Fire and Explosion Characteristics of Powders

Vahid Ebadat, Ph.D.

Chilworth Technology, Inc.
Princeton Corporate Plaza
11 Deer Park Drive, Ste. 204
Monmouth Jct, NJ 08852
www.chilworth.com
vebadat@chilworth.com

Prepared for Presentation at the Society for Chemical Hazard Communication Spring Meeting
Las Vegas, Nevada
April 16-17, 2002

Copyright Chilworth Technology Inc.

March 2002
Unpublished
 Fire and Explosion Characteristics of Powders
Vahid Ebadat, Ph.D.
Chilworth Technology, Inc.

INTRODUCTION

The majority of powders handled by the pharmaceutical, chemical, plastics, food, and many
other industries will explode if dispersed in the presence of a sufficiently energetic ignition
source. As with flammable gases and solvent vapors, there are three conditions that need to exist
simultaneously for a dust explosion to occur, namely;

1. A flammable dust cloud.

2. An ignition source of sufficient energy.
3. An atmosphere that supports combustion.

Strictly speaking, for an explosion to occur all the above need to occur together in a confined
area. An ignition of an unconfined dust cloud can be referred to as a flash fire, however, as the
mechanism of both is the same, both are considered together.

A systematic approach to identifying and controlling flash fire and explosion hazards during
powder processing operations should follow a procedure to define a basis of safety. Essentially
this involves performing an operational hazard assessment as follows:

1. Characterize the fire and explosion properties of powder(s) being handled.

2. Perform audit to determine the location and extent of flammable atmospheres and to
identify potential sources of ignition
3. Assess the risk and consequences of ignition
4. Establish the basis of safety

The basis of safety could be, for example, avoidance of ignition sources, exclusion of oxygen, or
provision of explosion protection measures (relief venting, containment, suppression).

This article focuses on the characterization of the fire and explosion properties of powders and
explains the uses of test data in designing safety measures.
DUST CLOUD EXPLOSION TESTS

The first stage is to establish whether the dust is combustible. This can be assessed by an
Explosion Classification test in which the observation of flame propagation or detection of an
explosion pressure rise determines whether or not a suspended dust is capable of initiating an
explosion. Powders can usually be classified into tow groups. Group A defines a dust that burns
and propagates flames. Group B dusts do not ignite.

If the dust is combustible (Group A), the next step will be to establish the sensitivity to ignition
of any associated dust cloud or layer by the ignition sources that may exist during powder
handling/processing. Safety can be based on the prevention of ignition sources, provided correct
ignition sensitivity tests have been performed and the results suggest that these ignition sources
are unlikely to cause ignition.

The following tests would provide information on the sensitivity of powders to ignition by
electrostatic discharges, hot surfaces, self heating, heat from mechanical impact, and electrical
sparks.

- Minimum Ignition Energy

Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) test will determine the smallest amount of electrostatic spark
energy, that is required to initiate a dust cloud explosion.

The result of the Minimum Ignition Energy test provides information on the electrostatic ignition
risk, which can arise from powder handling operations. For example, based on the MIE data
decision can be taken on whether it is safe to pneumatically convey a given powder or allow it to
be packaged in non-conducting plastic packages or containers.

- Minimum Dust Cloud Ignition Temperature

The result of the Minimum Dust Cloud Ignition Temperature (or auto-ignition temperature) can
be used to investigate whether a dust cloud would self-ignite by a hot surface. This test is carried
out in a furnace apparatus with the temperature adjustable up to 1000C. Also powders with low
minimum ignition temperature and minimum ignition energy may present particularly high risk
of ignition by mechanical impact or frictional sparks.
- Thermal Instability Tests

A reliable assessment of the minimum temperature for the onset of exothermic activity (thermal
instability) of materials subjected to heat can be made by appropriate small-scale laboratory tests.

Situations in which powder in bulk is subjected to elevated temperatures, for example, at the
bottom of some dryers and in silos or bags, can be simulated by the Bulked Powder test. In this
test the powder can be heated isothermally or ramped at typically 0.5C/min. A suitable
operating temperature on large scale can then be recommended directly from the test data.

A Powder Layer test is required to determine the minimum ignition temperature of a powder
layer, exposed to a heated air stream over its surface. This test simulates tray drying or other
operations when heated air flows over the surface of the product. Such conditions may also arise
on ledges or walls of dryers.

Dust Cloud Explosion Violence (Kst)

A dust / air mixture is introduced into a 20-liter sphere and ignited by chemical ignitors. From
the pressure v time curve produced, values of the maximum pressure Pmax, and the maximum rate
of pressure rise (dp/dt)max, give an indication of the relative severity of the explosion.

Dust explosion severity test is seen as an essential test for all combustible powders (products and
intermediates) that could form dust clouds in plant. The data obtained from this test will be
required for the design of explosion protection measures such as, relief venting, suppression or
containment of explosion in a dust handling plant.

SAFETY OPTIONS

A dust explosion can be prevented by elimination of all the likely and possible ignition sources.
Elimination of ignition sources is, however, usually the first step rather than the ultimate basis
for safety. Other explosion preventative measures include operating in an inert atmosphere (e.g.
nitrogen inerting) and operating below the minimum dust concentration that is required to sustain
an explosion, Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC). However, operating below the MEC
is seldom used in practice because in most situations it is almost impossible to ensure that over a
period of time dust accumulation to above the minimum concentration does not occur.

The most frequent explosion prevention and protection options are summarized below.
Explosion Prevention

Inert Gas Blanketing

For a combustion process to occur, some oxidant is required. This is normally the oxygen in air
but other oxidants such as chlorine or nitrogen dioxide may support combustion. Safety can be
achieved by reducing the concentration below a level that will no longer support combustion
with the addition of an inert gas. This is known as inert gas blanketing. Nitrogen gas is the most
commonly used inert gas, however, argon and carbon dioxide can also be used.

The concentration of oxygen in air at which the atmosphere will no longer support combustion is
known as the Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC) for combustion. LOC values vary
depending on the material involved and the inert gas used. LOC test is usually performed in the
20-liter sphere vessel.

The inert atmosphere will need to be established before flammable atmospheres are present and
should be maintained throughout the process. Once the inert atmosphere has been established
the ingress of air should be prevented.

Avoidance of Ignition Source

There are a number of ignition sources that are commonly found in powder handling processes
and machinery. Those that are often intrinsic include static electricity, frictional heating, impact
sparks, hot surfaces and thermal decomposition.

Dust layer and deposits can be ignited by sparks, incandescent particles and other high-
temperature sources. An important feature with dust deposits is that smoldering combustion may
take place. This can occur by a process of self-heating when the temperature of dust layer or
bulk material is raised to a level at which the heat liberated by the exothermic reaction is
sufficient to exceed the heat losses. Eventually, the smoldering material may make the transition
into flame, especially when disturbed.

Safety can only be based on the prevention of ignition sources, if appropriate tests have been
conducted to assess the sensitivity of the dust cloud or layer to ignition by all potential sources of
ignition that are likely to be present.
Explosion Protection Measures

Explosion Relief Venting

The principle of explosion relief venting is to provide sufficient area for products of combustion
to be expelled at such a rate, to limit the internal pressure to an acceptable level. The sizing of an
explosion relief vent is dependent upon the internal volume, aspect ratio and pressure strength of
the equipment, the rate of combustion of the fuel and the opening pressure of the vent
panel/door. Secondary parameters such as the initial turbulence level and the shape and length of
vent ducting also influence the sizing of the explosion vent.

When a vent is opened burning powder is ejected resulting in a fireball external to the
equipment. The size of the fireball is enhanced if unburned dust is entrained in the release. It is
essential to divert this fireball to a safe area away from personnel, thoroughfares and plant
equipment. Vent ducts are often needed to relieve the explosion pressure to outside the
buildings. These give added back pressure to the explosion inside the vented vessel and this
needs to be compensated for.

Good house-keeping practices will reduce the risk of secondary explosions caused by disturbing
accumulated dust deposits (i.e. on floors, ledges etc).

Explosion Suppression

Essentially, explosion suppression relies on detecting an explosion in the early stages by

monitoring internal pressure or UV/IR radiation and then injecting an extinguishing agent into
the growing fireball. This maintains the explosion pressure to an acceptable level and prevents
an explosion from developing.

With explosion suppression systems, the explosion within the plant is contained, even in cases
where the plant may be lightly constructed. This makes suppression systems particularly suitable
where the discharge of a toxic dust would give rise to environmental pollution, or where the
relative position of the vessel with respect to any outside wall is such that the resulting back
pressures are unacceptable.

Containment of Explosion

This method of protection relies on the ability of equipment as well as all interconnected
pipework, flanges, manhole covers, instrumentation mountings etc, to withstand the maximum
explosion pressure.

The containment of the explosion pressures developed by a dust explosion requires powder
handling equipment of high strength, possibly capable of withstanding pressures in the range 7-
10 barg.
Isolation

With any of the above techniques, measures will be needed to prevent an explosion initiated in
one plant item from propagating along pipes, ductwork, chutes or conveyors, and starting a
subsequent explosion in other plant items or outside the equipment. Measures should therefore
be taken to create barriers to avoid propagation of an explosion.

There are basically two types of isolation barriers available;

- Mechanical barriers include rotary valves, screw feeders and quick acting valves.
- Chemical barriers rely on the detection of the flame front or the pressure wave an
activation of suppressors located downstream of the detector.

FINAL NOTE

Dust fire and explosion properties are critically dependent on test methods and sample
preparation. The use of published data or data where the samples origins and test methods are
not defined is to be guarded against. For example, many powders of say 500m diameters will
not explode if dispersed in air. The same powder if micronized, however, would be expected to
generate explosion pressures and rates of pressure rise that increase as the particles size falls.
Some test methods allow test sample selection based on pre-sieving although for some
applications it can be permissible to test powder sampled direct from plant.

The importance of careful selection of test sample becomes even more apparent when one
realizes that moisture content, air availability, chemical composition, particle shape, trace
solvents etc all affect dust explosion and thermal stability properties and therefore the outcome
of any hazard assessment. In thermal instability tests, for example, a small change in the product
may be the addition of a de-dusting agent or a change of drying method can have a major affect
on the self heating temperature and could lead to thermal runaway incident.

For additional information regarding this topic or any other process safety issues, please contact
Chilworth Technology, Inc., 11 Deer Park Drive, Monmouth Junction, NJ 08852, Tel: 732-274-
0900; Fax: 732-274-1371; Email: safety@chilworth.com; http://www.chilworth.com