ROSENAU - A Pre-Theory Revisited

A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence
Author(s): James N. Rosenau

Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 245-305
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association
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Studies
International (1984) 28, 245-305
Quarterly
A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics

in an Era of Cascading Interdependence
JAMES N. ROSENAU
ofSouthern
University California
On thepresumption thatthestructures ofglobalaffairsare undergoing a profound

crisisofauthorityand otherchangesofa comparablemagnitude,theanalysisseeks
to build a comprehensive theoryofworldpoliticsthatsynthesizes thesedevelop-
mentsat microas wellas macrolevels.The synthesis is accomplished byfocusingon
thesimultaneity and expansivity ofpatternspromoting boththecoherenceand the
breakdownofsystems at all levels,patternsthatare giventhelabel of'cascading
interdependence' and that are exploredthroughthe conceptsof action scripts,
analyticaptitudes,subgroupism,aggregation,and adaptation.In thiscontext
governments are positedas increasingly ineffectiveas internationalactorsand
individualsas increasingly skilledin theirpublic roles. In addition,analystsof
worldpoliticsare seen as inevitablyshapingthe courseof events,so thatit is
important forthemtoremaineversensitive to thewaysin whichtheyinteractwith
theworldtheyseekto study.
Quarter-centuryanniversariesinviteretrospection.They cryout forassessmentsofgoals

realized, problemsencountered,errorscommitted,and solutionsenvisioned. Sometimes
the result is despair, but in our case retrospection would surely be an upbeat
undertaking,one rifewithopportunitiesto trace growth,recordprogress,identifyneeds,
and clarifyobjectives. One need only glance at any international relationsjournal or
text of the 1950s to appreciate how stunning and diverse have been the advances in
theoreticalsophisticationand methodological creativityin the first25 years since the
International Studies Association was founded.
Or so it seems to one whose professionalcareer spans the life of ISA. I marvel at
the extentto which incisive analysis and imaginative formulationshave supplanted the
ambiguous and limited conceptions that once were so commonplace. I delight in the
realization that common sense is now subjected to counter-intuitivereasoning, that
single-causeexplanations have yielded to multivariateimpulses,that staticframeworks
Author'snote:Partsofthisarticlewerepresentedas thePresidentialAddressat theAnnualMeetingofthe
InternationalStudiesAssociation, Atlanta,March 29, 1984.An earlierdraftwas assessedat a Workshopon
InternationalRelationsTheory,sponsoredby the School of InternationalRelationsof the University of
.SouthernCaliforniaand convenedin Ojai, Californiaon December2-4, 1983.For theirhelpfuldialogueon
to RichardAshley,RaymondDuvall,JeffFrieden,
thatdraft,I am grateful MichaelFry,David Lake,Dwain
Mefford, andJohnOdell. That theywillhardlyrecognizethisrevisedversionis testimony to thevalueoftheir
feedback.The suggestions ofMargaretL. Campbell,Heidi H. Hobbs, MargaretKarns,and StevenKrasner
have also beenvaluable. I alone,however,am responsibleforthisfinalproductofall thereactions.
() 1984 InternationalStudiesAssociation
0020-8833/84/03/0245-61/$03.00
246 Revisited
A Pre-Theory
have given way to dynamic models, that rigid boundaries, unitary actors, and fixed
institutions have been superseded by a sensitivity to systemic transformations,
organizational complexity,and interactivephenomena, and that grand formulations
such as neo-realism, complex interdependence, the world-system approach, and
long-cycletheorynow vie forour attention.
Problems persist,to be sure. As indicated below, our progress has not freed us of
perplexityover the changing structuresof global politics or of the need to monitorour
conduct as analystsand advocates. Important as the problemsmay be, however, I have
no trouble at thismoment of celebration in assertingthat theywill surelybegin to yield
to our talentsifthe pace ofour progressin the next quarter-centurymatches that of the
last one.
Yet, to examine the growth and difficultieswe have experienced is to take on an
impossible task. Our collective effortshave been marked by such an extraordinary
maturationin the way internationalphenomena are probed and analyzed that it might
well require a multi-authored, multi-volume encyclopedia to document and fully
evaluate the expansion of our field.Thus a more modest undertakingis in order here,
one that is more limitedin scope and yet consistentwith the spiritofcritical assessment
evoked by our having achieved our 25th birthday.
Such a context need not be contrived. This month marks another anniversarythat
seems well suited to the tasks of retrospection:it was just 20 years ago that I first
presentedmy paper on 'Pre-Theories and Theories ofForeign Policy' at a Northwestern
Universityconference,'and the sentimentalistin me sees its survival across two decades
as worthyof commemoration. Or at least I like to thinkthat despite the extensiveand
cogent criticismsto which theideas in theoriginalpaper have since been subjected,2they
stillseem to enjoy sufficientcurrencyto warrant revisitation.Equally important,while
myhard-nosed,analytic selfacknowledges that the paper's anniversaryis a personal one
and that thefactofitssurvivalis thushardly an occasion forISA to celebrate,some ofthe
concernsofthat pre-theoreticaleffortdo offera basis fororganizinga modest assessment
of where we have been, where we have strayed,and where we ought to be going.
Anticipatingwhat follows,let me assertmyorganizing themesat the outset.There are
10 of them:
1. The Pre-Theorywas a staticproduct ofa staticera (the early 1960s) and needs to be
rendereddynamic ifit is to be applicable to thedynamic circumstancesofthe 1980s.
2. Its presentinsufficiencies derive fromthe onset ofglobal changes that may amount
to a worldcrisisofauthorityor may otherwisebe farmore profoundthan any ofus have
yet to recognize.
3. To increase the likelihood of glimpsing any new global dynamics that may be at
work,it is importantto presume that any and everysystemcomprisingglobal lifeis
always on the verge of collapse.
4. Among the many sources of change, the explosion of subgroupism, of individuals
redefiningtheirloyalties in favor of more close-at-hand collectivities,is especially
relevant to the global crisisof authority.
5. The explosion ofsubgroupismis, in turn,rooted in a substantialenlargementofthe
analyticaptitudesofcitizensthroughouttheworld which,along witha diminishedsense
ofcontrolover the course oftheirlives,has led individuals to heightenthesalience of
subgroup affiliationsand lessen the relevance of whole system ties, thereby
precipitatingthe authoritycrisisthat has altered the distributionof power and the
effectivenessof states on a global scale.
JAMES N. ROSENAU 247
6. The confluenceof new structuresand old patterns has resulted in self-generating

and far-reachingdimensionsof global lifethat are so recurrentas to amount to an
overall pattern of disorder,one that can usefullybe called Cascading Interdepen-
dence.
7. Three major concepts-role scenarios, aggregation, and adaptation are compel-
ling as means through which to render the Pre-Theory dynamic and thereby
capable of probing the emergentstructuresand persistentpatternsof our waning
century.
8. As war drives long-cycle theory,as the distributionof power and the position of
hegemons drive Neo-Realist theory,as class struggleand control over productive
capabilities drive Marxist theory,so does the interactionof the authoritycrisis,the
mushroomingof subgroupism, and the enlargement of the analytic aptitudes of
individuals on a global scale drive the theoryof cascading interdependence.
9. The theoryof cascading interdependence can be developed without dwelling on
war, power balances, or military strategies because in focusing on authority
relationships, aggregative dynamics, and adaptive mechanisms it is probing
phenomena along the same continuum ofwhich the threator exerciseofforceis but
one extreme.
10. As observersofglobal life,we are, inevitably,also actorsin theprocessesofcascading
interdependence and must thus be ever alert to maintaining ourselves as open
systems.
These themesare quite different fromthoseon which the Pre-Theorywas founded.At
that time,caught up in the heady euphoria ofscience's seeminglyunlimitedcapacity to
explore heretoforeinexplicable dimensions of the field, I was mainly concerned with
explaining those patterns that seemed elusive and were thus presumed to underlie
bafflingshiftsand fluctuationsin foreignpolicy. In addition, I had hoped to contribute
to an ever-widening intersubjectiveconsensus about the field and the appropriate
methods forstudyingit. Now, with the advantage of hindsight,it seems clear that any
attemptto probe new and changing dimensionsofglobal lifemustproceed on thebasis of
also comprehending those featuresthat appear stable and predictable. Now it seems
obvious to me that to aspire to theoretical breakthroughs we need to return to
fundamentals,to take nothingforgranted,to delineate ratherthan assume theauthority
relationsthatlinkmicroactions and macro outcomes,to presumeratherthan dismissthe
possibilitythat even the most permanent of global structuresare always susceptible to
transformation,to regard both the long-standingand recent actors in world politics as
no less capable offalteringand disappearing than theyare ofsucceeding and surviving.
And now it is also clear that a broadly shared paradigm is presentlybeyond our grasp
and that the dialectic dialogues that have emerged instead of consensus may actually
stimulate progresstoward greater comprehension.
Changing Observers of a Changing World

But, followingthe Pre-Theory'sstresson the need forself-consciousinquiry,it is crucial
to acknowledge at the outset that a return to fundamentals may prove exceedingly
difficult.To treatbasic structuresand processesas no longer given is to riskobfuscation
and uncertainty.It may also force us to confrontsigns of slippage in our conduct as
scholars,to admit that the dynamicsofglobal change may be upending our balance and
capacities as observers,therebylesseningour confidencethatwe can comprehendglobal
248 A Pre-TheoryRevisited
patternsand explain theirunderlyingdynamics. Even worse,we mightdiscoverthat the

diminution of our confidence has induced us into curbing our creative impulses,
narrowingour horizons, and settlingforimmediate, manageable problems as research
foci rather than aspiring to knowledge-buildingon a grand scale. Still worse, to treat
long-standingconstantsas dynamics is to face the realization ofhow fullywe have been
living in conceptual jails ofour own making and the extentto which we have thus been
prisonersof our own theories.
If confusionhas led to disillusionand loss ofconfidence,it is certainlyunderstandable.
The breakdown and diffusionofauthoritystructures,theimpotenceofgovernments,the
advent of economic disarray in the First World and the persistenceof povertyin the
Third World, the simultaneity of collapse and coherence in global, regional, and
national systems,theintractabilityofthe arms race, and the overall decline ofcivilityare
but a fewofthe patternsthat run counter to our understandingoftheforcesthatwere at
workin the world at thatdistanttimewhen ISA was founded. Back then,the orderliness
ofthe patternsseemed quite recognizable and, accordingly,world affairsseemed subject
to influenceand redirection.Now everythingseems in disarray,as ifneithermen ofgood
will nor tyrannicalregimescan affectthe macro forcesof transnationalchange that are
unfoldingeverywhere.
The world, in short,has let many of us down. It simply has not conformedto our
expectations.Our theoreticalpremiseshave been vividlynegated by eventsand we have
been endlesslysurprisedby developmentsforwhich our formulationsallowed no room.
An Egyptian Presidentwas not supposed to address the Israeli Knesset and an American
Presidentwas not supposed to toast his hostsin China. The Embassy in Teheran was not
supposed to be overtakenand Solidaritywas not supposed to gain momentum.The price
of oil was supposed to remain stable and so were the world's currencies. Deterrence
policies were supposed to reduce the threat of nuclear holocaust and detente policies
were supposed to ameliorate East-West frictions.
Not all of us, ofcourse, feeloverwhelmedor dispiritedby such developments.For the
Realists, Neo-Realists, and others among us who are accustomed to presuming an
anarchical systemand anticipatinga deepening and spreading ofthe chaos it promotes,
the changing landscape of world politics appears as simply more of the same, as an
updated versionofwhat is bound to happen when a hegemon declines and global power
therebygets redistributed.For them the surprisesmay lie more in the fact that other
embassies have not been seized and that the sharp jumps in oil prices did not produce
more intense disturbances.
For those long-timeAmerican students of international affairswho attached more
importance to the world's growinginterdependencethan to the shiftsin its distribution
of power, the disillusionmenthas been especially acute. For us, the transformationof
global structuresand the dynamic pace ofchange was accompanied by marked declines
in both our country'scapacities as a superpower and our own resourcesas researchers.
Many of us who entered the professionbefore,say, ISA's tenthbirthday had become
accustomed to assuming that thiswas the American Century,a time when the United
States could exerciseenough controland wisdom to move the course ofeventstoward a
more sane and decent world. Perhaps equally important, the abbreviated American
Century was also a period when there were more than enough fundsforus to gather
data, travel, confer,and otherwiseengage in activitiesthat reinforcedthe vision of an
ever-expanding universe of reliable and cumulative knowledge.
All that came to an end with Vietnam. Not only did the events of the early 1970s
reveal that the country'swisdom and effectivenessas a superpower could no longer be
assumed, but they also contributed to, or at least coincided with, the beginning of the
steady erosion of suppport forinternational studies. In retrospectthe era of plenty in
academe that preceded the 1970s seems like a never-to-be-repeatedanomaly; but, for
those who enjoyed its fruits,the subsequent paucity of research support may well be a
substantialcomponent of the frustratedtendencyto feelthe world is neitherorderlynor
knowable. This 'anguish of the liberal' gets expressed in a varietyof ways by drifting
unabashedly into the realm of values and abandoning any semblance of analytic
detachment,by confininginquiryto immediate policy questions,by focusingon obscure
and low-level theoreticalproblems,by denouncing one's own past formulations,and/or
by franticallysearching for new concepts that might 'Letterreveal the dynamics of
cascading change.
It is not my purpose to downgrade such reactionsor to appeal forcalm in a turbulent
era. While I may know what reaction works forme, I surelydo not know how others
mightbest cope with the dynamics of the world we are committedto studying.Our ties
to that world are too intimate forany among us to dare to tell othershow theyshould
conduct theirinquiries. What I might view as an anguished reaction othersmay well
regard as highlyrational. What mightbe disillusioningforthose in my generationwho
treatedthe discipline'sgrowthas personal challenges and whose midlifecriseswere thus
intensifiedby the advent of global chaos and the decline in research support may, for
those in subsequent generations,loom merelyas problems of the discipline that should
and can be addressed. Accordingly,my purpose is, simply,to call attentionto the fact
that we are open systems,that we are thusvulnerable to a varietyofreactions,and that
we are bound to be betterscholars the more conscious we are ofhow a changing world is
changing us.
The extent to which many of us thrash around for new concepts with which to
comprehend and explain the rapid transformationsof global life offers a good
illustrationofhow confusionand a loss ofconfidencemay be underminingour capacities
as observers. I am, let me hasten to note, especially culpable in this respect, having
moved throughsuch concepts as calculated control (Rosenau, 1963), linkage politics
(1969), political adaptation (1970, 1981), aggregative processes (1980), and fragmeg-
ration (1983a) without pausing to explore fullytheirexplanatory power. Indeed, the
concept of cascading interdependence developed below might be viewed as merely
another frantic attempt to cope with the confusion of emerging and unfamiliar
structures.
Yet I am not alone in this tendency.As one observer (Schmitter,1983) has noted in
thecontextofconfoundingchanges in thestructuresofWest European politics,in recent
years social scientistshave developed at least thirteenconcepts internationaldivision
of labor, center-peripheryrelations, internal colonialism, economic interdependence,
organized complexity,diffusionprocesses,fiscalfederalism,politikverftechtung,territorial
devolution, transnational phenomena, international regimes,micro nationalism, and
neolocalism in an attempt to cope with the shiftingstructuresof political units and
theirrelationships.Nor have our reactionsto global change been confinedto a quest for
new conceptual equipment. The search has also led to broad frameworksand models,
even to whole fieldsof inquiry and schools of thought.As Schmitter(1983: 3) puts it:
New protodisciplines fieldssuch as regionalscience,peace
or interdisciplinary
research,internationalintegrationtheory,theoriesof the local state, and
world-systemsanalysishave emergedtodeal withanalyzingsituationsinwhichthe
identity,and authorityhave becomeincreasingly
unitsof interest, incongruent,
and withdescribingtheefforts whichhave been made-or shouldbe made-to
250 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
readjust spatial boundaries,redistributefunctionalcompetences,restructure

productivesystems, and redefinecollectiveimagesin orderto cope withthisnew
reality.
This is not to imply that effortsto develop and refineconcepts appropriate to newly
emergent structures are necessarily expressive of confusion and are bound to be
counterproductive. Political theoryis, to a large extent, a product of upheaval and
breakdown, of the need to rationalize and/or explain new conditions and problems
(Wolin, 1969: 1080), so that the presentimpulses to theorize are in continuous need of
nurturing.If new, even frantic,conceptual formulationsare required to sustain such
impulses,thensurelytheyshould be undertaken. It may well be, in fact,that theprocess
of thrashing around for new conceptual equipment will lead to theoretical break-
throughs.Clearly, forexample, the concept ofinternationalregimes,focusingas it does
on issue-areas wherein transnational ties and informaldecision-ruleshave evolved to
compensate forthe insufficiency ofestablished lines ofauthority,offerssome promise in
thisregard. Even the concepts ofrole scenarios and cascading interdependenceoutlined
below, I like to think,have potential as building blocks ofviable theoryand may thusbe
more than a fretfulreaction to global chaos.
But thereremains the danger thatfrustrationover the course ofeventswill lead to the
replacement of incisive concepts with formulationsthat are vague and elusive, that do
not discipline our inquiries and allow us to strayfromtough-mindedempiricism,and
that therebyundermineour capacity as observers.Consider, forexample, how Burton's
(1983: 16) deep and urgentdespair over the state ofworld affairsleads him to obfuscate
conceptual distinctionsby equating idealism withrealismand viewingan 'appeal' to one
as an appeal to the other. Or ponder the fact that the diverse meanings attached to the
concept ofa world systemhave proliferatedto the point where the concept now has to be
differentiatedin termsof whetherit is used 'with or without the hyphen' (Thompson,
1983). More significantly,consider the unrestrainedenthusiasm (e.g., Krasner, 1984;
Lentner, 1984) thathas greetedand sustained the tendencyto resurrectthe 'State' as an
analytic concept and to employ it ambiguously in at least fivedifferentways (Benjamin
and Duvall, 1982). While thistendencydoubtless stemsfrommany sources including
the increased relevance of economic variables and the need to posit an adversary for
dependent peoples, classes, and multinational corporations one of them certainly
seems to be the failure of the available conceptual equipment to quicken the slow and
erratic pace of knowledge-building.
But even if frustrationcan be contained and confusion transformedinto creative
insight,how to proceed? Given a greater self-consciousnessof our analytic selves as
vulnerable to the course of world affairs,how to avoid slipping into narrow policy
concerns or reliance on elusive conceptual equipment? Under conditions of dynamic
change how does one retain and serve the aspiration to knowledge-buildingon a grand
scale?
The answers are not simple. The very reasons to be self-consciousalso underlie our
vulnerability and leave us ever tempted to forgo long-term goals for short-term
satisfactions.Yet, though it may seem self-evident,the keylies in understandingthat as
observerswe are, inevitably,also actors, that we are as subject to the ebbs and flowsof
world politics as the individuals and collectivitieson whom we focusour analytic skills.
More specifically,we need to appreciate that the dynamics ofglobal lifeare affectingus,
thatwe are always in danger ofgettingcaught up so fullyin the transformations at work
that we will lurch erraticallyacross the global landscape we seek to comprehend.
Such, at least, is my aspiration forthe ensuinganalysis. I hope it suggestshow a return

to fundamentalscan fortify inquiries and therebyreinforceour
us against self-defeating
commitment to building knowledge that is enduring, that can outlast the policy
concerns of today and serve equally well the needs of tomorrow.
Patterned Disorder
In rereadingthe Pre-Theory I am struckby how time-boundit is. Despite the emphasis
it places on the world's growing complexity and interdependence, the original paper
remains clearly a product of the early 1960s,3of that relativelytranquil period when
both the United States and itssocial scientistsassumed that plentitudeand growthwere
the underlyingcondition ofglobal lifeand thuswere confidentthat any problem could
be resolvedifenough resourcesand imagination were broughtto bear on it. Nothing in
the Pre-Theory anticipated a world of mounting scarcities, falteringsuperpowers,
collapsing economies, and pervasive breakdowns ofauthority.It did referto the need to
let our variables vary widely, but it certainlydid not contemplate empirical variations
that would encompass fundamentalistupheavals in the East and burning cities in the
West. And while it also urged probing beyond manifeststructuresforlatent tendencies,
it certainlydid not trace conceptual horizons that allowed foroil crunches,organized
terrorism,currencycrises,and informationrevolutions.
Theoretically, too, the Pre-Theory was time-bound. It was overly simple in its
reliance on the natural sciences and the aspiration to a cumulative theorythat can be
applied to any actor at any time. In so doing, the Pre-Theoryutterlyfailed to anticipate
the subsequent advent of a generation of scholars who, perhaps disillusioned by
Vietnam, Watergate, and other corruptionsof the post-war order, came to doubt the
utility of cumulation and welcomed counterintuitivechallenges to established pro-
cedures. More specifically,encouraged by the worksof Lakatos and Musgrave (1970),
Habermas (1971, 1974, 1976), and other critical theorists (Held, 1980) who were
skeptical about the prevailing scientificparadigm, many in the post-Vietnam, post-
Popper generation became committed to the idea that knowledge-buildingis better
served through a dialectic method that sustains conflictingtheories than through a
scientificmethod thatseeks consensual theoryfounded on empirical proof.Some among
us are saying,in effect,that the disorderwhich marksworld affairsalso characterizesour
effortsto comprehend world affairs.Equally important,and as will be seen, they are
saying that neither the empirical nor the theoretical chaos are regrettable,that the
quality oflifeas well as thequality ofknowledgemay be advanced throughconditionsof
disorder.
At the core ofthe Pre-Theory'sfailurewas a static conception ofauthoritystructures,
both within and between societies. As noted below in Figure 1, it treated the world as
frozen into a structure comprised of nation-states which had governments that
interactedthroughan activitycalled foreignpolicy. To be sure,allowance was made for
variations in the way domesticfactorsinfluencedthe external behavior ofgovernments
as well as fora modicum ofrelevanttransnationalinteractionsamong nongovernmental
actors and between them and governments.But the flow of activities and influence
outside government-to-government relations was posited as ancillary because of an
implicitassumption that all the actors in the systemunderstood theirroles to be located
in the unvarying structuresof the state system. Such a perspective was not in itself
erroneous.States and governmentswere (and are) centralinternationalactors and they
did (and do) initiate much of the flow of influence along the tributaries of the
252 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
international system.Rather, the trouble with the Pre-Theory was less its descriptive
accuracy and more its conceptual rigidity. It did not subsume dynamics whereby
authority relationships within and among states could change. Stated in terms of a
concept developed below, the Pre-Theory presumed that the role scenarios of all the
system'sactors played out sequences in which theirauthorityand theirresponsivenessto
the authorityof the otherswas fixedand unquestionable. The habits of the state system
were treated as deeply engrained in the leaders and the led, in the powerfuland the
weak, in domesticpublics and state bureaucracies, and in all the othercollectivitiesthat
comprised the world in the firstdecades afterWorld War II. Indeed, it seems clear in
retrospectthat all the actorswere presumed to be so habituated to theirroles as to lack a
capacity for learning or otherwisealtering the authoritypatternsinto which they fit.
Compliance and systemmaintenance were implicitlyposited as the givens of authority
structuresand only the way in which authoritywas exercised was seen to vary.
Thus it is hardly surprising that the Pre-Theory was marked by a narrow
preoccupation withforeignpolicy as the phenomenon to be explained. Not only did the
original formulationfocuson the sources offoreignpolicy behavior withoutelaborating
on the nature ofthatbehavior, but in so doing it also divertedattentionfromthepatterns
of world politics to which the external policies of states contribute. That is, the only
outcomes it sought to explain were the policies undertakenby governmentsabroad and
it explicitlyeschewed casting a net large enough to encompass the outcomes that result
from the interaction of governments and other international actors. As specified,
therefore,the Pre-Theory was bound to be insensitiveto much of the change that has
unfolded in recent years.
Similarly,since recurrentforeignpolicy undertakingsare relativelyeasy to identify
and quantify,theylend themselvesreadily to a natural science format.The Pre-Theory
sufferedfrom an imprecise formulation of what constitutes foreign policy, but it
nonethelessencountered no difficulty in classifyingthe externalbehavior ofstatesas the
dependent variable and treating the individual, role, governmental, societal, and
systemicantecedents of such behavior as independent variables. Such variables are
equally operative in world politics and, in retrospect,it is regrettablethat this more
encompasing focus was not at the center of the original formulation. What was a
Pre-TheoryofForeign Policy could and should have been cast as a Pre-TheoryofGlobal
Politics. As will be seen, the ensuing analysis does not shy away fromcasting thiswider
net.
The question arises as to whetherthe advent ofgrand formulationssince the original
Pre-Theory have not obviated the need to cast a wider net. Why not work with, or
rework,neo-realism,regimes,long-cycle theory,or the world-systemapproach, some
might ask, rather than revisitthe Pre-Theory and attempt to expand its scope? I have
pondered this question at some length,aware that the natural tendencyto see vitality
rather than obsolescence in one's prior work reinforcesthe inclination to stickwith it.
Nevertheless,revisitationseems preferable to replacement for several reasons. One is
that while I envy the parsimony accomplished by the assumption of neo-realism that
states-as-actorsalone infuselogic and substance into global structures,by thesimplifying
premisesof the world-systemapproach on the role of the capitalist world economy, and
by the postulatesoflong-cycletheoryas to the transforming dynamicsofglobal wars, the
empiricist in me is restlesswith such elegant formulations.More accurately, I am
impressed by the multiplicityand diversityof the motives, actors, outcomes, systems,
and levels of aggregation in world affairs that do not fit snugly into the grand
formulations.There seem to be so many points at which authoritystructuresand other
interactionpatternsmay be changing that I see a danger ofprematureclosure on behalf

of parsimony. The fact that new generations of computers provide a realisticbasis for
some relaxation of our aspirations to parsimony adds furtherto the incentive to stick
withthemultiple-layerperspectiveunderlyingthe Pre-Theory.Even more importantly,
the scope of the grand formulations is too broad to encompass the dynamics of
compliance and learning on the part of subgroups within states or the world system
taken as a whole. The possibilityand implicationsofa worldwide crisisofauthoritycan
thus not be brought clearly into focus by any of these formulations.
This is not the place to probe all the changes that reveal the static nature of the
Pre-Theory. A revisit need only delineate those changes that may have fostereda
worldwide crisis of authority and that thus highlight where and how conceptual
revisionsmust be made to infusedynamism into the Pre-Theory. Most of the changes
have emerged at the macro level, but the changing analytic skills of publics is one
alterationthathas surfacedat themicro level which seemscloselylinked to the authority
crisesat all levels. Indeed, it seems so fundamentalas tojustifyfocusingon the authority
structuresand aggregative processes whereby the micro components of international
politics get transformedinto macro outcomes (see below).
As elaborated at greaterlengthelsewhere (Rosenau, 1980), six macro changes strike
me as especially noteworthy.Perhaps the most conspicuous is the advent of resource
scarcitiesand the prospect of a continual decline in theiravailability. Not only does the
global pie seem to have acquired finiteboundaries, but it has also shrunkrelative to the
demands made upon it. Shortages in energy,food, water, lumber, and other resources
now routinelyand quickly make theirway throughprice increases,famines,droughts,
etc. along the causal chains that link the structuresof world politics.Just as dynamic
technologieshave rendered individuals and communitiesever more interdependent,so
have theyintensifiedeconomic development and spurred more complex industrializa-
tion,processesthat in turnhave consumed natural resourcesat a greaterrate with the
result that technological breakthroughs are then generated in order to offsetthe
emergentresourceshortages.Experts differon the extentto which various resourcesare
being depleted, but most agree that depletion is occurring and that the futurewill be
marked by increasing scarcities (Barney, 1980).
Anotheremergentpattern,stimulatedin part by mountingresourcescarcitiesas well
as a variety of other factors,is the growthin the demands of the disadvantaged for a
redistributionofwealth. Both withinand among nations thosewith only small sliversof
the global pie have become increasinglyrestlessand theirrestlessnesshas brought them
togetherin organizations, from the guerrilla movement to the Group of 77, that are
increasinglycoherent. And as the motives of the disadvantaged have changed and
become more self-conscious,so have long-establishedrelationshipsamong individuals,
groups,communities,and statesundergone both subtle and radical shifts.Oft-timesit is
no longer clear who is leading and who is following,who is dominant and who is
subordinate,who is astride the wave of the futureand who is ridingthe crestofthe past.
Nor are the disadvantaged alone in sharing a greaterconsciousnessof theircollective
needs and wants. For reasons elaborated below, the trend toward segments of
society becoming increasinglyaware of the ties that differentiatethem what I call
'subgroupism' is unfoldingon a worldwide scale. It encompasses skilled professionals
as well as blue-collar workers,universityfaculties as well as student groups, wealthy
industrialistsas well as unemployed laborers, mainstream citizens as well as ethnic
minorities.It would seem, in short,that wherevercommon ties can be identified,they
have been, thus leading to the drawing togetherof the ties,the articulationofdemands
254 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
supporting them, the restructuringof loyalties and authority relationships,and the

weakening of the whole systemin which the subgroups share memberships.
Recent events in Lebanon offer a quintessential example of subgroupism. In
February, 1984, during the heightof the conflictin Beirut,militaryunitsof at least ten
factions were joined in battle the Amal Shiites, the Islamic Amal, the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards, the Druse, the Sunni Muslims, the Phalangists, three smaller
Christian militias, and the Lebanese Army along with elements of the Palestine
guerrillas and the Syrian, Israeli, French, British,and US armed forces.
With the proliferationofsubgroups and the changes in theiraspirations,and with the
continued advances oftechnologyand the unending consumptionofresourceson which
its advances rest,equally profoundpatternshave surfacedin the means and capabilities
throughwhich various internationalactors pursue theirgoals, reinforcetheirmotives,
and maintain theirrelationships.More organized and more cohesive, many subgroups
in many societies are better able than ever beforeto back up theirdemands with the
stubbornconfidencethat goals are attainable. And as the capabilities and dedication of
subgroups grow, correspondingdeclines oftenfollow in the authorityof governments,
reducing their capacity to govern and furtheraltering the pace of change and the
relativestrengthofthe actorscontestingitsdirection.Thus, while governmentshave not
lost theircapacity for repression,many seem increasinglyless able to maintain order,
solve problems, plan ahead or otherwise cope with transformationsat home and
challenges fromabroad.
In a like manner the breakdown ofauthoritywithinnation-statesis paralleled by the
fragmentationoftiesamong them,so that grand alliances are no longergrand and their
leaders can no longer be sure theirallies will follow theirleads. The bipolar world has
thusgiven way to the multipolarworld and thusmay the multipolarworld yield to forms
of world order that have yet to mark human history.
Still another emergentpatternneeds to be noted. It involves the large extentto which
unfamiliarsocio-economicissueshave crowded onto theglobal agenda, rivaling(and, in
some instances, superseding) military-security issues for the attention of officialsand
publics. Generated by the world's growinginterdependence,the new issues give rise to
value dilemmas that are new and political processes that are not readily managed
through conventional national and international channels (Rosenau, 1984). Accord-
ingly,theycan be viewed as genuinelytransnationalissues in the sense that theycan be
just as easily initiated and sustained by nongovernmentalactors as by governments.
Currencycrises,acid rain, terrorism,and refugeeboatloads are merelyillustrativeofthe
relativelyrecent advent of serious and enduring transnationalissues.
But all of the foregoingare macro patterns and, as such, raise the controversial
question of what changes at the micro level may be occurringso that those at macro
levels get initiated and sustained. This question is controversialbecause Neo-Realists,
among others,argue that macro structuresfollow a logic of theirown, that once they
become established theycan be explained in theirown terms,and thatto proceed in any
other way is to fall victim to an unnecessary reductionism. I am not persuaded. The
changes at work in the world strike me as too extensive to be independent of
transformations occurringat microlevels. Why, forexample, are subgroupsincreasingly
coherentand demanding? While the answer lies partlyin developmentsat macro levels
of aggregation,especially in the national societyand the internationalsystem,no small
part ofit is also to be foundin thegreaterself-consciousness and expanding capabilities of
individuals. As will be discussed below, a case can be made fortheconclusion that,across
cultures and on a worldwide basis, individuals are increasinglyskilled at managing
complexity even as they also increasingly sense the course of events to be beyond
control.
If thisis so, ifmuch of the disarray that appears to mark global lifecan be traced to
these emergent capacities of great masses of people, then changes at the micro level
cannot be dismissedas irrelevantreductionism.At the veryleast it is compelling to view
macro and microphenomena as interactive,witheach givingdefinitionand structureto
the other. That is, the habits of compliance and cooperation that sustain macro
collectivitiesand institutionsare the habits of individuals, but these habits are in turn
shaped by the values and needs that enable the collectivitiesand institutionsto persist.
A final change pattern is operative at both the macro and micro levels. It concerns
thoseintellectual and technological advances encompassed by the postwar upheaval in
communicationsand the recentupsurge in itsmomentumthat is perhaps best labeled as
'the microelectronicrevolution'. Involved in the latter are the evolving developments
thathave produced artificialintelligence,robotics,new generationsofcomputers,and a
host of other mechanisms for facilitating the generation, flow, and application of
informationthat apparently portend changes of such profound magnitude as to be
comparable to those precipitated by the industrial revolution. Perhaps because it is so
new, themicroelectronicimpact on global politicshas yetto become fullymanifest.With
few exceptions (Gilpin, 1979; Kochen, 1981; King, 1983), in fact,it has not yet been
recognized as capable of becoming a powerful force for change in world affairs.
Nevertheless,enough has been documented on the scope and potential of microelec-
tronictechnologyto presume thatit will intensifyor otherwiseconsiderablyaffectall the
macro and micro changes enumerated above.4 If nothing else, the interactionamong
resourcescarcities,subgroupism,the effectiveness ofgovernments,transnationalissues,
and the aptitudes of publics will be greatlydeepened and extended as the impact of the
technologyspreads.
With individuals more self-consciousand competent,with subgroups coalescing and
governments foundering, with multinational corporations collaborating in joint
productiveenterprisesand multilateralalliances splittingover monetaryand economic
policies,withinternationalregimesseekingto develop theglobal commons and national
actors trying to extend and enclose their piece of the commons, and with the
microelectronicrevolutionhasteningand enlargingall thesetrends,theoverall structure
of the internationalsystemcertainlyseems disorderlyto an extreme. Compared to the
past, the boundaries that differentiatethe actorsin world politicsseem less clear-cutand
theirauthoritystructuresseem less comprehensive.Gone is the relativetidinessprovided
by historicjurisdictionsand stable polities,by legal precedentsand accepted procedures,
by shared values and culturalcontinuities.Where thelegitimacyofstateswas once taken
for granted, today it is frayed or (as in Poland and Lebanon) virtually nonexistent.
Where rebel organizations used to join togetheragainst a common enemy, today they
resisteach other (as among the Afghans) and even war on each other (as in the PLO).
Where geographic borders once delineated a people, today they surround partial and
mixed populations as the flow of refugees,immigrants,and illegal aliens swells in all
parts of the world. Where economies were once largely self-contained,today they are
permeated by goods and services from abroad and by underground markets and
exchanges at home. Where the UN SecurityCouncil once voted on resolutions,today it
mostlyholds debates. Where embassies were once immune and inviolate, today theyare
subject to occupations and targets of explosives. Where the flightsof commercial
airlinersonce constituteda simple transnational pattern,today theycan be the foci of
superpower competition.
It mightbe contended that I have overstatedthe degree to which change has come to
mark the global scene, that a nostalgic preferencefororder has led to a highlyselective
focus on a few deviant cases, that in any event the citation of recent examples is no
substitutefora broad historicalperspectivewhich posits recentchanges as merelynew
instancesoflong-standingpatterns,and that,indeed, the changes are less a consequence
of dynamics at work in the global systemand more a functionof our recentprogressin
developing conceptual and analytic techniques for probing more deeply into the
underlyingstructuresand processes of world affairs.These lines of reasoning certainly
cannot be discounted. Despite the availability ofresearchfindingsthatdepict change in
the direction of greater interdependence on a worldwide scale (e.g., Rosecrance and
Stein, 1973), it may well be that a more historicalapproach which casts analysis in the
context of centuries rather than decades would lead to the conclusion that global
structuresremain much the same as they have always been (Gilpin, 1981).
For me, however, the charge of ahistoricismis not persuasive. As argued elsewhere
(Rosenau, 1983b), too many of the fundamental parameters of modern lifeare of too
recent origin to warrant reliance on the long-term lessons of history. The nuclear
weapon, perhaps the most fundamentalparameter of all, entered historyonly in 1945.
The industrialsocietyhas yielded to the informationsocietyeven more recently.And as
several astute observers (e.g., Toffler,1980; Yankelovich, 1981; Naisbett, 1982) have
cogently demonstrated, the parametric change represented by the microelectronic
revolution has in turn been associated with still other cultural, psychological, and
socioeconomic patternsthat could hardlyhave been imagined by earliergenerations.In
any event,even ifsuch assessmentsexaggerate the pace and depth ofchange, thereseems
to be enough commotionin theworld tojustifypresumingthatpervasivechanges as well
as resilientconstanciesare at workon a global scale. And even ifthe resultingchaos is no
greaterthan in previoushistoricaleras,itsprevalence today is surelypervasiveenough to
renderdubious any assumptionswhich posit global structuresas stable and permanent.
Thus it is also difficultto view the asymmetriesand disorder that have come to mark
world affairsas expressiveofan era oftransition,as reflectingprocessesofreorganization
and regrouping that will eventually culminate in new symmetriesand a new global
order. Given the changes that are underway, such a perspective may well be more a
functionofour need forcognitivebalance and orderlystructuresthan ofthe dynamicsat
work in the world. The asymmetriesmay be part of the emergentorder and theymay
even be forerunners if not stimuli of still more ungainly asymmetriesin the future.
Indeed, it is not difficultto discern in the interaction of the foregoingchanges an
underlyingorder, a patterned chaos, that may well persistacross a number of decades.
Cascading Interdependence
What is that patternedchaos? What are its patterns?And what about it is chaotic? The
patternsare formedby breakdowns oflong-standingauthorityrelationsat everysystem
level, fromthe individual throughthe global, which have resultedin the interlockingof
two historic processes and one that derives from the recent advent of complex
interdependence.The chaos resultsfromthe simultaneity,contrariety,and expansivity
inherentin the interactionof these primaryprocesses.
Although given new shape and impetus by the changing structuresenumerated
above, the two historicprocesses are familiarfeaturesof social systems.They consistof
those dynamics that conduce to systemicintegration on the one hand and systemic
disintegrationon the other, to centripetal forces that today are making groups and
nations more and more interdependent even as centrifugalforces are increasingly

fragmentingthem into subgroups and subnations. It has always been the case that
movementstoward thecoherenceofa sociopoliticalsystemnormallyfostercountermove-
mentstoward fragmentationon the part ofits subsystemsand/orthe systemsofwhich it
is a subsystem.Contrariwisegreatercoherence withinsubsystemshas always tended to
create problemsofbreakdown forthesystemofwhich theyare a part.5Historicallythese
interactivetensionsbetween systemsand subsystemshave been sequential, stretching
out across long periods of time to accommodate the communications and learning
necessaryto the evolution of tensions.In thisera ofself-evidentscarcities,self-conscious
subgroupism, ineffectivegovernments,transnational issues, and instant communica-
tions,however, the time lapse between coherence and breakdown in social systemsand
their subsystems has been reduced virtually to zero. Simultaneity marks their
interaction.Coherence and breakdown now feed on each other continuously,without
respitesthat allow foreitherthe systemor itssubsystemsto consolidate and adjust to the
tensions.
A recent circumstancein Lebanon offersan incisive insightinto the extentto which
the links between systemic coherence and breakdown can be simultaneous and
self-sustaining.In March, 1984, faced with an on-goingcivil war and the prospectsof a
total breakdown oftheirsociety,leaders ofthenine Lebanese factionsagreed to converge
in Switzerland to arrange fora cease-fireand talkson 'national reconciliation'. None of
theleaders could flyout oftheircountry'snational airport,however.Why? Because they
could not agree on termsthat would open the airportlong enough to allow fortheirsafe
departure.
But the interlockingand simultaneityof integrative and disintegrativetendencies
within sociopolitical systems are not the only dimension along which patterned
asymmetrieshave surfacedin global life. No less importantis the expansivityof these
tendenciesthatderivesfromtheincreasingcomplexityofglobal interdependence.In the
past, with the sovereigntyofstatesless permeable and theirdependence on otherstates
less pervasive,the tensionsbetween a systemand itssubsystemswere confinedlargelyto
that system.But the advent of complex interdependencehas expanded the boundaries
withinwhich systemic-subsystemic tensionsunfold. Today, preciselybecause scarcities
are greater,subgroupsstronger,and governmentsweaker, thesetensionscan spread and
interlockwith comparable tensionsin othersystems,therebyproducing changes which
cascade endlesslyupon each otheracross the global system.The cascading changes may
seem chaotic and lacking in order, but they strike me as orderly,as so inextricably
intertwinedthrough the simultaneity,contrariety,and expansivity of the integrative
and disintegrativetendencies at work in the world as to forma patterned chaos.
What renders these processes orderly, what makes them patterned despite the
appearance of chaos, is that theyderive fromat least two common sources. One is the
advent ofa breakdown ofauthorityon a global scale. For a host ofreasons,including the
changes enumerated in the previous section, relations between those who have
legitimacyand/or exercise authorityand those who respond to and/or comply with it
have undergone transformationat every systemiclevel. As illustratedby the seizure of
the US embassyin Iran, or by the topplingof thejunta in Argentina,or by the pending
United States withdrawal fromUNESCO, or by the politics of Chicago to mention
just a few obvious instances among the myriad that could be cited at every systemic
level the role scenarios through which individuals and collectivitieshave long been
habituated to legitimacyand authorityhave become increasinglyless compelling and
viable. The symbols,values, and memoriesthat have been stimulito compliance are no
longer taken for granted in many parts of the world. New foci of loyalty, borne
sometimes out of desperation and sometimes out of sophistication,have emerged to
compete forthe commitmentsof individuals and the orientationsof collectivities.
In short,theglobal crisisofauthoritycan be viewed as more profoundthan theadvent
ofrevolutionaryupheaval. It is notjust the have-notswanting to depose the haves. It is
ratherthat the habits ofcompliance are being questioned, replaced, and/orabandoned
on a worldwide scale, among the haves as well as the have-nots.As one observerputs it:
Authorities are nowbeingchallengedin all areasofhumanlife.Institutions are no
longerrespectedjust because theyare institutions. The church,the school,the
family,thestate-thosetraditional bastionsofauthority-havelosta largeamount
oftherespectthatwas formerly automaticallyaccordedto them.In almostevery
countryoftheworld,theyoungquestiontheviewsoftheireldersto a degreenever
done before.
More is at stake... we believethanthemererevoltofdissidents. At issueis a
changein ourwayofthinking aboutthebasicnatureand functionofauthorityitself.
We are now witnessing a challengeto the veryideaof authority.The crisisof
authority is morethana reconsideration ofhow authorityshouldbe expressedin
society.It extendsalso to a reconsiderationofthemeaningofauthority.
Many of the questionsnow being asked about the nature and functionof
authority arequitehealthyones,motivatednotfromrebellionand revolt,butfrom
a sincerequestto discoverthetruenatureand locus,or loci,ofauthority. Whatis
happening... is theattempttointernalize authority,
thatis,toshiftthebasisofits
verificationfromexternaland publicmodesto internaland privateones (Harris,
1976: 1).6
Whether one views the interpretationthat the global crisisas rooted in attemptsto
internalize authority,or whetherone focuseson the effortsto externalize authorityby
Islamic fundamentalistsand other groups, both interpretationshighlightthe cruciality
of the breakdown of compliance habits at all systemiclevels to the emergingorder of
world politics.For the pervasivenessofthesebreakdownshas resultedin the realignment
ofsystemsand subsystems,in the transferoflegitimacysentimentsand authorityhabits
away fromone systemlevel and toward another, thus fosteringgreaterintegrationfor
the latterand greaterdisintegrationforthe former.If the transferflowsfroma systemto
a subsystem,as happens much more oftenthan transfersat the same systemiclevel, then
it is the subgroup that gains in coherence at the expense ofthe system'sintegrity.And as
the habits ofcompliance give way to thehabitsofrethinking andredirecting so do
compliance,
the simultaneityand expansivity of the integrative and disintegrativeprocesses get
reinforcedand sustained.
There is a second, even more crucial source that fostersthe emergentorderlinessof
global life. It involves the dynamics which underlie the habits of rethinkingand
redirecting compliance. The analytic aptitudes of individuals, their capacity for
elaborating ever more complex role scenarios thatstretchout acrosslongerperiodsin the
future,have in recentdecades undergone substantialgrowththroughouteveryregionof
the world, thereby facilitatingand nourishing the habit of rethinkingthe foci and
consequences of compliance. The potential and limitsof these aptitudes are discussed
and evidence oftheirgrowthis outlined in a subsequent section,but forthe momentthe
reader is asked to suspend doubt and presume thatsuch a dynamic is at workon a global
scale. Acceding temporarilyto thisrequest is central to appreciating my argumentthat,
despite the appearance of chaos, the dynamics of world affairs are patterned and
orderly.
Stated most generally,the patterningoccurs because the enlarged analytic aptitudes

of people enable them to recognize both the virtuesand the drawbacks ofwhole system
coherence and subsystemunity,with the resultthat each systemicrealignmentcontains
the seeds of the next realignmentas individuals redirecttheirlegitimacysentimentsand
compliance habits back and forthbetween the whole systemsand subsystemsof which
they are a part. That is, as subgroups gain coherence at the expense of whole system
integrity,so does it become clearer to theirmembers with growing analytic skillsthat
weakening the systemmay prove costlyto themand that thesecostsare not offsetby the
gains in subsystemiccoherence and effectiveness.Accordingly,the habit of rethinking
compliance is revived and at some point a measure of legitimacy is redirected back
again toward the whole system.Thus, to cite a recent example, it is hardly surprising
that West Germany's Social Democratic Party reversed itselfafter its unsuccessful
campaign against locating American medium-range missilesin Europe and sought to
establishitscredentialsas a supporterofNATO and an advocate ofcentristpositionson
foreignpolicy (Markham, 1984). In effect,the coherence it gained by opposing the
missiledeploymentwas subsequentlyrecognized as too costlyin termsofthe advantages
of more secure ties to the whole system. Similarly, to note an example in which
legitimacysentimentsmoved in a subgroup direction,the Catholic Church in Poland
began to experience fragmentationwhen the coherence it gained throughmoderating
the impact of martial law proved insufficientto withstand furthergovernmental
crackdowns.
Put in stillanotherway, thereis nothingin the state ofnature which enables a system
to serve well all the relevant needs and wants of people. Whole systemsand subsystems
alike are limited in what theycan accomplish. The formerdo poorly at providing the
psychological rewards derived froma shared identityand the latter are ill-equipped to
solve the material problemsassociated withphysical securityand well being. So tensions
between them are bound to persistand the advent of more analytically skillfulpublics
has inextricablylinked each cascade of tensionsto those that follow.
In stressingthe interdependence of sequential cascades, however, I do not mean to
imply a processwhereinsystemsand theirsubsystemsnormallyreturnto a pre-existing
and stable equilibrium. Sometimes that does occur, but oft-timesit does not. Cascading
processes may not be equilibrating devices in that oft-timesthe outcome of a cascade
moves a systemand its subsystemson to new relational patternsthat are founded on a
new equilibrium until such time as another cascade initiatesfurtherchange.
The ebbs and flowsofsystemictensions,in sum, are causally connected. What seems
like a chaotic crisis of authorityis, in reality,an orderly set of processes whereby the
simultaneity,the contrareity,and the expansivity of integrative and disintegrative
tendenciesformthe patterned structuresof an emergingglobal system.
The ways in which these processes differentiatethe emerging global order fromits
predecessorare presenteddiagrammatically througha comparison of Figures 1 and 2.
These depict the global system, respectively,before and after the microelectronic
revolutionand the other changes outlined above. Both figuresdisplay world politicsin
termsof two national systems(I and II), theirgovernments(A and B), and two oftheir
nongovernmentalsubsystems(al, a2, b 1, and b2). Both Figures 1 and 2 also indicate the
interaction patterns that have long marked the international scene: conventional
state-to-statediplomatic relations is represented by Arrow I and those that occur
between bureaucratic agencies are indicated by the dotted extensions of Arrow 1;
economic aid, propaganda, and otherprogramsdirectedat publics and nongovernmen-
tal institutionsabroad are representedby Arrows2 and 3; the interactionsand tensions
The World as a System of Cascading Change
A AL W BL
21 t2 3 t 111
4 5 7 8
+ a 10
al b2l~~1 +
I IT
FIG. 1. The WaningSystem
14 15
A 1 B
4 5
~~~~ 37 8
12
6
10
13
FIG. 2 The EmergingSystem
between systemsand theirsubsystemsare representedby Arrows 4 through9; and the

transnational dimension of intersocietalrelations is representedby Arrows 10, 11Iand
the dotted segmentsof Arrows 2 and 3.
Figure 2, however, also contains Arrows 12, 13, 14, and 15, which highlighthow the
simultaneity,contrariety,and expansivityof systemic-subsystemic tensionsat work in
the world have become interlocked.While the firsteleven arrows all link actors to each
other, Arrows 12 through 15 distinguish links between relationships. That is, they
representthe interactionthat occurs between sets of interactionsrather than between
actors. Arrow 12 highlightsthe interactionsthat followwhen tensionsbetween a system
and its subsystemsbecome part of comparable tensionsin other systems.An example
here is provided by the way in which the dynamics of a government'sinteractionwith

protestingpeace groups quickly become linked to theinteractionsbetween governments
and protestersin other countries. Similarly, Arrow 13 suggests the interactions that
follow when tensions between a system's subsystems get interlocked into conflicts
between subsystems in other systems. The spread of agitation between Islamic
fundamentalistsand other sects offersa good illustrationof these interactive pheno-
mena. Arrows 14 and 15 point to the dynamics wherebytensionswithinsystemsswiftly
become part of the tensionsbetween them, a dynamic that is readily observable in the
impact ofAmerican presidentialelectionson Soviet-Americanrelations. In earlier eras
these several types of interlockingtensions unfolded in separate sequences as time
intervenedto slow down theirspread (e.g., the linksdepicted by Arrow 12 in Figure 2
were once betterrepresentedby an Arrow 5 -+ 10-+7 linkage). In the emergingsystemof
today, however, the spread can be so rapid as to collapse into undifferentiatedand
continuous processes such as those described by Arrows 12 through 15.
Stated more generally,Figure 2 makes clear that thesequences initiatedby Arrows 12
through 15 enter into and become part of the internal and international politics of
SystemsI and II, therebycreatingfeedback loops that cascade change throughoutthe
global systemand infusepatterninto its chaos. In effect,the patterneddisorderconsists
of tensions between systems and subsystems that spill over in cascading ways to
exacerbate or otherwise impact on the interaction between other systemsand their
subsystems.And it is here,in theseextended interactionsequences, that the dynamicsof
change operate and differentiatepresent-dayglobal structuresfrom those that have
prevailed in the past.
Examples of these new structuresabound. Perhaps the most obvious concerns the
cascading effectsofThird World debts. Whethertheyare viewed as the originor merely
a sequence of the problem, the debts are part ofa vast feedback loop that can be traced
through United States deficitsand high interestrates, overlending by banks, great
difficulty in paying the interestand/or principal on overseas loans by such countriesas
Argentina, Mexico, and Poland, insistence by the IMF on austerityprograms as a
condition offurtherloans, restlessnessamong domestic publics protestingthe austerity
programs,vacillation by Third World governmentsin the face ofdomestic tensionsand
IMF requirements,and a host ofotherlinkswhich interactwith each otherin ways that
readily conformto the patternsdescribed in Figure 2.
The question arises as to what to call the overall global structuredepicted in Figure 2.
Labels are important.Sound labels orientus toward our subject, the challenges it poses,
and the dynamics it subsumes. Inappropriate labels, on the other hand, can be
diverting, leading us either into misleading arguments over the adequacy of the
nomenclatureor, worse, into rejectingserious consideration of the labeled phenomena
because the designations for them are grating. Both of these reactions greeted Riggs
(1961), forexample, when he delineated the 'prismaticsystem'as a political entityand
offereda new terminologyforprobing its dynamics.
But identifyingan appropriate label is not easy. Just as White (1984: 23-24) had
trouble 'findinga phrase forstylingthisdecade ofdiscontinuity'in American politics,so
do global changes seem to defy labeling. Initially I stressed that the new structures
amounted to an overall patternoffragmegration, a word contrivedto emphasize, through
its very unwieldiness, how the simultaneity and contrariety of integrative and
disintegrative processes give rise to asymmetrical structures and patterned chaos
(Rosenau, 1983a). Justas 'stagflation'successfullydepicted new phenomena comprised
ofold dynamics,it was felt,so would fragmegrationdo the same forfragmentationand
262 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
integration and thereby designate the new ways in which systemicbreakdown and
coherence had become interlocked.
Now, however, fragmegrationno longer seems compelling as a label. In addition to
being awkward and sounding like excessivejargon, it does not call sufficient attentionto
the expansivity inherent in complex interdependence. Fragmegrative dynamics can
occur withinany national system,whereas a centralfeatureoftheemergentasymmetries
is preciselythe global spread of these dynamics via the routes suggested by Arrows 12
through 15 in Figure 2.
So a more accurate and palatable label is in order.The notionofinterlockingtensions
that, being interlocked,derive strengthand direction from each other and cascade
throughoutthe global systemsuggeststhe utilityofcalling its overall structurecascading
interdependence and to speak of cascadingprocesseswhen referringto its dynamics. The
established ways of using the term are suggestiveof how closely it approximates the
emergent nature of world affairs. According to the Second Edition of Webster's
Dictionary,forexample, a 'cascade' describesa waterfall;a particularkindoffirework;a
typeoflace that traces 'a zigzag line in a verticaldirection'; an electricalcircuitin which
'the firstmember of the series supplies or amplifiesthe power of the second, and so on
throughtheseries'; a method in physicsfor'attainingsuccessivelylower temperaturesby
utilizingthe cooling effectof the expansion of one gas in condensing another less easily
liquefiable'; and a technique in electrochemistry forplacing 'electrolyticcells so that the
electrolytefallsfromone cell to the nextlower in the series.' Those in the electricalfield,
moreover,speak of'cascade control' in a 'cascade system'as a means ofobtaining two or
more speeds in a motor-drivingsystem.Although too recentto appear in the dictionary,
perhaps it is also noteworthy that an account (Schmeck, 1984: 1) of a major
breakthroughin cancer researchnoted that expertsin that fieldnow agree that 'cancer
develops in several steps' and that theyreferto the entiresequence ofstepsas a 'cascade'
leading to cancer.
Since the cascade concept suggestsa downward flowof causal dynamics,it should be
stressedthat the intenthere is to referto flowsdown throughtimeand not down through
hierarchicallyordered systems.It is preciselythe nature of cascading interdependence
that the breakdown of authoritystructureswhich precipitate the flowsof change can
originateat any systemicor subsystemiclevel, at which point theycan thenmove up and
across as well as down systemicstructures.
It also should be emphasized, of course, that while the label serves to focus our
attention on the interplay of change and constancy in global life,in itselfit adds no
substance. The interlockingrelationships set forthin Figure 2 do not hint at any
theoreticalpropositions.They only identifythe routes along which influencetraverses
the global system.The next task is to specifythe micro and macro components of the
systemic-subsystemic tensions which constitute the dynamics that drive and sustain
global life.
Concrete and Abstract Units of Analysis
One of the major gaps in the Pre-Theory,its silence on the basic analytic unit on which
theory is to be founded, needs to be addressed if conceptual links are to be drawn
between the macro and micro levels of analysis. The original formulation merely
assumed that the unit had to be limitedto an 'actor' to an observable entitywho made
calculations, frameddecisions,and undertookactions-albeit theactor mightvaryfrom
single individuals to small groups such as cabinets to large collectivities such as

governments.In effect,it was presumed that one started with actors and sought to
theorize about their actions, a presumption which precluded treating other than
concreteentitiesas analytic units. Most notably,it precluded formulationsin which the
abstract aspects of entities say, their orientations,structures,processes, or hierar-
chies-could be the basic units around which inquiry might be organized (Ashley,
1984).
In retrospect,this limitation seems flawed because it is the abstract and not the
concreteaspects ofglobal lifethat preoccupy us. The stabilityofstructures,the limitsof
dominance, the breakdown of authority patterns, the coherence of subgroups, the
processesofcascading interdependence,the adaptation ofsystems,and the dynamics of
change-these are the kinds ofissues that provoke our curiositiesand evoke our values,
and all of them involve only parts of concrete actors and not theirentirebeings. Stated
differently, while a concrete actor may undertake an action in order to preserve or
promote a particular value, oft-timeswe look beyond the actor and its capabilities and
values to the consequences ofthe action forconsensus-formation, systemicstructure,and
a host of other analytic implications of the action that are far removed fromthose who
undertook it.
Thus it seems plausible to argue that our approach to specifyingbasic analytic units
ought to be broader. We need to allow forunitsthat are abstract as well as thosethat are
concrete, that are conceptual parts of entitiesas well as empirical wholes. That is, we
need to allow fortheorizingthat employs analytic unitsderived by workingback from
abstract aspects of actions as well as by working forward from concrete actors. In
addition to developing,say, individuals-as-actor or states-as-actor models,we ought to
make room forschemesin which such abstractionsas, say, roles,structures,or outcomes
are posited as the basic analytic unit, as the unit that gets aggregated, that adapts, and
that sustains global processes. As will be seen, the ensuing presentation outlines the
possibilityof treatingrole-derivedaction scriptsas analytic units.
Does broadening the conception of analytic units in this way render impossible the
empirical tasksofidentifyingand tracingglobal patterns?I do not thinkso. Moving up
the ladder ofabstractiondoes not necessarilytake us beyond the realm ofthe empirical.
Indeed, by focusingon informaldecision processes, international regimes,and many
other 'entities'whose existenceis inferredfromobserved behaviors, we have long been
conductinginquiriesfromrungshigh on the ladder. To be sure, the empirical tasksmay
be more complex because the techniques for measuring the abstract aspects of
phenomena are more elaborate than those used to measure concretephenomena. But in
principle models founded on abstractions-as-units are no less subject to close scrutiny
than those which employ concrete actors-as-units.
States as Actors
To broaden our approach to specifyingthe units of analysis is immediatelyto face the
question ofhow we treattheincreasinglyfragmentednature ofthe 'modern State'. Quite
aside fromthe many methodological problems associated with positingthe State as the
prime internationalactor discussed below-that is, even ifone insistson employingthe
concept the worldwide crisis of authority can be viewed as having so thoroughly
underminedthe prevailingdistributionofglobal power as to alter the significanceofthe
State as a causal agent in the course of events. With the advent of more analytically
skillfulpublics and thesurgein subgroupism,it becomes increasinglydifficultto perceive
power as distributedprimarilyamong States. Indeed, for those who see the crisis of
authorityas deep-seated and enduring, it no longer seems compelling to referto the
world as a State system.It is, rather,a systemin which power is distributederratically
among some centralized whole systems(States) and numerous subsystemsat various
levels.
To be sure,mostwhole systemson the scale ofnational societiesstillcontrolthemeans
ofviolence. Most can stilldraftsoldiers,imprisonrecalcitrants,and raise taxes. But the
capabilities are no longerwhat theyused to be, now that thewhole system'slegitimacyis
open to question, challenge, and possible rejection.The crisisof authorityhas reduced
the relevance, salience, and potency of the State, compelling it at the very least to
bargain furiouslyto preserve its integrityin the face of ever more demanding and
competentpublics and, at most,requiringit to contractitssphereofcompetence to those
domains and subsystemswhere its authorityremains intact. The deteriorationof the
Lebanese State, the precarious existence of the Argentine State, and the tortured
fragilityofthe Polish State over thelast decade may be only the mostvisibleand extreme
examples of the dynamics at workwhereversocietiesare seekingto cohere on a national
scale. Stated differently,as it is commonlyused, thenotionofthe State connotesfarmore
authorityand autonomy than is empiricallythe case in today's decentralized world. (It
is in order to emphasize this exaggeration that I have capitalized the firstletterof the
word throughoutthe discussion.)
Perhaps an even more urgent reason to be wary of models organized around the
concept of the State is the ambiguitythat tends to attach to it. Not only are at least five
very differentdefinitionsused to delineate its meaning (Benjamin and Duvall, 1982);
but, even more importantly,none of them is operationalized in such a way as to clearly
specifythe empirical phenomena it embraces. On the contrary,more oftenthan not the
State is posited as a symbol without content, as an all-pervasive actor at work on the
world stage whose nature, motives, and consequences are somehow too self-evident
and/or powerfulto warrant conceptualizing in precise and elaborate terms.
Unfortunately,despite the ambiguity inherentin the concept, reliance on the State
appears to have had a renaissance in recentyears,withan increasingnumber ofscholars
ofvarious theoreticalpersuasions abandoning systemsanalysis and relyingon the State
as the prime analytic unit. Skocpol (1982: 2-3) traces this revival to the shifting
structuresof world politics. Some of the very changes that are here seen as sources of
cascading interdependenceand thusas lesseningthe utilityofthe State as an organizing
concept, she sees as conducing to greaterreliance on it: 'the Pax Americana ofthe period
afterWorld War II' encouraged Westernsocial scientiststo focuson modernizationand
to treat 'spontaneous, socioeconomic and cultural processes ... (as) the primaryloci of
change', all of which enabled them 'to keep their eyes averted from the explanatory
centralityof states as potent and autonomous organizational actors.' According to
Skocpol, the 1970s were a conceptual turningpoint not only because of the slow and
erratic pace of the knowledge generated by the 'structural-functionaltheories
predominantin political science and sociologyin theUnited States duringthe 1950s and
1960s', but even more because the American Century came to an abrupt end in the
1970s, renderingthe United States and Britisheconomies 'beleaguered ... in a world of
competing national states. It is probably not surprisingthat,at thisjuncture, it became
theoretically fashionable to begin to speak of "the state" as an actor and as a
society-shapinginstitutionalstructure.'As Skocpol sees it, the more the United States
and Great Britain appeared like other 'state-societiesin an uncertain,competitive,and
interdependentworld ofmany such entities',the more did a 'paradigmatic shift. .. (get)
underwayin thesocial sciences,a shiftthat involvesa fundamentalrethinkingoftherole

of states in relation to societies and economies.'
Krasner (1984) offersa somewhat differentexplanation forthe resurgenceofinterest
in the State as 'the master noun of modern political discourse'. Agreeing that vast
changes have marked recentdecades ofglobal politics and that these include the rapid
decline ofAmerican power, he sees the changes as highlightingtheconstraintsat workin
world affairsand, as ifthe operation ofconstraintssomehow is not a formofbehavior, as
thus requiring the development of the differentanalytic equipment inherent in the
concept of the State if knowledge-buildingprogressis to be made:
The morecomfortable and familiarworldofthe1950sand 1960sisgone.American
global hegemonyhas eroded. 'Enlightened'policieshave not ended social ills.
Economic problemsdo not respond to conventionalsolutions.Third World
countrieswill not follow the path trod by the United States. Institutional
arrangements that seemed to be part of the basic natureof thingshave come
undone.In sucha worldtheattentionofscholarswillturnfrombehaviorwithina
totheconstraints
constraints
givensetofinstitutional themselves.. . 'The state'will
once again become a major concern of scholarlydiscourse(Krasner, 1984,
243-244).
Whatever thereasonsforthe resurgenceofthe 'masternoun', attemptsto resurrectthe
State do not strike me as either necessary or desirable. To focus on institutional
constraintsratherthan the behavior withinthem is neitherto alter the criteriaofsound
empirical inquiry nor to necessitate new conceptual equipment. Such fundamental
processes as those of compliance and defiance at the micro level and aggregation and
adaptation at the macro level are no less central to analyzing the operation of
institutionalconstraintsas theyare to comprehendingthe individuals and collectivities
who may be constrained. Treating institutionalconstraintsas variables rather than
constants,as interactivephenomena ratherthan as contextual limits,does shiftthe level
of analysis at which analysis proceeds, but it does not necessitatea change in eitherthe
methods or the basic concepts on which the analysis rests. On the contrary,casting
institutionalconstraintsas interactive phenomena subject to variation heightens the
need to avoid the ambiguous and imprecisespecificationsand terminologythat usually
accompanies reliance on the concept of the State.
Similarly,the fact that the United States and Britain are no longer 'unchallengeable
"lead societies" ' (Skopcol, 1982: 3) neitherdeprivessystemsformulationsoftheirutility
nor lessens the ethereal tones that pervade effortsto specifythe nature of the State.
Indeed, it can be readily argued that the postwar distributionof global power and the
subsequent decline of hegemons has made it easier to treat States as phantom-like
entitiesthat sometimes are more powerfulthan governments,sometimescoterminous
with governments,and sometimesless encompassing than governments.In the absence
of a centralized, stable, and clear-cut international hierarchy,it is difficultto specify
preciselythe prime moversin world politicsand analystsare thusencouraged to discern
the hidden hand of the State at work wherever developments seem to defy exact
empirical explanation.
This is not to deny thatsystemson thescale ofnational societiesdevelop and maintain
mechanisms for sustaining legal order, for controllingthe means of violence, and for
raisingthroughtaxation the resourcesnecessaryto the exerciseofsuch controls.All such
systemsdo have authorized legal, coercive, and revenue-raisinginstitutions,and these
do tend to have exclusivejurisdictionsover the territoriesand membersoftheirsocieties.
But it is questionable whether anything analytic is accomplished by grouping these
institutionstogether,as many analysts do, under the general rubric of the 'State'. Not
only does such a clusteringtend to elevate one's analytic eye to an abstract plane above
the controls through which the goals and directions of polities are set, but it also
encourages the assumption that the legal, coercive, and taxing authoritiesof the State
are cooperativelylinked together.Or, at least, such a clusteringpermitsanalyststo treat
the State as a static catch-all in which its structures,processes, and values are either
taken forgranted or viewed as somehow managing to maintain order and to reproduce
themselvesacross timethroughthesocialization and coercion ofitsmembers.As a result,
analyses founded on the State tend to preclude the possibilitythat the legal, coercive,
and taxing authoritiesmightbe at odds or otherwiseunable to sustain theirlegitimacy.
The course of events in Lebanon and Poland in recent years, forexample, cannot be
broughtinto focus,much less explained, by conceiving ofthemin termsofthe trialsand
tribulationsof the Lebanese and Polish States. Intruding as it does an arbitraryand
irrelevant level of analysis, such a formulation only compounds and obfuscates
understanding;inasmuch as the two countriesare only extremeinstancesof the crisisof
authoritythat is now global in scope, theyare perhaps best viewed as exemplaryrather
than exceptional cases of the problems inherentin relyingon the concept of the State.
In otherwords,while State formulationsallow foradministrative,legal, and coercive
organizations that 'are variably structuredin differentcountries' and thus variably
'embedded' in differentgovernmental systems(Skocpol, 1982: 3-4), they tend not to
build in dynamics that allow forchange and conflictin the orientationsand activitiesof
the State. On the contrary,the central tendencyis to posit the State as sovereignand its
organizations as essentiallyintegrated,therebyrenderingits sovereigntycomplete and
absolute while also insuringthat change can only be superficialand transitory,since the
State would not permit any deep and enduring transformationsthat might alter or
otherwiseundermineitssovereignty.Thus, endowed with an inclinationand a capacity
to prevent change, States are bound to be static. Unlike systems,which in both their
cybernetic and structural-functionalistconceptions consist of specified processes
whereby the maintenance of boundaries, the procurement of resources, and the
achievement of equilibria may be altered throughthe conversionofinputsinto outputs
and/orthe performanceoffunctionsby structures,States are bound to engage in actions
marked by a constancy that may be as undifferentiatedor as elaborate as the analyst
conceives them to be.7
To some extent,admittedly,thischaracterizationofthe State as a staticcatch-all may
be inapplicable and unfairto those analystswho argue thatitsconceptual revitalization
is necessaryto comprehendinghow the capitalist world economy expands and sustains
itself.For them,the State is an expressionofsociety'sneed to be organized foreconomic
production and, as such, it is a central actor in the expansion and maintenance of the
world economy. Thus forthemit has a precisemeaning which facilitatestheorizingon a
grand scale about the interactionsamong societies,economies, and global structures.It
is my impression,however, that even at this theoreticallevel the State is treated as a
constant. While such formulationsallow for booms and busts in economies and for
convergencesand breakdowns in societies,theydo not posit comparable fluctuationson
the part of States. On the contrary, their tendency is to reject the relevance of
decision-making,bureaucratic politics, and aroused publics as sources of variation in
State behavior. Given the need for theory on a grand scale to assume away the
day-to-day perturbationsof politics, such a rejection may be justifiable, but it hardly
makes sense with respect to the interservicerivalries,competitive belief systems,and
other formsof deep-seated cleavage that can fluctuate significantlyin military and
bureaucratic organizations and therebycrucially affecthow the State maintainsitselfin

the world economy.
Thus, to repeat, to a large degree the State is a residual categoryused to explain that
which is otherwiseinexplicable in macro politics. It takes us back to billiard balls, to
unitary actors, to reified collectivities. It obscures, even ignores, the dynamics of
decision-making,bureaucratic politics,and aroused publics. It assumes the processesof
aggregation and adaptation through which structuresare transformedrather than
highlightingthe need to probe them. It dismisses the delicacy of system-subsystem
relations by collecting all authorityunder the rubric of sovereigntyinstead of focusing
our attentionon the conditionswherebyauthorityis created, legitimacysustained, and
compliance achieved. It denies us an ability to discernunintended consequences and to
distinguishbetween manifestand latent functions.It encourages us to relyon intuition
rather than observation, to accept anthropomorphismin place of empiricism.
Roles as Analytic Units

Curiously, our tendencyto eschew precise conceptualization is hardly less conspicuous
in our treatmentof micro units as it is in our handling of macro units. For all the
confusionand inconsistencythat pervades analyses of the State, those that focuson the
individual are just as ambiguous. Clear-cut specificationsof the concept of a person
rarelyaccompany thenumerouspleas that he or she be made more centralto thestudyof
world politics. Neither those whose pleas stem largely fromvalue considerations (e.g.,
Burton, 1983) nor thosewhose concern derivesfroma conceptual convictionthatmacro
analyses musthave rootsin microphenomena (e.g., North and Choucri, 1983; 444-447)
express puzzlement as to what is meant by the 'individual'. Somehow it is viewed as a
concept with specifications that are taken for granted, as if everyone, being an
individual, knows what the concept signifies.
Such a lapse in our conceptual impulsesstrikesme as regrettable.If micro unitsare to
be incorporatedinto macro theories,thenwe must be as vigorousin our formulationsof
what we mean by the 'person' as we are in our models ofthe 'State', the 'regime', or any
othermacro units.It is not enough-indeed, it is highlymisleading-to presumea world
populated by the 'real individual, that awful and inconsistentperson who does not fit
into any convenient analytic model' (Burton, 1983: 1). Nor is it sufficientto note that
people are differentiatedby culture,circumstances,and prior experience. More precise
understanding of what underlies individual actions is needed if our effortsat
micro-macro theorizing are to avoid being thrown off course by our sentimental
attachmentsto the worth and dignityof the individual.
This reasoning proved central in revisitingthe Pre-Theory's treatmentof roles as
micro units of analysis. More specifically,it led to exploring the possibilityof treating
individuals not as concrete,identifiablepersons,but as complexes of roles and statuses,
as membersofa varietyofsystemsthatso fullyaccount fortheexpectationsto which they
respond that nothing meaningful is left over as the quintessentiallyunique person.
Stated even more bluntly so as to arrest attention on the need for more precise
conceptualizing, thereis no individual apart fromthe networkofsystemsin which he or
she is embedded.
This is not to argue fora mechanisticview ofpeople or otherwiseto dismissthe values
associated with the human spirit. Nor is it to say that people do not experience
themselves and the feeling of being unique. Rather, conceiving of them as role
composites provides an analytic context in which theorizingabout world politics can
268 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
systematically and meaningfully build in micro units expressive of needs, wants,

orientations,and actions at the individual level. If it is important to argue that some
undefinable variance reflectiveof the human spirit is leftover afterthe expectations
attached to a person's role networksare taken into account, then such an argumentcan
readily be made without undermininga role-compositeformulation.
Viewed with the hindsightof 20 years, the absence of such a perspectivelooms as a
major shortcomingof the Pre-Theory. In that original formulationthe concept of role
was confinedto the attitudes,behaviors,and expectations that attach to top positionsin
the foreignpolicy-makingprocess. The various role variables were, in turn,posited as
competingwith individual, governmental,societal, and systemicvariables forinfluence
in shaping how the occupants ofthe top positionsmade theirdecisions. This formulation
of the sources ofinternationalaction now seems too vague. It suffersfromthe absence of
common dimensionsacross thefivetypesofsource variables thatcould serveas a basis for
comparing among them. As it stands, the Pre-Theory suggests that societal and
systematic variables consist of forces operating on top officials,that governmental
variables involve institutionalpracticesto which theymustaccommodate, thatindividual
variables are comprised of previouslyacquired valueswhich predispose them in certain
directions,and that thevarious forces,practices,and values are in endless tensionamong
themselvesand with the expectations attached to the top roles.
But how to assess the relative strengthof forces,practices,values, and expectations?
Clearly, it is like comparing apples and oranges. Clearly, the differentvariables have to
be conceptualized as differenttypesoffruitifthe competitionamong themis to be fully
discerned and cogentlyassessed. The concept ofrole readilylends itselfto thisneed fora
unifyingdimensionacross thevariables: all ofthemcan be conceived as consistingofrole
expectations, the differencesamong them being the differencesamong the systemsin
which each role is located. That is, the individuals who make foreignpolicy occupy a
number of roles in a number of systemsand, accordingly, they are simultaneously
subjected to a number of conflictingrole expectations those that derive from the
private systemsin which theyare or previouslywere members,fromthe governmental
institutionsin which theirpolicy-makingpositionis located, fromthe societal systemfor
which theymake policy (Holsti, 1970), and fromtheinternationalsystemsin which their
society is a subsystemas well as the expectations to which they are exposed in their
top-level, face-to-face decision-making unit. The interaction among the source
variables, in other words, culminates in the individual policy-maker, creating role
conflicts that, in turn, reflect the differentvalues, capabilities, and histories that
differentiatethe various systemsin which the policy-makingposition is situated.
Some examples are in order. Consider President Reagan's retreat fromcampaign
pledges not to make concessions in arms control negotiations prior to a substantial
defense build-up. Instead of attributingthe shiftin his attitudes and behavior as a
response to vague forces at work on a global level, it can usefullybe treated as the
outcome of a competitionbetween the expectations attached to his longtimeparty role
as a conservative'hawk' and thoseembedded in his role as the top leader ofa superpower
in a systemmarked by cross-pressuresfromeconomic exigencies,peace movementsin
Europe, and aroused publics at home. Similarly, Nixon's 1972 trip to China can be
viewed as resultingnot froman idiosyncratictraitor skill,but fromthe requirementsofa
superpower leader whose countryneeded more leverage in the increasinglysignificant
Chinese-Soviet-US triad. Or consider the interpretationthat John Foster Dulles's
alleged religiousfervorunderlay his conduct as SecretaryofState. Whatever the degree
to which that was the case, his Secretaryshipcan be assessed in termsof the relative
potency of his roles in the policy-makingprocess on the one hand and the Presbyterian
Church on the other.
A number ofadvantages flowfromreconceptualizingroles as common denominators
forall the source variables. In the firstplace, it is responsiveto theplea ofthosewho want
to resurrectthe individual as the prime unit of analysis. To treat the individual as a
composite of identifiableand competing roles and thus as a prime site of the world's
conflicts,does not, admittedly,ftillymeet the plea. Such a conception divides people up
into analytical parts ratherthan treatingeach one as a whole entity.Nevertheless,it does
orient attentionto micro phenomena bounded by individuals as well as to that level of
analysis wherein the aggregative processes that produce and differentiatecollectivities
and global structuresoriginate.
As the Dulles example suggests, moreover, according a central place to role
expectations facilitatesclarificationof a research issue that for many analysts, myself
included (Rosenau, 1968), has loomed large and troublesome: namely, the issue of
where individuals and theiridiosyncraciesfitin the dynamics ofworld politics.At stake
here are value questions pertaining to how much discretionindividuals can exercise as
policy-makersand empirical questions as to the extent to which the policy-making
process can be randomly distorted, improved, or otherwise affected by the unique
talents and beliefsthat particular policy-makersmight bring to their responsibilities.
Although good, systematicinquiries into the vagaries of individual variables are now
available (Stassen, 1972; Jervis, 1976; Etheredge, 1978; Falkowski, 1979; Hermann,
1980; Steiner, 1983; Walker, 1983), the predominant tendencyhas been to view themas
encompassingsuch extensivevariabilityas to be beyond thecompetence oftheanalyst to
observe and thus as constituting a realm of global life where unknowable and
unpredictable events originate. If the idiosyncratic tendencies and belief systemsof
policy-makersare seen as reflectiveofrole phenomena, however, the task of accounting
for the impact of individuals on world politics is eased considerably. Under this
conceptualization their inexplicable actions do not have to be consigned to the
unknowable. Their priorexperiencesand commitmentsare transformedfroma residual
categoryinto a readily identifiableseries of roles occupied in private life.Not all of the
variance would be picked up this way, of course. Values derived from childhood
socialization and personality traits stemming from early family experience would
probably remain inaccessible. But the variance left over after treating inexplicable
actions as the products ofrole conflictsseems likelyto be much less than is presentlythe
case.
Another virtue of transformingindividual, governmental, societal, and systemic
variables into role phenomena is thata means is provided forsystematicallyprobing and
comparing the many transnationalstructures,fromthe nongovernmentalorganization
to the international regime, now relevant to global politics. Unlike governments,the
roles comprisingregimesand other transnationalstructuresare identifiednot so much
by formal, authoritative, and legal instruments that accord their occupants the
legitimacynecessaryto performtheirtasksas by informal'principles,norms,rules,and
decision-making procedures' that regularize and shape behavior 'in a given area of
internationalrelations' (Krasner, 1982: 186). The presence and relevance ofa regimeor
any transnationalentityis thus not readily apparent. Informalsources of behavior are,
by definition,rooted in predispositions that are both undocumented and habitual.
Hence the presence ofsuch entitiesand theirstructuresmustbe inferredfrompatterned
activitiesthat cannot be traced back to formalsources. Once such entitiesare identified
in this manner, furtherinferencesare necessary to clarifythe principles,norms,rules,
and procedures that govern theirbehavior. And it is here that the role concept becomes
valuable. For a major component of the expectations that comprise any role are the
informalprinciples,norms,rules,and proceduresthatothersrequireofitsoccupants and
that the occupants require of themselves (Rosenau, 1968). Accordingly,viewing the
leaders of regimes and other transnational entitiesas role occupants in systemswhose
goals may be in conflictwith the demands ofinternational,societal, governmental,and
private systemsputs them on the same analytic plane with foreignpolicy officialsand
provides a common dimension along which to observe theiractions and interactions.
The role concept also gives meaning to the 'given area ofinternationalrelations' that
defines the boundaries of a regime. What is such an area? If it has any empirical
expressionat all, it consistsof the expectations that derive fromthe values at stake in a
particular realm of endeavor. These values may be associated with such diverse issues
as trade, security,or balance-of-paymentsfinancing-to cite the three'cases' explored
in a recent volume (Krasner, 1982) devoted exclusivelyto regimes-but they have in
common that theyare the basis forthe role expectations throughwhich the principles,
norms, rules, and procedures of regimes are sustained. Conceiving the values
encompassed by regime boundaries in terms of unique role expectations, moreover,
makes it easier to break down and analyze the conduct of those actors,such as chiefsof
state and foreign secretaries,who are active in a multiplicityof regimes. For such
officials,regimestake the formofrole conflicts,the analysis ofwhich seems likelyto be as
revealingofthe nature ofregimesas ofthe conduct ofofficials.To a large extent,in other
words, regimes are comparable to what were identified as 'issue-areas' in the
Pre-Theory. Like regimes,issue-areas were posited as informalstructuresderived from,
founded on, and delineated by a specifiable set of unique values contested in different
ways by the individuals and groups forwhom the values are especially salient.
Still another advantage of giving analytic prominence to the role concept is that it
serves well those who continue to have reasons to cling to the State as a central actor.
Viewed as a complex of role expectations, the State is transformedfroman abstract,
vague, and undefined entityinto a precise and observable set of phenomena. Stated
simply, the State becomes the actions of those who are expected and who expect of
themselves-to act on behalf of the polity rather than any other societal systemor
subsystem.That is, ifthe State has interestsbeyond governmentand party,as thosewho
cling to the concept contend, surely the interestswill be manifestin the recurrent
activities of those in bureaucratic and military organizations who are expected to
articulateand servethem.And, obviously,theirservicingoftheseinterestsis not likelyto
be easily accomplished. Those who occupy State roles are not freeofrole conflicts.These
can range widely across all the contradictoryexpectationsthat derive fromthedomestic
disputes and internationalsituationsin which States become embroiled.
Finally, and perhaps mostimportantly,the role concept is well suited to discerningthe
micro dynamics of cascading interdependence. To the extent that individuals occupy
multiplerolesin some systemsdominated by integratingprocessesand in othersmarked
by fragmentingprocesses such as citizens in Poland and Lebanon, labor leaders in
Detroit and Great Britain,or political leaders in El Salvador and France then to that
extenttheirrole conflictsare preciselythose that cascade change across systems.In such
conflictsindividuals have to choose which roles in which systemshave the greater
legitimacy and which are linked to the highest authority, and the aggregate
consequences of these choices then shape the flow of change throughout the global
system.
The confluence and simultaneityof conflictingrole demands in the cognitive and
emotional space ofpeople, in otherwords,has transformedtheminto an arena in which

cascading processes flourish.Individuals have become a major battlegroundon which
States, governments,subnational groups, international organizations, regimes, and
transnational associations compete for theirloyalties, therebyposing forthem choices
that cannot be easily ignored and that,forus as analysts,can serve as both a measure of
global change and a challenge to global stability.
Role Scenarios as Action Schema

But the foregoingunderstates the potential of the role concept. Even as a common
denominator across systemlevels, the Pre-Theory'sformulationofroles as setsofformal
and informal expectations experienced and held by their occupants now seems
insufficient.It limits roles to static phenomena. Expectations highlightthe constant
constraintsand opportunitiesattached to any role, but so definedthe concept does not
allow forthe flexibilityin role expectations that its occupant must employ as situations
unfold through time. More specifically,conceived merely as a set of expectations, the
concept specifiesthe attitudesand actions an occupant is expected to maintain in order
to performeffectively in the role, but it does not anticipate what the occupants do once
theyconfronttheirrole conflictsand undertakeaction in responseto one or anotherset of
expectations. To fillthis conceptual gap and infusedynamism into role expectations,
roles can be viewed as embedded in more encompassing schema, what I shall referto as
rolescenariosor actionscripts.These embed the expectations of any role in those more
elaborate and precisepremisesupon which any ofitsoccupants is likelyto draw in order
to depict where he or she fitsin relation to other role occupants in the systemas they
collectivelyconflict,collaborate, or otherwisecope with the chores and challenges that
make up the daily lifeof the system.
In any role, in otherwords,we not only have an understandingofwhat is expected of
us, but we also carryaround a multitudeofassumptionsabout how othersin therelevant
systemsconduct themselvesin relationboth to us and to the problem at hand. And from
these premiseswe derive scenarios as to how events are likelyto develop as we and the
others,each of us conformingto the expectationsof and/orexercisingthe flexibilitiesin
our role, mightreact to each other as the problem unfolds.
To recurto theforegoingexample ofReagan's role conflictin the fieldofarmscontrol,
the concept of action scriptsenables us to understand his behavior as much more than
simplya choice to favorhis role as a superpowerleader over his longtimeparty role as a
conservative hawk. Presumably his decision to retreatfromcampaign pledges and to
make negotiatingconcessions also sprung froma choice among conflictingscenarios in
which the responsesofthe Soviets, the peace movementin WesternEurope, and publics
in the United States varied as each reacted differently, depending on whetherhe acted
out of his hawk or superpower role.
Or considerhow Prime MinisterThatcher moved in a shortspan of 15 monthsfroma
tough to a weak stand in negotiationswith the Chinese over Hong Kong, frominsisting
in late 1982 on Britain retaining administrative control over the territoryfor an
indefiniteperiod after 1997 to pressingin early 1984 forthe best guarantees available
fromthe Chinese. Her earlier position was assertedin the contextof being flushedwith
victoryin the Falklands and the domestic and internationalprestigethat flowedfrom
having assertedtheinviolabilityofsovereigntyin thatsituation.Subsequently,however,
she discovered that the expectationsbuilt into the east Asian systemare not those of the
south Atlantic system,that the strategic and legal circumstances surrounding Hong
Kong, not to mention the differencesbetween the Argentineand Chinese armed forces,
were such that the original scenario derived froma tough stand was not viable when she
later occupied the Britishhead-of-governmentrole in the Pacific (Apple, 1984).
Or consider the twice-postponed summit meeting of the Organization of African
States at Addis Ababa in June, 1983. All the chiefsofstate broughtwith them not only
expectations of how they had to tailor their conduct to their own society's goals and
demands, but each also had scenarios of how the otherswould react if theircollective
votes led to a seating of the delegation from the Polisario guerrilla movement. Each
anticipated that a vote to seat the delegation would lead to another Moroccan-led
boycott that would prevent a quorum from convening and thus give rise to a third
postponement which, in turn, could have resulted in the collapse of the OAU. The
aggregation of these role scenarios resulted in enough pressure on the Polisario
delegation for them to 'voluntarily and temporarily'relinquish their seat, a decision
which permittedthe nineteenthsummitmeetingto get underway. To conclude that the
Polisario delegation bowed to pressure,however,is to overlookthefullrichnessprovided
by action scriptsas analytic tools. For presumably membersof the Polisario delegation
also made a choice among their own role scenarios, in the end preferringnot to risk
evoking the scenario in which theywould lose the support of theirAfricanallies and be
perceived as having brought about the OAU's demise.
The centralityof role scenarios is also evident in the interactiondynamics that occur
withinas well as between governments.In the United States, forexample, all ofthe key
role occupants in the policy-makingprocess are familiar with the goals, calculations,
constraints,and conflictsthat the othersexperience in theirmultiple roles. Thus all of
them can envision a varietyofoutcomes ensuingfromtheirinteractionover any salient
foreignpolicy issue. More specifically,they can envision the various stages through
which different interactionsequences will unfoldand culminate as, at each stage,each of
themchooses to resolve theirotherrole conflictsin one or anotherway. The Democratic
Speaker of the House of Representatives knows that ifhe is responsive to the partisan
requirementsof his party role rather than the bipartisan expectations of his govern-
mental role on, say, thequestion ofEl Salvador, theRepublican President'sreactionsare
likely to vary accordingly, as will those of the Secretary of State, the Senate Minority
leader, thepro- and anti-militaryaid factionsin theHouse, and any otherrole occupants
whose responsibilitiesmay be evoked by the issue.
In one importantrespectthe foregoingexamples are misleading. They imply that the
relevance of role scenarios is confinedto the analysis ofdecision-making.Certainly they
are central to the ways in which individuals and bureaucracies frame and make their
choices, but the reasoning and reactions of officialsis not the only level at which action
scriptsare core phenomena. They are also the basis on which publics participate in
global life,withchoices among various scenariosunderlyingthedegree to which theyare
active and the directionwhich theircollective actions take. Stated more emphatically,
role scenarios are among the basic understandings and values that are transmitted
throughpolitical socialization and that sustain collectivitiesacross generations.As such,
as culturallyderived premisesforrelatingto the political arena, theyare also among the
prime phenomena that get aggregated when the energiesofa collectivityare mobilized
and concerted around goals. Put in still another way, the task of leadership is that of
selling action scripts,of gettingpublics to regard one set of scriptsas more viable and
valid than any other they may findcompelling.
It followsthat falteringrole scenarios lie at the centerof the authoritycriseson which
cascading interdependencethrives.Whetherit be a small group, a city,a nation-state,or
JAMESN. ROSENAU 273
an internationalsystem,the glue that keeps collectivitiescohesive and enables them to

reproduce themselves includes a set of shared action scripts that depict who has
legitimacyand authorityin a collectivityand how all concerned will and should respond
when the authorityis exercised. Such scriptsare, in effect,theoriesof how collectivities
resolve their problems; and, like us in relation to our theories of world politics, the
membersand officialsofcollectivitiesare normallyprisonersofsuch theories.They are so
habituated to thescriptswhich sustain and reproduce the authoritystructuresthat their
compliance withinthemis taken forgranted and normallytheyare unlikelyto be aware
that they are performing in their designated roles. When legitimacy becomes
questionable, however,authority-basedaction scriptsquickly surfaceinto consciousness
and scenarios involving noncompliance and the redirectionof legitimacy sentiments
quickly emerge as alternativecoursesofaction. At thatpoint a collectivitygoes into crisis
because the very basis for organizing its effortsis undermined and undergoes
transformation,giving rise therebyto tensionswhich intrude into the action scriptsof
other collectivitiesand then cascade as widely and pervasively throughoutthe global
systemas authoritystructureselsewhere are in flux.
A good, currentexample ofhow the action scriptsofpublics can become inextricably
linkedinto cascading processesis provided by the activitiesofWesternpeace movements
in response to the deployment of new weapons systemsin Europe. Both the ordinary
citizen and the movement's leaders had to make choices among scriptsin which their
actions mightdifferentially affectthe coherence of theirorganizations, the effectiveness
of theirgovernments,the stabilityofNATO, the negotiatingposturesofthe Soviets, the
orientations of the Reagan Administration,and the prospects for cooling down or
heating up the arms race. A number ofthesescenarios,perhaps even all ofthem,are also
illustrativeof the concept's relevance to the central concern of thisinquiry. Looked at
fromany perspective,be it thatofthepeace groups,NATO, itsmembergovernments,or
the Soviet Union, most of the plausible scenarios doubtless contained a number of
segmentswhich depicted the chaos that can follow when role conflictsare resolved in
favorof systemicor subsystemicexpectations during a period of cascading interdepen-
dence.
Whether applied to micro decision-makingactivitiesor macro collective actions, role
scenarios are at once issue-specificand generalized in theirscope. That is, while theyare
framedin the contextof particular issues, theyare not transitoryin the same way issues
are. Issues come and go, but the scenarios anticipating theircourse are based on the
more enduring understandingswhich the occupants of any role are likelyto have of the
opportunities,constraints,and conflictsbuilt into the otherroles comprisingthe system.
In effect,the scenarios reflectthe comprehensionattached to any role ofhow the system
functions its goals, procedures, cultural premises, capabilities, and historical pat-
terns both in general and in relation to particular issues. Note that thescenariosare
inherentin theroleandnotin itsoccupants.
Differentoccupants may resolve a role's conflicts
differently, but such resolutionsare likely to be founded on similar conceptions of the
alternativescenarios that are in conflict.Why? Because the scenarios are the action side
of a role's expectations: in experiencing and learning the expectations, the role's
occupants also become knowledgeable about the dynamics of the other roles in the
systemand the contingenciesthat thus underlie the interactionsamong them. That is,
they cannot learn about the opportunities and limitations built into their own roles
without at least a minimal grasp of the requirementsfaced by the occupants of other
roleswith whom theymust interact.Thus, thereare no role expectationsdivorced from
the systemsin which the roles are lodged, and thus there can be no systemwithout
274 Revisited
A Pre-Theory
role-derived scenarios among which its members chose as they sustain or change its
patternsthrough time.
This is in no way to imply that role scenarios are clear-cut,orderly,logical, or in any
other way standardized. They may well be akin, rather, to what has been called
'working knowledge' that 'organized body of knowledge that administratorsand
policy-makersuse spontaneously and routinelyin the context of theirwork', including
'the entire array of beliefs,assumptions, interests,and experiences that influence the
behavior of individuals at work' (Kennedy, 1983: 193-194). Role scenarios can be
thoughtof as translatingthese arrays of understandinginto diverse paths that stretch
into and anticipate the future,with each path consistingofsegmentsthat are linked by
and fan out from choice points and with movement along any segment being a
consequence of the interactive expectations held and choices made by all the
participants whose paths cross in a situation. At each choice point in a scenario,
moreover, new segments may be introduced as the prior interactions create new
circumstancesthat tap workingknowledge in differentways and divertthe path onto a
new course. Thus, beyond the frameworkof segmentedpaths to and fromthe decision
points in a situation, action scripts are anything but standardized. Founded on a
composite of beliefs,assumptions,interests,and experiences as well as observation and
information,theirsegmentsmay formpaths that are long or short,straightor circuitous,
clear or obscure, continuous or broken to mention only a fewof the dimensionsalong
which variation can occur. And the more thatcascading processesare part ofa situation,
of course, the greater is the likelihood of extensive and rapid fluctuationsalong these
dimensions. Role scenarios are as operative under chaotic conditions as under orderly
ones, but theirlength,direction,clarity,and continuityare likely to be highlyvolatile
the more changes cascade upon each other.
It follows that role scenarios are likely to be marked by a tension between their
tendency toward complexity and the limits to which their complexity can be
comprehended. The complexity derives from the fact that an action script can
potentiallyembrace a great number and varietyofsegments,as many permutationsand
combinations as those occupying multiple roles are able to manage in anticipatinghow
thechoices theymake among competingrole expectationswill interactsequentiallywith
the alternativechoices othersin the systemmay make. One can begin to appreciate the
complexityofinteractivescenarios by thinkingof theirpaths metaphoricallyas maps of
the system,with decision routes tracing how the choices made by the relevant actors
criss-crossand diverge as each selectsone scenario ratherthan another,therebysending
the unfoldingsequence ofchoices offin a new direction.Viewed fromthe perspectiveof
an observeroutside thesystem,thedecision routeseithermove forwardto theconclusion
of an issue or they are marked by circularityand back-and-forthvacillation as the
choices made by the role occupants offset,negate, or otherwise fall short of the
collaboration necessaryto a resolutionof the situation. Viewed fromthe perspectiveof
any of the role occupants, the issue maps lie at the core of theiractivitiesand either (for
the pragmatist) serve to guide the pursuitof theirgoals in the contextofwhat is feasible
or (for the idealist) highlightthe obstacles that hinder the realization of theirvalues.8
But as scenarios tend toward increasing complexity, so do the constraintsagainst
playing out in the imagination all the segmentstheymightencompass. There is, it seems
reasonable to hypothesize, a high correlation between the length and clarity of a
scenario: otherthingsbeing equal,9 thelongerand more diffuseit is i.e., thegreaterthe
number of choice points throughwhich it fansout fromTime 1-the more obscure will
be its segmentsat the distant ends (Time n) and the more clear-cut will be those in the
near future (say, Times 2 and 3). Why? Because anticipating the path beyond a few
segmentsinvolves managing a great deal of complex informationand confrontinga
great number of hypotheticalsituationsforwhich prior experience provides no guide,
and thiscombination of complexityand uncertaintytends to curb the inclination to be
preciseas scenariosstretchfurtherinto thefuture.With so many segmentshaving fanned
out by Time n, anticipating likelihoods begins to appear impossible. Thus, citizensand
officialsalike eithertend to fall back on the early segmentsand to settleforthe obscurity
that appears to envelope the later ones or they presume that somehow the path will
ultimately lead them in the direction they want to go even though the intervening
segmentsare shrouded in obscurity.Consider, forexample, acting at Time 1 in a conflict
with two other participants,each of which mightmove in threenew directionsat each
new stage of the unfoldingsituation. By the time the fourthchoice point arrives the
situation mightwell require informationabout and demand imaginative forecastingof
dozens of possible scenario segmentsalong which the conflictmightevolve, a challenge
that even the more skilled role occupants would probably want to simplifyeither by
treatingsome segments at Time 4 as 'unrealistic' or by otherwiseassuming that they
comprehend the organizing principles which underlie interactionin the situation and
guide its path throughthe several choice points.
The expectationsattached to roles also operate as constraintsthatkeep scenarios both
streamlinedand stretchedtoward Time n. A number of the possible segmentsthat can
fan out from future choice points are likely to require action which exceeds the
maximum leeway that a role permitsits occupants to exercise.At Time 3, forexample, a
scenario might require a foreignsecretaryto undertake initiatives that he could not
pursue without prior cabinet or legislative approval. Or consider the informal role
expectationsinvolved in the deploymentofnew weaponry in Europe. Doubtless leaders
of the peace movementexcluded fromtheirscenarios those segmentswhich mighthave
flowed from choices that allowed for missile deployment in exchange for future
compromisesin arms controlnegotiations.Similarly,surelythekeyNATO governments
managed to simplifytheir action scripts by dismissing a choice point in which they
agreed to postpone deployment. Hence, on the grounds that the course must be stayed
and that the commitmentto goals is unwavering, the tendency toward complexityis
oftenlimitedand the anticipated paths into the futurekept straighter,longer,and more
continuous than might otherwisebe the case.
Whatever may be the bases forkeeping role scenariosstreamlined,it seems reasonable
to hypothesize that the longer people occupy a role, the more elaborate will be their
scenarios. Indeed, the more elaborate a person's scriptsbecome, the more is that person
thoughtto have political wisdom. For, ifthe termmeans anythingas it is normallyused,
political wisdom refersto an astute knowledge of a systemand an ability to anticipate
how itskeyactorsare likelyto conduct themselvesunder varyingcircumstances which
is another way of saying that those who are politically wise are able to juggle a more
extensiveset ofscenarios than most people. Their 'horizons ofobservability' to use an
apt phrase employed by sociologists to describe the distance in a communications
networkbeyond which people are unlikelyto be aware of the role performanceofothers
(Friedkin, 1983) stretchwidely across the relevant systems.
The more elaborate a role scenario is, of course, the more does it encompass all the
varied sources out of which action flows. Virtually by definition,for example, wise
politiciansdevelop theirscenarios out of theirgeneral perceptionsand knowledge of the
other relevant roles and theirspecificinformationabout the goals the othersmay seek,
the means theymay consider,the capabilities theymay have available, the cost-benefit
276 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
calculations they may make, and the support they may mobilize all of this in the
contextof how theirown choices mightvariously affectthe choices and scenarios of the
others.
While role scenarios include game-theoreticalcalculations as to how the various role
occupants may bluff,threaten,or otherwiseseek to enhance desired outcomes through
strategic posturing in their interactions with each other, it would be erroneous to
conclude that the concept ofaction scriptsrequires us to depend on game theoryforour
analyses. The concept posits role scenarios as empirical phenomena, as action-oriented
premises held by role occupants, and not as hypothetical constructs employed by
rational actors.10
Being inherent in the dynamics of any system,in other words, role scenarios are
observable. They can be discerned in the position papers prepared fordecision-makers,
in the public accountingsoftheiractions and what theyhope to achieve, in theproblems
theyencounterand the choices theymake. And scenarios can also be empiricallytraced
in the claims and actions of citizens, in the enduring collaborative and conflictful
patterns of collectivities,and in the stalemates and transformationsof international
systems.Game-theoretical analysis can be usefulin assessing the options open to a role
occupant, but it is quite secondaryifthe analyst's taskis definedas one ofestimatinghow
and why theoccupant did or mightbehave in a particularway or ofcomprehendinghow
diverse role scenarios aggregate to one systemputcome rather than another.
Furthermore,as noted, action scripts derive from deeply engrained, subconscious
predispositionsas well as explicit,analytic assessments.The decision routesofscenarios
are sustained as much by unstated cultural premises (such as challenges should be met,
friends should be rewarded, or alternatives should be considered) and historical
memories (such as dictators cannot be trusted, organizations can be paralyzed by
inertia, and unruly mobs can foment change) as by current role requirements and
situational imperatives. From early in childhood we acquire the 'givens' of social
interaction,the inclinations, perceptions,and values throughwhich role expectations
are filteredand structured,and as these implicit orientationscumulate into working
knowledge across time theyincreasinglyserve as guides to the behavior ofothersas well
as sources of our own conduct. Thus, forexample, the scenarios that Western officials
and publics developed aftera Soviet fightershot down a Korean airlinerconsistednot
only ofdecision pointsshaped by the on-goingarms controlnegotiations,but also by the
cultural premise that killing innocent civilians is unacceptable and the historical
memory that the Russians are obsessed with territorialsecurity.
Given the extent to which role scenarios are compounded out of unspoken, tacit
assumptions, they can hardly serve as the basis for game theoretical calculations.
However, as previously noted and as will be seen in greater detail, the subconscious
components of action scripts are the basis of a more important function: through
socialization and the transmissionof culture they serve as the underlyingfoundations
from which aggregative processes derive and thereby sustain collectivities across
generations.
That action scriptsare compounded out oftacitand deeply engrained premisesas well
as explicit and currentrole expectations also accounts for the capacity of individuals,
officialsand citizens alike, to draw on a multitudeofscriptsas theyrespond to the vast
array of issues that may evoke their interest.Every culture has its own logic, its own
self-containedvalues and symbolsforinterpretingand adapting to any challenge, and
thusthosesocialized into it neverwant forthe abilityto concoct scenariosforcoping with
the many ongoing situations and the few unexpected developments that claim their
attentionat any one time.The individuals need not be well informed,and theymay even
be uninformed,about a situationin order to respond to it. Nor do theyneed to have clear
and elaborate picturesoffuturechoice pointsand thescriptsthatconnect them.The rich
and all-encompassingvalues and presumptionsof theirculturewill always enable them
to develop competing scenarios in which they can fitthemselvesas well as the others
involved in the problem.
It follows that integrated and consensual role scenarios are the glue that holds
collectivitiestogether,just as discrepant and competitive scenarios are the acid that
paralyze or tear them apart. Depending on whether or not they are widely shared,
therefore,action schema can underlie system stability or they can foment system
collapse. No less important,and as noted below in greater detail, the extent to which
they are shared by a system's role occupants either facilitates aggregation or it
contributesto disaggregation.
In a general sense,in otherwords,a collectivityis no more coherentthan thedegree to
which itsmernbersshare an appreciation ofthe different scenarios that may ensue when
theydo or do not support the processeswherebypolicies are framedand implemented.
In a specificpolicy sense the degree of agreement among scenarios relevant to how an
issue will unfoldanticipates the degree to which the policies pursued will be supported
and, accordingly, effective.Thus some of Solidarity's calls to rally were successful
because enough members perceived that the greater the number who marched under
threateningcircumstances,thegreaterwould be theeffecton the Polish governmentand
the union's friendsand adversariesabroad. And thus,too, can thoserallies thatfailed be
attributedto the pervasivenessof alternativescenarios among the union's membership
in which the consequences of arrest or violence were seen as too great vis-a-vis the
perceived impact of a large turnouton governmental and other actors. Similarly, the
effectiveness ofUS foreignpolicy in, say, Central America will correspondclosely to the
degree to which legislative and executive officialsframepolicies on the basis of shared
scenariosofwhat will happen in theregionas a consequence ofone or anotherlevel ofUS
military and economic aid. In the same manner widespread and rapid shiftsin the
shared action schema ofa system'smemberscan be said to underlie the momentumand
success of revolutionarymovements and any other changes that profoundlyalter the
system's structures.For example, at some point in Iran, perhaps upon Khomeini's
returnfromFrance, the scenario ofa successfuloverthrowofthe Shah became viable as
well as desirable formillionsofIranians and theircollectiveactions thatfollowedproved
thisassessmentto be sound. Indeed, as will be seen, the convergenceofa societyaround
new role scenarios quintessentially reveals the aggregative dynamics that underlie
systemtransformations. "
But how do role occupants converge around common scenarios? Under what
circumstancesdo theirchoices among scenarios enhance subsystemintegrationat the
expense of system fragmentation (or vice versa)? To examine these'questions our
analytic focusmustshiftfromthe micro level ofrole occupants to a macro concern with
the dynamics of collectivitiesas aggregative and adaptive entities caught up in the
turbulence of cascading processes. The need forsuch a focus is even more compelling
when the fullextentof the declining effectiveness ofgovernmentsis taken into account.
Governments as Actors
Although the Pre-Theory is pervaded with caution as to the extent to which foreign
policies can promote desired or prevent unwanted changes abroad, upon rereading it
278 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
appears to be founded on a presumptionthat governments,as the prime precipitantsof

global processes, have considerable leeway in how they conduct themselvesabroad.
Given theirdeclining effectivenessnoted earlier, this presumptionnow seems open to
question. Or at least a more clear-cut delineation of the limitsto which theyare locked
into certainforeignpolicies by changing societal and systemicstructuresseems in order.
To posit governmentsas less and less effectiveis, once again, to pose a problem of
perspectiveand measurement.Some would contesttheassertionofdecliningeffectivenes
by arguing thatgovernmentshave neverbeen veryeffective,that theyhave always been
caught up in a crisisoflegitimacy,and thatcurrenttrendsare thusmere fluctuationsin a
long-standingpattern.Others would contend that the assertionis based on impressionis-
tic evidence and thatit needs to be checked out withsystematictime-seriesdata. I do not
quarrel with these points. What follows, admittedly, is not based on rigorous
longitudinal data because materials relevant to what is meant here by declining
effectiveness have not been compiled. Hence it may well be thatthepostulated trendline
of declining effectivenessdistorts and/or exaggerates the underlying processes of
governance at workin the world. Nevertheless,the impressionofdeclining effectiveness
is not easily dispelled and, in any event, thereis much to be said forproceeding as ifit is
descriptiveofunderlyingtrendsand thenexploringthe theoreticalimplicationsofsuch a
presumption.
By declining effectivenessI have in mind a progressive inability on the part of
governments to provide their clients (elites, citizenries, allies, adversaries) with the
conditions and servicesthat reflectthe goals theyhave set forthemselvesand that their
clientsexpect. Effectiveness,then,is more than the maintenance oforder. It involves the
solving of problems and the resolvingof issues, or at least preventingthe worseningof
problems and the escalation of issues. Stated differently, effectivenesspertains to policy
outputs, to tangible services such as highways and unemployment checks and to
intangibleconditionssuch as a feelingofphysical securityand a sense ofoptimismabout
what the futureholds. It is in thissense that the impressionofa decline in governmental
capabilities looms large. Compared to earlier periods of this centurywhen politicians
were heroes because theydelivered on promisesand thus held high officeforrelatively
long times,not to mention earlier centurieswhen foreignpolicy was the sport of kings,
the performancerecordsof modern governmentsseem conspicuouslymeager. Whether
theybe democratic or authoritarian,Western or Eastern, the outcomes of theirefforts
seem increasinglyto fall far short of their aspirations. As Shils puts it (1982: 25), the
conditions under which the tasks of governmentcan be performedefficaciously
no longerobtain in any country,advanced and rich or backwardand poor.

Everywherethereare clamorousdemandsfora greatvarietyof governmental
actionsreachingdeeplyintosocietyand extendingover its entirebreadth,and
everywhere governments haveundertaken toattempttosatisfy
thesedemands.It is
a hopelessundertaking ... it is difficult
forany groupto stayin powerforlong
exceptthroughyieldingtodemands. . . These are amongthereasonswhytherate
ofinflation
isso highinso manycountries and whytherateofgrowthofinvestment
in the maintenanceof physical capital lags behind the rate of growthof
consumption.
To be sure, the capacity of governments to maintain order through strong-arm

methods may not have lessened perhaps it is even greater than ever but the
achievement of obedience and compliance throughthe exerciseofforceis, in no way, a
of whethera governmentis performingits expected tasks and
measure of effectiveness,
gettingitsjobs done. And ifthe political skillsofpublics are becoming ever more refined
(as suggested below), even the maintenance of order may prove to be increasingly
difficult,as such diverse regimes as those in Chile, France, Peru, the Philippines, and
Poland have recentlydiscovered. Indeed, it is hardly surprisingthat the progressive
decline in effectivegovernance has been accompanied by a correspondingemergence
and growthof 'political riskanalysis' as an intellectualenterpriseundertakenby banks,
insurance companies, governmental intelligence agencies, and many other organiza-
tions that need to reduce uncertaintyabout the future.
Viewed in termsof outputs, effectivenessis not easily measured. Ideally it should be
traced in the attitudesand behavior of those toward whom the outputs are directed,in
the orientationsand activitiesofelitesand citizenriesin the case ofdomesticpolicies and
in the responsesof allies and adversaries in the case of foreignpolicies. Systematically
observing and then aggregating such phenomena presents, obviously, enormous
difficultiesand mostanalystshave thusbeen compelled to employ 'crude' measures,such
as whethergovernmentsheld a legislativemajorityforthree-fourths ofa decade (Powell,
1982: 18-19), that are hardly more satisfactoryor less crude than the widely shared
impressionofineffectiveness derived fromsuch developmentsas the total breakdown of
governmentalauthorityin Poland, Lebanon, and NorthernIreland, the persistenceof
high unemploymentin all parts of the world, the failureof agricultural policies in the
communistworld, the existenceofundergroundeconomies, the unyieldingresistanceof
theAfghansto Soviet power, the inabilityofthe United States to get desired solutionsin
Central America and the Middle East, the outbreak of riots in France, the advent of
mutiniesin the PLO, and so on througha seeminglyendless seriesofepisodes expressive
of governmentsthat are unable to provide elemental conditions and services.12
Effectiveness, ofcourse,is not theonlycriterionby which governmentscan and should
be evaluated. Stability and openness may be equally importantcriterion,and in some
instancestheirrecordsin theserespectsmay be more impressive.From theperspectiveof
governmentsas actors constrained in the conduct of foreignpolicy by the structuresof
domestic and international life, however, the criterion of effectivenessis especially
relevant. For the greater the decline in the capacities of governmentsto realize their
goals, the greater is the likelihood of resistance to their policies and erosion of their
legitimacy,consequences which, in turn,detractfurtherfromtheireffectiveness. And as
Inglehart (1977: 14-15) cogentlydemonstrates,themore governmentsseek to alter their
course so as to increase theireffectiveness,the greaterthe likelihood ofintensifiedactive
resistanceto theirefforts.It is no mere coincidence, forexample, that riotingin France
followed a new governmentalinitiativeto cope with inflationand that mutiniesin the
PLO followed Arafat's movement toward accommodation with Lebanon.
Whether the decline in governmentaleffectivenessis a cause or a consequence of a
countertrendtowardincreased authorityand legitimacyattachingto nongovernmental
collectivities and doubtlessit is both a cause and a consequence theresultis thesame:
those occupying roles in foreign-policy-making systemshave limited room forinnova-
tion. Internally they are constrained fromundertakingnew policies by the absence of
widespread consensuses and by the demands of more coherent and adamant groups,
while externallytheirinitiativesare limitedboth by thecomparable circumstancesofthe
governmentswithwhich theymustnegotiate and by the demands ofmore coherentand
capable transnational actors.
Societal and systemicvariables, in short,have locked governmentsinto long-standing
policies, and even the well-established policies may prove increasingly difficultto
maintain if the global crisis of authoritycontinues to intensifyand cascades tensions
280 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
along the many fault lines of cleavage. Viewed from this perspective,Sadat's trip to
Jerusalemlooms as an extraordinaryevent,one ofthoseexceedinglyrare instanceswhen
a national leader broke freeof the locks that sustain the continuitiesof world politics.
Much more indicative ofthevice-likegrip ofsocietal and systemicvariables is theway in
which Polish officialshave been constrainedby theriseofSolidarityand themalaise that
has followed theirdestructionof it.
In Western democracies, at least, much the same can be said about governmental
variables: the polarization and volatilityof voters in Western democracies has led to
minoritycabinets, fragilecoalitions,frequentturnovers,and stalemated policy-making
processes that add furtherto the constraintsupon those in high office.My collaborative
research with Holsti (Rosenau and Holsti, 1983; Holsti and Rosenau, 1984) on the
foreignpolicy beliefsystemsofAmerican leaders is poignantlyillustrativein thisregard.
Our findingsclearly point to enduring cleavages and the absence of consensus in the
United States that seem bound to conduce to vacillation ratherthan innovation in the
policy-makingprocess. In the absence of any dramatic consensus-formingevent, and
the likelihood of such an occurrence seems very remote,present and futureAmerican
policy-makersappear to have little control over what they can undertake, much less
accomplish, in foreignaffairs.
To posit governmentsas severely and increasinglycircumscribed by domestic and
foreignconstraints,however, is not to say that theyhave ceased being prime actors on
the international stage. Far from it: governments continue to enjoy considerable
authorityand (with a fewnotable exceptions) legitimacy.Their foreignpolicies are still
the most conspicuous and pervasive actions on the stage. In the swirlsand counterswirls
of cascading processes they are the focal points, the managers of change, even if
diminishedin theircapabilities and more constrainedin theirleeway. More specifically,
governmentsare not so locked into theircontextual circumstancesthat theyhave lost
theirability to adapt to the convergingdemands fromat home and abroad. They still
retain a full array of adaptive mechanisms for bargaining, synthesizing,or otherwise
playing the various demands off against each other and thereby maintaining their
identityas collectivities.And in so doing theycan stillexertinfluence,commitblunders,
pressforcompliance, and meet challenges. The reasons to theorizeabout foreignpolicy,
in short,are no less compelling than ever.
But the theorymust now be more sensitive to the contextual constraintsand the
adaptations that are made to the demands inherent in them. In addition to
acknowledging the declining effectivenessofgovernments,now our theorizingneeds to
account for the vacuums therebycreated. In addition to focusingon government-to-
government interactions over particular issues, now foreign policy theory needs to
expand its conceptual storehouseand proceed as if multi-actorsituationsand linkages
across system levels and issue areas constitute the normal conditions under which
governmentsframeand implement theirpolicies. In addition to assessingoutcomes in
termsofdirectresponsesto stimuli,now our theoriesneed to include circuitousresponses
to layers of stimulifilteredthrougha varietyof indirectchannels. This means that we
need to explore more fully how foreign policy officialsshare their authority and
coordinate theiractions with subsystemleaders at home and those abroad who occupy
top roles in transnational organizations and international regimes. It means that we
need to be more conversant with the concept of compliance and, followingYoung
(1979), more alert to the variabilityof the conditionsunder which actors do and do not
modifytheirbehavior in response to priorstimuli.It means that we have to be ready to
treatthe structuresofworld politics as structuresof authorityin which the unfoldingof
eventsmay be due as much to thelegitimacythatattaches to actions as to thecapabilities

that back them up.
The Aggregation of Collective Actors

The decline of governmental effectivenessand the increasing relevance of contextual
constraintsand multi-actorsituationspoint up theneed fortheoriesofforeignpolicy that
encompass the dynamics whereby roles and their scenarios get aggregated into
collectivitiesand the processes whereby the collectivitiesthen adapt to threats and
challenges. The more crises of authority cascade subgroupism across the global
landscape, the more extensive is the disaggregation of wholes into parts that, in turn,
eitherget aggregated or incorporated into new wholes. That is, cascading interdepen-
dence can readily be viewed as continuous processes of systemic formation and
reformation, and the concept of aggregation offersperhaps the only means for
comprehendinghow and why theyunfoldas theydo. Stated more sweepingly,not until
such timeas we can account for,first,the transformation ofmicro action scriptsinto the
behavior ofmacro collectivitiesand, second, the aggregationofmacro collectivitiesinto
global structures,can we expect to move frompre-theoriesto theoriesthat encompass
thedynamics outlined in Figure 2. To repeat a deeply held conviction,macro structures
do not exist entirelyapart fromtheirmicro components, and in a period of enormous
change, cascading processes,and multi-actorsituationsit would be follyto assume that
the linksand tensionsbetween micro and macro unitsare sustained as theyalways have
been.
To speak of the formationof structuredand purposefulcollectivitiesis to referto a
process that is never automatic, that is sometimescircuitous,that is oftenobscure, and
thatis endlesslyawesome. It is awesome because thedisparate individuals thatcomprise
a modern collectivitydo not know each other, much less interact directly,and yet
somehow they acquire coherence and structureas a collective actor which develops,
possesses,and uses resourceson behalf of goals. How does thisoccur? Anticipating the
ensuing discussion,it occurs througha process of aggregation in which the individuals
are seen, and see themselves,as parts thatsum to a whole which,as such, is differentiated
fromotherwholes and existsas a realityin the minds of both those who occupy its roles
and those external to it who must take its existence into account. The summing of the
partsis carried out and proclaimed by thosewho seek to organize and mobilize themin a
particular way forparticular purposes; concurrently,the sum is found compelling as a
role scenario by thosewho formits parts and, as the sharingof the scenario spreads and
acquires legitimacy,the collectivitytakes on a lifeofitsown. Subsequently, whateverits
nature and goals whether it is weak or strong,systemor subsystem,governmentor
transnational association, international regime or revolutionary movement the
collectivitypersists and survives only as long as the role scenarios and interaction
patternsthat identifyits existence are consistentwith theiravailable resourcesand are
thusmeaningfulin the minds and memoriesof those touched by the policies pursued on
theirbehalf. That is, a collectivityendures only as long as its policies lead to successful
adaptations to changing circumstances that reinforce the action scripts, authority
structures,and compliance patternson which itsperceived existencerests.Normally,the
longera collectivitysurvives,the moredoes it accumulate writtenrecordsand unwritten
traditionsthat formdeeply engrained cultural premises which, in turn, reinforcethe
expectationsand scenarios embedded in its roles occupied by succeeding generationsof
individuals whose actions sustain the aggregative sequences.
282 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
This is not to imply,however,that the formationand maintenance ofcollectivitiesis a

one-way process, that theycome into being and persistonly because micro units share
the same basic values and thus converge around the same action scripts. On the
contrary, their formation and continuation is profoundly a two-way process, with
the collectivitiesand theirimplementingorganizations servingto defineand shape the
values and orientations of their role occupants who, in turn, act to sustain the
collectivities.Aggregation, in other words, is inescapably an interactionprocess, with
the micro units limiting the scope of macro structuresand with macro structures
narrowing and guiding the contributionof micro units.
Stated in stillanother way, aggregationinvolves two realities,one ofindividuals who
occupy specificroles and one of collectivitiesthat consist of systemsof interconnected
roles which are widely differentiatedand labeled as such by the individuals who,
needing to infusestructureinto theirworlds,conduct themselvesin termsofthesystemic
structuresthey have articulated with their labels. In turn, the norms underlyingthis
conduct become habitual and institutionalized,therebyreinforcingrole expectations
and insuring the persistence of collectivities across time. From this interactive
perspective the question of what comes firstin the formation and maintenance of
collectivitiesis essentiallytrivial.Micro unitsand macro structuresare productsofeach
other and it does not matterin what order theyoriginallysurfaced.
It bears re-emphasizing, however, that notwithstandingtheir duration and the
awesomeness of their coherence, collectivitiesare always susceptible to change and
collapse. Cascading dynamics can engulfthe micro roles of which they are composed,
raise the salience of othersystems,or otherwisealter theirexpectationssuch that habits
and institutionsbreak down and collectivitiesare therebytransformed.This is why we
can never take micro units forgranted in our macro inquiries.
In sum, collectivitiesconsistofshared action schemas to which meaning is attached in
the realityworld of the mind, but as such theyare verymuch alive and thus are, forall
practical purposes, living units that act and react, press and retreat, conform and
deviate, or otherwisepursue that vast range of behaviors which preoccupy studentsof
world politics. To comprehend these behaviors, however, it is not enough simply to
assume either the processes of aggregation whereby micro parts are fused into macro
wholes or the processes of adaptation whereby the macro wholes sustain a balance
between theinternaland externaldemands thatpressupon them.Collectivitiescan take
many formsand can evolve in a number of directions, and such differencescannot
be understood unless we are able to trace how the capabilities of collectivities
expand, contract,or otherwiseundergo change in the support theycan bringto bear on
behalf of their goals. That is, we need to specifythe dynamics of aggregation and
adaptation.
As noted, the key to casting aggregative processes into a theoretical context lies in
positing them as resultingin variable sums, as adding up to macro wholes that are
sometimesgreater and sometimes lesser than the sum of their micro parts, and then
assessinghow, when, and why the summingoccurs one way ratherthan another. Under
what conditions is the interaction between micro and macro units susceptible to
aggregation? At what points and through what mechanisms do the wholes become
greaterthan the sums of theirparts?And when do the parts add to less than the whole?
When is the possible existenceofeithera greateror lessersum recognized?Who does the
summing?How is the presence ofthe summed whole articulated and proclaimed? What
political consequences followfromthe publicity attendant upon its articulation?Why
are some sums accepted as valid while the accuracy ofothersare contested?How does an
aggregated sum get transformedinto a collectivity?When does a sum need to be

recalculated or rearticulated for a collectivityto retain its vitalityin politics? Are the
processesand politics of disaggregation,of wholes unraveling eitherinto lessersums or
into parts no longer summable, comparable to those of aggregation?
Building on a previous formulation that focused on the motivational sources of
aggregativeprocesses (Rosenau, 1980: 79-82), thesequestions can be addressed here by
distinguishingbetween unintentional and participatoryaggregationsand by notinghow the
formerget transformedinto the latter. To differentiatebetween these two types of
aggregations is to stressthat not all aggregative processes culminate in collectivities.
Some give rise simply to aggregations,that is, to wholes which lack the organizational
and purposeful characteristicsof collectivitiesand, consequently, which are exactly
equal to, and never more nor less than, theirparts. These are unintended aggregations,
and theyare always equal to the sum of theirparts because politics,by definition,does
not interveneto count the parts or contest the sums.
Unintended aggregation occurs when a multiplicityof role occupants undertake
similar but unrelated behavior to serve theirown purposes. Each action is designed to
advance each role occupant's goals or otherwisemeet his or her needs, but because the
actions are all similar even though the goals or needs may be diverse, the actions are
summable. If the similar actions are relevant to the concerns of those such as
journalists,scholars,bureaucrats, or politicians who are expected in theirprofessional
roles to be alert to change, then the patternstheyformwill eventually be recognized,
summed, and publicized. Once note has thus been taken of the similar behaviors, they
can be said to form a whole even though the parts may be neither interactive nor
connected. Depending on how it is perceived and publicized, the unintended
aggregation can thus become the targetof public policies and the core of international
issues. Population explosions,resourceshortages,or financialcrisesare cases in point. A
familyhas a child, fillsits car with gasoline, or purchases a televisionset made abroad
unconcerned that elsewhere millions of families are doing the same. When the
cumulative implications of theseprivate acts (the people crunch, the energycrunch, or
the trade imbalance) are discerned, evaluated, and proclaimed by observers or
spokespersonsfor collectivities,the aggregated sum enters the public arena and feeds
into the structuresand processes of world politics.
This is not to suggest that world politicsis essentiallya process of consciousness-rais-
ing. The sumsget calculated whetheror not people are aware ofthepublic consequences
of theirprivate actions, and more oftenthan not theyare unlikelyto be cognizant ofthe
leadership summations to which theyhave contributed.
Of course,lengthytimelags may ensue between thecumulation ofmicropatternsand
the public acknowledgementof them by leaders ofmacro collectivities.Indeed, it is the
discrepancy between unintended aggregations and their activation on the agenda of
world politicsthat,in effect,describestheinformaland latentstructuresofinternational
systems.Prior to theidentificationofan aggregation,or duringsubsequent periodswhen
it is quiescent as a public issue, policy-makers for collectivities may unknowingly
encounter the opportunitiesand limitationsinherentin the aggregate patterns while
making decisions and launching undertakingsrelevant to the issues then on the global
agenda. The aggregate consequences ofpopulation explosions or ofwidespread distrust
of government,for example, were surely encountered by politicians long before their
explicit recognitionas a public problem was articulated. Unintended aggregations,in
otherwords,can operate as basic parametersofglobal processesto the extenttheylimit
or channel the scope or direction of those processes. As such, the aggregations are
informal and latent structures unarticulated givens for politicians that are no less
importantlinks between micro parts and macro wholes forbeing deeply buried in the
responsesof policy-makersto the issues they confront.
The timelag between the recognitionand the articulationofunintendedaggregations
helps clarifyhow the whole becomes differentfromthe sum of its parts. During that
period, word ofsuch an aggregationhaving been identifiedspreads, in academic circles,
legislativecorridors,and editorial boards as well as among interestgroups,opportunistic
politicians, and public servants; as word spreads and the circumstancesthat led to the
recognition of the unintended patterns intensify,the existence of the aggregation, its
meaning, relevance, and futuredevelopment,increasinglybecomes salient as a problem
and a source ofcontention.At some point one or anotherofthoseinvolved in recognizing
and assessingthe aggregation findreasons to publicly proclaim its existenceas a matter
ofconcern. If the public surfacingofthe patternleads to furtherdebate, the aggregation
can be said to have become a political issue and to be headed fora place on the political
agenda. And the more such an aggregationgetspoliticized,ofcourse, theless is it merely
a sum ofmicro parts and the more does it undergo transformation froma parameter to a
variable in world politics. That is, the very fact of being the focus of public attention
makes the unintended aggregation something differentthan it previously had been.
However accurate the proclamation of a sum may be and oftenthe initial contention
over the issue involves argumentsover what the correctsum is it serves as a basis for
subsequent action in the public arena.
Turning now to participatoryaggregation,here the similar behavior undertaken by
the occupants of comparable roles is based on similar scenarios that envision
achievement of the same collective goals. The role occupants eitherparticipate directly
in the aggregation by contributingthroughtheirown actions to the sum or theydo so
indirectlyby permittingthe sum to be claimed on their behalf. Whether the desired
effectoccurs or not, aggregation ensues because those seeking to mobilize and organize
the role occupants are able to call attentionto theirshared purposes and therebyconcert
the supporting behavior and give direction to its cumulative impact. The effortsof a
governmentto activate the citizenryforwar or ofopponents to generate public protests
against military action are obvious examples of participatory aggregation. Indeed,
many attemptsto initiatethe processesofparticipatoryaggregationspringfroma desire
to offsetor undo the consequences of unintended aggregation. Advocates of new
governmentalpolicies to controlrisingbirthrates,forinstance, are seekingto reverseor
moderate the course of an unintended aggregative process.
While the two typesofaggregativeprocessesmay thusbe interactiveas theyforgelinks
with macro collectivities,theyare neverthelessseparable and can usefullybe analyzed
separately. The distinction between them is the difference between unplanned
consequences and calculated organization, between latent and manifestcumulation,
between individual and collective action, between diffusedand mobilized behavior.
There is another distinction between unintended and participatory aggregation
worth noting: the formeris, so to speak, leaderless, while the latter culminates with
spokespersons calling attention to the aggregated behavior. That is, unintended
aggregation gives rise to macro parameters that become salient, perhaps even crucial,
dimensions of the world scene as they limit or enhance what can be accomplished by
those who move around in the global arena seeking to articulate, manage, or resolve
issues on its agenda. Because unintended aggregations consist of many diverse and
unorganized parts,however,theyneitherhave designated leaders nor positionsin which
leaders could be placed. To revertagain to the example of population explosions,these
'hard realities' of present-dayglobal politics simply exist. They have no leaders who
speak for them or who are otherwiseauthorized to act on theirbehalf.
Virtually by definition,on the otherhand, participatoryaggregationsdo have leaders
and spokespersons. Whether the role occupants are linked togetherin organizations
(collectivities) or do not share common membershipsbut are mobilized to act in the
same way fora particular purpose (regimes), the resultingstructurescontain some roles
that require their occupants to advance the general organizational goals and/or the
specificpurposes forwhich mobilization was initiated.Thus the world scene is pervaded
with occupants of positions-leaders who shoulder responsibilityforthe orientations
and activities of participatory aggregations collectivitiesand/or regimes and who
therebyseek to promoteor preservevalues in theglobal system.Viewed in thiscontextof
spokespersonsassociated with aggregated outcomes, much of world politicsis a contest
among leaders of participatory aggregations over the legitimacy of their claims to
allocations of the global pie.
This is not to imply that participatoryaggregationscome into being only throughthe
mobilizing activitiesof theirleaders. As previouslynoted, the interactionofleaders and
followersis a two-way process: the participatoryaggregation could not formwithout
leaders leading, but neither could it take shape without followersready to follow.
Perhaps these interactive dynamics usually begin with the tireless leader. Yet, on
occasion theyoriginate with the restlessfollower.The sudden, newfoundwillingnessof
hundreds of thousands of Chileans to defythe Pinochet regime with protestsin May,
1983, is a case in point. Apparently no one anticipated the protests,least of all the man
who touched themoff:an obscure 28-year-oldclerkin thestatecopper industry,Rodolfo
Seguel, who was elected to his firstpost in the copper union the previous December and
became itspresidentin February. One ofhis firstacts was to call fora strikein May. This
was eventuallywatered down to a call fora day ofprotest,but the intended aggregation
broughtinto being thatday was so large as to astonishSeguel along witheveryoneelse. 'I
found I had said what everyonewas thinkingand no one dared to say', he was quoted as
observing. 'Suddenly people began to lose theirfear' (Hilton, 1983).
The distinction between participatory aggregations sustained by collectivitiesand
those that take on the characteristicsof regimeslies in whetheror not the role scenarios
encompass sequences in which the role occupants share commitmentsto the aggrega-
tion's policy-makingprocess as well as to a set of policy goals. If theydo involve such
commitmentsand are thus led to accord legitimacyto a particular system,the partici-
patoryaggregationacquires theorganizational structureofa collectiveactor an interest
group,government,or polity thatequips it to cope witha varietyofissuesand to endure
beyond the lifeof any issue. On the otherhand, ifthe scenarios are confinedto a shared
commitmentto a policy-makingprocess among organizations rather than attaching
legitimacyto the same organization, the participatoryaggregationlacks the capacity to
deal withdiverseproblems and thus takes on the informalstructuresof a regime.
As forthevariabilityofthe sums collectivitiescan aggregate,the greateror lessersums
result from the extent to which their resources and structuresare seen, in the role
scenarios held by both their members and those outside, as enabling them to move
toward theirgoals. Consider, on the one hand, those collectivitieswhose resourcesare
seen as insufficient to the realization of a particular set of goals and/orwhose scenarios
are seen as not so widely shared as to allow forthe coherent mobilization of theirrole
occupants on behalf of those goals. Such aggregationssum to less than theirparts. Each
member does not contributeenough to allow theirleaders to make effectiveclaims on
theirbehalf. Where resources and shared role scenarios support the collectivity'sgoals
286 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
and policies, on the other hand, the leadership is able to press, bargain, or otherwise
move toward the goals, a set of circumstancesin which the collectivitycan aggregate a
sum seen to be in excess of its parts.
Distinctions drawn among aggregative sums, in short, are capability statements
derived fromthe discrepancybetween a collectivity'sperformanceand the claims made
on its behalf. The statementsassess the coherence and potential ofcollectivitiesas actors
on the global stage, both in general and with respect to particular issues. Examples
abound. Political parties in open societies offerclear illustrationsof the dynamics of
aggregative processesin thisregard. A party sums to less than its parts if the support it
gets on election day falls short of either its totals in prior elections or of the votes its
leaders claimed theycould muster.Under theseconditions,the influenceof the partyis
diminished by its failure to conformto the prior claims made on its behalf. If, on the
other hand, the vote approximates or exceeds the claimed support,then the subsequent
activitiesof the party's leadership representmore than the sum of its parts in the sense
that their effortsto press the collective demands of the membership have not been
undermined. The retreatingor advancing army, the falteringor expanding economy,
and the fizzled or unexpectedlylarge rally are other examples of how collectivitiescan
aggregate sums that are, politically,less or more than theirparts. The aforecitedcase of
the Chilean copper union, moreover, suggests that the quicker the alterations in the
aggregative sums occur, the more profoundwill be theireffects.
It followsthat periods of cascading interdependenceare marked by a high degree of
participatory aggregation and considerable fluctuationsin the sums aggregated by
collectivities.As the fragmentingof whole systemsand the coherence of subsystems
cascades across previouslystable boundaries, leaders in both systemsneed to be more
active in mobilizing and summing the energies of theirmembers and findingways to
demonstrate that the emergentsums are consistentwith theirclaims. At the height of
cascading processes,of course, both the sums and the claims made about them gyrate
erraticallyas the contrariety,simultaneity,and expansivityoftensionsand changes flow
swiftlywithinand among systems.The evolution of Solidarity offersa good example in
thisregard. As its core expanded froma small nucleus of workersin Gdansk, the union
became a political force in Poland far more powerful than the size of its formal
membershipindicated. And as it expanded, the Polish governmentand Communist
Partybecame increasinglyhelpless,theirfragmentationrevealing them to be collectivi-
tiesconsiderablyless than the sum oftheirparts. At thesame timerepercussionswere felt
or fearedin other Eastern European countries,with theirgovernmentsfearingthat the
cascades might engulf them and reveal their sums to be fragile and those of their
subsystems to be increasing. Then, when martial law was imposed by the Polish
government,the directionof the cascades was reversedand the relativesums fluctuated
throughstill another phase of uncertaintyand reaggregation.
Much the same analysis can be employed to probe the Soviet forcesin Afghanistan,
the US effortsin Central America, the government of El Salvador, or any other
collectivity whose actions stir commotion on the global scene. And it is equally
applicable to internationalsystems.Consider, forinstance, NATO. Its capacities as a
collectivityamount to less than the sum ofits parts to the extentthat the membersdiffer
on military strategy,fall short on their annual contributions,or otherwise work at
cross-purposes.The frequentpleas ofUS leaders to bringNATO's forcelevels up to prior
commitmentsare, in effect,effortsto make the organization into a whole greater than
the sum of its parts,just as is the argument of other members that theynot be asked to
make commitmentsbeyond theirmeans.
In short,viewed across timeand the range ofissuescomprisinga collectivity'spolitical

agenda, aggregation and reaggregation are continual processes and the way in which
theirsums fluctuate,sometimeswildly and sometimesslowly,sometimesexceeding the
whole and sometimes falling short of it, depends on how the changing demands and
conditions that prevail in the collectivity'sinternal and external environmentsimpact
on the role scenarios underlyingthe actions of its members. Both the rapidity and the
direction of the fluctuationsare extremelyrelevant in an era of cascading interdepen-
dence. For, as elaborated below, it is preciselythe fluctuationsin the essentialstructures
of governmentsand societies that pose the adaptive challenges to which they must
respond and with which they must cope if they are to persist and flourish.Adaptive
collectivities are, by definition, those that keep their essential structures within
acceptable limits,while those that fail to do so are conceived to be maladaptive and
moving toward eventual extinctionas a collectivity(Rosenau, 1981: 58). Viewed in this
way, the primary challenge to systemsis that of keeping cascading processes from
exacerbating the sums to which theyaggregate beyond acceptable limits.As indicated
by thepathos ofrecentdevelopmentsin Lebanon, thischallenge cannot readilybe metif
key subsystemsbegin to narrow or otherwiseredefinetheircriteriaof what constitutes
acceptable fluctuationsin the system'sessential structures.
Adaptive Collectivities as Actors

If aggregative processes depict how and why parts come together to form wholes,
adaptive processesaccount forhow and why the parts and thewholes manage to survive
amidst other parts and wholes. Both the subsystemparts and the systemwholes evolve
mechanisms and processes for keeping fluctuationsin their essential structureswithin
limits acceptable to their members. By 'essential' structuresis meant those patterned
formsof interactionthat are necessaryto a system'scontinuation,such as its economy,
polity,and society.These structuresare not imperviousto change. They do fluctuateas
new circumstancesarise, but normallythe fluctuationsare relativelyminimal and thus
acceptable to the system'smembers.Keeping them minimal and acceptable entails the
maintenance of some formof balance or, better,a range of balances between the
demands that emanate fromwithinthesystem'sinternalsettingand thosethatoriginate
external to it. As developed at much greater length elsewhere (Rosenau, 1981), the
internal-externalbalance is conceived to approximate any of fourgeneric types. If the
role expectations of a system's or subsystem's policy-makersgive higher priorityto
external than to internal demands, as is the case today in the countries of Eastern
Europe, the resultingrole scenarios and behavior will amount to acquiescent adaptation.If,
on the other hand, internal considerations are predominant in the role scenarios of
officials,as has long been trueofSouth Africa,intransigent
adaptationis viewed as the basic
mode throughwhich the systemseeks to keep its essential structureswithin acceptable
limits.Preservative adaptationprevails when both the internal and external demands are
experienced as extensiveand defined as equally important,a condition which tends to
characterizemostcollectivitiesthat are society-widein scope. Promotive adaptation
persists
when a system'sor subsystem'srole expectations define both the internal and external
demands as of minimal significance and thus enable its policy-makers to pursue
scenariosderived fromtheirrolesin othersystems,a condition that is particularlylikely
to mark the way in which revolutionarymovementsconduct themselves.
To conceive offoreignpolicies as expressiveofone offourformsofadaptive behavior is
to take a major step beyond the Pre-Theory. In that originalformulationallowance was
288 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
not made fortensionsbetween a society'sinternaland externalcircumstances.Systemic

and societal variables were posited as additive and not as competitive (as partials in a
total variance and not totals unto themselves), thereby inhibiting the derivation of
propositionsas to the conditions under which one or the otheris likelyto predominate.
By treating the task of policy-makersas that of maintaining some form of balance
between domestic and foreignchallenges, however, the concept of adaptation focuses
theoreticalattentionon a crucial dynamic underlyingthe conduct ofa system'srelations
with the restof the world. External relationsare never undertakenwithoutconcern for
their internal consequences. Even the most ritualistic and peripheral diplomatic
activities are rooted in a concern for sustaining the stability of the international
environmentso that essential structuresat home can freelyadhere to their historic
patterns. Stated differently,the requirements of politics at home and abroad are
bound to be inconsistentwith each other-if only because the latter encompasses
the conventions and goals of other cultures and how the two are brought
intojuxtaposition and harmonized must thus be a prime focus of any theoryof foreign
policy.
Indeed, if the scenarios, strategies,and actions of officialsare conceived as effortsto
keep the fluctuationsin a society'sessential structureswithinacceptable limits,foreign
policy phenomena are bound to be centralfociofempiricalpolitical theory.Or at least it
is hard to imagine how any theoryof any polity,or any class of polities,can be viable
without propositionsthat specifythe values, processes,and institutionsthroughwhich
the internal-externalbalance is maintained.
Regardless ofthemode ofadaptation to which theymay be committed,policy-makers
normallygo to great lengths to avoid a direct confrontationbetween the internal and
external demands that vie fortheircompliance. Such confrontationscompel choices in
which either goals abroad or support at home will be set back. They are no-win
situationsthat no regimecan affordto endure, and thusconsiderable effortis expended
on either mobilizing domestic support for foreign policies or moderating external
commitments so as not to endanger the support base at home. Under some
circumstances,however, unavoidable conflictsbetween internal and external demands
do occur. The quintessential example along these lines is the conflictinherentin the
choice between guns and butter.Ample supplies of both are not possible in the modern
era. As was again revealed when LyndonJohnson undertookto achieve a 'great society'
at home and militarystabilityin Vietnam, having both guns and butter gives rise to
economic dislocations that even the wealthiest of societies cannot tolerate forlong.
It is perhaps a measure of the pace of cascading interdependence that direct and
unavoidable conflictsbetween internaland externaldemands are now surfacingin new
arenas farremoved fromguns-or-butterissues. Recently, forexample, both the United
States and the Soviet Union were unable to avoid such a conflict.The formerwas faced
withdemands fromtheThird World forincreasesin itscontributionto the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) that conflictedwith demands fromwithin the Congress that
IMF loans to poor countries be curbed and the US contribution thereby reduced.
Similarly,the Soviet leadership was apparently confrontedwith a dilemma as to how to
placate Western publics over the downing of the Korean airliner without admitting
error and responsibilityto their own people. The United States sought to resolve its
conflict by pressing for new limits on IMF loans as a price for not reducing its
contribution and the Soviets sought a resolution of its problem by offeringforeign
audiences a differentexplanation of what happened over Sakhalin Island than the one
presented at home (Burns, 1983b). Not surprisingly,neitherthe United States nor the
Soviet resolution worked very well and, at best, amounted to only a temporary
amelioration of the underlyingproblem.
The inability of superpowers to keep theiressential internal and external structures
fromclashing points up another compelling reason to treat foreignpolicy as adaptive
behavior: such a perspective offersa means for tracing and explaining why and how
national collectivitiescope with the continual changes inherentin cascading processes.
While the original Pre-Theory stressedthat the world was not static and that a viable
theoryofforeignpolicy had to allow forthe dynamismofchange at home and abroad, it
provided no basis for theorizing along these lines other than noting that the relative
potency of individual, governmental, societal, and systemicvariables could undergo
alteration. Since it presumes that the core values, processes, and institutions of
collectivities fluctuate, the adaptation model readily fills this gap: by positing the
possibilitythat each of the fourtypesof adaptation may give way to each of the other
three, it identifiestwelve types of transformationsany collectivitycan undergo and
highlightsthe domestic and foreignconditionsthat are likelyto initiateand sustaineach
of them (Rosenau, 1981: 80-87). By examining the action scriptsembedded in each of
the twelve, moreover, the model lends itself to specifyingthe sequences whereby
individuals,both leaders and citizens,get aggregated into largerwholes thateitherfoster
or hinder fundamental adaptive transformations.
The capacity to trace and account foradaptive transformationstakes on additional
significancewith the end ofa prolonged period ofworldwide growthand the advent ofa
global recession in the 1980s. In earlier postwar decades the impetus to adaptive
transformationsoriginated largely within most countries in, for example, electoral
upheavals, social unrest,and fallen dictators that underlay, respectively,transforma-
tions in Greece, Chile, and Spain-while their external circumstances remained
relativelystable. In countriessuch as Vietnam, Afghanistan,and Czechoslovakia, to be
sure, militarythreatsfromabroad constitutedadaptive challenges that could, and did,
lead to transformations, but formost countriesthe relevant internationalsystemswere
marked by comparative stability.With the onset of the global recession,however, new,
unforeseen, and not readily comprehensible challenges emanated from abroad.
Enormous deficitsin major countriesof the Second and Third Worlds rendered them
vulnerable to external economic conditions which, transmittedthrough the IMF and
other lenders, conduce to the kind of extraordinary fluctuations in their essential
structuresthat can result in adaptive transformations.It is hardly coincidental, for
instance, that in the same narrow timeframethe publics offourcountries Argentina,
Chile, the Philippines, and Poland forced highly authoritarian regimes to acknow-
ledge and make adjustments to their demands. Unique circumstances (such as the
Falklands War or the Aquino assassination) were at workin each country,but so was it
also thecase thatrecessionand the necessityofcoping withinternationaldebts in all four
countriesedged new middle-class groups over into the ranks of the opposition.
In a like manner high unemployment,overcommittedbanks, swollen interestrates,
and lessened productivity in the First World rendered its countries susceptible to
externallyinduced austerityprograms that, in turn,have fosteredinternal discontent.
These dynamics have already surfaced in France, but their operation in one formor
another can also be discerned wherever the shocks of the internationaleconomy have
undermined currencies, thereby initiating adaptive challenges that have greatly
quickened the pace of cascading processes. As a retiringofficialof the OECD put it,
'Adaptation in a high-growthenvironmentis painless', but it is difficultto adjust to 'the
cold climate of slow growth'; among other things,she added, slow growth poses the
290 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
problem of whetherpublics 'will continue to accept a drastic lowering of expectations,

an end to the assumption of economic growth,increasingincome, good jobs and better
and more forever,'(quoted in Gewirtz [1983]).13
In sum, the concept ofadapting collectivitiesfocusestheoreticalattentionon both the
continuitiesand the breakpoints of international history.The continuitiesare evident
year in and year out as the essential structuresof national systemsfluctuate within
narrow bounds. The breakpoints, those moments when historyveers offand change
ensues, become salient when the fluctuations turn into gyrations that undermine
long-standingrole scenarios and cascade new scenarios which reaggregatethe sums and
the identityof the systemsand subsystemscompeting forscarce resources and public
loyalties.14
Individuals as Actors
Since individuals have thus far been treated as products of role expectations who get
aggregated into collectivitiesthat sustain the structuresof global lifethroughadaptive
and cascading processes,it may seem a vast contradictionto returnto themas actors and
to posit individual variables as primedynamicsin world affairs.Yet I am driven to do so
by asking why it is that systemsand subsystemsof the late twentiethcentury are so
marked by simultaneous coherence and breakdown. The coherence and breakdown
underlie the forces of change- the demands of subsystems, the ineffectivenessof
governments,the weaknesses of internationalorganizations, the emergence of regimes,
and the adaptation of societies but what accounts fortheirsimultaneity?The answer
lies partly, as noted, in the quickened pace of communications fostered by the
microelectronicrevolution.But thisis hardlya sufficient explanation. It does not explain
why neithercoherence nor breakdown have predominated or why theyhave unfolded
simultaneously rather than sequentially. Taken singly or interactively,in short, the
dynamics examined thus farfail to account forwhy crisesof authorityare so pervasive,
forwhy the chaos of our time seems so orderly,forwhat it is that infusesstructureinto
cascading interdependence and makes it appear so patterned.
To returnto individual variables, however,is not to back away fromtheconception of
people as role occupants and theiractions as stemmingfromrole scenarios. For thefocus
here is on generational phenomena, on individual differencesacross broad historical
eras, as distinguished from the actions and interactions induced by the roles that
comprise the systemsand subsystemsof a particular generation. What follows,in other
words, explores the ways in which the commotion that marks the global systemin the
presentera may derive fromcharacteristicsthat people, irrespectiveof theirroles and
cultures,share. In so doiSngit does not relax the presumptionthat role expectationsand
scenariosshape attitudes,channel personalities,and direct behavior. Nor does it negate
the socialization and training whereby roles can enlarge a person's skills. Rather,
without compromising the scope and power of role variables, the ensuing analysis
identifiestwo individual variables as operating prior to and independently of the
expectations experienced by role occupants.
One of the variables, what I shall call the aptitude factor,involves changes in the
capacity ofpeople ofan era to develop, elaborate, and use action schema as theyperform
in theirdiverse roles. The other,what I have labeled the controlfactor,
refersto the extent
to which people feel that world affairsare controllable, eitherby themselvesor by 'the
powers that be'. My overall hypothesisis that in the last decades of the twentieth
century,those years in which the post-industrial,high technology age of information
and interdependence began, the aptitudes of individuals for coping with complexity
have reached new heightseven as theirsense ofcontrolover the complexityhas fallento
new lows.
Beforeindicatingwhy thesefactorsare primesourcesofcascading processes,it is useful
to note that there is a reason why I have shiftedterminologyand introduced them as
factorsand not as variables. It is that I conceive of them as largely constants in the
presentera even though theyhave varied considerablyin earlieragrarian and industrial
eras. As will be seen, theyare constantsin the sense that both the urban sophisticateand
the rural peasant have so greatlyimproved their aptitudes with role scenarios and so
markedlylowered theirconceptions of controllabilitythat thesefactorstend to operate
uniformlyand not variably across systemstoday.
By 'uniformly'I do not mean that the analytic aptitudes of the rural peasant have
caught up withthoseofthe urban sophisticate.The high-techage ofinformationhas not
resultedin equal distributionofits skillsany more than the industrialera gave rise to an
equality in the distributionof wealth. Obviously enormous differencesamong various
population strata still remain. Indeed, the analytically wealthy may even be getting
wealthier in theircapacity to elaborate action scriptsrelative to those who have long
been poor in this regard. Compared to the one out of three persons who gets a daily
newspaper and the one out of 12 who has a TV set in developed countries,forexample,
thecomparable figuresforthe developing countriesare one out of30 and one out of500,
respectively.Similarly, the same source reports that 83% of the world's books are
produced in developed countriesand the same figureis used fortheirproportionof the
world's data processing equipment in 1978 (Rada, 1983: 204-205). However, despite
these patterns, and as indicated in the ensuing discussion, there are good reasons to
presume that the aptitude factorhas operated uniformlyin the sense of enabling and
expanding the analytic skillsof those in everysocietal stratumto the point where their
action scriptsare neitherobscure nor truncated.
One way to probe the aptitude factor is to ask what the advent of instantaneous
communicationsand informationretrieval of satellitesbringinglive picturesofworld
crises and trends into homes everywhereand of computers storing, processing, and
disseminatinginformationheretoforeunknown and ungatherable may be doing to
individuals as potential actors in global dramas? One answer, perhaps a standard
answer for hardened students of world history,is rooted in the premise that the
person-in-any-street does not change, that he or she continues to be remote fromand
uninformed about international affairs and thus disinterested in them. Such a
perspectivesees people as simplistic,as imperviousto upgrading, as rabble, or at least as
masses that are normallyquiescent but that can be easily manipulated and aroused by
demagogues under adverse conditions. The daily scenes of screaming and chanting
Iranian mobs in the streetsofTehran during the takeoverofthe American Embassy are
quintessentiallyillustrativefor those who perceive publics as uneducated masses and
thereforeas unaffectedby the age of information.
Such a perspectivestrikesme as no longer tenable. A preponderance of the world's
people may still be ignorant and apathetic, but that does not mean they have been
untouched by the communications revolution. It runs counter to everythingwe know
about social and political dynamics to assertthatmostpeople remain unchanged even as
global structuresare undergoing profound alteration. Indeed, recent research into six
developing countrieshas led to the conclusion
thatwhatislackingin thetraditional
culturemaybe providedbytheinstitutions
of
modernsociety by theschool,thefactory, thenewspaper,and theradio.These
292 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
sources of influenceevidentlyhave an independentpower to effectpolitical

socialization,trainingmento knowmoreabout polities,stimulating themto take
an interestin politicaleventsand toparticipatein civicaffairs,
and fostering
a shift
in allegiancefromtribaland local leadersto thoserepresentinga widercommunity
ofinterest(Inkeles,1983: 256).
If thisis so, surelythe communications revolutionis having consequences forpeople
everywhereand notjust foreducated elites and attentivecitizens! Surely traces of this
revolution,thisinformation-pervadedage in which we live, are reaching across class and
geographic lines and impacting upon the urban poor and underprivilegedpeasants as
well as the busy middle classes!
Assertionssuch as these seem tenable ifthe age ofinformationis viewed as involving
parameter changes comparable in theirscope and importance to those initiated by the
industrial revolution or the advent of nuclear energy. Such era-altering upheavals
affectedthe skills,orientations,and lives of generations on a global scale even though
many people may have been unaware of the causal chains or unable to articulate how
the patternsoftheirlives were altered. Much thesame has occurred,I would contend,as
a consequence ofthe parameter shiftsbroughtabout by cascading interdependenceand
the microelectronicrevolution.People everywhereare differentbecause the world is no
longer the same since the advent of communications satellites and the many other
creations of our high-techage.
As I see it, people are differentbecause change at the individual level has involved a
transformationin the intellectual, cognitive, and emotional aptitudes throughwhich
theydevelop and use action scriptsin theirvarious roles. The realization thatsocial and
physical distances have shrunk considerably and made the world much more
interdependent, the availability of more information and, most significantly,the
increased opportunitiesto appreciate that informationgets packaged in scenarios and
that links in complex scenarios get displayed on TV screens around the world have,
interactively,so substantially extended the way people comprehend the world as to
amount to a transformationin theiraptitudes as individual actors. Most conspicuously,
people today,whethertheylive in the First,Second, or Third Worlds, and irrespectiveof
whethertheirlives are organized around urban or rural routines,employ much more
elaborate role scenarios than was the case fortheirpredecessorsin earlier eras.
I use the word 'elaborate' quite deliberately,having explicitlyrejectedcharacterizing
their action scripts as ever more 'rational', 'sophisticated', or 'accurate'. The new
aptitudes forthinkingin scenario ratherthan static,cross-sectionaltermsmay not lead
to sound conclusions or greater sophisticationabout world affairs.They may even, as
Cox (1984) has cogentlyargued, underlie therecentresurgenceoftraditionalreligionon
a global scale. For many, these new aptitudes may well be conspiratorial in tone and
culminate with scapegoats as villains, but whatever theiraccuracy, illogic, and level of
crudity,the scenarios which delineate the reality world of the mind for adults in the
present era are more elaborate. They are marked by longer causal chains, by
connectionsbetween events,by feedback links,by the perception of action at Time 1 in
Place A settinglimitsand/oropening up opportunitiesforotheractorsat Time 2 in Place
B. For the same reasons, and no less significant,the processes of aggregation and the
consequences of collective action are probably much more central to the individual's
scenarios today than was the case forprevious generations.
Viewed withthesehypothesizedchanges ofaptitude in mind, the Iranian mobs raging
around theAmerican Embassy in Tehran become a quintessentialexample ofhow much
more elaborate role scenarios have become with the advent of cascading interdepen-
dence. Or at least the accounts ofhow the crowds outside the Embassy were galvanized
into action whenever the TV cameras were on and pointingin theirdirectionsuggestsa
keen understandingthatpicturesofoutrage and protestrelayed around theworld would
have consequences be linksin scenarios that could serve well the reasons formilling
around the Embassy.
rorkTimes/CBSNews poll of
The aptitude factoris also plainly evidentin a recentJNfew
the American public's attitudes toward the conflictsin Central America that evoked
widespread attentionbecause its resultsseemed so contradictory(Clymer, 1983a). The
press and a number of other commentatorswere perplexed by the poll's uncovering a
low level ofinformationabout US policies toward the regionon the one hand and a high
degree of skepticismtoward any policies the United States might pursue in it on the
other. Such a discrepancy, however, can be readily resolved if the notion of being
informedis expanded to encompass the aptitude factor. The various commentators
relied on too simple a conception of what it means to be informed,confiningtheir
understandingto distinctionsamong levels offactual knowledge. Viewed in thisway, it
is indeed confusingthat a high level of ignorance should be linked to skepticismrather
than disinterestor support. But if the idea of being informedis revised to stressthe
elaborateness of the role scenarios people employ to react to world events,then the poll
data make eminentsense. Most Americans may not have been acquainted with thefacts
of which factionsthe United States supports in El Salvador and Nicaragua, but at a
higher level of abstraction theywere apparently clear in theirminds about the action
scriptsthat would follow if the United States extended its involvementin the region.
Memories of increased involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s, along with the
extended capacity to think analogically and in terms of causal chains the aptitude
factor enabled those polled to assert positions on Central America even though they
seemed 'uninformed'as that termis conventionallyused.
Nor have the Russians been immune fromthe consequences of the microelectronic
revolution.Their closed systemhas not been so imperviousas to preventchanges in the
competence of the citizenry.Or at least the presence of the aptitude factorwas quite
noticeable in the extraordinarylengthsto which the regimewent to place thedowning of
the Korean airlinerin a favorable light. As one observer noted (Burns, 1983a):
Fromchildhood,Russianshave beentaughtthattheyare surrounded byenemies,

primarily theUnitedStates,and thatsacrificesmustbe made to ward offattack.
Yet, in the view of Westerndiplomats,the plane incidentraises troubling
thattheleadershipcannotignore.The averageSovietcitizenis better
possibilities
educatedthathe was 20 yearsago, and probablymoreinclinedto makecritical
assessments.
In all of this,the diplomatsbelieve, thereis a potentialdifficulty
for the
authoritiesas ordinarypeopleassesstheincidentand askthemselves
whether itwas
handledresponsibly.
Still anotherway ofglimpsingthe aptitude factorat workis by askingwhy thecurrent

period is not marked by trade wars as virulent as those of the 1930s. Certainly the
imbalances are conspicuous: with Michigan's automobile industry having been
upended by Japanese competition,forexample, why have the pressuresforhigher US
trade barriers been largely unsuccessful?The answer is complex, to be sure, and a
number of macro factorsare surely relevant to an explanation. But some part of the
variance lies, I think,in micro changes, in the greaterabilityofcitizenstoday, compared
to their counterparts five decades ago, to handle complex scenarios which stretch
294 A Pre-Theory
Revisited
beyond a sequence wherein the absence of competitiveimportssustainsproductivityto

elaborate sequences in which the political, diplomatic, and militaryconsequences of a
highly protectionistworld are envisioned. Stated differently, while the trade issue is
highlycontentious politically and while many citizens and leaders do press forhigher
tariffbarriers,theiroppositiondoes not seem so virulentand theissue thusdoes not seem
so contentious as was the case in the 1930s because the opponents, being more able to
discernand elaborate alternativescenarios,are constrainedin the lengthsto which they
are prepared to press theircase forelevating the restrictionson trade.
Of course, examples cannot be cited as proof. Myriad illustrationsof the aptitude
factoroperative throughouttheworld today could be cited; but, obviously,thesecannot
be said to affirmthe hypothesisthat individual aptitudes fordeveloping and using more
elaborate role scenarios have expanded significantlyin the present era. To be sure,
persuasive evidence compiled by Inglehart (1977) indicates that the political skillsof
Westernpublics have undergone changes which increasinglyenable them to 'intervene
in the political processon a qualitativelydifferent level' (p. 367); but thesefindingsfocus
on modes of participation and only imply a shiftin the analytic skills necessary to
scenario construction. Systematic data that allow for the comparison of scenario
structuresacross eras have yet to be made, and until they are we can only stressthat
underlyingthe examples is a logic that argues forthe hypothesis.
The logic is rooted in the observation that greater interdependence and faster
communicationshave heightenedthe salience ofaggregativeprocessesand made people
more aware of themselves as sequences in elaborate scenarios. While the life of
communitieshas always been founded on the aggregation of individual actions, never
beforehas the transformationofindividual behaviors into collectiveproblemsseemed so
plainly and so poignantlyevident. There are a multitudeofoccasions each day forthose
in the industrialworld to be conscious of themselvesas linksin causal chains. From the
trafficjams in which people get caught to the boycottstheyare asked tojoin, fromthe
water shortages theyare asked to alleviate to the tax revoltsin which theyparticipate,
from the worker rallies in Poland to the urban mobs in Iran they have seen on live
television,today's persons-inthe-streethave had ample first-handexposure to the links
between individual and collective behavior. Similarly,whether it be when they start
theirautomobiles, turnon theirair conditioners,or buy theirgroceries,many are likely
to have a fleetingthought that the very act of pressing the accelerator, raising the
thermostat,or purchasing bread is part of worldwide processesleading, respectively,to
pollution (or clean air), oil shortages (or gluts), or famines (or surpluses).
For some people, of course, such scenarios will include multinationalcorporationsor
incompetentpoliticians as weak linksin the chains, whereas otherswill develop action
scriptsin which theirlinksinvolve hoarding or cheatingon thegroundsthatelsewherein
the scripteveryoneis doing it. Regardless ofhow accurately or responsiblythe scenarios
are utilized, however, the point is that they are elaborate and they invoke familiar
experiencesfor theirusers.
Similarly,in this era when national economies are so clearly and intricatelywoven
into shiftsin the global economy thus fosteringand aggravating thoughts about
scenarios in which the causal chains pose a threatto one's savings, one's job, and one's
ability to travel people can hardly be oblivious to the once-remotesequences whereby
global currencyflowsand banking practices culminate in close-at-hand daily routines.
Indeed, such sequences, to cite recent cases, press hard upon Venezuelan and French
citizens,all ofwhom were able to move freelyand widely around theworld only a couple
of years ago.
Nor is theheightenedconsciousnessand proliferationoflengthenedscenariosconfined

just to the FirstWorld. From Afghan tribesmento Argentinegauchos, frompeasants in
India to studentsin the Philippines,fromby-standersin Peru to protestersin Chile, from
blacks in South Africato Palestinians in Lebanon, the interdependenceofglobal lifeand
the consequences ofcollectiveaction are daily experiences.The action scriptsused in the
Third World may not be so elaborate as those to be found in the First World, but
evidence that neither are they limited or abbreviated can readily be noted. As
Dominguez (1981: 201) concluded after a lengthy analysis of extensive systematic
evidence: 'Mass publics in less developed countrieshave . .. been strikinglyresponsiveto
changing international events.' More poignantly, consider the anecdotal evidence
implicitin thisreportofan astutejournalist who was visitedin her Paris officeby a poor
Iraqi exile:
It made me impatientthathe persisted in seekinga simpleformula,

thathe was so
totallyconcentrated on thepain and injusticein hisown country, so unawareof
otherpeoples' miseries,so confidentthatif the Americansand the Frenchand
othersonlyknewthatthingswerebad in hishomelandtheywoulddropeverything
to fixthem.I toldhimI had no moretime.
Butwhenhe left,I keptthinking abouthim.He isa personfroma long-darkened
place whois comingto knowwhata humanbeinghas a righttoexpect.He can no
longeraccepttheold,dullsubmission. He had evenmanagedtoseethatIraqiswere
notalone,thattheirenemies,theIranians,mustbe suffering horriblytoo.
His horizonshave broadened.There mustbe quite a lot ofpeople likehimby
now, emergingthrougheducationto questionthe definitionof good and bad
handeddownbyauthority, noticingtheremaybe otherwaysofseeingthings, other
peoplewithreal concernsand grievances.
The moreI thought, thebetterI feltabouthim.He is partofchangein theworld
... (Lewis, 1984).
In short,in the absence of contrarydata there are cogent reasons to presume that
individuals have not been immune to the world's shrinkage,that through a growing
capacity for elaborating role scenarios they are linked ever more securely into the
processesofworld politics,that theyare keenlyaware of theselinks,and that both their
capacities and their awareness is in turn central to the dynamics of cascading
interdependence. But how do these new aptitudes of individuals get translated into
actions that initiateand sustain cascading processes?My argumentis that theydo so by
combiningwith the controlfactorto encourage a preferenceforthosescenariosin which
certaincollectivities,thosethatare closestin time,space, and function,seem particularly
likely to serve a persons's needs and wants. And once people discriminate among
scenarios in terms of salient subsystemsthat are especially effective,coherence and
breakdown cascading processes are bound to follow.
Turning to the control factor,again the evidence is more suggestivethan clear-cut,
but it is sufficientto hypothesizethat change is at work,that a global trendis unfolding
wherebypeople increasinglyfeel,both individually and collectively,that theyhave lost
controlover thecourse ofevents.On the one hand, thereare such anecdotal indicatorsas
the anguish of the peace movement over the prospects of nuclear holocaust and the
apathy of American students over US actions in Grenada, Lebanon, and Central
America. A sense of powerlessnesshas been cited as the explanation forthe difference
between these tepid reactions on the campuses in the 1980s and the vigorous student
protestsin thelate 1960s and early 1970s against US actions in Vietnam. 'People care', a
296 Revisited
A Pre-Theory
student at Iowa State Universityreportedlysaid, 'but wonder what's the point when
there's nothing they can do'.
More importantly, supporting the anecdotal indicators are systematic findings
developed by social psychologistsand sociologists.The formerhave compiled consider-
able data on what theycall 'locus ofcontrol' (Lefcourt,1980; Weisz and Stipek, 1982), in
which 'the perception of control' is viewed as 'a process, the exercise of an expectancy
regarding causation' (Lefcourt, 1976: 53). Unfortunately,however, all their findings
pertain to the sources ofvaryingresponsesto close-at-hand situationsand not to distant
events in large systemsbelieved to be beyond control. Similarly,sociologistshave long
worked on such concepts as alienation (Seeman, 1983), powerlessness (Tilly, 1978),
norm emergence (Turner and Killian, 1972), and a host of other phenomena that bear
some, though not immediate, relevance to the concept of the control factordeveloped
here. Commonplace, forexample, is theinclinationamong sociologiststo enumerate the
negative consequences of growing social, economic, and political complexity for the
sense ofcontrolpeople have over theirlives. Central to theirformulationsis the premise
that modern man is and feels increasinglyremote from the centers of decision in
society. Such a feeling had even been noted among members of the Trilateral
Commission. An account ofthe Commission's 10thAnniversaryConferencenoted thata
mood of despair marked the deliberations:
Whatcomesthroughmostclearlyin theseostensibly innercirclesofpoweris how
littlecapacitythesepeoplefeeltheyhave toshapeevents.Far fromflexingmuscles
to manipulatehiddenleversofcontrol. . theyare gropingalmostdesperately for
ways to bringback some order.If thereis any conspiracy,it seemsto be in the
diffusionofpower,ofimpersonalifnotinhumanforceseludingand confusing the
attemptto plan (Lewis, 1983: 31).
If the eliteoftheWesternworld are racked by such feelings,surelythesame can be said of

those whose resourcesand influenceare virtuallynil.
Perhaps the most persuasive indication that a worldwide sense of lost control marks
our timeis provided by the rampant subgroupismthat has surfacedon a global scale in
recentyears. Doubtless some part of the subgroup explosion has derived fromemulative
processes,froma communications technologywhich enables groups in one part of the
world to observe and imitate the activitiesof counterpartselsewhere. But presumably
theproliferationand expansion ofsubgroupsstemsfrommore than the rapid diffusionof
examples. There must,afterall, be reasons to emulate others.There mustbe similarbut
unrelated circumstances at work throughout the world that underlie its emulative
processesand account forthe concurrentsense and recognitionofshared identityamong
the members of diverse and innumerable subgroups in every corner of the globe. It is
here, in the questions posed by the presumed pervasiveness of autonomous and
spontaneous sources of rampant subgroupism, that traces of the control factorcan be
delineated: Why have the waning years of the twentiethcenturywitnessedan explosion
of authoritycrises and of intense group feelingson every continentand in all of their
communities?Why are people everywhereturningtheirbacks on thewhole system the
state, the society,the community and turningto less encompassing collectivities?
Surely a major part of the answer is that, having acquired a growing capacity to
elaborate scenarios in which whole-systemcomplexityresultsin theirisolation, people
everywherehave lost confidencein the whole systemsas being too complex to meet their
needs and serve theirwants. And so theyhave turned to subsystems,to the less remote
and less complex groups with which they somehow feel linked, in the hope that their
interestscan be better served and a modicum of control thereby exercised over the
distant and impersonal forceswhich intrudeupon daily routines.The resurgenceof the
family and the church, not to mention the emergence of long-dormant linguistic,
nationality,and ethnicgroups, can be seen as exemplifyingresponsesto the complexity
that has removed people fromcontrollingtheirown destinies.
Some might argue that people have been increasinglyremoved fromthe centersof
decision ever since the onset of the industrial revolutionnearly two centuriesago and
that, accordingly,once again it is a misguided formof ahistoricismto treat the control
factoras a recentdevelopment. This reasoning overlooksthe interactionof the control
and aptitude factors.While it is surely the case that the processes which progressively
separate people from decisional centers have been intensifyingsince the eighteenth
century,only in our time has this long-termtrend taken offand reached the point
wherein people have given up on the distant centersand turned to those more close at
hand. Stated metaphorically, the long-term trend was a gentle slope that rose
incrementallyin the directionofskepticismand doubt; but the short-termpatternofthe
past few decades traces a steep climb in which the sense of lost control has mounted
exponentially. Why? Because the newly acquired capacity to elaborate lengthy
scenarioshas enabled people to discernmore clearly the complexityand number oflinks
in the causal chains that distance themfromthe whole systemsand to recognize that the
possibilityof theirbreaking into and refashioningthe chains has declined to near zero.
An estimateof'near zero' seems more accurate than simply'zero' because thesymbolsof
whole systems their flags, heroes, and historicmonuments still serve as sources of
confidenceand hope forsome citizens,therebyinhibitinga perfectinversecorrelation
between the aptitude and control factors. In the coming decades, however, as time
passes and extends the aptitude factor,the sense of lost control may sink to zero as the
whole-systemsymbolsseem increasinglyvacuous.15
I do not mean to implythatall systemsand subsystemshave been pulled into zero-sum
relationshipsas the world has become more complex. Obviously thereare a number of
non-zero-sum situations wherein systems and subsystems interact harmoniously,
reinforcingeach other's structuresand sharing the burdens and opportunitiesinherent
in common challenges.
To repeat, however, the central tendency would appear to be in the direction of
cascading interdependence. It is difficultto foreseea diminutionin the dynamics of the
high-techera thathave intensifiedtheaptitude and controlfactors.The tensionbetween
these factorsseems bound to extend and deepen the global crisisof authorityas people
everywherebecome more skilledat locating themselvesin an ever-morecomplex world,
at graspingtheextraordinarydilemmas thecomplexityposes forthem,at seeing through
the authorities who claim they have answers and can resolve the dilemmas, at
recognizing the ineffectivenessof governments,at acknowledging a readiness to shift
theirloyalties and undergo reaggregation,and at identifyingclose-at-hand subgroups
which seem to offergreater hope of satisfyingtheirneeds and wants.
Yet, it is the verynature ofcascading processesthat theirpaths into the futureare not
linear and unwavering. One can readily imagine circumstances in which the very
dynamics that make for pessimism over the short run fostertendencies deserving of
optimismin thelong run. That is, even as intensifiedconflictlies in the immediate future
because people will be inclined to fallback increasinglyon theirnear-at-handsubgroups
as theirgrowing analytic capacities and a declining sense of control undermine their
confidencein the ability of whole systemsto ameliorate and resolve theirproblems,so
mightthe verysame capacities lead themsubsequentlyto ever more elaborate scenarios
which,in turn,will generate a recognitionthatincreased subgroup conflictalso does not

serve theirneeds. At that point, hesitantlyand reluctantly,but sustained by theirstill
enlarging capacities foranalysis, theywill begin to appreciate that compromisesstruck
within the whole systemmay be preferableto treatingsubsystemvalues as paramount
and non-negotiable. Forerunners of this dynamic can be seen in the crisis-inspired
schemes designed to prevent the collapse of the international banking system,in the
growing trend toward labor union votes accepting reduced or eliminated wage
increases, and in the continual bargaining between church and state authorities in
Poland.
In any event,whatever course the emergingglobal systemmay follow,the expanded
talentsand action scriptsofpublics are likelyto serveas the building blocks on which the
aggregation and adaptation ofcollectivitieswill be founded and sustained in the future.
If so, if the analytic aptitudes of individuals have become increasingly worldly,
henceforththe tasksoftheorymustproceed fromthe premisethat our timeis marked by
cascading processes,by dynamics of change that spread across systemsand subsystems
with such rapidity and power as to fuse once separate processes of coherence and
breakdown into seamless webs.
Observers as Actors
It remains to stressagain that we are not immune to the swirlsof change that cascade
across the global system.We are studentsofthesystem,but we are also part ofit and thus
our work is, in subtle and erraticways, interactivewith it. I use the word 'interactive'
deliberately. It suggestsnot only that our conduct as scholars may be responsiveto the
course ofevents (as noted at the outset), but also thatwhat we do as observersmay have
an effecton the conduct ofworld affairs.For our analytic aptitudes have also undergone
enlargement,sensitizingus ever more acutely to the alternativescenariosinherentin the
rigiditiesand frailtiesof collectivities.Thus we too can be torn apart by the tensions
between our own subgroup ties and our links to whole systems,with the resultthat our
experiencingof these tensionsseems bound to underlie our teaching, research,and the
many other ways in which we interactwith the world.
The Pre-Theory was not totally oblivious to these interactions. It did highlight
ourselves as recipientsin them by stressingthat science is a value-explicit and not a
value-freeenterpriseand that, accordingly,studentsof world politics need to be more
self-consciously adept at the tasksofexplication ifa cumulative, consensual, and reliable
body ofknowledgeis to evolve in the field.To a large extent,in fact,the Pre-Theorywas
no more than an attemptto illustratehow inchoate thoughtabout the externalbehavior
of differenttypesof national societies can be brought into consciousness,how all of us
carry around presuppositionsabout foreignpolicy of which we may be unaware and,
regardless of the depth at which they may be buried in our subconscious, how these
implicit understandings,assessments,and concepts could and should be explicated if
theorydevelopment is to occur.
But the hindsightof20 years suggestsmy argumentforexplication was too limited. It
focused on self-consciousnessas necessary to the process whereby theoriesare assessed
and findingsevaluated. In so doing it neglectedtheways in which awareness ofourselves
in relationto our subject matteris crucial to thequality and directionofour researchand
the ways in which our critical theories shape and sustain the processes of cascading
change. To stressvalue explicitness,in otherwords,is to imply too simple a process,as if
one need only search one's soul and rummage throughone's conceptual storehouse to
insure analytic rigor.Such sensitivitiesdo, indeed, continue to be crucial to cumulative

and high-quality inquiries, but the dynamics of global change today-especially the
heightened salience and claims of subgroups and the lessened effectivenessand frayed
authorityof whole systems point up the need to extend our sensitivitiesto what is
happening to us as scholars, as definersofglobal reality,as individuals seeking to move
forward professionallyand personally. We can no longer assume-as the original
Pre-Theory did that we are static observers, that our values and concepts remain
constant throughoutour careers, that our personal lives evolve independently of our
professionalsuccesses and difficulties, and that explication consistsmerelyofbeing clear
about these constancies. Instead, we need to treat ourselves as open systems,as actors
undergoingcontinuous development and change in response to the verychanges in the
world we are seeking to grasp and influence (Dannefer, 1984).
Most conspicuouslyperhaps, we need to recognize that our professionaland personal
worlds may be intimatelyand inextricablyconnected and that any disturbancesin the
one can have repercussionsfor the other. We need to acknowledge that our links to
international affairs are not exclusively cognitive. They may also be shaped by
considerable affect,with the result that how we feel about the world may impact
significantlyupon how we frame and conduct our inquiries into it. In effect,we are
subject to developing an affectiveas well as a cognitivestake in the course ofevents,an
affectivestake that can be as influentialin our theorizingas the cognitivepremisesthat
guide us.
No less important than the recipient side of our interactionswith the world is the
output side, thoseways in which we may influencethecourse ofeventsthroughour work
as analysts and advocates. Such influences,or the lack of them,can also be a source of
confusionand disillusion. The world has never been very attentiveto our advocacy or
responsiveto our actions, and thuswe are oftenconfrontedwith the temptationto forgo
scholarlydetachment forpolicy involvement.And yielding to the temptationis easily
rationalized: the great problems of war, justice, and poverty are of such overriding
importance that oftenit seems compelling,ifnot reasonable, to devote ourselvesto them
as activistsand therebyto riskexceeding our trainingand competence as we champion
worthysolutions. Then, swept along by the intrinsicrightnessof our actions, we easily
mistake the vigor of our advocacy forthe rigor of our analysis.
This is not to argue forisloation in an ivory tower.By scholarlydetachment I do not
mean we should avoid enteringthe public arena. My thoughtis ratherthat we remain
trulyscholarlywhen we are in that arena. How? By adhering to a strictrule-of-thumb
which specifiesthat our conduct in the public arena be no differentthan our conduct in
the classroom,the library,or the computer center.Thus, forexample, one bringsto the
op-ed page, the legislative hearing, and the television talk-showall the qualifications
and cautious interpretationsthat are the hallmark ofour workin the various settingson
campus or in the columns of our journals. Thus, too, one avoids the temptation to
participate in situations involving brief advertisements,stormyrallies, or any other
formatthat does not allow for breaking problems down into their component parts,
delineating alternative explanations of them, or the many other cautious practices to
which one is habituated in the classroom, the library,and the computer center.
And there are good reasons to quell the activist temptations and cling to the
rule-of-thumbthat confinesus to the detachment ofour analytic talents.One is that we
are not verygood at advocacy. It is not our medium. Either our sense ofurgencymakes
us sound shrillor our sense ofourselvesmakes us sound pedantic, with the resultthat we
are easily dismissed as either self-servingor irrelevant. Shorn of our professional
300 Revisited
A Pre-Theory
skills our commitment to careful interpretation,to multi-variate explanations, to

testingthe null hypothesis we lose our distinctivenessand feware inclined to listen.A
second reason is that we undermineour reputationas analyststhe more we do battle in
the public arena. Why should anyone listenifwe sound no differentfromall the others
who self-interestedly clamor for public support? A third is that once we abandon the
analytic rule-of-thumband enter the arena on its terms, we may have difficulty
withdrawingfromit. That is, we may undermineour capacities as analystsby becoming
so engaged in worthycauses as to lose touch with the veryskillsthat set us apart in the
firstplace. It is hard, forexample, to accept the null hypothesisifone cares too much.
Fourth, a good case can be made forthe idea that everysocietyneeds analystswho are
sufficientlydetached to critically assess where it is going. If ours was exclusively a
communityofadvocates, who would provide the feedback thatis so vital to the health of
viable collectivities?
But thereis an even more importantreason to limitour interactionswith the world to
conduct befittingthe classroom, the library,and the computer center. It is that we may
have a fargreaterinfluenceupon global affairsin our role as analysts than we do when
we become activistsand advocates. Our influencein thisregard is not easily traced, and
oft-timesit moves along circuitousroutes,but it is surelyoperative. How? Our work as
scholars helps define-through our students who subsequently enter leadership roles,
through our empirical findings that eventually get translated into premises for
journalists, through our interpretiveessays on which politicians and other advocates
may build theirbeliefsystems the sociopolitical realityaround which public affairsare
organized. Put more specifically,a subtle process is always at work wherebythe way in
which publics and officialsidentifyissues, define situations, contrast action scripts,
recognize cascading processes, comprehend how collectivitiescohere and adapt, and
otherwisegive structureto the course ofeventsis in some measure a consequence ofhow
we conduct our inquiries.
In sum, as advocates we can be readily dismissed,but as builders and disseminatorsof
knowledge our effortsbecome entriesin the channels ofcommunication that shape and
sustainthefabricofglobal life.As observers,then,inevitablywe are also actors,and that
thoughtshould be both a sobering and exhilaratingsource of renewal as we move the
International Studies Association beyond its firstquarter-century.
Notes
1. The paperwas subsequently publishedin Farrell(1966: 27-92).

2. Forcriticaldiscussions oftheshortcomings and limitations ofthePre-Theories article,see Stassen(1972);
McGowan (1974); Faurby(1976a, 1976b);Smith(1979, 1981c,1983a, 1983b);Wilkenfeld etal. (1980);
Callahan etal. (1982); Korany(1974, 1983,1984); and Vasquez (1983a). Forindications thatitcontinues
to be usefulto analysts,see Kegleyet al. (1975); East et al. (1978); Blong (1979); Kegleyand Wittkopf
(1982); and Vasquez (1983b).
3. I actuallywrotethepaperin thesummerof 1963,starting it afterJohn F. Kennedy'ssane appeal forthe
applicationofintelligence at AmericanUniversity and completing it beforehisinsanedemisein Dallas.
4. For broad analysesofthepotentialofthemicroelectronic revolution, see Dertouzosand Moses (1979);
Evans (1979); Masuda (1981); Cornish(1982); Didsbury(1982); Friedrichsand Schaff(1983); and
Shurkin(1983).
5. For cogentanalysesofhow and whysystems and subsystems are lockedintoendlesstensions, see Lerner
(1963); and Ramsoy(1963).
6. For otherincisiveanalysesconcernedwiththe changingnatureof authority, legitimacy, and related
phenomena,see Friedrich(1958); Leitesand Wolf(1970);Eckstein(1973); Rogowski(1974); Dornbusch
and Scott(1975); Ecksteinand Gurr(1975); and Moore (1978).
7. For two noteworthyexceptions in which an attemptis made to integratethe State and systemconcepts, see
Burton (1968); and Nettl (1968).
8. Of course, viewed from the perspective of policy-makers who may occupy a number of roles in private
systemsas well as the many built into their officialpositions, the scenarios are even more elaborate and
complex, approaching mammoth proportions as the criss-crossingpatterns also trace the personal
conflictsand consequences that may followfromemersion in the action schema of theirpublic roles. For a
stimulating discussion of the tensions between private and public role scenarios, see Sennett (1977).
9. Given the potential of the microelectronicrevolution forstoring,proliferating,and analyzing interactive
filesof information,other things may not remain equal forvery long insofaras the construction of role
scenarios is concerned.
10. For formulationsof the concept in which stressis placed on scenarios as means of processing information
rather than as sources of action, see Abelson (1973); anid Axelrod (1973).
11. It is also points up why revolutions occur so rarely: given the complexityofsocial processes, the chances of
simultaneous convergence occurring around new scenarios are extremelysmall and yet, as Crozier and
Friedberg have noted (1980: 223-224), profound collective changes only unfold when all the actors learn
the new scenario together.
12. For analyses that reston assumptions and/or impressionsthat a decline is occurring in the effectivenessof
governmentssee Fromkin (1975); Editorial Research Reports (1976); Geekie (1976); Linz (1978); Vidich
and Glassman (1979); Ingram and Mann (1980); Rose (1980); Shils (1982); Barber (1983); Campbell
(1983); and Page (1983).
13. The officialis Sylvia Ostry, formerChief Economist of the Organization forEconomic Cooperation and
Development.
14. For other analyses that employ the concept ofadaptation as a means ofprobing foreignpolicy phenomena,
see Stephens (1972); Hansen (1974); Thorson (1974); Bellows (1976); Petersen (1977); East and
Salomonsen (1981); Smith (1981a, 1981b); Rosenau (1982).
15. Viewed in terms of a lessening hold that whole-systemsymbols exercise over an increasingly analytical
citizenry, the long and progressive tendency toward cheating on taxes and the long and progressive
decline ofvoter turnoutin the US become furtherindicators ofthe aptitude and control factors.For in this
context the widening underground economy to which tax cheating gives rise is not so much a consequence
of amoral, anomic behavior as it is of effortsto retain control over the key, close-at-hand links through
which people are tied to the whole system.Similarly, the lower turnoutsbecome not so much a reflectionof
apathy as theyare ofanalytic skilland the reduced inclination to vote to which the skillleads. As the report
on a recent survey of voter attitudes put it, 'Low voter turnout in the United States is unlikely to be
changed much by simplifyingvoting and registrationprocedures, extending voting hours or instituting
Sunday or holiday voting ... The poll of 2,530 adults ... showed that the problem was not procedure but
motivation, especially a low level of belief that voting makes a difference'(Clymer, 1983b).
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ROSENAU - A Pre-Theory Revisited

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ROSENAU - A Pre-Theory Revisited

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A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence

Author(s): James N. Rosenau

A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics

On thepresumption thatthestructures ofglobalaffairsare undergoing a profound

Quarter-centuryanniversariesinviteretrospection.They cryout forassessmentsofgoals

6. The confluenceof new structuresand old patterns has resulted in self-generating

Changing Observers of a Changing World

patternsand explain theirunderlyingdynamics. Even worse,we mightdiscoverthat the

readjust spatial boundaries,redistributefunctionalcompetences,restructure

Such, at least, is my aspiration forthe ensuinganalysis. I hope it suggestshow a return

interactionpatternsmay be changing that I see a danger ofprematureclosure on behalf

supporting them, the restructuringof loyalties and authority relationships,and the

nations more and more interdependent even as centrifugalforces are increasingly

Stated most generally,the patterningoccurs because the enlarged analytic aptitudes

The World as a System of Cascading Change

FIG. 1. The WaningSystem

FIG. 2 The EmergingSystem

between systemsand theirsubsystemsare representedby Arrows 4 through9; and the

here is provided by the way in which the dynamics of a government'sinteractionwith

Concrete and Abstract Units of Analysis

single individuals to small groups such as cabinets to large collectivities such as

underwayin thesocial sciences,a shiftthat involvesa fundamentalrethinkingoftherole

bureaucratic organizations and therebycrucially affecthow the State maintainsitselfin

Roles as Analytic Units

systematically and meaningfully build in micro units expressive of needs, wants,

emotional space ofpeople, in otherwords,has transformedtheminto an arena in which

Role Scenarios as Action Schema

an internationalsystem,the glue that keeps collectivitiescohesive and enables them to

appears to be founded on a presumptionthat governments,as the prime precipitantsof

no longerobtain in any country,advanced and rich or backwardand poor.

To be sure, the capacity of governments to maintain order through strong-arm

eventsmay be due as much to thelegitimacythatattaches to actions as to thecapabilities

The Aggregation of Collective Actors

This is not to imply,however,that the formationand maintenance ofcollectivitiesis a

aggregated sum get transformedinto a collectivity?When does a sum need to be

In short,viewed across timeand the range ofissuescomprisinga collectivity'spolitical

Adaptive Collectivities as Actors

not made fortensionsbetween a society'sinternaland externalcircumstances.Systemic

problem of whetherpublics 'will continue to accept a drastic lowering of expectations,

sources of influenceevidentlyhave an independentpower to effectpolitical

Fromchildhood,Russianshave beentaughtthattheyare surrounded byenemies,

Still anotherway ofglimpsingthe aptitude factorat workis by askingwhy thecurrent

beyond a sequence wherein the absence of competitiveimportssustainsproductivityto

Nor is theheightenedconsciousnessand proliferationoflengthenedscenariosconfined

It made me impatientthathe persisted in seekinga simpleformula,

If the eliteoftheWesternworld are racked by such feelings,surelythesame can be said of

which,in turn,will generate a recognitionthatincreased subgroup conflictalso does not

insure analytic rigor.Such sensitivitiesdo, indeed, continue to be crucial to cumulative

skills our commitment to careful interpretation,to multi-variate explanations, to

1. The paperwas subsequently publishedin Farrell(1966: 27-92).

BURTON, J. W. (1983) 'The Individualas the Unit of Explanationin InternationalRelations.'International

HANSEN,P. (1974) 'AdaptiveBehaviorofSmallStates:The Case ofDenmarkand theEuropeanCommunity'.

NETTL, J. P. (1968) 'The State as a ConceptualVariable'. World Politics20(4): 559-592.

SMITH, S. M. (1983a) Rosenau's Contribution. Studies9: 137-146.

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