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POLITICAL LAW |SET 2 | DIGEST

1. CITY OF CALOOCAN v. ALLARDE

FACTS: Caloocan City Mayor Marcial Samson, thru an ordinance, abolished the position of Assistant City Admin and 17 other positions
from the plantilla of the local government of Caloocan. Said positions were held by herein private respondents. They assailed the legality
of such abolition before the CFI. The CFI declared the abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and
the payment of their back salaries and other emoluments. The City appealed to the CA but it was denied. Caloocan City was ordered to
pay the respondents. It paid all respondents in full amount, except to respondent Santiago, leaving a balance of 530K.

Thereafter, Judge Allarde issued a writ of execution for the payment of the remaining balance. By virtue of which, the Sheriff levied and
sold in public auction the motor vehicles owned by the City of Caloocan, the proceeds were turned over to Santiago as partial payment
of her full claim. Later, the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, which included the amount of
P439,377.14 claimed by nt Santiago as back salaries, plus interest. However, the subsequent Mayors refused to sign the check which was
intended as payment of the claim. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan on the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). After 21 long years, the claim of private respondent Santiago was finally settled in full.

ISSUE: WON the garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan is valid and legal

HELD: YES. The general rules is that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine
Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be
subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity
of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been
judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a
judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an
implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. The rule is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as
required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds
sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the
government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.

In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount
of P439,377.14 for respondent Santiagos back salaries plus interest. Thus this case fell squarely within the exception. For all intents and
purposes, Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, was the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The sum indicated in the
ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary allocations of the City of Caloocan and
earmarked solely for the Citys monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such
funds.

2. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DUQUE

FACTS: Pres. Corazon Aquino issued EO No. 51 or the Milk Code. One of the provisions therein seeks to give effect to Art. 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From
1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.

In 2006, the Dept. of Health issued Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR). It was assailed by petitioners, as representative
of manufacturers of breast milk substitute.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the ICMBS and WHA are transformed into a domestic law
(2) WON the WHA resolutions from 2002-2006 are deemed incorporated into our domestic system
(3) WON the provisions of DOH-RIRR is consistent to the Milk Code

HELD:
(1)YES. It was adopted through local legislation the MILK CODE. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.

The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. This is pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."

The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law. Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

In the present case, the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the
WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that
has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the
ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising
or other forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides
that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the
Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

(2)NO. Under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principlesare deemed part of the law of the land. In
order for it to be a generally accepted principle, it must be binding in all or several states. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.

In the present case, WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging member states to implement the
ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature
enacted most of the provisions into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, specifically providing for exclusive
breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and promotions of
breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member
states; neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in
nature.Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of
the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the
need of a law enacted by the legislature.

(3)Partially YES, partially NO. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective,
purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as
such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

3. MIJARES v. RANADA

FACTS: Herein petitioners are prominent victims of human rights violation during the Marcos regime. They filed a complaint before the
US District Court of Hawaii against the estate of Marcos, and later awarded with compensatory and exemplary damages. The said award
was affirmed by the US CA, amounting to a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty
Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90), hence, final and executory. In order for the said judgment be executed, the
petitioners filed before PH-RTC a complaint for the enforcement of the foreign final judgment, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.

As a defense, the Marcos Estate moved to dismiss the complaint on account of non-payment of correct filing fees. It alleged that since the
complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation, the docket fee paid by the petitioners was incorrect.

ISSUE: WON the recognition of foreign judgment is a generally accepted principle, thus, forms part of PH law

HELD: YES. The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that
may vary in different countries. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from
the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

There is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to
limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread
rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and
enforcement. Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in the
rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions.

In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its current form since the
early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an
action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted
doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that
there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare
principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.

4.TANADA v. ANGARA

FACTS: To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three
multilateral institutions, namely: Word Bank, International Monetary Fund and lastly to took effect, the World Trade Organization. Like
many other developing countries, the PH, as articulated by Pres Ramos, joined the WTO for the purpose of improving Philippine access
to foreign market and opening of new opportunities for the services sector.

In 1994, the Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry Rizalino Navarro, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. In effect, the Ph is hereby
(1)submitting to WTO Agreement and to (2) adopt Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

Thereafter, the PH Senate adopted a Resolution which concurs to the ratification of the Agreement Establishing WTO by the President.
The petitioners, on the other hand, questioned the same and alleged that the WTO contravenes the Filipino first policy as enshrined
under Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further alleged that that the
foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the WTO violates the Constitutional provisions regarding Filipino First Policy
(2) WON the WTO limit, restrict and impair PH sovereignty

HELD:

(1)NO. The Court ruled that the cited provisions Secs 10 and 12 of ART XII, merely laid down general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony and should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13
thereof. With the said provisions, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor
of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them
competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos. In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and
speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes
the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did NOT intend to
pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.

(2)YES. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to
restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine
of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda -- international
agreements must be performed in good faith.

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely
diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct
of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing
conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations.

5. REP. OF THE PHIL (PCGG) v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: The Republic filed a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages entitiled Republic of
the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., The case is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that
petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto and others
pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 14. The PCGG sequestered the properties of Benedicto, specifically its 227 shares in NOGCCI, a
corporation owned by him. Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of Directors of
NOGCCI and thereafter issued a resolution assessing a month membership due of 150 each share, and later increased to 250.

Thereafter, the PCGG and Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement where the Republic agreed to lift the sequestration over the
shares and acknowledged that the shares was acquired through his business and exercise of profession. The Compromise Agreement was
approved by the Sandiganbayan and ordered the PCGG to deliver the 227 shares in favor of Benedicto.

ISSUE: WON the Republic, through the PCGG, may invoke the principle of State immunity from suit

HELD: NO. Based on the facts presented, it is the State itself who is the plaintiff in the main case, hence, immunity from suit cannot be
effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against
a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the
latter may have against it. Petitioner Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from
suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in
the same case.

In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its
immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents,
in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits
accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering
into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such
contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

6. SHANGRI-LA INTL. HOTEL v. DEVELOPERS GROUP OF COMP. (DIGC)

FACTS: On Oct. 18 1982, respondent DIGC filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 166, an application for registration of the "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo. It was granted and since then, DDGCI
used the mark and logo.

On the other hand, the Kuok Family owns and operates a chain of hotels with interest in hotels and hotel-related transactions since 1969,
and likewise using the same mark and logo around the world. In 1987, EDSA-Shang and Makati-Shang were incorporated in the Phil. to
operate two hotels.
In 1988, Kuok Grp filed a petition for the cancellation of the registration of the mark and logo to DGCI on the ground that the same
were illegally and fraudulently obtained and appropriated. On the other hand, the DGCI likewise filed a complaint for Infringement and
Damages against the Kuok Grp. In its answer w/ counterclaim, the Kuok Grp alleged that it is using the same mark and logo since 1962
and according to Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, it is afforded a security to exclusively use the mark and logo.

ISSUE:

(1) Which between the Kuok Grp and DGCI is qualified to register and use the subject mark and logo

(2)WON the prior use of the mark and logo internationally entitles the Kuok Grp to use it in the PH

HELD:

(1)NONE. Under RA No. 166, in order to register a trademark, one must be the owner thereof and must have actually used the mark in
commerce in the Philippines for 2 months prior to the application for registration. Since "ownership" of the trademark is required for
registration, Section 2-A sets out to define how one goes about acquiring ownership thereof. Under Section 2-A, it is clear that actual use
in commerce is also the test of ownership but the provision went further by saying that the mark must not have been so appropriated by
another. Additionally, it is significant to note that Section 2-A does not require that the actual use of a trademark must be within the
Philippines. Hence, under R.A. No. 166, as amended, one may be an owner of a mark due to actual use thereof but not yet have the
right to register such ownership here due to failure to use it within the Philippines for two months.

In the present case, Kuok Grp is not qualified under Section 2 of R.A. No. 166 as a registrant, neither did respondent DGCI, since the
latter also failed to fulfill the 2-month actual use requirement. What is worse, DGCI was not even the owner of the mark. For it to have
been the owner, the mark must not have been already appropriated by someone else. At the time of respondent DGCI's registration of
the mark, the same was already being used by the petitioners, albeit abroad, of which DGCI's president was fully aware.

(2)NO. The new Intellectual Property Code (IPC), Republic Act No. 8293, undoubtedly shows the firm resolve of the Philippines to
observe and follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the relevant portions of the Convention such that persons who may question
a mark (that is, oppose registration, petition for the cancellation thereof, sue for unfair competition) include persons whose
internationally well-known mark, whether or not registered, isidentical with or confusingly similar to or constitutes a translation of a
mark that is sought to be registered or is actually registered.However, while the Philippines was already a signatory to the Paris
Convention, the IPC only took effect on January 1, 1988, and in the absence of a retroactivity clause, R.A. No. 166 still applies.

The Paris Convention mandates that protection should be afforded to internationally known marks as signatory to the Paris Convention,
without regard as to whether the foreign corporation is registered, licensed or doing business in the Philippines. It goes without saying
that the same runs afoul to Republic Act No. 166, which requires the actual use in commerce in the Philippines of the subject mark or
devise. The apparent conflict between the two (2) was settled by the Supreme Court in this wise - "Following universal acquiescence and
comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international
agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal. "Following universal acquiescence and comity, our
municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international
agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal.

7. IBP v. ZAMORA

FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, Pres. Estrada
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose suppressing these crimes. The president also declared
that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such
time when the situation shall have improved. In compliance with this, the PNP Chief formulate a Letter of Instruction as to the manner of
joint visibility patrols.

On the other hand, the IBP, being the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution, questioned the validity of the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. It argued that it
violates the constitutional mandate under Section Sec 3, Art II.

ISSUE: WON the deployment of Marines to assist the PNP breach the civilian supremacy clause under the Consti

HELD: NO. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in
this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed/restricted. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the
LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to
brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.[ It
is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of
the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law
enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these
operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case,
it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or
control over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character
of the PNP.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols.

8. CALEON v. AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP

FACTS:Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Sampaloc, Manila. It was leased to Rita Caleon who
constructed therein a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of the Corp, Caleon sub-leased two rooms to one Rolando
Guevarra and Felicisima Estrada. Upon learning, the Corp demanded them to vacate the premises. Upon failure to comply, it filed a
complaint for Ejectment, alleging that there is a violation of BP 25 or the unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to
third persons without securing the consent of the lessor.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Corp, which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, the present petition. Caleon argued that Batas
Pambansa Blg. 25 cannot be applied in this case because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition on
subleasing which had been in effect between petitioner and private respondent long before the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25.
Therefore, the application of said law to the case at bar is unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contracts.

ISSUE: WON BP 25 was an act made through police power legislation, hence, it may impair the contract and obligation of the parties
involved

HELD: YES. It is beyond question that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject
to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. In spite of the
constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to
safeguarding said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. In fact, every contract affecting public interest suffers a
congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power
can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the
general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police
power.

In the present case, BP 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by this Court as a police power legislation, applicable to
leases entered into prior to July 14, 1971, so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied.

9. OPOSA V. FACTORAN

FACTS: The herein petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. As an additional plaintiff, Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), was impleaded. A complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit against respondent Factoran, then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR).

Petitioners invoked the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology as a cause of action, which is granted to the people and
also to the next generation. They alleged that the continued deforestation will lead to a distortion and disturbance of the ecological
balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. All of which are violations of the invoked consti right. They prayed that
the respondent be ordered to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners may invoke the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology through a class suit
HELD: YES. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of
all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Indeed, they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

10. TABLARIN v. GUTIERREZ

FACTS: The present petition assails the constitutionality of RA 2382 and MECS Order No. 52. The former created the Board of Medical
Education which is vested with the power to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into College of Med. On the other
hand, the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports issued the assailed Order which establishes a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into
medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987.

Herein petitioners are among those who were required to take the exam and they were failed to take the exam successfully. Hence, the
filed a petition in order to enjoin the enforcement of the law and order for being violaive of certain constitutional provisions, such as
those enshrined under Art II State Policies.

ISSUES:

(1)WON the petitioners successfully discharged the burden of proof required to assail RA 2382 and MECS Order No. 52

(2)WON RA 2382 and MECS Order No. 52 constitute a valid exercise of police power, and if yes, whether there is reasonable
connection between the required exam and the power of securing the health and safety of the general community

HELD:

(1)NO. Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue
and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the
administrative order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is
relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of
necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of
basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not
made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation
impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.

(2)YES. The legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the petitioners, constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of
the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of
the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community.
An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no
one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.

As to the issue of whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. It is most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long
ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Hence, the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."

11. MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP INC

FACTS: By virtue of PD 1869, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City, by leasing a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. It was renovated and was prepared to become a casino there during the Christmas
season. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was not in favor with this; hence, it passed City Ordinance which cancels
the business permit of any establishment that is used for the operation of the casino and totally banned the operation of the casino
throughout the province. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc assailed the same and seeks to enjoin its enforcement.

On its part, CDO argued it is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. For being a
political subdivision, it is expressly vested with the police power, thus, it may prohibit the operation of the casinos, notwithstanding PD
1869. Further, it argued that the enactment of LGC, subsequent to that of PD 1869, has the effect of repealing the charter of PAGCOR
insofar as its provisions do not conform to the LGUs philosophy and provisions. Finally, it raised the liberal interpretation accorded to
the LGUSs in case of doubts regarding the effect of LGC and PD 1869.

ISSUES:

(1)WON the Ordinance is valid

(2)WON the Ordinance repealed PD 1869

(3)WON the Ordinance violates PD 1869 which is a legislative enactment which has effect of a statute

HELD:

(1)NO. By observing Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited
but are in fact permitted by law.. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or
phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude
that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only
illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. To rules otherwise would make the
PAGCOR as a toothless tiger or a white elephant that will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government
revenue through the operation of casinos.

(2)NO. Par (F) of the repealing clause of LGC did not make any express provision repealing PD 1869. Assuming that there is an implied
repeal, the same is not presumed presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. There is no sufficient
indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of
Congress (R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or
detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis). With these later enactments,
the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity
more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

(3)YES. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless
there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a
folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it.
We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants
at will of the legislature. All told, casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that CANNOT be
amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.

12. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CA

FACTS: Republic Act No. 4850, which is a special law, created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority that is vested with the
authority to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area, including the surrounding provinces, cities and
municipalities. In line with this, it is also vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of the lake waters for any
projects or activities. Thereafter, a general law was enacted, RA 7160 or the LGC. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region
interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
fishing privileges (thru Mayors Permit) within their municipal waters. Thus, it issue permit to private entities for the use of laguna lake
waters within their jurisdiction. This alarmed the LRA since almost one-third of the entire laguna lake were used by fishpens, hence, it sent
notice to the fishpens stating that their operation is illegal and advised them to dismantle their structures therein.

ISSUE: Which between the charter of LLA and the LGC, shall prevail in so far as the authority to give permit for the use of laguna lake
waters is concern

HELD: RA 4850, charter of LLA shall prevail. The Local Government Code of 1991 does NOT contain any express provision which
categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to
repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the
Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a
general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided
for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the
intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law."

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces/shows the
legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of
special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be
given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.

13. MARCUS v. MANGLAPUS (DECISION Sept. 15, 1989)

FACTS: The case recalls the first people power revolution wherein Pres Marcos was deposed from office and Pres. Aquino was declared
the President. It was followed by Marcos flew to Hawaii. Now, on his deathbed, he wished to return to the PH, but this wish was
refused by Pres. Aquino considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward. Hence, the present petition. To support
its claim in returning to the PH, Marcos invoked its right under the Bill of Rights and under international law of Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.

ISSUE: WON the Pres has the power to bar Marcos from returning to the PH

HELD: YES, in the exercise of its Executive Power under the Consti. While the petitioners argued that the executive power is confined to
only those enumerated under the Consti, the Court ruled otherwise. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially
ideals to guide governmental action. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, the President has to consider these principles and
adhere to them. With this, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest.

In the present case, the problem of the president is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of
rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is
founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. Being such, the president did not act arbitrarily but in fact, act as a
protector of peace, when it bars the return of Marcos to PH.

14. MARCUS v. MANGLAPUS (RESOLUTION Oct. 27, 1989)

By reason of the Decision rendered by the Court, the petitioners filed a Motion for Recon, raising among others, that the residual power
of the Pres powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. The Court is not convinced. The residual powers of the
President under the 1987 Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate
(in case of emergency) pursuant to Amendment No. 6. There is no similarity between the two. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an
express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.
The Court, once again, upheld the validity of the act of Pres Aquino for being in compliance with her oath of office to protect and
promote the interest and welfare of the people.

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