LEOVERAS vs.

VALDEZ
G.R. No. 169985
June 15, 2011

FACTS:

Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered

owners - three-fourths () and one-fourth () pro-indiviso,
respectively - of a parcel of land. Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths ()
share to Benigna Llamas. The sale was duly annotated at the back of
OCT No. 24695. When Benigna died in 1944, she willed her three-
fourths () share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa
Llamas.8 Thus, Alejandra and Josefa each owned one-half () of
Benignas three-fourths () share. Alejandras heirs sold their
predecessors one-half () share (roughly equivalent to 10,564 square
meters) to the respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Also, Josefa sold her own one-half () share (subject property) to the
respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of
Absolute Sale. The respondent and the petitioner executed an
Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject property. The
petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
over the subject property. The parties took possession of their respective
portions of the subject property and declared it in their name for
taxation purposes.
The respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen,
Pangasinan on the requirements for the transfer of title over the portion
allotted to him on the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent
learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two transfer
certificates of title.
The respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title,
Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the
reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion (disputed property)
covered by TCT No. 195813, on the ground that the petitioner is
entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties
Agreement.
 The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioners titles
by contesting the authenticity of the petitioners documents.
Particularly, the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting
Benignas death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could
not have executed a deed, which purports to convey 4,024 square
meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already died in 1944.
The respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the
parties her three-fourths () share in 1969 because she had already sold
her share to Benigna in 1932.22
The petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and for a
declaration that he is the lawful owner of the parcels of land covered by
his titles.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed
the RTC by ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the
Affidavit. As the totality of the evidence presented sufficiently sustains
[the respondents] claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner] were
based on forged and spurious documents, it behooves this Court to
annul these certificates of title. Hence, this petition for revie.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred for basing its findings on the basis
of evidence presented in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule.

RULING:
No. The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the
authenticity of these documents, (Permanent Savings and Loan Bank
vs. Velarde (G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004) particularly the
Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not
reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently
executed in order to reflect the parties true intention. The petitioners
argument calls to for the application of the parol evidence rule, i.e.,
when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written
agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in
the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is
understood to have been waived and abandoned. To avoid the
operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party
to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of
the minds of the parties.

SPOUSES PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVOLPMENT CORP
G.R. No. 171601
April 8, 2015

FACTS:

Lucia Paras was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at

Kabulihan, Toledo City. Kimwa is a construction firm that sells
concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu. Lucia and
Kimwa entered into a contract denominated "Agreement for Supply of
Aggregates" where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were allotted by
Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted
aggregates at Lucia's permitted area in Toledo City at P240.00 per
truckload. Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic
meters of aggregates. However, after this Kimwa stopped hauling
aggregates and allegedly transferred to the concession area of a certain
Mrs. Remedios dela Torre in violation of their Agreement.

Spouses Paras sent demand letters to Kimwa. As these went

unheeded, Spouses Paras filed a complaint for breach of contract with
damages against Kimwa. In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never
committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates. It argued that
the 40,000 cubic meters represented is only the maximum quantity that
it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the May 15, 1995 which was the
expiration of the Special Permit of Lucia was never set as a deadline.
Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were
barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties
had agreed differently.

The RTC rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. On

appeal, CA reversed the RTC's Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred for basing its findings on the basis
of evidence presented in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule.

RULING:

No. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence

provides that "When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add

to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a)
An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the
written agreement; (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written
agree.

There are 2 things must be established for parol evidence to be

admitted: first, that the existence of any of the 4 exceptions has been
put in issue in a party's pleading or has not been objected to by the
adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be
presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the
presenting party.

In the present case petitioners pleaded in the Complaint they

filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement,
as well as the Agreement's failure to express the true intent of the
parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also
responded to petitioners Spouses Paras' pleading of these issues. This
is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence.

Proof of how petitioners Spouses Paras successfully pleaded and

put this in issue in their Complaint is how respondent Kimwa felt it
necessary to respond to it or address it in its Answer. Thus, the
testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by
petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and
what they aver to have been the parties' true intent, may be admitted
and considered.

PNB vs. PASIMIO

G.R. No. 205590
September 2, 2015

FACTS:
Ligaya Pasimio filed a suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum
of money and damages before the RTC of Paraaque City. She alleged
having a peso and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB in the total
amount of P4,322,057.57 and US$5,170.80, respectively; that both
investment placements have matured; and when she sought to withdraw
her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB refused to oblige.
During the trial following the joinder of issues, Pasimio denied
obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the corresponding
loan proceeds. While conceding signing certain documents which
turned out to be the Peso Loans Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan
Applications, the Promissory Notes and Hold-out on Savings
Deposit/Peso/FX Time Deposit and Assignment of Deposit Substitute
and the Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit Transaction (Loan
Documents), she professed not understanding what they really meant.
She agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in blank or
in an incomplete state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch
manager, Teresita Gregorio (Gregorio), and Customer Relations
Officer, Gloria Miranda (Miranda), led her to believe that what she was
signing were related to new high-yielding PNB products.

Pasimio would also deny re-lending the loan proceeds to Paolo Sun.
She asserted in this regard that Gregorio repaired to her residence with
a duly accomplished affidavit detailing the re-lending event and urged
her to sign the same if she wished to recover her placements.
RTCs decision: Rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The
disposition is predicated on the postulate that Pasimio had proven by
convincing evidence that she did not obtain any loan accommodation
from PNB. As a corollary, the trial court held that there was no evidence
snowing the release by PNB of the loan proceeds to Pasimio. Pushing
the point, the RTC stated that the transaction documents were highly
questionable for the reasons stated in some detail in its decision to be
reproduced by the CA in its assailed decision.
CAs decision: Affirmed RTCs decision. The CA explained that
even if both parties may have been negligent in the conduct of their
respective affairs, PNB cannot evade liability for its shortcomings. As
stressed by the appellate court, the banking industry is impressed with
public interest. Accordingly, all banks and their personnel are burdened
with a high level of responsibility and expected to be more careful than
ordinary persons. The CA held that since PNB was grossly negligent,
it should bear the consequences

ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in not applying the Parol Evidence Rule on
notarized notes presented by PNB.
RULING:
Here, the RTC and the CA focused on finding trivial Haws and
weaknesses in PNB's evidence and totally disregarded the bank's most
telling proof, foremost of which are the notarized notes Had the courts a
quo looked at and considered the totality of the bank's evidence, then it
would have realized how preposterous the story that Pasimio spun was,
a story featuring, at bottom, a well-educated, accomplished woman
signing several pieces of bank documents involving millions of pesos,
without knowing, nay even reading, what she is signing.

Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of an

agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the
parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing.

Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to

contradict, change or vary a written document, except if a party presents
evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a written agreement
and puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake,
or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties; (c)
the validity of the written agreement; and (d) the existence of other
terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution of the written agreement.

Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such

sufficient credibility as to overturn the written agreement. Since no
evidence of such nature is before the Court, the documents embodying
the loan agreement of the parties should be upheld.

HEIRS OF SABANPAN vs. COMORPOSA

G.R. No. 152807
August 12, 2003

FACTS:
This case arose from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed in
the MTC by petitioners against respondents involving possession of a
parcel of petitioners land by respondents. Respondents argue that they
have acquired just and valid ownership of the premises and that the
Regional Director of the DENR has already upheld their possession
over the land in question when it ruled that they were the rightful
claimants and possessors. MTC in favor of petitioners. RTC reversed,
ruled in favor of Respondents. CA affirmed RTC.

CA Ruling: Although not yet final, the Order issued by the

DENR Regional Director remained in full force and effect. The
certification that the DENR's community environment and natural
resources (CENR) officer issued was proof that when the cadastral
survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet
allocated to any person. Respondents had the better right to possess
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, because they have
sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. Hence, SC
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA gravely abuse its discretion and erred in
sustaining the RTCs ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer's
Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, that it is a new matter
raised for the first time on appeal.

RULING:

No. Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July

22, 1997 is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR
officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they
cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter
being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.

In Garvida, the Court held: "A facsimile or fax transmission is a

process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a
time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified
amount of electric current."

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and
are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence,
as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for

bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda.
The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to
in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature,
which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but
recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification.
In fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as
reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998.

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the

regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order.
Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer
to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct
control and supervision.
Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on
appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked
as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The
Certification was not formally offered, however, because respondents
had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction

the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the
trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not
to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which
no full-blown trial is held.

TORRES vs. PAGCOR

G.R. No. 193531
December 14, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding
of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-
Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved
the slot machine and internal security personnel of respondent
PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent
PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an
investigation to verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered
the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after
the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit
before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an
actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount
of eitherP50,000.00 or P35,000.00. Based on the CIU's investigation of
all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt
for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the
members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding,
which included herein petitioner.

On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by

Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was
issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding
of anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was then required to
explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof
why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed
under preventive suspension effective immediately until further orders.
 On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter
explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any
involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the
CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal
investigation of the accusations against him.

On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2,

2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's
Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from
the service.

On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a

Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for
illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. The
complaint alleged among other things, that he tried to persuade
respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of
reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the
members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection
Board and that no resolution was issued on his letter reconsideration.

Thereafter, the CSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that

the same has already prescribed.

After the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Torres

elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which likewise dismissed his
petition on the same ground.

ISSUE:
Whether the sending of the letter of reconsideration by means of a
fax machine is a valid mode of filing a letter of reconsideration.

RULING:
A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal
delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same
shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the
envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other
hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the
date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days
from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.

Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4,

2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been submitted
either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007.
However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for
reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of
petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications
issued by PAGCOR employees.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter

reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile
transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to
appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not
sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be
filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.

In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of

pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission

and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original
copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone
of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is
transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave
relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental
area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is
equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on
paper referred to as a facsimile.
xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best,
an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the
original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the
facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed
by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx

Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic

evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of
whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data
messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the
Electronic Commerce Act.

The court, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message"
and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a
facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It
is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

ANG vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 182835
April 20, 2010

FACTS:
The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private respondent, Irish
Sagud were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University in
Maria Aurora Province of Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan
has a live-in-partner whom Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish
decided to broke up with Rustan. The latter asked Irish to elope with
him, since he does not love the other girl, to which Irish refused. To
pressure Irish to get back with him he sends multimedia messages to
Irish, bearing a picture of a naked woman, who spread her legs with a
face of Irish superimposed on it. Rustan even added in the text message
that it is easy for him to spread those pictures in the internet. Because
of this scenario, Irish, asked help from the Vic-Mayor of the
municipality, to which coordination with the local police was
made. Entrapment operation was conducted and arrested Rustan.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners contention that the multimedia messages
should not be made admissible for the basic reason that such was
not properly authenticated as provided by the Rules on Electronic
Documents.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-
SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility

of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court.
The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He
should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal

action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions,
quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

Indeed the assertion of Rustan will not be given merit for the
basic reason that such contention was only raised before this court to
which the latter had a presumption that Rustan has waived his right to
question the authenticity of the pictures. Moreover, the court avers that
such assertion of Rustan cannot be made possible in criminal case; such
can only be made before, civil and administrative actions.
The high court denied the petition.

PEOPLE vs. ENOJAS

G.R. No. 204894
March 10, 2014

FACTS:
PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of
Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a suspiciously
parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and asked for his
documents. Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of
documents shown them, they invited him in their mobile car to the
police station for further questioning. Enojas complied leaving his taxi
behind. Upon reaching 7-11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped
and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he
approached the stores door, however, he came upon two suspected
robbers and a shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead
and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2
Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio was also engaged in a
shootout with two more armed robbers who managed to escape. He then
went back to the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting that
Enojas was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched his
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone apparently left behind by
Enojas. The police officers monitored the incoming messages and
posed as Enojas. The accused appellants were later on arrested in an
entrapment operation and were convicted of murder by RTC Las Pinas.

ISSUE:
Whether the text messages were inadmissible as evidence, not
having been properly identified.

RULING:
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted
them in conformity with the Courts earlier Resolution applying the
Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to
be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in
order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on
them.

SYHUNLIONG vs. RIVERA

G.R. No. 200148
June 4, 2014

FACTS:
Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant
and defendant in the instant case. Syhunliong is the President of
BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF) while Rivera
used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. She was hired in
September of 2002.

About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family

matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on February 3, 2006
and continued working for BANFF until March of the same year to
complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas
(Lumapas) Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to
request for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and
incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid,
but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her
incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.

On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following

text message to one of BANFFs official cellular phones held by
Lumapas:
 I am expecting that. grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang
pagkuha ng last pay ko. I dont deserve this because I did my job when
I was still there. God bless. Sana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real
meaning.

Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:

Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan

including incentive up to the last datena nandyan ako para di na kami
abot sa labor.

Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the

National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against Syhunliong
for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay, gratuities
and tax refund.

On April 16, 2007 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor

case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, and the
public prosecutor finds probable cause to indict Rivera the crime of
libel.

Rivera filed a Motion to Quash the aforequoted information. She

argued that the text message, which was the subject of the libel
complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she had suffered due to the
delay in the release of her unpaid salaries, benefits and incentives.
Further, the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime
of libel as the elements of malice and the making of defamatory
imputation for public consumption were wanting. Her text message was
not prompted by ill will or spite, but was merely sent as part of her duty
to defend her own interests.

During the arraignment on October 11, 2007, Rivera entered a

plea of not guilty
 The lower court concurred with the Public Prosecutors finding
that there was probable cause to indict Rivera for having ascribed to
Syhunliong the possession of a vice or defect, or for having committed
an act, tending to cause dishonor or discredit to the latters name. As a
defense, Rivera said her text message falls squarely within the
parameters of "Privileged Communication" or the elements of Article
353 of the Revised Penal Code are not fully established by the
Prosecutions evidence. Thereafter, the lower court issued an Order on
June 18, 2009 denying Riveras motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing.

On July 11, 2011, the Appellate Court rendered their decision

directing the dismissal of the information for libel filed against Rivera.
The CA likewise explained that:

The focal issue to the parties in the present case is whether the
facts charged in the information as well as the undeniable facts
appearing on the record show that an offense of libel has been
committed. Our criminal law convincingly provide us with a definition
of libel It is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a
vice or defect ... or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt
of ... a person. x x x.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute the offense of libel?

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the

outright dismissal of the complaint of Syhunliong on the putative
ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were privileged
communication?

RULING:
 There is no merit in the instant petition.

Prescription had set in. Well settled rule in statutory construction

that the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes
emanates from the liberality of the State, any doubt on this matter must
be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused. As prescription
of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish
the same.

In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed

his complaint against Rivera more than one year after the allegedly
libelous message was sent to Lumapas. Whether the date of the filing
of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007, it would not alter
the fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period
provided for in Article 90 of the RPC.

In relation thereto, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides

that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally extinguishing the
criminal liability.

Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this

Court to order the dismissal of the libel information, but the Court still
stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within
the purview of a qualified privileged communication.

The rule on privileged communication means that a

communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the
communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a

qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the
following requisites must concur:
 (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral,
or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest
to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom
it is made;

(2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or

superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the
power to furnish the protection sought; and

(3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith

and without malice

Presiding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA'
s declaration that Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a
qualified privileged communication since she was speaking in response
to duty, to protect her own interest, and not out of an intent to injure the
reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity
of the message beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned.

MARCOS vs. HEIRS OF ANDRES NAVARRO

G.R. No. 198240
July 3, 2013

FACTS:
Spouses Navarro passed away and left behind several parcels of
land. They were survived by their daughters, Luisa Navarro Marcos
(petitioner) and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son,
Andres Navarro. The heirs of Andres are the respondents in this case.
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the lot based on an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property where Andres, Sr. donated the lot to Andres, Jr. The sisters
requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit.The PNP
handwriting expert, PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez, found that Andres, Sr.s
signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of
Andres, Sr. were not written by the same person.The sisters sued the
respondents for annulment of the deed of donation. Respondents moved
to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness.

RTC granted respondents motion and disqualified Alvarez as a

witness, ruling that her supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has
no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also,
there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be
presented as an expert witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.
CA dismissed the sisters petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether PO2 Alvarez should be disqualified as a witness.

RULING:
Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage.
Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the
adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged
communication. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses
excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those
mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include
an exception not embodied therein.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely

perceive and make known her perception to others. Respondents
motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was
not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC
confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight
of her testimony. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received
in evidence. PO2 Alvarezs testimony would not be hearsay.

Under Section 49 of Rule 130, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an

expert opinion. Although the word may in Sec. 49 of Rule 130
signifies that the use of the opinion of an expert witness is permissive
and not mandatory on the part of the courts, handwriting experts are
often offered as expert witnesses considering the technical nature of the
procedure in examining forged documents.

RTC should not have disqualified Alvarez as a witness. She has the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a witness under the
Rules. The analysis of the signature in the deed of donation executed
by the late Andres, Sr. is crucial to the resolution of the case.