Mind Association

The Naturalistic Fallacy

Author(s): W. K. Frankena
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 48, No. 192 (Oct., 1939), pp. 464-477
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2250706
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 IV.-THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY.
BY W. K. FRANKENA.

THE future historian of "thought and expression " in the

twentiethcenturywill no doubt recordwith some amusement
the ingenioustrick,which some of the philosophicalcontro-
versialistsof the firstquarterof our centuryhad, of labelling
their opponents'views "fallacies ". He may even list some
of these alleged fallaciesfor a certainsonoritywhich theirin-
ventorsembodiedin theirtitles: thefallacyofinitialpredication,
the fallacyof simplelocation,the fallacyof misplacedconcrete-
ness, the naturalisticfallacy.
Of these fallacies,real or supposed,perhapsthe most famous
is the naturalisticfallacy. For the practitionersof a certain
kindofethicaltheory,whichis dominantin Englandand capably
represented in America,and whichis variouslycalledobjectivism,
non-naturalism, or intuitionism, have frequentlychargedtheir
opponentswith committingthe naturalisticfallacy. Some of
these opponentshave stronglyrepudiatedthe chargeof fallacy,
othershave at least commentedon it in passing,and altogether
the notionof a naturalisticfallacyhas had a considerablecur-
rencyin ethicalliterature. Yet, in spite of its repute,the nat-
uralisticfallacyhas never been discussedat any length,and,
forthisreason,I have electedto make a studyofit in thispaper.
I hope incidentallyto clarifycertain confusionswhich have
been made in connexionwith the naturalisticfallacy,but my
main interestis to freethe controversy betweenthe intuitionists
and theiropponentsof the notion of a logical or quasi-logical
fallacy, and to indicate where the issue really lies.
The prominenceof the concept of a naturalisticfallacy in
recentmoral philosophyis anothertestimonyto the great in-
fluenceof the Cambridgephilosopher,Mr. G. E. Moore,and his
book,PrincipiaEthica. Thus Mr. Taylorspeaks ofthe " vulgar
mistake" which Mr. Moore has taught us to call "the nat-
uralisticfallacy",1 and Mr. G. S. Jury,as if to illustratehow
I A. E. Taylor,The Faithofa Moratist,
vol. I, p. 104 n.
 W. K. FRANKENA: THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY. 465

well we have learnedthis lesson, says, with referenceto nat-

uralisticdefinitionsof value, "All such definitionsstand charged
with Dr. Moore's 'naturalistic fallacy'.' 1 Now, Mr. Moore
coinedthe notionofthe naturalisticfallacyin his polemicagainst
naturalisticand metaphysicalsystems of ethics. " The nat-
uralisticfallacyis a fallacy,"he writes,and it " must not be
committed." All naturalistic and metaphysicaltheoriesofethics,
however," are based on the naturalisticfallacy,in the sense
that the commissionof this fallacy has been the main cause
of theirwide acceptance".2 The best way to dispose of them,
then,is to expose this fallacy. Yet it is not entirelyclear just
what is the status of the naturalisticfallacy in the polemics
of the intuitionistsagainst other theories. Sometimes it is
used as a weapon, as when Miss Clarke says that if we call a
thinggood simplybecause it is likedwe are guiltyof the natur-
alistic fallacy.3 Indeed, it presentsthis aspect to the reader
in many parts of Principia Ethica itself. Now, in taking it
as a weapon, the intuitionists use the naturalisticfallacy as if
it were a logical fallacy on all fourswith the fallacy of com-
position,the revelationof which disposes of naturalisticand
metaphysicalethicsand leaves intuitionism standingtriumphant.
That is, it is takenas a fallacyin advance,foruse in controversy.
But thereare signsin Principia Ethica whichindicatethat the
naturalisticfallacyhas a ratherdifferent place in the intuitionist
scheme,and should not be used as a weapon at all. In this
aspect, the naturalisticfallacymust be provedto be a fallacy.
It cannot be used to settle the controversy, but can only be
assertedto be a fallacywhen the smoke of battle has cleared.
Considerthe followingpassages: (a) "the naturalisticfallacy
consistsin the contentionthat good means nothingbut some
simpleor complexnotion,that can be definedin termsofnatural
qualities"; (b) "the point that good is indefinableand that
to denythisinvolvesa fallacy,is a pointcapable ofstrictproof".4
These passages seem to imply that the fallaciousnessof the
naturalisticfallacy is just what is at issue in the controversy
between the intuitionistsand their opponents,and cannot be
wielded as a weapon in that controversy. One of the points
I wish to make in this paper is that the chargeof committing
the naturalisticfallacycan be made,ifat all, onlyas a conclusion
fromthe discussionand not as an instrumentof decidingit.
1 Valueand EthicalObjectivity,
p. 58. 2 PrincipiaEthica,pp. 38, 64.

3 M. E. Clarke," Cognition in the Experienceof Value ",

and Affection
JournalofPhilosophy,1938.
4 PrincipiaEthica,pp. 73, 77. See also p. xix.
466 W. K. FRANKENA:

The notion of a naturalisticfallacyhas been connectedwith

the notion of a bifurcationbetweenthe 'ought' and the 'is',
betweenvalue and fact, betweenthe normativeand the des-
criptive. Thus Mr. D. C. Williams says that some moralists
have thoughtit appropriateto chastiseas the naturalisticfallacy
the attemptto derivethe Oughtfromthe Is.' We may begin,
then, by consideringthis bifurcation,emphasis on which, by
Sidgwick,Sorley,and others,came largelyas a reactionto the
proceduresof Mill and Spencer. Hume affirms the bifurcation
in his Treatise: " I cannot forbearadding to these reasonings
an observation,whichmay, perhaps,be found of some impor-
tance. In every system of moralitywhich I have hitherto
met with, I have always remarked,that the author proceeds
forsome time in the ordinaryway of reasoning,and establishes
the being of a God, or makes observationsconcerninghuman
affairs;when of a sudden I am surprisedto find,that instead
of the usual copulationsof propositions, is, and is not,I meet
with no propositionthat is not connectedwith an ought,or an
oughtnot. This change is imperceptible;but is, however,of
the last consequence. For as this ought,or oughtnot,expresses
some new relationor affirmation, it is necessarythat it should
be observedand explained; and at the same timethat a reason
should be given,for what seems altogetherinconceivable,how
this new relationcan be a deductionfromothers,which are
entirelydifferent fromit. But as authors do not commonly
use this precaution,I shall presumeto recornmendit to the
readers; and am persuaded,that this small attentionwould
subvertall the vulgar systemsof morality,and let us see that
the distinctionof vice and virtueis not foundedmerelyon the
relationsof objects, nor is perceivedby reason."2
Needless to say, the intuitionistshavefoundthis observation
of some importance.3They agree with Hume that it subverts
all the vulgarsystemsof morality,though,of course,theydeny
that it lets us see that the distinctionof virtueand vice is not
foundedon the relationsof objects,nor is perceivedby reason.
In fact,theyhold that a small attentionto it subvertsHlume's
own system also, since this gives naturalisticdefinitionsof
virtueand vice and of good and evil.4

1" Ethicsas Pure Postulate", PhilosophicalReview, 1933. See also

T. Whittaker, The TheoryofAbstractEthics,pp. 19 f.
2 Book III, partii, sectioni.
3 See J. Laird,A Studyin Moral Theory, pp. 16 f.; Whittaker,
op. cit.,
p. 19.
4See C. D. Broad,Five TypesofEthicalTheory, ch. iv.
 THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY. 467

Hume's point is that ethical conclusionscannot be drawn

validly from premiseswhich are non-ethical. But when the
affirmthe bifurcationof the 'ought' and the 'is',
intuitionists
theymeanmorethanthat ethicalpropositions cannotbe deduced
fromnon-ethicalones. For this difficulty in the vulgarsystems
of moralitycould be remedied,as we shall see, by the intro-
duction of definitionsof ethical notions in non-ethicalterms.
They mean, further,that such definitionsof ethical notions
in non-ethicalterms are impossible. " The essential point",
says Mr. Laird, " is the irreducibility
of values to non-values."1
But they mean still more. Yellow and pleasantnessare, ac-
cordingto Mr. Moore,indefinablein non-ethicalterms,but they
are natural qualities and belong on the ' is ' side of the fence.
Ethical properties,however,are not, for him, mere indefinable
naturalqualities,descriptiveor expository. They are properties
of a differentkind-non-descriptiveor non-natural.2The
intuitionistbifurcationconsists of three statements:
(1) Ethical propositionsare not deduciblefromnon-ethical
ones.3
(2) Ethical characteristicsare not definable in terms of
non-ethicalones.
in kind fromnon-
(3) Ethical characteristicsare different
ethical ones.
Really it consistsof but one statement,namely,(3), since (3)
entails (2) and (2) entails (1). It does not involve saying that
any ethical characteristicsare absolutely indefinable. That
is another question, although this is not always noticed.
What, now, has the naturalisticfallacy to do with the
bifurcationof the 'ought ' and the 'is' ? To beginwith,the
connexionis this: manynaturalisticand metaphysicalmoralists
proceedas if ethical conclusionscan be deduced frompremises
all of which are non-ethical,the classical examples being Mill
and Spencer. That is, they violate (1). This procedurehas
latelybeen referred to as the " factualistfallacy" by Mr. Wheel-
wrightand as the " valuational fallacy" by Mr. Wood.4 Mr.
Moore sometimesseems to identifyit with the naturalistic
fallacy,but in the main he holds only that it involves,implies,
I A Study in Moral Theory,p. 94 n.
2 See Philosophical Studies, pp. 259, 273 f.
3See J. Laird, op. cit., p. 318. Also pp. 12 ff.
4P. E. Wheelwright,A Critical Introductionto Ethics, pp. 40-51, 91 f.;
L. Wood, " Cognition and Moral Value," Journal of Philosophy, 1937,
p. 237.
 468 W. K. FRANKENA:

or rests upon this fallacy.'vWe may now considerthe charge

that the procedurein .questionis or involvesa fallacy.
It may be notedat once that, even if the deductionof ethical
conclusionsfromnon-ethicalpremisesis in no way a fallacy,
Mill certainlydid commit a fallacy in drawing an analogy
betweenvisibilityand desirabilityin his argumentforhedonism;
and perhaps his committingthis fallacy,which,as Mr. Broad
has said, we all learn about at our mothers'knees, is chiefly
responsiblefor the notion of a naturalisticfallacy. But is it
a fallacyto deduceethicalconclusionsfromnon-ethical premises?
Considerthe Epicurean argumentfor hedonismwhich Mill so
unwiselysoughtto embellish: pleasureis good,sinceit is sought
by all men. Here an ethical conclusionis being derivedfrom
a non-ethical premise. And, indeed, the argument,taken
strictlyas it stands, is fallacious. But it is not fallacious
because an ethicaltermoccursin the conclusionwhichdoes not
occur in the premise. It is fallacious because any argument
ofthe form" A is B, therefore A is C " is invalid,iftakenstrictly
as it stands. For example,it is invalid to argue that Croesus
is rich because he is wealthy. Such argumentsare, however,
not intended to be taken strictlyas they stand. They are
enthymemesand contain a suppressedpremise. And, when
this suppressedpremiseis made explicit,they are valid and
involve no logical fallacy.2 Thus the Epicurean inferencefrom
psychologicalto ethicalhedonismis valid when the suppressed
premiseis added to the effectthat what is soughtby all men
is good. Then the only question left is whetherthe premises
are true.
It is clear,then,that the naturalisticfallacyis not a logical
fallacy,since it may be involved even when the argumentis
valid. How does the naturalisticfallacy enter such "mixed
ethical arguments" 3 as that of the Epicureans? Whetherit
does or not depends on the nature of the suppressedpremise.
This may be eitheran induction,an intuition,a deductionfrom
a " pure ethicalargument,"a definition, or a propositionwhich
is true by definition.If it is one of the firstthree,then the
naturalisticfallacydoes not enterat all. In fact,the argument
does not theninvolveviolating(1), since one of its premiseswill
be ethical. But if the premiseto be supplied is a definition
1 See Principia Ethica, pp. 114, 57, 43, 49. Whittakeridentifies it
withthe naturalistic fallacyand regardsit as a " logical" fallacy,op. cit.,
pp. 19 f.
2 See ibid.,pp. 50, 139; Wheelwright, loc.cit.
3 See C. D. Broad,The Mind and its Place in Nature,pp. 488 f.; Laird,
loc.cit.
 THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY. 469

or a propositionwhichis true by definition, as it probablywas

forthe Epicureans,thenthe argument,whilestillvalid, involves
the naturalisticfallacy,and will run as follows:-
(a) Pleasureis soughtby all men.
(b) What is sought by all men is good (by definition).
(c) Therefore,pleasureis good.
Now I am not greatly interestedin deciding whetherthe
argumentas here set up violates (1). If it does not, then no
' mixed ethical argument' actually commitsany factualistor
valuationalfallacy,exceptwhenit is unfairlytaken as complete
in its enthymematic form. If it does, then a valid argument
may involve the deductionof an ethical conclusionfromnon-
ethical premisesand the factualistor valuational fallacyis not
reallya fallacy. The questiondependson whetheror not (b) and
(c) are to be regardedas ethicalpropositions. Mr. Moorerefuses
so to regardthem,contending that,by hypothesis,(b) is analytic
or tautologous,and that (c) is psychological,since it reallysays
only that pleasureis soughtby all men.' But to say that (b)
is analyticand not ethicaland that (c) is not ethicalbut psycho-
logicalis to prejudgethequestionwhether'good ' can be defined;
for the Epicureanswould contendpreciselythat if their defi-
nitionis correctthen (b) is ethical but analytic and (c) ethical
thoughpsychological. Thus, unless the questionof the defina-
bilityof goodnessis to be begged,(b) and (c) must be regarded
as ethical,in whichcase ourargumentdoesnotviolate(1). How-
ever, suppose,if it be not nonsense,that (b) is non-ethicaland
(c) ethical,then the argumentwill violate (1), but it will still
obey all of the canons of logic, and it is only confusingto talk
of a 'valuational logic' whose basic rule is that an evaluative
conclusioncannot be deduced fromnon-evaluativepremises.2
For the onlyway in whicheitherthe intuitionists or postula-
tionistslike Mr. Wood can cast doubt upon the conclusionof
the argumentof the Epicureans(or upon the conclusionof any
parallel argument)is to attack the premises,in particular(b).
Now, accordingto Mr. Moore, it is due to the presenceof (b)
that the argumentinvolvesthe naturalisticfallacy. (b) involves
the identification of goodnesswith 'being soughtby all men',
and to make this or any othersuch identification is to commit
the naturalisticfallacy. The naturalisticfallacyis not the pro-
,cedureof violating(1). It is the procedure,impliedin many
mixed ethical argumentsand explicitlycarriedout apart from
1 See op. cit.,pp. 11 f.; 19, 38, 73, 139. 2 See L. Wood,loc.cit.
470 W. K. FRANKENA:

sulchargumentsby many moralists,of definingsuch character-

istics as goodness or of substitutingsome other characteristic
for them. To quote some passages fromPrincipia Ethicac-
(a) " . . . far too many philosophershave thoughtthat when
theynamedthose otherproperties[belongingto all thingswhich
are good] they were actually defininggood; that these pro-
perties,in fact, were simplynot 'other', but absolutelyand
entirelythe same with goodness. This view I propose to call
the 'naturalistic fallacy'....'
(b) " I have thus appropriatedthe name Naturalismto a
particularmethod of approachingEthics. . . . This method
consistsin substituting for' good ' someone propertyofa natural
object or of a collectionof natural objects. ..." 2
(c) ". . . the naturalisticfallacy[is] the fallacywhichconsists
in identifyingthe simple notion which we mean by ' good'
with some othernotion."3
Thus, to identify' better' and ' more evolved', 'good ' and
'desired' etc., is to committhe naturalisticfallacy.4 But
just why is such a procedurefallaciousor erroneous? And is
it a fallacyonly when applied to good ? We must now study
Section 12 of Principia Ethica. Here Mr. Moore makes some
interestingstatements:-
" . . . if anybodytriedto definepleasureforus as being any
other natural object; if anybody were to say, for instance,
that pleasuremeansthe sensationof red. . . . Well, that would
be thesamefallacywhichI have calledthenaturalisticfallacy....
I should not indeed call that a naturalisticfallacy,although
it is the same fallacyas I have called naturalisticwithreference
to Ethics.... When a man confusestwo natural objects with
one another,defining the one by the other. .. then there is no
reason to call the fallacy naturalistic. But if he confuses
'good ' whichis not ... a naturalobject,withanynaturalobject
whatever,then there is a reasonfor calling that a naturalistic
5
fallacy.
Here Mr. Moore should have added that, when one confuses
'good ' which is not a metaphysicalobject or quality, with
any metaphysicalobject or quality, as metaphysicalmoralists
do, accordingto him,thenthe fallacyshouldbe called the meta-
physical fallacy. Instead he calls it a naturalisticfallacy in
this case too, though he recognisesthat the case is different
since metaphysicalpropertiesare non-natural6-a procedure
1 p. 10 2
p. 40. 3 p. 58, cf. pp. xiii, 73.
4 Cf. pp. 49, 53, 108, 139. 5 p. 13.
6 See pp. 38-40, 110-112.
 THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY. 471

which has misled many readers of Principia Ethica. For ex-

ample,it has led Mr.Broad to speakof" theologicalnaturalism".1
To resume: " Even if [goodness]were a natural object, that
would not alter the nature of the fallacynor diminishits im-
portance one whit".2
From these passages it is clear that the fallaciousnessof the
procedurewhichMr. Moore calls the naturalisticfallacyis not
due to the factthat it is appliedto good or to an ethicalor non-
natural charateristic.When Mr. R. B. Perry defines'good'
as 'being an object of interest' the troubleis not merelythat
he is defininggood. Nor is the troublethat he is definingan
ethicalcharacteristicin terms of non-ethicalones. Nor is the
trouble that he is regardinga non-naturalcharacteristicas a
natural one. The trouble is more generic than that. For
clarity'ssake I shall speak of the definistfallacyas the generic
fallacy which underliesthe naturalisticfgllacy. The natural-
istic fallacy will then, by the above pasgSages, be a species or
formof the definistfallacy,as would the metaphysicalfallacy
if Mr. Moore had given that a separate name.3 That is, the
naturalisticfallacy,as illustratedby Mr. Perry'sprocedure,is
a fallacy,not because it is naturalisticor confusesa non-natural
quality with a natural one, but solely because it involvesthe
definistfallacy. We may, then, confineour attentionentirely
to an understandingand evaluation of the definistfallacy.
To judge by the passages I have just quoted, the definist
fallacyis the processof confusingor identifying two properties,
of definingone propertyby another,or of substitutingone
propertyforanother. Furthermore, the fallacyis alwayssimply
that two propertiesare beingtreatedas one, and it is irrelevant,
if it be the case, that one of themis naturalor non-ethicaland
the othernon-naturalor ethical. One may committhe definist
fallacywithoutinfringing on the bifurcationof the ethicaland
the non-ethical,as whenone identifies pleasantnessand redness
or rightnessand goodness. But even when one infringeson
that bifurcation in committing the definistfallacy,as whenone
identifiesgoodness and pleasantness or goodness and satis-
faction,thenthe mistakeis stillnot that the bifurcation is being
infringedon, but only that two propertiesare being treatedas
one. Hence, on the presentinterpretation, the definist
fallacy
does not, in any of its forms,consistin violating(3), and has
no essentialconnexionwith the bifurcation of the 'ought' and
the 'is'.
1 Five TypesofEthicalTheory,p. 259.
2 p.14. 3 As Whittakerhas, loc.cit.
472 W. K. FRANKENA:

This formulationof the definistfallacy explains or reflects

the motto of Principia Ethica, borrowedfromBishop Butler:
" Everythingis what it is, and not anotherthing". It follows
fromthis motto that goodness is what it is and not another
thing. It followsthat viewswhichtryto identifyit withsome-
thing else are making a mistake of an elementarysort. For
it is a mistaketo confuseor identifytwo properties. If the
propertiesreally are two, then they simplyare not identical.
But do those who defineethical notionsin non-ethicalterms
make this mistake? They will replyto Mr. Moore that they
are not identifyingtwo properties;what they are saying is
that two wordsor sets of wordsstand foror mean one and the
same property. Mr. Moore was being,in part, misled by the
materialmode ofspeech,as Mr. Carnapcalls it, in such sentences
as " Goodness is pleasantness", " Knowledge is true belief",
etc. When one says instead," The word 'good' and the word
' pleasant' mean the same thing", etc., it is clear that one is
not identifying two things. But Mr. Moore kept himselffrom
seeingthisby his disclaimerthat he was interestedin any state-
ment about the use of words.'
The' definistfallacy,then,as we have stated it, does not rule
out any naturalisticor metaphysicaldefinitions of ethicalterms.
Goodness is not identifiablewith any 'other' characteristic(if
it is a characteristic at all). But the question is: whichchar-
acteristicsare other than goodness, which names stand for
characteristicsother than goodness? And it is begging the
questionof the definability of goodnessto say out of hand that
Mr. Perry,forinstance,is identifying goodnesswith something
else. The point is that goodnessis what it is, even if it is de-
finable. That is why Mr. Perrycan take as the motto of his
naturalistic Moral Economy another sentence from Bishop
Butler: " Thingsand actions are what they are, and the con-
sequencesof themwill be what they will be; why then should
we desire to be deceived? " The motto of Principia Ethica
is a tautology,and should be expanded as follows: Everything
is what it is, and not anotherthing,unless it is anotherthing,
and even then it is what it is.
On the otherhand,ifMr.Moore'smotto(or the definist fallacy)
rules out any definitions, for example of 'good', then it rules
out all definitionsof any term whatever. To be effectiveat
all, it must be understoodto mean, " Every termmeans what
it means, and not what is meant by any other term". Mr.
Moore seems implicitlyto understandhis motto in this way
1 See op. cit., pp. 6, 8, 12.
 THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY. 473

in Section 13, for he proceeds as if 'good ' has no meaning,

if it has no uniquemeaning. If the mottobe takenin thisway,
it will followthat 'good' is an indefinableterm,since no syn-
onyms can be found. But it will also followthat no term is
definable. And then the method of analysis is as useless as
an English butcherin a world withoutsheep.
Perhaps we have misinterpreted the definistfallacy. And,
indeed,someofthe passageswhichI quoted earlierin thispaper
seem to implythatthe definist fallacyis just the errorof defining
an indefinablecharacteristic.On this interpretation,again,
the definistfallacyhas, in all of its forms,no essentialconnexion
with the bifurcation of the ethicaland the non-ethical. Again,
one may commit the definistfallacy without violating that
bifurcation, as whenone definespleasantnessin termsof redness
or goodnessin termsof rightness(grantedMr. Moore's belief
that pleasantness and goodness are indefinable). But even
when one infringeson that bifurcationaild definesgoodness
in termsof desire,the mistakeis not that one is infringing on
the bifurcationby violating(3), but only that one is defining
an indefinable characteristic. This is possible because the
propositionthat goodnessis indefinableis logicallyindependent
of the propositionthat goodnessis non-natural:as is shownby
the factthat a characteristic may be indefinable and yet natural,
as yellownessis; or non-naturaland yet definable,as rightness
is (grantedMr. Moore's views about yellownessand rightness).
Considerthe definistfallacy as we have just stated it. It
is, of course, an errorto definean indefinablequality. But
the question,again, is: which qualities are indefinable ? It is
beggingthe questionin favourof intuitionism to say in advance
that the quality goodness is indefinableand that, therefore,
all naturalistscommit the definistfallacy. One must know
that goodnessis indefinablebeforeone can argue that the de-
finistfallacy is a fallacy. Then, however,the definistfallacy
can enteronlyat the end ofthe controversy betweenintuitionism
and definism,and cannot be used as a weapon in the contro-
versy.
The definistfallacymay be statedin such a way as to involve
the bifurcationbetweenthe 'ought' and the 'is '.' It would
then be committedby anyone who offereda definitionof any
ethical characteristicin termsof non-ethicalones. The trouble
with such a definition,on this interpretation, would be that
an ethicalcharacteristicis being reduced to a non-ethical one,

1 See J. Wisdom,MIND, 1931,p. 213,note 1.

31
474 W. K. FRANKENA:

a non-naturalone to a natural one. That is, the definition

would be ruled out by the fact that the characteristicbeing
definedis ethicalor non-naturaland therefore cannotbe defined
in non-ethicalor natural terms. But on this interpretation,
too, thereis dangerof a petitioin the intuitionist
argumentation.
To assume that the ethical characteristicis exclusivelyethical
is to beg preciselythe questionwhichis at issue when the defi-
nitionis offered. Thus, again, one must know that the char-
acteristicis non-naturaland indefinablein naturaltermsbefore
one can say that the definistsare makinga mistake.
Mr. Moore,McTaggart,and othersformulatethe naturalistic
fallacy sometimesin a way somewhatdifferent fromany of
those yet discussed. They say that the definistsare confusing
a universalsyntheticpropositionabout thegoodwitha definition
of goodness.' Mr. Abraham calls this the " fallacy of miscon-
strued proposition ".2 Here again the difficulty is that, while
it is true that it is an errorto construea universalsynthetic
propositionas a definition,it is a petitiofor the intuitionists
to say that what the definistis takingfor a definition is really
a universalsyntheticproposition.3
At last, however,the issue betweenthe intuitionists and the
definists(naturalisticor metaphysical)is becomingclearer. The
definistsare all holding that certain propositionsinvolving
ethical terms are analytic,tautologous,or true by definition,
e.g., Mr. Perryso regardsthe statement," All objects of desire
are good". The intuitionistshold that' such statementsare
synthetic. What underliesthis difference of opinionis that the
intuitionistsclaim to have at least a dim awarenessof a simple
unique qualityor relationofgoodnessor rightness whichappears
in the regionwhichour ethicaltermsroughlyindicate,whereas
the definistsclaim to have no awarenessof any such quality or
relationin that region,whichis different fromall otherqualities
and relationswhichbelong to the same contextbut are desig-
natedby wordsotherthan ' good ' and ' right' and theirobvious
synonyms.4The definistsare in all honestyclaimingto find
but one characteristic wherethe intuitionistsclaim to findtwo,
as Mr. Perry claimsto find only the propertyof being desired
where Mr. Moore claims to find both it and the propertvof
vol. ii,
1 See PrincipiaEthica,pp. 10, 16, 38; The NatureofExistence,
p. 398.
2 Leo Abraham," The Logic of Intuitionism Journalof
", International
Ethics,1933.
3 As Mr. Abrahampointsout, loc. cit.
4 See R. B. Perry,GeneralTheoryof Value, p. 30; cf. Journalof
Philosophy,1931,p. 520.
 THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY. 475

being good. The issue, then,is one of inspectionor intuition,

and concernsthe awareness or discernmentof qualities and
relations.' That is why it cannot be decided by the use of
the notionof a fallacy.
If thedefinistsmay be taken at theirword,thentheyare not
actually confusingtwo characteristicswith each other, nor
definingan indefinablecharacteristic, nor confusingdefinitions
and universal syntheticpropositions-in short they are not
committingthe naturalisticor definistfallacy in any of the
interpretations given above. Then the only fallacywhichthey
commit-the real naturalisticor definistfallacy-is the failure
to descrythequalitiesand relationswhichare centralto morality.
But this is neithera logical fallacynor a logical confusion. It
is not even, properlyspeaking,an error. It is rathera kind
of blindness,analogous to colour-blindness.Even this moral
blindnesscan be ascribedto the definistsonlyif theyare correct
in theirclaim to have no awarenessof any unique ethicalchar-
acteristicsand if the intuitionistsare correctin affirming the
existenceofsuchcharacteristics, butcertainlyto call it a ' fallacy',
even in a loose sense,is both unamiableand profitless.
On the otherhand, of course,if thereare no such character-
isticsin the objectsto whichwe attach ethicalpredicates,then
the intuitionists,if we may take themat theirword,are suffer-
ing froma corresponding moral hallucination. Definistsmight
or moralisticfallacy,exceptthat
then call this the intuitionistic
it is no more a 'fallacy' than is the blindnessjust described.
Anyway,they do not believe the claim of the intuitioniststo
be aware of unique ethical characteristics,and consequently
do not attribute to them this hallucination. Instead, they
simplydeny that the intuitionistsreally do find such unique
qualities or relations,and then they try to findsome plausible
way of accountingforthe fact that veryrespectableand trust-
worthypeople think they findthem.2 Thus they charge the
intuitionists withverbalism,hypostatisation, and the like. But
this half of the storydoes not concernus now.
What concernsus more is the fact that the intuitionistsdo
not credit the claim of the definistseither. They would be
much disturbed,if they really thoughtthat their opponents
were morallyblind,for they do not hold that we must be re-
generatedby grace beforewe can have moralinsight,and they
sharethe commonfeelingthat moralityis somethingdemocratic
even thoughnot all men are good. Thus they hold that " we
ofthePhilosophy
'See H. Osborne,Foundations of Value,pp. 15, 19,70.
1931,pp. 520 ff.
JournalofPhilosophy,
2 Cf.R. B. Perry,
476 W. K. FRANKENA:

are all aware" of certainunique characteristics when we use

the terms'good', 'right', etc., only due to a lack of analytic
clearnessof mind,abettedperhapsby a philosophicalprejudice,
we may not be aware at all that theyare different fromother
characteristics of whichwe are also aware.' Now, I have been
arguingthat the intuitionistscannot charge the definistswith
committingany fallacyunless and until they have shownthat
we are all, the definistsincluded,aware of the disputedunique
characteristics.If, however,they were to show this, then, at
least at the end ofthe controversy,theycouldaccusethe definists
of the errorof confusingtwo characteristics, or of the errorof
definingan indefinableone, and these errorsmight,since the
termis somewhatloose in its habits,be called 'fallacies', though
they are not logical fallaciesin the sense in whichan invalid
argumentis. The fallacyof misconstruedpropositiondepends
on the errorof confusingtwo characteristics, and hence could
also on our presentsupposition,be ascribed to the definists,
but it is not reallya logtcal confusion,2
sinceit does not actually
involvebeingconfusedabout the difference betweena proposition
and a definition.
to see how the intuitionists
Only it is difficult can provethat
the definistsare at least vaguely aware of the requisiteunique
characteristics.3The question must surely be left to the in-
spectionor intuitionof the definiststhemselves,aided by what-
ever suggestionsthe intuitionistsmay have to make. If so,
we mustcreditthe verdictof theirinspection,especiallyof those
among them who have read the writingsof the intuitionists
reflectively, and, then,as we have seen, the most they can be
chargedwith is moral blindness.
Besides tryingto discoverjust what is meant by the natural-
istic fallacy,I have triedto show that the notionthat a logical
or quasi-logicalfallacyis committed by thedefinists onlyconfuses
the issue betweenthe intuitionistsand the definists(and the
issue between the latter and the emotistsor postulationists),
and misrepresents the way in whichthe issue is to be settled.
No logical fallacy need appear anywherein the procedureof
the definists. Even fallaciesin any less accurate sense cannot
be implementedto decide the case against the definists; at
best they can be ascribedto the definistsonly afterthe issue
has been decided against them on independentgrounds. But
I PrincipiaEthica,pp. 17, 38, 59, 61.
2 But see H. Osborne,op. cit.,pp. 18 f.
oftheirarguments,
3 For a briefdiscussion see ibid.,p. 67 ; L. Abraham,
op. cit. I thinktheyare all inconclusive, but cannotshowthishere.
 THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY. 477
the only defectwhichcan be attributedto the definists, if the
intuitionistsare rightin affirming the existenceof unique in-
definableethical characteristics, is a peculiar moral blindness,
which is not a fallacy even in the looser sense. The issue in
question must be decided by whatevermethod we may find
satisfactoryfor determining whetheror not a word stands for
a characteristic at all, and, if it does, whetheror not it stands
for a unique characteristic.What methodis to be employed
is, perhaps,in one formor another,the basic problemof con-
temporaryphilosophy,but no generallysatisfactorysolution
of the problemhas yet been reached. I shall ventureto say
onlythis: it does seemto me that the issue is not to be decided
against the intuitionistsby the applicationab extrato ethical
judgmentsof any empiricalor ontological.meaning dictum.'
1 See PrincipiaEthica,pp. 124 f., 140.