[G.R. No. L-7644. November 27, 1956.

] SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
HENRY LITAM vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, as guardian of the incompetent
MARCOSA RIVERA, and ARMINIO RIVERA

[G.R. No. L-7645. November 27, 1956] CIVIL ACTION

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED RAFAEL LITAM.
GREGORIO DY TAM, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, in her capacity as judicial guardian
of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, ARMINIO RIVERA

Article 148, CC:

Secs. 7 & 29, Rule 123, Rules of Court

FACTS:
On May 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam, instituted Special Proceedings No. 1537 before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal entitled In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Rafael Litam
On April 24, 1952, petitioner filed a petition alleging that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in
Manila on January 10, 1951 and that he has 7 other siblings.
- He alleged that he and his other siblings are the children of the decedent by a marriage
celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia Khin, no deceased
- That Rafael Litam, during the subsistence of said marriage with Sia Khin, contracted in
1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera, a Filipino citizen
- That Rafael Litam left his property and his share valued at P65,000 in the purported
conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rovera which partnership consisted of
the ff real property acquired during the marriage between him and Marcosa Rivera:
1) 3 parcels of land covered by TCT No. 1228 of the Registry of Deeds of the province
of Pampanga:
2) 1 parcel of land covered by TCT No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds of the province
of Bulacan
- that Rafael Litam had left neither a will nor a debt.
Soon thereafter, Marcosa Rivera filed a counterpetition substantially denying the alleged marriage
of Rafael Litam to Sia Khin and the alleged filiation of the persons of Henry Litam and his siblings;
asserting that the properties described herein are her paraphernal properties and that the Rafael
Litam had left unpaid debts

RTC: granted the petition Henry Litam thus letters of administration were issued to Arminio Rivera who
assumed his duties and later submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam. Inasmuch as
said inventory did not include the properties mentioned in the petition.

On November 29, 1952 Gregorio Dy Tam filed a motion for the removal of Rivera as administrator
of the subject estate.
Remedios Espiritu was appointed in Special Proceeding No. 1709 as guardian of Marcosa Rivera
who had been declared incompetent.
April 20, 1953, Gregorio Dy Tam filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 against Remedios
Espiritu as guardian of Marcosa Rivera and Armino Rivera wherein the plaintiffs reproduced
substantially the same allegation in the petition dated April 1952 except that the properties
acquired during the existence of marriage between Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera and/or with
their joint efforts during the time that they lived as husband and wife were said to be more than
those specified in said petition.

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 In her answer to the complaint. Marcosa Rivera reiterated in effect the allegations in her counter-
petition in SP No. 1537 and set up some affirmative and special defenses as well as a counterclaim
for the sum of P110,000.

RTC:
1. dismissed the petition of the plaintiff
2. declared that all the properties in question are the exclusive, separate and paraphernal properties
of Marcosa Rivera
3. declared that the plaintiffs are not the children of the Rafael Litam and that his only heir is his
surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera

ISSUE:
1. Are appellants the legitimate children of Rafael Litam? No. evidence presented is not enough
to overturn the preponderance of evidence presented by the defendants and petitioners/plaintiffs
were not able to present the marriage certificate between Rafael Litam and Sia Khin which the
Court think is the best supporting evidence to their claim.
2. Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the properties in question or do the same
constitute a common property of her and the decedent? Marcosa is the exclusive owner of the
properties in question based on the attending circumstances in the present case

RULING:

On the 1st issue: whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in1911 and whether Rafel Litam is the
father of appellants herein. In this connection, the lower court found out that:
1. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 have utterly failed to
prove their alleged status as children of Rafael Litam by a marriage with Sia Khin.
2. The various official and public documents executed by Rafael Litam himself convincingly show
that he had not contracted any marriage with any person other than Marcosa Rivera, and that he
had no child.
a) In the marriage certificate, it was clearly stated that he was single when he married
Marcosa Rivera on June 10, 1922.
b) In the sworn application for alien certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950, Rafael Litam
unequivocably declared under oath that he had no child.
c) In the several other documents executed by him and presented in evidence, Rafael Litam
had consistently referred to Marcosa Rivera alone as his wife and he had never mentioned
of Sia Khin as his wife, or of his alleged children.
d) The witnesses presented by the defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator
and counter petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 positively testified to the effect that they know
that Rafael Litam did not have any child, nor was he married with Sia Khin.
e) An impartial and disinterested witness, Felipe Cruz, likewise testified that he has known
Rafael Litam even before his marriage with Marcosa Rivera and that said Rafael Litam did
not have any child.
3. On the other hand, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537
presented in support of their theory the testimony of their lone witness, Luis Litam, and certain
documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that the said plaintiffs and said petitioner did not
present in evidence the marriage certificate of Rafael Litam and Sia Khin, which in the
opinion of the Court, is the competent and best evidence of the alleged marriage between
them.
- The testimony of the lone witness, Luis Litam, cannot be given any credence and value at
all. His testimony is mostly hearsay and uncorroborated. The court noticed that the said
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 witness was only 22 years old when he testified, and it appears in the petition that said
witness is the youngest of all the alleged eight children of Rafael Litam.
- The birth certificate presented by the plaintiff cannot be given even little consideration,
because the name of the father of the children appearing therein is not Rafael Litam, but
different persons. It also appears in said birth certificates that the children's mothers
named therein are different. These documents do not establish the identity of the deceased
Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father. Besides, it does not appear in the
said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation
and filing thereof.
4. "The other documentary evidence presented by the said plaintiffs and petitioner are entirely
immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael
Litam and Sia Khin and the alleged statue of the plaintiffs as children of said decedent.

The findings of fact thus made in the decision appealed from are borne out by the records and the
conclusion drawn from said facts is, to our mind, substantially correct.

It is clear to us that said pictures and the testimony of Luis Litam, as well as the other evidence
adverted to in the above-quoted portion of the decision appealed from, are far from sufficient to
outweigh, or even offset, the evidence in favor of the appellees.

Although Gregorio Dy Tam asserted that he and his co-heirs came to know about the marriage of the
decedent and Marcosa Rivera after the death of Rafael Litam, the very testimony of Li Bun Lin as
witness for the appellants show, beyond dbout, that said appellants knew during the lifetime of Rafael
Litam that he and Marcosa Rivera were living in Malabon Rizal openly and publicly as husband and wife
and regarded her as his lawful wife.

Thus, aside from the circumstance that the wedding and marital life of Marcosa Rivera and Rafael
Litam is undisputed, it is also an established fact that they had the general reputation of being legally
married and were so regarded by the community and by appellants during the lifetime of Rafael Litam.

2nd Issue:

As regards the title to the properties in dispute, the lower court established by the evidence that the
properties in question were bought by Marcosa Rivera with her separate and exclusive money which she
earned and accumulated while she was still single, with the money she inherited fro her late sister
Rafaela Rivera and the money she received from the proceeds of the sale of the pieces of jewelry she
inherited from her father Eduardo Rivera and her sister Rafaela Rivera. The properties in question having
been bough by Marcosa Rivera, although during her marriage with Rafael Litam with her exclusive and
separate money said properties are undeniably her paraphernal properties.

Great importance should be given to the documentary evidence presented by the defendants which
proved of any doubt that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera
1) Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under his oath that the money paid by Marcosa Rivera for
the fishponds in Bulacan was her exclusive and separate money which was earned by her while
she was still single.
2) Same Rafael Litam in June 1947 also under oath, acknowledge the fact that the sums of P13,000.00
and P10,000.00 loaned by Marcosa Rivera to the spouses Catalino Pascual and Juliana Pascual, and
to Juliana Pascual, respectively, are the separate and exclusive money of Marcosa Rivera, in which
money Rafael Litam had no interest whatsoever.

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 3) Same Rafael Litam acknowledged the fact that he had obtained, before the outbreak of the second
world war, from Marcosa Rivera the sum of P135,000.00 which belongs exclusively to the latter,
and that after the liberation, he stole from Marcosa Rivera the further sum of P62,000.00, also
belonging exclusively to the latter, which amounts, totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of interests,
have not, according to the evidence, been paid to her up to the present.
4) It was acknowledged by Rafael Litam that he had not given any money to his wife, Marcosa Rivera,
and that they have actually adopted a system of separation of property, each of them not
having any interest or participation whatsoever in the property of the other.
These declarations and admission of fact made by Rafael Litam against his interest are binding upon him,
his heirs and successors in interests and third persons as well.

CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PROVED THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES
OF MARCOSA:

1) Marcosa Rivera was already rich when she married Rafael Litam in 1922 since she was from a
prominent family. (char )
2) On the other hand, Rafael Litam was poor. He used to borrow from Marcosa, stole from her the
amount of 62,000 and have not been able to pay up to the present. (aaaaaww. )
3) She administer properties to the exclusion of Rafael Litam before she became incompetent.
4) Torrents Title covering subject properties registered in the name of Marcosa Rivera married to
Rafael Litam which indicated that the properties in question belong to Marcosa as her
paraphernal properties for if they were conjugal, the title should have been issued in the names of
Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera.

Scant or no consideration at all could be given by the Court to the immaterial, incompetent and
unbelievable testimonies of the witnesses presented by the said plaintiffs and petitioners. The disputable
presumption of law that the properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties, upon which
legal presumption said plaintiffs and petitioner mainly rely has been decisively overcome by the
overwhelming preponderance of evidence adduced in these cases that the properties in question are the
paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera."

This notwithstanding, we do not believe that appellants should be sentenced to pay damages. The
petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071
contain nothing derogatory to the good name or reputation of the herein appellees.

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 [G.R. No. 184148. June 9, 2014.]
NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and ELVIRA B. CALALANG, petitioners-defendants,
vs.
ROSARIO CALALANG-GARCIA, LEONORA CALALANG-SABILE, and CARLITO S.
CALALANG, respondents-plaintiff

FACTS:
The property in controversy has an area of 1,266 sq.m and specifically identified as Lot 1132
situated in Brgy Burol 2nd, Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan
The respondents, Rosario, Leonora and Carlito filed a complaint for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of property against the petitioners Nora and Elvira with the RTC of Malolos Bulacan
asserting their ownership over the subject property where they alleged that they acquired it from
their mother Encarnacion Silverio through succession as the latters compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his
lifetime.
The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio and during the subsistence of this
marriage their parents acquired the subject property from their maternal grandmother Francisca
Silverio.
Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the
same.
On June 7, 1942, the 1st marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a 2nd marriage with Elvira Calalan who then
gave birth to Nora and Rolando. According to the respondents, it was only during tis time that
Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of
Lands, Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusive
ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had 3 children with his first
spouse.
On Sept 22, 1974, the ROD of Bulacan issued OCT No. P-2871 in favor of Pedro Calalang only.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled OCT No. P-2871 and issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
On December 27, 1989, 7 Pedro Calalang died.
The respondent assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on 2 grounds:
1) That the sale was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the
respondents who were co-owners of the same. 1
2) That the sale was absolutely simulated as Nora did not have the capacity to pay fr the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale.
In their Answer, the petitioners argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the 2nd
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang. They stressed that OCT No. P-2871 itself stated
that it was issued in the name of Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]. Thus, the
property belonged to the conjugal partnership if the Sps Pedro and Elvira. They also denied the
allegation that the sale of the land was absolutely simulated as Nora was gainfully employed in
Spain at the time of the sale. Finally they alleged that the respondents have no cause of action and
if there is they are barred by laches, estoppel and prescription.

1As compulsory heirs upon the death of Encarnacion SIlverio, the respondents claimed that they acquired successional rights over the land.
Thus, in alienating the land with their consent, Pedro Calalang allegedly deprived them of their pro indiviso share in the property.
5
RTC: in favor of the respondent (children of 1st marriage) 2 ; ruled that because the application for free
patent filed by Pedro Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang should be
considered as a trustee of an implied trust.
CA: reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive
owner of the subject parcel of land.
1) It held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly
acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage
2) Upheld the indefeasibility of OCT No. P-28713 thus, upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio on June
7, 1942, the respondents did not acquire any successional rights to the parcel fo land which was
exclusively owned by Pedro Calalang.
3) Pedros heirs from both of his marriages succeeded Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his
death.
4) Sale between Pedro and Nora was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the
respondents were unlawfully deprived of the pro indiviso shares over the disputed property.
5) On the issue of prescription, the action has not yet prescribed yet since the property was
registered in the name of Nora in 1984 and the action for reconveyance was filed in 1991 (7 years)
and the prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years.

ISSUE:

Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its transfer to his
daughter Nora.

RULING:

Yes. The Court sustained the findings of the CA that PC is the sole and exclusive owner of the
disputed property.

The ruling of the lower court relied on the testimony evidence from Rosario Calalang-Garcia
however she was unable to produce any document evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the
name of either of her parents. Moreover, the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang
and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents' submission
that the subject property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro
Calalang and Encarnacion.

This Court cannot likewise sustain the argument of the petitioners that the property belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the 2nd marriage on the groun that the title was issued in the name of Pedro
Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]

2 The trial court declared that the Sps Pedro and Encarnacion jointly acquired the parcel of land from the parents of Encarnacion. Thus, it
was part of the conjugal property of the 1st marriage of Pedro Calalang. When this marriage was dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion
Silverio on July 1942, the corresponding shares to the disputed property were acquired by the heirs of the decedent according to the laws of
succession.

PARTITION: (633 sq.m)- Pedro + (633sq.m)- Rosario (211 sq.m), Leonora (211 sq.m), Carlito (211 sq.m)
- wherein the share of Pedro shall be given to Nora on account of the Sale
3 It held that although the free patent was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" this phrase was merely
descriptive of the civil status of Pedro Calalang at the time of the registration of the disputed property.

6
The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 of PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that the phrase
"Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" merely describes the civil status and identifies the
spouse of the registered owner Pedro Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the property is
conjugal. In Litam v. Rivera, the Court also applied the same principle.

It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, applicant Pedro Calalang averred that the
land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut
plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot.

But he applied for free patent only in 1974 and was issued a free patent while already married to Elvira B.
Calalang.

Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law after the
dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure became
private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang's exclusive property. It was therefore excluded from
the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage.

As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984.

It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the
New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent."

Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their
respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the
sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro
Calalang.

And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable
consideration the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground
that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established
by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.

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 [G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009.]
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, petitioner
vs.
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, respondent.

Where the fuck is St. Moritz Hotel?

FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippine in 1983 after he was assigned by his
employer, an Austrian company to work at a project in Mindoro.
In 1984, he transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the NPC. There, he met
Descallar, the respondent in this case, a separated mother of 2 boys who was working as a
waitress at St. Moritz Hotel.
Jambrich befriended Descallar and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of additional
income to support her children, Descallar agreed. The tutorials were held in Descallars residence
at a squatters area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan
Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-macro
Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City.
In the Contracts to Sell dated Nov 1985 and Mar 1986 covering the properties, Jambrich and
respondent were referred to as buyers.
A deed of absolute sale dated Nov 1987 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the
Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the ROD, registration was refused on
the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienanle lands of the public domain.
Consequently, Jambrich;s name was erased from the document but his signature were present in
specific pages of the document beside the signature of Descallar.
3 TCTs were issued in respondents name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondents 2 sons.
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, Descallar found a new boyfriend while
Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondents sons
for only 2 months after the break-up.
In 1986, Jambrich met Borromeo who was engaged in real estate business but he also built and
repair speedboats as a hobby
In 1989, jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from Borromeo for
which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights
and interest in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioners for P250,000 as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment.
On July 1991, when Borromeo sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that the
titles to the 3 lots have been transferred in the name of respondent and that the subject property
has already been mortgaged.
On August 1991, Borromeo filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property
before the RTC of Mandaue City.
- Borromeo alleged that the Contracts to sell and the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale over
the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the
true agreement of the parties since Descallar did not pay a single centavo of the purchase
price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties
using his exclusive funds

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 - In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of
the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her
own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in
question", and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real
property in the Philippines.
At the trial, Descallar presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the
disputed property with money from a supposed copra business. Borromeo in turn presented
Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which
Jambrich received while still employed by the Austrian company.

RTC: in favor of Borromeo

it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties under litigation or
could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth more than
P700,000.00 when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a
month as salary and tips of more or less P2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily
needs of her family so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in nancial distress
when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him because that was a big
nancial opportunity for her and her children who were already abandoned by her husband. 9
xxx xxx xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell
dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and nally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16,
1987] as buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she has
taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty,
sweetness, and good attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything
she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition
of these properties under litigation was at the time when their relationship was still going smoothly and
harmoniously.

CA: reversed the decision of RTC

Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:

What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the country
as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under the
Torrens system?

1) Who purchased the subject properties?

2) Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm
Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?

RULING:

At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at an
Austrian Company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of P50,000 then Jambrich was assigned
to Syria for almost one year where his monthly salary was approx. P90,000.

9
On the other hand, Descallar was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not
more than P1,000. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by
her during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were
unsubstantiated. The copra business was actually the business of her mother and their family with 10
siblings. She has no license to sell copra and had not filed any income tax return.

Furthermore, the Child Study Report submitted by DSWD in the adoption proceedings of Descallars 2
sons disclosed that she was having financial problems during the time that she met Jambrich and when
he observed the situation of Descallar particularly the children who were malnourished, he offered to
transfer the family into a decent place.
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath that Jambrich was the owner of the
properties in question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of
legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as
buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks
issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank..
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten months,
where she was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject
properties to respondent.

Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject
properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.

Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple's cohabitation also does
not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry
each other, does not apply.

In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together.
In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of
the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to
lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.

2nd issue
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the
fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent.
A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.

However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good
faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. This is the situation in the
instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had
no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully
supported by Jambrich.

10
Fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except
only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed
the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen.
In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a
number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino
citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of
the transferee is rendered valid.

The rationale behind the Court's ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
subsequent cases, is this since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation's land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the
property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no
more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.

PETITION IS GRANTED

[G.R. No. 202932. October 23, 2013.]

EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR. petitioner
vs.
SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA respondents.

FACTS:
Socorro and Esteban were married on June 9, 1980. Although Socorro and Esteban never had
common children, both of them had children from prior marriages:
- Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda
- Socorro had a son who was the father of Edilberto Ventura Jr., the petitioner in this case.
Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas when she married Esteban. The marriage
was not annulled and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.
Estebans prior marriage on the other hand was dissolved by virtue of his wifes death in 1960.
According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at Vitas,
Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on
her father's behalf sometime in 1970. The Vitas property was covered by TCT No. 141782, dated
December 1980, issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business
establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino).
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale.
Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the
RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Esteban's
signature on the deeds of sale was forged.
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 Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorro's prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void.
Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased
by Esteban and respondents.

RTC: dismissed the petition for lack of merit; the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are
governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code and concluded that Socorro did not contribute any
funds for the acquisition of the properties. Hence she cannot be considered a co-owner and her heirs
cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC but ruled that Article 148 of FC should have been applied

ISSUE:

RULING:

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-
owned by Esteban and Socorro because:
(1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the
parties were married; and
(2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."

We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase
"married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-
owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas
property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of
the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.

Edilberto claims that Esteban's actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not
sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.

We cannot sustain Edilberto's claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property was
acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase
price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father.

Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1238.Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the
debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor's consent. But the payment is
in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan
property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban. During trial, the Abuda spouses
presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other hand,
Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro's alleged monetary contributions

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 [G.R. No. 198356. April 20, 2015].
ESPERANZA SUPAPO and the HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
ROBERTO and SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, and THOSE PERSONS
CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, respondents.

FACTS:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint accion publiciana against the respondents before the MeTC
of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches,
Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot).
The subject lot is covered by TCT No. C- 28441 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's
names. The land has an assessed value of P39,980.00 as shown in the Tax Declaration issued by
the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan.
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but
they made sure to visit at least twice a year.
During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses
were built without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus
occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one.
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot
by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a
certificate to file an action for failure of the parties to settle amicably.
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.

MeTC: convicted the respondent

The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. While the appeal was pending, Congress
enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree
No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final.
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents'
civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot.

RTC: granted the motion

CA: granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents'
criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.

The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for accion publiciana.
After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary
hearing and argued that:
(1) there is another action pending between the same parties;
(2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and
(3) the Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment.

ISSUE:
I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred judicata.
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RULING:

We hold that:
(1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
(2) the cause of action has not prescribed; and
(3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.

I.
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.

Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, 37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is plenary. 38

RA No. 7691, 39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20, 000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos ( P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro
Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration 45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of
Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.

Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, w e hold that the
MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.

II.

On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion publiciana more than ten
(10) years after the certificate to file action was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action
is imprescriptible since the subject property is registered and titled under the Torrens system.
We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.

At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses
Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979. 46 Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge
the existence, authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.

The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The
most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:

Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
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In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to
the possession thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence
of ownership. Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible.

In Bishop v. CA, we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the
other persons' occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners
have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.

Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer of the property, we
still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed
of sale, a duly-registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or sale.

III.
The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.

Res judicata embraces two concepts:

(1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47 (c).
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the merits
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving
the same claim, demand or cause of action.

The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:
1) The former judgment or order must be final;
2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and
4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action.

Res judicata is not present in this case.

While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the n there is no identity of subject matter,
parties and causes of action between t h e criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the
civil action for the recovery of the subject property.

First, there is no identity of parties.

The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the
people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the
Spouses Supapo.

Second, there is no identity of subject matter.

The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion
publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.

And third, there is no identity of causes of action.

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The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests by
prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect
their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession.

Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata has still no
basis.

The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of action
provided that there is identity of issues and identity of parties.

Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same.

As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the Anti-
Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone, "conclusiveness of
judgment" does not apply.

PETITION IS GRANTED.

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