Clarisse

Globe Mackay vs. CA

Facts:
Private Resp Tobias was employed as purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager
of Globe Mackay
He discovered anomalies and fraudulent transactions, reported them to his immediate superior and to Pet Herbert Hendry who
was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager
One day after he reported, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him
to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys
respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a
"swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting,
signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies
Manila police cleared R of participation in anomalies
Not satisfied, Ps hired private investigator, found R guilty, but expressly stated that further investigation needed
Nevertheless, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work
Handwriting specimens, lie detector test, etc. yielded negative results (not guilty)
Nevertheless, P still filed 6 criminal cases against R (estafa) dismissed
R filed complaint for illegal dismissal entered into compromise agreement
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry,
without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty
respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private
respondent
private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman
treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered

Issue: whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent (YES)
Whether or not the petitioners abused the right they invoked -right of employer to dismiss an employee (YES)

Held:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct
for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While
the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application the question of
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the
record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified
Following acts were taken into consideration: 1) belligerent reaction of P Hendry to R after report of anomalies 2) after leave
P H called R the crook and swindler of the company baseless since no report yet. petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21
of the Civil Code
 Other tortious acts: PH said they will file a hundred more cases until he lands in jail; You Filipinos cannot be trusted; letter to
RETELCO; filing of criminal complaints (found to be in bad faith) - filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by
Tobias against petitioners
Ps invoke principle of damnum absque injuria (damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount
to a legal wrong is not actionable) only damage R could have suffered was direct result of having been dismissed from
employment, which is a legal act on the part of Ps
Court: This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the
right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which
petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner
in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners
Petition denied.

Albenson vs. CA

Facts:
September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short) delivered to
Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the mild steel plates which
the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of
P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner Albenson,
through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao."
Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship
business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking
Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao."
Lawyer of Albenson made extrajudicial demand to respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon is his. He
further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted business with Albenson
Albenson filed complaint for BP 22
But it appears that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment,
E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same business
address of Guaranteed
Nevertheless, Information against private respondent was filed
PR moved for reinvestigation, Provincial Fiscal reversed findings of Trial Fiscal, dismiss Information
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced in violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its
employee
TC ruled in favor of PR
CA upheld TC ruling but reduced moral damages
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case of Madera vs.
Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part absolves them from any liability for malicious
prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil
Code

Issue: Whether or not PR may recover damages on the basis of Article 19 (NO, P acted in good faith, no malicious intent)

Held:
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following:
to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial
limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is
different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this
article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has
become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent
exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72)
Cited Globe Mackay: There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in
damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of
law which do not especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or
negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure
under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of
damages
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not
distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently TC made the mistake of lumping them all together
BUT Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each one, could be validly made
the bases for an award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the circumstances, We see no cogent reason
for such an award of damages to be made in favor of private respondent
petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to file the
case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due
on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries
regarding the origin of the check
if indeed private respondent wanted to clear himself from the baseless accusation made against his person, he should have
made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr.
(private respondent), and Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the issuer of the check). He,
however, failed to do this PR and son were doing business in the same building
Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent
waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for
damages. The Court will not countenance this devious scheme
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
Still, private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise
includes liability for damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious
prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order
that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and
the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao
vs. CA)
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages
grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for damages based on
malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and
third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where
one has acted with probable cause
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent by
instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in determining the liability of
private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award of
damages
Innocent mistake; action was filed in good faith
adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate
Petition granted.

Amonoy vs. Gutierrez

Facts:
Amonoy was counsel in a partition case involving 6 parcels of land in Tanay, Rizal. One of the clients is Asuncion Pasamba.
Lots were adjudicated in favor of her and Alfonso Formilda. Attorneys fees charged were P27,600. Asuncion and Alfonso executed
executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of
his attorneys fees
 Asuncion died; one of her heirs in R Angela Gutierrez
Case 1: Because his attorneys fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before CFI of
Pasig, Rizal
heirs opposed, contending that the attorneys fees charged [were] unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only
P11,695.92
CFI: ruled in favor of Amonoy; heirs failed to pay; 2 lots sold in public auction
Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00; A deficiency was claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale was
conducted, and again the highest bidder was Amonoy at P12,137.50
Case 2: decedents heirs filed on 19 December 1973 before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal[,] Civil Case No. 18731 entitled Maria
Penano, et al vs. Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the annulment
dismissed by TC and CA
CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made
Orders were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses
27 September 1985 the petition entitled David Fornilda, et al vs Branch 164 RTC IVth Pasig, Deputy Sheriff Joaquin Antonil
and Atty. Sergio Amonoy, G.R. No. L-72306, was filed before the Supreme Court. Among the petitioners was the R Gutierrez
TRO granted
SC granted Certiorari; order to TC to demolish set aside, TRO made permanent, return land to Gutierrez, et al.
But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision, respondents house had already been
destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court
Case 3: Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner
before the RTC
TC dismissed; CA reversed TC, CA denied Ps MR
Petitioner invokes this legal precept of damnum absque injuria in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents
house. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC

Issue: Whether or not damnum absque injuria applies in this case (NO)

Held:
True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents house on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of
Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of
respondents house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of
the Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986
Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of
respondents house well until the middle of 1987. This is clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrezs testimony
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing
the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted
not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court
on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition
Cited Albenson: Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but
also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Courts Order and wittingly caused
the destruction of respondents house
Petition denied.

UE vs. Jader

Facts:
Romeo Jader (R) was enrolled in the College of Law of UE (1984-88). In the first sem of his last year, he failed to take the final
exam of Practice Law I, and because of this, he was given an incomplete grade. Second sem, he enrolled in the course, took the
exam, but he failed.
 In the meantime, his name appeared in the Tentative List of Graduates with the following annotation: Def. Conflict of Laws
x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2"). His name appeared even
on a revised list.
He attended the investiture ceremonies, was given a white sheet of paper (symbolical diploma), had blow-out, etc.
He took a leave from his work for bar review. During bar review, he found out of his deficiency, dropped his review class and
did not take bar exam.
respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's
negligence
petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a
Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students
TC ruled in favor of R Jader, CA affirmed
P UE argues that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the
alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his
removal exam

Issue: Whether or not UE liable (YES)

Held:
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into between said
institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the
student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to the status or result of his
grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing with each other such information. The Court takes
judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their
grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they
would be included among those who will graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is
not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the whole world that the
students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the
requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of
any problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had
already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be
sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.5
It is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its
rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise
control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors
and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that
exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the
students' standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the
damage or injury
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it should
have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. 8 In civilized society, men must be able to assume that
others will do them no intended injury that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they
act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those
with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable
reliance under conditions of civilized society.9 Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to
them, for without the latter, the former are useless
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from
the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or
omission can support a claim for damages.10 Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. 11 Petitioner ought to have known
that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that
respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B.
graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a student has to comply
with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from
its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had
satisfied all requirements for the course
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to
respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. 13 The modern
tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. 14 If mere fault or
negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith
make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse
BUT respondent should not recover moral damages - If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he
brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing
himself for the bar examination
CA decision affirmed with modification.

Pantaleon vs. AMEX

Facts:
Pantaleon family on vacation, shopping, credit card delayed (happened 3 times in Amsterdam, Boston)
Tour group became irritated
after coming back to Manila, Pantaleon sent a letter7 through counsel to the respondent, demanding an apology for the
"inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment he and his family thereby suffered" for respondents refusal to provide credit
authorization for the aforementioned purchases
In response, respondent sent a letter dated 24 March 1992,9 stating among others that the delay in authorizing the purchase
from Coster was attributable to the circumstance that the charged purchase of US $13,826.00 "was out of the usual charge
purchase pattern established
Pantaleon filed a complaint for damages with RTC Makati
RTC ruled in favor of Pantaleon
CA reversed TC
In addition, Pantaleon submits that even assuming that respondent had not been in breach of its obligations, it still remained
liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code
RTC had concluded, based on the testimonial representations of Pantaleon and respondents credit authorizer, Edgardo
Jaurigue, that the normal approval time for purchases was "a matter of seconds." Based on that standard, respondent had been in
clear delay with respect to the three subject transactions. As it appears, the Court of Appeals conceded that there had been delay
on the part of respondent in approving the purchases. However, it made two critical conclusions in favor of respondent. First, the
appellate court ruled that the delay was not attended by bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. Second, it ruled that respondent "had
exercised diligent efforts to effect the approval" of the purchases, which were "not in accordance with the charge pattern" petitioner
had established for himself, as exemplified by the fact that at Coster, he was "making his very first single charge purchase of
US$13,826," and "the record of [petitioner]s past spending with [respondent] at the time does not favorably support his ability to pay
for such purchase

Issue: Whether or not AMEX acted with good faith (YES)

Held:
Thus far, we have already established that: (a) AMEX had neither a contractual nor a legal obligation to act upon Pantaleons
purchases within a specific period of time; and (b) AMEX has a right to review a cardholders credit card history. Our recognition of
these entitlements, however, does not give AMEX an unlimited right to put off action on cardholders purchase requests for indefinite
periods of time. In acting on cardholders purchase requests, AMEX must take care not to abuse its rights and cause injury to its
clients and/or third persons. We cite in this regard Article 19, in conjunction with Article 21, of the Civil Code, which provide:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 19 pervades the entire legal system and ensures that a person suffering damage in the course of anothers exercise of
right or performance of duty, should find himself without relief.[1][36] It sets the standard for the conduct of all persons, whether
artificial or natural, and requires that everyone, in the exercise of rights and the performance of obligations, must: (a) act with justice,
(b) give everyone his due, and (c) observe honesty and good faith. It is not because a person invokes his rights that he can do
anything, even to the prejudice and disadvantage of another
 While Article 19 enumerates the standards of conduct, Article 21 provides the remedy for the person injured by the willful act
In the context of a credit card relationship, although there is neither a contractual stipulation nor a specific law requiring the
credit card issuer to act on the credit card holders offer within a definite period of time, these principles provide the standard by
which to judge AMEXs actions
Pantaleon: even if AMEX did have a right to review his charge purchases, it abused this right when it unreasonably delayed
the processing of the Coster charge purchase, as well as his purchase requests at the Richard Metz Golf Studio and Kids Unlimited
Store; AMEX should have known that its failure to act immediately on charge referrals would entail inconvenience and result in
humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety and distress to its cardholders who would be required to wait before closing their transactions
Court: Good faith presumed. Although it took AMEX some time before it approved Pantaleons three charge requests, we find
no evidence to suggest that it acted with deliberate intent to cause Pantaleon any loss or injury, or acted in a manner that was
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. We give credence to AMEXs claim that its review procedure was done to ensure
Pantaleons own protection as a cardholder and to prevent the possibility that the credit card was being fraudulently used by a third
person
Pantaleon countered that this review procedure is primarily intended to protect AMEXs interests, to make sure that the
cardholder making the purchase has enough means to pay for the credit extended. Even if this were the case, however, we do not
find any taint of bad faith in such motive. It is but natural for AMEX to want to ensure that it will extend credit only to people who will
have sufficient means to pay for their purchase
Very first single card purchase of that amount; It would certainly be unjust for us to penalize AMEX for merely exercising its
right to review Pantaleons credit history meticulously
Pantaleon also not blameless party
MR granted.

Garcia vs. Salvador

Facts:
respondent Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal,
Inc. (the Company). As a prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic
Center (CDC). Garcia who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and on October 22,
1993, CDC issued the test result5 indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag: Reactive." The result bore the name and signature of Garcia
as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Castro as pathologist
Company terminated Ranidas employment for failing the physical examination
Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at the Bataan
Doctors Hospital. During Ramons confinement, Ranida underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result 8 indicated
that she is non-reactive
Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test conducted on her indicated a "Negative"
result
Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa Method. The result indicated
that she was non-reactive
CDC conducted another test: Negative
Company rehired Ranida
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint13 for damages against petitioner Garcia and Castro of CDC, claiming that, by reason of
the erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranidas examination, she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and
sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the scientific explanation for the "false
positive" result; Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was referred to him; that he did not
examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp signature
TC dismissed complaint; CA reversed TC

Issue: Whether or not award for moral damages by CA reasonable (YES)

Held:
Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to comply with the mandate of the laws and rules
aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis;
and was compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously
followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
 The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one
commits an act in violation of some legal provision.30 This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person
who suffers damage because another has violated some legal provision
We find the Court of Appeals award of moral damages reasonable under the circumstances bearing in mind the mental
trauma suffered by respondent Ranida who thought she was afflicted by Hepatitis B, making her "unfit or unsafe for any type of
employment
CA decision affirmed.

Karla

GARCIA vs. SALVADOR

Mar 20 2007

FACTS:

Ranida Salvador started working as a trainee in LBHT. She underwent a medical exam at CDC with
Garcia (medtech) conducting the HBs Ag test. Her result was REACTIVE. The company physician (Sto.
Domingo) told her she is suffering from HepaB, and based on the medical report SD submitted, LBHT
terminated her employment. Ranida told her father Ramon about her condition, then the latter suffered a
heart attack and was confined at Bataan Doctors Hospital. Ranida took another HBs Ag test in BDH, and
the result was NON-REACTIVE. She told Dr. SD about it but the latter said the CDC test was more
reliable, so she took another test at CDC again, and the result this time was NON-REACTIVE. She took
the same test used in CDC @ BDH and the result was NON-REACTIVE (four tests!). She submitted the
results to the LBHT ExecOff who requested her to undergo under test (WTF!) - result is NEGATIVE (5th
test, haha), so LBHT rehired her.

Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against medtech Garcia + pathologist Castro, claiming
that the erroneous interpretation led her to lose her job, suffer mental anxiety, while Ramon was
hospitalized + lost business opportunities.

DOCTRINE:

Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the HBsAG
test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the
protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.

Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia's failure to comply with the mandate
of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the physical
examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more
tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in
conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was incorporated by the Code
Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal
provision.

We find the Court of Appeals' award of moral damages reasonable under the circumstances bearing in
mind the mental trauma suffered by respondent Ranida who thought she was afflicted by Hepatitis B,
making her "unfit or unsafe for any type of employment." Having established her right to moral damages,
we see no reason to disturb the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

WASSMER vs. VELEZ

Dec 26 1964

FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz, following their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days before
their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be postponed as his mother
opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her nothing changed rest assured
returning soon. Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise
to marry.

DOCTRINE:

The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article
21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.

This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.

When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded
under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of
said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.

TANJANCO vs. CA
Dec 17 1966

FACTS:
Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araulli Santoshe expressed and professed his
undying love and affection towards her which she eventually reciprocated. For one year from Dec. 1953-
Dec. 1954, petitioner succeeded in having carnal access to her, because of his protestation of love and
promise of marriage. She got pregnant, for which she resigned from her work as IBM secretary to avoid
embarrassment. He refused to marry her nor give support.

Thus, she filed for an action before the trial court to compel him to recognize the unborn child and provide
support. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state the cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA ruled
that cause of action existed for damages as premised on Art. 21.

DOCTRINE:

The case under Art. 21, cited as an example by the Code Commission, refers to a tort upon a minor who
has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse, or a
breach or promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Where for one whole
year, a woman of adult age maintained intimate sexual intercourse, such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, no case is made under Art.
21, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the
complaint.

In US v. Bustamante, 27 Phil 121: To constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction.

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is
here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfil his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.

BAKSH vs. CA
Feb 19 1993

FACTS:

Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was
an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even
went to Marilous house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to
leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a
complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in
the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the
petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is already
married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to be married
neither sought consent and approval of Marlious parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out
of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private
respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.

DOCTRINE:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code).

It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private respondent on
account of the latters ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not at all moved by good faith and an
honest motive. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to
fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino concept of morality and so
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the
exercise of his right and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At most, it could be
conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.
 PE vs. PE
May 30, 1962

FACTS:

Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant,
a married man, frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the
rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. (WELL THAT ESCALATED QUICKLY.) When
the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. But the affair
continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brothers house where she was
living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador The present action
was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs
appealed.

DOCTRINE:

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead to any other
conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent
of making her fall in love with him.

This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her
to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was
allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family,
the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan
but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their ilicit affair reached
the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing
Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national.

Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental
home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her.

The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.