G.R. No.

191988 August 31, 2010

ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, C.J.:

What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4,

Article VII of the Constitution: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any
reelection?"

The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue involved in this case
present a temptation that magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law
students alike would find hard to resist. However, prudence dictates that
this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue before it has already
been mooted by subsequent events. More importantly, the constitutional
requirement of the existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy" for the
proper exercise of the power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the
allure of making a grand pronouncement that, in the end, will amount to
nothing but a non-binding opinion.

The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is

covered by the ban on the President from "any reelection." Private
respondent was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in
the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C.
Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).1 His motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.2
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari3 on May 7, 2010. However,
under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the
execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is
sought to be reviewed.4 Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the
position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the
second highest number of votes.51avvphi1

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be
premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
conflict of legal rights exists.6 There is in this case no definite, concrete, real
or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests.7 No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein.8 As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is
sorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.9 The
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to
the thing in issue in the case before it.10 In other words, when a case is
moot, it becomes non-justiciable.11

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable

controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.12
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of
a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the
same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private
respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It
will serve no useful or practical purpose.

Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Mayor Atienza

G.R. No. 175241 | February 24, 2010 | First Division
Ponente - CARPIO MORALES, J.

Facts: The IBP, through its then National President Cadiz, filed with the Office of the City
Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge
on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and
members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.

The Office of the Manila Mayor issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to
stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead
of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari. The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners
filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari. The Court denied the
petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the
merits in view of the pendency of the case in the CA, and denied the motion for
reconsideration.

The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed
with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the MPD earlier barred
petitioners from proceeding thereto. The MPD thereupon instituted a criminal action
against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not
indicated in the permit.

The appellate court ruled and found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not categorically require respondent
to specify in writing the imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants
the denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates that the action taken shall
be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The appellate court went
on to hold that respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the freedom of
expression and of public assembly which are not absolute, and that the challenged permit
is consistent with Plaza Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are
allowed without permit.

Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the
venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion?

Held: Yes, the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs
rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

The respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable
condition to such modification.

In KMP v Ermita, the Court reiterated that the freedom of assembly is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The
sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.

In Reyes v. Bagatsing, the Court elucidated that the public official concerned shall appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that
the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Also, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.

The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been
heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the
action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable
action on the permit. Respondent mayor failed to indicate how he had arrived at
modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test
which is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit
adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or
modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render
illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.