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Table of Contents
1 Introduction 5
1.1 Executive Overview 5
1.2 GSMA IoT Security Guideline Document Set 5
1.2.1 GSMA IoT Security Assessment Checklist 6
1.3 Document Purpose 6
1.4 Intended Audience 7
1.5 Definitions 7
1.6 Abbreviations 8
1.7 References 9
2 The Challenges Created by the Internet of Things 11
2.1 The Availability Challenge 11
2.2 The Identity Challenge 12
2.3 The Privacy Challenge 12
2.4 The Security Challenge 13
3 The Mobile Solution 14
3.1 Addressing the Challenge of Availability 14
3.2 Addressing the Challenge of Identity 14
3.3 Addressing the Challenge of Privacy and Security 15
4 The IoT Model 16
4.1 Service Ecosystem 16
4.2 Endpoint Ecosystem 16
5 Risk Assessments 17
5.1 Goal 18
5.2 Risk Model References 18
6 Privacy Considerations 18
7 Using This Guide Effectively 20
7.1 Evaluating the Technical Model 20
7.2 Review the Current Security Model 21
7.3 Review and Evaluate Recommendations 21
7.4 Implementation and Review 22
7.5 Ongoing Lifecycle 23
8 Example Wearable Heart Rate Monitor 23
8.1 The Endpoint Overview 23
8.2 The Service Overview 24
8.3 The Use Case 24
8.4 The Security Model 25
8.5 The Result 26
8.6 Summary 27
9 Example Personal Drone 27
9.1 The Endpoint Overview 27
9.2 The Service Overview 28
9.3 The Use Case 28
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1 Introduction
Analysts have indicated that security issues are a significant inhibitor to the deployment of
many new IoT services and, at the same time, the provision of wide area connectivity to an
ever-widening variety of IoT services will increase the whole ecosystems exposure to fraud
and attack. There is already much evidence to show that attackers are beginning to show
ever greater interest in this area.
As these new service providers develop new and innovative services for particular market
segments, they may be unaware of the threats their service may face. In some cases, the
service provider may not have developed a service that has connected to a communications
network or the internet before and they may not have access to the skills and expertise to
mitigate the risks posed by enabling internet connectivity within their devices. In contrast,
their adversaries understand the technology and security weaknesses, quickly taking
advantage if vulnerabilities are exposed.
The telecommunications industry, which the GSMA represents, has a long history of
providing secure products and services to their customers. To help ensure that the new IoT
services coming to market are secure, the network operators together with their network,
service and device equipment partners would like to share their security expertise with
service providers who are looking to develop IoT services.
The GSMA has therefore created this set of security guidelines for the benefit of service
providers who are looking to develop new IoT services.
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throughout the life cycle of the service. The documents provide recommendations on how to
mitigate common security threats and weaknesses within IoT Services.
The structure of the GSMA security guideline document set is shown below. It is
recommended that this document, (i.e. the overview document) is read as a primer before
reading the supporting documents.
CLP.11
IoT Security Guidelines Overview
Document CLP.14
IoT Security
CLP.12 CLP.13
+ Guidelines for
Network
IoT Security Guidelines IoT Security Guidelines Operators
for IoT Service for IoT Endpoint
Ecosystem Ecosystem
Network Operators, IoT Service Providers and other partners in the IoT ecosystem are
advised to read GSMA document CLP.14 IoT Security Guidelines for Network Operators
[13] which provides top-level security guidelines for Network Operators who intend to provide
services to IoT Service Providers to ensure system security and data privacy.
Completing a GSMA IoT Security Assessment Checklist [16] will allow an entity to
demonstrate the security measures they have taken to protect their products, services and
components from cybersecurity risks.
http://www.gsma.com/iot/iot-security-assessment
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cost of the attack, as well as the cost of remediation, and the cost, if any, of not addressing
the risk.
The scope of this document is limited to recommendations pertaining to the design and
implementation of IoT services.
This document is not intended to drive the creation of new IoT specifications or standards,
but will refer to currently available solutions, standards and best practice.
This document is not intended to accelerate the obsolescence of existing IoT Services.
It is noted that adherence to national laws and regulations for a particular territory may,
where necessary, overrule the guidelines stated in this document.
IoT Service Providers - enterprises or organisations who are looking to develop new
and innovative connected products and services. Some of the many fields IoT
Service Providers operate in include smart homes, smart cities, automotive, transport,
heath, utilities and consumer electronics.
IoT Device Manufacturers - providers of IoT Devices to IoT Service Providers to
enable IoT Services.
IoT Developers - build IoT Services on behalf of IoT Service Providers.
Network Operators who are themselves IoT Service Providers or build IoT Services
on behalf of IoT Service Providers.
1.5 Definitions
Term Description
Identifier of a network connection point to which an endpoint device
Access Point
attaches. They are associated with different service types, and in many cases
Name
are configured per network operator.
A hacker, threat agent, threat actor, fraudster or other malicious threat to an IoT
Service typically with the intent of retrieving, destroying, restricting or falsifying
information. This threat could come from an individual criminal, organised
Attacker
crime, terrorism, hostile governments and their agencies, industrial espionage,
hacking groups, political activists, hobbyist hackers, researchers, as well as
unintentional security and privacy breaches.
A network of remote servers on the internet that host, store, manage, and
Cloud
process applications and their data.
This Endpoint model has a persistent connection to a back-end server over a
Complex Endpoint long-distance communications link such as cellular, satellite, or a hardwired
connection such as Ethernet. See CLP.13 [4] for further information.
Components Refers to the components contained in documents CLP.12 [3] and CLP.13 [4]
Embedded SIM A SIM which is not intended to be removed or replaced in the device, and
enables the secure changing of profiles as per GSMA SGP.01 [2].
Endpoint A generic term for a lightweight endpoint, Complex Endpoint, gateway or other
connected device. See CLP.13 [4] for further information.
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Term Description
Endpoint Any configuration of low complexity devices, rich devices, and gateways that
Ecosystem connect the physical world to the digital world in novel ways. See section 4.2 for
further information.
The Internet of Things (IoT) describes the coordination of multiple machines,
devices and appliances connected to the Internet through multiple networks.
These devices include everyday objects such as tablets and consumer
Internet of Things
electronics, and other machines such as vehicles, monitors and sensors
equipped with communication capabilities that allow them to send and receive
data.
Any computer program that leverages data from IoT devices to perform the
IoT Service
service.
IoT Service Enterprises or organisations who are looking to develop new and innovative
Provider connected products and services.
The operator and owner of the communication network that connects the IoT
Network Operator
Endpoint Device to the IoT Service Ecosystem.
Organizational A set of cryptographic policies and procedures that govern how identities,
Root of Trust applications, and communications can and should be cryptographically secured.
Refers to the recommendations contained in documents CLP.12 [3] and CLP.13
Recommendations
[4]
Risk Refers to the risks contained in documents CLP.12 [3] and CLP.13 [4]
Security Tasks Refers to the security tasks contained in documents CLP.12 [3] and CLP.13 [4]
Service Access A point of entry into an IoT Services back end infrastructure via a
Point communications network.
The set of services, platforms, protocols, and other technologies required to
IoT Service
provide capabilities and collect data from Endpoints deployed in the field. See
Ecosystem
section 3.1 for further information.
Subscriber Identity The smart card used by a mobile network to authenticate devices for
Module (SIM) connection to the mobile network and access to network services.
A Secure Element Platform specified in ETSI TS 102 221 that can support
multiple standardized network or service authentication applications in
UICC
cryptographically separated security domains. It may be embodied in
embedded form factors specified in ETSI TS 102 671.
1.6 Abbreviations
Term Description
3GPP 3rd Generation Project Partnership
API Application Program Interface
APN Access Point Name
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team
CLP GSMAs Internet of Things Programme
CPU Central Processing Unit
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
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Term Description
GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
GPS Global Positioning System
GSMA GSM Association
GUI Graphic User Interface
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
IoT Internet of Things
LPWA Low Power Wide Area
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OBD On Board Diagnostics
OCTAVE Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation
OMA Open Mobile Alliance
PIA Privacy Impact Assessment
PII Personally Identifiable Information
RAM Random Access Memory
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
1.7 References
Ref Doc Number Title
The Mobile Economy 2015
[1] n/a
http://www.gsmamobileeconomy.com/
Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning Architecture
[2] SGP.01
http://www.gsma.com/iot/embedded-sim/
IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service Ecosystem
[3] CLP.12
www.gsma.com/iot//iot-security-guidelines-for-iot-service-ecosystem/
IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Endpoint Ecosystem
[4] CLP.13
www.gsma.com/iot/iot-security-guidelines-for-endpoint-ecosystem/
NIST Risk Management Framework
[5] n/a
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/framework.html
Introducing OCTAVE Allegro: Improving the Information Security
CMU/SEI-
[6] Risk Assessment Process
2007-TR-012
http://www.cert.org/resilience/products-services/octave/
[7] Not Used Not Used
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping
[8] TS 33.220 Architecture (GBA)
www.3gpp.org
Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile
[9] RFC 4186 Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-SIM)
www.ietf.org
Conducting privacy impact assessments code of practice
[10] n/a
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1595/pia-code-of-
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These declarations are the result of the rapid social and technological changes that have
stemmed from the growth of the Internet. This has resulted in the Internet becoming a way of
life, one of the primary sources of all classes of information, and the most common method
for maintaining connectivity to loved ones and peers. The Internet is not simply a technology,
it has become a part of us.
In concert with the growing desire to maintain connectivity, a technological explosion has
occurred over the past few years. While technologists have declared The Internet of Things
is coming! for over a decade, the interest in ubiquitous access to information and the cost
model required to do so had not yet combined into a practical business model until the past
five years. At this point, component costs sharply decreased, while access to wireless
services and the speed of those services have dramatically increased. Protocols, battery life,
and even business models have all evolved to accommodate our ever increasing demand
for information and connectivity.
And that, in essence, is what the Internet of Things is all about. It isnt really about things. Its
about Us. The Internet of Us. The human and digital experiences no longer sit side-by-side,
they are bound ever tighter by this new way of life.
And because the human physical experience is bound more to the digital world than ever
before, it must be protected, as digital security now directly impacts the physical world more
than ever. The Internet of Things is an excellent opportunity for the world to move forward
together, in order to create ever greater databases of knowledge, shared experiences, and
explosions of innovation. But, for this to work effectively, the technologies that drive this
connectivity must be secured, to enforce the privacy, reliability, and quality of services
necessary to ensure that this great utility, this imperative basic need, is kept available to all
those that require it.
For the Internet of Things to evolve effectively, we must resolve the security challenges
inherent to its growth. These challenges are:
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well with the challenge of ubiquitous Internet access for the modern world. For this to
succeed, several questions must be answered:
How can Low Power Wide Area Networks (LPWAN) be implemented with a similar
level of security to modern cellular systems?
How can multiple mobile operators support the same level of security as new IoT
Endpoints migrate across network boundaries?
How can network trust be forwarded to capillary Endpoints that rely on Gateway
Endpoints for communication?
How can the power constraints of Lightweight Endpoints be addressed in secure
communications environments?
Can the user operating the Endpoint be strongly associated with the Endpoints
identity?
How can services and peers verify the identity of the end-user by verifying the identity
of the Endpoint?
Will Endpoint security technology be capable of securely authenticating peers and
services?
Can rogue services and peers impersonate authorized services and peers?
How is the identity of a device secured from tampering or manipulation?
Medical devices, automotive solutions, industrial control systems, home automation, building
and security systems, and more, all directly impact human physical lives. It is the duty of the
engineers to uphold these products and services to the highest level of assurance possible,
to reduce the potential for physical harm as well as the exposure of privacy relevant data.
Therefore, we must ask ourselves how privacy affects not only the end-user, but how IoT
technologies are designed:
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In order for IoT to evolve while not exposing massive groups of users and physical systems
to risk, information security practices must be enforced on both Endpoints and IoT Services.
Are security best practices incorporated into the product or service at the start of the
project?
Is the security life-cycle incorporated into the Software or Product Development Life
Cycle?
Is application security being applied to both services and applications running on the
embedded system?
Is a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) implemented in both the Endpoint and the
Service Ecosystem?
How does the TCB enforce self-verification of application images and services?
Can the Endpoint or IoT Service detect if there is an anomaly in its configuration or
application?
How are Endpoints monitored for anomalies indicative of malicious behaviour?
How is authentication and identity tied to the product or service security process?
What incident response plan is defined for detected anomalies indicative of a
compromise?
How are services and resources segmented to ensure a compromise can be
contained quickly and effectively?
How are services and resources restored after a compromise?
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The mobile industry continues to scale rapidly, with a total of 3.6 billion unique mobile
subscribers at the end of 2014. Half of the worlds population now has a mobile
subscriptionup from just one in five 10 years ago and an additional one billion
subscribers are predicted by 2020, taking the global penetration rate to approximately
60%. There were 7.1 billion global SIM connections at the end of 2014, and a further
243 million machine-to-machine connections.
There is an accelerating technology shift to mobile broadband networks across the
world. Mobile broadband connections (i.e. 3G and 4G technologies) accounted for
just under 40% of total connections at the end of 2014, but by 2020 will increase to
almost 70% of the total.
While 2G remains the dominant network technology globally today, its position has
already declined materially. 2G connections accounted for 90% of the total in 2008,
but this had fallen to around 60% at the end of 2014. In absolute terms, the number of
2G connections peaked in 2013 and fell by 6% during 2014.
The ongoing technology migration to higher speed networks is also facilitated by
significant operator investments. Recent research from GSMA predicts that more
than four out of five people will have access to 3G networks by 2020, up from 70%
today. The report also highlights that 4G networks are being rolled out at a faster
pace than was the case with 3G. While it took 10 years for 3G network coverage to
reach half of the global population, it will take 4G networks just eight years after
launch to reach the same milestone in 2017.
In the future we will also see the integration of Low-Power Wire-Area (LPWA) wireless
technology into the cellular communications space covering the needs of IoT. This class of
communications technology offers the wide area, wireless connectivity of todays mobile
networks at a fraction of the power required to communicate effectively. Mobile operators will
be integrating LPWA protocols and technologies into their offerings to provide services and
solutions to businesses in the near future.
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solution called the Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning Architecture [2] which is
appropriate for use in IoT to enable deeper component level integration into Endpoint
devices, reduced production costs and the management of connectivity via Over-The-Air
(OTA) platforms to enable the connectivity of the IoT Endpoint devices for their whole
lifetime.
Identity technologies, such as the Embedded SIM, are designed as trust anchors that
integrate security by default. They are manufactured to withstand attacks such as:
Glitching
Side-channel analysis
Passive data interception
Physical tampering
Identity theft
This dual use capability will be further augmented by the integration of mobile industry
security specifications such as those provided by 3GPP GBA [8], OMA [11], oneM2M [12]
and others. These technologies will help to securely provision devices in the field, securely
enable over-the-air firmware updates, and manage device capabilities and identity.
These technologies, when used together, will ease the currently complex engineering
processes and combine it into one simple component. Instead of application engineers
building complex technologies that they themselves have to manage, the network operator,
who already manages the network identity, can perform this on behalf of the application.
This not only reduces the engineering complexity, but the businesss daily management
requirements.
Furthermore, network technology can be secured through the use of the SIM and
technologies such as GBA [8] or EAP-SIM [9]. By using these technologies, the SIM can be
provisioned with a session security key that can be used in communications with application
network peers over well-known protocols. This process can diminish the potential for
adversaries to manipulate the application protocol to compromise the devices or service.
Thus, it is possible to secure both the network and the application with this model.
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In almost all modern IoT service or product models, this diagram defines the primary
components that are required when deploying a production-ready technology.
Communications network components are inherent to IoT and, for the purposes of this
model, provide the connection between the two ecosystems with each end of the
communication link discussed within the appropriate Endpoint Ecosystem and Service
Ecosystem document.
Specific network security guideline recommendations for Network Operators can be found in
the GSMAs IoT Security Guidelines for Network Operators [13].
The Service Ecosystem security guidelines to be used in conjunction with the process
described in this overview document can be found in CLP.12 IoT Security Guidelines for IoT
Service Ecosystem [4]
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The Endpoint Ecosystem security guidelines to be used in conjunction with the process
described in this overview document can be found in CLP.13 IoT Security Guidelines for IoT
Endpoint Ecosystem [13]
5 Risk Assessments
While the concept of a risk assessment has been around for many decades, many
businesses are more familiar with applying the concept to general business risk than to
information security. However, an information security risk assessment process is also
imperative toward the secure operation and longevity of the technological side of a business.
Obviously, in Internet of Things technology, where the engineering team is a critical
component to the success of the business, the risk assessment process should be the first
step the organization takes to building a security practice.
While every organization should create a granular perspective of technological risk, there are
high level questions that function as starting points for the risk assessment process
These starting points will help the engineering and information technology teams work more
effectively with the organization. The goal is to ensure that the technical side of the business
agrees on the risks, values, and remediation plans with the executive side of the business.
Forcing the teams to work together will help create a more realistic perspective of not only
the risk to the business, but the value of assets. This will directly affect the budget that
should be applied toward resolving outstanding gaps in security.
There are some risks that simply cannot be resolved. Some of these risks will be discussed
in these guidelines. The organization should evaluate these risks and determine whether
they are acceptable. This will provide the business with a realistic understanding of their
limitations, the technologys limitations, and their ability to react to certain types of threats.
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There is nothing more monetarily draining than presuming that all security gaps can be
resolved in a cost-effective manner.
5.1 Goal
The goal of a risk assessment is to create (or update) a set of policies, procedures, and
controls that remediate, monitor, and respond to gaps in security found in the technical part
of the organization. The output of the risk assessment should help the business adjust not
only its technology, but the way the technology is managed, designed, and deployed. Once
the risk assessment output more adequately describes the value of the information and
resources used by the organization, the overall business can be secured through the
enhancement of its personnel, processes, and policies.
Remember, the core benefits to using the output of a risk assessment are:
Informing personnel
Enhancing processes
Defining (or updating) policies
Executing remediation
Monitoring for new gaps
Enhancing the product or service
This, essentially helps the organization enforce a base platform for personnel and process
security. This platform then should be incorporated into a cycle that constantly assesses and
refines the overall roles and responsibilities of the organization.
6 Privacy Considerations
Many IoT services and products will be designed to create, collect, or share data. Some of
this data may not be considered personal data or impact a consumers privacy, and
therefore, not subject to data protection and privacy laws. This data could include
information about the physical state of the machines, internal diagnostic data, or metrics
regarding the state of the network.
However, many IoT services will involve data about or related to individual consumers and
will be subject to general data protection and privacy laws. Where mobile operators provide
IoT services they will also be subject to telecommunications-specific privacy and security
rules. Consumer focused IoT services are likely to involve the generation, distribution and
use of detailed data that could impact an individuals privacy. For example, drawing
inferences about their health or developing profiles based on their shopping habits and
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locations. As consumer IoT services gain in popularity, more consumer data will be created,
analysed in real-time and shared between multiple parties across national borders.
Where data relates to specific individuals, this complex, connected ecosystem may raise
concerns from the consumer over:
All providers of IoT services that rely on consumer data as well as any partner companies
capturing or using such data have an obligation to respect individuals privacy and keep
personally identifiable or privacy-invasive information secure.
A key challenge for IoT service providers is that there are multiple, and often-inconsistent,
laws dealing with privacy and data protection. Different laws may apply in different
countries, depending on the types of data involved, as well as the industry sector and
services that the service provider is offering. This has implications for a number of
consumer-oriented IoT service providers;
A connected vehicle, for example, can move between different countries, meaning the
associated data transfers may be governed by several different legal jurisdictions. In-car
sensors tracking the location of the car (static or dynamic) and its frequent destinations could
be used to infer a number of insights about the drivers lifestyle, hobbies or religion, which
the driver may consider personal information. Additionally, insights about driving habits
through on-board diagnostics sensors might be shared with insurance companies who
might use those insights to impose a higher premium and therefore discriminate against the
driver without their knowledge.
IoT services and devices (including connected cars) can also move between different
sovereign territories and therefore different legal jurisdictions. In many cases, an individuals
personal data may transit or reside in jurisdictions different from the individual. These are
important issues that need to be considered before a multi-national IoT Service is deployed.
Another challenge is that most data protection laws require companies collecting consumers
data to get the affected consumers (also known as the data subject) consent before
processing certain categories of personal data such as health related data. Most laws
define personal data as any information that relates to an identified or identifiable living,
natural person.
But as more and more devices are connected to the Internet, more and more data about
individuals will be collected and analysed and possibly impact their privacy, without
necessarily being considered personal by law. The combination of massive data volumes,
Cloud storage and predictive analytics can provide detailed profiles of users. In particular, it
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may become challenging to truly anonymise information and personal information can be
inferred from other data types.
The need to maintain the privacy of sensitive, health data records is well recognised, not
least due to the potential for commercial abuse of such records. In the United States of
America, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) includes
privacy and security requirements to mitigate the risks of unauthorised disclosure of health
records.
HIPAA, like many other regulations such as those in the European Union, only applies if the
health data is personally identifiable. The data stored in a blood monitoring device (which
does not identify the user) would not be covered by these requirements, whereas that same
data in a smartphone app or in a Cloud server is likely to be covered because it is able to be
linked to an individual (in the case of a smartphone because the phone will almost certainly
contain other data identifying the user and in a Cloud server because it will be associated
with an identifiable user account). Policymakers around the world are realising that
information and insights about people can impact their privacy even if they are not defined
as personally identifiable. They are therefore beginning to adopt more risk-based
approaches to regulation but also considering the wider privacy implications of data use
rather than focusing on legal definitions.
In order to build trust in the IoT ecosystem Governments should ensure data protection and
privacy legislation is technology-neutral and that rules are applied consistently to all players
in the internet ecosystem. Furthermore, in order for IoT Service Providers to minimise the
need for formal regulatory intervention, we recommend that they follow the steps described
in Annex A at the early development stages of their IoT service or product.
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Start by making a document describing each component used in the system. Identify how
the component is sourced, how it is used, what privilege level it requires, and how it is
integrated into the overall solution. Map each component to the technologies described in
the Model section of each Endpoint Ecosystem [3] and Service Ecosystem [4] guidelines
documents. It is acceptable if the document doesnt specifically match a component, as it
should map the components general class. Simply use the class of component, such as a
microcontroller, communications module, or trust anchor, as the context. Consider the
following questions:
These questions, when answered, will provide an understanding of how the technical
components interact with each other, and how the overall product or service is affected by
each component.
This process corresponds with the first and second phases of the CERT OCTAVE risk
assessment model [6], or the Frame stage of the NIST Risk Management Framework [5].
This assists in the development of a profile for each critical business asset, the development
of security objectives, and establishes a foundation for how the company will assess,
monitor, and respond to risk.
Once the security model has been reviewed, the reader should have a better understanding
of what technologies are most vulnerable, or most desirable to the Attacker, in the product or
service being developed. This information should be shared with the organization, to ensure
that both engineers and leadership understand the risks and threats to the current model.
However, it should be noted that the organization should not take steps to adjust their
security model at this time. It is too early to make concise architectural changes.
This process again corresponds to the first and second phases of the CERT OCTAVE model
[6], or the Frame stage of the NIST Risk Management Framework [5]. Reviewing the security
model helps enhance the technical model by identifying potential gaps in security and
shining a spotlight on security objectives that should be prioritized.
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recommendations, but will provide insight into the challenges involved in implementing the
particular recommendation.
For each recommendation, a Method section is provided. This section will outline
methodologies that assist in the remediation or mitigation of the corresponding security risk.
These methods, while presented from a high level, will outline concepts that reduce risk from
a holistic perspective, to ensure the greatest amount of gain is acquired from a reasonable
and practical amount of effort.
An Expense section is provided to discuss, where applicable, extra financial expenses that
the organization should prepare for when implementing a particular recommendation. While
most expenses, such as engineering time and raw materials, are fairly obvious, less obvious
expenses can alter the finances applied to products and services whose profit margins and
budgetary limits have already been defined by the business leadership. While specific
numbers are not provided, technologies and services are specified that may incur additional
costs.
A Risk section is also provided so the reader understands the gaps in security that are likely
to result from not implementing a particular recommendation. While the business may accept
that some risks are within the businesss operating guidelines, the reader should review
each risk section to ensure that the business fully understands the side effects of not
implementing (or not correctly implementing) a given recommendation. This may seem
straight forward for recommendations such as Encrypt Data, but the subtlety of some
threats, such as replay attacks against messages that are not cryptographically unique, may
be a surprise to the reader at a later date.
In some cases, references are provided for further review. While this document does not
provide detailed information on every technology, risk, or remediation plan, other standards
and time-proven strategies do. This set of documents will provide references to those
materials, where applicable, within each recommendation.
The output from reviewing the Recommendations section should directly tie into the Security
Tasks section. The Security Tasks should now be filled out with Recommendations that are
appropriate for implementing the Security Tasks correctly. These Security Tasks will then tie
back to specific Components assigned to members of the organization.
Evaluating recommendations corresponds to the Assess step of the NIST Risk Management
Framework [5], and steps six, seven, and eight of the CERT OCTAVE methodology [6].
When the implementation is complete, the organization should review the Risks in both the
Recommendations subsection and the Component sections. The organization should ensure
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that the implementation fulfils the requirements set forth by these sections. The organization
should then ensure that the implementation solves security with regard to the context in
which the Component is designed in the organizations product or service, as these
documents cannot fully address every product or service being designed in the field. If
possible, have a third party consulting firm evaluate the implementation to ensure that it
does indeed adhere to security best practices.
Implementation and review corresponds with the Respond component of the NIST Risk
Management Framework [5], and step eight of the CERT OCTAVE model [6].
Managing the ongoing security lifecycle corresponds with the Monitor and Frame
components of the NIST Risk Management Framework [5], and steps one, four, and five of
the CERT OCTAVE model [6].
The HRM is composed of standard components for a simple wireless wearable device: an
ambient light photo sensor and a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) transceiver enabled
microcontroller. The sensor is used to capture pulse rate data, while the microcontroller
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analyses the data emitting from the sensor and chooses what data to send over the built-in
BLE transceiver. In this example, the BLE stack used is version 4.2.
A coin cell battery is used in this example to transmit data from the HRM to another device,
such as a smart-phone or tablet. No other components are required for this device to
function.
According to the Endpoint Ecosystem document, this device would fit into the Lightweight
Endpoint class of devices.
Visualization of the data can be achieved using the mobile application, or via the services
website. Users of the wearable technology can log into the service providers website to
perform more actions with the metrics captured by the endpoint.
This is a very simple and common service model with no custom or unnecessary
complexities.
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The business intends to use this data to partner with medical device manufacturers, health
care providers, and other organizations that can use these metrics to identify whether a
consumer is more or less likely to incur a health-related event, such as a heart attack or a
stroke.
From an endpoint perspective, the team learned the following issues are of concern:
Cloning
Endpoint impersonation
Service impersonation
Ensuring privacy
From a service perspective, the team decided the following issues are of concern:
Cloning
Hacked services
Identifying anomalous endpoint behaviour
Limiting compromise
Reducing data loss
Reducing exploitation
Managing user privacy
Improving availability
The team reviewed the recommendations for each of the above issues, as suggested by
each relevant Frequently Asked Security Question section. The team then chose to
implement recommendations that were cost-effective improvements that ensured the
greatest amount of security.
In this example model, the endpoint would not require a substantial change. Since the
endpoint has very little functionality, minimal security can be employed on the endpoint for
both application security and communication. Since the endpoint application is flashed on a
single device, as long as the device firmware is locked, there is no real threat of attack
against the endpoint within the given use case.
However, since privacy is an issue, the organization should employ at least a Personalized
PSK version of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB). This would ensure that encryption tokens
were unique to each endpoint, so that one compromised endpoint cannot compromise all
endpoints. If the personalized (unique) keys were encoded into the locked microcontroller, it
would be reasonable to believe that this use case were adequately secured from the threat
of cloning, impersonation, and privacy issues. Review the IoT Service [3] and Endpoint [4]
documents for a more complete discussion on what a Trusted Computing Base is within
each ecosystems context.
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The server infrastructure, however, requires a significant amount of changes. The engineers
realize that, according to the recommendations, they are at serious risk of abuse. The
following issues are acknowledged:
In the above figure, the changes to the service ecosystem are easily observable. Each class
of service has been broken into separate tiers to help secure and scale the technology easily
in the event that demand spikes. Two additional tiers were added, a database tier and an
authentication tier, to separate critical systems from services that directly interface with the
outside world. A security front-end was implemented to help guard the internal network from
multiple types of attacks, including DoS and DDoS attacks that reduce the overall availability
of the system. Finally, an administrative model was defined to allow management secure
access to the production environment. One component not depicted in the above diagram is
the presence of an analytics model that observes when endpoint behaviour may be
indicative of a compromise, or a flaw in the firmware or hardware design.
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8.6 Summary
Overall, this simple technology could have been easily compromised had it been deployed
as is. Yet, with a few fast, simple, and cost-effective changes made on the endpoint, the
technology is assured to have years of longevity in the field without change to the
architecture.
With the service ecosystem ramped up, there is far less of a threat to both users and the
business. Cloning and impersonation is no longer a threat. Privacy is ensured by granting
each endpoint unique cryptographic tokens. Systems that contain critical information are
separated and secured from more heavily abused public-facing systems. This model, while
slightly more complex, reduces the overall risk of the production environment.
This personal drone is composed of a robust set of components. The processing capabilities
of the drone are high performance due to the multiple motors, sensors, and other equipment
that all must function efficiently in parallel. This model uses an ARM Cortex-A8 CPU with the
primary operating system (Linux) stored in NVRAM on a separate chip. An array of various
sensors are required for detecting movement, light, speed, and more. A SD/MMC card is
used to store video, sensor metrics, and metadata. A camera is used to allow the operator to
see from the drones perspective. A cellular/GPS combination module is used to ensure the
drone can maintain connectivity to its operator even when it is out of range of a proprietary
protocol. GPS is also used for guidance, and for minimal automation.
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A Lithium Polymer (LiPo) battery is used to drive the drone. Its fly time is approximately two
hours before a new charge is required when all functions are active at once.
According to the Endpoint Ecosystem document, this device would fit into the Complex
Endpoint class of devices. Even though it contains a cellular module, it is not considered a
gateway as it does not route messages to or from other endpoints.
However, as the drone has some light automation features, it can be given coordinates and
a path to traverse while taking photos or short videos. These media files can be uploaded in
real time over LTE to the back-end service to show the operator its course and viewpoint
during automated execution.
Thus, a robust back-end service is required to ensure a high degree of service availability for
each drone that might connect to the system. Availability is also necessary for the high
bursts of network traffic required to transmit videos and high-resolution images over a
cellular link. There must also be a web interface that allows the operator to view media
uploads from a web browser.
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cinema, as the camera and stabilization capabilities of the drone are exceptional for the price
point. As a result, the drone will be used in expensive filming projects where intellectual
property and privacy are major concerns.
From an endpoint perspective, the team learned the following issues are of concern:
Endpoint identity
Endpoint impersonation
Trust anchor attacks
Software and firmware tampering
Secure remote management
Detecting compromised endpoints
Service impersonation
Ensuring privacy
From a service perspective, the team decided the following issues are of concern:
Managing user privacy
Improving availability
The team reviewed the recommendations for each of the above issues, as suggested by
each relevant Frequently Asked Security Question section. The team then chose to
implement recommendations that were cost-effective improvements that ensured the
greatest amount of security.
In this example, the service infrastructure does not require a substantial change. This is
because the service infrastructure already had to be built out extensively to accommodate
for the bursts of traffic required in servicing the endpoint product. The architecture already
demanded a well formed and secure architecture simply to be able to scale effectively and
maintain availability of resources even when some services were incurring temporary faults.
However, the organization chose to investigate user privacy further as this has become a
primary point of contention for the businesss unexpected niche.
The bootloader is not properly validating the application prior to executing the
operating system kernel, leading to a risk of tampering
There is no TCB used to manage the security of the application or communications
Because there is no properly implemented TCB or trust anchor, endpoint
impersonation is a problem, which may lead to data leakage
Without a well implemented TCB, the endpoint cant properly authenticate services
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Without a well implemented TCB, the endpoint cant properly authenticate the
operator over the proprietary radio interface
The engineers have relied on the security of LTE to ensure the communications
channel cant be compromised, but has not considered the threat of endpoint
impersonation or Femtocell repurposing, both of which bypass the security of LTE to
compromise weak service security
For the existing drone system already in production, the engineering team issues a firmware
update that implements a Personalized Pubkey security model. The firmware update
improves the bootloader as well to bake security into the core architecture. Since a
Personalized Pubkey model was used, anyone attempting to abuse the initial lack of security
in the endpoint to attempt to impersonate another users endpoint would fail, as the
engineers leveraged their existing user-to-endpoint mapping database to create
personalized keys on a per-user basis. This way, no user without the appropriate web
credentials can download and install another users Personalized Pubkey update. While this
process was complex and time consuming to implement, it will be worth the effort.
Future versions of the drone technology will implement an internal CPU trust anchor. This
trust anchor will be tied to a Personalized Pubkey TCB, to ensure that each endpoint is
uniquely seeded with exceptional security from the ground up.
Deploying strong cryptography in this fashion is imperative, as it also negates the potential
for the other classes of attack the company identified as a concern. By leveraging the benefit
of strong cryptography and a TCB for verification and authentication, the engineering team
can easily identify whether rogue services are being made available to the drone. The drone,
upon detecting rogue services, can simply land back at the original take-off site.
Any service that detects an improperly secured drone can also raise flags internally. The
administration team, at that time, can determine how to deal with the potentially
compromised drone. This provides a level of agility with regard to security events, and also
gives the organization a way to evaluate if there are software or hardware problems that are
causing abnormal behaviour on the endpoint.
9.6 Summary
While the engineering team obviously spent an exceptional amount of time creating a
resilient architecture from a mechanical engineering and back-end services perspective,
substantial work needed to be done to create secure endpoint technology. While this
scenario did not pose a critical threat to the overall business, it was fortunate that there was
a solution that worked well enough for their customers needs. Had this been a more safety-
critical technology, even the solution deployed here may have not been sufficient.
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For more information on Trusted Computing Base variants, such as Personalized Pubkey
TCB or Personalized PSK TCB, please review the IoT Service [3] and Endpoint [4]
Ecosystem documents.
While the above model is too complex to properly depict in a simple diagram, the three high-
level components involved are:
A telematics uplink unit that manages the sensor network, makes complex decisions
on behalf of the driver, and maintains a connection to the back-end system
A vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) system that detects and reacts to V2V events
A general sensor network that provides metrics to the telematics uplink unit
In modern automotive systems, the telematics unit is a part of the automobiles computer
network and makes decisions based on sensor data and back-end communications. This
unit will make decisions with, or on behalf of, the consumer driving the vehicle. The unit
ensures that the vehicle is operating properly, attempts to make intelligent decisions during
emergencies, and takes commands from the back-end network.
The V2V sensor network identifies vehicles in the vicinity and makes decisions based on
metrics gathered from sensors. While the telematics unit primarily makes decisions based on
the state of components (such as brakes or tire pressure monitors) the V2V system makes
decisions based on the presence of other vehicles, or sends out alerts to nearby vehicles in
the case of a critical event.
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The general sensor network is a series of components that provide data to the telematics
unit, and sometimes the V2V unit. These units use the information gathered from the general
sensor network to make accurate decisions during critical events.
According to the Endpoint Ecosystem document, this system has components that fit into
every IoT endpoint class. The telematics uplink unit acts as a gateway. The V2V unit acts as
a complex endpoint. The general sensor devices are effectively all lightweight endpoints.
The system may also be augmented to provide the consumer with useful services, such as
remotely unlock door, start engine, and similar features. In the near future, these systems
may allow vehicles to be driven remotely through automated guidance systems.
While most critical decisions will be made in the processing units on the vehicle itself, it is
reasonable to conjecture that some decisions will be made in the cloud, where more
machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) along with behavioural or statistical
models can be leveraged to make more complex decisions.
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critical scenarios can potentially be resolved through the use of sensors and well designed
computer systems.
One interesting feature of this technology is that it may be entirely transparent to the user.
The user would not need to configure these computers to act in a certain fashion. Instead,
they should be capable of negotiating the current landscape through the use of sensor
metrics. This will allow the computers to behave correctly regardless of the environment.
From an endpoint perspective, the team learned the following issues are of concern:
Endpoint impersonation
Service or Peer impersonation
Side-channel attacks
Detecting compromised endpoints
Ensuring safety at the risk of security
From a service perspective, the team decided the following issues are of concern:
The biggest risk to this environment that hasnt been discussed in previous examples is the
risk of impersonation with regard to peers. One concern that engineers have in this type of
environment is the risk that a computer will make critical decisions using data that is not
properly authenticated.
Since sensor data in critical scenarios requires exceptionally fast processing times, it is
theorized that it may not always be feasible to implement asymmetric cryptography or PKI
based communications. However, this may not be an accurate assertion. Instead, an
accurate security model should account ahead of time for time-critical scenarios and cache
session keys for nearby Endpoints. For example, if two objects are approaching each other
at a known rate, security applications in the Service Ecosystem can prepare session keys
specific to these two Endpoints before they reach a distance where they can physically
impact one another. This would ensure that secure communication between Endpoints and
sensors can still be used in the event that there is no time to renegotiate an instantaneous
secure session when the potential for a critical scenario (like an impending automotive
crash) is detected. .
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Yet, regardless of these changes, safety is still a critical factor. The engineering team and
business leadership, along with the companys legal team and insurance brokers, should
evaluate safety critical technology and determine whether security can be implemented
without risking safety of the users. While security can often be implemented, even in safety-
critical scenarios, with some architectural adjustments, there are times when safety must
come before all other concerns.
10.6 Summary
Systems like these are often well engineered and take a large amount of effort to attack the
ecosystem. However, subtle flaws in the communications architecture can lead to a
compromised environment. In walled gardens, such as some CANbus networks, a single
flawed endpoint can cause the entire system to become vulnerable. This, in safety-critical
environments, is unacceptable.
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Step Consideration
What data do you need to collect from / about the user so that your IoT service or
product can function properly?
One of the first steps in any business model relying on data is to identify what information
is actually required from or about the consumer, for the service or product to function
properly. The types of data a service requires could be categorised as static such as the
consumers name or home address and data that is dynamic, such as real-time
location. So if you are offering, for example, a fitness wristband tracking someones steps
Step 1 and calories burned, then you would need to know the weight, age, gender, distance
travelled and the heart rate of the individual wearing the wristband, but you would
arguably not need the actual location of the individual.
When assessing the types of data needed, its also important to decide whether the
individuals consent is needed to use that data and how you would obtain their consent or
indeed offer them options to control their privacy preferences. A smartphone could act as
a medium for offering the user privacy options (e.g. mobile app or online dashboard)
where the product itself has no screen.
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The following diagram presents one option of how the proposed steps above could be
illustrated:
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For the sake of simplicity, our automotive tracking system will have the following capabilities:
Endpoint Ecosystem:
A simple Graphic User Interface (GUI) that allows a user to:
Log in with a username and password
Disable tracking
Enable tracking
Identify and visualize current location
A cellular module for connecting to back-end services
A SIM card for the cellular module
A Lithium-Polymer battery for back-up power
A Central Processing Unit (CPU)
An embedded application in Non-Volatile RAM
RAM
EEPROM
Service Ecosystem:
Cellular Data connectivity
Secure Private APN
Service Access Point
Cellular Modem OTA management service
SIM Card OTA management service
After marking down the information relevant to each technology, the team reviews the Model
section of each Guideline document and identifies the appropriate technological model. This
Endpoint is a Complex Endpoint. The Service and Network model is a standard mobile-
enabled IoT service.
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In our example solution, there are only two threat surfaces that are relevant to an attack:
Since there is no local network connection, only a mobile network connection, an Attacker
would have to either compromise the cellular network connection, enter the communications
channel from the private APN or enter via the Service Access Point, cellular modem OTA
management server or SIM card OTA management server.
Physical attacks are the only other way to compromise the device of which there are multiple
entry points as shown in the above diagram, so in the case of this IoT service the Endpoint
should be heavily focused on.
Once each Component is assigned to an owner, the process can begin. This means, at this
stage, the team understands:
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Once the recommendations are reviewed, the Component owners can determine whether a
recommendation has already been applied, or mark a recommendation pending. This will
allow the group to have a discussion regarding the applicability of a recommendation prior to
its deployment. This is a better strategy to follow, as some recommendations may have side
effects that impact the fulfilment of other recommendations, or existing controls.
After reviewing Recommendations and the Component risk section, the following security
gaps were identified:
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In this particular instance, the team has identified that they are working with a GSMA
member that is capable of provisioning an SIM card that contains application-capable trust
anchor technology. They will resolve their need for a trust anchor by using the existing SIM
card. This also resolves personalization, as each SIM can be personalized in the field using
standard GSMA technology.
SIM technology can also help provision communication security keys over the air, resolving
the need to implement communications authentication and privacy.
The SIM company-specific zone can be programmed with a trusted root base that enables
the business to authenticate peers using a certificate chain. This resolves Organizational
Root of Trust and peer authentication requirements.
The EEPROM is encoded with data that is encrypted with security keys stored in the SIM
trust anchor.
The bootloader is altered to use the trust anchor for the authentication of the application
image.
The Endpoint is reprogrammed to support secure password input from the user by blocking
out password characters as they are typed.
A privacy management GUI is added so the user can view and control what information is
being gathered by the business.
Once these implementations are defined, the team re-evaluates all security
Recommendations and Risks, and reviews the Security Model to identify whether the
changes have resolved their concerns.
The team will plan how each incident or gap is identified, remediated, and recovered from.
This will ensure that, over time, the evolving technological and security landscape will not
take the organization by surprise.
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It is our intention to provide a quality product for your use. If you find any errors or omissions,
please contact us with your comments. You may notify us at prd@gsma.com
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Copyright Notice
Copyright 2017 GSM Association
Disclaimer
The GSM Association (Association) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept
any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document.
The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.
Antitrust Notice
The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Associations antitrust compliance policy.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction 5
1.1 Introduction to the GSMA IoT Security Guideline Document Set 5
1.2 Document Purpose 6
1.3 Intended Audience 6
1.4 Definitions 6
1.5 Abbreviations 8
1.6 References 8
2 The Service Model 9
3 The Security Model 12
3.1 Networking Infrastructure Attacks 14
3.2 Cloud or Container Infrastructure Attacks 15
3.3 Application Service Attacks 17
3.4 Privacy 17
3.5 Malicious Objects 17
3.6 Authentication and Authorization 18
3.7 False Positives and False Negatives 18
4 Frequently Asked Security Questions 19
4.1 How do we Combat Cloning? 19
4.2 How Are Users Authenticated via the Endpoint? 19
4.3 How can the Service Identify Anomalous Endpoint Behaviour? 20
4.4 How can the Service Restrict an Abnormally Behaving Endpoint? 21
4.5 How Can I Determine Whether a Server or Service Has Been Hacked? 21
4.6 What Can I Do Once A Server Has Been Hacked? 22
4.7 How Should Administrators Interact With Servers and Services? 22
4.8 How Can the Service Architecture Limit the Impact of a Compromise? 22
4.9 How Can The Service Architecture Reduce Data Loss During a
Compromise? 23
4.10 How Can the Service Architecture Limit Connectivity from Unauthorized
Users? 24
4.11 How to Reduce the Likelihood of Remote Exploitation? 24
4.12 How Can the Service Manage User Privacy? 25
4.13 How Can a Service Improve Its Availability? 25
5 Critical Recommendations 26
5.1 Implement a Service Trusted Computing Base 26
5.2 Define an Organizational Root of Trust 27
5.3 Define a Bootstrap Method 28
5.4 Define a Security Infrastructure for Systems Exposed to the Public Internet 29
5.5 Define a Persistent Storage Model 30
5.6 Define an Administration Model 31
5.7 Define a Systems Logging and Monitoring Approach 32
5.8 Define an Incident Response Model 33
5.9 Define a Recovery Model 34
5.10 Define a Sunsetting Model 35
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1 Introduction
The structure of the GSMA security guideline document set is shown below. It is
recommended that the overview document CLP.11 IoT Security Guidelines Overview
Document [1] is read as a primer before reading the supporting documents.
CLP.11
IoT Security Guidelines Overview
Document CLP.14
IoT Security
CLP.12 CLP.13
+ Guidelines for
Network
IoT Security Guidelines IoT Security Guidelines Operators
for IoT Service for IoT Endpoint
Ecosystem Ecosystem
Network Operators, IoT Service Providers and other partners in the IoT ecosystem are
advised to read GSMA document CLP.14 IoT Security Guidelines for Network Operators
[4] which provides top-level security guidelines for Network Operators who intend to provide
services to IoT Service Providers to ensure system security and data privacy.
Completing a GSMA IoT Security Assessment Checklist [14] will allow an entity to
demonstrate the security measures they have taken to protect their products, services and
components from cybersecurity risks.
http://www.gsma.com/iot/iot-security-assessment
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The scope of this document is limited to Recommendations pertaining to the design and
implementation of IoT services and network elements.
This document is not intended to drive the creation new IoT specifications or standards, but
will refer to currently available solutions, standards and best practice.
This document is not intended to accelerate the obsolescence of existing IoT Services.
Backwards compatibility with the Network Operators existing IoT Services should be
maintained when they are considered to be adequately secured.
It is noted that adherence to national laws and regulations for a particular territory may,
where necessary, overrule the guidelines stated in this document.
IoT Service Providers - Enterprises or organisations who are looking to develop new
and innovative connected products and services. Some of the many fields IoT
Service Providers operate in include smart homes, smart cities, automotive, transport,
heath, utilities and consumer electronics.
IoT Endpoint Device Manufacturers - providers of IoT Endpoint Devices to IoT
Service Providers to enable IoT Services.
IoT Developers who build IoT Services on behalf of IoT Service Providers.
Network Operators who provide services to IoT Service Providers.
1.4 Definitions
Term Description
Access Control List A list of permissions attached to a computing object
Identifier of a network connection point to which an endpoint device
Access Point Name attaches. They are associated with different service types, and in
many cases are configured per network operator.
A hacker, threat agent, threat actor, fraudster or other malicious threat
to an IoT Service. This threat could come from an individual criminal,
organised crime, terrorism, hostile governments and their agencies,
Attacker
industrial espionage, hacking groups, political activists, hobbyist
hackers, researchers, as well as unintentional security and privacy
breaches.
A network of remote servers on the internet that host, store, manage,
Cloud
and process applications and their data.
A technology that makes it possible to run multiple isolated systems, or
Container
containers, on one host.
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Term Description
A UICC that supports remote provisioning of the network or service
Embedded UICC (eUICC)
subscriptions it authenticates, as specified by GSMA.
End Customer Means the consumer of the IoT Service provided by the IoT Service
Provider. It is feasible that the End Customer and IoT Service Provider
could be the same actor, for example a utility company.
Endpoint Ecosystem Any configuration of low complexity devices, rich devices, and
gateways that connect the physical world to the digital world in novel
ways. See CLP.11 [1] for further information.
Forward Secrecy A property of secure communication protocols: A secure
communication protocol is said to have forward secrecy if compromise
of long-term keys does not compromise past session keys.
The Internet of Things describes the coordination of multiple machines,
devices and appliances connected to the Internet through multiple
networks. These devices include everyday objects such as tablets and
Internet of Things
consumer electronics, and other machines such as vehicles, monitors
and sensors equipped with machine-to-machine (M2M)
communications that allow them to send and receive data.
A generic term for a complex IoT endpoint device or IoT gateway
IoT Endpoint
device.
Any computer program that leverages data from IoT devices to perform
IoT Service
the service.
The set of services, platforms, protocols, and other technologies
IoT Service Ecosystem required to provide capabilities and collect data from Endpoints
deployed in the field. See CLP.11 [1] for further information.
Enterprises or organisations who are looking to develop new and
IoT Service Provider
innovative connected IoT products and services.
The operator and owner of the communication network that connects
Network Operator
the IoT Endpoint Device to the IoT Service Ecosystem.
A set of cryptographic policies and procedures that govern how
Organizational Root of
identities, applications, and communications can and should be
Trust
cryptographically secured.
Acts as a virtual firewall that controls the traffic for one or more virtual
Security Group
server instance.
A Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is a conglomeration of algorithms,
policies, and secrets within a product or service. The TCB acts as a
module that allows the product or service to measure its own
trustworthiness, gauge the authenticity of network peers, verify the
integrity of messages sent and received to the product or service, and
Trusted Computing Base
more. The TCB functions as the base security platform upon which
secure products and services can be built. A TCBs components will
change depending on the context (a hardware TCB for Endpoints, or a
software TCB for cloud services), but the abstract goals, services,
procedures, and policies should be very similar.
A Secure Element Platform specified in ETSI TS 102 221 that can
support multiple standardized network or service authentication
UICC
applications in cryptographically separated security domains. It may be
embodied in embedded form factors specified in ETSI TS 102 671.
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Term Description
Secured and logically separated partition of a network to allow
dedicated usage by one particular customer set of service. So called
Virtual Private Network
because the VPN is Private from the rest of the network, and hence
acts as a virtualised network in its own right
1.5 Abbreviations
Term Description
3GPP 3rd Generation Project Partnership
ACL Access Control List
API Application Program Interface
APN Access Point Name
CERTS Computer Emergency Response Teams
CLP GSMAs Internet of Things Programme
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
GSMA GSM Association
HSM Hardware Security Module
IoT Internet of Things
IP Internet Protocol
SQL Structured Query Language
TCB Trusted Computing Base
VM Virtual Machine
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAF Web Application Firewall
1.6 References
Ref Doc Number Title
[1] CLP.11 IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document
[2] CLP.12 IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service Ecosystem
[3] CLP.13 IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Endpoint Ecosystem
[4] CLP.14 IoT Security Guidelines for Network Operators
OWASP Secure Application Design Project
[5] n/a
https://www.owasp.org
TCG Trusted Platform Module
[6] n/a
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
TCG Guidance for Securing IoT
[7] n/a
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
OAuth 2.0
[8] n/a
http://oauth.net/2/
OpenID Foundation
[9]
http://openid.net/foundation/
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Regardless of the format, the Service Ecosystem acts as the nexus of functionality and
communication for each core facet of the overall IoT technology. All other ecosystems are
dependent on the Service Ecosystem for hierarchical authentication, connectivity to users,
availability, management, and other tasks critical to the day-to-day operation of IoT. To
accomplish these tasks, the Service Ecosystem is composed of any number of tiers required
to fulfil the goals of the infrastructure. Database clusters, application servers, application
proxy servers, and other types of infrastructure are example tiers that would be found in
many given deployments. As implied in the diagram below, the Network and Endpoint
Ecosystems are dependent on the core functionality of the Service Ecosystem.
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Some examples of modern Service Ecosystems include, but are not limited to:
While each of these sample environments might seem widely variant in their design,
topology, and implementation, they are based on the same theories regarding how
information flows in and out of an application.
All modern computing systems require a point of entry, known as a service access point, into
an applications infrastructure. The internal subsystems that create content and context for
that application must be able to process data from within secure, reliable environments and
networks. Data must be stored somewhere, then returned to the service layer which
responds or sends authorized commands down to various components within the same
ecosystem, or other ecosystems and their associated networks.
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Regardless of what technologies, modern or traditional, are used to implement this standard
framework, information will be processed, served, and authenticated using proven protocols
and technologies. While topologies and abstractions for processing environments have
subtly changed to fit with modern requirements for speed, computational power, and
storage, the technologies used to implement these innovations are, at their core, the same.
For example, each tier typically contains a proxy or firewall system that manages
connectivity to and from a set of servers of a specific type. Billing services will reside in a
Billing Tier. Application Servers reside in a tier specific to the application. Database services
must be managed within a Database Tier. These systems all work together based on the
ingress and egress rules that are applied at the proxy servers.
As a result, the security model for the Service Ecosystem can be easily broken down into a
set of components. These components will be discussed in this document.
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For example, consider the common components in building a simple service that is capable
of fielding queries and sending responses from and to endpoints, partners, and users. This
model should contain, but not be limited to, the following tiers:
Even if there is only one server in each tier, it is more architecturally effective to separate
each logical concept into its own tier. This also helps isolate one layer of technology from
other layers in the event of a compromise, or if the system needs to scale up to serve more
requests.
If a type of system is thought of from the perspective of a type of tier, it can be more easily
secured, scaled on-demand, decommissioned and sunsetted. The only requirement is an
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API that is versatile enough to be augmented or adjusted throughout the lifespan of the tier.
Defining this API is out of the scope of this document. However, recommendations regarding
high level security attributes of the API the organization either chooses or defines will be
discussed here.
In the example above, a slightly more complete tier description is provided. The only
augmentation that is needed to depict the tier is a proxy server. This proxy server is just a
descriptor representing the actual security technology that will be employed within the tier.
Regardless of whether the actual control is a hardware firewall, software firewall, Security
Groups, Access Control Lists (ACL), or another technology, there will be a component that
mandates ingress and egress controls on behalf of the tier.
When choosing or defining an API, the organization should consider existing specifications
that may resolve the concerns of the engineering team. The organization should consider
the following specifications:
For publicly accessible components, like the Service Front-End Tier, the only augmentation
the model needs is an additional security component for:
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While not exhaustive, a list of issues internal to the platform environment will be:
The most common form of attack in this model is the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack. This
attack presumes that there is either no peer authentication, one-sided peer-authentication, or
broken mutual authentication on the communications channel. An adversarys goal is to
impersonate one side of the conversation to force the peer to perform actions on the
adversarys behalf. This attack can be mitigated by enforcing mutual authentication, which
requires a well-defined Organizational Root of Trust, a Trusted Computing Base (TCB), and
a communications model.
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Other attacks are, for example, attacks against Forward Secrecy, encryption
communications analysis, and side-channel attacks. These must be mitigated using proper
cryptography protocols, algorithms, and standards.
These attacks are difficult and require access to networking infrastructure either internally to
an organization, in the core Internet infrastructure between an organization and its partners
or Endpoint Ecosystem, or at the infrastructure near Endpoints. The simplest and most
common attack is attempting to manipulate the network infrastructure of the Endpoint, such
as the Wi-Fi, Ethernet, or cellular network, to gain a position of privilege between the Service
and its peer.
Attacks against a single endpoints infrastructure are restricted to that endpoint, or the group
of endpoints available in that physical location. Attacks against core internet infrastructure
typically involve Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijacking, attacking a core router, or
abusing the Domain Name Service (DNS) infrastructure. These attacks would provide a
position of privilege more disassociated with a particular target, potentially allowing the
attacker to have access to target many systems at once. Attacks against internal networking
infrastructure require access to the internal network, which implies an insider attack or an
existing position of privilege inside a corporations environment, which may imply an already
deeper system compromise.
Regardless of which type of attack is utilized, this model is easy to mitigate using mutual
authentication, forward secrecy, and appropriate cryptographic protocols and algorithms.
Doing so will negate an attackers ability to abuse this infrastructure, or will skyrocket the
cost of this type of attack to a price point that is infeasible for the common attacker to
implement.
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Another Cloud or Container infrastructure attack presumes that the adversary has control
over a VM on the same physical server as the target VM. The adversary may then use
several methodologies to compromise other VMs on a physical server. They could:
Use a vulnerability in the VM infrastructure to break out of a Guest into a Host system
Use a side-channel attack to infer secret keys from another Guest VM
Consume excessive resources on the physical server to force a target VM to migrate
to a physical server that the attacker has more control over
Regardless of the attack model utilized, there is little that a business can do to guard against
this risk. Instead, the Cloud service provider must implement adequate functionality to
reduce the probability that an attacker can subvert the Cloud or Container infrastructure.
One way to reduce this risk is to implement a Container based architecture that limits each
container to one specific user and a unique cryptographic identity. While this is a highly
resource intensive activity, and may incur additional cost, it will mitigate the ability for an
adversary to abuse the VM infrastructure, to gain access to multiple users or multiple
services at once.
However, it is notable that this type of compromise is largely undetectable by the guest VM,
or an application running on top of it. Thus, metrics may be gathered that reveal anomalies
in the behaviour of a particular Cloud VM or Container, but it may be extremely difficult to
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identify whether or not a compromise actually occurred. This is because any adversary with
sufficient privilege at the host layer of the VM infrastructure would be able to manipulate the
guest to make it difficult for it to detect manipulation.
Attacks from guest to guest are exceptionally difficult to detect, even by the Cloud service
provider. It is important to note, however, that these attacks are largely theoretical in nature.
While side channel attacks are possible, whether they are practical is up for debate as these
attacks require a level of consistency in the underlying execution platform that is not
guaranteed in a real world environment. Furthermore, escalation attacks from guests to
hosts in a VM, container, or hypervisor environment are difficult to find and even more
difficult to exploit. This makes it much less likely that a vulnerability will result in exploitation
of a mass amount of guests, or a specific target.
Therefore, while this is a significant position of privilege for attackers, the likelihood of a
successful attack is low as the difficulty, cost, and opportunity make exploitation mostly
impractical.
The application presents the largest layer of complexity in any product or service, and
always contains the potential for an adversary to increase their privilege through multiple
tiers of technology. Therefore, while the goal of this document is to drive the focus of an
attack away from the network infrastructure, it is driving the focus largely to the one place
where success is far more likely.
To diminish the potential for attack, please review many of the well documented pieces of
literature on application security (for example the OWASP Secure Application Design Project
[5]), to implement the application execution architecture as securely as possible.
3.4 Privacy
While partner systems are designed to consume data/metrics or other user-centric
components to provide added value to the overall system, there is never a guarantee as to
the level of security implemented by the partner. Rather than simply pass information to a
third party, it is necessary to evaluate what types of data should be handed over, what the
tangible return should be, and how that information shall be protected.
Legal liability can be diminished through contracts and insurance clauses, however, losing
customers can occur due to a third partys failure. Rather than risking such a loss of
business, an organization should evaluate third party engineering teams to determine what
level of security they apply to their infrastructure, applications, and APIs. If the level of
security is not sufficient, it is recommended to look for alternative partners.
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their structure, and are difficult for software to parse correctly. Advertising networks are an
interesting channel for the distribution of malware. Content Distribution Networks (CDNs)
also represent potential channels for malware distribution. Any system that offers complex
multimedia types, or bundles of code (either web or executable) for the purposes of
rendering dynamic information, can traffic malware.
Therefore, it is imperative that the business evaluate the different types of technological
offerings that will be passed through a particular channel. The business must decide what to
allow and what is too excessive to hand off to their customers. For example, an advertising
firm may want to traffic Java code to client systems over a proxy service application offered
to partners by the IoT business. The business will need to decide whether the client systems
running on certain environments are more susceptible to attack from Java technology. If this
is found to be true, the business may want to disallow Java, but allow other technology, such
as Hypertext Mark-up Language (HTML) to pass through.
Since malware comes in many forms, ranging from polymorphous file types, to Adobe Flash,
Java, and multimedia exploits, there is no single uniform way to guarantee the end-users
safety. A simple solution would be for the engineering team to enforce a policy on what
technologies are used over their channels, and how their users will be impacted. Monitoring
subsystems can be put into place, as well as sandboxes, to ensure that any object rendered
on a client system is less subject to abuse.
While these are excellent ways to share technology across platforms, engineers must
ensure that technology is not inadvertently consuming credentials that can be used to abuse
permissions not expressly granted to a third party service. For example, certain platform
APIs allow the constraining of permissions to a class that is either accepted or denied by the
user. This allows the user to tune the experience to one that is suitable for their specific
privacy needs. If the platform is unable to offer granular security permissions, then it should
list what technologies it does want access to.
It is necessary for the engineering team to request of their partners that the offering enable
granular permissions to ensure that revocation of a service does not inadvertently allow a
window of exposure of that users data that continues on even after the subscription is
revoked.
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Furthermore, the organization must be able to discern whether their endpoint architecture is
being subverted. This enables the organization to react to a device that has been cloned into
multiple instances of the same device. This could be done by an unscrupulous manufacturer,
or an adversary trying to impersonate a particular user.
Review the following recommendations for assistance on using the Service to combat
cloning:
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communications security. What is most important about this abstraction is evaluating how
trustworthy the communications channel is for user authentication.
For example, if the trustworthiness of an endpoint is low because there is no endpoint TCB,
or a weak endpoint TCB implementation is used, the user authentication mechanism that
relies on endpoint software/firmware to run cannot be trusted. This means that any user
authenticating through an endpoint device cannot be considered authenticated.
From a different perspective, a well architected endpoint TCB can poorly authenticate the
end-user if the authentication scheme is easily bypassable. Thus, the service ecosystem
must rely on the endpoints trustworthiness as well as the authentication mechanisms
implementation to ensure the service ecosystem can make guarantees about whether the
correct user is logged into the system.
Consider the following recommendations for assistance in dealing with these complexities:
Resolving this issue requires the ability to inspect behaviour on the endpoint, the network
layer, and the service ecosystem. However, if the right infrastructure, services, and
partnerships are not built to gather these data points, the organization wont have the
information required to make a determination as to whether there is a problem, or whether a
problem is related to security or reliability.
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For example, a cellular-enabled endpoint that constantly connects to and disconnects from
the mobile network in a frantic loop should be forcibly disabled until the erratic behaviour is
resolved. Another useful example is a compromised endpoint that an adversary is using to
try and attack back-end services. In this scenario, the back-end services should disallow the
abusive endpoint from reaching the services at all.
How to handle each scenario is up to the IoT Service Provider, and depends on their
business goals, and how incidents should be handled. To assist with developing these
guidelines, consider the following recommendations:
4.5 How Can I Determine Whether a Server or Service Has Been Hacked?
While endpoint anomalies are more esoteric and require a vast amount of behavioural
analytics to catch a majority of attacks, the service ecosystem is more straight forward.
Services and servers are deployed within an environment that is tightly controlled by the IoT
Service Provider or their partners that manage the cloud or server infrastructure. Thus, the
organization and its partners can use readily available monitoring and diagnostic systems to
identify and contain potential problems.
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Regardless of the administrative need, the interface should be restricted-access to limit the
ability for adversaries to interact with or abuse the technology. Consider the following
resources:
4.8 How Can the Service Architecture Limit the Impact of a Compromise?
One fascinating attribute of an IoT network is its unique ability to attach services to specific
consumers. In web services, each user must be given the ability to interact with the service
from any type of device or, potentially, from anywhere in the world. This is not true of IoT
technology. IoT technology typically requires a specific endpoint device to interact with IoT
services. Because of this difference, server ecosystem architects can leverage the one-to-
one relationship between endpoints and consumers to restrict an endpoints access to back-
end data.
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Consider the scenario where an endpoint is pushing sensor metrics to a back-end service. In
a micro-service architecture, the service ecosystem may deploy a specific micro-service or
uni-kernel to handle a particular consumer. Using this architecture, the engineer can ensure
that the micro-service is provisioned only with the resources and access capabilities required
to deliver data and services specific to the individual consumer.
This means that if a service is compromised, and the endpoint is the only technology that
can communicate with that specific service, there is zero additional benefit to compromising
that service as the access gained from the compromise will be limited to the resources that
would already be available to the endpoint. In essence, there is a zero sum gain from the
attack.
4.9 How Can The Service Architecture Reduce Data Loss During a
Compromise?
Another interesting attribute of IoT architecture is the reduction of data loss. This is similar to
how services can be isolated to a specific user. Data can also be isolated to a specific user
once the user has been authenticated. However, data storage cannot easily be implemented
on a per-user basis because of the expense of database and storage infrastructure.
Instead, unique tokens should be provisioned to services that then act on behalf of a specific
user within the storage infrastructure. This way, an attacker with access to the data storage
environment may be able to connect to the service, but should not be able to interact with,
retrieve, or alter user data other than the user that has been compromised.
From the perspective of the network layer, reducing the flow of traffic from the server
ecosystem out to the Internet is also a requirement. Egress controls force an adversary to
traffic intellectual property or customer data through specific channels. This can either
increase the difficulty of moving large amounts of data, or force it through communications
layers that can detect and cut off communication during incidents.
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4.10 How Can the Service Architecture Limit Connectivity from Unauthorized
Users?
A benefit of leveraging common IoT architectures is restricting the ability for unauthorized
Internet users to directly connect to back-end services. Most web applications do not have
this luxury, and must be available for public use. In IoT, however, because the endpoint is
the entity that must connect to a particular service, Virtual Private Network (VPN) can be
used to restrict who has access to back-end services. This can be implemented over
standard Internet protocols, or can be implemented using mobile services, such as the
Private APN. Review the following recommendations for more information:
For more information on reducing the potential for remote exploitation, please see:
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To start the discussion within your organization, please review the following
recommendations:
As a result, entirely new models for the availability of services have been built to combat this
threat. Consider the following recommendations when building out the service ecosystem:
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5 Critical Recommendations
When developing a secure endpoint, the following recommendations should always be
implemented. The following critical recommendations define a secure endpoint architecture.
Without these recommendations, the endpoint will have an incomplete security profile that
will be abused by an adversary.
A TCB can be built and deployed for any given class of system, such as Mobile Equipment
(smartphones), IoT Endpoints, and even servers living in a Service Ecosystem. TCBs are all
composed of similar technologies. Yet, depending on the class of system, those
technologies may take on very different characteristics. For example, bootstrapping a TCB in
a cloud server will look vastly different than bootstrapping an endpoint.
Building a TCB in a Service Ecosystem means defining the way an application image shall
be rolled out. An image in this context represents the raw binary data that comprises an
application executable, its configuration files, and its metadata. These things together are
commonly referred to as an application image, or simply image. In most modern Service
Ecosystems, systems will be replicated, powered up, or spun down on demand to reactively
scale with changes in the computing environment. This means that a TCB must define a way
to allow systems to scale effectively while maintaining a persistent security model.
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5.1.1 Risk
Without a well-defined Trusted Computing Base, computing platforms are unable to verify
that it is currently running in a configuration approved by the engineering team. This is
important as the application subsystem must be able to determine if it has been
compromised by an adversary. A TCB can be used to remediate this risk, as well as provide
a security layer for all network communications.
Build or acquire, for example, a Hardware Security Module (HSM) to store the
organizational root secret
Generate a root secret and/or certificate
Ensure the private facet of the secret is stored securely
Generate a set of one or more signing keys to be used for Tier TCB signing key
Sign the public facet of the signing key with the organizational root
Ensure these keys cannot be used without authentication and authorization from the
business and engineering leads
Every time a new Tier system is defined, its unique cryptographic key or certificate can now
be signed by the signing key. If another system connects to this new system, it can validate
the identity of the system by verifying the chain of trust defined by the organizational root.
It will cryptographically validate that the messages were signed by the public key
representing the system. Then, it will verify the signature the signing key generated of that
systems unique public key. Then, the client should verify that the signing key was indeed
the signing key authenticated by the organizational root.
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Because each set of certificates or secrets is restricted to fewer and fewer individuals in the
organization, and the policies and procedures defined should restrict who can use those
secrets and when, each level of trust should increase as the client descends through the root
chain.
A service must be defined that presents authentication capabilities to authorized peers within
the Service Ecosystem. For example, authentication using the certificate or secret chain
cant be used on its own to guarantee security. A service must be made available that
verifies whether certificates have been revoked, or are currently valid. Another service may
need to be used to authenticate the identities of servers or services with a short lifespan,
depending on the requirements of the underlying infrastructure.
5.2.1 Risk
The risk of not using an organizational root of trust is that any compromise to a single key
can result in compromise of the entire ecosystem. By separating the organization into a
hierarchy, and deploying separate keys for the hierarchy, keys can be cycled at regular
intervals and according to the priority of the application or sub-organization the key relates
to.
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Define an API that allows the application to cryptographically identify itself to its peers
Consider utilizing an existing API defined by a trusted industry leader
Define how the application will authenticate Endpoints, Service Peers, and Partners
Define what the applications configuration should look like
Enforce each different application to have a unique identity, especially applications
running on separate tiers
While it may seem intuitive that an application should cryptographically identify itself to its
peers, and it may not need an API to do so, the process in production is slightly non-intuitive.
This is because in the bootstrap model, one must consider how the cryptographic identity is
provisioned to the application. How does the application acquire its identity? Is the identity
acquired securely? What is the process for revoking secrets that the identity will use in the
event the secrets must be updated or altered?
Use the Organizational Root of Trust to define trust models for each Tier deployed in the
overall ecosystem. This will allow each separate application to have a unique cryptographic
identity. This will provide peers with the ability to differentiate between a database service
and an application service, for instance.
5.3.1 Risk
Without a well-defined Bootstrap Model, the system will have no way of verifying each layer
it requires to operate. In essence, there is no layering of trust on each facet of the overall
technology. This lack of trust layers introduces complexity that can result in gaps that may
be abused by adversaries.
DDoS-resistant infrastructure
Load-Balancing infrastructure
Redundancy systems
Web Application Firewalls (optional)
Traditional Firewalls
These additional technologies should be placed in front of the applications tier to ensure that
it cant be manipulated by public attackers. While the communication security model will
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remediate or mitigate the potential for an anonymous third party to access the system, these
technologies will diminish the ability for the adversary to make the system unavailable.
Front-end security should be applied to all protocols implemented by the services. For
example, if the service is available over IPv4 and IPv6, the same security constraints should
be applied to the service over both protocols. If a service is accessible over TCP as well as
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), the security constraints should be applied to
both of those protocols as well. Ports that do not offer public services pinned to the IoT
product or service should not be accessible.
Ensure that both ingress and egress filtering are managed, whenever possible. While
ingress filtering stops a range of attacks, any attack against a publicly accessible service can
still result in a compromise of the service ecosystem. Egress filtering is imperative, at this
point, to ensure that a compromised component of the service ecosystem cannot be used by
an attacker to move laterally within the ecosystem. In addition, egress filtering helps to
complicate the ability for attackers to exfiltrate critical data from the ecosystem to adversary-
controlled servers, leaving more time for administrators to identify and isolate the attacker.
Several organizations offer these services in a simple API model that can be dropped into a
given technology. This allows the technology to be used with little effort. Not much
engineering effort is required beyond signing up and configuring the application within the
service providers system. Consult with your service provider to determine the best way to
implement their security technology for your environment.
Please consider using material from the following organizations to assist with this
recommendation:
5.4.1 Risk
Secure infrastructure for public-facing services and applications is imperative due to the
volatile nature of the Internet. Random DDoS attacks occur often, and for little reason. DDoS
services can be purchased in the underground market for several hundred dollars. Thus,
adversaries of the business, or a businesss customer, will not be the only perpetrator of
such attacks. Random attacks can occur just to see if it is possible to take a system down. It
is better to be prepared against such attacks to ensure that critical IoT services are not
unexpectedly brought down. Availability is a critical component of an IoT product or service.
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is not large enough, nor designed to be made available long term, for the application to use
these technologies as persistent storage. In addition, these systems may be defined as on-
demand entities, and may have no semblance of centralization. In other words, there is no
way for the other systems to define which system has enough storage for persistent use.
This is why central storage systems are imperative, and why they must be carefully secured.
Since storage systems must be made accessible to any given temporary system in this type
of environment, any short-lived server or service that becomes compromised will have
access to a persistent storage entity (or Tier) that is used by many other servers or services.
This is often an effective way adversaries can laterally (or potentially, vertically) compromise
any given network.
To restrict this, each server or service should have access to persistent storage, but should
store information based on the application it represents, and, more importantly, the unique
Endpoint, Partner, or User that the application is acting on behalf of. The last part of this
point is the most essential point, as enforcing persistent storage access on behalf of a given
identity limits the short-lived server or services access to data.
In other words, an adversary that has compromised short-lived system can only affect the
data stored on behalf of the identity tied to that same short-lived system. If that system only
has access to a single identitys data, the adversary cannot use this systems compromise to
migrate laterally to other accounts. They are restricted to accessing information for that
single identity. This significantly limits the adversarys ability to leverage a vulnerability into a
significant exploit of the system.
5.5.1 Risk
If a secure persistent storage model isnt defined, there will be no architecture that enforces
unique per-user attributes to be securely separated from other assets. The result can be that
any compromise of a token that grants an adversary access to a storage device may result
in the compromise of multiple users data. A persistent storage model, however, can isolate
the compromise to one single user, or a single storage technology with encrypted data. In
either case, the scope of the compromise is significantly reduced, granting the organization
more time to react and combat the threat to both users and the business.
To accomplish this, identify how the administrative team will communicate with each system
in each tier. There should be authentication boundaries, such as VPNs, that separate
disparate systems from each other. Ensure the administrative team must authenticate
through each tier.
Also, identify how the administrator will interact with the system. Can the system be
snapshotted, akin to a VM? Is a terminal used? Is a remote Secure Shell (SSH) used to
interact with the system? Are there APIs for monitoring and analysis of system metrics, such
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as CPU usage, disk usage, and network usage? Can those be used to troubleshoot or
identify anomalies?
Regardless of the model, there are certain things that must be defined:
5.6.1 Risk
Environments without a well architected path for administrative access typically end up using
ad-hoc means to access systems in production. This often leads to administrative ports that
are open to public connectivity, or services that offer diagnostics, but are not restricted from
being used by third parties. A clear administrative model reduces the potential avenues
attackers can take to gain privileged access to critical IoT resources.
This obviously takes multiple levels of monitoring and consolidates the information into a
resource that can be streamed to an oversight team. There are several professional
applications that provide this technology, and convert the metrics into visual systems usable
for IT professionals and system engineers.
Anomalies that indicate adversarial behaviour may include, but are not limited to:
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business providing the monitoring system to determine how to capture and interpret metrics
in a way that is most effective for the specific implementation.
Please consider using material from the following organizations to assist with this
recommendation
5.7.1 Risk
Systems monitoring technology is a key attribute of the IoT security model. Without
monitoring, there is no way to determine if a vulnerability has been found in critical service
components. Monitoring allows administrators to quickly diagnose pain points in service and
infrastructure, and can assist in differentiating between security incidents and software bugs.
This may be difficult if a container-based environment is used where cloned applications are
running with a vulnerable configuration. The application system must be able to detect a
reboot or update event, where the application connection is handed off eloquently to
another system in the Cloud, or the user is forcibly logged out, to permit the update to occur.
No matter what the execution model is, however, the engineering team must be able to
capture metrics in a way that allows for forensic analysis. These policies and procedures
must be set in stone and approved by the legal (and possibly the insurance team) to validate
whether the information is contained in a way that is suitable for Law Enforcement Officers
(LEO). Compliance will assist in ensuring the business is not only complying with local and
federal law, but is providing samples of a compromise that can be used in court.
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Once the samples are captured, each aspect of the overall system should be assessed for
logs, metrics, and other data that can corroborate to the event in question. This data should
all be captured and stored in a secure system for legal review.
Please consider using material from the following organizations to assist with this
recommendation:
5.8.1 Risk
Organizations that lack an incident response model will take far more time to organize their
resources, identify compromised systems, quarantine those systems, and review the
systems for information. This also significantly slows the efforts that should be made to patch
and restore a given system. This unpreparedness grants adversaries a large window of
opportunity to leverage one compromise into lateral or vertical movement within a given
environment. This may result in a significantly larger compromise due to the increased
response time. Organizations should be prepared to respond to an incident almost
immediately to reduce the amount of time an adversary has to control critical portions of the
service.
For example, if an application has gathered information from an Endpoint regarding the
output of a particular action, and there is a storage fault that disallows the application from
solidifying the output of that data in persistent storage, the application can:
Engage both the engineering and business leadership to determine how a failed or
compromised application should recover, especially in the context of user activity.
For systems that have been provably compromised by an adversary, there must be a model
in place for validating that the application or system has been sufficiently patched prior to
recovery. Without this policy and procedure set defined, a vulnerable system may simply be
redeployed into the Service Ecosystem, facilitating further compromises.
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5.9.1 Risk
Recovery models ensure that information, applications, and configurations are restored
correctly. Without a restoration model, the team may unintentionally redeploy vulnerable
subsystems to servers or infrastructure. Also, tainted data that could have been manipulated
by an adversary in a database or storage environment could be replicated across multiple
systems, unintentionally propagating malware or simply altered data. Recovery processes
reduce the ability for adversaries to abuse weaknesses in the recovery of an incident, which
adds to an already expensive event.
This process helps guarantee that all technologies are revoked and decommissioned in such
a way that an adversary cannot take on the identity of, or use the facilities of, the given
technology. For example, a simple case is a domain for a particular product after a
businesss acquisition by a parent company. If the product is renamed, and the domain is
migrated to the parent companys domain, an adversary may be able to take ownership of
the now defunct domain. If the adversary can issue cryptographic certificates for that domain
and still interact with deployed technology under that old domain, there will be a significant
gap in security caused by a lack of procedure in the sunsetting of that product or service.
5.10.1 Risk
A lack of a sunset process can result in both Endpoints and services being compromised by
competitors or adversaries. This is possible legally because if an organization releases
access to certain objects, such as domain names, phone numbers, and other renewable
services, an adversary or competitor has the right to acquire those objects, even if it seems
unethical. This may open devices or services up to unscrupulous abuse or even malicious
behaviour.
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policy on data security, but will help define the level of security Partner organizations apply
to the businesss data, their own data, and customers data.
While this process should be investigated and tailored to the organization, most data security
classification policies should start out with the following classes:
This will allow the organization to not only build technical policy, but enact business policy
that supports the technical requirements. This makes it easier for the engineering team to
hand off these requirements onto partners and internal organizations that would seek to
break the policy, either intentionally or unintentionally.
Once the security classifications have been standardized, it is important to evaluate how the
security classification model can be affected by privacy requirements of the business and its
users. The organization must take the time to apply a privacy model to the security
classifications, to give meaning to users data, and help protect their privacy in the event that
a Partner wants access to specific resources that could put users at risk of exposure. By
contextualizing privacy in the context of security classifications, Partners will need to seek
approval by the business leadership and users, when Partners want to acquire certain types
of privacy-centric data. The users must have the option to guard their privacy-centric data,
and must be able to limit the exposure of their data to third parties.
5.11.1 Risk
Classifying models for security is imperative toward architecting solutions that use security in
an effective manner. In order to protect information, that information must be quantified so
that appropriate controls can be formulated based on corresponding policies and
procedures. Without these models, engineers tend to implement security either too intensely,
or not at all, depending on their perception of the risks involved. The entire team, including
both engineers and business leaders, should identify what data means to the business and
how it should be secured within an appropriate range of cost-effective controls.
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While this document will not attempt to model all variations of data that may be relevant to a
specific organization, certain types may be as follows:
Users
Actions
Images
Editable documents
Personally-Identifiable Information
Protected Health Information
A piece of information may be attributed one or more types. But, the data itself should be
attributed only one security class. While the type identifies what the data represents and how
it should be processed, the security class will represent how, where, and when the
information can be used, and to whom it may be shared.
Defining the various types of data and attributing classifications to them is a long-winded
process. Doing so sets an organizational standard for the business and allows the
engineering team to execute technical controls around the data and its classifications. This
greatly assists the engineering and business leadership teams later when negotiating with
Partners over how data can be shared and processed.
5.12.1 Risk
As with security classifications, controls cannot be implemented around data without
quantifying what that data is, and what relationship that data has to the business. These
classes define how the information should be used within the system, and what protections
must be applied to the data in order to maintain an appropriate security posture. Without
these classes, engineers have a tendency to apply too stringent or too weak of security
measures. Security measures should be agreed upon by the engineering team and business
leadership, to balance the controls with the importance of the data to the business.
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6 High-Priority Recommendations
High priority recommendations represent the set of recommendations that should be
implemented, but only if the endpoint architecture requires it. For example, not all endpoint
architectures require tamper resistant product casing. These recommendations should be
evaluated to determine if the business case deems them a requirement.
To accomplish this, have a similar GUI that describes granular authorization capabilities, and
how they will be distributed to Partners. Allow the user to grant access, or revoke access, to
certain capabilities on demand. Ensure that revoked capabilities take action immediately, to
diminish the potential for abuse.
The system must be heavily monitored to ensure that Partners do not take actions that they
are not allowed to take. Granular control of the authorization model should allow users to
configure when Partners have access to certain capabilities, and how often. Attributes like
this will improve whether a user can take control of their system from a potentially abusive,
or compromised (hacked), Partner.
6.1.1 Risk
Without an Authorization Model, third parties will not have restricted access to a users
capabilities. This may allow a rogue or compromised third party to acquire full access to a
users technology or data. By creating an authorization model, access is restricted to only
the attributes that a user will allow. This enables the user to have greater control over what
capabilities and data are made available to third parties, and reduces the risk of the IoT
Service Provider by mitigating the potential for widespread compromise.
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For example, the RC4 algorithm was recently discovered to have significant security flaws. If
a patch can be securely distributed to clients configured to use RC4, that replaces RC4 with
AES-256, then RC4 becomes less of a concern. If mutual authentication is performed using
a more resilient technology, such as Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange and
asymmetric keys, or a UICC security token, the patch can be verified without using the
vulnerable cryptographic algorithm.
Passwords and pins used by a user or endpoint should never be passed over the network in
plaintext, even if the communications channel is secured through encryption. Instead, the
cryptographic hash of the password or pin should be used, to ensure that any
misconfiguration in the cryptographic tunnel does not expose the password, itself. The hash
should be generated by the password and at least one unique one-time token. While it is
common for this token to be taken from the network session, it is more secure to take the
value from a rolling code stored on both the endpoint and the service infrastructure. This
way, an attacker with a position of privilege on the network cannot seed the hash with
beneficial values, which may result in a forced-signing attack.
Please review the following guides and references for more information on this topic:
6.2.1 Risk
Properly deploying a solution with a cryptographic architecture ensures that the algorithms,
protocols, and secrets utilized all fall within the current recommendations. In addition, the
recommendations change over time. Without a cryptographic architecture it will be more
difficult to identify all of the technologies that have deprecated, which creates an opportunity
for gaps in security.
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This includes Endpoints that have not yet been provisioned by the system, as the hardware
fabrication and personalization process should configure the hardware adequately enough
that it may be authenticated as a business-deployed resource.
Mutual authentication
Confidentiality
Integrity
A root of trust must be used to ensure that each entity in the communications model is
authorized by the same organization as the peer. This helps to ensure that all entities have
been provisioned and authorized by one central organization. The technology used to
ensure this root of trust may be centralized (similar to TLS certificates) or decentralized
(similar to IoT models based on Bitcoin blockchain, for example IBM/Samsungs ADEPT
project, Tilepay, and others). Regardless, one central business must be the owner of the
model, and guard the provisioning system.
Provisioning and revocation must be a part of the communications model, to help guarantee
that any compromised secret or identity can be removed from the system with minimal effort.
Technologies such as Online Certificate Security Protocol (OCSP) help with this process.
The communications protocol must employ a technology that mitigates the potential for
compromising communications from the past. This is done by creating ephemeral
asymmetric cryptographic keys that are used to exchange a communications secret. If a
certificate is compromised, the ephemeral secret will not be. This ensures that storing
encrypted messages for a long period of time will not later result in an adversary decrypting
them if the certificate private secret is ever compromised or exposed.
The challenge with communications security is in the implementation and longevity of the
technology. Encryption algorithms can be selected that are held in a high degree of
confidence by authoritative entities, diminishing the potential for failure.
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Please consider using material from the following organizations to assist with this
recommendation:
6.3.1 Risk
Communications security is the cornerstone of IoT. Without communications security, there
is no guarantee that embedded devices are communicating with the correct back-end
services. This is imperative for critical services that guide, configure, and send commands to
devices such as telematics, medical devices, and industrial control systems. Without
communications security, there are no guarantees that commands are being sent to the
correct endpoint. Enforce communications security to ensure that messages are being sent
to and received from the intended peer.
Evaluate whether the authentication technology will create meaning at the application layer,
for authentication purposes. If the token can be used as a security store, determine whether
the device can be used as an authentication layer for the physical Endpoint to build a TCB
using the token.
While many network operators enforce network-based authentication, granting access to this
API to authenticate either users or Endpoints is a fairly new technology. Evaluate whether
the Network Operator you are working with creates a meaningful experience in this space. If
so, consider using this technology as more than a network layer authentication token, as it
may be easier to utilize one security store technology, instead of multiple technologies.
6.4.1 Risk
When network authentication services incorporate trust anchors such as the UICC, not
utilizing these services to secure the application layer will limit the ability for the application
to reliably authenticate users and will increase the expense of the underlying Endpoint
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platform. This increases the cost of deployment and also decreases the information available
to the organization from the Network Operator.
To accomplish this, identify the services that should be accessible to the surrounding
environment. Define whether the environment the server will live in will be public or private,
and what that means in the context of server security. Determine whether each service
running on the server should be accessible to the public, or whether only authenticated
clients must connect to the service.
Evaluate the lifecycle of the operating system that will run on the server. Determine how to
properly manage software updates to ensure that security patches will be quickly deployed
and committed to servers working in production. Evaluate a roll-back model in the event that
updates fail or cause unexpected issues with production services, as some library or
application updates may result in unintended side effects.
Finally, evaluate the sunsetting model of the provisioned server to determine the most
secure way to remove assets from the system. This includes system logs that may be
required for assessing anomalous service or client behaviour.
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r3.pdf
6.5.1 Risk
Server provisioning is an imperative part of the overall security of an IoT environment.
Without it, the organizations control over the server architecture will be substantially
weakened. This may result in gaps in security due to a lack of architecture specification.
Without a specification, the organization cannot review whether the deployed technologies
adhere to modern best practices. In addition, improving these technologies will require
investigation of each deployed system to evaluate the deltas between deployed assets. This
is inefficient and a high concern in the event that a critical security update needs to be
deployed. If there is no consistency and no architecture to define the services, there will be
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no way to easily track which systems require immediate attention without manually checking
each one.
For each layer of the execution platform, define a network resource such as a unique
URL for the new application image
Generate a signing key for each specific layer
For all new, authorized versions of each layer, generate an image of that layer
Include metadata describing the image (version, timestamp, identity, etc.) in the layer
image
Sign the layer image with the signing key
Make the image, the signature, and the public key available, possibly via the unique
network resource, or through a update service
When a new system is deployed it should:
This recommendation implies that a patch management process should be used to maintain
services and technologies within the infrastructure.
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r3.pdf
6.6.1 Risk
Without a well-defined update model, services and applications risk compromise through
abuse of the update procedure. Adversaries may be able to inject custom applications into
the update process and deploy their own software onto Cloud systems and other servers. If
the communications security infrastructure is not secured, this can easily be performed
simply by manipulating network services such as Domain Name Service (DNS). More
advanced attacks against routing, such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) attacks, have
been implemented many times in the past to compromise insecure services.
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that breach the technological controls or policies set in place to guard users data and
privacy.
To accomplish this, the engineering team must define monitoring and logging technologies
that apply to security classifications and not simply user data. This will allow an auditing trail
to apply not only to information, but to the classification of that information. This will help the
organization defend itself in the event that user information is exposed. The organization will
be able to show that its security classifications, and the technical controls put in place to
manage those classes, managed, stored, and disseminated the data according to policy.
It is beneficial that the organization use the monitoring and logging technology to prove when
a Partner has broken the rules of the security classifications. The leadership should, at that
point, decide whether or not the Partner should be subject to fines, dismissal, or another
consequence.
6.7.1 Risk
Without a breach policy, there are few legal guards to protect the organization from liability of
data that has been exposed by a third party. If the business is the source for the exposed
data, the third party may have lost the data, but the business is liable for the data it hands off
to its partners.
Breach policies ensure that partners must uphold a level of security adequate for the data
that they are being provided. Any breach of that security helps to removes the liability from
the IoT Service Provider as long as the IoT Service Provider follows its own security
requirements. Then, it is up to the partner to adhere to the policy.
These policies should be reviewed by legal and insurance teams to ensure that the models
do, in fact, reduce the liability of the organization by adhering to stringent security policies
and procedures. Some businesses, due to the nature of the products or services they offer,
may not be exempt due to regulations, legal statutes, or other issues.
Although, for usability, the engineering team may choose to collapse these two
authentication schemes into one if the user is provided with sufficient information that
describes to them the risks in utilizing this method of authentication. Such a method would
enable an authenticated users local application password to decrypt a local database
containing an authentication token that works on the remote service. This multi-step
authentication model may be sufficient for most users.
Regardless, the central Authentication Service must first authenticate the user to the local
application, then enforce policies and procedures that mandate how that authentication
token can be used, and for what period of time. Metrics should also be gathered to
determine if the user has migrated to an alternative computing platform, but is using the
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same token. Or, if the user has migrated to another location in a short period of time, but is
using the same token. Depending on the type and speed of movement, these metrics may
indicate a potential compromise of the token. At which point, the token should be invalidated,
and the user should be forced to log back in, potentially by using multi-factor authentication,
where applicable.
6.8.1 Risk
Due to the abuses possible in Endpoint systems, regardless of how secure the architecture
can be, authenticating a user without confirmation from a back-end system is always
unreliable. This presumes that the user has not updated their credentials, or can fragment
credentials across multiple types of devices. This is inefficient and may open up a gap where
a compromised device is using an older version of the users credentials.
For example, a fascinating attack includes the encoding of a null byte into messages that are
processed as strings by higher level languages. Some high level languages accept null
bytes as part of a binary string, rather than seeing it as a delimiter. When this binary string is
passed down to lower level libraries, the embedded null byte is interpreted as a string
delimiter, truncating the string to mean something entirely different than what the application
interpreted the string as. In the past, this has been a clever way to access file system
resources that would otherwise be unavailable to a particular user.
While there is an infinite number of variations for malicious input to take form, engineers do
not need to test for every possible case. Instead, the process is fairly simple:
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6.9.1 Risk
Systems that do not employ input validation are subject to an array of possible attacks
including issues referenced in the OWASP Top Ten such as SQL Injection (SQLi), and even
remote code execution attacks. Because the range of potential abuses is so wide, the risk
cannot be fully quantified here. Input validation is a critical attribute of any secure
application, whether it is a cloud service or an application running on an Endpoint.
In the first case, all data to be rendered by the presentation layer must be assessed prior to
it leaving the service layer. This will ensure that data encoded into the presentation layer, for
example, in JSON messages or encoded JavaScript, does not contain formatting that could
break or invalidate the presentation of the data. This means that any characters stored in the
system that, if rendered, could break the presentation model must either be filtered out or
encoded in such a way that they do not alter the presentation in unexpected ways.
A methodology for remediating this issue is either filtering restricted characters out, enforcing
an encoding on all characters so that the presentation of these characters does not alter the
GUI (the characters arent interpreted by a rendering engine as control codes), or simply not
displaying the message. While any of these methods work, some are more appropriate in
certain applications. Reviewing the message forum example, it would be just as bad if an
adversary were able to place scripts that other users can copy and execute without knowing
what they are doing. Therefore, instead of just rendering the information in a way that
doesnt inject HTML or other scripts into the presentation layer, the information should be
scrubbed so that other users are not affected.
In the case where data should not be presented back to the user, this does not relate to data
stored and rendered by an adversary. Rather, this issue relates to the manifestation of data
that isnt suitable for public consumption, and should be reserved for administrators and
engineers. For example, if an internal error is generated in processing information, that error
should not be rendered, with its full debug data, to the user. This may allow a user to identify
and instrument a bug for the purposes of exploiting weaknesses in the application. This
information should be internally logged, and a generic error should be raised to the user that
does not provide enough context for the user to abuse the bug. Even if the user can
reproduce the bug, the user should not be able to evaluate a differential in output from the
application that indicate improvements in the exploit methodology.
6.10.1 Risk
Output validation is a critical attribute of IoT security. Systems that do not perform output
validation risk exposure of critical user data, privacy related data, diagnostic data, verbose
error messages, and more. These messages may be used to expose user information or can
be used to create a reliable exploit against a networked service.
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The answer, however, is somewhere in between all the requirements of each group.
Passwords should be forcibly long, but should not be complex. While eight character
passwords used to be the norm, and some systems even allow 6 characters even at the time
this document is being written, the password length should be taken from the latest best
practice standard, but will likely far exceed even 8 characters. By enforcing a longer
password length, the complexity requirement is reduced. Instead of enforcing bizarre
assortments of various character sets, the user can simply remember a sentence. Because
they can choose to utilize white spaces, capitalization, numbers, and punctuation, the
complexity is automatically skyrocketed for any attacker applying brute-forcing.
Lets not forget, there are typically four ways an attacker will compromise a password:
Brute-forcing application passwords is then the most effective way an attacker can abuse
passwords. This potential is significantly diminished by a properly designed authentication
service. If one bad password has been guessed, the system should automatically start
increasing the amount of delay required between guesses. Then, a threshold must be
defined that limits the total number of attempts. If the attacker reaches this threshold, the
account should be locked, and two-factor authentication, or another model, should be used
for the user to unlock and verify their account. This type of security substantially reduces the
benefit of a network based attack, which brings us to the final point.
Malware on the client system is something that must be dealt with by the computing
platform, or by the user installing the appropriate combative technology. This is typically not
something that can be secured by the application, itself. Since there is little to nothing the
application can do to combat this risk, beyond enforcing 2FA, the application engineer will
have satisfactorily reduced the threat surface of password attacks against the authentication
system if this is an adversarys only viable course of action.
It must be noted, however, that the reward for implementing this recommendation is not
high. This is because no matter what technologies are used to reduce the potential for
attacking password authentication, passwords are, essentially, an intangible resource. They
are not physical tokens that can only be captured by a single individual. Rather, it is an
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abstract object that can be copied infinitely across computer systems and through visual
observation. Therefore, they are a significantly weak source of authentication that does not,
in any way, adequately indicate a particular user. Therefore, passwords, themselves, are a
weakness, and any technology using passwords is subject to the risks that passwords
inherently imply.
Passwords should never be hard-coded in the system. For endpoints, unique cryptographic
keys should be generated. Refer to the Endpoint document for more information on endpoint
provisioning. For services and user interfaces, the password should be defined by the user
when they register. The password, at that time, must adhere to strong password security
requirements. Never allow a user to utilize a default, weak, or poorly designed password.
Ensure that the user always has the ability to change their password at any time. Enforce
strong authentication requirements and communications security in order for the user to
change their password. Where possible, enable two-factor authentication (2FA) to verify the
identity of the user prior to allowing a password change. Always force a user to re-enter their
original password when they submit a new password to the system. This ensures that
another user hasnt usurped an open web application by taking advantage of an unlocked
laptop, or stolen a web application session token.
6.11.1 Risk
Systems that dont enforce adequate password controls risk the ability for adversaries to
easily guess passwords from users of the system.
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Generally, this application layer authentication will be facilitated by the same service.
However, information will be gathered from a separate resource. For example, it is best to
place user and administrative authentication data in separate databases. This ensures that if
there is a way to manipulate the database through the application layer (for example, using a
SQL injection), attackers may only move laterally through the user database. They may not
move vertically, elevating their privileges to administrator, without compromising the
database, itself. This is a significant improvement in organizational security.
Endpoint identities
Users
Administrator credentials
Partners
This will create a logical separation of duties for applications and infrastructure, but within
the same authentication API managed by the Organizational Root of Trust service.
Please consider using material from the following organizations to assist with this
recommendation:
6.12.1 Risk
Without a methodology for enforcing application layer authentication and authorization, there
is no way for the system to confirm the actions purported to be from a user are actually
authorized by that user. Implementing this recommendation ensures that each action is
traceable to an authenticated user and an authorization. These metrics can be stored and
later reviewed in the event that a compromise is suspected. Without these steps, there will
be no safeguards that minimize the risk of abuse.
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Yet, there are times when these technologies may not be sufficient in protecting service
infrastructure. Sometimes, firewalls and other network traffic protection systems fail. When
these systems fail, they often fail open. The reason for this is that if the system fails, traffic
must still be able to work, as traffic for other computing environments will be routed through
the infrastructure along with the IoT Service Providers traffic. Thus, traffic cannot suddenly
come to a stand-still. As a result, the system often fails open to allow as many services as
possible to continue working.
The engineering team should employ operating system hardening to ensure that the effects
of failed infrastructure do not result in a catastrophic security event. Instead, it simply means
that more connections can be made to existing service infrastructure.
For example, hidden services should not be placed behind technology such as firewalls.
Instead, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or other high-security protections can be used to
secure the services from adversaries.
Note that software firewalls carry an additional risk, in that they can be manipulated by a
savvy attacker. If a software firewall is used, any server infrastructure that is improperly
hardened may be manipulated by an attacker. In other words, if a public service running on a
server carries unnecessary privileges (such as super-user privileges) and is compromised,
the attacker will likely be capable of disabling the software firewall. Thus, the engineering
team must evaluate whether a software firewall is too high of a risk for the chosen
architecture.
6.13.1 Risk
Without employing strategies to compensate for failure in the network traffic security
systems, the environment will be subject to unnecessary attacks that could be easily
prevented with standard service hardening strategies.
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when a user enters a certain physical zone may be fingerprinted by sniffers that are
capable of receiving these messages as they are transmitted through the air. While it may
not be intuitive, this is a potential liability if an adversary can identify who is in a physical
location and where they are in that location. Network patterns should be assessed to
determine if there is a simple way that adversaries can turn transmission patterns into
actionable data.
Metadata has long been used by intelligence services to evaluate the context of messaging
systems without requiring a warrant or other legal access to encrypted data. Often, the
metadata is enough information for an organization to create actionable intelligence.
However, now hobbyists, criminal organizations, and curious users are able to use metadata
for tracking and other potentially nefarious purposes. As a result, it is more important than
ever to diminish the amount of metadata available to third parties. Where possible, limit the
amount of metadata to only enough information required for a communication peer to
evaluate whether the message is intended for them.
Along that line of thought, the hardware address of the communication module, and any
unique serial numbers, should be protected or randomized, if possible. For example, Apple
changed the iOS model for probing Wi-Fi access points. Instead of using the static hardware
address, they changed their technology to use a randomized hardware address, which
diminishes the potential for someone to track a users location based on Wi-Fi active scans.
IoT technology will function similarly, but will have a larger set of communications
technologies affected by this issue. Some technologies will not be capable of random
hardware address generation, such as cellular. But others, such as 802.15.4, Wi-Fi, and
Bluetooth, may be capable of this depending on the firmwares functionality.
6.14.1 Risk
While it should go without saying that communications security is a requirement, it is
sometimes confusing as to why it is a requirement. Communications security doesnt just
ensure that an adversary cant read data. It also ensures:
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7 Medium-Priority Recommendations
The medium-priority set of recommendations encompasses the set of recommendations that
are relevant depending on the design choices of the endpoint technology. For example,
enforcing operating system level security enhancements is only valid if there is an operating
system running on the endpoint. If the endpoint is composed of a monolithic kernel
application, or an embedded Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) with a single embedded
application, the recommendation may not apply. Where recommendations do apply to the
endpoint design, they should be implemented.
OWASP [5]
7.1.1 Risk
Applications that are deployed with a secure architecture can be subject to compromises
that cannot easily be traced back to a specific source. Tools and techniques for
compromising services and applications have become advanced in the past decade. Some
open source technologies, such as Metasploit, allow the development and integration of
custom exploits into an attack platform that can provide technologies to increase the stealth
of an attack.
A secure Application Execution Environment can combat this risk by securing the way
applications are ran, interact with each other, and the types of technologies that are used
during runtime. These attributes can not only lessen the likelihood of a compromise
occurring, they can add traceability and critical logging capabilities to track and diagnose the
abused vulnerability.
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This will allow the IoT business to more quickly identify whether a particular user or Endpoint
is either a threat, or has been compromised by an adversary. As a result, businesses may
react more effectively to pre-empt attacks against other areas of the businesss
infrastructure.
The complexity with this service comes from the network operators ability to provide the
intelligence in a meaningful timeline. If the network operator can only provide the intelligence
once the adversary has attacked the IoT business, then monitoring and logging systems
placed in the IoT businesss infrastructure should be able to detect the behaviour. However,
if the network operator is able to notify the business of adversarial behaviour at the network
layer, and can identify which individual subscriber has been emitting anomalous network
traffic, the business may be able to limit exposure of the IoT ecosystem by cordoning off that
single users traffic.
7.2.1 Risk
There are certain technologies that the IoT Service Provider will rely on that cannot be
monitored by the IoT Service Provider. One such technology is the communications network
that connects an Endpoint to the Service and Network Ecosystem. Without monitoring
services, the IoT Service Provider will not have a window into the events occurring within the
network, itself. Thus, if an application-level identity A is attempting to compromise a service,
the organization will be unable to identify that Endpoint B is actually the unit that has
connected to the communications network. This gap in information is critical, as the
organization may attribute the attack to identity A rather than a compromised Endpoint B.
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APN. This diminishes the potential for rogue or random wireless clients to connect to the
APN and access restricted services. In addition, it allows the organization to identify which
specific clients are behaving anomalously, which allows the organization to tie negative
behaviour to a specific piece of hardware, or a specific user.
Firewalling ensures that entities attached to the APN from both the client side (Endpoint
Ecosystem) and the service side (Service Ecosystem) are restricted from communicating by
using unapproved channels. This also restricts the ability for an Endpoint to abuse the APN
as a channel to the open Internet, and cordons off traffic to a specific set of approved
services.
Endpoint communications restrictions ensure that rogue endpoints are unable to attack other
endpoints by using the APN as a wide area network. Instead, all communication must pivot
through services approved by the organization. If desired, the organization can disallow
point-to-point communication entirely.
Monitoring services enhance the security improvements that will be made by the
organization in monitoring existing cloud or service infrastructure. By pairing those existing
monitoring services with the APN and network monitoring technologies offered by the
Network Operator, the organization can more easily track down the source of anomalous
behaviour. This enables the organization to more deeply inspect incidents that occur against
its endpoint or service infrastructure. For example, if the application layer indicates that User
A may be compromised, but User Bs equipment is making the authenticated connection to
the APN, the organization will be able to use the APN monitoring services to identify that
User B has potentially compromised User A, or an adversary has compromised both User A
and B.
Network Operators have additional services that can be layered on top of the services
described above. These services will help black-list bad actors in the network, monitor
specific users or sets of users, and can reroute certain types of traffic that may indicate
anomalies. Other options may be available. Engage the Network Operator to determine
which services are right for your organization.
While utilizing all of these services in concert may seem challenging, working with the
Network Operator will simplify the process, and make it simpler to integrate these offerings
into the businesss existing infrastructure. The complexity will come from utilizing the data
effectively, and requires an engineering team that is capable of processing and managing
the data in a reasonable fashion. Some services may incur an additional cost. Determine
what pricing model and services will work best for your organization.
7.3.1 Risk
Without a Private APN, an Endpoint device can connect to almost any service or technology,
including making direct connections to other Endpoints on the APN, or arbitrary service on
the Internet. Since this would allow a compromised Endpoint to interact with almost any
service on the Internet, and could turn the Endpoint into a practical target for acting as a
proxy for attacking more secure networks or services, this recommendation should be
enforced to restrict the ability for Endpoints to make arbitrary, unauthorized connections. It is
much more valuable to the business and to the security of the entire IoT ecosystem when
Endpoints are forced to connect only to approved services.
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While a data distribution policy can be highly descriptive, there are several key elements that
will help define a successful policy:
7.4.1 Risk
Data distribution policies enforce security requirements on partners who may not adhere to
the same level of security internally as the IoT Service Provider does. Since the IoT Service
Provider cannot control the security a partner has implemented in their internal services and
network, the IoT Service Provider can only enforce that data contributed to a partner is
trafficked in a secure manner. Without this definition, the partner can enforce insecure
configurations that may expose user data to adversaries while the data is still under the
control of the IoT Service Provider. By enforcing stringent security controls for the
communications channel, the IoT Service Provider proves it is doing everything it can do to
enforce security until the data is out of its control.
Does the data fit the format the Partner outlined for the data model
Is the data well-formed
Does the data represent a polymorphic object that could be misinterpreted by the
client
Will the data affect the way the client renders the presentation layer
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Will the data affect how the client interprets the presentation layer
Does the data entice or request the user to perform a behaviour that would weaken
security
Does the data spoof or impersonate a component (password input field) of the client
GUI
Reject any data that doesnt fit an approved model. Notify administration immediately on
detection of such data, and include as many metrics as possible regarding the origin and
format of the data. Log a sample, if possible, in a secure database.
7.5.1 Risk
Dynamically generated data from third parties could contain malware, inappropriate content,
or other undesirable data, either intentionally or unintentionally. Without an ingress filter
shaped toward the definition of the third party service, the organization can risk accidentally
allowing malware or other malicious content to reach the end user. This may result in system
compromises, or simply lost customers, due to the side effects of such data.
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8 Low-Priority Recommendations
Low priority recommendations encompass the set of recommendations that apply to risks
that are extremely costly to combat, or are unlikely to affect the endpoint design. While these
recommendations are valuable, and the information detailed within the recommendations is
important, the mitigation or remediation strategies discussed may be out of scope with
respect to the business. Evaluate each recommendation and determine whether the risks
described are relevant or important to the business and its customers. If the customers
require these risks to be addressed, apply the recommendations.
In other words, if exploited correctly, an adversary can elevate their privileges from one user
to another user by manipulating a hardware flaw in modern implementations of DRAM or
SRAM. Many modern implementations of DRAM and SRAM have been found provably
exploitable through this vulnerability. However, it requires the ability to execute code on the
local system in order to create the memory access sequences capable of triggering this bug.
And yet, it may be possible to trigger this type of behaviour remotely through runtime
languages such as sandboxed GoLang, Python, Erlang, and more. However, the
preciseness of these types of attacks has not yet been documented, and is highly
improbable to work effectively as an exploit.
This attack must be resolved at the hardware level. However, engineers can mitigate the risk
of abuse by disallowing clients from executing code, even through a virtual machine or
runtime, on a given service. By restricting this capability, engineers will be able to stop
adversaries from creating the memory access sequences that are required in this attack.
8.1.1 Risk
Without sufficient guards against this kind of attack, adversaries may be able to remotely
elevate privilege or execute arbitrary code against a target host. It should be noted, however,
that a successful attack requires an extremely deep knowledge of the hardware, operating
system, attack vector, and other factors that make this attack unlikely and rare.
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One major concern of deploying in virtual server environments is the ability for hosts to be
compromised, or for servers (virtual guests) to intercept the data of other guests running on
the same infrastructure.
While these attacks are valid concerns that should be evaluated by the IoT Service Provider,
they often take a large amount of skill and time to perfect. Thus, it is a possibility that an
attack may occur, but it will likely be a rare event. However, if the service infrastructure isn't
well guarded, it will be possible that adversaries may be able to compromise administrative
access to the virtual machines. This kind of a breach may not require a high amount of skill
to succeed.
One way to combat this issue is with server provisioning. This process will ensure that each
server is encoded with a unique set of cryptographic keys. If this process is followed, any
compromise to a single server can be limit to that single server.
8.2.1 Risk
The risk of not accommodating for this type of attack may leave the service infrastructure
vulnerable to many types of attacks. Server impersonation using keys accessible from
the service infrastructure, data exfiltration, privacy compromise, and user
impersonation may be possible.
This can come in the form of an authenticated API, or a GUI that allows simple Yes or No
controls on a general, and per-Partner basis.
8.3.1 Risk
Without the ability for users to control what data they contribute to an IoT Service Provider,
they run the risk of their data being exposed in the event of a security breach either at the
Service Provider, or one of the partners the Service Provider uses. Since certain users are at
much higher risk than others, each user should be able to tune their privacy restrictions
according to their personal needs. Making this interface available helps to ensure that the
capability is there. The user must take it upon themselves to adjust the controls to suit their
needs.
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It is important to note that the engineering team is not the only entity that must make this
kind of decision. The business leadership, the lawyer team, and the insurance team should
be involved in the determining the correct reaction in potentially dangerous scenarios.
Engineers must then encode the correct decision making process into the technology in a
verifiable and reproducible way.
This process is highly challenging as it demands the attention of the entire organization on
how the technology should react in critical scenarios. Trustworthiness is a challenging
attribute to apply to a piece of technology, especially an embedded technology.
8.4.1 Risk
Without an assessment model for false positives, engineers may spend too much time
analysing benign events while more important events are occurring. This may result in
increased risk of the metrics analysed by the organization do not provide clear direction as to
what types of events are occurring in production. This devalues the logging and monitoring
infrastructure, and negates the organizations ability to use these expensive resources to its
benefit.
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9 Summary
In summary, almost every security risk in an IoT product or service can be combatted by a
well-defined architecture, intelligence to identify risks before and during security related
events, and policies and procedures to handle such events. By analysing which high-level
security concepts are important to the IoT Service Provider, frequently asked security
questions can be reviewed. This should guide the engineering team toward which
recommendations are most relevant to resolve gaps in their security architecture.
Overall, every engineering team will face very similar risks. It is imperative that the
organization choose to share their concerns with their peers to build common a
knowledgebase for both risks and remediation strategies. Together, our organizations can
build both technology and knowledge to assist each other in building security into the future
of IoT.
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It is our intention to provide a quality product for your use. If you find any errors or omissions,
please contact us with your comments. You may notify us at prd@gsma.com
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Copyright Notice
Copyright 2017 GSM Association
Disclaimer
The GSM Association (Association) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept
any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document.
The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.
Antitrust Notice
The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Associations antitrust compliance policy.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction 5
1.1 Introduction to the GSMA IoT Security Guideline Document Set 5
1.2 Document Purpose 6
1.3 Intended Audience 6
1.4 Definitions 6
1.5 Abbreviations 8
1.6 References 9
2 The IoT Endpoint Security Challenge 11
2.1 Low Power Consumption 11
2.2 Low Cost 11
2.3 Long-Lived (>10 years) 11
2.4 Physically Accessible 11
3 The IoT Endpoint Model 12
3.1 The Lightweight Endpoint 12
3.2 The Complex Endpoint 13
3.3 The Gateway (or Hub) 13
3.4 The Overarching Model 14
4 The Security Model 15
4.1 Network Communications Attacks 15
4.2 Accessible Network Services Attacks 16
4.3 Console Access Attacks 16
4.4 Local Bus Communications Attacks 17
4.5 Chip Access Attacks 18
5 Frequently Asked Security Questions 19
5.1 How do we Combat Cloning? 19
5.2 How should I Secure the Endpoint Identity? 19
5.3 How do I Reduce the Impact of an Attack Against the Trust Anchor? 20
5.4 How do I Reduce the Probability of Endpoint Impersonation? 20
5.5 How do I Disallow the Ability to Impersonate Services or Peers? 20
5.6 How do I Disallow Tampering of Firmware and Software? 21
5.7 How do I Reduce the Possibility of Remote Code Execution? 21
5.8 How do I Disallow Unauthorized Debugging or Instrumenting of the
Architecture? 21
5.9 How should I handle Side-Channel Attacks? 22
5.10 How should I Implement Secure Remote Management? 22
5.11 How do I Detect Compromised Endpoints? 23
5.12 How do I Securely Deploy a Device Without a Back-End Connection? 23
5.13 How do I Ensure my Consumers Privacy? 23
5.14 How do I Ensure User Safety While Enforcing Privacy and Security? 23
5.15 What Issues Should I Not Expect To Resolve? 24
6 Critical Recommendations 25
6.1 Implement an Endpoint Trusted Computing Base 25
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction to the GSMA IoT Security Guideline Document Set
This document is one part of a set of GSMA security guideline documents that are intended
to help the nascent Internet of Things (IoT) industry establish a common understanding of
IoT security issues. The set of non-binding guideline documents promotes methodology for
developing secure IoT Services to ensure security best practices are implemented
throughout the life cycle of the service. The documents provide recommendations on how to
mitigate common security threats and weaknesses within IoT Services.
The structure of the GSMA security guideline document set is shown below. It is
recommended that the overview document CLP.11 IoT Security Guidelines Overview
Document [1] is read as a primer before reading the supporting documents CLP.12 [2] and
CLP.13 [3] (this document).
CLP.11
IoT Security Guidelines Overview
Document CLP.14
IoT Security
CLP.12 CLP.13
+ Guidelines for
Network
IoT Security Guidelines IoT Security Guidelines Operators
for IoT Service for IoT Endpoint
Ecosystem Ecosystem
Network Operators, IoT Service Providers and other partners in the IoT ecosystem are
advised to read GSMA document CLP.14 IoT Security Guidelines for Network Operators
[4] which provides top-level security guidelines for Network Operators who intend to provide
services to IoT Service Providers to ensure system security and data privacy.
Completing a GSMA IoT Security Assessment Checklist [19] will allow an entity to
demonstrate the security measures they have taken to protect their products, services and
components from cybersecurity risks.
http://www.gsma.com/iot/iot-security-assessment
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The scope of this document is limited to recommendations pertaining to the design and
implementation of IoT Endpoint Devices.
This document is not intended to drive the creation of new IoT specifications or standards,
but will refer to currently available solutions, standards and best practice.
This document is not intended to accelerate the obsolescence of existing IoT Services.
Backwards compatibility with the Network Operators existing IoT Services should be
maintained when they are considered to be adequately secured.
It is noted that adherence to national laws and regulations for a particular territory may,
where necessary, overrule the guidelines stated in this document.
IoT Service Providers - Enterprises or organisations who are looking to develop new
and innovative connected products and services. Some of the many fields IoT
Service Providers operate in include smart homes, smart cities, automotive, transport,
heath, utilities and consumer electronics.
IoT Device Manufacturers - provide IoT Devices to IoT Service Providers to enables
IoT Services.
IoT Developers who build IoT Service on behalf of IoT Service Providers.
Network Operators who provide services to IoT Service Providers.
1.4 Definitions
Term Description
Identifier of a network connection point to which an Endpoint device
Access Point Name attaches. They are associated with different service types, and in many
cases are configured per network operator.
A hacker, threat agent, threat actor, fraudster or other malicious threat to an
IoT Service. This threat could come from an individual criminal, organised
Attacker crime, terrorism, hostile governments and their agencies, industrial
espionage, hacking groups, political activists, hobbyist hackers,
researchers, as well as unintentional security and privacy breaches.
A network of remote servers on the internet that host, store, manage, and
Cloud
process applications and their data.
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Term Description
This Endpoint model has a persistent connection to a back-end server over a
Complex Endpoint long-distance communications link such as cellular, satellite, or a hardwired
connection such as Ethernet. See section 3.
Embedded SIM A SIM which is not easily accessible or replaceable, is not intended to be
removed or replaced in the device, and enables the secure changing of
profiles.
Endpoint An IoT Endpoint is a physical computing device that performs a function or
task as part of an Internet connected product or service. See section 3 for a
description of the three common classes of IoT devices, and examples of
each class of Endpoint.
The Internet of Things describes the coordination of multiple machines,
devices and appliances connected to the Internet through multiple networks.
These devices include everyday objects such as tablets and consumer
Internet of Things
electronics, and other machines such as vehicles, monitors and sensors
equipped with machine-to-machine (M2M) communications that allow them
to send and receive data.
Any computer program that leverages data from IoT devices to perform the
IoT Service
service.
The set of services, platforms, protocols, and other technologies required to
IoT Service
provide capabilities and collect data from Endpoints deployed in the field.
Ecosystem
See CLP.11 [1] for further information.
IoT Service Enterprises or organisations who are looking to develop new and innovative
Provider connected IoT products and services.
The operator and owner of the communication network that connects the IoT
Network Operator
Endpoint Device to the IoT Service Ecosystem.
A set of cryptographic policies and procedures that govern how identities,
Organizational Root
applications, and communications can and should be cryptographically
of Trust
secured.
Service Access A point of entry into an IoT Services back end infrastructure via a
Point communications network.
Subscriber Identity The smart card used by a mobile network to authenticate devices for
Module connection to the mobile network and access to network services.
In cryptographic systems with hierarchical structure, a trust anchor is an
Trust Anchor
authoritative entity for which trust is assumed and not derived.
A Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is a conglomeration of algorithms, policies,
and secrets within a product or service. The TCB acts as a module that
allows the product or service to measure its own trustworthiness, gauge the
authenticity of network peers, verify the integrity of messages sent and
Trusted Computing
received to the product or service, and more. The TCB functions as the base
Base
security platform upon which secure products and services can be built. A
TCBs components will change depending on the context (a hardware TCB
for Endpoints, or a software TCB for cloud services), but the abstract goals,
services, procedures, and policies should be very similar.
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Term Description
An environment which runs alongside a rich operating system and provides
Trusted Execution security services to that operating system. There are multiple technologies
Environment (TEE) which can be used to implement a TEE, and the level of security achieved
varies accordingly.
A Secure Element Platform specified in ETSI TS 102 221 that can support
multiple standardized network or service authentication applications in
UICC
cryptographically separated security domains. It may be embodied in
embedded form factors specified in ETSI TS 102 671.
1.5 Abbreviations
Term Description
3GPP 3rd Generation Project Partnership
AC Alternating Current
API Application Program Interface
APN Access Point Name
BT Bluetooth
CLP GSMAs Internet of Things Programme
CPE Customer Premises Equipment
CPU Central Processing Unit
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
eUICC Embedded UICC
FIB Focused Ion Beam
GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
GPS Global Positioning System
GSMA GSM Association
LAN Local Area Network
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
IoT Internet of Things
IP Internet Protocol
ISM Industrial, Scientific and Medical
MCU MicroController Unit
NVRAM Non-Volatile Random Access Memory
OMA Open Mobile Alliance
PAN Personal Area Network
PSK Pre-Shared Key
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
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Term Description
SSH Secure Shell
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
TCB Trusted Computing Base
TTL TransistorTransistor Logic
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
1.6 References
Ref Doc Number Title
[1] CLP.11 IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document
[2] CLP.12 IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service Ecosystem
[3] CLP.13 IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Endpoint Ecosystem
[4] CLP.14 IoT Security Guidelines for Network Operators
OMA FUMO OMA Firmware Update Management Object
[5]
www.openmobilealliance.org
na ST-LINK/V2 in-circuit debugger/programmer
[6]
http://www.st.com/
[7] na
n Mobile IoT Initiative
a http://www.gsma.com/iot/mobile-iot-initiative/
na Nmap Security Scanner
[8]
https://nmap.org/
CLP.03 IoT Device Connection Efficiency Guidelines
[9]
http://www.gsma.com/iot/iot-connection-efficiency-guidelines-v4/
na Federal Information Processing Standards
[10]
www.nist.gov/itl/fips.cfm
na EMVCo
[11] n
www.emvco.com/
na SIM Alliance - Open Mobile API
[12]
simalliance.org/key-technical-releases/
GPD_SPE_013 GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control
[13]
www.globalplatform.org/specificationsdevice.asp
GPD_SPE_024 GlobalPlatform Trusted Execution Environment API Specification
[14]
www.globalplatform.org/specificationsdevice.asp
GPC_SPE_034 GlobalPlatform Card Specification
[15]
www.globalplatform.org/specificationscard.asp
ISO/IEC 29192-1 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Lightweight
[16] cryptography
www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:29192:-1:ed-1:v1:en
[17] TS 33.220 Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping
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The net result of the above is in many IoT Services, the IoT Endpoints are not directly
connected to wide area communications networks and many IoT Endpoints have no Internet
Protocol (IP) capabilities. For example, an IoT Endpoint may use an industrial, scientific and
medical (ISM) radio transceiver to transfer data to a local IoT Service Gateway that then
takes the data and transmits it to the communications network using IP, complicating the
process of securing the end-to-end communication.
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Depending on the capabilities of the IoT Endpoint and the security risks associated with it,
different security methods with varying degrees of complexity may need to be applied as
explained in the rest of this document.
In the diagram below some common IoT Endpoint configurations are shown:
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Wearables
Home security sensor Endpoints
Proximity beacons
Non-cellular capillary devices
Due to the low cost of lightweight Endpoints, the security technologies available to these
devices is minimal. Security technologies that require a significant amount of current draw,
cost, or space on the circuit board are not usually available to these systems. However,
lightweight Endpoints can still use cost effective and small trust anchors to implement robust
security framework.
Complex Endpoints are capable of more current draw, typically implement more robust
processors, and have more space on the circuit board available for security technologies. As
a result, much more can be done with Complex Endpoints. These devices can use almost
any kind of Trust Anchor. As a result, they are easily able to implement a Personalized Pre-
Shared Key (PSK) or asymmetric Trusted Computing Base (TCB) model as described later
in this document.
While the primary function of an IoT Gateway is to route messages to and from lightweight
Endpoints, it is also capable of performing critical tasks, such as:
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Device discovery
Network driver deployment
Management functionality
Runtime monitoring
Authentication and Security such as GBA or TLS setup
While Gateways are technically Endpoints, they may not necessarily be managed by the
end-user, and may be managed by the IoT Service Provider or Network Operator (see
below). Regardless of this, Gateways may also be engineered as Complex Endpoints to
make more efficient use of distributing an uplink to multiple Lightweight Endpoints in a
localized network.
Like the Complex Endpoints, Gateways are capable of more processing power, current
draw, and typically have more space available on the circuit board. This allows IoT
Gateways to implement complex Trusted Computing Base solutions, and technologies such
as GBA authentication clients, with relative ease.
These attributes of the Gateway also enables them to incorporate multiple communications
technologies to route messages between disparate types of networked devices. This
enables communication between endpoints that normally would be unable to exchange
messages in an effective manner. In this fashion, Gateways function as an aggregation point
for devices within the local ecosystem, allowing them to communicate with each other and, if
necessary, the Network and Service Ecosystems.
There are typically two types of Gateway an IoT Service Gateway and Customer
Premises Equipment (CPEs) Gateway. The difference is explained below:
1. An IoT Service Gateway is provided by the IoT Service Provider. It may be owned
by the end user but is typically managed by the IoT Service Provider. Such a gateway
is typically used as a hub to connect lightweight Endpoints to the service ecosystem
(either directly via a fixed/cellular connection, or via a CPE gateway), where the end-
user buys a managed service from an IoT Service Provider.
2. A CPE Gateway is provided by a Network Operator. This is typically a broadband
router connected to the internet by cellular or fixed networks. This may be used in
residential or enterprise environments. In this configuration, the gateway is usually
managed and configured by the Network Operator.
It is notable that lightweight Endpoints have less storage and computation capacities than
Complex Endpoints or Gateways. They typically have less security capability as well.
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The most important aspect of the overarching model is that each type of Endpoint device
has one primary job: to define a reliable, high quality, and secure platform for executing a
particular application. In other words, similar to more complex computing platforms such as
smart-phones, Cloud servers, and mainframes, before a high-quality application can be ran
reliably or interact securely with its peers, the engineering team must ensure the hardware
presents a trustworthy platform to the application.
IoT Endpoints, by nature, participate in a network of other Endpoints. They are not
standalone devices that perform an action without the influence or participation of an
oversight service. To increase the trustworthiness of a given device, and diminish the
potential for liability due to gaps in security or reliability, every Endpoint must be designed
with the idea that trustworthiness in the entire IoT ecosystem begins by the construction of
the Endpoint hardware.
With this perspective in mind, it is clear that even the easiest to develop type of Endpoint
device must behave in a reliable, high quality, and secure manner because it is expected to
participate in a network that could eventually span up to millions of devices in size. The
manner in which a single Endpoint behaves will certainly have an effect on its entire IoT
ecosystem. As a result, engineers must consider the implications of architecture design far
beyond the physical attributes associated with a given embedded device. Engineers must
think in terms of the security, reliability, and quality needs of the entire IoT ecosystem.
Using the Overarching Endpoint Model defined above, the components used can be
evaluated from a high level. The high level perspective of each component will direct an
analyst to technologies that are commonly used, and likely to be improperly secured. By
prioritizing these components from the least level of expertise, equipment, and cost required
to succeed, an analyst or adversary can build an attack model that will quickly assess any
given Endpoint for security flaws.
In the Endpoint Ecosystem, there are several threat surfaces that will be investigated by
adversaries depending on their resources, access to infrastructure, and expertise. These
threat surfaces are:
Network Communications
Accessible network services
Console access
Local bus communications
Chip access
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This strategy can waver from extremely simple to extremely difficult. The reason for this is
the analyst or adversarys access to the plaintext data passing over the communications
channel. A sufficiently outfitted analyst will already have technology to intercept
communications for BLE, 802.15.4, and other popular protocols. Since observing, or
performing a man-in-the-middle attack against an Endpoints communications typically
requires little to no change to the Endpoint, the adversary is in a highly beneficial position. It
requires very little effort and work to implement this type of attack.
However, if the communications model uses best practices to enforce the confidentiality and
integrity of data, the adversary will have an exponentially difficult time accessing valuable
secrets. This will cause the adversary to move on to the next easiest attack model.
An assessment will be performed with a tool such as NMap [8] to determine whether network
ports are open. If the network topology isnt IP capable, which is common in BLE or IEEE
802.15.4 networks, the adversary can still use readily accessible tools to connect to the
Endpoint over the appropriate radio protocol.
The adversary will then attempt to send messages to the Endpoint to determine if the
Endpoint can be manipulated into either executing commands, or providing remote-console
access to the operating system. A common method is assessing whether a network login
interface, such as Secure Shell (SSH) or telnet is available. If default login credentials are
used, the adversary may be able to log into the Endpoint. This will allow the adversary to
manipulate the local operating system, and potentially abuse local vulnerabilities to escalate
privileges and extract secrets from the device.
Another common example includes the abuse of poorly designed web services, where
commands can be injected over Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts that dont
adequately strip control characters from user input fields, resulting in code execution on the
local operating system.
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Looking for a 5 pin header on the circuit board indicating a TTL serial port
Looking up the specifications for the CPU or MCU and identifying the UART pins
A multi-meter can be used to identify a TTL port, as the pins will adhere to the typical voltage
specification for TTL. Alternatively, a logic analyser can be used to guess the baud-rate of
any serial data traversing hardware pins. The analyst will quickly be able to discern whether
a console is available on the local hardware.
In many cases, simply accessing a console port allows an analyst to have direct access to a
command prompt on the Endpoint device. In other cases, login credentials are required, but
are typically guessable. If another individual on the Internet has identified the login
credentials, and all Endpoint login credentials are the same, all an analyst has to do is
perform a Google search online to see if someone else has posted the credentials.
Remote console access can be acquired through diagnostic networking protocols, console
access protocols (e.g. SSH or telnet), or other means. These access methodologies should
be evaluated to determine whether an adversary can manipulate the access channel,
thereby granting the adversary access to a remote console.
The simplest attack is identifying whether writable media is present. This could be media that
is simple to alter, such as a writable external memory (SD/MMC) card. Or, an NVRAM chip
or EEPROM can be altered with application or configuration changes to allow command
prompt access, or access to securely stored tokens.
If this vector is properly secured, the analyst will determine if cryptographic secrets are
passed in the clear over hardware busses. This could involve using a logic analyser to
intercept messages between an EEPROM and a CPU, a microcontroller and a SPI-
connected network adapter, or other attacks. These attacks can range from extremely
simple and fast, to complex and expensive, depending on the complexity of the attack and
the technology abused.
If the adversary cannot intercept valuable secrets using the above method, they can attempt
to inject messages into hardware busses to change the behaviour of an application running
on the Endpoint. This is a difficult attack that requires a high degree of expertise, equipment,
and the ability to evaluate the application-specific data and its context.
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All of these attacks require a high degree of skill, electronic engineering knowledge, and
expensive equipment. While most organizations will not need to fear an Attacker utilizing
these methodologies to reverse engineer their products, it is still an important possibility to
consider. The reason is that these attacks only need to be performed one time if the
Endpoint devices are not provisioned with unique cryptographic secrets.
If they are not provisioned with unique cryptographic secrets, one attack in this class will
extract secrets that can affect the entire product line. That is a significant risk, because if the
data is released to the public for any reason, the technology will be subject to attack and
abuse until a patch is released, if one can be released.
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Building authentication into the Endpoint communications will ensure that each Endpoint is
cryptographically proven to be manufactured by the IoT Service Provider. Whenever the
back-end services, or a peer Endpoint, communicates with an Endpoint device, it will be able
to differentiate between a valid Endpoint and a clone by forcing the Endpoint to authenticate
itself. If the device cannot do so, the peer or service can reject the Endpoint. This requires
the following recommendations to work:
In many Endpoint architectures, an adversary can simply copy cryptographic tokens (if there
are any) from the target device in order to impersonate it. If each Endpoint manufactured by
the IoT Service Provider utilizes the same set of cryptographic tokens, the adversary may be
able to impersonate any device simply by compromising one single set of tokens.
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5.3 How do I Reduce the Impact of an Attack Against the Trust Anchor?
It is also important to note that the way a device is manufactured and provisioned has a
drastic effect on the security of an Endpoint in production. The manufacturing process will
determine whether Endpoints are securely encoded with keys. The fulfilment and
provisioning process will determine how an Endpoint is associated with a particular
consumer, and whether the device can be compromised before or after an association is
made.
Regardless of the rationale, combatting this attack can be achieved by using a TCB,
personalization, authentication, and also:
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Thus, the ingress of data into the computer system from both remote and physical interfaces
must be heavily scrutinized. To limit the potential for exploitation of an application, and limit
exposure once an application is compromised, consider the following:
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Also, the adversary can use expensive analysis technology to extract secrets from the
device, or to build extremely small circuits that bridge connections through security layers in
the silicon. While these attacks are extremely difficult to combat against, there are some
things that the implementer can do to dissuade attacks:
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Anomaly Detection
Use Tamper Resistant Product Casing
Enforce Power Warning Thresholds
5.14 How do I Ensure User Safety While Enforcing Privacy and Security?
Safety is a topic that must be considered in context with the application, its purpose, the
intended environment(s) in which the application will live, the type of consumer, and the
communications technology used. There are often times it may seem that trade-offs should
be made between safety and security. This may not be true, however. Instead, the
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architectural model may need to be shifted in order to maintain both safety and security.
Where possible, security should not be discarded in favour of safety. Both should be
enforced, where ever possible. While this is a philosophical recommendation, it is important
that safety be constantly reviewed by the engineering team. Consider the following
recommendations to start a discussion about safety in IoT:
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6 Critical Recommendations
When developing a secure Endpoint, the following recommendations should always be
implemented. The following critical recommendations define a secure Endpoint architecture.
Without these recommendations, the Endpoint will have an incomplete security profile that
will be abused by an adversary.
The core of the TCB is the trust anchor, a secure hardware technology that stores and
processes cryptographic secrets such as Pre Shared Keys (PSK) or asymmetric keys. Trust
anchors, such as an UICC, can be used to authenticate not only peers during network
communications, but can be augmented to store data useful for Endpoint application
security.
Once the trust anchor is chosen and integrated into the Endpoint solution, libraries can be
chosen or designed that integrate the trust anchor into the overall TCB suite. The TCB will
allow the Operating System and the Endpoints primary applications to more easily manage
the overall security of not just the device, but the network.
It is important that the engineering team choose the correct trust anchor for the solution, as
each combination of trust anchor and TCB will result in different level of security. Some
combinations and trust anchor implementations will result in a false sense of security.
The most common variations of a Trusted Computing Base, in order of least secure to
most secure are:
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Consider the figure above. In this diagram, each TCB variants capabilities are given a
weight. A thumbs-down icon denotes that the TCB model cannot accommodate for the
security strategy depicted along the top row. A stop-watch icon shows that the security
strategy can be used, but will be subject to a break in security within a reasonable amount of
time. A thumbs-up icon shows that the security strategy can be implemented soundly, and
that the lifetime of the security strategy will likely be long-lived.
While a TCB can be used to secure many aspects of the overall IoT product and service, this
document focuses on five core concepts:
Executable image validation
The mutual-authentication of network peers
Separation of Duties within the IoT security architecture
Provisioning and Personalization
Isolated Environment security (or connectionless site security)
A TCB that implements executable image validation secures the Endpoint device by
cryptographically verifying each executable image to be loaded and executed by the device.
This process starts at the bootloader, which should cryptographically validate the next stage
of execution, typically an operating system kernel. The bootloader could also validate the
operating system image, or a firmware application image stored in NVRAM.
A TCB that implements mutual-authentication of network peers helps provide a root of trust
for the authentication of network components, and cryptographically authenticates itself to
network peers. This increases the likelihood that peers on the network represent the
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identities that they claim to represent. For example, if the network peer claims to offer a
firmware-update service, the TCB would authenticate the peer as being a part of the core
IoT Service Provider network before accepting firmware updates from the peer.
A TCB that implements a separation of duties uses a hierarchy of keys to identify varying
components or services within the IoT Service Providers offerings. For example, one set of
cryptographic keys could represent a firmware update service, while a second set of
cryptographic keys could represent a push service. Since these services have a completely
disparate functionalities, they should not use the same cryptographic keys and identities for
communication. As such, the TCB should manage and verify each identity to separate one
service or function from another. This reduces the ability for an adversary to compromise the
entire IoT service infrastructure if one of the cryptographic keys is compromised. In other
words, if an Attacker compromises the key for the push service, they will not also have the
ability to impersonate the firmware update service.
A TCB that implements personalization and provisioning ensures that the Endpoint has an
identity that is cryptographically unique from every other Endpoint of its type. It also ensures
that all communications identities are safeguarded to reduce the potential for privacy leaks
or tracking.
A TCB that implements isolated environment security enforces policies and procedures that
validate the authenticity of peers and the confidentiality and integrity of data even if there is
no back-end service to help in the process. In other words, if communication to back-end
services are cut off for an extended period of time, the localized IoT ecosystem will still be
able to function with a high degree of security. Though the integrity of isolated environments
degrades over time, a well designed TCB that implements isolated environment security can
strengthen the resilience of the network and lengthen the amount of time that the
environment can be considered secure.
In this context, personalized is indicative of a unique set of keys that are associated with a
specific trust anchor. The personalization process includes the generation and installation of
the unique keys, the association of the keys with the unique chip, and the secure
dissemination of this information and the relevant metadata to the appropriate authorities.
This ensures that each chip has a unique cryptographic identity. Static, in this context, refers
to the same set of keys used for every Endpoint.
While TCBs can be used to solve almost any security concern an embedded system may
have, there are several core problems that a TCB must be able to solve
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While it is obvious that choosing to not implement a TCB results in a lack of security, there
are subtleties to the other common TCB implementations that should be addressed. If these
subtleties are not addressed, they may result in substantial gaps in security.
This model seems secure in that each problem solved by the TCB can be done effectively.
However, the lifespan of the overall solution can range from long to extremely short.
Depending on the security of the trust anchor and the cryptographic algorithm and key size
chosen, adversaries may be able to break the solution almost immediately.
The problem really arises in that a single compromise of the key exposes every Endpoint
system to compromise. This devalues the TCB implementation and negates the time and
money used to implement the solution in the Endpoint and overall IoT architecture. Thus,
this model is a dangerous TCB to implement as it is, effectively, a time bomb.
Because of the standards in cellular communications that have evolved over the past several
decades, Network Operators have perfected the PSK model for personalization of trust
anchors, such as UICC. As a result, UICC can sometimes be provisioned to serve as an
application trust anchor by the IoT Endpoint, helping to form a cost-effective security solution
for IoT applications. In the near future, when eUICC are available, this capability can be
enabled even on eUICC already deployed in the field.
Today, personalized key technology is the most effective security solution for a trust anchor.
TCBs implemented in IoT today should be based on a personalized TCB solution. IoT
Service Providers should have a discussion with their Network Operator to determine if the
UICC or SIM can be implemented as an application layer trust anchor.
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Use of these technologies will help speed up the implementation of provisioning and
personalization as the libraries and protocols have been vetted by experienced engineers
and security analysts for many years. Yet, these protocols may not fully enable the TCB to
validate the Endpoints application, or ensure that the Endpoint can properly authenticate
messages, or authorize actions. The TCB must incorporate other protocols to accomplish
these tasks, such as firmware validation, over-the-air update message validation, and more.
In the near future, technology such as eUICC will augment the capabilities from the
perspective of the application, and proactive UICC enable dual-use technology that can help
bootstrap the Endpoint itself, while managing Network security. This is an important
augmentation as Network Operators can remotely and securely manage the eUICC device
on behalf of the IoT service provider. In addition, the Confidential Card Content Management
functionality specified in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [15] enables several actors in the
IoT service ecosystems to manage their own application independently of each other, if
allowed by the network operator.
6.1.3 Risk
Choosing to not implement a TCB is a critical point of failure for the entire IoT architecture.
Without a well defined TCB, the interplay between the trust anchor and core application will
be loosely defined, and may have gaps that can be subverted by adversaries. The TCB
ensures that communications between the trust anchor, core application, and network peers
are secure, reliable, and up-to-date. Without a TCB, there is no central component to
manage the security lifecycle of the Endpoint.
A trust anchor is a secure hardware element, either a separate physical chip, or a secure
core inside a CPU, that is capable of securely storing and processing cryptographic secrets.
A UICC or eUICC device is an example of a secure technology that can be used as a trust
element to store authentication secrets.
Using a trust element effectively involves storing, verifying, updating, and processing data.
The data can be either secret or public information that must be cryptographically verified. In
either case, the trust anchor must be able to securely determine whether messages and
identities can be authenticated, and must be able to securely tell the TCB the result of all
authentication or cryptographic operations. This allows the Application, and the TCB, to
make valuable decisions that will affect the security of the overall Endpoint. For instance, a
trust anchor can help an Endpoint determine whether a network peer is impersonating a
critical resource, such as a patch deployment server. If the trust anchor cannot validate a
network peer, the TCB and Application on the Endpoint should choose not to interact with
such a peer, and should alert the user, where possible, of the fraudulent network resource.
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Thanks to the decrease in the cost of components and a sharp increase in demand, trust
anchors are becoming more available than ever before. This not only includes the actual
trust anchor technology, but libraries and interfaces approved for use with the technology.
This allows the engineering team to spin up a trust anchor solution in very little time, and will
help to ensure that the longevity of the technology is not weakened by custom software or
poorly implemented standards. Where possible, standards should be used to diminish the
potential for gaps in security.
Another challenge in implementing a trust anchor in lightweight Endpoints is the size of the
component. If an external trust anchor is utilized, it will be necessary to maintain a minimal
component profile. Achieving this profile is difficult when the form factor incorporates
technology such as a UICC. However, the ETSI TS 102 671 standard solves this problem by
introducing a very small form factor of approximately 6 millimetres by 5 millimetres in size.
These MFF1 and MFF2 augmentations to the UICC smart card form factor enabling full
access to technologies supported by the UICC while ensuring the physical requirements are
minimal. Extra security is added by utilizing a field-provisioned form-factor that is soldered
onto the device, making it more difficult for adversaries to transfer a devices identity to
another device.
Expenses incurred in the development and deployment of a trust anchor can include:
The cost of the base technology, either embedded within the CPU or a separate chip
The cost of integrating the technology into the circuit, where required
The cost of engineering or integrating the driver into the OS and TCB
o Maintaining the infrastructure required to secure and manage the keys and
metadata
Integrating carrier services, where available, to monitor and manage trust anchors
such as UICC
6.2.1 Risk
The risks of not utilizing a trust anchor are many, but all stem from the same base issue: the
ability for an adversary to steal keys relevant to the entire IoT ecosystem. The result of this is
that an adversary can:
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These gaps in security can result in costly issues to the business over time, and can allow
not only adversaries, but competitors, to abuse the infrastructure toward their benefit.
In the near future, some trust anchor manufacturers are planning to roll out variations of their
technology that are Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) [10], EMVCo [11] and
Common Criteria approved. Engineers developing new technology should determine
whether their current designs will support a move to compliant modules in the near future.
For more information, review the latest version of each standard to evaluate what level of
capability is offered by your manufacturer. Note that some levels of security are purposefully
close to impossible for consumer-based devices due to the cost and complexity of
implementations.
6.3.1 Risk
The risk of not using a tamper resistant trust anchor is extremely high. For example, if a trust
anchor is simply cryptographic keys embedded in NVRAM, any Attacker with the tools and
skill to extract those keys can potentially subvert the entire infrastructure. However, if the
secrets are stored in a tamper resistant trust anchor, the expense to extract the secrets is
high, which will make it far less likely that the secrets will be extracted, devaluing the trust
anchor as a potential attack target.
It is notable that if the trust anchor implementation is weak, the extraction of secrets resulting
in a compromise can be sufficiently high. Any compromise will invalidate the expense
incurred during engineering, architecture, production, and fulfilment. This may result in a
significant financial loss. Therefore, ensuring that the organization has architected the
correct implementation is imperative.
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This set of capabilities will help guarantee that the TCB never exposes critical security
assets to an insecure application or hardware environment. This can be accomplished by
using an existing specification that applies these requirements in a uniformed fashion.
Consider evaluating:
Many trust anchors will come with software libraries that can be implemented as a TCB.
These libraries will have APIs that the engineers can use to interact with the TCB. Libraries
provided by the trust anchor are preferred, where available, as they have likely been vetted
by experts in the field of trust anchor development. However, the engineering team should
evaluate the list of requirements set forth in this recommendation, and should ensure that
the library adequately accounts for these concerns.
Furthermore, TCBs should only be accessible from privileged applications running on the
Endpoint. A TCB interface should never be accessible from an unprivileged or untrusted
(third party) application running on the Endpoint. All access must be proxied through a
trusted service that evaluates requests and optionally alerts the user when suspicious or
privacy-centric requests are being made by untrusted applications.
The challenge in implementing this protocol is guaranteeing that all messages cannot be
tampered with between the point of origin for the data and the TCB, and vice-versa. It is
most effective if a segment of EEPROM, callable from the application, can perform these
functions on behalf of the application. By isolating the brunt of the API code to the internal
EEPROM, and using internal RAM to process the messages, less critical data will be
exposed to external busses.
6.4.1 Risk
If an Application Protocol Interface isnt well defined, using a TCB may have unintended
results or side effects. By defining the protocol ahead of time and vetting it for logic and
security issues, the engineering team can more quickly and effectively identify flaws that
may result in security issues later. Thus, the definition of the protocol should incorporate the
evaluation of existing APIs that incorporate the needs of the IoT Service Provider. If an
existing and well-established technology can be identified, this will always be favourable
over a custom solution.
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certificates, or public keys. This depends on the model available for use in the TCB, the
capabilities of the trust anchor, and what makes sense for the engineering team.
A root private key, either symmetric or asymmetric, should be used to digitally sign other
keys used in the hierarchy. For example, if our example organization, Example IoT Company
LLC, wants to create an organizational root of trust, they would generate a root key on a
trusted machine. This key will represent the organizational root. They would then generate
new keys representing each sub- organization that should have independent security
hierarchies. Examples may be:
This model helps to ensure that all messages are secured through the cryptographic
hierarchy. By separating duties among specific key types, compromised keys can be
revoked through the same communications process.
Difficulty arises when services that need the cryptographic keys must be deployed. Instead
of placing a security-critical asset, such as the Server communications key, on a web server
accessible to the Internet, a separate certificate or key pair should be generated specifically
for that server tier. Then, this certificate may be signed by the Server communications key.
This way, any Endpoint can verify that the service has been authenticated by the root of
trust, but the critical organizational key will not be exposed to adversaries.
If a key is ever compromised, it can be revoked from use by using the Revocation master
key to authenticate revocation.
It goes without saying that all core keys in the organizational root of trust are critical to the
security of the infrastructure. These keys must be heavily guarded, and only used by trusted
internal members of the core team. Utilizing an approved Hardware Security Module (HSM)
to store, access, and use the keys is highly recommended.
While an HSM can often be a significant expense at the start of a technologys deployment,
the long-term financial effects are highly positive. Rather than incur a significant expense
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later in forensic analysis and engineering to diagnose and combat a particular risk that could
have been solved by a TCB and an HSM, a relatively small up-front expense is incurred.
6.5.1 Risk
The risk of not using an organizational root of trust is that any compromise to a single key
can result in compromise of the entire ecosystem. By separating the organization into a
hierarchy, and deploying separate keys for the hierarchy, keys can be cycled at regular
intervals and according to the priority of the application or sub-organization the key relates
to. This creates a separation of duties between facets of the organization, and diminishes
the ability for a compromised key to subvert the security of the entire infrastructure.
Note that personalization of the Endpoint platform is separate from personalization of the
network identity. Utilizing a UICC for network authentication is beneficial for many reasons,
and where possible, the UICC could be used as a trust anchor. However, if the network trust
anchor can only be used for authentication of the network, personalization of the application
trust anchor must be performed separately. Cryptographic uniqueness of the application
trust anchor is required to ensure that the application platform is verified prior to execution of
the Endpoint application.
Using the proper agreement with a network operator or other issuing party, UICCs can
sometimes be provisioned before delivery to serve as an application-centric trust anchor. In
the near future, Endpoint developers should evaluate whether eUICC technology is suitable
for use in IoT products and services. These technologies will allow in-the-field provisioning of
cryptographic secrets in a fashion similar to an application-centric trust anchor. Since the
mobile industry is a leader in the personalization and provisioning process, there may be a
significant advantage to using an eUICC as a trust anchor.
Furthermore, these technologies will incorporate remote provisioning capabilities and Secure
Channel for secure communication between the application and the eUICC trust anchor.
These capabilities will provide in-field personalization, which will reduce the overall cost of
Personalization and Provisioning for each individual Endpoint.
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A short tutorial on use of UICC cards in an IoT service ecosystem is contained in Annex B.
The challenge comes with managing the Endpoint identities and the signing process. Each
identity must be catalogued, along with unique identifiers matching the identity, in a system
that cannot be tampered with. While the process is usually performed at the PCB/A facility, a
connection from that facility to the business must be set up to securely traffic the identity
data.
Rolling out this solution may be straight-forward with some facilities that are more familiar
with cryptographic personalization. Other fabrication facilities may not have a process in
place to accomplish this. The mobile industry has been able to succeed in this fashion due to
their ability to control the fabrication and fulfilment of embedded technologies such as UICC.
While the mobile industry has been a leader in this process for some time, the IoT
application Endpoint personalization and provisioning process is still in its infancy.
Be prepared to determine whether the identity of the Endpoint should (or could) be managed
by a gateway or uplink. Evaluating the architecture of the IoT product or service will help
determine whether this attribute of identity management will affect the personalization
process. While trust may be distributed to gateways, the organization should determine
whether trust can be adequately delegated without diminishing the overall security of the
communications and authentication system.
Expenses involved in personalization typically include, but are not limited to:
6.6.1 Risk
If the organization chooses not to implement personalization of the Endpoint device, they
risk being unable to differentiate one Endpoint from another. If all keys are conformed across
Endpoint systems, it doesnt matter if serial numbers are unique. The reason for this is that if
keys are extracted from any single Endpoint, the adversary would be capable of
impersonating any Endpoint.
Personalization combats this by forcing the adversary to extract the cryptographic secrets
from each Endpoint they want to clone or impersonate. Because the expense of this process
can be very high, personalization using a trust anchor is the single strongest method for
combatting cloning and impersonation.
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Once this MVeP has been defined, the minimal bootloader can use the trust anchor to verify
a more robust bootloader, or can execute the rest of the bootloader after verifying external
applications. This allows a consistent environment to be defined with minimal effort that
authenticates subsequent chains of code that will define the applications platform.
Another benefit is that with using the MVeP model, even processors with a minimal amount
of internal NVRAM or EEPROM can bootstrap a trusted architecture using an internal or
external trust anchor.
Lastly, an MVeP is important for rolling back to stable versions of a particular platform. If an
MVeP can be defined that has the minimal functionality required to verify the integrity of
application firmware images and configure the execution environment, its functionality can
be separated from the core application functionality. Thus, if a firmware update fails for any
reason, the MVeP can still be used to reconnect to the back-end network and download
another firmware image (either the same image, or an older image). This also enables
Endpoints with damaged NVRAM chips to still communicate with the back-end services and
submit diagnostic information.
6.7.1 Risk
While it may seem benign, defining a MVeP ensures that the architecture of the overall
Endpoint cryptographically verifies each step in the boot process. This step is critical in
ensuring that an Endpoint can authenticate itself to the network, and its peers. If the MVeP is
poorly architected, it can result in security gaps in the boot process that may be exploitable
by adversaries, invalidating the security architecture.
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The provisioning process does not happen during manufacturing, but relies on the
personalization process deployed in manufacturing. Provisioning typically occurs in the field,
based on the customer that initializes the activation process. Yet, for the process to be
secure, provisioning relies on the unique security tokens set during the personalization
process to ensure that the unique Endpoint is tied to a unique customer. This way, an
adversary cannot arbitrarily register (or unregister) Endpoint devices simply by guessing
Endpoint details. They would, instead, require each unique cryptographic token generated
and set during the personalization process, which is computationally infeasible.
In this fashion, the IoT Service Provider can mathematically guarantee that it is improbable
that adversaries can arbitrarily spoof or register Endpoint devices at will. This leads to a
more secure and stable IoT environment, where the relationship between customers and
devices can be more trustworthy.
6.8.1 Risk
Not implementing the provisioning process can result in a desynchronization between the
organization and its Endpoint nodes. It will be more difficult for the organization to track
Endpoints and established which devices have been enabled for use in the ecosystem or
decommissioned. Furthermore, it may be difficult to establish which devices are associated
with particular customers, which will increase the difficulty of tracking down a problematic or
potentially compromised device in the field.
Users will need to be secured from the simplest attack possible, another user attempting to
guess their password. This can be alleviated by simply negating the potential for a brute-
force attack. This can be done by increasing the time limit between password attempts. With
each failed login attempt, there should be an increased delay before the next password is
allowed to be entered. A ceiling should be implemented such that no more than N attempts
can be tried at once. Otherwise, a reasonable lockout period should be enforced. The user
should be alerted to the brute-force attempt once the real credentials are entered.
Hardcoded or default passwords should never be used in IoT systems. There should never
be an administrative back door password to enter a system. There should never be a
privileged account with default credentials. This is essential to guard user devices against
unauthorized intrusion by users trolling randomly on the Internet for weak security.
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and helps the user guard against theft. Consider reviewing the OWASP or SANS guidelines
for password security to ensure the application complies to recent best practices.
Passwords must never be displayed on a users screen. Always hide the password with the
asterisk character, or another benign glyph.
In addition, all interfaces that accept passwords must utilize brute-force mitigation
technology. It is also important that the technology that validates the password must do the
enforcing. For example, JavaScript embedded in a web page rendered on a web browser
should not implement brute-force mitigation. Any web savvy Attacker can bypass these
controls by interacting with the back-end authentication server over the Internet. The
mitigation technology must be implemented on the server side in this model. In mobile
applications, where a local pin or password is embedded in the applications secure storage
region, the mobile device must mitigate brute-force attacks in this interface.
Furthermore, after each invalid password is attempted, the mitigating system should
increase the delay that is required between allowed attempts. There must also be a
maximum threshold for invalid password attempts. After this threshold is reached, the user
should be locked out pending either two-factor authentication or another more invasive
model. Difficulty
This process is extremely simple to implement, and takes very little effort on the part of the
engineering team.
6.9.1 Risk
The risk of not implementing this recommendation is:
The ability for stolen devices to be subverted through brute-force password guessing
Drive by Internet attacks can subvert the security of IoT systems by simply using
hardcoded passwords
Users can be compromised through shoulder surfing if the user interface displays
the actual password being input into the system
This is also extremely important for unique cryptographic key generation. Given a set of
environmental conditions, an adversary must not be able to influence the environment to
cause a TCB to generate predictable numbers during key generation, signing, or
cryptographic message padding.
This process is as simple as identifying whether the TCB is capable of FIPS [10], EMVCo
[11] or Common Criteria approved random number generation.
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6.10.1 Risk
Utilizing cryptography without a strong random number generator is dangerous for many
reasons. While the reasons are too many to list here, there are some key weaknesses that
should be noted:
These issues can result in significant failures in the overall integrity of the cryptographic
security of the entire IoT ecosystem. This risk does not only affect the Endpoint device, it
affects the entire network.
This process is ordered to perform the most volatile activities first, and the operations least
likely to fail last. This way, the least amount of work is performed in order to observe the
most likely risks.
This process is exceptionally easy to implement, especially when the TCB is capable of
performing the brunt of the processing on the applications behalf. The real challenge is
more subtle: it is what application is performing the operation.
An application that hasnt been cryptographically verified cannot perform the operation, as it
has no way of knowing whether its own code has been subverted by an adversary. Altering
code in NVRAM is a common way for Attackers to manipulate embedded systems, if the
embedded system doesnt verify the application.
An internal EEPROM application must, instead, perform this procedure first, on any
application image in external persistent storage. Then, that application may either perform
the operation itself, or may request an application encoded into internal EEPROM to perform
these types of tests on its behalf.
6.11.1 Risk
If the application image stored in Endpoint firmware (NVRAM) is not cryptographically
signed, the system will not be able to differentiate between authorized code and code
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injected by an adversary. This could allow not only an adversary to abuse executable code
to manipulate a physically compromised Endpoint, but could allow a rival business to install
their own software on an Endpoint.
Where passwords are used, enforce the use of passwords that conform to best
practices regarding password complexity and length
Ensure that the end-user is made aware when an administrator remotely accesses
the Endpoint
6.12.1 Risk
Failure to define, implement, and enforce a policy on remote administration may result in the
remote compromise of Endpoints. If there isnt a rigid security model for super-user access
to the Endpoint devices, adversaries may be able to reverse engineer the technology, or
extract security keys from the Endpoints that will result in access to every Endpoint in the
ecosystem. Administrative access is often one of the first technologies abused by
adversaries in embedded systems, as they are often misconfigured or technologically weak.
Anomaly detection
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Endpoint logging
Endpoint diagnostics
An Endpoint should log its own behaviour and intermittently upload this log to back-end
services for processing. This log should be composed of normal activity such as kernel logs,
application logs, and other metadata.
Diagnostic information should also be observed at regular intervals and delivered to the
back-end service either with or separate from normal logs. Diagnostic messages should
include as much environmental data about the Endpoint as possible, including temperature,
battery life, memory usage, execution time, process lists (where applicable), and more. This
information will help to identify when and what service(s) is related to a problematic or
anomalous event.
Anomaly detection in the network should assist in catching a problem that cant be revealed
through log or diagnostic analysis. It also will help to classify issues that can be observed in
the logs or diagnostics, or attribute the issues to a specific component that may be reacting
poorly in the physical world. For example, a cellular module that keeps reconnecting to the
network, or a sensor that generates bad data.
Together, this information will not only help identify whether a flaw in the technology is
observed in the field. It will also help to identify whether anomalous behaviour is indicative of
a security event.
6.13.1 Risk
Failing to implement logging and diagnostics may cause the organization to miss critical
information. This information may not simply impact the security of the ecosystem, but may
help diagnose critical product engineering flaws.
Any environment that requires an unprivileged application to run must be able to secure itself
from rogue or compromised applications. This ensures that these rogue or compromised
applications cannot access areas of memory that control privileged resources such as the
TCB, the trust anchor driver, or hardware peripheral registers.
The challenge in this area is often migrating from an eight-bit microcontroller platform to a
more robust platform, such as a 32bit microcontroller or a full processor architecture.
However, there are many operating systems available either free or with a nominal license
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fee for embedded systems that correctly implement memory protection with either an MPU
or MMU.
6.14.1 Risk
If these technologies are not used, rogue or compromised applications will not be restricted
from altering core resources such as drivers, peripheral registers, or even privileged services
such as the kernel and other applications. A lack of memory protection allows any
application to have full access to the full range of memory present on the microcontroller or
processor. Unprivileged applications must be restricted from abusing these resources.
Depending on the level of protection provided to the chip or region of memory hosting the
Bootloader, an adversary may be able to use a local bus (such as Serial Peripheral Interface
(SPI)) or a remote API (such as Firmware Over-the-Air) to manipulate the embedded code.
This will result in an adversary being able to subvert the computing platform by placing
custom code at the most trusted point of execution, the first stage of executable code.
Another attack could be an adversary simply swapping one Bootloader chip for their own
chip containing custom instructions by desoldering then soldering the new chip. Without a
way to verify the integrity of the external code, the user will be unable to distinguish between
approved and unapproved software.
In order to customize a boot loader, an Attacker would either need to develop, or outsource,
bootloader development. Depending on available resources, and the target processor, the
difficulty of this action can range wildly from extremely easy to extremely hard.
6.15.1 Risk
Not evaluating the chain of trust and enforcing a verification of integrity for the initial code
loaded by the CPU can result in a full system compromise. This step is critical toward
securing the IoT Endpoint device and, thus, the ecosystem.
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While it is true that adversaries can still subvert the system by replacing these critical
sections of memory with their own code, it requires them to build their own custom version of
the software, which may be a complex and challenging process. This vastly increases the
overall cost of the attack, and the skill required to succeed. Additionally, if personalization
and provisioning are used, these steps will force the Attacker to recreate the process for
every Endpoint, customizing their solution to the unique cryptographic characteristics of the
local system. This makes the overall attack exceptionally costly, and decreases the
feasibility.
To remediate this risk, simply identify whether the technology that stores critical sections of
memory is capable of being locked. Alternatively, start with a lockable EEPROM technology.
Ensure that if a lock is used, the lock is not set in software. Software-defined locks are
enabled only after the software has executed the respective functionality to engage the lock.
There will be a few millisecond window in which an adversary can abuse the unlocked state
toward their gain. Thus, hardware locks, such as fuses or lock bits, should always be
employed where possible.
6.16.1 Risk
Without a lock or read-only state, critical sections of memory can be easily altered by an
adversary. This may give them enough privilege to compromise the entire Endpoint platform
without further action, subverting all subsequent security controls used in the system.
Many bootloaders used by microcontroller vendors, for example, allow external firmware to
be loaded into CPU memory for execution, or allow firmware updates over serial interfaces.
Other bootloaders may prompt a user for locations that contain application images, allowing
a user to execute any application they choose.
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6.17.1 Risk
An insecure bootloader can be as damaging as a poorly architected bootloading process.
Securing the bootloader is a critical step toward ensuring the integrity of the IoT Endpoint.
However, there is a catch. This common key agreement model presumes that the
asymmetric keys are always kept secret. This may not be the case. In the future, a
sufficiently funded entity may be capable of computing the private key for any given public
asymmetric key. If the Attacker saves every communications session between a target entity
and their peers, the entity will then be able to decrypt every communication message from
the past by generating the private key sometime in the future.
One solution to this problem is to generate an ephemeral asymmetric key pair during the key
negotiation process. Only the public key for this ephemeral key pair is passed to each side of
the communication link, it can be used to traffic a symmetric key.
This ephemeral key should be generated with sufficient entropy and a key size large enough
to negate the potential for a computational exhaustion attack within a reasonable period of
time. This will ensure that the key negotiation process is sustainable and less likely to be
subject to attack in the future.
Furthermore, this methodology ensures that peers use their persistent asymmetric key only
for authentication, not for confidentiality and integrity. If this asymmetric key is stolen or
exposed to the public it will only affect the authentication process, not the confidentiality and
integrity of the communications channel.
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To make this process even more resilient from attack, the asymmetric key used for
authentication must be subject to a secure revocation process that guarantees that an
Endpoint will be able to verify if a key has been compromised. The Endpoint should no
longer trust that key for authentication if it has been notified that such a compromise has
occurred.
6.18.1 Risk
Not implementing PFS can expose all network communications to an adversary if that
adversary ever gains access to a private key used to secure the communications channel. At
any time in the future, if the adversary captures the private key, all communications captured
by the adversary in the past will then be decrypted. This will lead to serious consequences.
As a result, Endpoint designers must implement communications security from the following
perspectives:
Although clear-text messages can be sent and received in order to interoperate with
Endpoints designed by other organizations, data communicated over any channel that
incorporates commands, user privacy data, or critical system messages must be secured.
The first step is to authenticate the peer device to ensure that it is what it claims to be. This
is especially important if the peer represents a system service.
Next, data confidentiality is required to ensure that third parties cannot read critical data
passed over a communications channel.
Finally, message integrity is required to ensure that secret messages have not been
tampered by an adversary.
These three attributes, combined together, will result in a communications model that can
survive for years with few engineering changes.
This process is made far simpler through the use of existing and well analysed security
protocols, such as, but not limited to:
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While the engineering team can use any suite that adheres to the aforementioned
requirements, utilizing a standard communications protocol suite will reduce the number of
errors that will be observed in the field. This is because experts in information security and
cryptography are involved in the development of standardized protocols.
6.19.1 Risk
While it should go without saying that communications security is a requirement, it is
sometimes confusing as to why it is a requirement. Communications security doesnt just
ensure that an adversary cant read data. It also ensures:
The message to be signed by the TCB must also contain a challenge issued by the back-
end system. This negates the ability for an adversary to replay an authentication message
already submitted from the TCB to the back-end. If sufficient entropy is contained in the
challenge, the potential for message-replay is negated.
Receive a request from the Endpoint which contains the unique identity token
Generate a unique challenge and send it to the Endpoint
Receive the challenge reply from the Endpoint containing the signature and the
message
Verify that the signature is correct using the shared key
Ensure that the signed message contains the correct identity token and any other
relevant metadata
Acknowledge the verified signature
To process a challenge:
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Cryptographically authenticate the identity of the back-end system using the TCB
Send a message containing the Endpoint identity and other metadata to the back-
end
Receive a challenge from the back-end
Generate a message containing the unique identity token, metadata, and the
challenge
Sign the message
Send the message and its signature to the back-end
Verify that the back-end system approved the signed message
6.20.1 Risk
The risk of not implementing this recommendation is that Endpoints will be clonable or
vulnerable to impersonation attacks. This can open up the organizations infrastructure to
attacks from both competitors and adversaries. Competitors can use a lack of Endpoint
identity authentication to build a competing platform from the same Bill of Materials, but at a
lower cost.
Alternatively, a competitor can use the lack of authentication to sell hardware that
piggybacks off of the organizations infrastructure. These issues can result in a loss of
revenue for the business, and an increased operational expense as the competitor can
benefit from the use of the businesss network infrastructure, even though they are not
paying to use it. Since network bandwidth has a quantifiable cost, and Cloud servers, CPU
usage, disk usage, and other resources have a quantifiable cost, this kind of parasitic
business can have a serious impact on a vulnerable organization.
This model will create longevity with regard to the cryptographic secrets, forcing the Attacker
away from uncovering those secrets. Instead, the Attacker will need to rely on manipulating
bits in the RAM that equate to the effects of using said secrets. This will require the Attacker
to change bits in memory every time the secrets are used internally, massively increasing
the complexity of the attack.
Not all operating systems define models for utilizing internal RAM for the processing of
secrets. Therefore, it might be required for the engineering team to implement this
themselves. While this process is not difficult, it is not trivial, either. The executable code
must ensure that its memory routines all use specific regions guaranteed to represent
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internal processor memory. This may require extra work, depending on the operating system
and compiler toolchain used.
7.1.1 Risk
Most microprocessors and some CPUs have a small amount of internal SRAM dedicated to
code running from internal EEPROM or internal NVRAM. This SRAM is typically inaccessible
to external peripherals, unless it is purposefully exposed by using technology such as DMA.
If kept private, cryptographic secrets processed by the code have a much smaller likelihood
of being exposed to adversaries capable of intercepting RAM communications.
While it is not a high risk, cryptographic secrets should not pass over publicly accessible
busses, in order to diminish the potential for attack. Well equipped adversaries capable of
intercepting RAM communications at potentially high speeds can capture data such as
cryptographic secrets. However, it would take a skilled reverse engineer to capture
messages across RAM that could be attributed to cryptographic operations.
If the normal behaviour of an Endpoint type is catalogued by the IoT Service Provider, the
organization will be able to identify behavioural patterns that should be indicative of
anomalous behaviour. By setting a baseline of behaviour, then continually monitoring for
potential outliers, the organization can more quickly diagnose both security and performance
problems in production environments.
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Cataloguing the behavioural fingerprint may also assist the organization in more quickly
linking a faulty set of functionality to a particular feature or environmental condition. This may
lead to engineering solutions at a more rapid pace than if behavioural data isnt collected.
7.2.1 Risk
Without anomaly detection, it may take an excessively large amount of time to detect a
compromised Endpoint within the IoT ecosystem. If the Endpoints anomalous behaviour is
only visible outside of normal operations, the administrative team may have no reason to
distrust the Endpoint. However, if anomaly detection is implemented throughout the
ecosystem, malicious behaviour may be detected and thus contained far sooner.
Sensors that trigger an alert when a physically static devices location is moved
Alerts raised with either internal or removable components are removed from the
device
Using these methodologies can improve the tamper resistance of a physical Endpoint.
However, it may be more cost effective to improve the design of the circuit, itself. While
these methodologies will go far to diminish the potential for compromise by amateur
hobbyists or adversaries, they will not mitigate well equipped and experienced security
analysts.
Thus, these methods improve the organisations ability to ensure that the product itself
cannot be tampered with while it is out of the possession of the consumer that owns it. In
other words, if a consumer leaves their device at home or in the field, an adversary must not
only gain physical access to compromise the device, but they must also defeat the tamper
resistant security controls as well in order to alter then replace the device. This negates the
ability for devices to be quickly compromised and replaced, which is a valuable improvement
to physical device security.
Yet, if the threat model ignores this aspect and focuses on remediating physical attack in
general, including advanced and equipped Attackers, it does not fully remediate that threat.
In that case, these tamper resistant additives will slow down an adversary, but will not stop
an adversary with time and expertise.
Thus, a balance must be met between what is cost effective, and the threat model of the
given device. An Automated Teller Machine (ATM) is a sufficient example of such a device.
Tamper resistance in the encasing is required for ATM security, to ensure that an adversary
cannot open and alter the physical encasing to, say, capture magnetic stripe data and record
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Engineers and business leaders should evaluate the threat model of a given product or
service and balance the risk of attack with the tamper resistant measures implemented in the
device. Each type of tamper resistance will incur a cost, depending on the process,
engineering, and materials involved. And yet, the effort may not result in the level of security
desired.
An example of this problem is with coating chips with epoxy. While this process is valuable,
there are two things an Attacker can easily do to bypass the use of epoxy:
While epoxy hides the chip component from view, it does not and cannot hinder the
electrons traveling across circuits that emanate from the epoxy coated chip. Thus, if critical
secrets are communicated across the hardware bus, epoxy will not stop the adversarys
ability to intercept this data.
Furthermore, the epoxy itself can simply be removed. Home grown hobbyist techniques
have surfaced in the past several years that clearly outline a practical method for removing
epoxy from a circuit using consumer ready chemicals and processes. While the process can
be caustic and potentially dangerous, the procedures outlined by skilled reverse engineers
are sound and can be implemented by anyone with a properly vented laboratory or office.
Thus, a risk assessment must be performed that clearly weighs the benefits of the tamper
resistant technology with the ease of compromise. If each device is simply to be secured
from an adversary wishing to easily manipulate or abuse a random device, tamper
resistance should be employed. If the requirement is that advanced Attackers must be
mitigated from intercepting messages across hardware busses, a more resilient security
architecture for the application and operating system should be considered over tamper
resistance.
7.3.1 Risk
As noted in the previous section, the risk of not deploying tamper resistance varies wildly
with the requirements for the device. If the requirement is that the device should alert the
user if the physical device was opened, broken, or altered, tamper resistance is important. If
the requirement is that the device should be protected from analysis by an amateur or skilled
security researcher or adversary, architectural security is probably the correct resolution for
the risk.
In either case, the risk of not deploying tamper resistance in the case is such that the user
will not be able to determine if an adversary tampered with the physical device. While this
may not mean much to applications with a robust and hardened hardware and application
security architecture, it will mean a lot to products that offer critical services to its users, such
as medical devices, telematics systems, and home security or automation systems.
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To do this, choose trust anchors that are capable of authentication and encryption and
validate that all messages containing answers to challenges are sent confidentially and,
where possible, with verifiable integrity.
UICCs that can be managed with Secure Channel are capable of confidentiality and
integrity. The IoT Service Provider should discuss with the Network Operator whether the
UICC Secure Channel technology can be used to assist with application security. In the
future, eUICC will be capable of application security. Secure Channel may then be used to
facilitate Endpoint application security from the bootloader stage to the network
authentication stage.
While this should seem like a simple exercise, there are subtleties to this process. Testing
each aspect of the communications layer is necessary. Some messages from various trust
anchors, may not be confidential or enabled with integrity. For example, a message that
indicates whether an operation succeeded or failed may seem benign, but must be protected
to ensure that an adversary doesnt send a tailored response, tricking the application.
Some trust anchors may not be capable of integrity in the communications channel. Integrity
is preferred, and should be employed to guarantee a message hasnt been tampered with.
But, doing this requires a base of trust on both the host processor and the trust anchor,
which may not be reasonable for the application.
Since all embedded systems are capable of compromise from a sufficiently equipped
physical adversary, it may be overkill to require a root of trust on both processors simply for
local bus communications. However, in applications where physical security is critical,
integrity should be implemented.
7.4.1 Risk
The risk of not enforcing confidentiality and integrity is an interesting one. This risk can range
from a complete system compromise to benign information gathering. This is because
certain messages can be gamed. For example, if a TCB requests that the trust anchor verify
a messages integrity, it will pass the message over a hardware bus to the trust anchor.
If the trust anchor is internal to the CPU, it is unlikely that an Attacker can alter this message
without sophisticated and expensive equipment. However, if the trust anchor is a separate
chip on the circuit board, there may be an opportunity for the adversary to alter the message
by splicing the circuit and inserting their own hardware. If, for instance, the trust anchor
receives the message and simply responds to the query stating Yes, this message is valid
without any integrity, the TCB will be unable to verify if the message had been manipulated
by an Attacker with physical access to the bus.
Furthermore, even if the response is integrity verified, an adversary with physical access to
the bus can simply compromise the circuit, absorb the message request from the TCB, emit
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their own trusted message to the trust anchor, and let the real trust anchors response pass
through to the TCB. If the hardware communications bus isnt properly secured, this attack is
possible as well, negating the trust anchors ability to perform its job.
However, expecting both the CPU and the trust anchor to have individual internal trust
anchors creates a paradox. How can a bootable CPU trust itself if the CPU can be changed
by an adversary, yet the CPU has to use its own EEPROM to verify the integrity of the trust
anchor! This creates a conundrum, but one that can be solved.
One solution is to insert a public key into the CPUs ROM. This key can be used to verify the
integrity of messages sent by the trust anchor. If an arbitrary message (to be verified) is
transmitted over the hardware bus to the trust anchor, the trust anchor can respond with a
signed message that includes the original message as a part of the reply. This verifies that
the message did in fact originate from the trust anchor, and that the message being
processed is indeed the message that was expected to be processed. The only concern left
would be to ensure that the nonces used in message padding ensured that the
cryptographic messages were not replayable.
With the above in mind, it is easy to identify that cryptography can fail due to very subtle
issues in not just the cryptography, but the algorithms that support cryptographic
communications. This is why implementing confidentiality and integrity (correctly) is so
important.
If the process fails at any point, the system should either revert to a backup image to ensure
the application performs as needed, or the emergency system can be used to call home and
notify the IoT Service Ecosystem that a fault has occurred.
The difficulty comes from creating a storage model that addresses two issues:
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Without a backup system or emergency partition, the device will have no choice but to fail.
Because embedded systems typically dont have robust user interfaces, this may present a
significant point of stress between the business and its customers. Failing as eloquently as
possible is imperative not only for user confidence, but for system reliability as well.
It is notable that some Attackers may want to corrupt the update process in purpose, to force
a system into a persistently vulnerable state. For example, if an exploitable vulnerability is
found in the active version of the application, but a patch is available in the newest version of
the application.
The benefit of this model is that even if the Attacker corrupts the network negotiation
process, the back-end system has the opportunity to take note of this event. If the back-end
network identifies that a node is communicating normally except for updates, an alert should
be raised for administration to determine whether that Endpoint node is being abused.
7.5.1 Risk
If the OTA application update process is not properly architected, it can result in adversaries
remotely injecting executable code into Endpoints. If the adversary has a privileged position
on the network, they could potentially affect thousands of Endpoints at once. The result of
the attack could range from simple code execution, to denial of service (bricking the
Endpoints), or completely altering the purpose of the Endpoint device.
The protection against this is authentication. For example, in the GSM network, anyone with
the right equipment can claim to own any IMSI they choose. However, cellular carriers
enforce authentication by encoding a cryptographic key into the Subscriber Identity Module
(SIM) that is unique per that subscriber (IMSI). When a GSM device communicates with a
base station stating that it is representing a particular IMSI, the base station will issue a
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cryptographic challenge that can only be solved by someone with the unique cryptographic
key stored in the SIM card provisioned for that particular identity. If the Attacker cannot solve
the cryptographic challenge, the base station can verify that the Attacker does not represent
the IMSI in question, and can disallow that user from associating with the network.
The model described above depicts client-based authentication. This is the model where the
server subsystem (including base stations) allow clients (Endpoints) to join and leave the
network as long as the clients can cryptographically authenticate their identity. However,
there is an inverse problem that exposes clients to manipulation: server authentication.
Newer protocols, such as 3G and LTE, enforce mutual authentication of both entities. This
allows Endpoints to cryptographically verify that the base station is serving on behalf of the
cellular carrier it claims to serve. An adversary must now break the cellular carriers
cryptography to impersonate a base station, significantly increasing the complexity, difficulty,
and cost of an attack.
In the modern communications threat model, however, access to this technology is not
limited to actors in the government and intelligence areas. Today, these systems can be built
from parts that are only several hundred US dollars, resulting in a cost-effective fake base
station capable of intercepting or impersonating cellular communications.
For example, a particular SIM card may be provisioned for use in an industrial control
system such as an oil well monitoring device. A SIM card, by design, is a removable
component. Anyone with physical access to the oil well monitoring device can extract the
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SIM card and place it in a laptop. If the laptop has software on it that can simulate the
functionality of the oil device, the back-end server will be unable to differentiate between the
actual oil device and the laptop. Yet, the laptop will be authenticated to the cellular network
because of the SIM card! Thus, the cellular network has authenticated the SIM card, but not
the laptop.
Once authenticated, each peer must encrypt and sign messages sent to other peers in the
network. Each peer that receives a message must cryptographically validate the data prior to
acting on it. Since not all communications protocols are capable of mutual authentication, or
have strong cryptography, it is imperative that the application engineer design a sufficient
protocol that enforces confidentiality and integrity, rather than relying on the communications
protocol.
Even more robust protocols that incorporate mutual authentication, such as LTE, do not
address the security of the infrastructure beyond the cellular communications network. Only
higher layer protocol security can address the risk of weaknesses in infrastructure beyond
the control of the cellular carrier.
7.6.6 Risk
The risk of not adhering to strong application security is that the Endpoint must trust the
security of the communications layer. As depicted in this recommendation, it may not be
adequate to solely trust the network to resolve the security issues in the application. Even if
the MNO can be trusted, the messages may pass through multiple pieces of networking
infrastructure not owned or controlled by the MNO before the data reaches servers owned
by the IoT Service Provider. Therefore, the IoT Service Provider risks anyone with control of
those systems intercepting, altering, or manufacturing messages to or from Endpoint
systems.
As a result, it is important that IoT Service Providers consider the privacy of their consumers
and develop Privacy Management interfaces that are integrated into both the Endpoint,
where possible, and the product or services web interface.
This technology should allow the user to determine what attributes of their privacy are being
utilized by the system, what the Terms of Service are, and the ability to turn off the exposure
of this information to the business or its partners. This granularity and opt-out system will
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help to ensure that users have the right and the ability to control the information that they
share about themselves and their physical world.
7.7.1 Risk
The potential risks of not protecting consumer privacy are many. Issues from stalking,
harassment, profiling, threats, and more, are realistic and practical results of not protecting
users data.
IoT Endpoints can be tracked similarly through Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) addresses,
802.15.4 addresses, Wi-Fi, or even cellular IMSI. Where possible, the IoT Service Provider
should develop their Endpoint technology in such a way that a random radio address is used
to connect to new environments, allowing the users privacy to stay intact.
This is also true of cryptographic keys, such as SSH public keys. While users typically want
their public keys to be known to the public, cryptographic public keys on Endpoints will
expose the users identity of a particular Endpoint, which is not desirable. Instead, the user
should be able to select whether they want their identity known when they are connecting to
a new environment.
7.8.1 Risk
Not adequately mitigating this risk will allow users with mobile Endpoints to be tracked as
their devices leave and join networks. This opens up significant gaps in privacy that legal
teams, legislators, and even insurance companies are currently analysing. Not adequately
implementing privacy to diminish the potential for tracking may open up a new IoT Service
Provider to legal consequences in the near future.
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Dropping super-user privileges is a common process that is well documented, and has been
implemented exceptionally well in applications such as the Secure Shell (SSH), apache2,
and other well engineered servers. The process usually encompasses:
Identifying a user identity (for example, UNIX User ID and Group ID) that the
application should run as
Fully changing the processs identity to the target user/group ID, thus removing
super-user privileges from the running application
A more complex model can be seen in the SSH implementation of privsep, which runs a
privileged service whose sole purpose is to bootstrap the main application under a target
user/group identity. This way, if the service exits it can be restarted easily without the
compromise of privileged resources.
7.9.1 Risk
Running applications with elevated privilege levels can result in a full system compromise if
a single application is compromised. Since super-user privileges grant an application full
access to the entire running system, there is no way to contain an adversary once they
compromise such an application. Dropping privileges helps contain the adversary, and limits
their ability to increase their privilege within the embedded system. This may be the
difference between a full system compromise and a minor annoyance.
For example, a network service that allows a user to retrieve information about the state of
the Endpoint must not also be able to manipulate the TCB over the same process. That
capability would be out of scope relative to the purpose of the service. These two distinct
operations should be handled in separate applications, and ran under separate user IDs on
the local Operating System, helping to separate the duties of the application, and reduce the
risk of abuse if one component were compromised.
To implement this correctly, memory protection must be enabled in the underlying hardware
architecture, and the operating system must have a concept of privilege levels. Unprivileged
software must be restricted from accessing privileged resources, such as drivers,
configuration files, or other objects.
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Services should make requests to access privileged resources, but through a constrained
API such as a system call, to ensure that all messages are well formed and fit the
requirements of the security architecture.
The concept of multi-tiers of privilege is a half a century old concept. However, in embedded
systems, it is often overlooked as users are not allowed to log into the console and run their
own applications. As a result, all services are often deployed as a privileged user. However,
this is flawed.
This requires planning and a sound application architecture that utilizes privilege separation
correctly.
7.10.1 Risk
If a separation of duties is not enforced, any compromise to a single service on the Endpoint
will result in a compromise of the entire device, because each service or application running
on the device will share the same user and/or group identity. If the recommendation is
implemented, a low privileged service that is compromised over the network will not
immediately result in compromise of the entire system.
Increasing the difficulty of an attack with a simple configuration change such as this will go a
long way toward ensuring the longevity of the device.
In addition, as compromised services can be detected through process monitoring and other
analytics, any service compromise can alert the Service Ecosystem that a device
compromise has been detected. This allows administrators to act to secure the system
before a full system compromise has been achieved. This also allows administrators to
diagnose and patch the vulnerable software prior to rampant abuse of the particular
vulnerability. This gives the business a significant edge against even skilled Attackers.
The compiler or run-time should be security hardened, where possible, to restrict the
potential for a vulnerability to be abused by an adversary. In a well defined run-time
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7.11.1 Risk
The risk of not hardening the programming language and resultant application is an easy-to-
exploit application. Some programming systems such as PHP are notoriously buggy and
should never be used by a professional engineering team. Other languages, such as Python,
are suitable for production environments, but have subtle security risks that must be
evaluated. Thus, the volatility of the resultant risk can be anywhere from a critical level to a
benign level. The engineering team must use the risk assessment and threat modelling
process to sufficiently evaluate what language is best for their production environment.
ASLR
Each operating system used in an embedded system will provide different variations and
combinations of these technologies, sometimes under different names. Determine what the
operating system and kernel are capable of providing, and enable these technologies, where
possible, to enhance the security of applications.
The challenge comes from identifying what each Operating System is capable of. For
example, applications running on platforms that have no Memory Management Unit (MMU)
may not be capable of ASLR. However, the equivalent of UDEREF can be enforced even in
environments with only a Memory Protection Unit (MPU). Evaluate which technology is being
used and its capabilities, and determine what level of security can be achieved through the
combination of architecture, kernel, operating system, and application protections.
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8.1.1 Risk
Not enforcing this recommendation will result in an application run-time environment that is
substantially easier to exploit. These enhancements will significantly constrain the number of
adversaries that are capable (if at all) of developing a reliable exploit for a vulnerable
service.
Thus, if an application developed by the organization has a security flaw that could be
abused to gain remote code execution capabilities, the potential for abuse can be negated
by enforcing ASLR, NX, UDEREF, and other technologies. This will limit the ability for an
Attacker to develop an exploit in a reasonable amount of time, as the exploit developer will
be required to use advanced and challenging techniques that must be customized against
each individual target. This increases not only the difficulty, but the time and expense
required to achieve a fully working exploit.
Without these enhancements, a fully working exploit can be developed using off-the-shelf
and freely available software within hours.
The Approved Configuration that a product is deployed with should never contain
debugging, diagnostic, or testing interfaces that could be abused by an adversary. Such
interfaces are:
Serial ports that can be removed by the system should also be physically removed from the
circuit board. However, many times serial ports such as UART/USART are enabled over
hardware pins on the microcontroller or processor. If these pins are still enabled as a
console, an adversary can simply tap the pins to interact with the console. Removing the
physical serial port itself, such as a DB9 interface, does not disable the console.
Furthermore, debugging ports such as JTAG and SWD should not simply be disabled via
software. These devices should be disabled by altering security fuses or locks. Disabling
these technologies from software offers a window of opportunity for an adversary to connect
to JTAG, SWD, or a similar hardware debugging interface prior to the time at which the
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software disables the interface. This window of opportunity is often sufficient enough for an
adversary to succeed.
8.2.1 Risk
Without implementing this recommendation, organizations open themselves up to extraction
of critical secrets from the central processing unit. This may allow adversaries to load their
own firmware into NVRAM or EEPROM, and allow them to extract or alter critical secrets
that further compromise the IoT network or device.
Disabling debugging ports is a critical step to ensuring the integrity of the IoT product or
service. However, it is important that the organization evaluate the risk of disabling these
technologies and weigh them against the benefit of being able to diagnose and debug
problems identified in the field. It may be significantly more challenging to remediate
production-level flaws in the product if there is no way to debug a running system.
Information security presents the class of anomalies purposefully induced in order to gain
access to objects that otherwise would be inaccessible. An abusable window for the
induction of anomalous behaviour beneficial to an adversary is Direct Memory Access
(DMA). Put simply, DMA is a technology that processors can use to allow external
components (peripherals) to gain access to main processor memory without interference by
the CPU. In other words, the CPU can grant a peripheral direct access to a region of
memory. This peripheral may then read or write to that region of memory.
If the processor does not properly restrict the region of memory usable by the peripheral, the
peripheral may have access to more of main memory than is required for the intended
functionality. In other words, if the peripheral (say, an Ethernet controller) is allotted a DMA
region intended for use as a circular buffer for received Ethernet frames, and the DMA
region allotted comprises the entire expanse of main memory, the firmware on the Ethernet
controller may now arbitrarily read and write to all system memory. The CPU will have no
way to block the Ethernet controller firmware from writing to memory.
The result of this attack is two-fold. Data can be leaked from main memory and encoded into
network packets or application information for covert or immediate exfiltration. Alternatively,
an Attacker could covertly insert a backdoor (malware) into main memory by overwriting an
applications executable code.
From the processors perspective, there is little it can do to identify whether an overly
permissive window of memory has been abused by a malicious peripheral device. To
combat this attack, identify whether the processor used in the Endpoint system is capable of
restricting DMA to small predictable regions of memory. If so, ensure that each region of
memory is defined per each peripheral device that requires it. Do not enable arbitrary
windows memory, where possible, to peripherals.
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Some processors may not allow granular restriction on the size or location in linear or virtual
memory of a DMA window. As DMA attacks should be considered a realistic threat to IoT
Endpoints for critical applications, evaluate whether it makes sense to consider an
alternative processor with more granular features.
For platforms that expose ports such as IEEE1394, Thunderbolt, Express Card, or other
ports that allow direct access to Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) DMA, canned and
cost effective attacks are already available.
For platforms where a DMA based attack requires abuse of a local hardware component, the
difficulty will certainly increase, but it is not out of the scope of an offense-based security
engagement to reflash a peripherals firmware in order to subvert DMA for compromise of a
local Endpoint. Cost, time, and expertise will however be a factor, making the actor in this
case likely a sponsored (paid) adversary.
8.3.1 Risk
Choosing not to restrict the ability for DMA to be abused by external components may
subject the platform to a full compromise, or, at least, the extraction of key secrets, privacy-
centric data, or intellectual property from the Endpoint.
While attributes of the user interface, such as passwords, have already been covered in this
document, there are some more subtle issues that must be discussed:
Alerting systems
Action confirmation
Furthermore, all actions performed by the device that are driven by encodings or seamless
transitions from one interface to another should be confirmed by the user. An example of this
is if the device camera reads a QR code, or a NFC or RFID interaction requests that the
device connect to an URL. In these cases, the user should be prompted to confirm the action
and validate that the action performed is desirable. The user should be given the option to
cancel the action. The user should be able to view all details about the given action,
including the full URL that will be connected to.
8.4.1 Risk
If this recommendation is not implemented, users will be vulnerable to attacks that cannot be
detected. While some system designers appreciate the seamlessness of transitioning from
an RFID chip to, say, the corresponding product website, there may be undesirable effects
of this behaviour. Users could be forced to view undesirable materials without their consent,
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or users could be tricked into visiting websites or performing actions that weakens their
security posture or privacy.
Also, users that have a difficult time reviewing their Alerts may not understand the risks of
using a potentially tampered device. This may decrease the users physical security and
could put them at risk.
A gap in security in this area may also result in a competitors advantage against the
business through spoofing, API abuses, data interception, device cloning, and even device
rebranding. Thus, it is imperative that critical sections of code be audited by an approved
third party, to ensure that technology is not at risk of abuse. Therefore, to find an information
security team adequate to perform the audit, evaluate what types of code will be audited.
Typically, in this model, that means: C, Assembly, and possibly C++ or Java.
Identify a team that is well versed in these languages, as well as the underlying architecture.
While many information security teams perform source code auditing, not many of them may
perform auditing on the particular platform used by the IoT business. Each platform has
subtle differences, and it is best to use a team with familiarity with the platform being used.
8.5.1 Risk
While hiring third party consultants to evaluate internally developed technology can be a
challenge, it is a requirement for security. This is because engineers developing technology
must be able to show that their architecture is provable. This is difficult to do if the engineers
developing the architecture are the only ones reviewing it. Engineers tend to visualize their
code base from the architecture that they have attempted to design and implement, not from
the actual implementation. Thus, third party eyes are often needed to find subtleties in the
architecture and implementation that could cause gaps in security.
Other attributes of a private APN can help diminish the potential for rogue Endpoints to
abuse the IoT ecosystem. Firewalls can limit what services or computers can be connected
to from the APN. A well configured APN will disallow Endpoints from making direct
connections to each other, which disallows a compromised Endpoint from migrating
horizontally through the network infrastructure to other Endpoints.
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Engage with the cellular carrier or Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) that the
organization is working with to determine what technologies are available within the secure
APN. Other services such as monitoring, blacklisting anomalous devices, and tying user
identities to actions, may be available.
8.6.1 Risk
Utilizing a private APN can alleviate many types of attacks. For example, private APNs allow
the business to reduce the amount of connections that can be made from the Endpoint
directly to the Internet. Endpoints should never be allowed to directly connect to untrusted
Internet resources. Only partner organizations should be trusted, and those services should
be authenticated.
Without the use of a private APN, compromised Endpoints can communicate to any Internet
service or protocol without restriction. This may allow an adversary to abuse the Endpoint in
order to launch a secondary attack on separate infrastructure. This could involve a denial of
service (DoS) attack, or could help facilitate a more dangerous attack against another
business, government, or civilian.
It is notable, however, that a private APN does not mitigate the risk of an adversary
compromising the communication link between the Endpoint and the private APN. In
addition, the private APN only acts as a gateway to the back-end services, and doesnt
enforce any security between the APN and the back-end services on the IoT Service
Providers private network. These potential gaps in security must be addressed separately,
regardless of the improvements that are granted through the use of a private APN.
Voltage ceiling circuitry protection to ensure voltage levels dont exceed a threshold
Current limiting circuits to ensure current draw cannot drop or exceed certain levels
Internal temperature monitoring for CPUs, MCUs, and other components that monitor
internal levels
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Low temperature levels also change the behaviour of a device. This may slow a circuit down,
or cause its components to react in unexpected ways. This may be useful to an Attacker if
temperature can cause a predictable anomaly that affects the application or circuitry in a
beneficial manner.
Difficulty in lock-out thresholds manifests when analysing temperature and humidity. Voltage
and current levels should be mitigated by Brown-out and Black-out circuitry either on the
circuit board or in the processor. Since engineers will be able to look up the numbers related
to a chips voltage and current thresholds, they can easily implement protections for these
issues.
For temperature and humidity, the decision to act is a bit more challenging as these levels
can be manufactured by an adversary without touching the physical device. In the case of
temperature, levels that may be indicative of a pending safety event must cause the device
to take adequate measures to lower the temperature. However, in critical environments such
as Industrial Control Systems or Medical Devices, the device should attempt to continue
performing critical operations, where possible. If levels exceed a certain defined point that
engineers and business leaders agree upon, only then should the device shut down.
8.7.1 Risk
For voltage and current draw, the risk of abuse is related to glitching and other side-channel
attacks that can benefit from changes in these levels. If Brown and Black-out detection is
implemented on the processor, the risk of abuse is lowered. Otherwise, the risk is related to
spikes in voltage or current that could cause safety issues with the physical device, or allow
an Attacker to instrument glitching (and similar) attacks to subvert the security of the
components.
These issues should be remediated through the use of circuitry on the PCB that protects the
components against anomalous spikes or drops in voltage or current.
For environmental level changes that are dramatic, the risk is related to the safety of the
user. High temperatures caused by excessive CPU usage or other anomalies can cause
burns, chemical burns, or even fires.
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Black-out events
Brown-out events
The user must be warned in a sufficient amount of time to allow them to compensate for the
loss of power. This could be accomplished by enabling an LED that denotes a particular
power state such as green for OK, orange for Low, and red for Critical.
Systems that are connected to alternating current mains power should be configured to warn
the user when black-out or brown-out events have occurred. Also, the Endpoint should log
these events in persistent memory to ensure that the user and administration can retrieve
the information at a later time. The information should be time stamped.
The challenge in this process is identifying at what rate the batterys power is being depleted
and the extra energy required to notify the user of a change in power state. This can all be
achieved through electrical engineering, and should not be too challenging of a process for
experienced engineering firms.
8.8.1 Risk
Without a well defined power warning system, the users will be unable to adequately prepare
for potentially critical power events. While this may be benign in the case of simple devices
such as pace counters, timers, and other wearable devices, more critical devices such as
personal trackers, telematics systems, and home security systems can be seriously
impacted by the loss of power.
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8.9.1 Method
Endpoints, especially Gateways, or Endpoints acting as Gateways, must be capable of
enforcing communications security even in environments where connectivity to the back-end
network is unavailable. Regardless of whether this lack of connectivity is temporary or not,
the Gateway or Endpoint must be capable of enforcing security as if the back-end system
were available.
To achieve this, the TCB must be used to authenticate all peers that the Endpoint must
communicate privacy-centric, configuration, or command data to. The TCB can be used to
ensure that messages sent and received from peers are being sent and received from an
entity that has been provisioned by the same organization. This reduces the likelihood that
an adversarial device is being communicated with.
Interoperability can still be achieved by communicating with other devices that cannot be
authenticated. However, the type of information that is communicated to these devices
should be restricted to inter-operational and non-sensitive classes of data.
The challenge comes from deciding what Endpoints to authenticate and what Endpoints to
communicate with in clear-text. The organization must decide what types of data are
classified and should be kept from unauthenticated peers. Once this classification of data is
achieved, the organization will be able to determine what peers are reasonably trustworthy
even without the assistance of the core IoT services.
8.9.2 Risk
The risk of deploying solutions to communication-less environments is that it opens up an
opportunity for competition to abuse the infrastructure. Competitors can undercut the
business by offering interoperability and using connection-less sites as a proving ground.
Instead, the organization can choose to allow interoperability, but to a point. Certain core
intellectual property and services can then be reserved for only authenticated peers that are
validated through the use of a TCB. This helps to reduce the exposure of the business to
intellectual property problems and adversarial competitors.
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To accomplish this, the TCB and supporting protocols should be used. Generally, the
process is to:
Verify the message signature using the TCB and the trust anchor
It is important that the message be signed and prepared for transmission prior to
decommissioning, as the decommissioning process includes the invalidation and removal of
security keys from the trust anchor. Because of this process, the keys used to sign the
decommission message will not be available. The service requires the reception of a
message that is integrity verifiable to ensure that the Endpoint did indeed receive and
process the message.
As a result, it is imperative that the backend system running in the Service Ecosystem
invalidate the Endpoint from being able to communicate with critical services. If the device
does attempt to interact with networked peers or critical services, the backend system
should raise an alert and let the administration know that the anomalous event has occurred.
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8.10.1 Risk
The risks of not implementing decommissioning and sunsetting are many, from complete
takeover of an entire network by adversaries to allowing compromised devices to continue
using networked services. The most common risk is associated with users that have ended
their subscription with an IoT Service Provider. If these users are not decommissioned from
the network, they may be able to continue communicating with other peers in the IoT
Endpoint network, or may be able to access services that should no longer be accessible to
the user. This incurs a cost on behalf of the IoT Service Provider, who must pay for the
bandwidth, CPU time, and storage in the Service Ecosystem.
Metadata analysis is used when communication between two network entities is encrypted,
but protocol structures that identify the type of message or identity of the sender and/or
receiver are exposed. This metadata can be used to derive intent.
Consider the scenario where automobiles emanate messages containing metadata that is
attributable to a specific consumer. Anyone with the ability to track (either locally or remotely)
these pieces of metadata may be able to monitor the consumers movements, and then
derive behaviour or intent from these movements. If there are security flaws that are
exploitable in the vehicles telematics system, it may be possible to track and target a
specific consumers telematics system, putting them at risk of physical harm.
Legal organizations and insurance companies are concerned about how these risks will
impact the future of automotive finance, and are beginning to get involved in legislation and
standards that will determine how engineers must design telematics equipment. This change
will eventually trickle down to the less active IoT verticals, as more technology is developed.
To combat metadata harvesting, encrypt as much data as possible and use unique binary
identifiers for communication modules. Enforce a policy that disallows external users from
being able to use the IoT systems API to derive hardware serial numbers and other
trackable identities from user profiles. Where possible, disallow the structure of a message
from being exposed to third parties. Do not allow actions, activities, or behaviours to be
exposed to third parties. Enforce confidentiality and integrity on all data that relates to user
privacy.
8.11.1 Risk
Using weak communications security may enable data or metadata harvesting that
endangers an end-user or exposes end-user privacy. As insurance agencies are building a
case for enforcing end-user privacy requirements in technology, the business may put itself
at risk if it doesnt take responsibility for the data their devices generate.
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Typically, the goal of such an attack is simple disruption, to disallow or deny service to
legitimate users. In other cases, the abuse may be more purposeful. For instance,
communications protocols that have no authentication mechanism can be spoofed. To
achieve this, the actual signal must be jammed so that the adversarys spoofed signal is
more likely to reach the intended target.
An example of this is Global Positioning Systems (GPS) spoofing. Civilian GPS signals lack
encryption and authentication as it is, essentially, a plaintext broadcast signal that anyone
can receive. It is also a relatively weak radio signal and is easily attenuated by
environmental anomalies such as Ultra High Frequency (UHF) pre-amplifiers for television
receivers and microwaves.
For devices that require location information to function properly, a jammed GPS signal can
result in a reliability risk that can cascade into an information security risk, especially if
spoofing is subsequently employed.
To combat jamming and other forms of intentional denial of service (DoS) attacks, develop a
robust communications protocol that focuses on methods to devalue breaks in service. The
network should detect whether devices have suddenly or abnormally left the network. Each
Endpoint should say goodbye when it intends to leave the network. If it doesnt, the
anomaly should be noted for statistical analysis.
In addition, communication security keys should be renegotiated every time a device re-joins
the network. The same communications security key should not be used. It should be
bootstrapped by the same asymmetric cryptographic key, but any symmetric key derived
from key negotiation should be novel per each communications session.
Unintentional jamming can occur on a radio for many reasons: environmental conditions that
disallow signal propagation, malfunctioning equipment, or even adjacent equipment
operating at the same frequency. Regardless of the underlying reason, engineers that rely
on radio communications expect that there will be temporal conditions that cause signal
degradation or loss. These losses must be compensated for through the design of the
application and network communications protocol.
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Developers are recommended to read the GSMAs Connection Efficiency Guidelines [9]
which contains advice on how to protect against unintentional Denial of Service attacks and
provide guidance regarding Device Host Identity Reporting (DHIR).
9.1.1 Risk
Failing to combat the risk of intentional DoS will result in abnormal or insecure Endpoint
behaviour. If the Endpoint always uses the same session key, this may be a way adversaries
could abuse network architecture to gather information about the symmetric key used to
secure the communications. Properly building a secure session after each disconnected
session is imperative toward the security of the Endpoint communications.
Therefore, it is imperative that IoT Service Providers evaluate their product from a safety
perspective to determine if, how, and when human life may be affected by the technology. If
adequate safeguards are not put into place to ensure the technology cannot be abused in
order to cause physical harm, their customers may be put at risk.
To help resolve the issue of safety, have a discussion with the IoT Service Providers
executive, legal, and insurance teams. Ensure that these teams understand the capabilities
and limitations of the technology used in the product or service. Determine whether these
technologies can meet the needs of the business and offer the customers the level of safety
necessary for the intended application.
9.2.1 Risk
Clearly, the result of not taking the time to evaluate the impact of the product or service on
the safety of the customers could result in the loss of revenue, unexpected accidents, or
even loss of life.
The goal of this attack would be to bypass the security employed between two components
on the bus. A typical example of this scenario is utilizing this weakness to bypass the
integrity validation process of analysing an application image stored in NVRAM. When the
CPU retrieves memory stored in NVRAM, the Attacker can use a pass-through system to
provide the real memory contents to the CPU. When the application running on the CPU has
verified the integrity of the application image, the Attacker may then instrument the
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communications on the physical bus to selectively swap out NVRAM contents that are
beneficial to the Attacker. In other words, the CPU verifies one application image (the
original image) but then loads the Attackers image into RAM and executes it.
It should also be noted at this point that an Attacker could subvert RAM as well, weakening
this process. However, performing a man-in-the-middle attack against RAM is far more
complex and costly than an attack against NVRAM because the speed of the bus and
access patters are far faster and more erratic than with NVRAM, which is primarily accessed
in blocks.
Alternatively, the Attacker can create checksums for smaller regions of validated NVRAM
contents and periodically check the signatures from NVRAM. If the checksums differ, then
the content is being manipulated. This may succeed, but has a lower success potential
because the adversary may only manipulate a small amount of data that isnt randomly
checked by the running application.
It should be noted that while the best way to guard against this attack is to validate the
contents of NVRAM then load it into executable RAM, there is no full solution for this
problem. The cost of securing physical components is so high that it is not practical to
resolve this attack in a more full way, unless the customer requires such security
assurances.
This attack is even more simplistic when a more basic physical communications protocol,
such as I2C, is used. Buses such as I2C are essentially physical broadcast systems. Thus,
any component sitting on the I2C bus can pretend to be any other component. This will allow
an adversary to impersonate other devices on the bus that dont enforce confidentiality and
integrity on the communications channel. Where this is a concern, enforce confidentiality and
integrity in the application protocol used on top of the physical bus protocol.
9.3.1 Risk
The risk of not implementing a solution at all will result in the ability for an adversary to
bypass integrity checks in the application. This will allow the Attacker to compromise the
application being executed by more privileged code, such as bootloaders or TCBs.
It should be noted, however, that this attack is far less likely than simpler attacks against the
bootloader. Performing a man-in-the-middle hardware attack against components like
NVRAM, or high speed components like RAM, is challenging, complex, and currently
expensive. While it will always be possible for an adversary to subvert an embedded system
in this fashion, it may be too cost-prohibitive to do so.
Thus, loading code into RAM and verifying the integrity may be a reasonable solution that
will bypass the majority of attacks, if any.
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Also, for the reasons described above and more, cryptographic keys should not be kept in
insecure privileges such as these. They should be stored in a trust anchor and used by the
TCB, not stored in media such as NVRAM that could be impersonated or compromised.
The goal of the attack is to compromise secrets that allow the Attacker to gain long-term
access to a resource that would otherwise be out of their reach. For example, breaking the
cryptographic algorithms used in the most recent standard of TLS would be impossible for
the average Attacker. However, compromising the private client certificate used in a mutual-
authentication TLS service would allow the Attacker to simulate the client from a more
convenient system.
To succeed in this attack, the Attacker must be able to remove the RAM from the target
computer system without the bits stored in the chip changing. As detailed in the research
paper, this can be accomplished by cooling the memory chips. However, the RAM must be
easily removable. If the RAM is soldered to the circuit board, this would vastly complicate the
attack and require the Attacker to use a soldering gun to extract memory, potentially
damaging the contents.
It is important to note that scrubbing memory at shutdown is always useful, and is advised,
to enhance the privacy of an Endpoint. Yet, a cold boot attack can occur at any time, even
while the system is running. Therefore, scrubbing memory may be useful, but may not
succeed in defeating a real-world attack.
A more effective mitigation for this attack is to process security-centric actions using RAM
that is internal to the CPU. Many CPUs, MCUs, and MPUs have a small amount of internal
SRAM that can be used by a running application. If the application limits the use of critical
security tokens (such as private keys) to this internal RAM, the contents of removable (or
external) RAM will have less value to an Attacker.
9.4.1 Risk
Not consider the risk of a cold boot attack may cause critical security keys to be extracted
using a simple attack model. If the security keys are universal to all Endpoints in the IoT
Service Providers ecosystem, a large compromise may be possible.
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An example of this is home automation technology that reacts based on a users physical
presence in a particular room. An adversary capable of remotely monitoring the
communications system may be able to observe how many users are in a particular home,
where the users are in the home, and who the user is, solely by watching patterns of
communication between IoT Endpoints, gateways, and back-end systems.
The adversary may be able to easily differentiate between a highly populated home, and
homes where only one individual is home alone, and where that individual is within the
home. Insurance companies and legal entities will need to understand how this potentially
increases risk to homeowners and other tenants in the living space.
Combatting this risk can be difficult. The most common and simplest model for doing so is to
send samples at a pre-defined rate, regardless of whether there is a user present to take
samples from. If confidentiality and integrity is enforced, disallowing remote adversaries from
evaluating the datas plaintext, an observer will be unable to differentiate between a sample
containing user activity and an empty sample.
There are concerns with this model, however, such as increased spectrum saturation,
increased power consumption for low-power or battery-enabled technology, and the
increased processing level required to decrypt, verify, and interpret the empty sample
packets.
An alternative is sending samples at random intervals, with varying bursts. This type of
pattern is less costly, less power hungry, and requires less processing power. Yet, it still may
be possible to observe subtle changes that indicate user presence. For example, any truly
entropic system is fully random and unpredictable. User behaviour, however, is entirely
predictable. If a user enters a room and the sensors in that room react and begin to send
data to peer IoT Endpoints in the network, the introduction of consistent behaviour may
indicate the presence of a user.
Any team developing technology that is subject to this type of risk should investigate the
potential effects of the exposure of privacy, and consult with the legal team to determine
whether the technology would have an effect on the businesss legal stance or insurance
model.
9.5.1 Risk
If the IoT Service Provider does not evaluate their technology from the perspective of
potential privacy exposures and security risks, the architecture may need to be substantially
overhauled in order to compensate for the risks that must be addressed. Instead of trying to
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make costly adjustments to the architecture at a later time, engineer these solutions into the
product at the start of the engineering phase, or, as early as possible.
In information security, a FIB can be used to tap internal busses for the purpose of
intercepting data trafficked over internal components. In addition, a FIB can be used to alter
internal circuitry, which changes how the internal component will operate, allowing an
adversary to bypass a security restriction.
Almost all devices are subject to attack by a FIB. Yet, only certain devices will be ran
through a FIB process. This is because a FIB itself is an extremely costly technology, at
approximately 1,000,000 USD per unit. Because of the high cost of the technology, few
organizations have such a device in their toolkit. Furthermore, the device isnt automated. It
requires a high degree of skill to manipulate, as well as a very high degree of expertise in
semiconductor analysis, to be usable. Thus, the realistic cost of a FIB is far beyond a simple
million-dollar figure, and extends into the multi-millions of dollars for the utility itself, and the
education, and salary and expertise of the user.
Some new technologies, such as modern trust anchor variants, claim resistance from FIB
probes. While there is some validity to these claims, any hardware protection that isnt
dynamic (and most arent) will result in a playbook after a sufficient amount of time has been
put into analysing bypass techniques. Therefore, these new claims may be valid, but may
only be valid for a window of time.
Consider the scenario where an adversary must use a FIB to extract cryptographic from
every Endpoint they wanted to target. This would quickly become an extremely costly
proposal, and would be out of scope with regard to almost any adversarys budget. Since
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9.6.1 Risk
The risk of a FIB is that cryptographic secrets and other intellectual property can be
extracted from a component, even a security-hardened component. Since defeating a FIB in
a cost-effective manner for consumer IoT is impractical, the organization must alter their
strategy for protecting Endpoint systems or risk a complete compromise of the Endpoint
ecosystem.
As a result, IoT Service Providers who are conscious about security must take into account
the source of their components, their assembly, and the fulfilment process used to ship the
assembled technology. If the process used to generate the technology isnt carefully
planned, a single point of failure in the process could result in a critical security failure.
Has the silicon design been analysed by a credible third party information security
team?
How will the EEPROM or NVRAM be populated with an executable image, such as a
bootloader?
Is the executable image verified once it has been flashed onto EEPROM or NVRAM?
If secrets are generated at the manufacturer, are they using a proven RNG to
generate the keys?
Are all of the security keys unique per the TCB recommendations?
How are the cryptographic secrets shared with the IoT Service Provider? Securely?
How are the unique chip identifiers (serial number, etc.) correlated with the
cryptographic secrets, and shared with the IoT Service Provider?
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While choosing a more security facility to build and assemble a product may incur a greater
cost, it may be an imperative step for the organization. This depends on the product use
case, the intended deployment environment, the intended customer, and other factors such
as human safety, military applications, and critical infrastructure deployments. Where human
life can be impacted by the resultant technology, the supply chain should be assessed for
gaps in security.
9.7.1 Risk
Without supply chain security the organization is subject to many risks, some of which may
be entirely unexpected, and yet critical to the business:
Theft of technology (competitors stealing from and undercutting the Service Provider)
Injection of implants (malicious back doors that may be activated at a later time)
Therefore, the provider should identify what privacy issues may result from a law
enforcement request, and should be ready to provide information relevant to the
organizations legal model and privacy policy, within their respective legal capabilities.
In the recent past, businesses such as Google, Apple, and other large entities have adopted
warrant canaries to legally let users know when a secret request has been made to the
company on behalf of an agency. The business may remove a phrase, image, or other
artefact that is representative of not being in contact with lawful intercept agents. The
removal of this object is indicative, of course, of a request being made.
9.8.1 Risk
Not readying the business for a lawful intercept request puts the business at a disadvantage
if such a requirement is placed on the business. The business may need to comply to the
request, but may not have the legal infrastructure or privacy policies ready, potentially
putting them at risk.
Not readying the Endpoint protocol and IoT platform for adequate confidentiality and integrity
will enable the communications to be intercepted at the network side without the businesss
knowledge. This can put the business at risk of the user data being leaked, or associated
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with an event such as the Snowden NSA leaks, substantially decreasing the publics trust in
the organizations ability to secure user data.
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10 Summary
In summary, almost every security risk in an IoT product or service can be combatted by a
well defined architecture, intelligence to identify risks before and during security related
events, and policies and procedures to handle such events. By analysing which high-level
security concepts are important to the IoT Service Provider, frequently asked security
questions can be reviewed. This should guide the engineering team toward which
recommendations are most relevant to resolve gaps in their security architecture.
Overall, every engineering team will face very similar risks. It is imperative that the
organization choose to share their concerns with their peers to build common a
knowledgebase for both risks and remediation strategies. Together, our organizations can
build both technology and knowledge to assist each other in building security into the future
of IoT.
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The overall security level of a multi hop network is defined by the weakest link in the chain.
Thus the local link between IoT Endpoint and an Gateway needs to be secured with a
comparable level of security as the wide area network to keep the same overall level of
security.
One candidate technology for achieving this is Generic Bootstrap Architecture (GBA) [17]
which can be used for both authentication as well as data integrity. This is based on pre-
shared keys which are then used to generate time-limited keys (tokens) as a basis of both
authentication and encryption.
Authentication is the process of determining whether someone or something is, in fact, who
or what it is declared to be. In the IoT space, where billions of Endpoints will be active,
determining what communication behaviour is genuine and trustful is paramount. The
mechanism established to create this trust relationship needs to satisfy the requirement of
being scalable and maintainable. Furthermore, the variety of IoT Services imposes the
requirement that the authentication mechanism can be adapted to accommodate those
different services and still maintain a common infra-structure. A mechanism that has proven
itself over time is network authentication based on the SIM. This authentication infrastructure
has the virtue of providing not only authentication, but also encryption capabilities based on
pre-shared secrets. The explosion in the number of Endpoints and the global reach of IoT
makes the use of SIM limited because of network roaming and the security weakness of
being able to physically remove a SIM from an un-attended Endpoint. The arrival of
technologies like the Embedded SIM provides a practical infrastructure for authentication
based on pre-shared secrets, extending the current SIM based network authentication.
Also, IoT growth is most likely to happen in the form of capillary networks (the PAN as
shown in the example configurations 2, 3 and 4 in the previous section of this document).
These capillary networks are swarms of Endpoint devices connected to a Gateway. Most of
these Endpoint devices will be lightweight Endpoint devices (i.e. they do not contain a SIM
nor cellular connectivity). These lightweight Endpoint devices will nonetheless require
authentication and encryption capabilities. In capillary networks the principal responsibility of
authentication lies on the Gateway, reducing the number of complex SIM based Endpoint
devices on the overall network. This authentication and security should be extended from the
Gateway to the Endpoint device, creating then a secure channel from the given Endpoint
device to the IoT Service Platform.
SIM based authentication is meant to serve a single application, i.e. the authentication of a
unique Endpoint device for network attachment. Endpoint devices will have a multitude of
services, each with different and exclusive need for authentication. A framework that extends
the network authentication to multiple services is required. One framework that was
designed for this purpose is GBA, Generic Bootstrapping Architecture. GBA leverages on
the SIM based infrastructure to generate time-base share keys between devices and
Network Application Functions (NAFs). GBA is an authentication method standardized by
the 3GPP in the 3GPP specification TS 33.220 [17]. The method enables the authentication
of a device with a 3GPP subscription to a service. The credentials of the subscription are in
the device, usually stored on a SIM, such as a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), or
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as remotely managed credentials, stored and managed on an embedded SIM (eUICC) for
example, such as the GSMA specified Embedded SIM (eUICC) [5].
Mutual authentication based on either PSK uniquely between a device and a Network
Application Function or shared key-based UE authentication with certificate-based NAF
authentication (TS 33.222) [18].
Credentials can be secured in a Trusted Environment
If eUICC is used, the credentials can be changed OTA.
Scalability. The complexity and economic cost of maintenance increases linearly with
the number of devices, since authentication is built inside the framework.
Data integrity. The time-base generated keys during authentication can be used for
establishing TLS-PSK tunnels, making this connection will provide very strong data
integrity and confidentiality.
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In IoT context, UICC can be available in multiple Form Factors and environmental operating
ranges as specified in ETSI TS 102 671. In its simplest embodiment, the UICC is typically
owned by a network operator and only hosts one Network Access Application (SIM
application as per 3GPP TS 51.011, USIM as per 3GPP TS 31.102, CDMA CSIM as
specified by 3GPP2, WiMAX SIM, etc.). In this case, the UICC provides a standardized
holder to host security provisioning and configuration information as well as cryptographic
procedures on a mobile device to enable network access, with additional mechanisms to
remotely manage the content of the UICC, using ETSI TS 102 225 / TS 102 226. The mobile
network ecosystem has procedures in place to ensure secure personalization and
deployment of UICCs under control of the network operator, resulting in the establishment of
individual shared symmetric keys between UICC hosting devices and the infrastructure.
One important feature of UICC platform is the support of isolated Security Domains that
enables multiple stakeholders in a complex ecosystem to each be assigned their own area
on a UICC and manage its content in confidentiality from other stakeholders. This
functionality is inherited through ETSI TS 102 226 from GlobalPlatform Card Specification
[15] Amendment A. Therefore, in an IoT context, a single UICC enables multiple
stakeholders to store and administer their own credentials independently from one another.
In general, a UICC can hold several Network Access applications (with only one being active
at any given time), and potentially other applications securing access to more elaborated
services, such as ISIM applications for IMS access (as specified in 3GPP TS 31.103) or, in
the case of IoT Services, 1M2M SM applications specified in Annex D of oneM2M TS-0003.
A 1M2MSM application can support direct provisioning of dedicated IoT Service/ application
credentials, as well as derivation from pre-existing network access credentials on the UICC
using the GBA mechanism specified by 3GPP. It further enables an IoT Service Provider to
customize the cryptographic procedures according to its specific needs, e.g. to support
specific service authentication mechanisms.
A single UICC can also hold multiple 1M2MSM applications, enabling the confidential
deployment of symmetric keys dedicated to each IoT Service Provider. A UICC owner
(typically a network operator or OEM manufacturer in IoT context) may share space on its
UICC with IoT Service Providers that request it, so that the accredited UICC personalization
chain and infrastructure that enables secure deployment of network access credentials can
also be leveraged by IoT Service Providers to deploy their own credentials.
Where IoT application security rely on asymmetric cryptography, custom UICC applications
can similarly be used to facilitate the deployment of public/private key pairs, as needed for a
specific IoT Service. Such UICC applications need to be specified and supported on hosting
devices on an IoT application specific basis.
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It is our intention to provide a quality product for your use. If you find any errors or omissions,
please contact us with your comments. You may notify us at prd@gsma.com
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Copyright Notice
Copyright 2017 GSM Association
Disclaimer
The GSM Association (Association) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept
any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document.
The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.
Antitrust Notice
The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Associations antitrust compliance policy.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Overview 3
1.2 Document Structure 3
1.3 Document Purpose and Scope 3
1.4 Intended Audience 4
1.5 Definitions 4
1.6 Abbreviations 5
1.7 References 6
2 IoT Service Assets That Network Operators Can Protect 9
3 Network Security Principles 10
3.1 Secure Identification of Users, Applications, Endpoint Devices, Networks
and Service Platforms. 10
3.2 Secure Authentication of Users, Applications, Endpoint Devices, Networks
and Service Platforms. 11
3.3 Provide Secure Communication Channels 11
3.4 Ensure Availability of Communication Channels 12
4 Privacy Considerations 14
5 Services Provided by Network Operators 14
5.1 Secure Subscription Management Procedures 14
5.2 Network Authentication and Encryption Algorithms 17
5.3 Security of Fixed Networks 18
5.4 Traffic Prioritisation 18
5.5 Backhaul security 18
5.6 Roaming 18
5.7 Endpoint and Gateway Device Management 21
5.8 Other Security Related Services 23
Annex A Document Management 26
A.1 Document History 26
A.2 Other Information 26
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
This document provides top-level security guidelines for Network Operators who intend to
provide services to IoT Service Providers to ensure system security and data privacy.
Recommendations are based on readily available systems and technologies that are
deployed today.
CLP.11
IoT Security Guidelines Overview
Document CLP.14
IoT Security
CLP.12 CLP.13
+ Guidelines for
Network
IoT Security Guidelines IoT Security Guidelines Operators
for IoT Service for IoT Endpoint
Ecosystem Ecosystem
This document is not intended to create new IoT specifications or standards, but will refer to
currently available solutions, standards and best practice.
This document is not intended to accelerate the obsolescence of existing IoT Services.
Backwards compatibility with the Network Operators existing IoT Services should be
maintained when they are considered to be adequately secured.
This document does not address the security issues associated with the interfaces and APIs
implemented on the IoT Service Platform (or IoT Connectivity Management Platform) in
order for the IoT Service Platform to share its data with end users (for example to share data
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with an end user via a smartphone or PC application) or other entities within the ecosystem.
Such interfaces and APIs shall be secured using best practice internet security
technologies and protocols.
It is noted that adherence to national laws and regulations for a particular territory may,
where necessary, overrule the guidelines stated in this document.
Firstly, Network Operators who wish to provide services to IoT Service Providers.
Secondly, enterprises and organisations who are looking to develop new and
innovative connected products and services (the so called Internet of Things)
utilising cellular of fixed line networks. In this document we refer to these enterprises
as IoT Service Providers.
1.5 Definitions
Term Description
Device Host Identify A capability for an Endpoint device to report host information to a Network
Reporting Operator. See GSMA Connection Efficiency Guidelines [17]
Diameter is an authentication, authorization, and accounting protocol for
Diameter
computer networks. See IETF RFC 6733 [18]
An IoT Endpoint is a physical computing device that performs a function
or task as part of an Internet connected product or service. See section 3
Endpoint
of CLP.13 [29] for a description of the three common classes of IoT
devices, and examples of each class of Endpoint.
A complex endpoint device that typically bridges between Lightweight
Gateway Endpoint devices (connected via a local network) and a wide area
network. See CLP.13 [29] for further information.
The Internet of Things describes the coordination of multiple machines,
devices and appliances connected to the Internet through multiple
networks. These devices include everyday objects such as tablets and
Internet of Things
consumer electronics, and other machines such as vehicles, monitors
and sensors equipped with communication capabilities that allow them to
send and receive data.
IoT Connectivity A system, usually hosted by the Network Operator, to allow the self-
Management management of IoT subscriptions and price plans by the IoT Service
Platform Provider.
Any computer program that leverages data from IoT devices to perform
IoT Service
the service.
The service platform, hosted by the IoT Service Provider which
IoT Service Platform
communicates to an Endpoint to provide an IoT Service.
Enterprises or organisations who are looking to develop new and
IoT Service Provider innovative connected IoT products and services. The provider could be a
Network Operator.
Typically a constrained device (e.g. sensor or actuator) that connects to
Lightweight Endpoint
an IoT Service via a Gateway device.
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Term Description
The operator of the communication network that is connecting the IoT
Network Operator
Endpoint device to the IoT Service Platform.
A Secure Element Platform specified in ETSI TS 102 221 that can
support multiple standardized network or service authentication
UICC
applications in cryptographically separated security domains. It may be
embodied in embedded form factors specified in ETSI TS 102 671.
A telecommunications network that extends over a large geographical
Wide Area Network
distance.
1.6 Abbreviations
Term Description
3GPP 3rd Generation Project Partnership
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
APN Access Point Name
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
CEIR Central Equipment Identity Register
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team
DNS Domain Name System
DoS Denial of Service
DPA Data Processing Agreement
EAB Extended Access Barring
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EID eUICC Identity
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EU European Union
eUICC Embedded UICC
FASG Fraud and Security Group
GCF Global Certification Forum
GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GRX GPRS Roaming eXchange
GSM Global System for Mobile communication
GSMA GSM Association
GTP GPRS Tunnelling Protocol
HLR Home Location Register
HSS Home Subscriber Server
ICCID Integrated Circuit Card Identity
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Term Description
IMEI International Mobile station Equipment Identity
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
IoT Internet of Things
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
L2TP Layer Two Tunnelling Protocol
LBO Local Break Out
LPWAN Low Power Wide Area Network
LTE Long-Term Evolution
M2M Machine to Machine
MAP Mobile Application Part
MME Mobility Management Entity
OMA Open Mobile Alliance
OSS Operations Support System
OTA Over The Air
A pseudo-acronym, originally meaning PCS Type Certification Review Board, but no
PTCRB
longer applicable.
RAN Radio Access Network
SAS Security Accreditation Scheme
SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SMS Short Message Service
SoR Steering of Roaming
SS7 Signalling System No. 7
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service
USSD Unstructured Supplementary Service Data
VLR Visitor Location Register
VPN Virtual Private Network
VoLTE Voice over LTE
WAN Wide Area Network
1.7 References
Ref Doc Number Title
ETSI TS 102 Secured packet structure for UICC based applications
[1]
225 www.etsi.org
ETSI TS 102 Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications
[2]
226 www.etsi.org
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The security services provided by Network Operators can provide a critical role in securing
the assets used to provide an IoT Service. These can include:
IoT Service data being sent between an IoT Endpoint device and the IoT Service
Platform this includes both primary privacy-sensitive data (e.g. end user related
data) and commercially exploitable data (e.g. such as actuator control data) which
may also have some secondary privacy impact.
The security assets (IMSI, keysets etc.) and network configuration settings (APN,
timer values etc.) used within Endpoint devices (including Gateway devices).
IoT Service Providers business-sensitive information, including brand reputation,
customer/user data under company responsibility, strategic information, financial
data, health records, etc.
An IoT Service Providers business infrastructures, service platforms, corporate
networks and other private network elements.
Public (i.e. shared) datacentre infrastructures provided by the Network Operator that
are used by the IoT Service. This can include public services, hosted capabilities,
virtualization infrastructures, cloud facilities, etc.
Communications network infrastructure, including radio access networks, core
network, backbone networks, basic service functions (DNS, BGP, etc.), access to and
aggregation of fixed and cellular networks, etc.
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In this section it is described how networks can provide value within the IoT ecosystem.
Identification and authentication of the entities involved in the IoT Service (i.e.
Gateways, Endpoint devices, home network, roaming networks, service platforms).
Access control to the different entities that need to be connected to create the IoT
Service.
Data protection in order to guarantee the security (confidentiality, integrity, availability,
authenticity) and privacy of the information carried by the network for the IoT Service.
Processes and mechanisms to guarantee availability of network resources and
protect them against attack (for example by deploying appropriate firewall, intrusion
prevention and data filtering technologies)
Within a cellular connected IoT Service, Endpoint devices are identified using IMSI and/or
IMEI (EIDs may also be used for devices with eUICCs). Networks are identified using
network codes and country codes. Each method of providing identity has varying levels of
secure assurance associated with it.
Identity plays a crucial role in the process of authentication as secure authentication can only
be achieved on the basis of a secure identity. It is therefore essential that the identities (for
example an IMSI, IMEI or ICCID) issued and used within an IoT Service are securely
protected against unauthorised modification, impersonation or theft.
One practical problem an IoT Service Provider may face is that their IoT Service may require
communications with many IoT Service Platforms, each of which may require a separate
unique identification. Each identity used to establish a communications link to each IoT
Service Platform will then need to be securely provisioned, stored and managed by the IoT
Service.
Where appropriate for the IoT Service, Network Operators recommend the use of UICC
based mechanisms to securely identify Endpoint devices. Network Operators can also
extend the secure storage functionality provided by the UICC to the IoT Service Provider to
enable them to store additional IoT Service related identities on the UICC. This technique
can be applied to both cellular and non-cellular Endpoint devices (e.g. EAP-AKA [27]).
Single sign-on services could also be provided by Network Operators to allow Endpoint
devices to establish and prove their identity once, and then connect to several IoT Service
Platforms without further inconvenience. The security trade-offs and risks of using such a
service must be considered across the multiple platforms.
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Network Operators can provide services to ensure that the users, applications, Endpoint
devices, networks and service platforms associated with an IoT Service are securely
authenticated.
The purpose of a secure communication channel is to ensure that the data being sent over
the channel is not processed, used or transmitted without the knowledge and consent of the
data subject. Encryption technologies play a crucial role in secure data transmission by
assuring the properties of confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Encryption must be
appropriate to the system being designed and deployed taking into account Lightweight
Endpoint devices, network aspects (such as satellite backhaul constraints) and the service
being provided.
Network Operators can provide IoT Service Providers with data encryption services to
ensure communication integrity and network resilience.
Network Operators can provide their customers with private networks where dedicated
communication channels are provided for the use of a single customer to ensure that no
data traverses a public network such as the Internet. Such private networks could be
created:
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1. By using a tunnelling protocol such as Layer Two Tunnelling Protocol (L2TP) and
secured using protocols such as Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), or
2. By creating a dedicated network for the IoT Service by deploying a separate instance
of the core network with shared radio network as per the example shown below.
Network Operators can provide IoT Service Providers with available networks. The most
fundamental mechanisms provided by Network Operators to provide network availability are
as follows:
Use of licenced spectrum, which provides the Network Operator with dedicated radio bands
in which to operate their network, ensures that careful network coverage and capacity
planning can be undertaken by the Network Operator to ensure maximum network
availability to their customers.
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also ensures the standard is subject to maximum scrutiny during its creation to ensure the
robustness of its technology.
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4 Privacy Considerations
To realise the opportunities that the IoT offers, it is important that consumers trust the IoT
Service Providers who are delivering IoT Services and collecting data about them. The
GSMA and its members believe that consumer confidence and trust can only be fully
achieved when users feel their privacy is appropriately respected and protected.
There are already well-established data protection and privacy laws around the world which
have been applied, and complied with, by Network Operators. Operators believe that it is
possible to apply existing data protection regulations and principles to address privacy needs
in the context of IoT Services and technologies.
However, IoT Services typically involve operators working together with IoT Service Provider
partners. It is important that there is regulatory clarity and legal certainty around IoT Services
and that privacy and data protection regulations apply consistently across all IoT Service
Providers in a service and technology-neutral way.
Network operators should be aware that if they process data in any way they need to sign a
Data Processing Agreement (DPA) with the IoT Service Provider. The data protection and
security practices developed for a given IoT Service should reflect the overall risk to an
individuals privacy and the context in which data about the individual is collected, distributed
and used. Any regulatory interventions should be limited to areas where identified risks
emerge and existing measures are insufficient to address these.
Network operators can draw on their extensive experience in addressing privacy and
security issues and work collaboratively with IoT Service Providers, to embed privacy and
security into IoT technologies and the overall consumer experience. Such collaboration will
ensure IoT Service Providers are able to identify and mitigate the relevant consumer privacy
risks in the context of the service being delivered.
For more information please see the GSMA Mobile Privacy Principles:
http://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/mobile-and-privacy/mobile-privacy-principles
This section contains best-practice recommendations when connecting IoT Services to wide
area networks. Where appropriate, the recommendations will be independent of the
technology used, but will also use best practice from cellular and other network types.
The Network Operator or IoT Service Provider should perform an assessment of the
network services that are needed to enable the IoT Service (voice, data, SMS, etc.)
both now and in the future.
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Based upon this assessment the Network Operator should operate on the principle
of least privilege and provision the IoT Service Providers subscriptions with only
those services required for the specific IoT Service. For example:
o IoT Services that only use data bearers should not be provisioned with
voice and SMS services.
o Where an Endpoint device only connects to a known IoT Service Platform,
the subscription associated with the device should only allow connection to
a known whitelist of IP address ranges (or domains).
o If the IoT Service uses voice or SMS, the use of a preconfigured fixed
dialling list should be considered.
o If the UICCs used for IoT Services are segregated from the UICCs used for
traditional handsets then this provides a basis for more secure and
efficient management of the associated subscriptions by the Network
Operator than might otherwise be the case. For example, a Network
Operator might consider using a separate HLR/HSS for Endpoint devices
which have extended lifetime and is better configured to support these
UICCs for a very long period of time (i.e. many years).
IoT Endpoint devices should support the necessary APDU commands recognized by the
UICC to make sure that UICC OTA command execution will succeed.
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For example, for IoT Service Providers who need to manage a large number of eUICCs that
are embedded into Endpoint devices for which the IoT Service Provider is not the owner and
cannot easily access (e.g. a car).
Typically Operators use IoT Connectivity Management Platforms to monitor and control the
communication services offered to the IOT Devices by (e)UICCs.
The Network Operator should support the GSMAs Remote Provisioning Architecture for
Embedded UICC Technical Specification [7].
The UICC may also be used for tamper-resistant storage of sensitive data for IoT Services,
including security keys controlled by the IoT Service Provider. ETSI TS 102 225 [1]
leverages on the Confidential Card Content Management feature of the Global Platform
Card Specification to enable IoT Service Providers to independently manage their own
security domain on a UICC.
An IoT Service Provider or Network Operator can ask the UICC Supplier to create such
security domains inside the UICC. The issuer of the UICC should ensure that it is protected
by proper security keys and the IoT Endpoint device can execute the necessary APDU
commands to access it.
Additionally the UICC could also be used to encrypt (using its securely stored keys) and
send sensitive content for IoT Services, or provide security services for Endpoint device
based applications via services such as the Open Mobile API [4].
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The Network Operator should implement network authentication algorithms that meet the
lifetime expectations of the IoT Service Providers Endpoint devices.
Network Operators provide several types of communication services that can be used by an
IoT Service, such as USSD, SMS and IP data connectivity. For the purpose of this document
only IP data connectivity is discussed since it is the most utilised form of communication
service used by IoT Services.
USSD and SMS are used by many existing IoT Services so it is worth highlighting that
USSD and SMS have limited security support capabilities in comparison to IP data
connectivity. In general, USSD and SMS traffic is not by default end to end
cryptographically protected by the Network Operator and cryptographic protection
mechanisms to ensure confidentiality and integrity are not available for SMS messages. IoT
Service Providers that use USSD or SMS for their communication need to be aware of the
vulnerabilities associated with USSD and SMS and, where possible, implement additional
encryption at the service layer.
Use a minimum of 128 bit A5/3 stream cipher to protect link between the IoT Endpoint
device and the base station. Network Operators should avoid A5/1 and A5/2 or use of
unencrypted links where possible.
Use the MILENAGE authentication algorithm. Network Operators should avoid
COMP128-1 and COMP128-2. Network Operators should consider support of the
TUAK authentication algorithm
Take appropriate measures to address and mitigate false base station attacks.
In GSM/GPRS systems the network is not authenticated by the Endpoint device, only the
device is authenticated by the network. End-to-end encryption at the service layer is
therefore recommended when using GSM/GPRS systems. Consideration must be given to
practical processing, Endpoint device limitations and network bandwidth constraints in
solutions provided as IoT Services.
In GSM/GPRS systems the GTP-tunnel between SGSN and GGSN which is created over
the GRX-network is not encrypted. The Network Operator should ensure the security of this
link by ensuring GRX-network is managed as a private network.
Network Operators who provide UMTS networks shall support the MILENAGE authentication
and key generation algorithm. Network Operators should support the Kasumi confidentiality
and integrity encryption algorithms.
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Network Operators are advised to review the GSMA whitepaper Wireless Security in LTE
Networks [30].
As such, security guidelines related to Low Power Wide Area Networks are out of the scope
of this document. .
The Network Operator should implement backhaul encryption for GSM, UMTS and LTE
networks for both end user data and signalling plane data traffic.
5.6 Roaming
Network Operators can provide IoT Service Providers with an international mobile footprint
through use of roaming services.
Roaming networks can be vulnerable to security breaches due to the relative openness of
the SS7/Diameter interworking functions used to connect the home and roaming networks.
This is of particular relevance to IoT Services due to the potentially high proportion of IoT
Endpoint devices that will reside on roaming networks. There are a few reasons for the high
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percentage of roaming Endpoint devices. Firstly, many Endpoint devices are manufactured
in one location and distributed globally. Therefore in many cases replacing a UICC is not
practical or not possible in the case of embedded UICC. Secondly, in many cases the
roaming status is preferable over local connectivity, due to the potential multiple coverage by
several roaming networks. The formation of global alliances with a global UICCs and
dedicated IoT roaming agreements facilitate the permanent roaming situation where allowed
by local legislation.
Network Operators should consider how to protect their HLRs and VLRs against Denial of
Service attacks (including unintentional DoS attacks), requests from unauthorised sources
and exploitation of steering of roaming services.
The roaming is facilitated by the inter-Network Operator signalling protocols that are
exchanged between the main core mobile network entities:
1. Between the VLR or the SGSN in the roaming (visited) network and the HLR at the
home network the MAP (Mobile Application Part) protocol (for CDMA networks,
IS41 is similar to MAP).
2. Between the MME in the LTE roaming network and the HSS at the home LTE
network the Diameter (certain variants such as S6a) protocol.
3. Between the SGSN/S-GW in the visited network and GGSN/P-GW at the home
network the roaming data transfer using GTP (GPRS Tunnelling Protocol).
This section will concentrate on roaming security issues related to IoT Services. General
roaming security issues are covered by the GSMA FASG (Fraud And Security Group) and its
sub-groups. Hence, issues such as double registration in roaming, received from two
different VLRs located in different countries a classical roaming fraud scenario is out of
the scope of this document.
There may also be a need for the home Network Operator (together with the IoT Service
Provider) to distinguish between low priority Endpoint devices, and critical Endpoint devices.
For example, it may be necessary for healthcare devices to continue to maintain service
under signalling storms and service denial attacks. There may be a need for Network to
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reject the registration of low priority roaming Endpoint devices under signalling storm
conditions, but to allow high priority Endpoint devices to register. The reject mechanism
implemented may be accompanied with a back-off timer, in order to assist the Endpoint
device in registration re-attempt, after the signalling storm.
The general recommendation would be for Network Operators to screen all roaming
messages received from home networks/roaming partners. In addition to blocking messages
from unauthorized/faked home networks/roaming partners, there is a need to filter the
messages according to the Endpoint device priority. Under signalling storm/denial of service
attacks, there is a need to either allow messages from high priority/critical Endpoint devices,
or reject messages from non-critical Endpoint devices. Reject methods are required in order
to postpone the registration attempts and other activities for a certain period.
In case a security risk is detected in a specific visited network, the home network may decide
to transfer its outbound roaming Endpoint devices to another visited network, using the SoR
mechanism. Such an active transfer of Endpoint devices can be made upon the next
registration attempt of the Endpoint device, or ad-hoc using the SIM OTA services. A
security risk related to a specific visited network can be detected if a problem is reported by
a relatively high number of Endpoint devices roaming on that network, or information
received by other inputs.
Signalling storms may happen when the home GGSN/P-GW is flooded with requests for new
data sessions. The GPRS protocol creates a secured tunnel between the Endpoint device
and the GGSN, and a request for a new session (Create-PDP-Context) results in setting up
a tunnel, and allocation of an IP address to the Endpoint device. When IoT Endpoint devices
do not behave in a personalised manner, they can generate bursts of requests for new data
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sessions as noted before. Denial of Service attacks can be generated by a relatively small
number of Endpoint devices, creating multiple requests for new data sessions in parallel.
The GGSN/P-GW servers are limited in their capacity and should be protected from such
storms.
To prevent signalling storms Network Operators may, based on a security policy, prevent
certain devices from connecting to their network by changing the communication profile of
the affected devices or by enacting security policies within the networks packet core.
Critical Endpoint devices should receive a service also under denial of service attacks, while
the requests of lower priority Endpoint devices are postponed for a certain delay period.
On top of this basic Endpoint device management capability more complex and specific
Endpoint Device management functionality can be provided by the IoT Service Platform.
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The blue blocks indicate what is traditionally managed by the Network Operators existing
device management platforms and the red blocks indicate the service component that are
managed by the IoT Service Platform.
Network operators can undertake some of the device management functions indicated in red
at the request of the IoT Service Provider.
The Gateway should be a managed object, in order for it to be monitored and updated with
new firmware or software should the need arise. Protocols for providing secure firmware and
software updates and secure software and systems integration mechanisms should be used
to secure the interconnection of the Gateway to the network backbone.
Network Operators can provide and manage secure Gateways on behalf of the IoT Service
Provider which allow Endpoint devices to securely connect in a way that best integrates with
the Network Operators wide area network security mechanisms.
Gateways that connect using fixed network connectivity can be managed remotely using the
Broadband Forum TR-069 Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) Wide Area Network (WAN)
Management Protocol [20].
Gateways that connect using cellular network connectivity can be managed remotely using
the OMA Device Management (DM) and Firmware Update Management Object (FUMO)
protocols [5] [6].
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Network Operators may also implement localised device greylisting to allow the temporary
suspension of suspect devices whilst the Network Operator investigates the nature of such
devices prior to any blacklisting. It should be noted that for critical services such as
healthcare, blocking an IMEI may not be desirable or possible. It is important that the details
of connected Endpoint devices should be clearly understood by Network Operators in so far
that the true application (or host) of an Endpoint device can be discerned. Endpoint devices
that leverage the IMEI issued to a communications module vendor should support Device
Host Identify Reporting which is a capability that enables the Endpoint device to report host
information to the Network Operator. Device Host Identify Reporting is described in the
GSMAs Connection Efficiency Guidelines [17].
Network Operators can supply either a private cloud or a shared cloud infrastructure
depending upon the requirements of the IoT Service Provider.
This is advantageous for IoT because Lightweight Endpoint devices and services cannot
provide this functionality themselves. Network Operators can provide IoT Service Providers
with visibility of the security status, identified threats and attacks as well as an overall
security health check. These introspection services are vital to ensure that threats are not
infiltrated inside the pipe, particularly where data services are encrypted. Services provided
include:
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The service platform guidelines offered in CLP 12 IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service
Ecosystem [26] offers valuable guidance that can benefit the Network Operator who support
IoT Connectivity Management Platforms. These guidelines contain the following
recommendations:
Network Operators should make sure access to their IoT Connectivity Management
Platforms web portal, which could be Network Operator or Cloud hosted, uses best
in class encryption as per the most recently published industry guidance from
organisations such as NIST [24] and ECRYPT2 [25].
Network Operators should make sure access to their IoT Connectivity Management
Platforms web portal makes use of standard best practice procedures for password
creation, updating and resetting.
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The GSMAs Mobile Connect initiative [12], together with OpenID Connect [21], FIDO [22]
and ETSI MSS [23] are examples of multi factor authentication enablers that can enable an
IoT Service Provider to obtain additional authentication and information from their end users.
The end user in this context being a human that can provide information to an IoT Service
Platform to provide different levels of assurance examples include entering a PIN and
providing a biometric signature.
Whilst most multi factor authentication solutions are currently used to enable traditional
smartphone services such technologies could be applied to IoT Services that require the
assurance of human authorisation for certain tasks such as performing a network attach
operation, software update or hard reset.
For example, using multi factor authentication, a mobile identity could be used in addition to
a Gateway device inside a connected car. In this use case the multi factor authentication
infrastructure could act as an additional authorization layer for the cars occupants to gain
access to infotainment and payment services provided within the car.
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It is our intention to provide a quality product for your use. If you find any errors or omissions,
please contact us with your comments. You may notify us at prd@gsma.com
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