. Vygotskys Ideas

Research on the structure of an individualsmental lexicon has shown
that, among the set of concepts belonging to a single semantic field,
there is typically one particular concept that stands out. The pro-
cesses of storage, identification, and retrieval of this concept are
faster and more successful than they are for the others. For example,
in the vertical hierarchy of the concept fruit-apple-antonovka
[McIntosh to give a familiar U.S. example-Trans.], apple plays
this type of lead role and also occupies the most prominent position
in the horizontal series apple-pear-plum-cherries-orange.
Concepts with such characteristics are referred to as basic, source,
or primary concepts. What is the reason for their special status?
R. Brown (1958), who first raised this issue, associated the spe-
cial status of one of the levels in a conceptual hierarchy with the
fact that this level has maximum utility in the majority of con-
texts. The child first learns words at the level of distinction that is
most useful to him. Thus, it is important for children to be able to

English translation 0 2003 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text 0 1994
Moskovskii GosudarstvennyiUniversitetand Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta.
Problema stroeniia individualnogo leksikona cheloveka v svete idei L.S.
Vygotskogo. Psikhologiia, 1994, no. 4, pp. 44-81. A publication of the Dept. of
Psychology, M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University.
Translated by Lydia Razran Stone.
115
 116 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN A N D EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

distinguish an apple from an orange, while the distinction between

a Golden Delicious and a Granny Smith [I have substituted Ameri-
can for Russian apple varieties-Trans.] is not significant. Analo-
gously the word tree is more useful than the word oak, and dog is
more useful than animal. The idea that the basic concepts were
those with maximum utility has been further developed in the works
of ethnographers (Berlin, 1972; Berlin et al., 1973), who showed
that the names of plants and animals in folk biology are divided
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into five (or six) levels: (1) unique names of the most primitive clas-
sifier: plant, animal; (2) names of categories of living things: tree,
bush; (3) generic names: pine, oak, birch; (4)species names: dwarf
birch; ( 5 ) varietal names: Karelian dwarf birch.
These ethnographers suppose that the basic level is occupied by
generic names, which are at the center of the hierarchy. In the
languages of the world this level contains the most terms and the
terms that are the most useful. Thus, terms at this level provide
greater discriminative ability than the hierarchical levels above it
as well as simpler names (a simpler classification system) than the
levels below it.
Agreeing with this point of view, E. Rosch and her colleagues
(Rosch et al., 1976) add that generic names are, on the one hand,
relatively close to each other in semantics (as compared to the
names at the higher levels), and, on the other hand, are relatively
far away from representatives of neighboring categories (as com-
pared to the names at the lower levels). The use of generic names
is most convenient, expedient, and frequent, and, for this reason,
children learn these terms earlier than the more general or specific
terms at other levels.
However, investigations by German scholars (Khoffman, 1986;
Hoffmann and Ziessler, 1982) have demonstrated that primary
(basic) concepts may occupy different positions in the generic-
specific hierarchy. For example, in the hierarchy, vehicZe-cur-
Volkswagen, the primary concept coincides with the generic name
(car).However, in the hierarchy, tree-deciduous tree-birch, the
basic concept (tree) is located two levels above the generic name
(birch).
 MARCH-APRIL 2003 11 7

Is it possible to determine what place primary concepts occupy

in generic-specific hierarchies? I. Hoffmann and M. Ziessler con-
ducted an experiment in which subjects were presented with vari-
ous concepts and asked to name their features. The authors
identified two forms of (mental) representation. Concepts to which
subjects attributed mainly pictorial features were called sensori-
ally represented concepts. Concepts that were generally described
by abstract features and examples were called categorically repre-
sented concepts (Hoffmann and Ziessler, 1982).These research-
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ers constructed a hierarchy whose lower levels were occupied by

sensorially represented concepts, while the higher levels were
devoted to categorically represented ones. They then defined the
primary concepts as the most abstract concepts that were still
sensorially represented,, that is, the highest level of the sensori-
ally represented concepts. Such concepts can be identified more
rapidly and have the greatest associative strength, as shown by
the fact that subjects generate the greatest number of features for
these concepts.
We reanalyzed the results cited by the above authors and found
that it is not possible to accurately identify the primary concept
as being the highest hierarchical level among the sensorially rep-
resented concepts in a given hierarchy. This is particularly clear
in the musical instrument hierarchy. Subsidiary to this highest
level concept, are two at the same level wind instruments and
string instruments. For the first of these categories abstract de-
scriptors are predominant, while sensory features predominate
for the second. Consistent with this, the concepts at the next
(lower) level are automatically treated differently: flute behaves
like a primary concept, while violin is a secondary one. How-
ever, both flute and violin would be considered primary on the
basis of number of descriptors supplied insofar as the number of
features subjects provided for them is higher than that for other
representatives of this hierarchy. The situation is analogous for
the weapons hierarchy.
Thus, we can see that none of the approaches considered allows
us to accurately define the level of the basic concept in a generic-
 118 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

specific hierarchy. U.S. investigators, using formal logical crite-

ria, identify the central level of the generic-specific hierarchy as
primary. German psychologists combine formal logical and psy-
chological approaches and provide an operational psychological
definition of primary concepts, but at the same time they embed
these in rigid hierarchies (which fail to correspond to the naive
logic of language) on the basis of the erroneous assumption that
categorically represented concepts must occupy the highest lev-
els, while sensorially represented concepts lie at the lower ones.
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As we have already seen in the examples cited, in a number of

cases, this assumption is not justified. Furthermore, if we do not
simply divide concepts into two groups, but indicate their place in
the continuum of categorically-sensorially represented con-
cepts, then we find that many higher concepts are closer to the
sensory pole than lower concepts (e.g., tree-deciduous tree;
boat-motorboat).
Both of the models considered correspond to reality to some
extent, but both allow too many exceptions. This suggests that the
very principle according to which basic concepts are identified
must be different-one that is consistently psychological, which
we, like L.S. Vygotsky, understand to be historical genetic or
genetic-functional. If we are to describe primary concepts, we must
start by considering their origin and functioning.
On the basis of Vygotskys findings that the system of word
meaning begins to form in a child while his thinking is prelogi-
cal and based on complexes* (the same is undoubtedly true with
respect to philogeny) and that the child first learns words with
concrete, pictorial meanings, forming associations of the type
word-generalized image, with the form of the generalization
changing developmentally in accordance with various laws, we
hypothesized that the meaning of the words first learned by a
child will act as the initial (primary, basic) words for the con-
struction of individual mental semantic fields (Akhutina, 1977;
Akhutina, Petrenko, and Nistratov, 1978).
During our experimental verification of this hypothesis we were
 MARCH-APRIL 2003 119

able to show that the primary meanings: (1) initially are image-
meaning complexes (sensorially represented; (2) because they
are images, they may, from a logical standpoint, be considered
nonelementary; (3) are constructed according to the laws of think-
ing in complexes; of these nonlogical structures, those that are
reinforced by the linguistic context remain and those that are not
so reinforced pass into a latent state or disappear; (4) are the refer-
ence points for defining meanings acquired later (i.e., secondary)
meanings in the same semantic field; ( 5 ) occupy a central position
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in the semantic field, which makes them easy to retrieve, thus

ensuring that they will be used frequently.
In agreement with the ideas of R. Brown and E. Rosch, we
hypothesize that primary concepts (which are the first words of
children) are maximally useful. It is significant for a young child
to be able to distinguish between an apple and an orange or a
carrot and a cucumber. Thus, for the categories of fruit and veg-
etables it is the level of generic names that is the basic one and
that contains the primary meanings. At the same time, to a small
child the difference between a birch and a linden or a bullfinch
and a sparrow is not so significant and thus tree and bird (names at
a higher level) form the primary concepts in the newly forming
semantic fields. The history of the semanticfield determines its
structure.
We have been speaking about the primacy of concepts in a
vertical series; however, members of horizontal series are also dis-
tinguished by their functional characteristics.
When subjects were asked to list the features characteristic of
apples, pears, oranges, and other members of the fruit category,
it was found that no single feature listed was common to all mem-
bers of this category (Rosch and Mervis, 1975).
At the same time, when subjects are asked to classify members
of one or another category on the basis of how typical they are,
they unanimously put the apple in the most typical category, and
olives in the least typical one. If the subjects can evaluate the
typicality of category members, it may be hypothesized that they
 120 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

have an idea of the most typical member-the prototype. In Roschs

opinion, this is just what they have in mind when they refer to the
category. The prototypical category member, occupying the central
place in the semantic category, has the greatest number of features
in common with other members of this category and is furthest
away from representatives of other categories. All category mem-
bers are grouped around the prototype according to the principle
of family resemblance.
The degree of typicality determines how easy it is to operate
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with the given concept. For example, if we ask subjects to evalu-

ate the truth or falsity of the propositions: A crow is a bird, and
A chick is a bird, then it will require less time to verify the first
proposition than the second, which names a nontypical category
member.
The facts and proposed explanation advanced by E. Rosch and
her colleagues accords fully with Vygotskys theory of concept
formation. Generalization of the thinking in complexes type and
organization of groups according to the principle of family resem-
blance are two different descriptions of a single phenomenon.
Despite their basic similarity, there is one difference between them.
The U.S. investigators speak of the principle of typicality or fam-
ily resemblance only with regard to the members of one category,
one horizontal series. On the other hand, Vygotsky, who was mak-
ing a more general assertion about the different types of verbal
thinking, attributed a broader sphere of operation to complexes.
Despite the fact that Vygotsky is cited so often in semantic in-
vestigations, his point of view is far from thoroughly or accurately
understood (the review by the erudite and subtle scholar S. Carey
[ 19821 is a case in point), and we will thus consider it in somewhat
more detail.
Experience with artificial concepts (using the Vygotsky-Sakharov
procedure) allowed Vygotsky to experimentally establish that the
meaning of words develops during childhood and that the develop-
ment goes through a series of stages (syncretism, complex,
preconcept, concept), which involve different types of generaliza-
 MARCH-APRIL 2003 121

tion. His conclusions here are well known. The following asser-
tions are less well known. Every generalization structure is based
on a specific system of commonality and commonality relationships
between general and particular concepts (Vygotsky, 1982, p.
27 1). The commonality relationship of flower-rose differs in
the complex and concept structures. To a two-year-old child, who
has learned the word flower before learning rose, both concepts
stand alongside each other, and can replace each other, while to
an eight-year-old child, one stands above the other and includes
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more particulars.
Vygotsky believed that only at the highest developmental stages
of word meaning (and thus of relationships of commonality) does
a complete system of concepts arise that permits each concept to
be designated in an unlimited number of ways through use of other
concepts to define its place in the system (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 273,
and further). He also suggests that the new level of generalization
does not completely supersede the developmentally previous one
in the linguistic consciousness of an adult; rather, old and new
forms coexist in a relationship akin to geological stratification.
Everyday thinking, which is based on everyday speaking, makes
extensive use of the higher forms of complex-based thinking in
the form of pseudoconcepts-everyday concepts, while scien-
tific thinking relies on scientific concepts (ibid., pp. 168, 176).
The essential difference between everyday and scientific con-
cepts is associated with the presence or absence of a system. Out-
side a concept system, all that is possible are associations
established among objects, that is, empirical connections. When a
system of concepts exists, meta-empirical associations become
possible (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 284) Thus, conceptual thinking dif-
fers from thinking in complexes by virtue of the existence of a
system (cf. The different commonality relationships determine
what types of operations are possible for a given level of thinking
[ibid., p. 2901).
Let us now turn to two aspects of word meaning-relatedness
to an object (= reference) and meaning per se. We will see that
 122 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN A N D EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

the latter is part of a system and may be identified in terms of its

place in the system, and that the laws of formal logic are appli-
cable to this system. Reference, which is based on a pictorial asso-
ciation between the word and the object, also entails association
between words, but these are complex-based associations of the
family resemblance type. The meaning of a word that desig-
nates a concrete object is thus stored in two coordinate systems:
(1) in a formal logic-based hierarchical system utilizing a system
of meanings per se (categorical meanings), and (2) in a visual
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image gallery of generalized images associated with the refer-

ential meaning of the word.
These ideas of Vygotsky are supported by the most diverse
empirical evidence. The natural division of meanings into sensory
and categorical representations, the characteristics of primary con-
cepts, the typicality effects for everyday concepts and the size of
categories for scientific concepts-all these facts can be explained
consistently by Vygotskys ideas. For example, experiments on
lexical recognition and naming of a word have shown that a con-
crete word has two types of meaning-perceptual and conceptual-
and that these are activated at differing rates (Flores dArcais,
Schreuder, and Glazenborg, 1985).
The fact that Vygotskys ideas correspond to the findings about
aphasia provides an important piece of evidence demonstrating
that they are correct. Special experiments targeted at analyzing
the retention of categorical meanings of words and referential
meanings have shown that one of these can be impaired without
impairment of the other. Patients with a brain lesion localized in
the parietal-temporal-occipital areas (i.e., suffering from the
semantic aphasia syndrome-Luria, 1947) have great difficulty
operating with categorical meanings. Categorical classification
(either of words or of objects), retrieval of words with a given
meaning (apple:fruit = dress:???) were the most difficult for this
group of patients (Akhutina and Malakhovskaia, 1985) When the
focus of the lesion is in the lower temporal-occipital cortex of the
dominant cerebral hemisphere, patients have the most trouble oper-
 MARCH-APRIL 2003 123

ating with the referential meanings. With my student N.V. Komolova,

we developed an experimental methodology based on the idea that
underlying such meaning is a generalized image-template, which
is used to segment the continuum of real phenomena. In these stud-
ies, subjects were asked to view schematic depictions of animals,
whose features changed smoothly along a single continuum and
to divide them into groups.
In our experiment, in addition to perceptual classification, we
used verbal classification in which words were to be placed in
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groups not on the basis of generic-specific categories, but on the

basis of whether they referred to a single object (in particular, the
words: pussycat, kitty, and purr, had to be distinguished from vixen,
sly, cub, yelps, or howl, pup). The difficulty of these tasks, which
was intercorrelated for these tasks but not correlated with defects in
performing tasks involving categorical meanings, was greatest for
patients with damage located as described above. This suggests that
patients with acoustic-mnestic and optical-mnestic (optical) apha-
sia suffer primary impairment of referential meaning.
These data confirm Vygotskys ideas and suggest that the mean-
ing of words denoting concrete objects is dually represented and
may be retrieved by two different routes: the categorical, within
the verbal system of concepts (cf. the term concept network in
Luria), and the imagistic, within the system of references. In the
first case, the categorical (significative) meaning is activated,
in the second the object denotation, to use Vygotskys term.
Each meaning occupies a particular place in a continuum, at one
end of which are the most categorically represented and least im-
agistically represented words and at the other end the most imag-
istically and least categorically represented.
The fact that the two systems of word meaning generaliza-
tions coexist in the linguistic consciousness of an adult is also
clearly demonstrated by investigation of speech and thinking in
patients who have undergone a course of unilateral shock therapy
(Balonov and Deglin, 1976; Deglin, Balonov, and Dolinina, 1983;
Chernigovskaia and Deglin, 1986). The most striking data come
 124 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN A N D EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

from word association experiments and syllogistic reasoning ex-

ercises. Under conditions where the left hemisphere is depressed,
in response to the stimuli words, there is an increase in responses
from the lexicosemantic area comprising the names of sets of
objects and real phenomena. Particularly typical of this state are
utterance-complexes (in Vygotsky s term)-naming of compo-
nents of a concrete image that underlies the word (Deglin, Balonov,
and Dolinina, 1983, p. 34). When the right hemisphere is depressed,
the tendency to rubrification, to superimpose an abstract classifi-
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cation scheme on the external world is intensified. Responses based

on the principle of binary opposition, syntagmatic responses, re-
sponses with semantically vacuous changes in words, and word for-
mations all increase. The number of utterance-complexes reflecting
individual life experience, and concrete images decreases sharply
(ibid., pp. 36-37).
As noted above, in Vygotsky s opinion, every generalization
structure corresponds to a specific system of logical mental opera-
tions that are possible with that structure (1982, p. 283). Study of
the solution of logical problems after one hemisphere has been
depressed showed that the same individual may use either logical
(when the right hemisphere is depressed) or empirical (when the
left hemisphere is depressed) methods of solution. Thus, after pre-
senting the syllogism, Every artist can draw a rabbit. Durer is an
artist. Can Durer draw a rabbit or not? a patient with a depressed
right hemisphere answered, Durer can draw a portrait of his mother
very well, and he can also draw a rabbit, because he is an artist, I
know of him (logical answer, reinforced by experience). The same
patient, after her left hemisphere had been depressed said: Durer?
He probably can (with little confidence). I dont remember (the
patient does not use logical rea~oning).~
Research on speech and thinking when one of the hemispheres
is depressed poses the question of the lateralization of various forms
of representation of meaning. While these investigations suggest
that the image glossary is stored in the right hemisphere and the
categorical in the left, the data from studies of aphasia suggest
 MARCH-APRIL 2003 125

the possibility of both systems being impaired in cases of patho-

logical lesions in the left hemisphere. As a working hypothesis,
we take the viewpoint that object images are stored bilaterally
and categorical word meanings are stored in the left hemisphere.
We understand, however, that this issue requires further careful
consideration using data obtained from a variety of experimen-
tal models.
Thus, we have considered the viewpoints in the literature on the
organization of the semantic field as components of an individuals
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mental lexicon. Studies performed on concrete lexicons have made

it possible to identify primary concepts, which occupy a favored
position in the semantic field. These constitute the starting point
and center around which the entire field is structured according to
the principle of complexes (family resemblances). The imagistic
nature of the generalization underlying the formation of a complex
leads to a situation where a meaning logically subsumed under a
particular complex (cf. a chicken is a bird) may not be part of
this complex but forms a separate semantic complex. The sys-
tem of logical generic-specific hierarchies that forms later, un-
der the influence of schooling, is superimposed on the first without
replacing it. This viewpoint, which follows from the experiments
and theoretical generalizations of L.S. Vygotsky, is confirmed
by the data on aphasia.

Notes
I. Because this research used indirect criteria forjudging the form of a concepts
representation-that is, the verbal definitions provided by subjects-it is impor-
tant to emphasize that there are other data in favor of this division, in particular,
data on aphasia. Also testifying in favor of this distinction are analyses of problems
with naming in patients suffering from various forms of aphasia performed by A.R.
Luria (1947), E.P. Kok (1967), E.D. Markova (1961), L.S. Tsvetkova (1972), N.G.
Kalita (1974,1979), T.V. Akhutina (1981a, 1981b, 1983), E.K. Warrington (1981a,
1981b),A. Caramazza, R.S. Bemdt, and H.H. Brownell (1982).
2. One can draw a parallel between the continuum complex-preconcept-
concept proposed by Vygotsky and the continuum of E. Bates and B. MacWhinney
grouping on the basis of family resemblance-grouping on the basis of features
 126 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN A N D EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

with different weights-grouping according to a formal logic principle (Bates

and MacWhinney, 1982).
3. For more detail on this see: Chemigovskaia and Deglin (1986). On the
existence of different types of thinking in members of modem cultures, see also,
Riumina (1982); Tulviste (1982,1988); Tulviste andTulviste (1985); Frumkina
(1984); Frumkina, Riumina, Mostovaia (1985).

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