Shona Tradional Marriages

University of Pittsburgh- Of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education
The Noble Custom of Roora: The Marriage Practices of the Shona of Zimbabwe
Author(s): Dominique Meekers
Source: Ethnology, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter, 1993), pp. 35-54
Published by: University of Pittsburgh- Of the Commonwealth System of Higher
Education
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3773544
Accessed: 01-10-2017 17:56 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
University of Pittsburgh- Of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education is

collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethnology
This content downloaded from 197.237.95.204 on Sun, 01 Oct 2017 17:56:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
rHE NOBLE CUSTOM OF ROORA:
THE MARRIAGE PRACTICES OF
'THES SHONA OF ZIMBABWE1
Dominique Meekers
if Pennsylvania State University
As is the case in many African societies, the norm

Shona-speaking peoples are characterized by th
bridewealth. In Shona society, the payment of thi
which is called roora, is the basis of marriage and
continuing emphasis on roora payments in the ethnog
several types of unions exist that deviate from t
Ethnographic studies suggest that these "deviant
increasingly common, but little is known about t
specific changes in marriage practices that are takin
and clarifies the transformations of Shona marriage
studies, and demonstrates the merits of sample surv
culturally appropriate events in the conjugal union f
The gradual erosion of traditional marriage customs
of unions has been observed in many African societi
educated and urban segments of the population. Most
in the prevalence of formal marriages to the gradua
the lineage and to changes in the relative status of m
socioeconomic transformations. In societies where
tendency to value premarital virginity and males (in
have an interest in controlling the marriage patt
These goals can be achieved by arranging marriag
contact between persons of the opposite sex befor
control can sometimes be avoided by means of elopem
by marriages contracted without parental consent (G
Resentment of the traditional subordination of women to their husbands is often
cited as another reason for the decline in bridewealth marriages. In traditional
bridewealth marriages, husbands have authority; husbands expect their wives to be
obedient, and they tend to make claims on their wives' labor and income (Bledsoe
1990; Little 1973:38; Obbo 1980; Roberts 1988). Nowadays, women who are
educated or who are engaged in wage labor often challenge their husband's authority
and want a greater influence in decision-making. In many cases, husbands oppose
their wives' involvement in wage labor because they believe that women who have an
independent source of income may become "big headed" and uncontrollable, a
situation which is believed to lead to divorce. Hence, women's desire to gain status
35
36 ETHNOLOGY
through economic independence is often a source of conflict wi

attempt to avoid such conflicts a growing group of women now
control by steering clear from bridewealth marriages (Bledsoe 1
MacGaffey 1988:172; Obbo 1980:44, 153; Oppong 1980; Parpar
and Parpart 1988). Clearly, this option of avoiding formal marr
those women who have sufficient resources outside of marriage
to avoid marriage is particularly visible among professional, bet
and wealthy women. Rather than contracting a formal marriage,
unmarried cohabitation or prefer to have lovers who do not liv
this allows them to maintain their liberty. Should such a partner
woman's autonomy, then she can leave him without the complic
arise in cases where bridewealth needs to be returned (Oppon
Despite the fact that some women prefer to remain single, m
important indicator of female status, and many women believe t
marriage (or a brief one) is preferable to not being married
Obbo 1980:106). Consequently, resentments of the institution of
domination) frequently result not in outright rejection of marrie
postponement of marriage; for example, until the woman has com
or until she has accumulated a certain amount of wealth of her
women can gain social status but minimize control by paren
entering into new forms of unions (e.g., marriages with low
changes in marriage patterns are taking place among the Shona
The Shona are known to practice several forms of unions th
normative roora (bridewealth) marriage. Traditionally, the Sh
as a noble custom that functioned as a safeguard against marita
it generally needs to be repaid upon divorce (Bere-Chikara 19
payment of roora gave a man custody of the children resulting
rights in genetricem, see Goody 1973). Normally, a woman's fat
her to take up residence with her partner until these bridewealth
(Bourdillon 1987:315; May 1983:25). A system based on b
implies that the family groups have a vested interest in the ma
influence over the married couple is considerable (May 1983
evidence that young couples now attempt to bypass the rigidities
Young couples increasingly oppose the payment of roora, at le
the amount of roora that is commonly demanded by a girl's
extremely high (because the bride's father wants to be compens
the education of his daughter, see May 1983:48). There are st
couples are trying to avoid parental control of the marriage by
types of unions (e.g., elopements). While inconceivable in t
happens, especially in urban areas, that couples live together with
their union by paying roora (Bourdillon 1987; Mittlebeeler 19
union formation have important implications for the stability
inheritance and property rights by women, and the custody and
children resulting from these unions (Maboreke 1987; May 19
MARRIAGE PRACTICES OF THE SHONA 37
Unfortunately, ethnographic studies of the Shona have not been able

prevalence of these alternative types of unions. While the results of su
can be generalized to the larger population, it is important to ackn
existing large-scale surveys have failed to capture the complexities
marriage process. Because bridewealth payments extend over a long per
among the Shona as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, there is often no
which a couple can say that they are fully married whereas they were
(Bourdillon 1987:40; May 1983:79-80; Meekers 1992; van de Wal
1977). Consequently, the interpretation of standard indicators of marria
and often results in the omission of unions that are in progress or tha
the norm. Commonly used statistical indicators of marriage, such as ag
and marital status, are not sufficient to reveal the perhaps subtle but imp
in marriage customs. What is needed in such a situation is a ty
questionnaire that takes ethnographic information into account by coll
information about all the significant events in the union formation pro
information from a 1986 survey of reproductive union formatio
Zimbabwe, to get a better understanding of the transformations of Sh
practices.
SHONA MARRIAGE CUSTOMS
The Shona are a composite ethnic group, composed of several groups cluste
the basis of linguistic and cultural similarities.2 The original peoples did not
themselves as Shona, but the term has become increasingly accepted because
cultural similarities (Bourdillon 1987:16-19; Nelson 1983:93-96). The
classified as Shona also resemble one another in both political and social s
(Gelfand 1965:5-8; Gelfand 1984; May 1983:22-23). All Shona groups are p
with property and authority in the hands of male heads of the extended famil
The Shona have virilocal residence, but specific marriage customs vary s
among the groups belonging to the cluster, yet such distinctions generally a
made in the literature.
Shona Marriage Payments
Traditional Shona marriage was a contract between two families, rather than a
personal arrangement between two individuals. Nowadays the social control of the
lineage has diminished substantially and often relatives have little say in the choice of
spouses of the younger generations, especially in urban areas. The informal courting
of a young couple becomes a private engagement by the exchange of love tokens
(Aschwanden 1982:152-153; Bourdillon 1987:40; Gelfand 1965:82-86; Holleman
1969:76-77). The boy gives the girl a token of their intimacy, such as a small coin.
The girl usually gives him a personal gift that she has worn or kept on her person,
such as a handkerchief or beads. By doing so, she consents to marrying him.
Although this engagement is fairly informal, if the engagement is broken without good
reason the other party may sue for damages in a traditional court. An engagement
38 ETHNOLOGY
becomes formal, and public, when the suitor approaches the girl'
his intention to marry by asking a mediator (munyai) to take a
parents of the woman. If the family of the prospective bride c
they will start negotiating the bridewealth payments.
The negotiation and payment of bridewealth is the central par
procedures. Bridewealth payments, made by the prospective
father, are negotiated by the heads of the two families or by t
Shona bridewealth payments consist of two parts, called r
(Bourdillon 1987:41-43; Gelfand 1965:82-86; Gelfand 198
rutsambo gives the husband sexual rights in the woman. Tr
payments consisted of some utility article (e.g., a goat or a h
tends to be a substantial cash payment. If the girl had children
rutsambo payments are omitted or at least diminished subs
rutsambo was to be paid only if the girl was a virgin. After the
the girl's father generally allows the groom to sleep with the bri
The second part of the bridewealth payments, roora, gives the
children born to the woman.3 Roora is perceived as a gift to
thank them for raising her well. Roora used to be paid in cattle,
paid in cash (Andifasi 1970; Bere-Chikara 1970; Bourdillon
Garbett 1960; Maboreke 1987; Makamure 1970; Tsodzo 1970).
made over a long period of time, and specific events in the
generally call for payment of part of the bridewealth. For exam
moves to the husband's home the groom's parents slaughter a b
bride; before the couple meets sexually for the first time the b
beast, which is hers to keep (Makamure 1970). A payment fo
bride (a cow, or its equivalent in cash) is very important symbo
omitted. The final payment of roora occurs only after the birth
sometimes not until much later (Andifasi 1970). Roora is an
marriage procedures, and marriage without roora is inc
1984:167).
Forms of Shona Marriage
In order to shorten the elaborate procedures for the negotiatio

bridewealth, couples often engage in elopement-marriages, calle
(Holleman 1969:109-115). Elopement-marriages are common
confused with elopements, which I will discuss later. In an elope
girl leaves her home with her prospective spouse or with one of
permission from her own family (Andifasi 1970; Bourdillon
Gelfand 1985:40; Janhi 1970). It is a staged abduction i
accompanied to her lover's village by one of his relatives. U
consent to an elopement-marriage until she has discussed the issu
may inform her parents. Elopement-marriages may occur becau
wants to avoid the long bridewealth negotiations, because the fa
the marriage, or because the girl wants to avoid an undesirable
slept with the girl before paying bridewealth, he is sometimes expected

the girl and pay roora after paying damages for having "spoiled" (d
girl. A man who has eloped with a girl is expected to negotiate a rec
of marriage soon afterward, for if he does not he could be considered
(Bullock 1970:337). In most cases, the families concerned accept the
marriages as a fait accompli, and will negotiate the bridewealth p
elopement-marriage allows a young couple to bypass some of the elabor
formalities, and eliminates parental control of the marriage.
negotiations in an elopement-marriage resemble those of regular marri
conducted much faster. There are no indications that the amount of rutsambo and
roora is different for elopement-marriages than for other marriages. Although a
somewhat irregular form of marriage, Bourdillon (1987:43) writes that elopement-
marriages were more common than regular marriages even as far back as 30 years
ago.
Elopement-marriages are distinguished from elopements, which are called kutizira.
Kutizira refers to a situation in which a girl runs away from her home without being
accompanied by her lover or his relatives. It is a unilateral action of the girl, without
prior knowledge of her suitor, with the intention to force the families to start marriage
negotiations. Holleman (1969:123-124) points out that kutizira is usually an act of
desperation, hence it is sometimes referred to as flight marriage. A girl elopes
because she wants to avoid an arranged marriage with a man she strongly dislikes or
because she got pregnant and failed to make arrangements for an elopement-marriage;
e.g., because her lover is temporarily absent, or because he is not willing to marry
her. The high amount of roora demanded is sometimes also a cause for elopements.
In recent times, roora has increased so much that prospective grooms have difficulty
raising the bridewealth (Andifasi 1970; Aschwanden 1982:172-176; Janhi 1970). In
such cases, a young woman may oppose her father's roora demands and elope. When
the girl arrives in her lover's village she offers herself as his prospective bride. His
family may either accept her and start the marriage negotiations or they may send her
back to her family. Because kutizisa is prearranged with the girl's lover while
kutizira is not, the former is more likely to lead to a regular marriage. Nonetheless,
kutizira is said to turn public sentiment in the girl's favor, with the result that the host
family usually accepts her as a bride. If so, marriage negotiations will be conducted
in the same manner as for elopement-marriages.
Although roora marriage is the traditional way of marriage, it sometimes happens
that couples form consensual unions that are unregistered and for which no roora has
been paid. Mittlebeeler (1976:43) writes that it often happens in urban areas, where
custom has been "badly battered," that a couple will live together without attempting
to legalize their marriage. These unions in which a couple cohabits without payment
of roora are called mapoto unions. Mapoto unions are frowned upon, and it is said
that in a rural area a man's relatives would not allow him to bring a woman to his
home without paying roora for her (Gaidzanwa 1985:68-72). Women living in
consensual unions in urban areas are sometimes called prostitutes because they behave
in an unconventional manner. Nonetheless, mapoto unions resemble regular
marriages in many respects: they are often stable unions that last many years; the
40 ETHNOLOGY
partners regard each other as husband and wife; the man is respon
for the woman and her children; and the woman is expected t
partner (Bourdillon 1987:319-320). Sometimes a girl's family m
her mapoto union or try to get the husband to pay bridewea
however, these girls are not marriageable before the union (becau
previously married or because they have illegitimate children), an
so once they have entered a mapoto union. Consequently, the gir
little choice but to accept the husband.
The African Marriages Act of 1950 requires that all tradit
registered by an officer of the District Court. The District C
required before a civil or religious marriage can be contract
District Court registration, civil marriage ceremonies, and
ceremonies, are all considered incidental to traditional procedu
and state marriages contracted without the customary roora pay
inferior marriages similar to concubinage. The registration i
triviality because unregistered marriages remain valid for th
guardianship, custody, and succession rights of the children. In t
in-law often prevented the marriage registration by insisting that the
be paid before he would consent to the union. As a result of
Majority Act of 1982, a girl over age eighteen no longer needs pe
father for the marriage registration, nor can he legally demand
In practice, however, it remains difficult for a girl to register a m
will of her parents. Christian marriages generally occur only
marriage, and often after a child has been born. As the payment o
right to children, by postponing the church ceremony until after
child, men ensure that they do not enter a hard-to-dissolve mon
a barren wife. Roora remains central to marriage, and the church
merely an extra rite in the long process of marriage.
DATA
Data Source
This research is based on a 1986 survey of reproductive union formation in Harar

Zimbabwe (see Udry et al. 1992). Because the survey was designed to study
formation of the first reproductive union, the sample was restricted to women w
were at least seven months pregnant with their first child, or who had recen
delivered their first birth. Consequently, the sample consists of fairly you
respondents (mostly between fifteen and 25 years of age) who have been in a conju
union for a relatively short time. Respondents were drawn from patients of Hara
Maternity Hospital and four other maternity clinics in Harare, in May and June 19
All respondents are Shona, but information on their specific ethnic background w
not collected in the survey.
Variables
All respondents were asked about the timing of fourteen specific events that may
or may not have taken place during the formation of their first reproductive union.4
The events enquired about included the negotiation of the marriage payments and the
payment of the first installment of the bridewealth (the complete list of events is
shown in Table 1). These events were described, both in Shona and in English, on
magnetic strips that were placed on a metal board. Respondents were asked to
remove those events that they had not (yet) experienced, and to re-order the remaining
Table 1
Events in the Formation of the First Reproductive Union,

Harare, 1986 (N= 173)
Events N % of all women
Met baby's father 173 100.0

Discussed with him introducing him to your family 89 51.4
Discussed him with your vatete (paternal aunt) or other relative 143 82.7
Introduced him to your family 124 71.7
Negotiation with your family of payments to them 97 56.1
First payment made to your family 105 60.7
District Court Registration obtained 5 2.9
Church marriage ceremony performed 5 2.9
Civil ceremony performed 2 1.2
First slept with him (had sex with him) 173 100.0
Began to live with him 163 94.2
Became pregnant with his child 173 100.0
Exchanged gifts 104 60.1
Kutizira 80 46.2
Source: 1986 Surv
events according
occurrence was
events. Respond
event. These ope
information. For
love tokens wer
roora or rutsam
contains inform
union formation
or who recently
42 ETHNOLOGY
generalized to unions that did not result in a pregnancy. Nonet

useful for studying the onset of reproductive unions, and for pr
the design of questionnaires for large-scale surveys. Althoug
listed in Table 1 are quite rare occurrences, several of them hav
in the formation of the union. The literature on Shona mar
following stages in the formation of a union: the exchang
approval of the girl's paternal aunt, and the negotiation an
bridewealth. In the following section, I describe the significanc
these events.
STAGES IN THE UNION FORMATION PROCESS
The Exchange of Gifts
Holleman (1969:77) claimed that although there appears to be a growing te

to consider the exchange of love tokens as a prelude to sexual gratification,
than as an intention to marry, the exchange of love tokens remains an
element of any serious courtship or private engagement. Most unions in ou
should be considered serious relationships, if only by virtue of the fact that
resulted in a pregnancy. However, only 60 per cent of the respondents (104
173) said that they had exchanged gifts.
The literature suggests that the exchange of love tokens indicates the beg
the private engagement between the young couple. Consequently, love t
exchanged early in the union formation process, before the engagemen
public and before the negotiation and payment of the bridewealth. Bec
tokens are typically exchanged before the family becomes involved in the re
this exchange suggests individual partner choice. Hence, one expects the
of love tokens to be more prevalent among the modern segments of the po
where the marriage process is least controlled by the elders. Because young
and educated women are generally in a better position than other women t
parental control, one also expects that these women would be more like
initiated a private engagement. Table 2 shows that the opposite is true
women are less likely to have exchanged love tokens than older women.
is true for urban and better educated women. This finding is surprising be
literature portrays the exchange of love tokens as an action between th
individuals, rather than an event controlled by the families.
Consequently, it appears that the exchange of love tokens is considered a tr
practice which young educated women are less likely to follow, or that the
is less of a private affair than is indicated by the literature (e.g., Gelfand 1
184). Indeed, 66 women explained that they had exchanged the gifts in the
their paternal aunt (vatete), or in her presence. Twenty-five women had ex
gifts in the home of another relative or in his or her presence. Only ten w
that they were alone with their partner when they exchanged the gifts.5 Fur
some women also indicated that they had exchanged gifts after they had d
their partner with their vatete (eight cases) or after the negotiations for the
payments had started (sixteen cases). This finding indicates that the fa
majority of couples continue to have considerable influence in the mar
even in this early stage of the union.
Table 2
Stages in the Union Formation Process
Exchanged Discussed Negotiated First N of Cases

Gifts Partner Marriage Payment
w/ Vatete Payments Made
Age
15-19 52.6% 77.3% 46.4% 51.6% 97
20+ 69.7 89.5 68.4 72.4 76
Education
1-7 years 69.8 81.0 52.4 60.3 63
8+ years 54.6 83.6 58.2 60.9 110
Residence
Urban 53.9 77.5 50.0 55.9 102
Rural 69.0 90.1 64.8 67.6 71
Duration of
Relationship
1-12 mths 53.1 79.6 57.1 55.1 49
13-24 mths 57.1 80.4 50.0 66.1 56
25+ mths 67.7 86.8 60.3 60.3 68
Total 60.1% 82.7% 56.1% 60.7% 173
The Influence of the Vatete (Patern
The discussion of the girl's boyfr

in the marriage procedures because
marriage. The strong authority of
fact that the roora received from t
brother's marriage (Bourdillon 19
Since it is the aunt's marriage th
position of special authority over t
a girl who is interested in marryin
aunt (Gelfand 1984:38; Mhondoro 1
44 ETHNOLOGY
boy would be a good husband for her niece. If the aunt is convin
not make a good husband, she has the authority to end her niec
this boy, although this rarely happens in practice. But whe
sufficient economic independence to allow him to make bridew
his own earnings, rather than from his sister's roora, the aunt
her niece's marriage (Bourdillon 1987:51). Eighty-three per cent
(143 cases) indicated that they had discussed their partner with
another relative (see Table 2). The percentage of women who
partner increases with the duration of the relationship, but even
that started in the past year the majority of women have talke
with a relative. Younger women and urban women are less likel
their partner with their vatete, or with another relative, than o
There are no substantial differentials by level of education.
Bridewealth Negotiations and Payments
As mentioned earlier, the negotiation of the bridewealth paym

part of the marriage process, as it indicates a formal and public
couple. The first payment is important because it gives the gro
cases also reproductive rights over his wife. The likelihood
negotiations have taken place increases strongly with the age of
residents are less likely to have negotiated marriage payments t
The same pattern holds for the first payment. It should be not
reported that a first payment had been made, although no n
place. For most of these respondents (26 out of 28 cases) the pay
made did not include roora.
Because the respondents were asked to discuss the specifics of the marriage
payments, we know which payments were made. Forty-five per cent of the
respondents reported that rutsambo had been paid. Only 17 per cent said that part of
the roora had been paid. At which precise time reproductive rights were transferred,
as opposed to sexual rights, is not known because the survey only contains
information on the timing of the first payment. However, from the literature and the
respondents' comments it is clear that the groom generally obtained sexual rights at
the time when the first payment was made. Thirty-five per cent of the respondents
said that a damage payment had been made. Damages can be claimed for several
reasons, but in this context the damage payment refers to the fine paid to the father
of a girl to compensate for an unlawful pregnancy (Dale 1987:39). Damage payments
are generally not subject to negotiations, which explains why the number of women
who indicated that the marriage payments had been negotiated is smaller than the
number of women who reported that a first payment had been made. Because damage
payments are not part of the bridewealth payments per se (i.e., one can pay damages
for an unlawful pregnancy without marrying), they will not be discussed further.
TYPES OF MARRIAGE PAYMENTS
Because the marriage payments are so important in the development of t

I now classify all unions according to the type of payments that have been
Table 3). The first group comprises those unions for which neither rut
roora was paid (53 per cent of the cases), the second category includes thos
for which only rutsambo was paid (30 per cent). The third group refers to
which roora was paid (17 per cent). For all but five cases, the payment of r
preceded or accompanied by the payment of rutsambo (recall that rutsambo
are sometimes omitted if the girl is pregnant). It is clear that despite t
preference for roora marriage, only a relatively small fraction of the respon
Table 3
Distribution of Unions by Marriage Payments,

and Background Variables
None Rutsambo Only Roora N of Cases
Age
15-19 66.0% 23.7% 10.3% 97
20+ 35.5 38.2 26.3 76
Education
1-7 years 50.8 30.2 19.1 63
8+ years 53.6 30.0 16.4 110
Residence
Urban 57.8 26.5 15.7 102
Rural 45.1 35.2 19.7 71
Duration of
Relationship
1-12 mths 59.2 24.5 16.3 49
13-24 mths 48.2 35.7 16.1 56
25+ mths 51.5 29.4 19.1 68
Total 52.6% 30.1% 17.4% 173
such a union. Moreover, ur

either rutsambo or roora has
are no large differentials i
findings suggest that younge
different types of unions.
46 ETHNOLOGY
TYPES OF UNION
A Typology of Unions
The data allow us to identify the different types of union specified in the
(i.e., elopements, elopement-marriages, roora marriages, and irregular
Because respondents were asked specifically whether they had eloped, el
(i.e., kutizira) can be identified directly. Eighty respondents (46.2 per cent)
that they had eloped. The data confirm that this type of union can be consi
act of desperation: when asked about the circumstances of the elopement, 73
said that they were pregnant at the time. Three respondents mentioned that
eloped because their parents wanted more roora. Elopement-marriages (kutiz
also be identified because respondents were asked to specify the circumstance
cohabitation. Twenty-seven respondents indicated that their union was an el
marriage.7 The third type of union that can be identified is the normat
marriage. I define a roora marriage as any marriage for which roora has bee
(in part or in full) and that was not described by the respondent as an elope
elopement-marriage. Only 21 respondents fall into this category.
The remaining group of unions comprises irregular unions (i.e., the
mapoto unions), informal sexual unions without cohabitation, as well as thos
that can be considered roora marriages in progress. Mittlebeeler (1976)
mapoto unions as a form of cohabitation lacking any attempt to form
marriage. Consequently, I define mapoto unions as cohabiting unions for wh
rutsambo or roora has been paid, and for which there have been no m
negotiations. Eight respondents fall in this category. In addition, there
women who reported that they had never cohabited with their partner, and
marriage negotiations had taken place. These are informal sexual unions whi
or may not lead to a stable union. Because of the small number of mapoto u
noncohabiting sexual unions, I treat these two types of unions as one g
remaining 29 unions can be considered marriages in progress, since brid
negotiations and/or the payment of rutsambo have already taken place.
Women were also asked whether they had a church or civil marriage cerem
whether their marriage was registered at the District Court. As indicat
literature, church and civil marriages remain uncommon. Only five wom
church marriage, and only two had a civil marriage. Although required
marriages are generally not registered with the District Court. Only five resp
indicated that their marriage had been registered, three of whom also had a
wedding. The persistence of traditional wedding procedures is further confi
the fact that all women who had a civil or church marriage or who had regi
their marriage with the District Court reported that traditional bridewealth
had been made as well. Because civil and church marriages are so uncomm
because they have all been preceded by a traditional union, I do not treat thes
as a separate group.
Characteristics of the Unions
Elopement-marriages are often simply an attempt to speed up the ma

and tend to be regularized by rutsambo and roora payments. Like
elopements are followed by negotiations for a regular marriage. Tab
what extent various types of unions have been regularized. For nearly
the elopement-marriages bridewealth negotiations have taken place, and
cent of them rutsambo has been paid. However, roora has been paid for
out of 27 elopement-marriages (11 per cent). Nearly half of the women
(45 per cent) report that marriage payments have been negotiated, but
roora has not beenfor
paid
most of them (for 25 per cent and 8 pe
respectively).
Table 4
Characteristics of the Unions
Boora Elopement Elopement Marriage Mapoto/

Marriage Marriage in Informal
(Kutizisa) (Kutizira) Progress Sexual Unions
Gifts Exchanged 85.7% 77.8% 50.0% 65.5% 37.5%
Discussed
Partner
With Vatete 100.0% 81.5% 80.0% 89.7% 62.5%
Negotiated
Marriage
Payments 95.2% 59.3% 45.0% 86.2% 0.0%a
Damage Paid 14.3% 44.4% 35.0% 48.3% 18.8%

Rutsambo Paid 85.7% 55.6% 25.0% 82.8% 0.0%a
Roora Paid 100.0%a 11.1% 7.5% 0.0%" 0.0%a
N of Cases 21 27 80 29 16
aBy definition.
Table 5 shows the distribu

characteristics. Elopemen
common among teenage
normative roora marriage
are most common among l
older.
48 ETHNOLOGY
Table 5
Distribution of Type of Shona Unions, by Background Characteristics
Boora Elopement Elopement Marriage Mapoto/ N of Cases

Marriage Marriage in Informal
Progress Sexual
Unions
Age
15-19 5.2% 13.4% 59.8% 11.3% 10.3% 97
20+ 21.1 18.4 29.0 23.7 7.9 76
Education
1-7 years 12.7 19.1 36.5 17.5 14.3 63
8 + years 11.8 13.6 51.8 16.4 6.4 110
Residence
Urban 11.8 10.8 52.0 14.7 10.8 102
Rural 12.7 22.5 38.0 19.7 7.0 71
Duration of
Relationship
1-12 mths 10.2 12.2 63.3 12.2 2.0 49
13-24 mths 10.7 19.6 33.9 17.9 17.9 56
25 + mths 14.7 14.7 44.1 19.1 7.4 68
Total 12.1% 15.6% 46.2% 16.8% 9.3% 173
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARRIAGE PAYMENTS
Considering the importance of roora payments in Shona society, one exp

marriage to give a woman and her children social and legal benefits th
accorded to other types of unions. Because roora payment traditionally gav
rights to the children of a union, the issue of custody and responsibili
children resulting from various types of non-roora unions is of special im
here.
Until recently, the payment of roora gave a man legal rights over the child
a union, although these rights could also be obtained by other means (i.e., b
compensation) if roora was not paid. The rights in the child of an unmarri
belonged to the mother's family, and were transferred to the family who
for the mother. Although the genitor could legitimate the child b
compensation, the father of the seduced girl could refuse this damage pay
which case the child would remain a member of his own lineage (Bullock 19
More importantly, while a man who has paid roora always had custod
children of the union (even if he is not the genitor), a man who has not pa
could deny responsibility for the child.
Today, legislation provides that a man no longer has automatic
guardianship and custody over his children, whether or not he paid roora,
guardianship and custody are to be awarded with the best interest of the ch
(Ncube 1987:203). In practice, however, custody is usually awarded to the m
paid the roora (May 1983:48). Although the Maintenance Act allows women
maintenance for themselves and for their children from husbands (loosely i
who deserted them, many women are ignorant of their rights, and those wo
are granted a maintenance order often have great difficulty in having
executed (May 1983:84-85).
Table 6
Percentage of Partners Who Abdicated Responsibility for the Pregnancy,

by Type of Union and Marriage Payments
Type of Union No Rutsambo or Roora Rutsambo or Roora

Payment Made Paid
Elopement
(Kutizira) 13.8% (58) 0.0% (22)
Elopement-Marriage
(Kutizisa) 8.3% (12) 0.0% (15)
Roora Marriage n.a. 0.0% (21)
Marriages in Progress 0.0% (5) 0.0% (24)
Mapoto/Sexual Unions 35.5% (16) n.a.
Total 16.5% (91) 0.0% (82)
In this survey, nearly 9 per cen

that their partner had abdicated
percentage of partners who refu
union and type of marriage paym
child was never denied if either
women who reported that their pa
and five were in a noncohabiting
raise questions about the respons
recently, when there had not bee
father was not legally obliged t
(Maboreke 1987:145). Although
50 ETHNOLOGY
maintain his child, legitimate or illegitimate, and whether or not h

child, there is little a woman can do to assure compliance with th
DISCUSSION
Traditional Shona marriage is characterized by the payment of roora, wh

the husband legal custody of the children resulting from the union. The am
roora paid was subject to elaborate negotiations between the families of the
Consequently, marriage arrangements were controlled by the family, rath
the couple itself. Nowadays, young couples increasingly oppose the pa
roora. Alternative forms of unions, such as elopement-marriages, allow the
avoid the rigidities of the traditional marriage system, which is controlled
lineage, and to bypass some of the lengthy customary marriage proc
Nonetheless, roora is said to remain central to marriage (although roora is
legally required to validate a marriage). Even for these irregular unio
marriage negotiations will take place and roora paid is expected. Church
marriage ceremonies, as well as the legally required District Court registrati
marriage, are still extremely uncommon. Those few couples who had a
church wedding did so only after having a traditional marriage, which con
notion that these western customs are considered merely an additional
customary marriage process, and without much significance in their own r
Despite the continuing emphasis on roora payments in normative Shona m
the data show that only a small fraction of reproductive unions in urban Z
are roora marriages. The extent to which the other types of union conform
normative model varies greatly. The least deviant type of union are pro
marriages that are in progress (i.e., where marriage payments have been ne
and/or rutsambo has been paid, but the first installment of the roora has no
paid). The existence of this type of union is a reflection of the lengthy natu
marriage process, and perhaps also of the difficulties in obtaining the requ
payments.
Goody (1973) pointed out that parental control over the marriage proceedings can
be evaded by resorting to elopements (which later may be followed by a marriage).
Among the Shona, elopement-marriages provide young couples with a means to
eliminate or at least substantially reduce parental control over the choice of partner.
While elopement-marriages have existed for several decades, the high prevalence of
true elopements appears to be a new development that is most common among young,
well educated, and urban women. In most cases, these elopements are triggered by
a premarital pregnancy. Neither type of union really challenges the traditional roora
marriage, if followed by regular marriage proceedings, as is expected. In such a
case, the young couple gains individual partner choice, but the lineage remains in
control of the marriage proceedings that follow. However, the data show that no
marriage negotiations or payments frequently occur, especially for elopements. This
finding is consistent with the theories suggesting that women want more autonomy,
not only from parents but also from their husbands (Bledsoe 1980; Goody 1990; Obbo
1980; Stichter and Partpart 1988).
A few unions lack any marriage negotiations or payments (i.e., the mapo
and informal noncohabiting sexual unions). This type of union is the m
because the involvement of the lineages is minimal. The low prevalence of
of union supports the argument that marriage remains important for wome
Many women want more control over marriage process and greater equalit
the marriage itself, and try to achieve these goals. But some women reject t
completely and prefer not to marry at all (Little 1973; Obbo 1980). As the
not marrying at all is only open to women who have independent access to
outside of marriage, it is possible that the prevalence of this type of
increase as more women become involved in wage labor.
On the one hand, the emergence of these new forms of union appea
positive development because they tend to give the young couple, in partic
wife, more control over the union. On the other hand, these unions also gi
new problems. While individual control is greater in these types of union,
rights of women in cases of divorce or the death of the husband, an
responsibilities for the children resulting from these unions are not alw
Traditionally, bridewealth payments did not only transfer rights in genetri
husband, but also implied that the husband was responsible for the c
According to the new Zimbabwe legislation, the payment of roora no
automatically grants the husband custody of children resulting from
(Maboreke 1987). Consequently, prospective grooms have less incentiv
roora. Although the biological father of a child is now legally responsible t
the child, even if he has not paid roora, it is difficult for women to en
obligation.
In this study, 9 per cent of fathers had abdicated responsibility for the pregnancy.
Responsibility was never denied for any of the roora marriages, for marriages in
progress, or for any irregular union for which rutsambo or roora had been paid.
Abdication of responsibility for the pregnancy is most common for those unions for
which no marriage negotiations have taken place. It is important to note that when
a father denies responsibility for the pregnancy, a woman will usually need to turn to
her parents for support. As these women have previously rejected the lineage system
by entering into a deviant type of union, it seems likely that they will not get the same
level of support that they would have received had they entered a regular type of
union. The finding that responsibility for the pregnancy was never abdicated when
roora had been paid indicates that the payment still transfers rights in genetricem.
Even though the new legislation awards custody of children on the basis of the best
interest of the child rather than on the basis of roora payments (Maboreke 1987:154),
it is evident that in practice a man who does pay roora not only obtains rights to the
children but also accepts responsibility for them. The custom of roora may be
disappearing, but for those who continue to practice it, its meaning appears not to
have changed.
In sum, the findings from this study indicate that important changes are taking place
in Shona marriage practices which have also been observed in ethnographic studies,
but not through large-scale surveys. The erosion of the social control of the lineage
that is associated with socio-economic development is leading to an increasing
52 ETHNOLOGY
prevalence of irregular forms of unions. These new forms of u

that there are attempts to reduce the amount of control the line
as well as the amount of control the husband has over his w
Goody 1976, 1990; Obbo 1980). However, the evidence availab
that these new forms of unions may give rise to problem
responsibility for the children. It is clear that existing nationa
contain sufficiently detailed information to study these issues.
design appropriate social policies to deal with the problems that
from these changes in union formation, there is a need to
information on the union formation process. Surveys such as t
are a useful tool to facilitate the design of national-level survey
us to enhance our understanding of the African marriage proce
ethnographic studies.
NOTES
1. This project was supported by the Population Research Institute, The Pennsylvania St
University, which has core support from a grant for international demographic research
the Mellon Foundation, and from the National Institute of Child Health and Develop
(grant 1-P30-HD28263-01). I am grateful to Gretchen Cornwell, Pat Draper, Anastasia Gag
Nancy Landale, and Marvellous Mhloyi for their suggestions and their comments on an ear
version of this paper. Many thanks to Richard J. Udry for making the data available, an
Li Zhan for conducting literature searches for this project. The inspiration for the title o
paper comes from an essay by Fidelis Bere-Chikara.
2. The Shona ethnic cluster includes the Kalanga, Karanga, Korekore, Manyika, Ndau
Zezuru. In the 1980s the Shona-speaking populations made up approximately 70 per cent
the total population of Zimbabwe, and 75 per cent of all Africans there (Nelson 1983:92-
3. In theory, the payment of roora is no longer required to give a man legal custody of
children. The 1969 African Law and Tribal Courts Act stated that custody arrangem
should be made in the best interest of the children, rather than on the basis of the paym
roora. In practice, roora still gives a father custody of his children. Upon divorce, a fat
is sometimes allowed to pay roora in order to get custody of the children (Maboreke 1987:
142).
4. All events refer to the relationship with the man responsible for the first pregnancy.
Although this information refers to the first reproductive union, women may have had previous
relationships that did not result in a birth.
5. Three women did not specify where and in whose presence the gifts were exchanged.
6. Note that the aunt may already be in position of special authority even if her roora has not
yet been used for her brother's marriage, based on the anticipation of such occurring at a later
time.
7. That elopements are more prevalent than elopement-marriages can be attributed to the fact
that the sample is restricted to women pregnant with their first child or who have recently
given birth to their first child.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andifasi, J. 1970. An Analysis of Roora. Shona Customs, eds. C. Kileff and P.

28-32. Gweru.
Aschwanden, H. 1982. Symbols of Life. An Analysis of the Consciousness

Gweru.
Bere-Chikara, F. 1970. Cattle: The Life Blood of Shona Society. Shona Customs, eds. C.
Kileff and P. Kileff, pp. 20-23. Gweru.
Bledsoe, C. 1980. Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society. Stanford.
1990. Transformations in Sub-Saharan African Marriage and Fertility. Annals of the
American Academy, 510:115-125.
Bourdillon, M. 1987. The Shona Peoples. An Ethnography of the Contemporary Shona,
with Special Reference to Their Religion. Gweru.
Bullock, C. 1970. The Mashona. The Indigenous Natives of S. Rhodesia. Westport.
Dale, D. S. J. 1987. A Basic English-Shona Dictionary. Gweru.
Dore, L. 1970. The Uses of Cattle in Shona Society. Shona Customs, eds. C. Kileff and
P. Kileff, pp. 24-26. Gweru.
Gaidzanwa, R. B. 1985. Images of Women in Zimbabwean Literature. Harare.
Garbett, K. G. 1960. Growth and Change in a Shona Ward. Occasional Paper no. 1.
Salisbury.
Gelfand, M. 1965. African Background. The Traditional Culture of the Shona-Speaking
People. Cape Town.
1984. The Genuine Shona. Survival Values of An African Culture. Gweru.
1985. Growing Up in Shona Society. From Birth to Marriage. Gweru.
Goody, J. 1973. Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia. Bridewealth and Do
eds. J. Goody and S. J. Tambiah, pp. 1-58. Cambridge Papers in Socia
Anthropology, no. 7. Cambridge.
1976. Production and Reproduction. Cambridge.
1990. Futures of the Family in Rural Africa. Rural Development and Popula
Institutions and Policy, eds. G. McNicoll and M. Cain, pp. 119-146. New Yor
Holleman, J. F. 1969. Shona Customary Law. With Reference to Kinship, Marriage
Family and the Estate. Manchester.
Janhi, L. 1970. Roora and Marriage. Shona Customs, eds. C. Kileff and P. Kileff, p
41. Gweru.
Little, K. 1973. African Women in Towns. An Aspect of Africa's Social

Cambridge.
Maboreke, M. 1987. The Love of a Mother: Problems of Custody in Zimbabwe. Women
and Law in Southern Africa, ed. A. Armstrong, pp. 137-163. Harare.
MacGaffey, J. 1988. Evading Male Control: Women in the Second Economy in Zaire.
Patriarchy and Class. African Women in the Home and the Workforce, eds. S. B.
Stichter and J. L. Parpart, pp. 161-176. London.
Makamure, D. M. 1970. Cattle and Social Status. Shona Customs, eds. C. Kileff and P.
Kileff, pp. 14-16. Gweru.
May, J. 1983. Zimbabwean Women in Colonial and Customary Law. Gweru.
Meekers, D. 1992. The Process of Marriage in African Societies: A Multiple Indicator
Approach. Population and Development Review, 18:61-78.
Mhondoro, L. 1970. Sharing and the Family Unit. Shona Customs, eds. C. Kileff and P.
Kileff, pp. 78-80. Gweru.
Mittlebeeler, E. V. 1976. African Custom and Western Law. The Development of the
Rhodesian Criminal Law for Africans. New York.
Ncube, W. 1987. Released from Legal Minority: The Legal Age of Majority Act in
Zimbabwe. Women and Law in Southern Africa, ed. A. Armstrong, pp. 193-209.
Harare.
54 ETHNOLOGY
Nelson, H. D. 1983. Zimbabwe: A Country Study. Washington

Obbo, C. 1980. African Women: Their Struggle for Economic I
Oppong, C. 1980. From Love to Institution: Indications of Ch
Journal of Family History 5:197-209.
Parpart, J. L. 1988. Sexuality and Power on the Zambian Copperbel
African Women in the Home and the Workforce, eds. S.
Parpart, pp. 115-138. London.
Roberts, P. A. 1988. Rural Women's Access to Labor in West
Class. African Women in the Home and the Workforce, ed
L. Parpart, pp. 97-114. London.
Stichter, S. B., and J. L. Parpart. 1988. Introduction: Towards a
African Women. Patriarchy and Class. African Women
Workforce, eds. S. B. Stichter and J. L. Parpart, pp. 1-26
Tsodzo, T. K. M. 1970. Cattle are Our Rank. Shona Customs, ed
pp. 17-19. Gweru.
Udry, R. J., N. Dole, and K. Gleiter. 1992. Forming Reproduc
Zimbabwe. International Family Planning Perspectives, 18
van de Walle, E. 1968. Marriage in African Censuses and Inqu
Tropical Africa, eds. W. Brass et al., pp. 183-238. Princet
Ware, H. 1977. Language Problems in Demographic Fieldwork
Cameroon Fertility Survey. WFS Scientific Reports, 2. Vo

Shona Tradional Marriages

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Shona Tradional Marriages

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

University of Pittsburgh- Of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education

University of Pittsburgh- Of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education is

As is the case in many African societies, the norm

through economic independence is often a source of conflict wi

Unfortunately, ethnographic studies of the Shona have not been able

SHONA MARRIAGE CUSTOMS

Shona Marriage Payments

Forms of Shona Marriage

In order to shorten the elaborate procedures for the negotiatio

slept with the girl before paying bridewealth, he is sometimes expected

This research is based on a 1986 survey of reproductive union formation in Harar

Events in the Formation of the First Reproductive Union,

Events N % of all women

Met baby's father 173 100.0

Source: 1986 Surv

generalized to unions that did not result in a pregnancy. Nonet

STAGES IN THE UNION FORMATION PROCESS

The Exchange of Gifts

Holleman (1969:77) claimed that although there appears to be a growing te

Stages in the Union Formation Process

Exchanged Discussed Negotiated First N of Cases

Total 60.1% 82.7% 56.1% 60.7% 173

The Influence of the Vatete (Patern

The discussion of the girl's boyfr

Bridewealth Negotiations and Payments

As mentioned earlier, the negotiation of the bridewealth paym

TYPES OF MARRIAGE PAYMENTS

Because the marriage payments are so important in the development of t

Distribution of Unions by Marriage Payments,

None Rutsambo Only Roora N of Cases

Total 52.6% 30.1% 17.4% 173

such a union. Moreover, ur

Characteristics of the Unions

Elopement-marriages are often simply an attempt to speed up the ma

Characteristics of the Unions

Boora Elopement Elopement Marriage Mapoto/

Gifts Exchanged 85.7% 77.8% 50.0% 65.5% 37.5%

Damage Paid 14.3% 44.4% 35.0% 48.3% 18.8%

Table 5 shows the distribu

Distribution of Type of Shona Unions, by Background Characteristics

Boora Elopement Elopement Marriage Mapoto/ N of Cases

Total 12.1% 15.6% 46.2% 16.8% 9.3% 173

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARRIAGE PAYMENTS

Considering the importance of roora payments in Shona society, one exp

Percentage of Partners Who Abdicated Responsibility for the Pregnancy,

Type of Union No Rutsambo or Roora Rutsambo or Roora

Total 16.5% (91) 0.0% (82)

In this survey, nearly 9 per cen

maintain his child, legitimate or illegitimate, and whether or not h

Traditional Shona marriage is characterized by the payment of roora, wh

prevalence of irregular forms of unions. These new forms of u

Andifasi, J. 1970. An Analysis of Roora. Shona Customs, eds. C. Kileff and P.

Aschwanden, H. 1982. Symbols of Life. An Analysis of the Consciousness

Little, K. 1973. African Women in Towns. An Aspect of Africa's Social

Nelson, H. D. 1983. Zimbabwe: A Country Study. Washington

You might also like