ALITA VS COURT OF APPEALS

The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead

patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27. The question
certainly calls for a negative answer. We agree with the petitioners in
saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they
till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated
pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such
contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the
enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
"The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of
the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build
a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for
subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the
citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence
is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain
degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks
after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard
the satisfaction of this vital right.
LBP VS CA & YAP
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in cash
or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include
a trust account among the valid modes of deposit, that should have
been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared
from which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed. In
sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term deposit.

In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to
enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9.
There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of
the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore
discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must
be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. In the same vein, petitioners
cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these
implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.
Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down
Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

NATALIA REALTY VS DAR

Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is
referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land." (Sec. 3 (c), R.A. 6657) The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation.

"Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable
agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands. Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are
outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted
to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government
agencies other than respondent DAR.

The Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of

Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion that lands covered by Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part,
having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as human
settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed
'agricultural lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A.
No. 6657." Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the
coverage of CARL.
DAR VS SUTTON
We find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including
them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum
retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the
1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,
all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The
Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-
raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and
poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise
is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures
and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders,
mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-
gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds,
deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenances.

The Department of Agrarian Reform has no power to regulate livestock

farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage
of agrarian reform.
LBP VS NATIVIDAD
There is nothing contradictory between the Department of Agrarian
Relations primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the
determination of just compensationprimary jurisdiction is vested in the
DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the
lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination
is subject to challenge before the courts.

The seizure of a landholding did not take place on the date of the
effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just
compensation, and where before the process is completed R.A. No. 6657
took effect, the just compensation should be determined and the process
concluded under the said law.

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based

on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs
failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with
RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering
that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being
real, substantial, full and ample. In this case, the trial court arrived at the
just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into
account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market
value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. This
Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount
of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and
guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS DARAB
We agree with the DARABs finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants.
Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al.,
pursuant to the livelihood program called Kilusang Sariling Sikap
Program, it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant
relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff
(participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the
harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU
collected was a nominal service fee and land use participants fee in
consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by
the CMU.

Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited

acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and
may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. In
view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven
to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.

Section 17 of Executive Order No. 129-A is merely a repetition of Section

50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try
and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP.
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 129-A is merely a repetition of Section
50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try
and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP.
DAR VS DECS
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are
exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their
exemption, viz: xxx xxx xxx c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used
and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, . . . , shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act. xxx xxx xxx Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows
that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be
actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary; and
2) the purpose is for school sites and campuses, including experimental
farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS CA
Neither the Local Government Code nor the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law requires a local government unit to secure approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform as a condition precedent to institute the
necessary expropriation proceedings. Local government units can
expropriate agricultural lands without prior authority from the
Department of Agrarian Reform as the determination of the public use of
the property subject for expropriation is considered an expression of
legislative policy.

The exclusive authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to

reclassify agricultural lands is limited to the applications for
reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries and
does not include the determination of the public purpose requirement
of the expropriating authority.
ROXAS & COMPANY INC VS DAMBA
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 merely recognized the potential
tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as
tourism zonesit did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.

A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically

allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of
conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform committed grave abuse of discretion

when he ignored the glaring inconsistencies in the certification submitted
early on by Roxas & Co. in support of its application vis--vis the
certifications it later submitted when the Department of Agrarian Reform
Secretary reopened DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97.