MADRIGAL TRANSPORTVSLAPANDAY HOLDINGSFACTS:

Petitioner Madrigal Transport, Inc filed a petition for Voluntary Insolvencybefore the
Regional Trial Court
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Subsequently, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against LapandayHoldings

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The insolvency court (RTC) declared petitioner insolvent

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Lapanday filed a Motion to Dismiss the case pending before the RTC whichwas granted
for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action
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Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was later denied
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Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court ofAppeals
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The CA issued a resolution requiring petitioner to explain why its petitionshould not be
dismissed outright, on the ground that the questioned ordersshould have been elevated
by ordinary appeal
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The appellate court ruled that the main issue in the instant case was purelylegal, the
petition could be treated as one for review as an exception to thegeneral rule that
certiorari was not proper when appeal was available.
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Lapanday challenged the ruling

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The CA issued a a
decision dismissing Madrigals petition for certiorari
stating that an order granting a motion to dismiss was final and thus theproper subject
of an appeal, not certiorari
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Furthermore, even if the petition could be treated as an appeal, it would stillhave to be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the issues raised bypetitioner involved pure
questions of law that should be brought to theSupreme Court pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 50 and Section 2 ( c) of Rule 41of the Rules of Court
ISSUES:I
Whether or not Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy
II
Whether or not CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Certiorari
HELD:
I.

Appeal is the proper remedy and not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule65
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or finalorder
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein whendeclared by
the Rules of Court to be appealable. Included in the modes of appeal areordinary
appeal, petition for review, and appeal by certiorari.An order or a judgment is deemed
final when it finally disposes of a pending action,so that nothing more can be done with
it in the trial court. In other words, the orderor judgment ends the litigation in the lower
court. An interlocutory order does notdispose of the case completely, but leaves
something to be done as regards themerits of the latter.

G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,Petitioners, vs.COURT

OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR andCITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG
CITY,Respondents.FACTSThe petitioners owned a parcel of land situated in Barangay Mauway,
Mandaluyong City.Halfof their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to
nine other families.Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income.On
October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adoptedResolution No.
552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take thenecessary
legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose ofdeveloping it for
low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.The petitioners became
alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying forthe annulment of
Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, andwithout force
and effect.The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City
Mayorto initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to
purchasethe property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was
premature.ISSUE:Whether or not the action of the petitioner will propsper.HELD:The fact that
there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint forexpropriation which was
based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing thesame is equivalent to
lack of cause of action.In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing
and providing forthe expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for
lack of cause ofaction.The remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a
resolution expressingthe desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners'
property was issued. As ofthen, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial
challenge, for the power of eminentdomain could be exercised by the City only through the filing
of a verified complaint in the propercourt. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed
such verified complaint, no expropriationproceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the
petitioners as the owners could not also bedeprived of their property under the power of eminent
domain

Special People Inc. Foundation vs. Nestor Canda, et al

(G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013)
Facts:
Special People Inc. Foundation (SPIF) was a proponent of awater-resource development and
utilization project in Bohol thatwould involve the tapping and purifying of water from the LobocRiver,
and the distribution of the purified water to the residents ofLoboc and six other municipalities.
SPIF applied for a Certificate ofNon-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management
Bureau(EMB) of the DENR, Region 7, seeking to be exempt from therequirement of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Upon evaluatingthe nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the
project,Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findingsthat the project is
located within a critical area; hence, InitialEnvironmental Examination is required. SPIF
appealed Candas
findings to EMB RD Lipayon, claiming that it should also be issued aCNC because the
project was no different from the Loboc-Loaywaterworks project of the DPWH that had
recently been issued aCNC. RD Lipayon notified SPIF that its documents substantially
complied with the procedural aspects of the EMBs review, and Later
on, RD Lipayon informed the SPIF that an Initial EnvironmentalExamination documents
was required for the project due to itssignificant impact in the area to determine whether the project
waswithin an environmentally critical area or not, one of which is
aCertification from PHIVOLCS that the area was not subjected toearthquakes of at least intensity
VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or itsequivalent during the period of 1949 until the year 2001
to which theSPIF complied. However, due to the tenor of the certification
fromPHIVOLCS, RD Lipayon declared that the project was within anenvironmentally critical
area, and that the petitioner was not entitledto the CNC. SPIF filed a petition for mandamus
and damages in theRTC in Loay, Bohol, alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as amatter of right
after having complied with the certificationrequirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to
theDPWH for a similar waterworks project in the same area.The trial court dismissed the petition for
mandamus ruling thatthe RTC would not interfere with the primary prerogative of the EMB
to review the merits of the petitioners application for the CNC
.Hence, this appeal brought directly to the Court via petition for reviewon certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the appeal directly to the Supreme Courtfrom the RTC was proper?
2. Whether or not the petition for mandamus was the correctrecourse?
Rulings
:
1.Petitioners appeal is improper under Rule 45, Rules of Court
.This appeal by certiorari is being taken under Rule 45, Rules ofCourt, whose Section 1
expressly requires that the petition shall raiseonly questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth. Yet, thepetitioner hereby raises a question of fact whose resolution isdecisive in
this appeal. That issue of fact concerns whether or not thepetitioner established that its project
was not located in anenvironmentally critical area. For this reason, the Court is
constrainedto deny due course to the petition for review. It is a settled rule,indeed, that in
the exercise of our power of review, the Court is not atrier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination ofthe evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial ofthe case.2. Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner. TheSupreme
Court dismissed the recourse because the SPIF failed toexhaust the available administrative
remedies, and because it failedto show that it was legally entitled to demand the performance of
theact by the respondents.
Held:
The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedythat is issued only in extreme necessity,
and the ordinary course ofprocedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief
toone who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to becompelled.

G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, Respondent.
VELASCO JR., J.:

NATURE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquinos Petition for Certiorari for not being the proper
remedy to question the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10),
ordering the demolition of his hotel establishment.

FACTS:
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest
Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioners application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the no build zone demarcated in Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131.

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever
taken by the respondent mayor.

A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering
the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves hotel.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order
was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion
Contentions of West Cove:
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million
peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the
demolition.

Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings

The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the
issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, certiorari will not lie.

ISSUE:
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the closure and
demolition of the property in question.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per sewhich can therefore
be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotels particular incident, its location and not its inherent
qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone,
Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the hotel is
not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se. Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise
ofpolice power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local
Government Code authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives,
to issue demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and
demolition of establishments.