A Study of Barangay Little Baguio

Introduction to the Study

Security Issues before the Reforms in Patrol System

Barangay Little Baguio is one of San Juan, Manilas 21 barangays; it has an area of 43.7156 has (hectares)
and has a population of 5,484 according to the latest government census. When incumbent Barangay
Chairman Allen Christopher M. Silvano took over the reins of Barangay Little Baguio in December 2007,
the Barangays security, peace and order were plagued by alarming incidences of crime, non-alignment
with the Department of Interior and Local Governments advocacies, and symptoms of the Barangays
inadequate responsiveness to peace and order situations.

Due to the rampant thefts of cables, not only were Barangay residents inconvenienced by service
disruptions, even stricken companies like PLDT eventually voiced their grievances to the San Juan local
government unit. The series of cable thefts in Little Baguio contributed to the cumulative losses of
telecommunications companies which have amounted to P13.7 million from 2005 to August 2007,
according to the records of the National Telecommunications Commission. As of 2007, high-grade
copper from communication cables fetch around P25 to 40 per kilo in junkyards. But for
telecommunication firms, every meter of stolen cable is equivalent to a loss of P1,500 to P5,200. The
figures presented here do not even reflect the theft-related opportunity and indirect costs shouldered
by the residents and the business establishments.

The communitys water meters were also widely targeted because of their high-grade copper content.
The repercussions of water meter theft merit emphasis because unlike telecommunication cables, water
is an immediate household necessity. Although it may be expected that quick action would be taken
against the disruption of a resource as vital as water, the water meter thefts persisted throughout 2007.
The temerity of water meter thieves in Little Baguio hinted at the Metro Manila-wide vulnerability of
water meters to theft. This widespread vulnerability undoubtedly contributed to Manila Waters non-
revenue water (NRW) rate of 23.9 % in 2007. Although it is contentious to argue that the elimination of
water meter theft in Little Baguio could have a significant impact on Manila Waters reduction of non-
earning water output, it is arguable that like in the case of cable pilfering, Little Baguios rampant water
meter thefts in 2007 also had consequences beyond the convenience and security of the Barangay
territory. Efficiency in water distribution and profitability in Manila Waters investments were involved.

Furthermore, failure to deter water meter theft was tantamount to allowing the proliferation of criminal
activity not only in the confines of Little Baguio but also in the area of San Juan. Thieves and criminal
organizations are not bound by territory and can criss-cross different barangays depending on the
latters laxity of vigilance. Having congruent mandates and goals issuing from a cohesive set of values,
government units are expected to cooperate with each other. Responding inadequately to a problem
which spills-over to the concern-areas of other government units seems inconsistent to cooperative
governance. Perhaps what made the task more daunting and rendered efforts inadequate is the fact
that criminal organizations have been exploiting R.A. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006. In both cable and water meter thefts, many suspects were below 18 years old and were afforded
certain protection. For example, those 15 years old or under enjoy exemption from criminal liability.
Thus, they find it easier to escape the gaze of the law and return to their own devices and criminal
groups.

Aside from the complications of minors in conflict with law, the issue of violence against women and
children revealed another dent in Little Baguios security and order efforts during the previous barangay
council. As early as January 2005, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Liga ng mga
Barangay (LnB), the umbrella organization the countrys barangays, jointly spearheaded a nationwide
advocacy campaign on "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" otherwise known
as R.A. 9262. To give the barangay a crucial role in coordinated efforts and feedback mechanism at the
grassroots level, DILG launched programs to educate barangay officials on R.A. 9262. As early as 2005,
DILG and LnB clearly urged barangays to employ systematic and concrete measures to enforce R.A.
9262. This is ideally a part of any tanods training or knowledge, especially for patrol members.
However, Chairman Silvano attested that when he assumed office in December 2007, the Barangay was
not wholly aligned with the DILF security directive as evidenced by the absence of a Violence against
Women and Children (VAWC) Desk in the Barangay.

Furthermore, only six tanods used to patrol Little Baguios 43 sq.km territory. Most were on foot or on
bikes because of lack of equipment. Chairman Silvano expressly commented that by the time his term
started in late 2007, Little Baguios patrol manpower, training, and equipment needed improvement.

Statement of the Problem

A description of the cable and water meter thefts, failure to systematically include VAWC knowledge
among tanods, and a cursory presentation of the inadequacies in manpower, patrol training, and
equipment all portray the challenges that Chairman Silvanos reforms have sought to remedy. Succinctly
stated, this study is concerned with assessing the impact, effectiveness, and prospects of Barangay Little
Baguios reformed Patrol System as a response to the security and order issues of the community. As an
explicit guide for developing the case study, the problem statement involves two sets of variables the
first set of variables includes the innovations introduced by Chairman Silvanos reforms while the second
set of variables primarily includes the crime rates and crime types before and after the reforms. The
variables mentioned, like manpower, patrol training, and equipment will be organized according to our
conceptual framework.

A refinement of the research query entails three main thrusts: Firstly, this study includes a descriptive
presentation of the security and order conditions of Little Baguio before and after the patrol reforms.
Secondly, this study also attempts to provide an explanatory dimension to the relationships of the
variables gathered. Finally, the study draws from the relationships of the two sets of variables and
attempt to include a prescriptive aspect by forwarding recommendations on how to improve the patrol
system. The prescriptive aspects also consider the possible synergies of the patrol system with other
barangay initiatives that aim for community welfare.

A basic problem statement requires scrutiny into the following questions: Does a greater number of
patrol tanods decrease crime in the Barangay, and why? Does having more and better equipment,
training, for patrols lower crime rates in the Barangay? Does the creation of a special VAWC Desk have
any synergy to the patrol system in its efforts to reduce crime or does it have any impact on the
incidence and types of crime in the Barangay? What are the other relevant reforms of Chairman
Silvano? Did these reforms improve the security of the Barangay? What are the weaknesses and areas
for improvement?

Scope and Limitations

Though the aforementioned questions suggest the scope of the case study, they do not explicitly
mention the entire scenario captured by the data from the field work. Hence, the studys scope covers
some factors that are not directly attached to crime rates even if quantitative data on crime rates
indeed form an important part of the case study. Pedantic reliance on the quantitative data of crime
rates can mute the factors that seem remote to the oscillation of crime rates but are found by our
research (from field work, and through a review of literature) to have effects to the patrol system.
Guided by the conceptual framework that will be explained in the succeeding sections, seemingly non-
crime related factors like funding and community involvement are also tackled to the extent of their
relevance to Chairman Silvanos patrol reforms.

It must be reiterated that this study chiefly concerns itself with the reformed Barangay Little Baguios
patrol as a way to prevent crime and thereby contribute to community safety. The past patrol system
will only be discussed along its stark and meaningful differences with the reformed system; thus, this
study should not be expected to explore the complete circumstances which explain the performance of
the previous barangay councils patrol system. Furthermore, this study does not include the new
barangay councils other reforms which may be aimed at community safety but have no direct impact on
the patrol system.

Though the aforementioned questions suggest the scope of the case study, they do not explicitly
mention the entire scenario captured by the data from the field work. Hence, the studys scope covers
some factors that are not directly attached to crime rates even if quantitative data on crime rates
indeed form an important part of the case study. Pedantic reliance on the quantitative data of crime
rates can mute the factors that seem remote to the oscillation of crime rates but are found by our
research (from field work, and through a review of literature) to have effects to the patrol system.
Guided by the conceptual framework that will be explained in the succeeding sections, seemingly non-
crime related factors like funding and community involvement are also tackled to the extent of their
relevance to Chairman Silvanos patrol reforms.

It must be reiterated that this study chiefly concerns itself with the reformed Barangay Little Baguios
patrol as a way to prevent crime and thereby contribute to community safety. The past patrol system
will only be discussed along its stark and meaningful differences with the reformed system; thus, this
study should not be expected to explore the complete circumstances which explain the performance of
the previous barangay councils patrol system. Furthermore, this study does not include the new
barangay councils other reforms which may be aimed at community safety but have no direct impact on
the patrol system.

Hypothesis

Based on the review of related literature and preliminary assessment of the Barangay Little Baguio, we
forward three hypotheses.

Firstly, mere presence or establishment of a patrol system is not enough to see noticeable crime
prevention.

Secondly, leadership, funding, manpower-training, equipment and stake-holder consultation allow

barangay-level patrols to prevent and reduce crime.

Lastly, after achieving improved crime prevention, a reformed barangay-level patrol, is likely to have
diminishing effectiveness because sustainability issues may arise and/or offenders find ways to
circumvent the patrol system. A patrol effort is not passive and must be subjected to continuous
assessment.
Organization of the Study

The case study is divided into four main parts: introduction, data, analysis and recommendations, and
conclusion. The preceding part will focus on the gathered data. The first section will present a more
detailed description of Barangay Little Baguio including the pertinent history and demographics. The
exact pre-reform crime rates, crime-type prevalence, and pertinent supplementary information are
presented. The past Barangay councils responses to these crime rates are then mentioned. Afterwards,
the implementation of reforms in the patrol system, the initiatives for reform, organization, financing,
patrol recruitment, patrol training, equipment, and notable activities are discussed in detail. Imbedded
in the discussion are the crucial differences between the current reforms and the previous responses of
the past Barangay Council. The latter section of the succeeding Part will compare the crime rates and
crime-type prevalence during the implementation of the reformed patrol system.

The third part is devoted to the analysis of data. The efficacy of the patrol reforms will be partially
scrutinized in light of the relationships between the two sets of variables. Reasons for success or failure
will be explained as well as other factors that might have also influenced the relationships. As always,
the conceptual framework will be applied where useful. Recommendations to improve the patrol system
will then be outlined. Possibilities, vulnerabilities, and predictions gleaned from the literature are also
enumerated to aid stakeholders in gearing the patrol system for the challenges ahead.

Relationships and insights which have compelling evidences will be highlighted as possible hypotheses
with wider generalizability and applicability to other barangays. However, caveats about Little Baguios
particularities will be forwarded as reasons to be cautious in implying generalizability.
Objectives of the Study

This case study is designed to establish the relationships between the two sets of variables without
ignoring other factors which have impact on the Barangay Patrol system. In doing so, this case study
aspires to provide the Barangay and its various stake holders a fresh comprehensive, systematic
description of the crime situation and the efforts to address the crime situation in the barangay through
the barangay patrol. The case study details the evolution of patrolling in the barangay, the causes, the
process, maintenance, financing, effectiveness, and weaknesses of the patrol.

An informative and instructive presentation of key findings in the form of simple but visually-appealing
graphs and tables are to be disseminated to communicate the progress and setbacks of patrolling
practices in Barangay Little Baguio. With the cooperation of Barangay officials, these informative
materials can be posted in conspicuous places in the Barangay Little Baguio. The case study will be
presented to the Barangay not only as recommendations for improvement but also as a documentation
of their recent history.

Ultimately, this case studys objective is to help community leaders increase the effectiveness of patrol
practices in maintaining security due to the officials better knowledge of best practices and the publics
awareness of the community safety efforts.

This case study is designed to establish the relationships between the two sets of variables without
ignoring other factors which have impact on the Barangay Patrol system. In doing so, this case study
aspires to provide the Barangay and its various stake holders a fresh comprehensive, systematic
description of the crime situation and the efforts to address the crime situation in the barangay through
the barangay patrol. The case study details the evolution of patrolling in the barangay, the causes, the
process, maintenance, financing, effectiveness, and weaknesses of the patrol.

An informative and instructive presentation of key findings in the form of simple but visually-appealing
graphs and tables are to be disseminated to communicate the progress and setbacks of patrolling
practices in Barangay Little Baguio. With the cooperation of Barangay officials, these informative
materials can be posted in conspicuous places in the Barangay Little Baguio. The case study will be
presented to the Barangay not only as recommendations for improvement but also as a documentation
of their recent history.
Ultimately, this case studys objective is to help community leaders increase the effectiveness of patrol
practices in maintaining security due to the officials better knowledge of best practices and the publics
awareness of the community safety efforts.

Review of Related Literature

A review of widely published literature engaged in active and long-standing study in community safety
led us to foreign scholarly works, especially to those in the United Kingdom. The UK has long
decentralized their community safety platform to more local levels and this is similar with our own Local
Government Code of 1991. The UKs exemplary sophistication in community safety research, their
prodigious output, vigorous scholarly collisions, and the prominence of community safety research in
the UK may be attributed to the formal, published, occasionally state-commissioned research tradition
which was already energetic even in the early 80s. Unlike in the UK, there seems to be no heated
crucible of peer critiquing, theory contestation and refinement in the Philippiness community safety
research hence, we did not find readily available, published output. Fortunately, we found out that it is
not uncommon for UK output in this area to be exported to other countries. In fact, the Australian
Governments Institute of Criminology and Latin American countries like Mexico benefit from British
scholarly works like Paul Ekbloms conjunction of criminal opportunity (CCO). These prove that leading
works from the UK tradition have reputed applicability in other contexts worldwide. Furthermore, the
wide acceptance of their most influential works gives credibility to an attempt to borrow their output for
community safety research in the Philippines such as this inquiry into a local patrol system.

It is convenient to assume that a patrol system is immediately aimed at community safety. But Paul
Wiles and Ken Pease caution that community safety is a multi-pronged effort towards the minimization
of the number and seriousness of harm in the community; not only crime, but also accidents,
serendipitous misfortunes, social volatility, health risks, environmental undesirables, among others,
constitute harm. Conversely, they argue that crime prevention and/or crime reduction is just one of
many avenues to community safety.

It is indeed plausible that a conceptual framework which directly subordinates patrol system to
community safety may erroneously connote that crime-centered initiatives like patrol systems are the
main avenue to community safety. Furthermore, directly subordinating patrol system to community
safety exposes an undeniable conceptual gap. Here, the utility of Wiles and Peases argument becomes
evident: a patrol system is not a direct subordinate to community safety. It can be viewed instead as a
strategy of crime prevention, and in turn, crime prevention is an element of community safety.
To avoid the muddled analysis which the literature warns against, the definitions of crime prevention
and its distinction from crime reduction deserve mention here. Ekbloms body of work behind CCO
helpfully defines crime reduction as a present and future-oriented effort to reduce the number of
crime and disorder events and the seriousness of their consequences, by intervening directly in the
events and in their causes. This can be distinguished from crime prevention which is the future-
oriented efforts to reduce the risk of occurrence and the potential seriousness of crime and disorder
events, by intervening in the causes. Crime reduction deals with chronic conditions and even seeks to
intervene in an event as it happens (present and future-oriented). In practice, there is little crime
reduction efforts which dont have preventive aspects. Similarly, successful crime prevention primarily
seeks to pre-empt crime (future-oriented) and thus reduce the incidence of crime. Ekblom explicitly
labels patrolling as a crime prevention effort.

Paul Ekbloms framework of conjunction of criminal opportunity, one of the most widely-applied
community safety concepts inside and outside Europe, is naturally an important work that cannot be
missed. His framework is an integration of both the situation-related and offender-related causes which
all conjunct into a crime or disorder event. The framework enumerates 11 pre-cursors of crime and also
identifies interventions for each. The literature also enumerates factors which have been observed as
central to practical success. According to Ekblom, capacity building-level is crucial and must be
buttressed through technical know-how, equipment, money, leadership skills, access to crime
preventers, among many others. Alternatively, Leslie Silverlock and Julia Staffords work provides a more
parsimonious prescription that funding, standards, training and partnership increase chances of success.

Interestingly, Stafford and Silverlocks claim of the importance of partnership resonates with other
studies. Scott Ballintyne and Penny Fraser provide an evidence-based assertion that consultation and
dialogue with stakeholders increase the effectiveness of efforts at community safety.

This section only tackled literature directly related to the construction of this case studys conceptual
framework. Other pertinent literature we surveyed will be introduced as needed.
Conceptual Framework

This paper takes advantage of CCOs utility at arranging the complex community safety scenario into a
robust, clear, and reputable basis for analysis. The resulting conceptual framework (please refer to the
Figure 2 for a visual representation) also selectively borrows from Silverlock and Staffords, and
Ballintyne and Frasers insights. Insights were selected based on their usefulness to the context of a
grass-root patrol system like that of Barangay Little Baguios. The output of UK researchers clearly
needed to be sifted because they are based on different circumstances. For example, UKs flagship
Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 and the Safer Cities Program involved greater formal, mandatory
collaboration between national and local units, and far greater mobilization in the private, business, and
even industrial sectors. Their efforts towards crime prevention even included forays into the overhauling
of urban planning, utilization of hi-tech security platforms, demands on industries to change designs of
cars and construction materials, review of cultural relations, among others many of these are naturally
reflected in their research endeavors. Clearly, a tight discussion of Little Baguios Patrol system will
exclude factors that are absent in a Filipino barangays reality.

Of the 11 precursors to crime enumerated in the CCO, five are situationrelated while the six are
offender-related. We focus on only one situation-related precursor which is the Absence of Crime
Preventers. Ekblom identifies patrolling as a crime prevention strategy to intervene with the Absence of
Crime Preventers.

The patrols practical success is anchored on a combination of factors forwarded by Ekblom, and
Silverlock and Stafford, and Ballintyne and Fraser with a partiality towards the more parsimonious work
of Silverlock and Stafford. The five success factors are Leadership, Funding, Equipment, Manpower and
Training, and Consultation. We include Ekbloms leadership because none of Silverlock and Staffords
success factors seems to account for leadership. We believe that Ekbloms technical know-how is
included in manpower-training. We put under one category manpower and training because they are
complements; sheer manpower will not be effective without training, while training implies that there is
manpower to be subjected to training. Ekbloms reference to money is similar to Silverlock and
Staffords broader term of funding, hence funding is used. The other success factors prescribed by the
reviewed literature like infrastructure networks are omitted because they are remote to the realities
of a barangay-level patrol system. Instead of using Silver and Staffords partnership as another success
factor, we replace it with Ballintyne and Frasers consultation. Partnership involves more of multi-
agency and industry-community linkages while consultation is more effective in connoting community
involvement.
As mentioned in the Scope and Limitation, some of the factors discussed in the Conceptual Framework
like consultation cannot be conveyed through the quantitative data we gathered through field work.
But they are still crucial to understand the workings of a barangay-level patrol system.

Another important point in our conceptual framework is how a patrol system has two connections to
community safety. First is at the practical level while the other is for conceptual clarity. Firstly, a patrol
system is a practice-oriented intervention to the Absence of Crime Preventers precursor of crime;
successful obstruction of this precursor contributes positively to Community safety.

The second connection of patrol to community safety shows the proper conceptual view of a patrol
according to the internationally-acknowledged nomenclature popularized by Wiles and Pease: patrol is a
kind of crime prevention while in turn, crime prevention contributes to community safety but is not
equivalent to community safety. We include this conceptual clarification to align our case study to the
internationally-acknowledged nomenclature in community safety research. Furthermore, a clear view of
the place of patrol in the greater scheme of community safety forestalls any misconception about
definition of terms and organization of concepts. This is also a reiteration to policy makers and
stakeholders that a patrol system is just one of many other initiatives towards community safety.
Assesment of the Hypothesis

Firstly, mere presence or establishment of a patrol system is not enough to see noticeable crime
prevention, During the mid-90s, Little Baguio was voted as one of San Juans most peaceful barangayas
but the years leading to 2007 saw a rise in crimes. Indeed, mere presence is not enough to effect
oticeable crime prevention.

Secondly, leadership, funding, manpower-training, equipment and stake-holder consultation allow

barangay-level patrols to prevent and reduce crime. The inclusion of these variables in before mid 2008
noticeably changed the crime rates. The data does not reject this hypothesis but does not offer
comprehensive results. The analysis has suggested the links between these variables and their effects on
crime. At this point, there is sufficient reason to believe that in the Philippines context, these five
success variables have a palpable effect on crime prevention just like the claims of the literature.
However, a more satisifying elucidation will require data on crime rates of more years.

Lastly, after achieving improved crime prevention, a reformed barangay-level patrol, is likely to have
diminishing effectiveness because sustainability issues may arise and/or offenders find ways to
circumvent the patrol system. A patrol effort is not passive and must be subjected to continuous
assessment. Again the success in the mid-90s and the spike of crimes in the years leading to 2007
confirm that there is a possibility for a reversal. The causes of these reversals are multitude. And if ever
the current promising patrol reforms bloom into a period of security similar to the mid-90s, the causes
of the reformed patrols reversal into ineffectiveness remain to be seen if ever such a reversal will
occur notwithstanding the literature and this case studys agreement that it is likely to occur. The
following section gives an account of the literatures analysis on these prospects.

Warnings: Future Vulnerabilities, Anticipated Possibilities

The vibrant community safety literature we have surveyed reveal empirically-compelling findings and
documented cases about probable vulnerabilities, and anticipated possibilities usually encountered by
crime prevention efforts like patrol systems that have already attained a level of success. While the
previous sections give recommendations on how to improve the five identified success-factors of a
barangay-level patrol system, this section tackles the probable predicaments the barangay will face
when it is already around a certain level of success. Discussing these warnings is crucial in helping the
stakeholders increase the patrol systems anticipatory capacity, policy flexibility, and awareness of its
horizons. Clearly, we stand to learn from the experiences distilled in the literature to better maneuver
from known faulty policies, and ignorance.
Crime displacement.

Perhaps the most immediately relevant waning to the patrol system is the issue of crime displacement,
which is the alleged tendency of prevented crime to move to other locales. For many years, countries
which have had started earlier in decentralizing crime prevention were embroiled in the crime
displacement debate. The critics of crime prevention and community safety allege that efforts to curb
crime do not result to net gains for society because the spatial displacement of the perpetrators of
crime offset any crime prevention gains. Furthermore, proponents of crime displacement, argue that the
resources poured into crime prevention and the associated opportunity costs all go to waste. In the
context of Little Baguio, the criminals discouraged by the higher risks may only transfer to the less
prepared communities bordering Little Baguio along Santolan Rd., P. Guevarra Street and Wilson Street,
or even miles away from Little Baguio. Unfortunately, crime displacement is an intuitively plausible
argument.

Furthermore, crime prevention efforts like patrol system largely affect the situation-side and not the
offender-side, thus, the pool of willing criminals are not directly thwarted. In many instances, the crime
displacement argument has encouraged inaction and passivity. Furthermore, areas which do not have
the resources to buttress their crime prevention efforts resent it when criminals are displaces to their
territory due to the successful crime prevention efforts of more capable areas.

If Little Baguios stakeholders encounter this argument, they must be aware that crime displacement has
already been discredited. In 1994, Hesslings empirical work conclude that crime displacement is
possible, but not an inevitable consequence of crime prevention. Further, if displacement does occur, it
will be in limited size and scope. It must be clear that Little Baguios stakeholders must learn from the
documented community prevention efforts which were hampered because of the passivity and inaction
forwarded by the crime displacement.

Obsolescence.

Indeed, while our field work has shown the considerable vigor of the current leadership to improve
patrols, literature has also documented the resilience of offenders in adapting to the new crime
prevention schemes. Gloria Laycock and Barry Webb contend that there is evidence that problems
usually return after a lull because offenders uncover the real risks of being apprehended (it may actually
lower than first thought), and find ways to circumvent the deterrents. Given the knowledge of patrol
systems presented in the previous part, a creative and determined criminal will not find it exceedingly
hard to breach Little Baguios Patrols and victimize its affluent residents. For example, in stealing water
meters, thieves can post mobile watchmen while their partners steal water meters as long as the coast
is clear of any patrols.
Furthermore, if the streets pose higher risks of being caught, why not do crime inside the houses when
their owners are at work and only gullible maids are home? In fact, Chairman Silvano recounted a recent
similar incident where a thief pretended to be the home owners relative. The maid let him in and he
consequently robbed an item.

Community leaders must calibrate their expectations to the reality that success may be in the short-
term. Public perception must also be conditioned to the realistic expectation of a patrols performance;
so that the when crimes suddenly spike after the initial success, the reputation of the barangay
leadership and the patrol itself are cushioned from disproportionate criticism. Public perception can be
influenced by holding meaningful and regular dialogues or consultation like the ones Chairman Silvano
has already began. These regular dialogues must also be used to inform the community of the changing
techniques and modus operandi of the criminals.

Complacency.

While obsolescence highlights the cunning of the criminals, complacency describes the crime
preventers gradual fading of vigilance after a surge of success. According to Hill and Pease, Decreasing
crime rates yield transitory praise followed by conviction that there is no longer a problem, all too often
followed by a resurgence of crime. Again, this is a warning that initial success may not be for long.

Little Baguios stakeholders must guard against complacency because this is less acceptable than
obsolescence, which is offender-related. It is unthinkable to tell the community that crimes are rising
again due to the patrols complacency. The worst case scenario is when obsolescence and complacency
coincide, which is likely because complacency exposes the system to obsolescence. Perhaps a concrete
measure to guard against complacency is to explicitly instruct the patrol teams to investigate the new
techniques of the criminals. These learnings must be included in the mandatory written reports of the
patrol teams. Learning firsthand of the new activities of criminals and the possible obsolescence of the
current patrol system may jolt the patrol from complacency. The information on recent criminal
activities gathered by patrols can then be shared to community during dialogues or consultations.

Sustainability.

The literature admonishes us that many crime prevention efforts both successful and unsuccessful-
have neglected the sustainability of their efforts. Patrol sustainability may be elaborated along the
conceptual frameworks five success-factors: sustainability in best leadership practices, equipment,
training, consultation, funding. Just to illustrate, let us revisit familiar questions like: what is the
equipments period of usefulness? What can be done to decrease the rate of equipment depreciation?
What can be done to retain the pool of trained and experienced patrollers? Or at the very least, what
can be done to preserve their expertise?
These patrollers might be lured by other work opportunities, or may leave the patrol when the barangay
leadership is changed. How will funding be sustained when the cost of crime prevention is likely to rise?
When greater effort is demanded from patrollers who have to cope with the evolving face of crime,
these patrollers may demand greater compensation. In Little Baguio, Chairman Silvanos wide
connections and placement in society has allowed the barangay to obtain free equipment and other
sources of funding. What if the next chairman is not as well connected? Where will they get
spontaneous sources of funding which has proven to be instrumental in the reformed patrol efforts?

The more pressing issue is in what will be done when the set of leaders are replaced. The policies and
disposition of the new leadership may be inconsistent with that of the former leadership. What
mechanisms are in place to sustain the patrol systems quality? From the old barangay chairman to the
new, and from the old patrollers to the new, there must be a transmission of knowledge, and a
congruence of values. Without these, it is hard to imagine sustainable successful patrol efforts.

Surely, Little Baguios current practice of including an experienced kagawad in each patrol team is in the
direction of sustainability. But Chairman Silvano must also make sure that when his term ends (if he is
replaced or if he finishes the limit of three consecutive terms) there is a transmission of knowledge from
the old council to the new. Furthermore, Chairman Silvano must compel the new council to conform to
the values which have made the patrol system better than how he found it. From these, we can see the
importance of properly documented, easily accessible written reports or records regarding the goings-
one in the barangay, especially those that concern crime prevention, crime statistics, regular patrol
reports, new criminal activity updates etc When knowledge and values are encoded on paper,
sustainability is enhanced.

However, accumulating quantities of written knowledge is not enough; it has been observed that quality
and relevance of sustainability-oriented knowledge must also be given attention. Literature warns that
stakeholders tend to meet in planning and meeting alone and devote little time to up-skilling, reflecting
and updating. Clearly,

Lastly, though it may impinge on the current chairmans personal prerogatives (we dont know the
politics between the incumbent and the successor), it may be for the barangays best interest if he
introduce his successor to his generous connections. This will increase the probability of the barangay
sustaining its spontaneous sources of financing.

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