The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self

Author(s): Michael J. Sandel

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 1984), pp. 81-96
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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 THE PROCEDURAL REPUBLIC
AND THE UNENCUMBERED SELF

MICHAEL J. SANDEL
Harvard University

OgLITICAL PHILOSOPHY seemsoftento resideat a distance

fromtheworld.Principlesare one thing,politicsanother,and evenour
best effortsto "live up" to our ideals typicallyfounderon the gap
betweentheoryand practice.'
Butifpoliticalphilosophyis unrealizableinone sense,itis unavoida-
ble in another.This is thesensein whichphilosophyinhabitstheworld
fromthestart;ourpracticesand institutions areembodiments oftheory.
To engage in a political practiceis already to stand in relationto
theory.2 For all our uncertainties
about ultimatequestionsof political
philosophy-ofjusticeand value and thenatureof thegood life-the
one thingwe knowis thatwe livesome answerall thetime.
In thisessayI willtryto exploretheanswerwe livenow,in contem-
poraryAmerica.Whatis thepoliticalphilosophyimplicitin ourpracti-
ces and institutions? How does it stand,as philosophy?And how do
tensionsin the philosophyfind expressionin our presentpolitical
condition?
It maybe objectedthatitis a mistaketo look fora singlephilosophy,
thatweliveno "answer,"onlyanswers.Buta plurality ofanswersis itself
a kindof answer.And thepoliticaltheorythataffirms thispluralityis
thetheoryI proposeto explore.

A UTHOR'S NOTE: An earlierversionof thisarticlewas presentedto the Political

PhilosophyColloquiumat PrincetonUniversity, and to theLegal TheoryWorkshopat
ColumbiaLaw School. I am gratefulto theparticipants,and also to theEditor,William
Connolly,for helpfulcommentsand criticisms.I would also like to thankthe Ford
Foundationfor supportof a largerprojectof whichthisessayis a firstinstallment.

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 12. No. 1, February198481-96

? 1984Sage Publications,Inc.

81

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82 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD

We mightbeginbyconsidering a certainmoraland politicalvision.It

is a liberalvision,and like mostliberalvisionsgivesprideof place to
justice,fairness, and individualrights.Itscorethesisis this:ajust society
seeks not to promoteany particularends, but enables its citizensto
pursuetheirown ends,consistentwitha similarlibertyforall; itthere-
foremustgovernby principlesthatdo not presupposeanyparticular
conceptionofthegood. Whatjustifiestheseregulative principlesabove
all is notthattheymaximizethegeneralwelfare,or cultivatevirtue,or
otherwisepromotethe good, but ratherthat theyconformto the
concept of right,a moral categorygiven prior to the good, and
independentof it.
This liberalismsays,in otherwords,thatwhatmakesthejust society
just is notthetelosor purposeor end at whichit aims,butpreciselyits
refusalto chooseinadvanceamongcompetingpurposesandends.In its
constitution and itslaws,thejust societyseeksto providea framework
withinwhich its citizens can pursue their own values and ends,
consistentwitha similarlibertyforothers.
The ideal I've describedmightbe summedup in theclaim thatthe
rightis priorto thegood, and in two senses:The priorityof theright
meansfirst, thatindividualrightscannotbe sacrificed forthesakeofthe
generalgood (in thisit opposes utilitarianism), and second,thatthe
principlesofjusticethatspecifytheserightscannotbe premisedon any
particularvision of the good life. (In this it opposes teleological
conceptionsin general.)
This is the liberalismof much contemporarymoral and political
philosophy,mostfullyelaboratedbyRawls,and indebtedto Kantforits
philosophicalfoundations.3But I am concernedhere less withthe
lineage of thisvisionthan withwhat seem to me threestrikingfacts
about it.
First, it has a deep and powerfulphilosophicalappeal. Second,
despiteitsphilosophicalforce,theclaimforthepriority oftherightover
the good ultimately fails.And third,despiteits philosophicalfailure,
thisliberalvisionis the one by whichwe live. For us in late twentieth
centuryAmerica,itis ourvision,thetheorymostthoroughly embodied
in the practicesand institutions most centralto our public life.And
seeinghow it goes wrongas philosophymay help us to diagnoseour
presentpoliticalcondition.So first, itsphilosophicalpower;second,its
philosophicalfailure;andthird,howeverbriefly, itsuneasyembodiment
in theworld.

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 Sandel / THE UNENCUMBERED SELF 83

But beforetakingup thesethreeclaims,it is worthpointingout a

centralthemethatconnectsthem.Andthatis a certainconceptionofthe
person,ofwhatit is to be a moralagent.Like all politicaltheories,the
liberaltheoryI havedescribedis something morethana setofregulative
principles.It is also a viewabout thewaytheworldis, and thewaywe
movewithinit. At theheartofthisethiclies a visionofthepersonthat
bothinspiresand undoesit. As I willtryto arguenow,whatmakethis
ethicso compelling,but also, finally,vulnerable,are thepromiseand
thefailureof theunencumbered self.

KANTIAN FOUNDATIONS

The liberalethicassertsthepriority ofright,and seeksprinciplesof

justicethatdo not presupposeanyparticularconceptionof thegood.4
This is whatKant meansbythesupremacyofthemorallaw, and what
Rawls means whenhe writesthat"justiceis the firstvirtueof social
institutions."5 Justiceis morethanjust anothervalue. It providesthe
framework thatregulatestheplayofcompetingvaluesand ends;itmust
thereforehave a sanctionindependentof those ends. But it is not
obviouswheresuch a sanctioncould be found.
Theoriesofjustice,and forthatmatter, ethics,havetypicallyfounded
theirclaimson one or anotherconceptionofhumanpurposesand ends.
Thus Aristotlesaid themeasureof a polis is thegood at whichit aims,
and evenJ.S. Mill,whointhenineteenth century called"justicethechief
part,and incomparablythe mostbindingpartof all morality,"made
justicean instrument of utilitarianends.6
This is thesolutionKant's ethicrejects.Different personstypically
havedifferent desiresand ends,and so anyprinciplederivedfromthem
can onlybe contingent. But themorallaw needsa categoricalfounda-
tion,not a contingent one. Even so universala desireas happinesswill
notdo. People stilldiffer inwhathappinessconsistsof,andto installany
particularconceptionas regulativewouldimposeon sometheconcep-
tionsofothers,and so denyat leastto somethefreedomto choosetheir
own conceptions.In anycase, to governourselvesin conformity with
desiresand inclinations, givenas theyare bynatureor circumstance, is
notreallyto be self-governing at all. It is rathera refusaloffreedom,a
capitulationto determinations givenoutsideus.
Accordingto Kant,therightis "derivedentirely fromtheconceptof
freedomintheexternalrelationships ofhumanbeings,and has nothing

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84 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

to do with the end which all men have by nature[i.e., the aim of
achievinghappiness]or withthe recognizedmeans of attainingthis
end."7As such,it musthave a basis priorto all empiricalends. Only
when I am governedby principlesthatdo not presupposeany parti-
cular ends am I freeto pursuemyown ends consistentwitha similar
freedomforall.
But thisstillleavesthequestionof whatthebasis of therightcould
possiblybe. Ifitmustbe a basispriorto all purposesand ends,uncondi-
tioned even by what Kant calls "the special circumstancesof human
nature,"-8wherecould such a basis conceivablybe found?Giventhe
stringentdemands of the Kantian ethic,the moral law would seem
almostto requirea foundationin nothing,foranyempiricalprecondi-
tionwouldundermine itspriority."Duty!" asksKantat hismostlyrical,
"Whatoriginis thereworthyofthee,and whereis to be foundtherootof
thynobledescentwhichproudlyrejectsall kinshipwiththeinclinations?"9
His answeris thatthe basis of the moral law is to be foundin the
subject, not the object of practicalreason, a subject capable of an
autonomous will. No empiricalend, but rather"a subject of ends,
namely a rational being himself,must be made the groundfor all
maximsofaction."'0 NothingotherthanwhatKantcalls"thesubjectof
all possibleendshimself'can giveriseto theright, foronlythissubjectis
also thesubjectof an autonomouswill.Onlythissubjectcould be that
"somethingwhichelevatesman above himselfas partof theworldof
sense"and enableshimto participatein an ideal,unconditionedrealm
whollyindependentof our social and psychologicalinclinations.And
onlythisthoroughgoing independencecan affordus thedetachment we
need ifwe are everfreelyto choose forourselves,unconditioned bythe
vagariesof circumstance. 1
Who or whatexactlyis thissubject?It is, in a certainsense,us. The
morallaw,afterall,is a law wegiveourselves;we don'tfindit,we willit.
That is howit(and we) escape thereignofnatureand circumstance and
merelyempiricalends.Butwhatis important to see is thatthe"we"who
do thewillingare not"we"qua particularpersons,youand me,each for
ourselves-the morallaw is not up to us as individuals-but"we" qua
participants inwhatKantcalls"purepracticalreason,""we"qua partic-
ipantsin a transcendental subject.
Now whatis to guaranteethatI am a subjectofthiskind,capable of
exercisingpure practicalreason? Well, strictlyspeaking,thereis no
guarantee;the transcendental subjectis only a possibility.But it is a
possibilityI mustpresupposeifI am to thinkofmyselfas a freemoral
agent. Were I whollyan empiricalbeing,I would not be capable of

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 Sandel / THE UNENCUMBERED SELF 85

freedom, foreveryexerciseofwillwouldbe conditionedbythedesirefor

someobject.All choicewouldbe heteronomous choice,governedbythe
pursuitofsomeend. My willcould neverbe a firstcause,onlytheeffect
of some prior cause, the instrument of one or anotherimpulseor
inclination."When we thinkof ourselvesas free,"writesKant, "we
transfer ourselvesintotheintelligibleworldas membersand recognize
theautonomyofthewill."'2And so thenotionofa subjectpriorto and
independentofexperience,suchas theKantianethicrequires,appears
not onlypossiblebut indispensible,a necessarypresuppositionof the
possibilityof freedom.
How does all ofthiscomebackto politics?As thesubjectispriortoits
ends,so therightis priorto thegood. Societyis bestarrangedwhenitis
governedby principlesthatdo not presupposeanyparticularconcep-
tionofthegood,foranyotherarrangement wouldfailto respectpersons
as beingcapable of choice; it would treatthemas objectsratherthan
subjects,as meansratherthanends in themselves.
We can see in thiswayhow Kant'snotionofthesubjectis boundup
withthe claim forthe priorityof right.But for those in the Anglo-
Americantradition,the transcendentalsubject will seem a strange
foundationfor a familiarethic. Surely,one may think,we can take
rightsseriouslyand affirm theprimacyofjusticewithoutembracingthe
Critiqueof Pure Reason. This,in anycase, is theprojectof Rawls.
He wants to save the priorityof rightfromthe obscurityof the
transcendental subject.Kant'sidealistmetaphysic,forall itsmoraland
politicaladvantage,cedes too muchto thetranscendent, and winsfor
justiceitsprimacyonlybydenyingititshumansituation."To developa
viable Kantian conceptionof justice," Rawls writes,"the forceand
contentof Kant's doctrinemustbe detachedfromits backgroundin
transcendental idealism"and recastwithinthe"canonsofa reasonable
empiricism."'3 And so Rawls' projectis to preserveKant's moraland
politicalteachingby replacingGermanicobscuritieswitha domesti-
cated metaphysic morecongenialto theAnglo-American temper.This
is therole of theoriginalposition.

FROM TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT TO

UNENCUMBERED SELF

The originalpositiontriesto providewhat Kant's transcendental

argumentcannot-a foundationfortherightthatis priorto thegood,

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86 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

but stillsituatedin the world. Sparingall but essentials,the original

positionworkslikethis:It invitesus to imaginetheprincipleswe would
chooseto governoursocietyifwewereto choosethemin advance,before
we knewthe particularpersonswe would be-whether richor poor,
strongorweak,luckyorunlucky-beforewe knewevenourinterests or
aims or conceptionsofthegood. These principles-theones we would
chooseinthatimaginary situation-aretheprinciplesofjustice.Whatis
more,ifitworks,theyareprinciplesthatdo notpresupposeanyparticu-
lar ends.
Whattheydo presupposeis a certainpictureoftheperson,oftheway
we mustbe ifwe arebeingsforwhomjusticeis thefirstvirtue.Thisis the
pictureof the unencumberedself,a selfunderstoodas priorto and
independentof purposesand ends.
Now the unencumberedselfdescribesfirstof all the way we stand
towardthethingswe have,or want,or seek. It meansthereis alwaysa
distinctionbetweenthevalues I have and thepersonI am. To identify
anycharacteristics as myaims,ambitions,desires,and so on, is always
to implysomesubject"me" standingbehindthem,at a certaindistance,
and the shape of this"me" mustbe givenpriorto any of the aims or
attributesI bear. One consequencesof thisdistanceis to put the self
itselfbeyondthereachofitsexperience,to secureitsidentity once and
forall. Or to put thepointanotherway,it rulesout thepossibilityof
what we mightcall constitutive ends. No role or commitment could
defineme so completelythatI could notunderstandmyselfwithoutit.
No projectcouldbe so essentialthatturning awayfromitwouldcall into
questionthepersonI am.
For the unencumberedself,what mattersabove all, what is most
essentialto ourpersonhood,arenottheendswechoosebutourcapacity
to choose them.The originalpositionsumsup thiscentralclaimabout
us. "It is not our aims thatprimarily revealour nature,"writesRawls,
"but ratherthe principlesthatwe would acknowledgeto governthe
backgroundconditionsunderwhichtheseaimsareto be formed... We
should thereforereversethe relationbetweenthe rightand the good
proposedbyteleologicaldoctrinesand viewtherightas prior."14
Onlyiftheselfis priorto itsendscan therightbe priorto thegood.
Onlyifmyidentity is nevertiedto theaimsand interestsI mayhave at
any momentcan I thinkof myselfas a freeand independentagent,
capable of choice.
This notion of independencecarriesconsequencesforthe kind of
communityof whichwe are capable. Understoodas unencumbered

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 Sandel / THE UNENCUMBERED SELF 87

selves,we are ofcoursefreetojoin involuntaryassociationwithothers,

and so are capable of communityin the cooperativesense. What is
deniedto theunencumbered selfis thepossibilityofmembership in any
community boundbymoraltiesantecedentto choice;hecannotbelong
to any communitywhere the self itselfcould be at stake. Such a
community-callit constitutive as againstmerelycooperative-would
engagethe identityas well as the interestsof the participants, and so
implicateits membersin a citizenshipmore thoroughgoing than the
unencumbered selfcan know.
Forjusticeto be primary, then,wemustbe creaturesofa certainkind,
relatedto humancircumstance in a certainway.We muststandto our
circumstancealways at a certaindistance,whetheras transcendental
subjectin the case of Kant, or as unencumberedselvesin thecase of
Rawls. Only in thisway can we view ourselvesas subjectsas well as
objectsofexperience,as agentsand notjust instruments ofthepurposes
we pursue.
The unencumbered selfand theethicitinspires,takentogether, hold
outa liberating vision.Freedfromthedicatesofnatureand thesanction
of social roles,thehumansubjectis installedas sovereign,cast as the
authorof the onlymoralmeaningsthereare. As participantsin pure
practicalreason,or as partiesto the originalposition,we are freeto
constructprinciplesof justice unconstrainedby an order of value
antecedentlygiven. And as actual, individualselves,we are freeto
choose our purposesand endsunboundbysuchan order,or bycustom
or traditionor inheritedstatus.So long as theyare not unjust,our
conceptionsofthegood carryweight,whatever theyare,simplyinvirtue
of our havingchosenthem.We are,in Rawls' words,"self-originating
sourcesof valid claims.""5
This is an exhilaratingpromise,and the liberalismit animatesis
perhaps the fullestexpressionof the Enlightenment's quest for the
self-definingsubject.Butis ittrue?Can we makesenseofourmoraland
politicallifebythelightoftheself-image itrequires?I do notthinkwe
can, and I willtryto show whynot by arguingfirstwithintheliberal
project,thenbeyondit.

JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY

We havefocusedso faron thefoundationsoftheliberalvision,on the

way it derivestheprinciplesit defends.Let us turnbrieflynow to the

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88 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

substanceofthoseprinciples,usingRawls as our example.Sparingall

butessentialsonceagain,Rawls'twoprinciplesofjusticearethese:first,
equal basic libertiesforall, and second,onlythosesocial and economic
inequalitiesthatbenefitthe least-advantaged membersof society(the
difference principle).
In arguingfortheseprinciples,Rawls arguesagainsttwo familiar
alternatives-utilitarianism and libertarianism.He arguesagainstutili-
tarianism that it fails to take seriously the distinctionbetween
persons.In seekingto maximizethe generalwelfare,the utilitarian
treatssocietyas wholeas ifitwerea singleperson;itconflatesourmany,
diversedesiresintoa singlesystemofdesires,and triesto maximize.It is
indifferent to the distribution of satisfactionsamong persons,except
insofaras thismayaffecttheoverallsum. But thisfailsto respectour
pluralityand distinctness. It uses someas meansto thehappinessofall,
and so failsto respecteach as an end in himself.Whileutilitarians may
sometimesdefendindividualrights,theirdefensemust rest on the
calculationthatrespecting thoserightswillserveutilityin thelongrun.
But thiscalculationis contingentand uncertain.So long as utilityis
what Mill said it is, "the ultimateappeal on all ethicalquestions,"''6
individualrightscan neverbe secure.To avoid thedangerthattheirlife
prospectsmightone daybe sacrificedforthegreatergood ofothers,the
partiesto theoriginalpositiontherefore insiston certainbasic liberties
forall, and makethoselibertiesprior.
If utilitariansfail to take seriouslythe distinctnessof persons,
libertariansgo wrongby failingto acknowledgethe arbitrariness of
fortune.They defineas just whateverdistributionresultsfroman
efficientmarketeconomy,and oppose all redistribution on thegrounds
thatpeopleareentitledto whatevertheyget,so longas theydo notcheat
or steal or otherwiseviolate someone's rightsin gettingit. Rawls
opposesthisprincipleon thegroundthatthedistribution oftalentsand
assetsand even efforts by whichsome get moreand othersget less is
arbitraryfroma moral point of view, a matterof good luck. To
distributethegood thingsinlifeon thebasisofthesedifferences is notto
do justice, but simplyto carryover into human arrangements the
arbitrariness of social and naturalcontingency. We deserve,as indivi-
duals, neitherthetalentsour good fortunemayhave brought,northe
benefitsthatflowfromthem.We shouldtherefore regardthesetalents
as commonassets,and regardone anotheras commonbeneficiaries of

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 Sandel / THE UNENCUMBERED SELF 89

the rewardstheybring."Those who have been favoredby nature,

whoevertheyare,maygainfromtheirgood fortuneonlyon termsthat
improvethesituationofthosewhohavelostout... Injusticeas fairness,
menagreeto shareone another'sfate."17
Thisis thereasoningthatleads to thedifference principle.Noticehow
it reveals,in yetanotherguise,the logic of the unencumberedself.I
cannot be said to deservethe benefitsthat flow from,say, my fine
physiqueand good looks,becausetheyareonlyaccidental,notessential
factsaboutme.Theydescribeattributes I have, notthepersonI am,and
so cannotgiveriseto a claimofdesert.Beingan unencumbered self,this
is trueofeverything aboutme.Andso I cannot,as an individual,deserve
anythingat all.
Howeverjarringto our ordinaryunderstandings thisargumentmay
be, thepictureso farremainsintact;thepriority of right,thedenialof
desert,and theunencumbered selfall hangimpressively together.
But the difference principlerequiresmore,and it is herethatthe
argumentcomes undone. The differenceprinciplebegins with the
thought,congenialto theunencumbered self,thattheassetsI have are
only accidentallymine.But it ends by assumingthattheseassets are
therefore commonassetsand thatsocietyhas a priorclaimon thefruits
of theirexercise. But this assumptionis withoutwarrant.Simply
because I, as an individual,do nothave a privilegedclaimon theassets
accidentallyresiding"here,"it does not followthat everyonein the
world collectivelydoes. For thereis no reason to thinkthat their
locationin society'sprovinceor,forthatmatter,withintheprovinceof
humankind, is anylessarbitraryfroma moralpointofview.Andiftheir
arbitrariness withinme makesthemineligibleto servemyends,there
seemsno obviousreasonwhytheirarbitrariness withinanypartiuclar
societyshould not make themineligibleto servethatsociety'sends as
well.
To put the point anotherway, the difference principle,like utili-
tarianism,is a principleof sharing.As such,it mustpresupposesome
priormoraltie amongthosewhose assetsit would deployand whose
efforts it wouldenlistin a commonendeavor.Otherwise,it is simplya
formulafor using some as means to others ends, a formulathis
liberalismis committed to reject.
Buton thecooperativevisionofcommunity alone,itis unclearwhat
the moral basis for this sharingcould be. Short of the constitutive

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90 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

conception,deployingan individual'sassetsforthesake ofthecommon

good would seeman offenseagainstthe"pluralityand distinctness" of
individualsthisliberalismseeksabove all to secure.
If those whose fate I am requiredto share really are, morally
speaking,others,ratherthanfellowparticipantsin a way of lifewith
whichmyidentityis bound, the difference principlefallspreyto the
same objectionsas utilitarianism.Its claimon me is nottheclaimof a
constitutivecommunity whose attachments I acknowledge,but rather
theclaimofa concatenatedcollectivity whoseentanglements I confront.
Whatthedifference principlerequires,but cannotprovide,is some
way of identifying thoseamong whomthe assets I bear are properly
regarded as common, some way of seeing ourselves as mutually
indebtedand morallyengagedto beginwith.But as we have seen,the
constitutiveaims and attachmentsthat would save and situatethe
differenceprincipleare preciselytheones deniedto theliberalself;the
moral encumbrancesand antecedentobligationstheyimplywould
undercutthepriority ofright.
What,then,ofthoseencumbrances? The pointso faris thatwecannot
be personsforwhomjusticeis primary,and also be personsforwhom
the difference principleis a principleofjustice. But whichmustgive
way?Can we viewourselvesas independentselves,independent in the
sensethatour identity is nevertiedto our aims and attachments?
I do notthinkwe can, at leastnotwithoutcostto thoseloyaltiesand
convictionswhosemoralforceconsistspartlyin thefactthatlivingby
them is inseparablefromunderstandingourselvesas the particular
personswe are-as membersofthisfamilyor community or nationor
people,as bearersofthathistory, as citizensofthisrepublic.Allegiances
such as theseare morethanvalues I happento have,and to hold,at a
certaindistance.Theygo beyondtheobligationsI voluntarily incurand
the"naturalduties"I owe to humanbeingsas such.Theyallow thatto
some I owe morethanjusticerequiresor evenpermits, notbyreasonof
agreementsI have made but insteadin virtueof those more or less
enduringattachmentsand commitments that,taken together,partly
definethepersonI am.
To imaginea personincapable of constitutive attachments such as
theseis notto conceivean ideallyfreeand rationalagent,butto imagine
a personwhollywithoutcharacter,withoutmoraldepth.For to have
characteris to know that I move in a historyI neithersummonnor
command,whichcarriesconsequencesnonethelessformychoicesand
conduct.It drawsme closerto some and moredistantfromothers;it

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 Sandel / THE UNENCUMBERED SELF 91

makessomeaimsmoreappropriate,otherslessso. As a self-interpreting
being,I am able to reflecton myhistoryand in thissenseto distance
myself fromit,butthedistanceis alwaysprecariousand provisional,the
pointofreflectionneverfinallysecuredoutsidethehistory itself.Butthe
liberalethicputs the selfbeyondthe reach of its experience,beyond
deliberationand reflection.Denied theexpansiveself-understandings
thatcould shape a commonlife,theliberalselfis leftto lurchbetween
detachmenton theone hand, and entanglement on theother.Such is
thefateof theunencumbered self,and itsliberatingpromise.

THE PROCEDURAL REPUBLIC

Butbeforemycase can be complete,I needto considerone powerful

reply.Whileitcomesfroma liberaldirection,itsspiritis morepractical
thanphilosophical.It says,inshort,thatI am askingtoo much.It is one
thingto seek constitutiveattachmentsin our privatelives; among
familiesand friends,and certaintightlyknitgroups,theremay be
founda commongood thatmakesjusticeand rightsless pressing.But
withpubliclife-at leasttoday,and probablyalways-it is different. So
longas thenation-state is theprimary formofpoliticalassociation,talk
of constitutive community too easilysuggestsa darkerpoliticsrather
thana brighter one; amidechoes ofthemoralmajority,thepriority of
right,forall itsphilosophicalfaults,stillseemsthesaferhope.
This is a challengingrejoinder,and no account of politicalcom-
munityin the twentiethcenturycan fail to take it seriously.It is
challengingnotleastbecauseitcalls intoquestionthestatusofpolitical
philosophyand itsrelationto theworld.For ifmyargument is correct,
if
theliberalvisionwe have consideredis not morallyself-sufficient but
parasiticon a notionofcommunity it officially
rejects,thenwe should
expectto findthatthepoliticalpracticethatembodiesthisvisionis not
practicallyself-sufficient either-that it must draw on a sense of
community itcannotsupplyand mayevenundermine.Butis thatso far
fromthe circumstancewe face today?Could it be that throughthe
originalpositiondarkly,on thefarsideoftheveilofignorance,we may
glimpse an intimationof our predicament,a refractedvision of
ourselves?
How does theliberalvision-and itsfailure-help us makesenseof
our publiclifeand its predicament? Consider,to begin,thefollowing

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92 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

paradox in thecitizen'srelationto themodernwelfarestate.In many

ways,we inthe1980sstandnearthecompletionofa liberalprojectthat
has runitscoursefromtheNew Deal throughtheGreatSocietyand into
thepresent.But notwithstanding theextensionofthefranchiseand the
expansionon individualrightsand entitlements inrecentdecades,there
is a widespreadsensethat,individually and collectively, ourcontrolover
theforcesthatgovernour livesis recedingratherthanincreasing.This
senseis deepenedbywhatappear simultaneously as thepowerand the
powerlessnessof the nation-state.One the one hand, increasing
numbersofcitizensviewthestateas an overlyintrusive presence,more
likelyto frustratetheirpurposesthanadvancethem.Andyet,despiteits
unprecedented roleintheeconomyand society,themodernstateseems
itselfdisempowered,unable effectively to controlthe domesticeco-
nomy,to respondto persisting social ills,or to workAmerica'swillin
theworld.
This is a paradox that has fed the appeals of recentpoliticians
(includingCarterand Reagan),evenas ithas frustrated theirattemptsto
govern.To sortitout,we needto identify thepublicphilosophyimplicit
in our politicalpractice,and to reconstruct itsarrival.We needto trace
the adventof the proceduralrepublic,by whichI mean a public life
animatedbytheliberalvisionand self-image we'veconsidered.
The storyof theproceduralrepublicgoes back in some waysto the
foundingoftherepublic,butis centraldramabeginsto unfoldaround
theturnof thecentury.As nationalmarketsand large-scaleenterprise
displaceda decentralized economy,thedecentralized politicalformsof
the early republicbecame outmoded as well. If democracywas to
survive,theconcentration ofeconomicpowerwouldhaveto be metbya
similarconcentrationof politicalpower.But the Progressivesunder-
stood,orsomeofthemdid,thatthesuccessofdemocracyrequiredmore
than the centralizationof government; it also requiredthe national-
izationofpolitics.The primary formofpoliticalcommunity had to be a
recast on a national scale. For HerbertCroly,writingin 1909, the
"nationalizingofAmericanpolitical,economic,and sociallife"was "an
essentiallyformativeand enlightening politicaltransformation." We
would become more of a democracyonly as we became "more of a
nation . . . in ideas, in institutions,and in spirit."'9
This nationalizingprojectwouldbe consummatedin theNew Deal,
butforthedemocratictraditionin America,theembraceofthenation
was a decisivedeparture.FromJeffersonto thepopulists,thepartyof
democracyinAmericanpoliticaldebatehad been,roughlyspeaking,the

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 Sandel / THE UNENCUMBERED SELF 93

partyoftheprovinces,ofdecentralized power,ofsmall-town and small-

scale America.And againstthemhad stood thepartyof thenation-
firstFederalists,thenWhigs,thentheRepublicansofLincoln-a party
thatspoke fortheconsolidationof theunion. It was thusthehistoric
achievementof the New Deal to unite,in a singlepartyand political
program,what Samuel Beer has called "liberalismand the national
idea."20
What mattersfor our purpose is that, in the twentiethcentury,
liberalismmade its peace withconcentratedpower.But it was under-
stood at thestartthatthetermsofthispeace requireda strongsenseof
nationalcommunity, morallyand politicallyto underwritetheextend-
ed involvements of a modernindustrialorder.If a virtuousrepublicof
small-scale,democraticcommunitieswas no longer a possibility,a
nationalrepublicseemeddemocracy'snextbesthope. This was still,in
principleat least,a politicsofthecommongood. It lookedto thenation,
not as a neutralframework forthe play of competinginterests,but
ratheras a formativecommunity, concernedto shape a commonlife
suitedto thescale of modernsocial and economicforms.
But this projectfailed. By the mid-or late twentieth century,the
for
nationalrepublichad runitscourse.Except extraordinary moments,
suchas war,thenationprovedtoo vasta scale acrosswhichto cultivate
the sharedself-understandings necessaryto community in theforma-
tive,or constitutive sense.And so thegradualshift,in ourpracticesand
institutions,froma publicphilosophyof commonpurposesto one of
fairprocedures,froma politicsof good to a politicsof right,fromthe
nationalrepublicto theproceduralrepublic.

OUR PRESENT PREDICAMENT

A fullaccount of thistransitionwould take a detailedlook at the

changingshape of politicalinstitutions,
constitutionalinterpretation,
and thetermsofpoliticaldiscoursein thebroadestsense.ButI suspect
we would findin thepractice of the proceduralrepublictwo broad
tendenciesforeshadowedby its philosophy:first,a tendencyto crowd
out democraticpossibilities;
second,a tendencyto undercutthekindof
community on whichit nonthelessdepends.
Wherelibertyin theearlyrepublicwas understoodas a functionof
democraticinstitutions
and dispersedpower,2'libertyintheprocedural

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94 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

republicis definedin opposition to democracy,as an individual's

guaranteeagainstwhatthemajoritymightwill.I am freeinsofaras I am
thebearerofrights,whererightsare trumps.22 Unlikethelibertyofthe
early republic,the modernversionpermits-in fact even requires-
concentratedpower. This has to do withthe universalizinglogic of
rights.Insofaras I have a right,whetherto freespeechor a minimum
income,itsprovisioncannotbe leftto thevagariesoflocal preferences
but must be assured at the most comprehensivelevel of political
association. It cannot be one thingin New York and anotherin
Alabama. As rightsand entitlements expand, politics is therefore
displacedfromsmallerformsof associationand relocatedat themost
universalform-in ourcase,thenation.Andevenas politicsflowsto the
nation, power shiftsaway from democraticinstitutions(such as
legislaturesand politicalparties)and towardinstitutions designedto be
insulatedfromdemocraticpressures,and hence betterequipped to
dispense and defend individual rights(notably the judiciary and
bureaucracy).
Theseinstitutional developments maybeginto accountforthesense
ofpowerlessness thatthewelfarestatefailsto addressand insomeways
doubtlessdeepens.But it seemsto me a further clue to our condition
recallsevenmoredirectlythepredicament oftheunencumbered self-
lurching,as we leftit, betweendetachmenton the one hand, the
entanglement on theother.For itis a strikingfeatureofthewelfarestate
thatit offersa powerfulpromiseofindividualrights, and also demands
ofitscitizensa highmeasureofmutualengagement. Buttheself-image
thatattendstherightscannotsustaintheengagement.
As bearersofrights, whererightsaretrumps,wethinkofourselvesas
freelychoosing,individualselves,unboundbyobligationsantecedent to
rights,or to the agreementswe make. And yet, as citizensof the
proceduralrepublicthatsecurestheserights,we findourselvesimpli-
catedwilly-nillyin a formidablearrayofdependenciesand expectations
we did notchoose and increasingly reject.
In our public life,we are more entangled,but less attached,than
everbefore.It is as thoughtheunencumbered selfpresupposedby the
liberalethichad begunto cometrue-less liberatedthandisempowered,
entangledin a networkof obligationsand involvements unassociated
withany act of will,and yetunmediatedby those commonidentifi-
cationsorexpansiveself-definitions thatwouldmakethemtolerable.As
the scale of social and political organization has become more
comprehensive, thetermsof our collectiveidentityhave becomemore

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 Sandel / THE UNENCUMBERED SELF 95

fragmented, and the formsof politicallifehave outrunthe common

purposeneededto sustainthem.
Somethinglikethis,itseemsto me,has beenunfolding inAmericafor
thepast half-centuryor so. I hope I havesaid at leastenoughto suggest
the shape a fullerstorymighttake. And I hope in any case to have
conveyeda certainviewabout politicsand philosophyand therelation
between them-that our practices and institutionsare themselves
embodimentsoftheory,and to unraveltheirpredicament is, at leastin
part,to seek aftertheself-image of theage.

NOTES

1. An excellentexampleofthisviewcan be foundin Samuel Huntington, American

Politics:The Promiseof Disharmony(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press,1981).See
especiallyhis discussionof the"ideals versusinstitutions"
gap, pp. 10-12,39-41,61-84,
221-262.
2. See, forexample,theconceptionsofa "practice"advancedbyAlasdairMaclntyre
and CharlesTaylor. Maclntyre,AfterVirtue(Notre Dame: University of NotreDame
Press, 1981),pp. 175-209.Taylor,"Interpretation and theSciencesof Man," Reviewof
Metaphysics25, (1971) pp. 3-51.
3. John Rawls, A Theoryof Justice.(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1971).
ImmanuelKant, Groundworkof theMetaphysicsof Morals,trans.H. J. Paton. (1785;
New York: Harperand Row, 1956).Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,trans.NormanKemp
Smith(1781,1787;London: Macmillan,1929).Kant,CritiqueofPracticalReason,trans.
L. W. Beck (1788; Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1956). Kant,"On theCommonSaying:
'This May Be True in Theory,But It Does Not Applyin Practice,'"in Hans Reiss,ed.,
Kant's Political Writings. (1793; Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1970).Other
recentversionsoftheclaimforthepriority oftherightovergood can be foundin Robert
Nozick,Anarchy,State and Utopia(New York: Basic Books, 1974); Ronald Dworkin,
TakingRightsSeriously(London: Duckworth,1977);BruceAckerman,Social Justicein
theLiberalState (New Haven: Yale University Press,1980).
4. Thissection,and thetwothatfollow,summarizearguments developedmorefully
in Michael Sandel, Liberalismand the Limits of Justice(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press,1982).
5. Rawls (1971), p. 3.
6. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism,in The Utilitarians(1893; Garden City:
Doubleday, 1973), p. 465. Mill, On Liberty,in The Utilitarians,p. 485 (Originally
published1849).
7. Kant (1793), p. 73.
8. Kant (1785), p. 92.
9. Kant (1788), p. 89.
10. Kant (1785), p. 105.
11. Kant (1788), p. 89.

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96 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

12. Kant (1785), p. 121.

13. Rawls, "The Basic Structureas Subject," AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly
(1977), p. 165.
14. Rawls (1971), p. 560.
15. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,"Journalof Philosophy77
(1980), p. 543.
16. Mill (1849), p. 485.
17. Rawls (1971), pp. 101-102.
18. The account that followsis a tentativeformulationof themesrequiringmore
detailedelaborationand support.
19. Croly, The Promiseof AmericanLife (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,1965),pp.
270-273.
20. Beer,"Liberalismand the National Idea," The Public Interest,Fall (1966), pp.
70-82.
21. See, forexample,LaurenceTribe,AmericanConstitutional Law (Mineola: The
FoundationPress,1978),pp. 2-3.
22. See Ronald Dworkin,"Liberalism,"in StuartHampshire,ed., Publicand Private
Morality(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1978),p. 136.

MichaelJ.SandelisAssociateProfessorofGovernment at HarvardUniversity.
He
is theauthorof Liberalismand theLimitsof Justice.

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