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PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH PROGRESS
PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL

DIFFERENCES: THEORY, ASSESSMENT,
AND APPLICATION
SIMON BOAG
AND
NIKO TILIOPOULOS
EDITORS
Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

New York
Personality and Individual Differences ISBN 978-1-61122-070-4
Ed: Simon Boag and Niko Tiliopoulos 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Copyright 2011 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
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Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Personality and individual differences : theory, assessment, and application
/ editors, Niko Tiliopoulos, Simon Boag.
p. cm.
Includes index.
1. Personality. 2. Individuality. I. Tiliopoulos, Niko. II. Boag, Simon.

BF698.P3584 2010
155.2--dc22
2010036439
Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Niko Tiliopoulos and Simon Boag
Part A: Processes and Performance
Chapter 2 Integrating the Study of within- and between-Person Variability in
Personality at Work 11
Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian and Robert E. Wood
Chapter 3 Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive
Functions 21
Damian P. Birney
Chapter 4 The Effects of Comparison Status and Individual Differences in
Social Comparison Tendencies on the Experience of
Schadenfreude 37
Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk
Chapter 5 Processing Style and Social Comparison Outcomes: Assimilation
and Contrast Effects in Automatic Behaviour and Self-evaluation 51
Lauren ODriscoll and Eugene Chekaluk
Chapter 6 The Excitation Transfer Paradigm and Emotional Intelligence:
Predicting Interpersonal Attraction 67
Madeleine Fraser and Simon Boag
Chapter 7 Take a Break: A Look at the Incubation Effect on Creativity 83
Gerry Pallier and Niko Tiliopoulos
Chapter 8 The Role of Personality in Learning Processes and Learning
Outcomes in Applied Settings 93
Paul Ginns, Gregory Arief D. Liem and Andrew J. Martin
Chapter 9 Something about Metacognition: Self-confidence Factor(s) in
School-aged Children 103
Sabina Kleitman, Karina Mak, Sarah Young, Phoebe Lau and
David Livesey
vi Contents
Part B: Culture, Religion, and Spirituality

Chapter 10 Spiritual-Hypnosis Assisted Therapy: A New Culturally Sensitive
Approach to the Treatment and Prevention of Mental Disorders 119
Luh Ketut Suryani
Chapter 11 Militant Extremist Mindset 131
Lazar Stankov, Gerard Saucier and Goran Kneevi
Chapter 12 Emotional Intelligence among Church Leaders: Applying the
Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale within Newfrontiers 141
Leslie J. Francis, Andrew Ryland and Mandy Robbins
Chapter 13 Ominous Signs: Schizotypy and Religious Attachment 151
Lisa Hancock
Chapter 14 Sham Reasoning, Humpty Dumpty and the Burden of Proof 163
Fiona J. Hibberd
Chapter 15 Will Right-brainers Rule the Future? 171
John Reid
Chapter 16 Cultural Perspectives on Personality and Personhood 181
Hoyt L. Edge and Cokorda Bagus Jaya Lesmana
Part C: Contributions to Clinical Psychology and Assessment
Chapter 17 Genetic Variation in DRD4, Criminality, and Conduct Disorder 193
Tara M. Thompson, Marya Getchell, Britt af Klinteberg,
Roman A. Koposov, Lars Oreland, Andrew J. Pakstis,
Vladislav V. Ruchkin, Carolyn M. Yrigollen and
Elena L. Grigorenko
Chapter 18 The Assessment of Depression, Anxiety and Tension/stress in
Youth 209
Marianna Szab
Chapter 19 Unconscious Schemas, Bulimic Tendencies and the Influence of
Subliminal Abandonment and Unification Cues on Eating 223
Kathleen Mairet and Simon Boag
Chapter 20 Motivational Interviewing Changes the Treatment Trajectory of
Group Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for Anxiety 237
Weiwen Yang and Esben Strodl
Chapter 21 What do Self-report Measures of Disinhibition Really Measure? 249
Elliroma Gardiner and Chris J. Jackson
Chapter 22 Can Employers Screen Job Applicants for Potential White Collar
Fraud Offenders? 265
Jennifer Keen and Julie Fitness
Contents vii
Chapter 23 Reflections on the Factor Structure of the Occupational Stress

Inventory-Revised 275
Richard E. Hicks
Chapter 24 Introducing the YWEDO Online Cognitive Laboratory 283
Chris J. Jackson
Part D: Developments in Theory and Structure
Chapter 25 Six Solutions to the Circular Nature of Trait Psychology 297
Jonathan P. Gerber
Chapter 26 A Proposition for a Parsimonious Taxonomic Convergence of
Personality Traits 307
Niko Tiliopoulos
Chapter 27 The Role of Conceptual Analysis in Personality Research 321
Simon Boag
Index 331
We should fill our life with possibilities, not regrets.
Impossibility is a result of an absence of belief in oneself.
Learning from experience is the best way to reach success.
Our happiness in this life depends on our ability to choose the best possibility to walk on.
No need for regrets; everything has an effect on the development of ourselves.
There is always a chance, if we are willing to try.
Everybody can change; they just have to want to.
Before trying to change others, change yourself first.
Luh Ketut Suryani

Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine,
Udayana University and The Suryani Institute for Mental Health, Bali, Indonesia
In: Personality and Individual Differences ISBN 978-1-61122-070-4
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Niko Tiliopoulos
School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
Simon Boag
Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia
ABSTRACT
Since Allport and Vernons assessment of the field over eighty years ago (Allport &
Vernon, 1930), the field of personality and individual differences research has expanded
enormously. This is particularly so in terms of theoretical development and practical
relevance, where the research generated by researchers in this field is distinguished for its
contributions to both assessment and application. In fact, personality and individual
differences research is relevant to practically every facet of human existence. For
instance, since theories of persons either explicitly or implicitly guide clinical work, the
field contributes to discussions of understanding abnormal psychology and provides a
guide for conceptualising best treatment. Additionally, the field is relevant to
understanding human development across the lifespan, and our understanding of
personality and individual differences impacts upon our views of socialisation and
interpersonal relations. Furthermore, business and organisations continues to utilise
personality and individual differences research since it provides the possibility of
predicting performance. Subsequently, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the
research covered in this field.
Concurrently, however, the field of personality and individual differences research is
developing in ways that reflect a new appreciation of encompassing a global-context and
of possible new approaches to understanding persons. This collection of papers from
personality and individual difference researchers highlights social and cultural
dimensions of personality and individual differences.
Ph: 61-2-9036 9223; Fax: 61-2-9036 5223; email: niko.tiliopoulos@sydney.edu.au; The editors would like to
acknowledge that the book and chapter represent equal contributions from both authors.
2 Niko Tiliopoulos and Simon Boag
CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

Historically, theories of personality and individual differences research have generally
emerged primarily out of western thinking and traditions. In fact, Dan Jones (2010) has
recently pointed out that since psychology students tend to be the most accessible and
willing participants for psychology research, such findings are mostly representative of
WEIRDosWestern, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic cultures. It has been
further pointed out that such theories and findings have tended to emphasise the individual at
the expense of understanding the person in relation (Edge, this volume; Hall, 2003).
Consider, for instance, the significance of self in many approaches to personality, and the
value placed on self-development and self-actualisation, and so forth. While there may be
value in such constructs, others have noted that this focus on the self reflects the values of
western, industrialised cultures (e.g., North America) and may actually ignore the vast
majority of the worlds cultures that place value on the social collective over and above the
individual (Hall, 2004; Markus, 2004). Consequently, some have been critical of personality
and individual research, claiming that it reflects (and imposes) a western bias and thus not
reflecting the global state of affairs (e.g., Markus, 2004). Some have even claimed that we are
each trapped in our own cultural cocoons and are thus prevented from even ever
understanding other cultures (e.g., Gergen, 2001). However, the latter claim is itself too
extreme since if it is true, then it is itself trapped in its cultural setting and so can make no
claim to making any truth statement extending beyond itself. Furthermore, it ignores
humanitys great capacity to learn and communicate, and while we may struggle to get into
anothers world we can still make the effort, just as someone brought up bi- (or even tri- etc.)
culturally has the benefit of appreciating multiple cultural nuances (cf. Hall, 2001).
Consequently, while much research has emerged out of western thinking, this is, in itself,
not necessarily problematic. Instead, acknowledging the potential for cultural bias raises very
interesting questionsempirical questionsabout whether findings generated in particular
parts of the world generalise to other parts, and whether our theories are as universal as we
may wish to believe. Subsequently, there is growing interest in cultural factors and increasing
questioning of the universality of theories and findings generated in the predominantly
English-speaking, western, industrialised countries. This makes for exciting times, and what
is helping to break down cultural barriers is increasing accessibility to the internet. Since the
internets inception approximately two decades ago, global communication has become
steadily more accessible and this global accessibility and communication has led to the
internet being increasingly used in research (see Jackson, this volume; Kraut et al., 2004).
More and more, then, we have the technology to help us become global researchers.
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY AND

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
While the greater global focus is both important and necessary for developing
comprehensive theories and approaches, it brings with it certain challenges. In particular,
coming to terms with different approaches to understanding personsespecially with respect
to religious and spiritual dimensionsis an element that many researchers may feel
Introduction 3
uncomfortable with. Since the dawn of modern psychology, it seems psychologists have been
sceptical about the value or utility of the psychological study of religion and spirituality. This
battering scepticism apparently resulted in a rather uneasy relationship between psychology
and religion (for example Esau, 1998; van Till, 1935/1972; Vande Kemp, 1986). Had it not
been for people like William James (1902/2002) and Gordon Allport (1950), who through
their pioneering ideas helped lift to a great extent that doubt, the field of the psychology of
religion may have been far more marginal than it is today. Echoing their words, we argue that
religion and spirituality are fundamental, multidimensional, and multilevel aspects of
humanity. Since they carry a set of experiences, communal as well as personal belief systems,
motives, and codes of values that seem to have a direct, at times powerful, and distinct impact
on a persons functional and dysfunctional mental processes and behaviour, their
investigation considerably overlaps with the domain of psychology, and more specifically
with that of personality. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the main psychological body of
both theory and empirical evidence on religion and spirituality comes from within the broader
area of personology and individual differences.
Contextualising the psychological interest, it should be made clear that it is the feeling,
thought, or personal interpretation of transcendence, as well as the associated attitudes,
behaviours, and personality correlates that are of direct if not exclusive interest to
psychology, while the existence of religious objects and the transcendent actual are best
addressed through philosophy or theology. It would be sagacious to stress Spilkas et al.
(2003) disclaimer that states that the object of the psychological study of religion is neither
God nor the worldview of religious institutions, nor faith versus reason, nor religion versus
science, but people. And religion appears to be important to our understanding of people, not
only because it addresses an element of life that seems to be central to most individuals and
societies, but also because it seems to affect a plethora of areas, such as individual
differences, identity, attachment, well-being, and mental health, that are of principal interest
to psychologists. Despite Sigmund Freuds (for example 1927/1961) attempts to present it as
an anachronistic and disappearing concept, it looks like psychologists, and definitely
personologists, are presently yet still gradually acknowledging that the psychology of religion
is here to stay.
CLINICAL DIMENSIONS
The relevance of the above discussion is all the more pertinent given the application of
personality and individual differences research to clinical work. In fact, more than ever is it
time to consider such issues given that changes in clinical conceptualisations are beginning
and that such changes directly involve personality factors. The American Psychiatric
Association (2010a) boldly states on its webpage DSM-V: The Future Manual, while the
official DSM-V site heralds the expected publication date of the manual (May 2013) as one
the most anticipated events in the mental health field (American Psychiatric Association,
2010b). Bells and whistles aside, what is immediately evident from reading through the
published draft of the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-V) is the triumphal influence of personology and individual differences on
the shape of things to come in the clinical assessment, diagnosis, and classification of mental
health. This influence is most obvious in the proposed changes to Axis II, and particularly to
personality disorders, where terms like personality trait domains, trait facets, personality
hierarchy, and dimensional assessment of personality functioningall rather familiar to
psychologistsprominently feature in abundance.
According to the currently used clinical and categorical (binary) model of
psychopathology (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), mental disorders are
conceptualised as distinct health-related (latent) taxa, with specific and differentiated
properties (symptoms and aetiologies) that an individual either possesses or not at any given
point in their life. This position sits comfortably with at least the traditional medical model
of illness, and initially it may appear to make intuitive sense. After all, and as a layperson
may state, one is either healthy or ill.
It has gradually, however, become apparent that the categorical model is problematic.
The arguably poorly defined and non-evidence based taxa and subclasses of disorders appear
to generate rather unreliable and subjective diagnoses, possess problematic construct
validities, result in unrealistically large numbers of co-diagnoses (the problem of
comorbidity), and seriously limit scientific enquiry into mental illness (for more see Millon et
al., 2004; Stark, 2006). Eventually, even the medical establishment acknowledged that the
distinction between normality and abnormality is far fuzzier than it was originally conceived
and that the current model is practically incapable of allowing a useful and meaningful
differentiation between the two (for example, Helzer et al., 2008).
As early as the 1970s (although arguably the seed had been planted decades before), with
Hans and Sybil Eysencks bold introduction of psychoticism as a fundamental dimension of
normal personality (e.g., Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976), personologists and clinical
psychologistsalso acknowledging the sincere efforts from the fields of behavioural genetics
and evolutionary psychologyhave been, at times, forcefully and explicitly questioning the
value of the medical model of mental health, with a particular focus on personality disorders.
The accumulating evidence points to the existence of the same personality traits in both non-
clinical and clinical populations, the similar heritability levels of disordered and functional
traits, common (if not identical) biological and genetic markers in the formation of both, and
a cross-cultural correspondence between them (see also Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman,
2009; O Donohue, Fowler, & Lilienfeld, 2007; Zuckerman, 2005). Thus far, the evidence
appears to overwhelmingly suggest that personality traits may function as vulnerability to the
aetiology and development of mental illness and that, within certain parameters, personality
disorders may be both quantitative and qualitative exaggerated, dysfunctional, and non-
adaptive expressions of normal personality variations. The inevitable conclusion is that the
adoption of a dimensional approach to mental illness is the viable evidence-based solution to
the problematic current state of affairs (see also Widiger, Livesley, & Clark, 2009).
Consequently within such framework, the diagnostic and assessment discourse centres around
levels of mental health functioning and impairment, and contextual or cultural degrees of
adaptation.
In the DSM-V the initial brave steps toward this approach are evident, with the complete
redefinition of personality (and other) disorders and the introduction of a dimensional traits
assessment of personality functioning. As a result, personology and individual differences
(officially) gain a new status and acquire a far more central role in mental health, with
corresponding levels of responsibility and increased demands for further research in the field.
It remains to be seen whether the infusion of such knowledge results in this future manual
Introduction 5
living up to expectations and allowing for diagnoses to be more accurate, valid, and
clinically useful (American Psychiatric Association, 2010b).
ORGANISATION AND SCOPE

With the above considerations in mind, the purpose of this book is twofold. The first
general aim is to draw attention to the rich scientific literature that continues to emerge with
respect to personality and individual differences psychology. Here the book addresses the
underlying processes associated with known and novel personality factors, as well as current
critical developments in theory. The second more specific aim is to draw attention to lesser
known cross-cultural considerations that impact upon personality and individual differences
research. This latter aim provides the book with a global context which is important for
reflecting the growing direction in personality and individual differences research. Here the
book addresses cross-cultural considerations and devotes special attention to religious factors,
noting a wide-range of views on the matter. At the very least, history demonstrates that
humans are attracted to the numinous, and so any account of personality should be able to
accommodate this aspect of the human psyche.
The book is divided into 4 major sections that address the major directions in personality
and individual differences research:
Part A: Processes & performance

Part B: Culture, religion & spirituality
Part C: Contributions to clinical psychology & assessment
Part D: Developments in theory & structure
Part A (Processes & performance) examines both individual and social processes that
impact upon behaviour. Nadin Beckmann and colleagues open this section with a chapter that
addresses the important issue of the relationship involving between- and within-person
variables and their consideration in research in the workplace. Damian Birney follows this up
with a discussion of the possibility of training fluid intelligence, a construct commonly noted
for its immutability. Lauren ODriscoll and Jessica Franklin then (each with Eugene
Chekaluk) focus upon the impact of the social environment on self-concept and self-
evaluation. Following this, Madeleine Fraser and Simon Boags chapter examines the
interaction of person-variables (emotional intelligence) and situational variables, before Gerry
Pallier and Niko Tiliopoulos discuss findings related to nonconscious processing, the
incubation effect, and its impact upon creativity (as well as theorising why sleeping on a
problem may be effective). Paul Ginns and colleagues discuss the role of traits in learning
and performance with respect to academic achievement, workplace performance and physical
exercise, and then finally, Sabina Kleitman and colleagues examine the important issue of
predicting self-confidence in childhood and its relation to metacognition.
Part B (Culture, religion & spirituality) discusses applications and findings relevant to
understanding and acknowledging the importance of cultural considerations. This section
begins with Luh Ketut Suryani discussing the significance of culture and spirituality, and its
application to therapy. At the other end of the scale, Lazar Stankov and colleagues then
examine militant extremist mindsets, a mindset often associated with extreme religious views.
Following this, Leslie Francis and colleagues look at emotional intelligence in church leaders,
finding relatively low scores on emotional intelligence compared to other populations. In a
similar vein, Lisa Hancock examines the relationship between religious attachment (an
extension from attachment theory) and schizotypal traits, finding a relationship between
religious attachment and schizotypy in Christian samples. Fiona Hibberd then addresses the
issue of secularism in psychology and whether there is a bias against discussion of religious
issues, while John Reid looks at right- and left-brain thinkers and considers possible future
issues in organisational psychology in a global economy. Finally for this section, Hoyt Edge
and colleagues discuss differences between individualist and collectivist cultures through
comparing North American and Balinese cultures.
Part C (Contributions to clinical psychology and assessment) discusses clinical findings
and evaluates current personality and individual differences assessment tools (including
cutting-edge discussion of internet assessment). Tara Thompson and colleagues begin this
section with a counterpoint to the influence of culture by examining the genetic variation
associated with conduct disorder. Next, Marianna Szab investigates the commonly used
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales and its suitability across different phases of the life-span.
Kathleen Mairet and Simon Boags chapter then looks at the potential role of unconscious
negative schemas underlying bulimia using subliminal presentation and again finding that
cultural consideration appear to be important. Weiwen Yang and Esben Strodl next look at
the importance of personality variables and motivational interviewing as an adjunct to
successful cognitive behavioural therapy. With respect to assessment, Elliroma Gardiner and
Chris Jackson address the noteworthy issue of conceptualising and assessing disinhibition, a
construct linked to impulse control failure, and then Jennifer Keen and Julie Fitness look at
issues related to assessing and detecting white-collar fraud, which is all the more salient in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis. Richard Hicks then discusses measures of stress and
both disadvantages and advantages associated with different approaches to the issue. Finally,
Chris Jacksons contribution concerns the use of current technologies in personality and
individual research, and will be of interest also to anyone wishing to assess and find new
online testing facilities.
Part E (Developments in theory & structure) discusses the theoretical and conceptual
issues surrounding personality and individual differences research. Jonathan Gerber first
discusses the issues of circularity and traits psychology before offering a constructive
response to rescuing traits from conceptual problems. Niko Tiliopoulos next discusses an
alternative circular conception of traits that arises in contrast to the problematic factor
analytic derivation of constructs. Finally, Simon Boags chapter argues for the importance of
conceptual research as a supplement for empirical research.
FINAL COMMENTS
This book arose from ideas generated at the Australasian Conference on Personality and
Individual Differences (ACPID) held at the University of Sydney in November, 2009. ACPID
has become a focal point for both personality and individual differences researchers in
Australia and increasingly throughout the world. In conjunction with this, ACPID provides a
Introduction 7
constructive forum for the exposition and discussion of personality and individual differences
research for both established researchers and also up-and-coming researchers. This spirit is
found within this volume. The Editors would especially like to thank Mike Jones (deputy
Head of Department at Macquarie University) and Chandera Rajah who made this book
possible with financial backing. The Editors would also like to extend their gratitude to
Sabina Kleitman, Carolyn McCann and Gerry Pallier for help with chapter reviews and
finally, we would also like to extend our gratitude to all of the authors who contributed to this
book.
REFERENCES
Allport, G. W. (1950). The individual and his religion. New York: MacMillan.
Allport, G. W., & Vernon, P. E. (1930). The field of personality. Psychological Bulletin, 27,
677-730.
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders (4th ed., text revision). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association (2010a). DSM-V: The future manual. Retrieved from
http://www.psych.org/dsmv.aspx
American Psychiatric Association (2010b). DSM-V: The future of psychiatric diagnosis.
Retrieved from http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx
Esau, T. G. (1998). The evangelical Christian in psychotherapy. American Journal in
Psychotherapy, 52, 28-36.
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1976). Psychoticism as a dimension of personality.
London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Freud, S. (1961). The future of an illusion. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 21, pp. 5-56).
London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1927).
Gergen, K. J. (2001). Psychological science in a postmodern context. American Psychologist,
56, 803-813.
Hall, G. C. (2003). The self in context: Implications for psychopathology and psychotherapy.
Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 13, 66-82.
Helzer, J. E., Kraemer, H. C., Krueger, R. F., Wittchen, H. U., Sirovatka, P. J., & Regier, D.
A. (Eds.) (2008). Dimensional approaches in diagnostic classification. Refining the
research agenda for DSM-V. Arlington: APA.
James, W. (2002). Varieties of religious experience. London: Routledge. (Original work
published 1902).
Jones, D. (2010). A WEIRD view of human nature skews psychologists studies. Science,
328, 1627.
Kraut, R., Olson, J., Banaji, M., Bruckman, A., Cohen, J., & Couper, M. (2004).
Psychological research online; report of Board of scientific Affairs Advisory group on
the conduct of research on the internet. American Psychologist, 59, 105-117.
Markus, H. R. (2004). Culture and personality: Brief for an arranged marriage. Journal of
Research in Personality, 38, 75-83.
Matthews, G., Deary, I. J., & Whiteman, M. C. (2009). Personality traits (3rd ed.).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Millon, T., Grossman, S., Meagher, S., Millon, C., & Ramnath, R. (2004). Personality
disorders in modern life (2nd ed.). Int.: Wiley.
O Donohue, W., Fowler, K. A., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (Eds.) (2007). Personality disorders:
Toward the DSM-V. London: Sage.
Spilka, B., Hood, R. W. Jr., Hunsberger, B., & Gorsuch, R. L. (2003). The psychology of
religion: An empirical approach (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford.
Strack, S. (Ed.) (2006). Differentiating normal and abnormal personality (2nd ed.). New
York: Springer.
van Til, C. (1972). The psychology of religion. Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Pubs.
(Original work published 1935).
Vande Kemp, H.(1986). Dangers of psychologism: The place of God in psychology. Journal
of Psychology & Theology, 14, 97-109.
Widiger, T. A., Livesley, J. W., & Clark, A. L. (2009). An integrative dimensional
classification of personality disorders. Psychological Assessment, 21, 243-255.
Zuckerman, M. (2005). Psychobiology of personality (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
PART A: PROCESSES AND PERFORMANCE
Chapter 2
INTEGRATING THE STUDY OF WITHIN- AND

BETWEEN-PERSON VARIABILITY
IN PERSONALITY AT WORK
Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian

Accelerated Learning Laboratory, University of New South Wales,
Sydney, NSW 2050, Australia
and Robert E. Wood
Melbourne Business School, Carlton, VIC 3053, Australia
ABSTRACT
Research on personality in the workplace has primarily focussed on differences
between individuals in their typical thoughts, feelings and behaviours as represented in
the five-factor model of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999). We argue that a within-
person conceptualisation of personality offers additional meaningful insights into the role
of personality in general and at work in particular. In this chapter we present a multi-level
framework that integrates between- and within-person approaches to the study of
personality in the workplace. We outline questions of interest that arise within this
approach, provide examples from the literature that illustrate each question and highlight
future research directions.
Keywords: Five-factor model, Experience sampling, Organisational psychology, Personality,

Within-person variability
Ph: 61-2-9931 9187; Fax: 61-2-9931 9199; nadin.beckmann@unsw.edu.au

12 Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian and Robert E. Wood
INTRODUCTION
An important but largely unresearched topic in personality research within organisational
contexts relates to the variability in personality responses that occurs within a person across
time and situations. Although much research has focussed on personality in the workplace,
this work has primarily focussed on differences between individuals in their typical thoughts,
feelings and behaviours as represented in the five-factor model of personality (McCrae &
Costa, 1999), and the relation of these to work outcomes of interest (e.g., Barrick, Mount &
Judge, 2001). In trait models, such as the five-factor model, which study between-person
effects, variability that occurs within a person is treated as error variance. In this chapter we
will present a multi-level framework that integrates between- and within-person approaches
to the study of personality in the workplace. We will outline some questions of interest that
arise within this approach, provide examples from the literature that illustrate each question
and highlight future research directions.
BACKGROUND TO AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

Over the past twenty years, the study of personality in organisational psychology has
been dominated by traits; that is, relatively stable personality characteristics that influence
thoughts, feelings, and overt behaviour (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1999). The most widely-
validated trait modelthe five-factor model (FFM; Costa & McCrae, 1992)describes
personality in terms of five broad dimensions labelled neuroticism, extraversion, openness to
experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. The trait approach as represented by the
FFM has provided a useful framework for organisational psychologists to describe individual
differences on fundamental personality characteristics. In particular, it has allowed us to
identify which of these between-person differences in personality are relevant for work. For
example, meta-analytic studies have shown that individuals who tend to be more
conscientious and/or less neurotic tend to perform better across a wide range of occupations
(Barrick et al., 2001). Furthermore, by providing a taxonomy of the major personality factors
the FFM has enabled the integration of seemingly heterogeneous findings regarding the role
of personality in work settings (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 2005; Borkenau, Egloff, Eid, Henning,
Kersting, Neubauer & Spinath, 2005).
Although the trait approach has yielded major contributions to the development of
personality research in organisational psychology, its emphasis has primarily been on
descriptions of people relative to each other on relatively stable characteristics. Less emphasis
has been placed on within-person variation, which itself is an important topic within the field
of personality (Cervone, 2004). Within-person variability was most prominently studied by
Mischel (1973) in the 1970s who argued that a considerable amount of variation in
cognition, affect, and behaviour occurs within an individual and that this variation can be
explained by the impact of the situation. In response, over the past two decades personality
research has adopted a model that includes both trait-concepts and situations as sources of
variability (see Matthews & Deary, 1998). This has been referred to as an interactionist
approach. Within this approach within-person variability is captured by the concept of
states. In contrast to traits, states are conceptualised as aspects of personality that are
Integrating the Study of within- and between-Person Variability 13
variable across situations and time. Specifically, traits interact with the situation to influence
an individuals state at a given point in time. However, within organisational contexts, the
emphasis has been on between-person differences, even when an interactionist approach has
been adopted. For example, when predicting job performance using conscientiousness as a
predictor, Barrick and Mount (1993) took into account the influence of the situation by
including job autonomy as the situational moderator. That is, they examined how individuals
who are working under different levels of autonomy compare on their job performance; not
how an individuals job performance varies across situations with different levels of
autonomy.
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the two types of variability (i.e., between-
versus within-person) discussed above. The figure plots the mean levels and variation in
effort expended by two employees (rated on a scale of 0 to 10) conditional on one situational
characteristic, namely who is present. Within-person variability in effort across different
situations is represented by the profiles (solid lines), whereas between-person variability is
represented by the differences between the mean effort levels (dashed lines).
Integrating within-person variability into the study of personality at work is important
because of at least three reasons: (1) Previous research within the general personality
literature has shown that within-person variability comprises a large part of the total
variability in behaviour (Fleeson, 2001). Consequently, in order to get a complete picture of
personality at work the two sources of variance (within-person and between-person) need to
be simultaneously taken into account; (2) Within-person effects often differ between people
and these differences capture meaningful components of personality. For example, it has been
argued that situation contingent within-person effects may provide insights into individual
differences in adaptability (Fleeson & Jolley, 2006). Assessing these differences and their
correlates will provide insights into aspects of personality that are not well captured by a
purely between-person trait approach; (3) Between-person relations are often used as proxies
for inferences that relate to within-person effects. Specifically, researchers often articulate
theories about the psychological processes that occur within an individual, but then collect
data to test these theories at the between-person level. However, the two levels are
conceptually and statistically distinct, and, therefore, conclusions that are made at one level
do not necessarily generalise to the other level (Nezlek, 2001).
In recent years the study of within-person variability has been advanced by developments
in methodological and data-analytic techniques. These techniques facilitate the collection and
analysis of data that involves frequent reassessments of individuals and has a multilevel
structure. Specifically, experience sampling methodology (ESM), while known for several
decades, has now become a practical option for collecting large-scale within-person data due
to advances in computer technology such as the advent of handheld computers (see Feldman-
Barrett & Barrett, 2001); additionally, developments in hierarchical linear modelling and
associated software provide a means by which researchers can appropriately address the
nested structure of such data (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We discuss experience
sampling and hierarchical linear modelling in greater detail below.
10
9
8
7
P1 Profile
Effort 6
P2 Profile
5
P1 Mean
4
P2 Mean
3
2
1
0
supervisor peer subordinate no one
Pe rs on Pre s ent
Figure 1. Response patterns for effort levels of two individuals (P1 & P2) as a function of people
present in the situation for: (a) the average level of effort across situations (dashed lines), & (b) the
variation in effort across situations where different people are present (solid lines).
Experience Sampling Method (ESM)
To study the within-person aspects of personality we require a design that allows

measurement of the individuals momentary thoughts, feeling and behaviours, and the
variation in these states over time and situations. Experience sampling is a methodology that
allows frequent sampling in a natural context without being too intrusive. This method has
begun to be used in organisational research (e.g., Miner, Glomb, & Miner, 2005) as it allows
for short, frequent measures of feelings, thoughts and behaviours that occur across the
workday. By assessing these states as they occur, ESM designs have been argued to be more
ecologically valid and less prone to the biases in recall that affect retrospective reports of
behaviour (e.g., Fisher, 2002). ESM is typically implemented by sending individuals signals
(e.g., via handheld computers or email) at different times during the day over several weeks
that request them to report on properties of the situation and their thoughts, feelings and
behaviours at that point in time. The sampling design for the timing of the signals and the
measures will depend on the specific hypotheses researchers are testing.
Hierarchical Linear Modelling
Integrating within-person and between-person variability raises several data-analytic

complications that are not present in studies that focus solely on between-person differences
(see Hofmann, 1997). In particular, the nested structure of the data (observations are clustered
within individuals) creates dependency among the observations that violates the independence
of observations assumption associated with the traditional ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis. Consequently, use of OLS to analyse multilevel data results in inaccurate
(downwardly biased) estimates of standard error. In contrast, hierarchical linear modelling
(HLM) explicitly and simultaneously models each level of analysisincluding the residuals
at each levelin terms of its own submodel. In this way, HLM accounts for the
interdependence between observations that are clustered within individuals. Furthermore, it
allows one to disentangle between-person and within-person effects on the outcome of
interest, and to examine cross-level interactions.
Use of hierarchical linear modelling has been limited in the past due to the practical
difficulties associated with estimating the model parameters, however the emergence of
several statistical programs for accomplishing this purpose has resulted in an increased use of
such models over the past decade (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Within-person
relationships (e.g., between situations and states) can be modelled by parameters at level 1
and between-person relationships (e.g., between traits and mean states) can be modelled by
parameters at level 2. Furthermore, cross-level interactions (e.g., the effects of traits on
within-person situation-state relationships) can also be represented and tested by parameters
at the second level.
QUESTIONS WITHIN AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

An integrated approach to studying personality at work lends itself to several types of
questions that include but also go beyond the between-person questions that have typically
been addressed in studies of personality at work (see Nezlek, 2007). In this section we outline
and elaborate on these questions and provide illustrative examples from the literature.
Between-person relationships: Individuals differ systematically in their typical levels

of cognitive, affective and behavioural states as a function of traits
Between-person relationships are the typical types of relationships that have
been examined in studies on personality at work. They include findings from meta-
analyses in which the association between personality variables and cross-sectionally
assessed outcomes of interest, such as job performance and job satisfaction, are
estimated (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002). This
category also includes studies in which between-person differences in personality
dispositions are related to between-person differences in aggregated levels of
momentary states, such as positive and negative affect (e.g., Fisher, 2002).
Within-person relationships: An individuals states vary systematically as a function
of the nominal and psychological properties of different situations as well as a
function of other states
In recent years, within-person relationships have received increasing attention in
the organisational literature, although this body of research has primarily focused on
state constructs that are distinct from personality, such as task performance (Fisher &
Noble, 2004), job satisfaction (Ilies & Judge, 2002) and organisational citizenship
behaviour (Ilies, Scott, & Judge, 2006). These studies indicate that within-person
variability typically accounts for a substantial amount of the total variability in the
construct of interest. Moreover, this variability is explicable as a function of
momentary situational characteristics such as task difficulty (Fisher & Noble, 2004),
as well as affective states (Ilies & Judge, 2002). In a recent study, we examined
whether these findings extend to momentary variations in the conscientiousness
levels of managers during three working weeks (Minbashian, Wood, & Beckmann,
2009, in press). As argued by Fleeson (2001), this represents a strong test of the
viability of studying within-person aspects of personality given the assumptions of
cross-situational consistency traditionally associated with the FFM. Nevertheless, we
found that within-person variability in conscientiousness was approximately two
times greater than between-person difference in conscientiousness, and that
psychological properties of the tasks individuals were engaged in (importance,
difficulty, urgency) accounted for the majority of this variance.
Cross-level interactions: The within-person relationship between situations and
states or between states and states, respectively, vary as a function of differences
between people in traits
In studies of within-person relationships the magnitude and/or direction of
within-person effects frequently differ between people. These individual differences
are often outcomes of interest in their own right and can be modelled as a function of
personality traits and other individual difference variables, thus defining a third type
of question that arises within an integrated approach. For example, Ilies et al. (2006)
found significant differences between people in the extent to which momentary
positive affect was associated with organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB). This
effect was moderated by agreeableness such that individuals low on agreeableness
tended to display a strong association between positive affect and OCB, whereas
highly agreeable individuals tended to display high levels of OCB regardless of their
affect levels. In contrast, Ilies and Judge (2002) found that individual differences in
the within-person association between affect and momentary reports of job
satisfaction were not significantly accounted for by either extraversion or
neuroticism, although the latter was related to within-person variability in negative
affect and job satisfaction. Such findings help to shed light on the way in which the
effects of traits are reflected in everyday work situations.
Comparisons of relationships at different levels: The between-person relationship
between two constructs is not necessarily equivalent to the within-person
relationship between the constructs
Findings from studies implementing between-person designs do not necessarily
generalise to within-person phenomena. For instance, the between-person finding of
a five-factor model of personality does not imply the existence of a five-factor
structure that operates within most individuals. This is because, statistically, models
of between-person variability are not related to models of within-person variability
(Nezlek, 2001; Schmitz, 2006). While the distinctness of the two models has been
discussed in the literature (e.g., Cervone, 2005, see also lead paper by Cervone, et al.,
2006 and associated commentaries), there has been little systematic empirical
investigation of this issue (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003). Few
studies have directly compared findings with regard to the structure of personality at
the between-person level with findings at the within-person level. In one study
Borkenau and Ostendorf (1998) collected data from 22 students once a day over 90
consecutive days employing a German adjective-based FFM measure. Individual
within-person factor structures of FFM relevant states were rather weakly related to
the overall between-person reference factor structure of FFM traits as assessed in a
different sample. A stronger match, however, was found when the average within-
person factor structure was considered. In our own research we have looked at the
relationship between two FFM dimensions, neuroticism and conscientiousness, from
a between-person and a within-person perspective (Beckmann, Minbashian, &
Wood, 2009, in press). We found that while neuroticism and conscientiousness were
negatively related at the between-person level (a finding that is well documented in
the literature, see Mount, Barrick, Scullen and Rounds, 2005), at the level of the
individual this relationship was reversed. Further empirical evidence for the
distinctness of within- and the between-person effects can be found in other areas of
psychology, for instance, in the field of self-regulation (Vancouver, 2001, 2006).
CONCLUSION
Personality has increasingly become an important topic in organisational psychology.
Much of this research has relied on between-person comparisons. In this chapter we argued
that the field would benefit from an approach that incorporates within-person aspects of
personality. We have presented a framework that illustrates the types of research questions
that can follow from this integrated approach. Furthermore we outlined some initial studies
that fall within each type of research question. In the following paragraphs we list three areas
of future research:
Broader focus. More research is required to evaluate within- versus between-person

effects on a broader range of personality related constructs. To date, most of the
research has focused on a limited number of broad personality dimensions, such as
conscientiousness and neuroticism (Minbashian, et al., 2009; Beckmann et al., 2009).
Yet, the personality domain comprises a multitude of constructs, both broad and
narrow that are likely to be relevant for a work context, such as openness to
experience (Barrick, et al., 2001), or goal orientation (Payne et al., 2007).
Conceptual clarity. Research is required to provide theoretical clarity about the types
of effects studied at the within- and between-person levels. Questions of interests
include: a) whether within-person effects (e.g., situation-state contingencies, such as
an individuals responsiveness to situational cues) are stable across macro-contexts;
b) whether these within-person effects are assessing constructs that are distinct from
traditional trait constructs (rather than representing different methods of assessing the
same constructs), and if so; c) how they fit in the nomological net of the traditional
trait constructs.
Malleability. Traditionally, trait approaches to personality have focused on the stable
aspects of personality and, consequently, there have been few applications designed
to develop personality in a way that facilitates performance in work contexts. It is
likely that within-person aspects of personality are more modifiable. Unlike trait
measures that have been traditionally routed in biology, within-person effects are
thought to reflect cognitive factors that arguable are more amenable to intervention
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995). However, this is an empirical question that has received
little attention to date in the organisational literature.
Implications for work outcomes. Finally, studies are required to evaluate the
implications of within-person effects for predicting and explaining work outcomes.
In particular, from a practical perspective an important question relates to whether
within-person measures provide incremental validity over what is already accounted
for by traditional trait measures. Furthermore, a study that addresses this issue can
also provide insight into the day-to-day processes by which personality traits
influence important work outcomes; that is, one can explore the extent to which
within-person constructs mediate the trait-job performance relationships that have
traditionally been observed. This knowledge is relevant for organisational
psychologists who are interested in identifying the underlying psychological
processes that can be targeted as part of employee learning and development
programs in order to implement behavioural change.
Integrating within- and between-person variability into the study of personality at work
represents an exciting direction for future research. Pursuing this approach will lead to a more
comprehensive picture of the individual in their work environment than captured by a purely
between-person trait perspective.
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Chapter 3
DELIBERATE PRACTICE AND THE TRAINABILITY OF

FLUID COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS
Damian P. Birney
Accelerated Learning Laboratory, University of New South Wales
ABSTRACT
Over 100 years of research has failed to produce training programs that lead to
demonstrable and sustained increases in fluid intelligence (Gf). We report on the work of
Jaeggi, et al. (2008) who showed Gf-gains obtained by training working memory using a
deliberate-practice-like approach. While promising, the work is not conclusive and we
argue that future research needs to be very clear about what attributes are being modified,
through what processes, and via what training-methods. We believe an investigative
framework of deliberate practice will be fruitful for such work. Closer investigations of
how training in different fluid cognitive functions leads to Gf gains which have a
practical impact on everyday functioning are required. Implications for theory and test
development, education and training programs, as well as ultimately for socio-political
stereotypes are significant. To achieve this, headway will need to be made in overcoming
a century of inertia surrounding traditional psychometric assessment and theorising.
Keywords: Deliberate Practice, Fluid Intelligence, Working Memory, Training
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we dissect and investigate the claim made by Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides,
et al. (2008) that they have achieved what over 100 years of education and psychology
research has failed to doto increase fluid intelligence (Gf). The increases in fluid
Ph: 61-2-9931 9484; Fax: 61-2-9931 9199; d.birney@unsw.edu.au

22 Damian P. Birney
intelligence were achieved through training working memory (WM) using a variant of the n-
back task. As will be discussed below, central to their success is a presentation routine that
prevented (or at least minimised) the automatisation of solution strategies by participants. It
will be argued that this is, in essence, a deliberate practice routine as prescribed by Ericsson
and his colleagues (Ericsson, 2003; Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Rmer, 1993). We outline
core issues that future research needs to address and discuss the socio-political importance
and implications of this research.
JAEGGI, ET AL.S RESEARCH

In the typical n-back task, participants are shown a series of stimuli (e.g., letters, sounds,
spatial locations), and for each stimulus are required to indicate whether it matches the
identity of the stimulus that preceded it by n-places in the series (see Figure 1 where n = 2).
The n-back task is considered a continuous WM task because participants must maintain and
update (and presumably rehearse) a set of items while responding to each current item. The
cognitive demands are thus theoretically consistent with the simultaneous storage and
processing requirement central to many theories of working-memory (Conway, Jarrold, Kane,
Miyake & Towse, 2007).
Jaeggi, et al.s (2008) training sessions entailed an adaptive presentation of the n-back
task that the authors believe minimised automaticity. We will outline their research here in
some detail because of the remarkable simplicity of the training design and the significance of
its impact on individual Gf gains. Participants were 69 healthy University of Bern students
(mean age = 25.6; SD = 3.3). The WM training entailed presentation of varyingly difficult
versions of the n-back task contingent on the individuals performance on previous trial sets.
Difficulty was manipulated in terms of changes in n (1, 2, 3-back). Automaticity was further
minimised by mixing the modality of presentation under dual-task conditions. That is,
participants had to simultaneously maintain and update different item sets for two different n-
back tasksone in an auditory mode and the other in a visuospatial mode. The auditory n-
back task consisted of one of eight consonants presented in a female voice. The visuospatial
n-back task consisted of the presentation of visual stimuli located at one of eight possible
screen locations. The rate of presentation of each component was synchronised to coincide
and only match responses were required. The difficulty of the task was tailored to the
individual. As individual performance changed, n incremented accordinglyup by 1 item for
improved performance, and down by 1 item when performance worsened. The amount of n-
back practice was manipulated across four different groups8 days (16 participants), 12 days
(22 participants), 17 days (16 participants), and 19 days (15 participants). Daily practice
consisted of 20 blocks of 20+n trials which equated to a daily training time of approximately
25mins. Change in Gf was evaluated using parallel versions of Ravens Advanced
Progressive Matrices and a short version of the Bochumer Matrizen-Test matrix reasoning
task at pre- and post-test (before and after training). The results indicated that relative to a
control group, not only did WM training result in greater gains in Gf, but the magnitude of the
gains were a function of training dosagethe more training, the greater the gains in Gf.
Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive Functions 23
2-Back Task
No Match
1
G 2
No Match
D 3
G 4
Match
R 5
D
N+1 Lure Trial
Figure 1. The 2-back task. Participants are presented each item (G, D, G etc) one at a time and are
required to indicate whether the current stimuli is the same as the one presented 2-back. Item 2 (D) is
a N+1 lure for Item 5 (D). In responding to Item 5, participants must inhibit the tendency to
incorrectly decide match which is triggered by the temporal location of Item 2s D to the target
location of Item 3 (G = no match) & the fact that it primes a match response with the Item 5 D.
EVALUATION OF JAEGGI, ET AL.S FINDINGS

Jaeggi, et al.s (2008) results are remarkable for a number of reasons. First, their sample
consisted of healthy adults in their mid-20s. The general consensus regarding the
developmental trajectory of Gf is that it rises from birth to plateau in the late teenage years
from which time on there is a general, gradual decline (McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami &
Woodcock, 2002). These trajectory findings are consistent with the common interpretations
of neuronal plasticity data (Berlucchi & Buchtel, 2009; Garlick, 2002). Significant neural
change, which is presumably happening during Jaeggi, et al.s WM training, is more likely to
occur in children rather than adults, because neuronal plasticity is reduced in adults.
Second, research in educational psychology often report negative correlations between
the amount of post-intervention gain and pre-intervention starting point (Sternberg &
Grigorenko, 2002). In ability domains, this negative-gain effect is sometimes interpreted as
the result of high-ability students simply having less room to improve than students who
begin with less ability. In comparison to a general population, university students are very
capable and (typically) already have quite high Gf levels. The student population used by
Jaeggi, et al. (2008) would be expected to gain less simply because they are starting from an
already high level. In short, that Jaeggi, et al. report measurable Gf gains over a relatively
short period of time in a high-ability adult sample is impressive.
WHY HAS THIS INTERVENTION WORKED?

Jaeggi, et al.s (2008) is not the first attempt to develop Gf. There have been numerous
programs over the years developed to train WM and attentional resources associated with
cognitive control. Most recently, the clear majority of these have been situated in the
24 Damian P. Birney
cognitive neurosciences (Braver, Paxton, Locke & Barch, 2009; Rougier, Noelle, Braver,
Cohen & O'Reilly, 2005) and have focused on identifying prefrontal cortex regions associated
with various executive process manipulations. Transfer performance has typically been
evaluated using untrained tasks that are similar in structure to the trained tasks. There is little
research looking at modifiability of higher-order functions like Gf, or at implications for
everyday function. A notable exception is the work of Holmes, Gathercole, and Dunning
(2009). They instigated an adaptive WM training program (primarily with complex-span like
tasks) with a small sample of 10yr old children (n=22) who had been previously assessed to
have poor WM (the program was adaptive in the sense that training was targeted at childrens
current span level). These children performed significantly better on other untrained WM
tasks compared to children in the non-adaptive condition who trained only on tasks that had a
list length of 2 (so as not to tax WM). The trained WM and the untrained (transfer) WM tasks
were comparatively similar in structure. It is important to note, the training and criterion tasks
used by Jaeggi, et al. (2008) were not structurally similar. Holmes, et al. (2009) found that
their adaptive WM training was associated with greater numerical reasoning performance
when assessed 6 months later, compared to the control group. However, unlike Jaeggi, et al.
there were no measurable increases in Performance IQ of the Wechsler test (the Gf proxy
used in the study).
In summary, Holmes, et al. (2009) showed improvements on some tasks following WM
training, but not on all tasks, and unfortunately, not on Gf tasks. Jaeggi, et al. (2008) argue
that their intervention worked because their form of n-back training engaged activities
required for the management of executive processes for responding to two n-back tasks
simultaneously. Further, and most importantly from our perspective is that the task format
discouraged the development of task-specific strategies and the engagement of automatic
processes. (p. 6830). The authors speculate that this is because of the tailored, adaptive
variation in n-back difficulty and because the two n-back tasks drew on different modalities.
We believe this is consistent with the concept of deliberate practice which will be elaborated
in the following section (Ericsson, 2003; Ericsson, et al., 1993).
CAN DELIBERATE PRACTICE LEAD TO GF GAINS?

Ericsson et al. (1993) used the term deliberate practice as a means to explain how experts
in a given domain arrive at a level of performance qualitatively different from people who
have been involved in the same domain for just as long, but who have not achieved such high
levels. Deliberate practice is differentiated from practice alone in that it is: a) highly
structured; b) effortful, and; c) designed to continually stress the individual to improve
performance beyond a level most people would consider more than sufficient. As their
primary case in point, Ericsson and his colleagues (extending on earlier research, Simon &
Chase, 1973) have analysed the practice routines of chess players who differed in levels of
expertise (i.e., novice, expert, and grand-masters). They concluded that the maximal levels of
performance obtained by grand-masters are not automatically achieved by simply extending
the amount of time playing chess. The aspect of experience that most strongly shapes the
development of expertise is deliberate practice (Ericsson, 2002, 2005). Within the domain of
higher-order problem-solving and knowledge acquisition, deliberate practice seeks to refine
knowledge representations while avoiding automatisation. Automatisation here can be

thought to refer to the development of eventually over-learnt strategies that might be triggered
unthinkingly when certain stimuli in the environment occur. While automatisation of
strategies frees resources for other activities, it tends to inhibit further learning improvements
(Wood, Beckmann & Birney, 2009).
Jaeggi, et al. (2008) make direct reference to the goal of preventing automatisation in
their WM training. The question here is whether deliberate practice, as conceptualised by
Ericsson (2002, 2005), can be used as a framework for explaining Gf gains reported by
Jaeggi, et al. While Ericsson (2003) suggests that performance and its mediating biological
mechanisms are modifiable as a result of extended deliberate practice, he presents no clear
evidence that this is possible for basic cognitive processes (like Gf). Most of the examples
cited are drawn from domains where gains could be obtained by a) better use of putatively
unmodifiable, possibly innate, cognitive resources, or b) from physical domains such as
sports, where aerobic training might lead to physiological changes that can be integrated with
better use of cognitive resources (anecdotally leading to, for instance, superior eye-hand
coordination). As an example of the former, Chase and Ericsson (1982) conducted a short-
term memory training study where they tested individuals on a simple digit-span task every
second day for many weeks and months. After 50h of practice, all subjects improved
performance by 200% (~20 digits). After 200-400h of practice, two participants performance
had increased by 1000% (~80 digits). Ericssons (2003) interpretation was that through
deliberate practiceadaptively extending the to-be-recalled list as individuals improvedthe
participants had acquired skill for storing and accessing long-term memory. That is, they had
expanded their functional WM. The implicit assumption here is that while skills and
strategies for using WM became more effective (increasing its function), there is no evidence
that the underlying components of WM per se had changed.
As an example of expertise development in the physical domain, Ericsson (2003) quotes
the typical finding that physically fit adults (e.g., university students) can make around 20
push-ups in a row (with a range of 8-32). In 1966, a record was set by an individual who was
able to complete 6000 push-ups. At the time of writing, Ericsson (2003) reported that the then
current record, limited by how many push-ups can be achieved in a 24hr period, was 26000.
These gains were attributed to deliberate practice.
Our conclusion is that the procedure used by Jaeggi, et al. (2008) seems to fit well with
Ericssons (2003) deliberate practice framework. However, while deliberate practice research
in cognitive and physical domains has shown that it is possible to vastly increase performance
on trained tasks, it is not clear (at least in our evaluation of cognitive performance) that what
is modified is truly transferable. That is, using the computer analogy of Newell and Simon
(1972), it is not clear a priori whether that WM training results in deep structural changes to
hardware, or whether it is simply tweaking software. Closer theoretical and empirical
consideration of the nature of the attributes Jaeggi, et al. refer to is needed before the
deliberate practice framework can be accepted as a plausible general account of the observed
Gf gains.
26 Damian P. Birney
WHAT IS BEING MODIFIED? IMPLICATIONS

FOR CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS
Jaeggi, et al.s (2008) research spanned between 8 and 19 days with no ongoing follow-
up evaluations of the sustainability of the gains observed. It is important for sustainability to
be evaluated further because interventions designed to improve intelligence in the past have
typically been conducted only with children and any putative Gf-like gains, if they have
occurred, have not persisted (Holmes, et al., 2009; Neisser, et al., 1996). For the remainder of
this chapter, rather than go into the details of any one study, we reflect on the broader issues
that we believe all research in this area needs to be cognizant ofconstruct definitions issues
and socio-political ramifications.
Fluid intelligence, working memory, executive functions, and to some extent learning,
have all been conceptualised as fluid cognitive functions (FCFs), a higher-order catch-all for a
range of cognitive processes that are not contingent on the specific content of the information
being processed (Blair, 2006). However, FCF turns out to be a rather nebulous
conceptualisation once one begins to drill down to component functions. This is because
while it might seem appropriate to include Gf, WM, and executive function under the same
overarching umbrella, the constituents of each and the relationships between them are not
always apparent theoretically (Birney, Bowman & Pallier, 2006) nor empirically. To
understand the nature and broader implications of Jaeggi, et al.s results, we need to know
what is being modified and whether these can be related to the effects of deliberate practice.
In the next section, we provide a brief analysis of the issues that need to be considered in
dissecting the claim made by Jaeggi, et al. (2008). Particular emphasis is given to issues
associated with the definitions and operationalisations of Gf (including the learning and
plasticity debate) and WM (including the executive function debate). We also reflect on some
of the potential non-cognitive variables that might moderate WM-training effects through
deliberate practice.
FLUID INTELLIGENCE (GF)
Definitions of Gf
Fluid intelligence could be considered the prototypical FCF. It is frequently considered to

be at a conceptually higher level than WM and executive processes. Gf has developed
meaning from within the differential psychology domain (Horn & Cattell, 1966) where
theoretical constructs are defined by a nomological network of tests. Using correlational
techniques (such as structural equation modelling), Gf is empirically defined as the latent trait
extracted from a variety of reasoning-dominated psychometric tests. If Ravens Progressive
Matrices (the Gf measure used by Jaeggi, et al.) is included in such a battery, it typically
dominates the extracted factor. Gf is considered perhaps the most important, some would say
quintessential, aspect of intelligence primarily because it has been linked to many everyday
success outcomes, such as schooling and job performance (Jensen, 1998).
Gf and Learning
A gap remains between how Gf is defined conceptually and how it is often empirically
operationalised. For instance, despite a common definition of Gf as the capacity to learn, few
measures of it are explicitly structured to provide the opportunity of learning throughout the
test (Carlstedt, Gustafsson & Ullstadius, 2000). Instead, research has tended to focus more on
the problem-solving aspect of Gf than on the learning ability aspect (Feldman Barrett, Tugade
& Engle, 2004). This is an interesting outcome because Gf is also considered empirically
distinct but theoretically related to Crystallised Intelligence (Gc). The latter reflects acquired
(i.e., learnt) acculturated knowledge. Gc, like Gf, is defined as a latent trait and is typically
estimated from tests of verbal based acculturated knowledge. The theoretical link between Gf
and Gc is that Gc is thought to develop through the application of Gf (Ackerman, 1996;
Ackerman & Beier, 2005; Cattell, 1987). Gf is critical to learning and knowledge acquisition.
A possible reason why operationalisation of Gf has focused on reasoning (rather than
learning) may be due to the restrictive and theoretically arbitrary assumption of many theories
of intelligencethat cognitive abilities are stable and mostly immutable (Birney & Sternberg,
2006). Historically, the immutability of Gf was also supported by early information-
processing theorists such as Newell and Simon (1972) who suggested that acquired
knowledge and skills were like a computers changeable software, and the cognitive
processes were like the fixed hardware. Under these types of assumptions, explicitly assessing
learning has been thought to have been unnecessary. Rather, the aptitude or ability to learn
could simply be inferred from static tasks that assess the capacity to reason. Hence,
paradoxically, learning has tended to have been under-represented in the basic theory building
research on Gf.
In attempting to manipulate task complexity, Carlstedt et al. (2000) intermixed items
from a number of different reasoning tasks in the same (i.e., heterogeneous) presentation.
Their expectation was that increasing task complexity should result in an increased
correlation between task performance and Gf (see Birney & Bowman, 2009, for discussion of
psychometric indicators of complexity). However, contrary to their expectations, performance
on the homogeneously presented items (items blocked by task type) was actually the better
predictor of Gf. The researchers argued that the basis of this finding was that homogeneous
presentation allowed strategies to develop and that high Gf individuals benefited more from
the opportunity to learn the structure of the items than low Gf individuals. This is a
reasonable interpretation. However, if the deliberate practice work of Ericsson (2003) and the
WM training approach of Jaeggi, et al. (2008) are considered, a heterogeneous presentation
would be expected to be more beneficial to learning in the long term. It may be the case that
the best way to assess Gf (i.e., homogeneous presentation, Carlstedt, et al.) is at odds with the
way we might develop Gf (i.e., heterogeneous presentation, Jaeggi, et al.).
Gf and Neuronal Plasticity
A relationship between learning and Gf has also been implicated at the biological level.
Neural plasticity was proposed as a biological account of learning over 100 years ago
(Berlucchi & Buchtel, 2009). However the consensus within the psychometric tradition of
cognitive abilities is that while it may be possible to better exploit the use of ones level of Gf
28 Damian P. Birney
through cognitive training and through the acquisition of reasoning strategies or mnemonics
(as supported by Ericssons studies), the underlying basis of Gf is largely immutable
(Ackerman & Beier, 2005; Garlick, 2002). Cognitive neuroscience studies tend to support this
assertion. That is, while a) brain changes during cognitive training have been observed
(McNab, et al., 2009), b) that impressive transfer and long-term maintenance has been
reported in untrained tasks of similar structure (Dahlin, Nyberg, Backman & Neely, 2008),
and c) that both these are examples of plasticity, before Jaeggi, et al. (2008), evidence for
functional behavioural changes that go beyond simple improvements on structurally similar
untrained tests has been lacking.
WORKING MEMORY (WM)

WM is important to consider because Gf gains were (purportedly) obtained by Jaeggi, et
al. (2008) by training on tasks that demand WM processes.
Definitions of WM
A clear consensus regarding the nature of WM remains somewhat elusive (Conway, et

al., 2007). Part of the confusion results from the varied approaches to the study of cognition.
Experimental psychology, neurosciences, and cognitive-individual differences psychology all
conceptualise WM processes somewhat differently. As a relevant case in point, the n-back
task (as used by Jaeggi, et al., 2008) has received considerable attention, particularly in the
cognitive neurosciences literature (Jonides, et al., 1997), however its status as a WM measure
has recently been questioned on the grounds that it does not demonstrate construct validity
with other (apparently more accepted) measures of WM, such as complex-span tasks (Kane,
Conway, Miura & Colflesh, 2007). That is, despite the n-back task having many of the
elementary cognitive operations that are hallmarks of WM, such as encoding, storage and
rehearsal, and inhibition and continued maintenance of irrelevant items (Gray, 2001; Jonides,
et al., 1997), correlations between n-back and complex-span tasks are often low. Jaeggi, et al.
focused on WM training because they believed it targeted the executive processes central to
WM, and that WM in turn was central to Gf. It is possible that inconsistency in correlations
between different WM tasks (e.g., n-back vs complex-span) may be a result of the tasks
targeting different executive processes. That is, training on different WM tasks may produce
different Gf gains. We explore some of these issues next.
WM as a System of Executive Processes
One of the main definitional problems with the executive processes underlying WM is
that different theorist often use the same terms for different purposes (Gray, 2001). Oberauer
et al. (2007) have argued that the term executive function is used in a rather loose and
very encompassing way (p. 59). They prefer to distinguish between primary cognitive
operations and executive processes, and argue for a further demarcation of two kinds of
executive processes. The first relates to cognitive control processes, the second relates to
inhibition processes.
A prototypical executive function of the cognitive control type is task-set switching
(Oberauer, et al., 2007). In task-set switching studies, the set of task parameters on which
decisions are made is changed and a performance cost is generated in the transition to the new
set of task parameters. While the exact interpretation of this cost is still open to debate (e.g.,
time costs or inhibition of proactive interference), Oberauer, et al. report that switching costs
have unexpectedly been shown to have low or non-existent correlations with other FCFs such
as WM capacity and Gf. This result was unexpected, they argue, because the capacity to
maintain different task set parameters and to control when these parameters are activated is
something a central executive-like component of WM would do. Finding zero or low
correlations with measures of WM brings into question the exact nature of the constructs
being assessed.
The complexity of the WM/executive process issue can be further appreciated if one
considers the work of Gray, Chabris, and Braver (2003). In this work, brain activation was
shown to be more correlated with Gf on lure-trials than non-lure trials in the n-back task. Lure
trials require inhibition of an inappropriate match-response. Thus, when executive processes
are defined by inhibition processes, high correlations are found. It seems that the
conceptualisation of the causal link between n-back performance and WM is in part a
function of what is emphasised, and thus even within a task, close attention is required
regarding just how WM components should be operationalised and trained.
NON-COGNITIVE MODERATORS OF GF GAINS

There are a number of non-cognitive factors that are known to impact on reasoning
performance and may thus moderate any observed Gf gains. The factors that are of most
interest here are: a) implicit theories regarding the malleability of cognitive abilities; b) goal
orientations toward learning versus performing, and; c) personality dispositions that favour
effortful cognitive activities.
Implicit Theories regarding Malleability of Intelligence
Dweck, et al. (1995) argue that the assumptions people make about the malleability of
highly valued personal attributes follow either an entity or incremental implicit theory. Entity
theorists tend to believe that intelligence is a fixed, non-malleable trait-like entity and that
although people can learn new things, their underlying intellectual abilities remain the same.
Individuals holding an entity perspective tend to view difficult situations as aversive, are less
likely to see intrinsic learning value in attempting difficult tasks, and are more likely to
attribute failure to external factors. The threat of potentially exposing ones ability limitations
is thought to lead to maladaptive behavioural responses. Alternatively, incremental theorists
tend to believe that intelligence is a malleable quality that can be changed and developed
through effort. Individuals who hold an incremental perspective tend to be more motivated to
attempt and persist at difficult problems. Failure is not simply attributed to lack of ability,
30 Damian P. Birney
rather they see challenging tasks as opportunities for learning and as evidence that more effort
should be invested (Grant & Dweck, 2003).
Investigating the impact of implicit theories on cognitive performance, Birney and
Jeltova (2005) presented 92 university students a set of easy to moderately difficult Latin
square reasoning problems (Birney, Halford & Andrews, 2006). At the completion of this
first set of items, participants were told that the next set would take the same form but would
be much more difficult. Individuals holding an entity perspective performed significantly
worse on the second set of items than individuals holding an incremental theory, in spite of
the fact that the two groups did not differ in Gf. It seems that the perspectives we have
regarding the malleability of intelligence in part determines the way we approach cognitively
demanding tasks and thus influences subsequent performance. Implicit theories need to be
investigated as a potential moderator of WM training effects.
Personality and Goal Orientation
Trait-based personality is typically conceptualised by five distinct and independent

personality factors: Extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and
openness to experience (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Openness to experience has been linked to
need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), a tendency to seek out complex cognitive
activities, and thus both are related to implicit theories in that they have the potential to
moderate effects on training outcomes. Conscientiousness is also of relevance to training
outcomes.
Furthermore, the goal orientation one adopts has also been shown to be important for
training outcomes (Payne, Youngcourt & Beaubien, 2007). Individuals with learning goal
orientations are similar to incremental theorists, in that task engagement is intrinsically
motivated. On the other hand, individuals with performance goal orientations are said to be
driven by seeking approval from others and they tend to engage in ineffective learning
strategies. All these non-cognitive factors are linked in that they influence the motivation to
engage in the types of behaviours demanded by deliberate practice.
IMPLICATIONS FOR REAL-WORLD ACHIEVEMENTS

We argue that one of the main reasons for why Jaeggi, et al.s (2008) findings are
important and why they need to be investigated further, has to do with the putative
relationship between the fore-mentioned FCFs and everyday life achievements. Although
there have been many successful educational programs and psychological interventions
developed to improve expertise in almost every area of human endeavour, the general
consensus has been that knowledge acquisition is contingent on, and therefore limited by,
basic cognitive functions which are largely immutable (Neisser, et al., 1996). As already
mentioned, knowledge acquisition in virtually all domains, including vocational ones, is
thought to be achieved to a significant extent through the investment of ones Gf in
appropriate learning activities (Ackerman & Beier, 2005; Cattell, 1987). If Gf is not a
malleable human attribute, then a limit on knowledge acquisition concomitant with ones Gf
would logically follow. Furthermore, if researchers and educators make the presumption that
certain cognitive abilities cannot be changed, then the approach to intelligence test
development will naturally progress in a way that supports this assumption. If these
assumptions are incorrect (even partially), then as argued by Birney and Sternberg (2006), the
psychometric tools and the intelligence theories which emerge through their use are
necessarily incomplete. Additional research is required to investigate the implications of
Jaeggi, et al.s findings for Gf testing and how measurement and conceptualisation of the
construct changes after training.
In this last section, we reflect on the socio-political implications of Jaeggi, et al.s (2008)
findings to present a case for the importance of continued research in this area. It is not
surprising, given the previous discussion, that the standard interpretation of an individuals
performance on a traditional intelligence test (that is, the meaning assigned to a score) has
progressed in a way consistent with the assumption that basic cognitive abilities are largely
immutable. It is also not surprising that historically this has had wide, ongoing, social
ramifications that have not been missed in the scientific and popular literature. Furthermore,
given the close link between intelligence and achievements in everyday activities (e.g.,
Jensen, 1998), and that the latter are often the responsibility of social institutions (i.e., policy
makers at schools, universities, governments, and in commercial industries), it is not
surprising there are complex implications. Much has been written and said throughout what
has been a long and sometimes sordid history about the educability and intellectual worth of
individuals and groups of individuals (the latter almost invariably linked to social, gender or
ethnic clustering). A view of the intellectual worth of one such group of individuals 130 years
ago was reported by Le Bon in 1879:
In the most intelligent races, as among Parisians, there are a large number of women whose
brains are closer in size to those of gorillas than to the most developed male brain... All
psychologists who have studied the intelligence of women recognize today that they
represent the most inferior forms of human evolution... They excel in fickleness, inconstancy,
absence of thought and logic, and incapacity to reason. Without doubt, there exist some
distinguished women, very superior to the average male, but they are as exceptional as the
birth of any monstrosity, as, for example, of a gorilla with two heads; consequently, we may
neglect them entirely (cited in, Gould, 1996, p 136).
And further:
A desire to give them the same education, and, as a consequence, to propose the same goals
for them, is a dangerous chimera. The day when, misunderstanding the inferior occupations
which nature has given her, women leave the home and take part in our battles; on this day a
social revolution will begin, and everything that maintains the sacred ties of the family will
disappear.
The contemporary view in comparison is of course considerably more moderate than this
extreme example (though of course, the example was not so extreme in 1879). However,
similar writings can be found since this time justifying slavery, early immigration policies,
and selection decisions regarding who will fight a war at the frontline and who will not. In
fact, group intelligence testing arguably emerged in the USA to specifically address just these
types of questions (see Gould, 1996, for an excellent review). Controversy persists regarding
32 Damian P. Birney
how to deal with the assumption of cognitive fixedness as a potential success-limiting factor
in providing access to educational and/or other opportunities. The debate has at times become
polarised with arguments presented for and against slashing social programs because
beneficiaries are seen as not being able to benefit because of inborn and fixed cognitive limits
(Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). These limits are almost invariably expressed as low IQ scores
collected from psychometric measures that were developed under the assumption that
cognitive abilities are generally fixed. Proponents of dynamic assessment (Lidz & Elliott,
2000), which philosophically has tailored adaptive assessment at its heart, strongly advocate
for a greater acceptance that for at least some individuals, scores on standardised
psychometric aptitude tests are not appropriate for making decisions regarding whether they
should be permitted access to quality education.
CONCLUSION
Specific evaluations of Jaeggi, et al.s (2008) work is still somewhat lacking. Sternberg
(2008), one of the leading contemporary researchers of intelligence, is optimistic about the
findings. He concludes that although several limitations of the study mean that there is a clear
need for follow-up research, none of them call into question the obtained results. (p.
6791). We have argued that a fruitful route for further investigation is to use an overarching
deliberate practice framework. To do this, one must be very clear about what attributes are
being modified, through what processes, and via what training-methods. There are significant
scientific and socio-political implications associated with this work. Simply demonstrating
that Gf can be measurably improved and that this has a follow-on effect in everyday
functioning has substantial implications for theory and test development, education and
training programs, as well as ultimately for social stereotypes. To achieve this, significant
headway will need to be made in overcoming a century of inertia surrounding traditional
psychometric assessment and theorising.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Timothy Scriven and Fiona Ang for their assistance in researching
the material for this Chapter. This research was supported under Australian Research
Council's Linkage Projects funding scheme (project LP0669552). The views expressed herein
are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian Research Council.
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Chapter 4
THE EFFECTS OF COMPARISON STATUS AND

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL COMPARISON
TENDENCIES ON THE EXPERIENCE
OF SCHADENFREUDE
Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk

Department of Psychology, Macquarie University
ABSTRACT
Little is known of the attributes of an individual that are involved in the emotion of
Schadenfreude (pleasure at anothers misfortune). This study used social comparison
theory as a basis for exploring individual differences in experiences of Schadenfreude.
Ninety nine first-year psychology students participated in a repeated measures
experimental study where they responded to vignettes where a comparison target (upward
vs. downward) experienced a misfortune. The participants completed a Schadenfreude
Scale that measured their response to the misfortune of each target. They also completed
the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure, which measured their social
comparison orientation (SCO), the Upward Comparison Subscale (UCS), and the
Downward Comparison Subscale, which measured their directional social comparison
tendencies. The results showed that participants reported greater Schadenfreude towards
the upward comparison target than the downward comparison target. Participants SCO
and UCS scores positively predicted Schadenfreude towards the upward comparison
target, but not towards the downward comparison target, whilst participants DCS scores
were not predictive of Schadenfreude towards either target. These findings suggest that
Schadenfreude is facilitated by upward social comparison processes, and that individual
differences in experiences of Schadenfreude can be partially explained by individual
differences in ones dispositional social comparison tendencies.
Ph: 61-2-9850 8009; Fax: 61-2-9850 8062; chekaluk@mq.edu.au

38 Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk
Keywords: Emotion, Negative affect, Schadenfreude, Social comparison theory
INTRODUCTION
When another person experiences misfortune, the emotional response directed towards
the unfortunate other is typically one of sympathy (Brigham, Kelso, Jackson, & Smith, 1997).
However, a somewhat less appropriate, joyous, emotional response may also occur. This
emotion is Schadenfreude, or, as it is commonly defined, pleasure at anothers misfortune
(Ben-Zeev, 2000; Hareli & Weiner, 2002). This unusual type of pleasure is characterised by
the observers passive role in both causing and sustaining the others misfortune (Ben-Zeev,
2000; Feather, 2008; Leach, Spears, Branscombe & Doosje, 2003). Thus, for one to
experience Schadenfreude, a third party or external event must be responsible for the others
suffering (Leach et al., 2003).
Although the existence of Schadenfreude has been documented by philosophers for
centuries (Nietzsche, 1887/1967; Portmann, 2000), empirical studies examining this emotion
only began to emerge in the 1990s. Much of the empirical research that has been conducted
has emphasised the social nature of Schadenfreude. Schadenfreude is undoubtedly a social
emotion: the other persons negative experience generates emotion within us, and is
subsequently directed towards them (Ben-Zeev, 2000; Hareli & Parkinson, 2008).
Schadenfreude is also dependent upon a discordant social appraisal, where the observer
positively evaluates a situation or event that the object of the Schadenfreude negatively
evaluates (Ben-Zeev, 2000; Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). The discordant social appraisal
signifies the presence of a comparative concern between the observers fortune and the
others misfortune (Ben-Zeev, 2000). It is due to this comparative concern, which is central
to the experience of Schadenfreude (Ben-Zeev, 2000), that Schadenfreude has been
theoretically and empirically linked to social comparison theory (e.g., Ben-Zeev, 2000;
Feather, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Smith et al., 1996; van
Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006). Previous empirical studies that have
investigated this link have typically emphasised other-focused social comparison explanations
for individual differences in Schadenfreude (Leach & Spears, 2008), and consequently,
insight into the dispositional personal attributes of an individual that may contribute to
differences in this emotional experience has been lacking. Thus, this study proposes to
examine both other- and self-focused social comparison explanations for individual
differences in experiences of Schadenfreude to achieve a more comprehensive understanding
of the relationship between Schadenfreude and social comparison processes, and to provide
insight into the personal characteristics of an individual that contribute to the experience of
this complex and under-studied emotion.
LINKING SCHADENFREUDE AND SOCIAL COMPARISON THEORY

Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) proposes that people seek to gain information
and evaluate their own abilities, opinions, and relative standing by comparing themselves
with similar others in their social environment. Similarly, Schadenfreude is typically directed
The Effects of Comparison Status and Individual Differences 39
towards others in our social-emotional environment (Hareli & Weiner, 2002). Furthermore,
just as people are more likely to compare themselves with others on attributes that are of
personal importance (Festinger, 1954), Schadenfreude is most likely to occur in self-relevant
domains (Leach et al., 2003; Nietzsche, 1887/1967), and in situations where there is direct
competition between the fortunes of the observer and those of the unfortunate other (Ben-
Zeev, 2000).
In recent years, social comparison theory has undergone numerous changes (Buunk
& Gibbons, 2007), with increasing focus on the affective outcomes of making comparisons
with others (Buunk, Zurriaga, Per, Nauta, & Gosalvez, 2005). Specifically, there has been
an emphasis on the affective consequences of making comparisons with those who are in a
superior position to oneself, that is, the process of upward comparison, and, with those who
are in an inferior position to oneself, known as downward comparison (Buunk, Zurriaga, et
al., 2005; Wills, 1981). Comparing ones fortunes with those of a superior or inferior other
will lead to differing affective outcomes (Buunk, Kuyper, & van der Zee, 2005; Wills, 1981).
Contrast effects are believed to occur when one views anothers status as unchangeable and
substantially different from their own, and thus, an upward comparison will elicit negative
feelings such as resentment, envy, inferiority and frustration, and a downward comparison
will elicit positive feelings such as relief and pleasure (Buunk, Kuyper, et al., 2005; Buunk,
Zurriaga, et al., 2005; Mussweiler, Rter, & Epstude, 2004).
SCHADENFREUDE AND TARGET COMPARISON STATUS

The status of another with whom we compare our fortunes has considerable implications
for the elicitation of Schadenfreude. Interestingly, research has found that Schadenfreude is
commonly preceded by an upward comparison with another (Ben-Zeev, 2000; Brigham et
al., 1997), and is facilitated by the contrastive negative emotions such as envy (Brigham et al.,
1997; Smith et al., 1996) and resentment (Feather & Nairn, 2005; Feather & Sherman, 2002)
that are elicited by this upward comparison. Pleasure and joy are experienced when the
superior other subsequently experiences a misfortune, as the misfortune provides relief from
the negative emotions associated with the upward comparison, whilst furthermore
emphasising the observers new, comparatively superior position (Ben-Zeev, 2000; Smith et
al., 1996). Accordingly, it is believed that Schadenfreude is rarely preceded by a downward
comparison, as the downward other poses no threat to the observers comparative fortune
(Ben-Zeev, 2000).
SCHADENFREUDE AND SOCIAL COMPARISON ORIENTATION

There are considerable individual differences in the extent to which people engage in
social comparison (Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Gibbons and
Buunk (1999) developed the concept of social comparison orientation (SCO), to refer to an
individuals dispositional tendency to engage in social comparison, and they developed a
scale assessing such individual differences. Generally, those who are high in SCO are more
prone to engage in social comparison (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Researchers have suggested
that this variability in SCO may be a function of differing personality characteristics, and
indeed, research has indicated that those individuals who are high in SCO are also more likely
to have an unstable self concept, lower self-esteem, and be higher in negative affectivity and
depression (Buunk & Gibbons, 2006, 2007). Furthermore, those high in SCO are typically
more affected by social comparison situations (Buunk & Gibbons, 2006).
These results have important theoretical implications for Schadenfreude. Firstly, as an
upward social comparison appears to be a necessary antecedent for the elicitation of
Schadenfreude (Brigham et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1996), it would be likely that the greater an
individuals SCO, and thus the more sensitive they are to social comparison situations, the
more Schadenfreude they would feel when presented with the misfortune of a superior other
in a socially comparative situation.
Secondly, as those who are high in SCO are more likely to suffer from low self-esteem
and depression (Buunk & Gibbons, 2006, 2007; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), it is likely that
individuals with these characteristics would be particularly sensitive to negative emotions
(Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, Vaknin, Marom, & Hermesh, 2008) emerging from an upward
social comparison, and thus experience more pleasure when these negative emotions are
alleviated by witnessing misfortune befall a superior other.
SCHADENFREUDE AND DIRECTIONAL SOCIAL

COMPARISON TENDENCIES
It is also believed that the direction in which people have a dispositional tendency to
compare with others varies considerably from one person to the next (Buunk, Ybema,
Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001; Wills, 1981). This finding has important implications for the
elicitation of Schadenfreude. As the experience of Schadenfreude is commonly preceded by
an upward comparison (Brigham et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1996), and witnessing a misfortune
befall another places the observer in a comparatively superior position to the unfortunate
other, effectively producing a downward comparison (Ben-Zeev, 2000), comparison
direction appears to play a fundamental role in the experience of Schadenfreude. It is likely
then, that the direction in which an observer has a dispositional tendency to compare with
others would be associated with their experience of Schadenfreude towards both upward and
downward comparison targets.
THE PRESENT STUDY

This study aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship
between Schadenfreude and social comparison processes by examining Schadenfreude within
the explicit framework of social comparison theory. Thus, we ask whether social comparison
theory can provide an explanation as to why individual variance occurs in experiences of
Schadenfreude. Specifically, this study aims to clarify previous findings by investigating
whether a social comparison others superior or inferior status may affect ones experience of
Schadenfreude. Furthermore, we aim to provide a new dimension to the Schadenfreude and
social comparison literature by investigating whether individual differences in experiences of
Schadenfreude towards upward and downward comparison others can be explained by

differences in individuals SCO, and their directional social comparison tendencies. Based on
the literature reviewed above, we propose:
1. Overall, participant experience of Schadenfreude will be greater towards the upward

comparison target than the downward comparison target.
2. SCO will be a positive predictor of participants Schadenfreude towards the upward
comparison target. This relationship will not be found for the downward comparison
target.
3. To explore whether participants dispositional directional comparison tendencies are
able to predict participants experience of Schadenfreude towards the upward and
downward comparison targets.
METHOD
Participants and Design
One hundred first-year psychology students from Macquarie University, Sydney,

Australia, participated in a repeated measures experimental study. The participants were
recruited via Macquarie Universitys subject-pool website and were required to be proficient
in English. One participant was excluded from the analysis as they failed to meet the
eligibility requirements. The remaining sample of 99 participants consisted of 18 males and
81 females whose ages ranged from 17 to 43 years (M = 20.08 years). For their participation,
all participants received a time-credit of 30 minutes towards their assessment requirement for
an introductory psychology course.
Materials
Vignettes
Two written vignettes were constructed to induce Schadenfreude in the participants. The
participants were asked to imagine themselves as they were described in the vignettes,
interacting with a peer student. The peer student was described as having either exceptional
social and academic skills (upward comparison target condition G.A.), or poor social and
academic skills (downward comparison target condition S.B.), whilst in both vignettes the
participant was described as having average social and academic skills. The vignettes were
written to increase comparison behaviour between the participant and the target by increasing
perceived similarity (Festinger, 1954), and were based around characteristics that students
typically compare themselves with others on such as grades, performance, and behaviour
(Buunk, Kuyper, et al., 2005). The vignettes then described a situation where the target
experienced a misfortune. The target was caught cheating from notes they had snuck into the
final exam and consequently failed the unit, jeopardising their chance of getting into a
competitive fourth-year program. Aside from the manipulation of the targets comparison
level, the two vignettes were identical.
Schadenfreude Scale
Two Schadenfreude Scales were constructed to measure the extent to which the
participants experienced Schadenfreude in response to the comparison targets misfortune
described in the two vignettes. The Schadenfreude Scales comprised of eight items in total.
Schadenfreude was measured by five items that described feelings of satisfaction, pleasure,
contentment, joy, and happiness at the targets misfortune (e.g., I feel satisfied by what
happened to G.A.). Three filler items that reflected general emotional responses to the
targets misfortune that are not consistent with the experience of Schadenfreude (e.g., I feel
upset by what happened to S.B) were also included. Participants were asked to rate their
level of agreement with each of the statements on a 6-point Likert-type scale that ranged from
1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) from the perspective of the participant they were
asked to identify with in each of the vignettes. Overall, a higher mean score on the five items
indicated greater Schadenfreude. Aside from being adjusted for the corresponding target in
each vignette, the two Schadenfreude Scales were identical.
Social Comparison Tendencies
SCO was measured using the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure

(INCOM; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). The INCOM comprises 11 items (e.g., I often compare
how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, popularity) with other people), and requires
participants to rate their level of agreement with each item on a 5-point Likert-type scale
ranging from 1 (I disagree strongly) to 5 (I agree strongly). After reverse coding items 5 and
11, a higher mean score on the 11 items indicates greater SCO. The INCOMS two
directional subscales, the Upward Comparison Subscale (UCS) and the Downward
Comparison Subscale (DCS; F.X. Gibbons, personal communication, March, 2009) were also
utilised. The UCS comprises six items measuring dispositional tendency to engage in upward
social comparisons (e.g., I sometimes compare myself with others who have accomplished
more in life than I have), and the DCS comprises six items measuring dispositional tendency
to engage in downward social comparisons (e.g., I sometimes compare myself with others
who have accomplished less in life than I have). All items on both subscales are rated on the
aforementioned 5-point scale, and a higher mean score on each subscale indicates a greater
dispositional tendency to engage in upward (UCS) and downward (DCS) social comparisons.
Procedure
Participants were randomly allocated a questionnaire booklet containing each of the
measures, where the vignettes and related Schadenfreude Scales were counterbalanced across
the sample. Instructions on how to complete each questionnaire were presented at the
beginning of each measure. The participants then read the first vignette and completed the
pertaining Schadenfreude Scale. This was followed by the INCOM, the UCS and the DCS.
Next, the participants read the remaining vignette and completed the subsequent
Schadenfreude Scale. The study concluded with completion of the demographics
questionnaire and a participant debriefing.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients for each of the
studys measures. As can be seen by the Cronbachs alpha coefficients, each of the scales
demonstrated sufficiently high internal consistency.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics & reliability coefficients for the study variables (N=99)
Measure M SD Min. Max. Possible Cronbachs

Range
Schadenfreude
UCTC 2.76 0.95 1.00 5.60 1-6 .84
DCTC 1.85 0.66 1.00 4.00 1-6 .80
Social Comparison
INCOM 3.78 0.55 2.45 5.00 1-5 .82
UCS 3.22 0.80 1.17 5.00 1-5 .82
DCS 2.89 0.82 1.00 4.67 1-5 .85
UCTC = upward comparison target condition; DCTC = downward comparison target condition;
INCOM = Iowa-Netherlands Social Comparison Orientation Measure; UCS = Upward
Comparison Subscale; DCS = Downward Comparison Subscale.
Data inspection revealed that the Schadenfreude Scale pertaining to the downward
comparison target condition was positively skewed, and so in accordance with the method
recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), a log10 data transformation was performed.
The resulting transformed data set was normally distributed. All statistical analyses were then
conducted twice, once using the untransformed data set and once using the transformed data
set. It was found that the actual pattern of significance of the results obtained in the two sets
of analyses did not differ. Therefore, for ease of interpretation, the untransformed data set was
used to report the results of all analyses. The primary assumptions for all other variables were
tested and satisfied and the conventional alpha level of .05 was used in all analyses.
Primary Analyses
Hypothesis 1
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to investigate the effect of target comparison
status on the participants experience of Schadenfreude. As predicted, participant reported
Schadenfreude was greater towards the upward comparison target (M = 2.76, SD = 0.95), than
the downward comparison target (M = 1.85, SD = 0.66), as participant scores on the
Schadenfreude Scale pertaining to the upward comparison target condition were significantly
higher, t (98) = 10.15, p < .0005, = .51, 95% CI [0.74, 1.09].
Table 2. Results of regression analyses of variables predicting Schadenfreude towards

the upward comparison target & Schadenfreude towards the downward comparison
target (N=99)
Predictor Variable B SE B p % variance

explained
Upward comparison target
SCO .45 .17 .26 .010 7%
Upward comparison .39 .12 .33 .001 10%
Downward .08 .12 .06 .518 <.005%
comparisonb
Downward comparison target
SCO .04 .12 .03 .772 <.005%
Upward comparison .04 .09 .04 .689 <.005%
Downward -.07 .09 -.08 .435 <.005%
comparisonb
Controlled for downward comparison scores. b Controlled for upward comparison scores.
Hypothesis 2
To test the second hypothesis for each of the dependent variables, two simple linear
regression analyses were conducted with participant scores on the INCOM as the independent
variable. As predicted, SCO was a significant positive predictor of participants experience of
Schadenfreude towards the upward comparison target, F (1, 97) = 6.95, p = .010, R = .07,
95% CI [0.11, 0.78], but not towards the downward comparison target, F (1, 97) = 0.09, p =
.772, R < .005.
Hypothesis 3
Firstly, to investigate whether participants directional social comparison tendencies
could predict participants Schadenfreude towards the upward comparison target, a full
multiple regression model was fitted with participant scores on the UCS and DCS as the
independent variables. The full model containing the two predictors was significant, F(2, 96)
= 6.61, p = .002, R = .12. An examination of the individual regression coefficients revealed
that participant scores on the UCS were a significant positive predictor of Schadenfreude
towards the upward comparison target, after controlling for participant scores on the DCS, t
(96) = 3.28, p = .001, R = .10, 95% CI [0.15, 0.62]. However, after controlling for participant
scores on the UCS, participant scores on the DCS did not predict Schadenfreude scores
towards the upward comparison target, t (96) = 0.65, p = .518, R < .005. The results of the
individual predictor variables for both analyses are summarised in Table 2.
Secondly, to investigate whether participants directional social comparison tendencies
could predict participant experience of Schadenfreude towards the downward comparison
target, a full multiple regression model was fitted with participant scores on the UCS and
DCS as the independent variables. The full model was not significant, F (2, 96) = 0.33, p =
.721, R = .01, indicating that participants Schadenfreude towards the downward comparison
target could not be predicted from their directional social comparison tendencies. The results
of the individual predictors are summarised in Table 2.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with the first hypothesis, the participants reported experiencing significantly
more Schadenfreude in response to the upward comparison targets misfortune, than in
response to the downward comparison targets misfortune. This finding suggests that upward
social comparisons may function as stronger elicitors of Schadenfreude than downward social
comparisons, and is consistent with previous literature that has suggested that Schadenfreude
is frequently preceded by an upward comparison with another (e.g., Ben-Zeev, 2000;
Brigham et al., 1997). Furthermore, this finding suggests that the focus of concern central to
Schadenfreude is ones own comparative fortune. A superior other is perceived as a threat to
ones situation (Smith, Eyre, Powell, & Kim, 2006), and thus when one witnesses a
misfortune befall them, this threat to ones fortune is alleviated, giving rise to the pleasurable
experience of Schadenfreude. Thus the findings of the current study also appear consistent
with those of Leach and Spears (2008) who found Schadenfreude to be more concerned with
feelings of inferiority of the self, than with the success or failure of others.
UPWARD COMPARISON PROCESSES AND SCHADENFREUDE

Consistent with the second hypothesis, SCO positively predicted participants
Schadenfreude towards the upward comparison target. This finding provides the first
empirical evidence to suggest that the greater ones dispositional tendency to engage in social
comparison, the more Schadenfreude they are likely to experience when witnessing
misfortune befall a superior other. This finding is in accordance with the idea that those who
are more prone to social comparison are particularly sensitive to social comparison situations
and information (Buunk & Gibbons, 2006) and thus, may also be particularly sensitive to an
emotion emerging from a social comparison situation. Another possible explanation for this
result emerges from the finding that those individuals who are high in SCO are also more
likely to have unstable self-concepts, low self-esteem and be high in negative affectivity
(Buunk & Gibbons, 2006, 2007). Although these variables were not measured in this study,
and may need to be included in future research, it may be that individuals with these
characteristics are particularly sensitive to negative emotions (Gilboa-Schechtman et al.,
2008) elicited by an upward comparison, and thus experience more pleasure when these
negative emotions are alleviated by witnessing misfortune befall a superior other.
UPWARD SOCIAL COMPARISON TENDENCIES AND SCHADENFREUDE

In terms of the exploratory third hypothesis, participants dispositional upward
comparison tendency positively predicted Schadenfreude towards the upward comparison
target. This provides the first empirical data to suggest that the greater ones tendency to
engage in upward social comparisons, the more Schadenfreude they are likely to experience
when witnessing misfortune befall a superior other. It is likely that those who have a higher
dispositional tendency towards engaging in upward social comparisons may experience more
pleasure at a superior others misfortune as it provides relief from the negative emotions
associated with frequently comparing upward. If this proposed explanation is correct, it

implies that ones own negative affectivity, intensified through the social comparison process,
may increase the intensity of ones Schadenfreude experience.
DOWNWARD COMPARISON PROCESSES AND SCHADENFREUDE

Consistent with the second hypothesis, SCO was not predictive of Schadenfreude towards
the downward comparison target. Furthermore, in terms of the exploratory third hypothesis,
participants dispositional downward social comparison tendencies were not associated with
Schadenfreude towards either comparison target. Together with the finding that overall
Schadenfreude towards the downward comparison target was very low, it appears that
downward comparison processes may have little or no association with ones experience of
Schadenfreude. The absence of this association appears consistent with theoretical literature
that has suggested that we rarely feel Schadenfreude for another who is below us as they pose
no threat to our own comparative fortune (Ben-Zeev, 2000), and thus, that ones perception
of their own negative comparative situation is central to the elicitation of Schadenfreude
(Ben-Zeev, 2000).
METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS

FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The current study also has a number of limitations that must be noted. Although the
manipulation aimed at increasing Schadenfreude did indeed lead to an increase in this
emotion, the participants overall Schadenfreude scores were fairly mild. A possible
explanation for this result emanates from the socially undesirable nature of Schadenfreude
(Portmann, 2000). Although measures were taken to reduce the likelihood of socially
desirable responding, it is likely that the participants under-reported their feelings of
Schadenfreude due to the negative social stigma associated with admitting to experiencing
pleasure in anothers pain.
An additional concern of the current study is the artificiality of ascribing the participants
the role of an average student within the vignettes as this may have prevented the
obtainment of realistic comparison status data. Future studies may therefore benefit from
including measures of actual participant status characteristics such as high school grades,
university grades, and popularity.
Lastly, it is evident that further research is needed to determine whether the relationship
between ones negative affect, and their social comparison tendencies, as proposed by the
current study, does increase the intensity of Schadenfreude. Therefore, it is suggested that
future studies of Schadenfreude and social comparison processes could also include
independent measures of participants self-esteem, depression, and negative affect. These
studies may also benefit from including measures of narcissism, neuroticism, and stress,
which have also been found to correlate with individuals social comparison tendencies
(Bogart, Benotsch, & Paadovic, 2004; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999).
CONCLUSION
Social comparison theory provided a useful framework to investigate individual
differences in Schadenfreude. Specifically, the current study contributed to the existing
literature that has linked Schadenfreude and social comparison theory by finding that ones
experience of Schadenfreude is largely affected by the comparison status of another.
Furthermore, the current study has provided the first evidence that individual differences in
the extent and direction of ones dispositional social comparison tendencies can partially
account for individual differences in experiences of Schadenfreude, and thus has provided
much needed insight into the personal attributes of an individual that are involved in this
complex emotion. As ones dispositional tendency to compare with others is largely shaped
by characteristics of ones personality (Buunk & Gibbons, 2006), this study has paved the
way for future researchers to investigate which specific features of personality may be
involved in Schadenfreude.
In sum, by examining Schadenfreude within the explicit framework of social comparison
theory, the findings of the current study have provided a more comprehensive understanding
of the relationship between Schadenfreude and social comparison processes, in finding that
Schadenfreude is indeed facilitated by upward social comparison processes.
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Chapter 5
PROCESSING STYLE AND SOCIAL COMPARISON

OUTCOMES: ASSIMILATION AND CONTRAST
EFFECTS IN AUTOMATIC BEHAVIOUR AND
SELF-EVALUATION
Lauren ODriscoll and Eugene Chekaluk

Department of Psychology, Macquarie University,
ABSTRACT
The importance of ones self-concept has long been recognised in personality
research. Social comparison theory suggests that individuals compare themselves with
others in order to evaluate their own opinions and abilities (Festinger, 1954). Based on
Frster, Liberman and Kuschels (2008) global/local model (GLOMO) of assimilation
and contrast, the effect of global versus local processing style on behavioural and self-
evaluative social comparison outcomes was investigated. The sample consisted of 93
undergraduates (23 males and 70 females). Participants were first primed with global,
local or global/local processing, and were then exposed to either an upward comparison
target or a control narrative. Assimilation and contrast effects were assessed using a
behavioural measure (Information Subtest of the Multidimensional Aptitude Battery II),
and a self-evaluation questionnaire. A 2 x 3 factorial design was utilised. The results
demonstrated that although GLOMO was generally unsupported for automatic behaviour
and self-evaluation, language and gender were shown to partially moderate the effects of
processing style and social comparison on assimilation and contrast.
Keywords: Assimilation, Contrast, Self-concept, Self-evaluation, Social comparison
Ph: 1-647-278-3505; Fax: 61-2-9850 8062; lauren.odriscoll@students.mq.edu.au

52 Lauren ODriscoll and Eugene Chekaluk
INTRODUCTION
The self-concept refers to a relatively stable and idiosyncratic knowledge structure
encompassing ones personal identity, and the significance of the self-concept in personality
research has long been recognised (e.g., Bandura, 1989). As Turner (1999) notes, self-concept
is a particularly useful construct for social psychologists, since it helps towards explaining
individual stability across social contexts (Turner & Onorato, 1999). An individuals self-
concept is largely developed in relation to comparison with others, in that evaluation of ones
personal traits through social comparison can allow for a better understanding of the self
(Mendaglio & Pyryt, 2002). As originally proposed by Festinger (1954), humans possess a
need for self-evaluation, and that in the absence of objective standards, individuals tend to
compare themselves to others in order to determine the correctness of their opinions and the
nature of their abilities. Thus, whether people consider themselves to be attractive, intelligent,
wealthy or athletic largely depends on how they size themselves up against others.
Following Festingers seminal theory of social comparison, a great deal of research has
focused on the potential consequences of comparison in terms of whether these consequences
are assimilative or contrastive in nature. The present research focused on the consequences of
comparing in an upward direction, as when one compares the self to someone who is regarded
to be superior on a certain dimension. Within the context of upward comparison, assimilation
may be conceptualised as an upward shift in an individuals self-evaluation, whereas contrast
represents a downward shift in an individuals self-evaluation. Notably, research has shown
that exposure to the same social comparison information can result in assimilation under
some circumstances and contrast in others (Wheeler & Suls, 2007).
THE GLOBAL/LOCAL MODEL OF ASSIMILATION AND CONTRAST

Frster, Liberman and Kuschel (2008) proposed the global/local model (GLOMO) in
order to explain assimilation and contrast effects. Frster et al.s GLOMO was derived from
the inclusion-exclusion model (IEM) developed by Schwarz and Bless (1992; 2007).
According to the IEM, the same comparison information may lead to assimilation or contrast,
depending on how this information is cognitively represented by the individual. The IEM
predicts that if such information elicits cognitive inclusion of the comparers self
representation in the point of comparison, assimilation results, whereas if the information
results in exclusion of the comparers self representation from the point of comparison,
contrast results (for an overview of the IEM, refer to Schwarz & Bless, 1992; 2007).
Extending from the assumptions of the IEM, Frster et al. (2008) reasoned that because
cognition is linked to and derives from perception (Finke, 1985) cognitive inclusion and
exclusion might further be influenced by perceptual processing. Processing style can be
conceptualised as a way of attending to information in the environment (Frster, 2009;
Navon, 1977). Global processing refers to perception of the stimulus as a whole, whereas
local processing refers to perception of the parts that make up the stimulus (Navon, 1977).
According to GLOMO, whether assimilation or contrast results from a social comparison
depends upon whether global or local perceptual processing is initiated at the time of the
comparison. Accordingly, Frster et al. proposed that global processing should widen an
Processing Style and Social Comparison Outcomes 53
individuals conceptual scope, thus resulting in cognitive inclusion and assimilation toward
the social comparison target. Alternatively, local processing should narrow an individuals
conceptual scope, resulting in cognitive exclusion and thus contrast away from the target.
GLOMO and Self-evaluation
Frster et al.s (2008) research on self-evaluative consequences of social comparison

provided support for GLOMO1. In one study, participants were first presented with one of
four comparison targets, ranging from extremely low to extremely high standards of
athleticism. They were subsequently primed with global or local processing using the Navon
task, in which participants were presented with large characters consisting of smaller
characters, and asked to focus on either only the large characters (global processing) or on the
small characters (local processing) (Navon, 1977). The participants then compared their own
athletic ability to that of the comparison target and completed an objective self-evaluation
questionnaire. As predicted by GLOMO, the results demonstrated that after being primed
with global processing, participants reported themselves to be significantly more athletic
(indicating assimilation), whereas those primed with local processing reported themselves to
be significantly less athletic (indicating contrast).
GLOMO and Automatic Behaviour
Perception can have inadvertent and unconscious effects on social behaviour. Merely
perceiving someone behave in a certain way can increase the likelihood that one will behave
in a similar manner (James, 1890). Research has shown that priming an individual with a
certain construct can in turn elicit behaviour in line with that construct (Bargh, Chen &
Burrows, 1996). For example, priming has been shown to influence even relatively complex
behaviour, such as performance on a general knowledge test. Dijksterhuis and van
Knippenberg (1998) reported that priming participants with either a professor stereotype or
the trait intelligent led them to perform significantly better on a general knowledge test,
when compared to those primed with soccer hooligans, the trait stupid or no stereotype.
Thus, as processing style has been shown by Frster et al. (2008) to affect the self-evaluative
consequences of social comparison, it is possible that global versus local processing could
result in assimilation and contrast of automatic behaviour in a similar manner.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH

The present research was designed to extend on Frster et al.s (2008) research on the
effects of global versus local processing on social comparison outcomes. Accordingly, the
primary aim was to investigate the potential effect of global versus local processing on the
1
Frster et al. (2008) also demonstrated assimilation and contrast effects in social judgement. As the focus of the
present study was on behavioural and self-evaluative assimilation and contrast, the social judgement effects of
GLOMO are not discussed at length.
behavioural and self-evaluative consequences of upward social comparison, in order to

determine whether these consequences were assimilative or contrastive in nature. It should be
noted that because the potential effect of processing style on the behavioural consequences of
social comparison has yet to be examined, the present research represented the first attempt to
investigate this possibility.
Hypotheses
It was predicted that individuals primed with global processing and presented with an
upward comparison target of high intelligence would achieve a significantly higher score on a
general knowledge test, and would rate themselves to be objectively and subjectively more
intelligent (an assimilation effect). Alternatively, it was predicted that individuals primed with
local processing and presented with an upward comparison target of high intelligence would
achieve a significantly lower score on a general knowledge test, and would rate themselves to
be objectively and subjectively less intelligent (a contrast effect).
Supplementary Investigation
A supplementary aim of the present research was to explore the potential moderating
roles of language and gender on assimilation and contrast effects within the GLOMO
paradigm. Frster et al. (2008) suggested that because processing style has been shown to
influence assimilation and contrast, it is possible that the consequences of social comparison
could further be moderated by factors that are known to affect processing style. Whereas the
effects of language and gender have been studied in relation to processing style2, the potential
effects of these individual difference variables on the consequences of social comparison
within the GLOMO paradigm have yet to be investigated.
METHOD
Participants
The sample consisted of 93 (23 male and 70 female) undergraduate students from
Macquarie University. Participants ranged in age from 15 to 26 years (M = 19.67, SD = 2.22).
In order to ensure the relevance of the social comparison vignettes, participation was further
limited to human resource management and psychology students. Of the total number of
participants, 24 indicated that English was not their first language and of those, 3 reported
that they did not read English fluently. No participants were excluded due to their English
language proficiency. Participants gave informed consent before the study began, and each
received course credit for their participation.
2
For research on processing style and language refer to Stapel and Semin (2007); and Semin, Grts, Nandum, and
Semin-Goossens (2002). For research on processing style and gender refer to Blough and Salvin (1987); Kail,
Carter, and Pellegrino (1979); Rilea (2008); and Lawton (2004).
Materials
Induction of Global/Local Processing

Processing style was primed in a manner similar to the procedure used by Frster et al.
(2008, Experiment 1). Participants were presented with two colour maps (the first map
displayed the U.S. state of Pennsylvania and the second map displayed the U.S. state of
Massachusetts), and were instructed to attend to particular attributes of each map for 1
minute3. In the global processing condition, participants focused on the overall shape and
outline of each map, in the local processing condition they focused on the details and on a red
star at the centre of each map, and in the control condition participants focused on both the
overall shape and details of each map.
Social Comparison Vignettes

The participants in the upward comparison condition read a short vignette describing a
highly intelligent and academically accomplished student in a scenario devised by Lockwood
and Kunda (1997). In order to ensure that the vignettes were comparable, the target was
described to be well-rounded, participating in a range of extracurricular activities. To further
maximise the relevance of the description, the comparison vignettes were tailored to match
the gender and major of each participant. Control participants were alternatively presented
with a neutral description on the subject of killer whales (National Geographic Society,
2009). In order to ensure consistency, the control description consisted of the same
approximate word-count as the comparison vignette.
Assessment Materials
Objective Self-evaluation
Objective self-evaluation was assessed by participant response to three objective
intelligence related questions. The first question asked participants to indicate what final
percentage grade they believed they would achieve in their first-year psychology course
(Seaton, 2002). In the second question participants were required to report how many
mathematical problems they believed they could solve in 1 minute (Mussweiler & Strack,
2000). The final question prompted participants to indicate how many minutes they believed
it would take them to read the front page of a newspaper in order to reproduce its content
(Mussweiler & Strack, 2000).
Subjective Self-evaluation
Subjective self-evaluation was assessed by each participants rating of his or her own
intelligence on a 6-point (1 = extremely unintelligent, 6 = extremely intelligent) Likert scale
(Seaton, 2002).
3
All maps were obtained from Friedman, Fishbach, Frster, and Werth (2003).
Automatic Behaviour
Automatic behaviour was determined by participant performance on the Information
Subtest of the Multidimensional Aptitude Battery II (MAB-II)4. The test consisted of 40
general knowledge questions in multiple-choice format (A through E). The MAB-II
Information Subtest has been shown to have an internal consistency (as measured by
Cronbachs alpha) ranging from 0.83 to 0.90 and test-retest reliability of approximately 0.97
(Jackson, 1998). The Information Subtest was selected for administration in this study
because its content was designed to be applicable across gender, age, nationality and culture
(Jackson, 2003).
Procedure
Participants were invited to the laboratory on the pretext of participating in a series of

pilot tests for future research. In order to minimise response bias, the true purpose of the
research was not initially disclosed. All tasks were completed on the computer using
MediaLab in order to limit variability within the sample. Each participant was randomly
assigned a global, local or control processing style condition, and to either an upward
comparison or control condition. Participants were first instructed to focus on either the
overall shape, details, or both the overall shape and details (control) of two maps. They were
then asked to compare themselves to an upward comparison standard, or presented with a
neutral narrative (control).
The final two tasks were behavioural and self-evaluation assessment measures. In the
behavioural measure, participants were presented with 40 general knowledge questions from
the MAB-II Information Subtest and were given a total of 7 minutes to complete the test.
They were then presented with three objective self-evaluation questions (final grade,
mathematics and reading time) followed by one subjective self-evaluation question.
Participants were also asked to indicate their age, gender, and whether they considered
English to be their first language. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion of the true
purpose of the study and fully debriefed.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analysis
All normality assumptions were satisfied except for normality of mathematics, reading
time and subjective self-evaluation. A square root transformation resulted in the normal
distribution of mathematics. Tests of homogeneity of variance revealed that all of the
dependent variables were homogeneous, with the exception of reading time and subjective
self-evaluation. A logarithm transformation was successful for both variables. As there were
no missing cases in the data, and no significant outliers were detected, the full data set (N =
93) was used in the analyses.
4
Permission to administer the MAB-II Information Subtest was granted by SIGMA Assessment Systems.
Main Analysis
In order to examine the self-evaluative and behavioural consequences of social

comparison, separate 2 (social comparison: upward comparison vs. control) x 3 (processing
style: global vs. local vs. control) factorial ANOVAs were conducted for the general
knowledge, objective self-evaluation (final grade, mathematics and reading time)5, subjective
self-evaluation and automatic behaviour dependent variables. The significance level was
maintained at p = .05 for all tests.
Notably, the results indicated that the research hypothesis was unsupported for both self-
evaluation and automatic behaviour. No main effects of social comparison or processing style
proved to be significant (p > 0.05), and the interaction effects were not significant (p > .05)
for any of the dependent variables (refer to Table 1), with the exception of a significant main
effect of social comparison (F(1,86) = 7.53, p = .007) for the final grade variable (refer to
Figure 1). Regardless of processing style, individuals in the upward comparison condition
indicated that they anticipated achieving a significantly higher final grade in their first year
psychology course (M = 68.50, SD = 7.81), when compared to those in the no comparison
control condition (M = 65.57, SD = 7.40).
Table 1. Main & interaction effects for dependent variables across conditions
Dependent Variable Processing Style Social Comparison Interaction

Final Grade F(1,86) = 0.30 F(1,86) = 7.53 F(2,86) = 0.03
p = .704 p = .007* p = .971
Mathematics F(1,86) = 0.28 F(1,86) = 0.22 F(2,86) = 0.72
p = .761 p = .640 p = .488
Reading Time F(1,87) = 2.56 F(1,87) = 0.32 F(2,87) = 1.26
p = .083 p = .573 p = .288
Subjective Self-Evaluation F(1,87) = 2.49 F(1,87) = 0.61 F(2,87) = 1.57
p = .089 p = .439 p = .215
Automatic Behaviour F(1,85) = 1.21 F(1,85) = 0.40 F(2,85) = 0.35
p = .304 p = .528 p = .704
*
indicates a significant effect (p < 0.05).
5
Although a composite measure was originally considered, the correlations between the three objective self-
evaluation measures ranged from r = -.12 to r = .01, indicating that the items were not appreciably related to one
another.
Figure 1. Final grade as a function of social comparison & processing style.
In order to further clarify the relationships between the independent and dependent
variables, the language (English as a first language = EFL, English as a second language =
ESL) and gender variables were subsequently analysed with social comparison and
processing style for each of the dependent variables.
Language Effects
The results revealed a significant main effect of language for the final grade variable
(F(1,80) = 9.62, p = .003). EFL participants generally reported anticipating a significantly
higher final grade in their first year psychology course (M = 68.62, SD = 7.20), when
compared to ESL participants (M = 62.90, SD = 7.72). The results also showed a significant
main effect of language (F(1,79) = 32.02, p < .001) for automatic behaviour. In general, EFL
participants performed significantly better on the general knowledge test (M = 18.37, SD =
4.88), when compared to ESL participants (M = 11.29, SD = 7.78). These results are to be
anticipated, as EFL participants would be expected to be more confident in achieving higher
grades while attending an English speaking university and would be expected to perform
better on a general knowledge test administered in English.
Figure 2. General knowledge as a function of social comparison & processing style for English as a first
language.
Additionally, the results for ESL revealed a marginally significant interaction effect
between social comparison and processing style (F(2,16) = 3.17, p = .069) for automatic
behaviour (refer to Figure 2 & Figure 3). Though no significant main or interaction effects
were detected for EFL participants, when primed with local processing ESL participants
achieved a higher general knowledge score in the no comparison control condition (M =
17.30, SD = 6.36), when compared to the upward comparison condition (M = 7.86, SD =
5.90).
Gender Effects
Finally there was a significant interaction effect between gender and processing style
(F(2,79) = 3.56, p = .036) for automatic behaviour (refer to Figure 4 & Figure 5). Males
performed significantly better on the general knowledge test in the comparison condition (M
= 19.14, SD = 6.05) than in the no comparison control condition (M = 16.93, SD = 7.01).
Males also tended to perform significantly better in the local processing condition (M =
21.81, SD = 5.09) when compared to the global processing (M = 15.90, SD = 8.46) and
control (M = 14.89, SD = 4.73) conditions. No significant effects were found for females.
Figure 3. General knowledge as a function of social comparison & processing style for English as a
second language.
Figure 4. General knowledge as a function of social comparison & processing style for males.
Figure 5. General knowledge as a function of social comparison & processing style for females.
DISCUSSION
Extending from Frster et al.s (2008) GLOMO, in the present research it was
hypothesised that individuals primed with global processing and presented with an upward
comparison target would assimilate automatic behaviour and self-evaluations toward the
comparison target, whereas those primed with local processing would contrast their automatic
behaviour and self-evaluations away from the target. Notably, the GLOMO hypothesis was
not directly supported for automatic behaviour, objective self-evaluation and subjective-self
evaluation in the present research.
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE SELF-EVALUATION

Although the research hypothesis was not upheld for self-evaluation, the results for the
objective self-evaluation variable, final grade, indicated an assimilation effect for individuals
presented with an upward comparison target, but no effect of processing style. These results
corroborate past research on social comparison by Lockwood and Kunda (1997), who
demonstrated that assimilation of self-evaluation toward an upward comparison target tends
to occur when the target is regarded to be self-relevant and when his or her success is thought
to be attainable. Because achieving high grades is expected to be a relevant goal among
undergraduate students, engaging in an upward comparison with the target most likely had the
effect of motivating participants to achieve high grades themselves, thus resulting in

assimilation of their objective self-evaluations toward the comparison target.
Accordingly, the absence of findings for the mathematics and reading time variables may
have been related to the nature of information that was presented in the upward comparison
vignettes, as they did not explicitly mention the mathematical or reading abilities of the target.
As these particular domains were not made salient to participants at the time of social
comparison, it is conceivable that they did not have enough information to make an
appropriate comparison on these dimensions (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997).
As discussed by Frster et al. (2008), subjective self-evaluation effects are often difficult
to detect. As the participants in the present study consisted of a relatively homogeneous
sample of university students, it is conceivable that they generally considered themselves to
be relatively intelligent to begin with. Stronger effects for subjective self-evaluation might be
detected with a more varied sample.
AUTOMATIC BEHAVIOUR: LANGUAGE AND GENDER EFFECTS

Although the GLOMO model was generally unsupported for automatic behaviour, the
results suggest that language and gender might partially moderate the effects of processing
style on the behavioural outcomes of social comparison. In terms of language effects, the
present research demonstrated that the local processing prime evoked a considerable increase
in general knowledge performance for those who reported that English was their second
language, but only when they were not presented with an upward comparison standard6. It is
possible that local processing may be more helpful than global processing in completing a
general knowledge test, because general knowledge questions tend to focus on detailed
information rather than holistic or global concepts (Navon, 1977). In addition, the finding that
participants who reported that English was their second language performed relatively worse
on the general knowledge test in the upward comparison condition (when compared to the no
comparison control condition) can be explained by research on standard attainability by
Lockwood and Kunda (1997). It may be that individuals who indicated that English was a
second language might have regarded the academic success of the comparison target to be
unattainable, consequently resulting in self-deflation and in turn a compromised performance
on the general knowledge test.
Although the results from the present research demonstrated no noteworthy effects of
processing style for females, males were shown to perform better on the knowledge test after
being primed with local processing. Again, it may be that local processing aids general
knowledge performance, though further research is required in order to determine the basis of
this effect. With regard to the effect of gender on social comparison outcomes, although no
effect of social comparison was revealed for females, males were shown to perform better on
the general knowledge test after engaging in an upward comparison, indicating a behavioural
assimilation effect. Thus, it is possible that the comparison vignettes were regarded to be
more relevant (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997) for male participants, or that males may have
6
Admittedly, the interaction effect did not reach significance in the present study (F(2,16) = 3.17, p = .069).
Nonetheless, when the analysis was broken down into two two-way interactions, significant effects were revealed
for ESL.
approached the social comparison in a more competitive way and thus were more affected by
the upward comparison standard when compared to their female counterparts.
LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH

There were several limitations within the present investigation that should be addressed.
First, the present research was based on subjective self-reports in response to a hypothetical
comparison scenario. It should be noted that individuals may respond differently to social
comparisons in the real world. As underscored by Wheeler and Miyake (1992), because social
comparison is a dynamic process, it is best studied under naturalistic conditions. In addition,
no baseline measures of processing style were taken, which would have allowed for further
determination of how individual differences in processing style might influence the effects of
priming.
CONCLUSION
Investigation into the mechanisms behind the consequences of social comparison is
important due to the common occurrence of social comparison in everyday life. Social
comparison research may have important implications for personality conceptualisations of
self-concept, in so far as comparison with others allows individuals to develop a better
understanding of themselves in relation to others. Notably, the present study did not provide
direct support for Frster et al.s (2008) GLOMO with respect to the self-evaluative and
behavioural responses to social comparison. Nonetheless, the present research revealed
incidental evidence that individual differences in language and gender may partially moderate
the role of processing style on the behavioural consequences of social comparison. Further
research is required in order to determine the role of such individual difference variables in
social comparison outcomes, and to further clarify how responses to social comparisons vary
for individuals from different backgrounds.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We thank Ladd Wheeler and Julie Sribney for their comments on an earlier draft of this
paper.
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Chapter 6
THE EXCITATION TRANSFER PARADIGM AND

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
PREDICTING INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION
Madeleine Fraser and Simon Boag

Department of Psychology, Macquarie University
ABSTRACT
The Excitation Transfer paradigm proposes that externally-caused residual arousal
may later intensify unrelated feelings of attraction, and thus emphasising the role of
situational variables. On the other hand, Emotional Intelligence (EI) involves an
individuals internal capacity to interpret and engage with emotionally-relevant
information. This study proposed that EI(as assessed by the Trait-Meta Mood Scale
TMMS)may moderate the Excitation Transfer effect. A sample of 104 female
undergraduates was randomly allocated to complete a cognitive task whilst either seated
at a table (control) or riding an exercise bike (aroused condition). Participants then
viewed a video recording of a male confederate and rated his attractiveness on a 19-item
First Impression Scale. Results indicated no main effects for arousal or EI on any factor
of attractiveness. However further analysis demonstrated significant higher-order
interactions between EI and arousal upon attractiveness factors. Specifically, individuals
with higher EI scores were less likely to be influenced by irrelevant arousal. Results
suggest that evaluative judgements of attractiveness are influenced by the interaction of
personality and situational variables.
Keywords: Arousal, Emotional Intelligence, Excitation Transfer paradigm, Individual

differences
Ph: 61-2-9850 8024; Fax: 61-2-9850 8062; simon.boag@psy.mq.edu.au.

68 Madeleine Fraser and Simon Boag
INTRODUCTION
Romantic partner selection can be influenced by a diverse range of variables including
both situational factors and internal personality traits. Zillmanns (1971) Excitation Transfer
paradigm states that residual arousal caused by a previous event may later intensify a diverse
range of reactions to other unrelated stimuli, including aggression (e.g., Zillmann, 1971),
sexual arousal (e.g., Cantor, Zillmann & Bryant, 1975), or attraction (e.g., White, Fishbein &
Rutstein, 1981). In the case of attraction, one might be mildly attracted to a new acquaintance
under ordinary circumstances; however this feeling may be intensified when physiologically
aroused, thereby eliciting the Misattribution of Arousal (Dutton & Aron, 1974). This
phenomenon is based on the premise that a state of physiological arousal and excitation
decays slowly over time, often remaining operative even after an individual has cognitively
adjusted to a new situation. The term arousal source ambiguity suggests that residual arousal
is more likely to be misinterpreted once obvious markers of physical exertion have dissipated
(e.g., shortness of breath). Accordingly, misattributions do not usually occur when arousal is
explicitly linked to its original source (Foster, Witcher, Campbell & Green, 1998; Gorn,
Pham & Sim, 2001).
A widely referenced study demonstrating the Excitation Transfer paradigm was
conducted by Dutton and Aron (1974) using a high suspension bridge over a canyon to induce
a state of physiological arousal. They found that aroused male participants who interacted
with a female experimenter soon after crossing the bridge were significantly more likely to
later call the experimenter and to have higher sexual content in their Thematic Apperception
Test responses than participants with lower levels of arousal. These results suggest that
residual physiological arousal was misinterpreted as feelings of attraction toward the
experimenter. Subsequently, the Excitation Transfer paradigm has been widely replicated
under a number of experimental manipulations ranging from rollercoasters (Meston &
Frohlich, 2003) to physical exercise (White & Knight, 1984).
However a body of research continues to demonstrate inconsistent results within the
Excitation Transfer paradigm. Foster, Witcher, Campbell and Greens (1998) metanalysis of
33 Excitation Transfer experiments found that under typical experimental conditions, arousal
exerts a small to moderate effect on attraction. These inconsistencies are particularly relevant
for female participants. Dutton and Arons (1974) original study failed to replicate their
results for female participants using a male confederate. Similarly Kenrick, Cialdini, and
Linder (1979) reported four failures to replicate Dutton and Arons (1974) findings, one exact
replication, and three replications with minor variations. Similarly, Dienstbier (1979) studied
the impact of startle-induced arousal on attraction, finding a significant difference between
control and aroused male participants but no difference for female participants. A review of
previous Excitation Transfer research conducted on female samples demonstrates conflicting
evidence both for and against the Misattribution of Arousal (Ben-Zeev, Fein & Inzlicht, 2003;
Bootzin, Herman & Nicassio, 1976; Rickwood & Price, 1988). These disparate results
suggest that there may be other factors contributing to the inconsistent Excitation Transfer
effects for female populations.
The Excitation Transfer Paradigm and Emotional Intelligence 69
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AROUSAL AND ATTRACTION

The present study proposes that the misinterpretation of residual arousal does not
uniformly effect or even occur to all individuals. Instead, these inconsistencies may be better
explained by accounting for Emotional Intelligence (EI). Individuals differ in their ability to
decipher which feelings they should trust as a reliable and accurate (Fiori, 2009), and EI
refers to individual differences in the recognition, regulation, and expression of emotional
information (Nelis, Quoidbach, Mikolajczak, & Hansenne, 2009). Consequently, EI may play
a moderating role between perceiving emotional information and subsequently using this
information to form an evaluative judgement. Petrides and Furnham (2001) propose a
distinction between conceptually and operationally different types of EI. The first, ability
models, describe EI as a set of cognitive abilities pertaining to the perception, interpretation
and utilisation of affect-laden information (Mayer, Caruso & Salovey, 1999; Osofsky, 1991).
In contrast, trait models conceptualise EI as a tendency to behave in a certain way in
emotional situations and the frequency with which one uses ones emotional abilities and
dispositions linked to personality (Petrides & Furnham, 2000). While both approaches have
their merits, applying a trait-based understanding of EI in the current study facilitates a clear
demarcation between the influences of situational variables (externally caused-levels of
arousal) and internally stable EI traits.
Trait EI is typically measured using self-report questionnaires such as the widely applied
Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey & Palfai, 1995). The
TMMS provides an index of individual differences in the mood regulation process termed the
meta-mood experience, involving monitoring, evaluating and regulating feelings and
emotions (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey & Palfai, 1995). The TMMS has demonstrated
good psychometric properties, including satisfactory to good internal consistency ( range
=.66 to .83; Tett, Fox & Wang, 2005) and continues to be applied to Australian samples (e.g.,
Fitness & Curtis, 2005). The TMMS loads onto three factors including Attention to emotion
referring to the degree of focus placed on ones own emotions and emotional reactions to
others; emotional Clarity, describing the capacity to notice feelings and accurately recognise
their nature and cause, and; emotional Repair, involving the regulation of feelings and
emotions, and capacity to adaptively motivate behaviour (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey
& Palfai, 1995). A final Global EI factor represents an overall score, indicative of a general
capacity to engage with emotional information.
Given that the Excitation Transfer paradigm involves a situation whereby individuals fail
to distinguish between incidental feelings and feelings elicited by a target, there are several
ways that EI may be relevant to understanding the misattribution of arousal. Fiori (2009)
suggests that individuals with higher EI may be less influenced by misleading emotions or
arousal than individuals with lower EI abilities. A related study by Mikolajczak, Petrides,
Coumans and Luminet (2009) found that trait EI moderates the impact of laboratory-induced
stress on mood change. Specifically, after inducing stress through an experience of failure,
higher trait EI scores were linked to significantly less mood deterioration. Generalising this
pattern, it is predicted that individuals scoring higher on EI will be less likely to mistakenly
interpret residual arousal as indicative of feelings of attraction toward a target. Furthermore,
females tend to receive higher trait-EI scores than males on a variety of measures (Katyal &
Awasthi, 2005; Petrides, Furnham & Martin, 2004) and links between EI and uniquely female
experiences (e.g., menopause and orgasm frequency) suggest EI may play an important role
in everyday functioning and decision-making particularly for females (Bauld & Brown, 2009;
Burri, Cherkas & Spector, 2009).
AIM AND HYPOTHESES

The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between arousal, Emotional
Intelligence, and attraction, hypothesising that a more precise account of the decisions
underlying romantic partner selection may be gained through accounting for both
environmentally induced arousal and EI. Firstly, based on the Excitation Transfer paradigm it
was predicted that aroused female participants should rate male confederate attractiveness
higher than control participants. Secondly, EI scores should moderate the relationship
between arousal and attraction. Thirdly and more specifically, it was hypothesised that
participants with lower EI scores should rate a confederate as more attractive when in a state
of physiological arousal compared to a control.
METHOD
Participants
The sample consisted of 104 female undergraduate students aged between 17 and 35
years (M = 19, SD = 3) enrolled in a first-year Psychology course.
Materials and Apparatus
Trait-Meta Mood Scale (TMMS): The 30 item TMMS questionnaire assesses trait-EI and
was administered on a laptop using the MediaLab computer program. Items were individually
displayed above a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 = not at all and 5 = very much so. In the
present study, the overall reliability of the scale was good (Cronbachs = .83), and the
reliability of the subscales included Attention = .65; Clarity = .86; Repair = .80. These
reliability scales are comparable to those obtained by the original Salovey, Mayer, Goldman,
Turvey and Palfau (1995) study (Attention = .78; Clarity = .87; Repair = .76). Each EI
subscale was treated as a continuous rather than ordinal variable to maximise the opportunity
to identify patterns related to EI scores.
First Impressions Scale

To construct an information-rich measurement of confederate attractiveness, two widely
applied questionnaires measuring both love and liking were combined to form the First
Impressions Scale. Seven items were derived from Foster et al. (1998) including questions
such as Is he the type of person you would want to get to know better? A further twelve
items from White et al. (1981) rated confederate personality traits such as likeability, sincerity
and conceitedness. The thirteenth item How sexually warm do you think the male in the
video is? was excluded from the current study as nine of the ten participants in a video pre-
screening test expressed confusion concerning its meaning. The nineteen items in the final
scale were randomly ordered and used a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 0-9 (higher scores
reflecting a more positive evaluation). There was no neutral option so as to optimise scale
sensitivity to differences in attraction between conditions, whilst also avoiding mixed
interpretations of neutral and minimizing response set tendencies (Kulas, Stachowski &
Haynes, 2008). Furthermore, the Likert scale included 0 as a more appropriate alternative to
1 to cater for an absence of attraction.
Arousal Manipulation and Manipulation Check

To measure the presence of residual physiological arousal, the heart rate of a subsample
of 70 participants was measured using a Panasonic wrist monitor at three stages; pre-maze,
post-maze completion and eight minutes later at the conclusion of the experiment. Heart-rate
has previously been linked to a state of arousal/excitation (Pastor, Mayo & Shamir, 2007).
Video Clip of Male Confederate

A video-recording of a male confederate was selected as a standardised yet information-
rich stimulus. Based on a pre-test screening of ten participants blind to the experimental
hypothesis, one recording of a male confederate was selected from six potential confederates
based on a higher and more consistent rating on the First Impressions Scale (M = 5.9 on a 0-9
scale, SD = 1.4). The confederate had a relatively symmetrical face in accordance with the
robust finding that average faces are perceived as more attractive universally (Rubenstein,
Langlois & Roggman, 2002). The confederates shoulders and head were filmed whilst they
delivered a 45 second speech about university life. The content of the script was deliberately
generic and broad, devoid of any specific attitudes to avoid the confounding influence of
attitudinal similarity-dissimilarity (Byrne, 1997). The video clip was shown to participants on
a laptop computer using Windows Media Player software.
Procedure
The methodological paradigm was adapted from Cantor et al. (1975) and White, Fishbein
and Rutstein (1981), using physical exercise to induce arousal before examining the effects of
residual arousal on attraction toward a confederate. This procedure has been widely applied in
attraction research (Allen, Kendrick, Linder & McCall, 1989; Meston & Gorzalka, 1996;
White & Knight, 1984). Prior to participation, all participants provided written consent and
were checked for possible medical conditions. Participants were informed the study was
investigating (1) the effect of exercise on concentration and (2) first impressions. This
deceptive cover story served to maximise arousal source ambiguity in the later stages of the
experiment. After being told they were given a mood assessment test and asked to answer
the questions as honestly as possible, participants completed the TMMS.
Table 1. Means & standard deviations of the TMMS & First Impressions Scale
Scale Subscales Number of Total Score Mean Standard

Items Deviation
TMMS Global 30 150 109. 19 11.71
Attention 21 105 48.87 4.79
Clarity 15 75 37.19 6.10
Repair 12 60 23.13 4.14
First Total Scale 19 190 120.61 18.36
Impressions Traits 4 40 24.67 5.50
Behaviour 5 50 28.72 7.46
Romantic 4 40 28.39 4.49
Negative Traits 3 30 26.54 4.53
Excite 3 30 11.41 2.61
Arousal Manipulation
Participants were then randomly allocated to either the arousal condition (riding a
stationary exercise bike on medium difficulty) or the control condition (seated at a table).
Both conditions were given five minutes to find as many correct exits from four maze puzzles
as possible. Participants read their answers aloud for the experimenter to record and were not
provided with accuracy feedback. All participants were then seated and given three minutes to
fill out a crossword puzzle of medium difficulty. On average, 24 of the 56 questions were
completed, indicating a relatively consistent level of difficulty for all participants (SD = 12.6;
range = 9-48). This filler task served to alleviate the obvious markers of physical exertion
(e.g., shortness of breath), thereby optimising the opportunity for residual arousal to be
misattributed, whilst also maintaining consistent delay times across conditions, thus
circumventing problems involving different delay periods evident in previous studies (e.g.,
White & Knight, 1984).
Attractiveness Assessment
Participants then viewed a 45 second video clip of a male confederate and completed the
First Impressions Scale. Finally, participants were given a short demographic questionnaire
gathering information on potentially confounding variables including age, current relationship
status and sexual orientation. To conclude, participants were probed for suspicion regarding
the true purpose of the study and debriefed.
RESULTS
Based on relationship status, statistical analyses were run separately for participants who
were single and those in a romantic relationship to account for the potentially confounding
influence of a romantic partner demonstrated in prior research (Meston & Frohlich, 2003;
Little, Jones, Penton-Voak, Burt & Perrett, 2002). 52 participants were currently single, and
52 in a relationship. After random allocation, roughly equal proportions were allocated to the
control and aroused conditions (58% and 48%). As there were no missing cases in the data,
and no significant outliers detected (including 4 participants who were interested in females
or both genders), the full data set (N = 104) was used in the analyses. The means and standard
deviations of both the TMMS and the First Impressions Scale are displayed in Table 1.
Table 2. Five factor solution using a principal components analysis based on the 19
items of the First Impressions Scale
First Impressions Items Factors Commu

1 2 3 4 5 -nalities
Trait Beha- Roma Negati- Excite
viour -ntic ve Traits
9. How sympathetic do you think the .89 .70
male in the video is?
14. How dependable do you think the .85 .73
13. How generous do you think the .78 .73
10. How sincere do you think the .72 .60
12. How much would you like to kiss .91 .79
him? *
17. How much would you like to date .83 .78
him? *
15. How much would you like to .58 .75
work with him? *
16. How well do you think you could .56 .74
get along with him? *
8. How much do you like him? * .39 .62
1. How physically attractive is the .79 .70
male in the video? *
3. How considerate do you think the .79 .80
4. Is he the type of person you would .75 .72
want to get to know better? *
2. How likeable do you think the .73 .72
male in the video is? *
11. How shallow do you think the .85 .75
5. How irritating do you think the .82 .71
18. How conceited do you think the .74 .71
6. How humorous do you think the .78 .77
7. How exciting do you think the .69 .78
19.How perceptive do you think the .47 .51
*
= items from Foster, Witcher, Campbell & Green, 1998.
= items from White, Fishbein & Rutstein, 1981.

Table 3. Bivariate correlations among the five factors derived from the 19 itemed First
Impressions Scale
Factors
SD 1 2 3 4 5
1) Trait 5.50 1.0 0.40* 0.42* 0.22* 0.46*
2) Behaviour 7.50 1.0 0.61* -0.09 0.49*
3) Romantic 4.49 1.0 0.21* 0.47*
4) Negative Traits 4.53 1.0 -0.31*
5) Excite 2.61 1.0
Note: * = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed).
Factor Analysis of the First Impressions Scale
A factor analysis provided evidence of sampling adequacy for the First Impressions Scale
(Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure = .853; Barletts Test of Sphericity = p <.001) and a principal
components analysis revealed the scale loaded onto five factors with eigenvalues exceeding 1,
which explain 35.84%, 13.56%, 10.26%, 6.12% and 5.69% of the variance respectively (see
Table 2). A promax rotation was applied in the present study as a non-orthogonal method of
rotation. For exploratory purposes, the present study used 0.4 as the threshold for determining
which item loaded onto which factor (Raubenheimer, 2004), and each factor was allocated
according to its highest loading.
Figure 1. Pulse rate differences for control & arousal conditions prior to the maze task, immediately
after & at the conclusion of the experiment (including standard error bars).
The first factor was comprised of four positive personality traits; each derived from
White, Fishbein, and Rutstein (1981) and thus was renamed Traits. The second factor,
Behaviour, included five behavioural questions involving interaction between the participant
and male target, each derived from Foster et al., (1998). The third factor involved a more
eclectic combination of items from the two original scales involving romantic behaviours and
personality traits, and was labelled Romantic. The fourth factor was comprised of entirely
negative personality traits which were all reverse coded in the scale (labelled Negative
Traits). Finally, the fifth factor was renamed Excite and contained three personality trait
judgements; exciting, humorous and perceptive. Focus was placed on Trait, Behaviour and
Romantic factors due to their higher predictive capacity, accumulatively accounting for
59.66% of total score variability. Table 3 displays the correlation matrix for the five factors
derived from the 19 itemed First Impressions Scale. Although each factor retains a low to
moderate correlation with other factors, the majority of these are significant at the 0.05 level.
Intuitively these correlation coefficients would be expected to share a degree of significance
given the factors are measuring similar variables.
Manipulation Check
Mean heart rates in the control condition did not significantly differ between Pre-Maze,
Post-Maze time periods and at the experiments Conclusion, F(1.74, 58.2) = 2.41, p .05, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Mauchlys test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been
violated in the calculation (chi-square = 7.71, p .05), therefore the degrees of freedom were
corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (epsilon = .87). Contrastingly, in the
arousal condition pulse rates significantly differed at each of the three stages of recording
(F(1.36, 206) = 22.60, p < .05). Mauchlys test indicated that the assumption of sphericity
had again been violated (chi-square = 13.43, p .05), therefore the degrees of freedom were
corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (epsilon = .74). Post hoc tests
revealed that the pulse rate of the post-maze participants was significantly higher than the pre-
maze participants (p .05) and remained higher at the conclusion of the experiment in
comparison to the pre-maze pulse rates (p .05). These results confirm that residual arousal
was present at the conclusion of the experiment in the aroused condition.
Multiple regressions were conducted to assess the relationship between arousal and
attraction, and also EI and attraction. Results demonstrated no significant difference between
aroused and control conditions on any of the five factors derived from the First Impressions
Scale (all p > .05). This finding did not support the Excitation Transfer hypothesis that
aroused female participants would rate the attractiveness of a male confederate higher than
non-aroused females. As expected, there were no main effects for any EI scale (Attention,
Clarity, Repair or Global) on any of the five First Impressions Scale factors (all p > .05).
Investigating the Effect of EI on the Excitation Transfer Paradigm for

Currently Single Participants
A series of multifactorial ANCOVAs using the General Linear Model examined the
interactions between condition (control and arousal) and EI scores (Global EI, Attention EI,
Clarity EI and Repair EI) with each of the five factors derived from the First Impressions
Scale as dependent variables (Trait, Behaviour, Romantic, Negative Traits and Excite). This
analysis was run separately for participants who were in a relationship and those who were
single. Two significant interactions were found for participants who were single. No
significant results were found for participants who were in a relationship.
Confederate mean Trait
Contro
l
Score
Global EI Score
Figure 2. For currently single participants; interaction between Traits & Global EI scores for arousal &
control conditions.
Confederate mean Trait
Control
Arousal
Score
Clarity EI Score
Figure 3. For currently single participants; interaction between Traits & Clarity EI scores for arousal &
control conditions.
The first significant interaction was between condition and Global EI with Traits as
the dependent variable (B = 26.43, F (1, 50) = 4.71, p < .05), as illustrated in Figure 2. Tests
of simple slopes showed that for the arousal group, the relationship between Global EI and
Traits was negative yet not significantly different from zero (B = -0.19, t (50) = -1.81, p =
.07). For the control group, the relationship was positive, yet not significantly different from
zero (B = .34, t (50) = 1.82, p = .08). The effect of the interaction demonstrated that the
difference between the conditions was greater at lower levels of Global EI than at higher
levels. For example, at one standard deviation below the mean of Global EI, the model
indicated a significant difference between the condition (B = -5.59, t (50) = -2.11, p < .05). At
one standard deviation above the mean of Global EI, the difference between the conditions
was not significant (B = 2.7, t (50) = 1.14, p = .26).
There was a second significant interaction between condition and Clarity EI with Traits
as the dependent variable, B = 26.01, F(1, 53) = 5.99, p < .05. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
Tests of simple slopes showed that for the arousal group, the relationship between Clarity EI
and Traits was negative, but not significantly different from zero (B = -.26, t (50) = -1.64, p =
.11). For the control group, the relationship was positive, and also not significantly different
from zero (B = .34, t (50) = 1.82, p = .07). The effect of the interaction was that the difference
between the conditions was greater at low levels of Clarity EI than at higher levels. For
example, at one standard deviation below the mean of Clarity EI, the model indicated a
significant difference between the condition (B = -5.51, t (50) = -2.38, p = .02). Conversely, at
one standard deviation above the mean of Clarity EI, the difference between the conditions
was not significant (B = 2.41, t (50) = 1.09, p = .28).
DISCUSSION
The present results suggest that the effect of residual arousal on interpersonal attraction
differs depending on the individuals capacity to engage with and interpret emotionally-
relevant information, as measured by trait-EI. Firstly, based on the Excitation Transfer
paradigm, in the current study it was hypothesised that participants in the aroused condition
would rate a male confederate as more attractive than those in the control condition. Although
the manipulation check illustrated the presence of residual arousal, no main effect for arousal
on attraction was found. This aligned with a small body of research suggesting females are
less likely to misattribute arousal than males (Ben-Zeev, Fein & Inzlicht, 2003; Bootzin,
Herman & Nicassio, 1976; Dutton & Aron, 1974; Dienstbier, 1979; Rickwood & Price,
1988). Similarly, no main effects were present for EI (Global EI, Attention EI, Clarity EI and
Repair EI) on any of the five factors derived from the First Impressions Scale (Traits,
Behavioural, Romantic, Negative Traits and Excite). Although accounting for arousal and EI
separately produced no main effects, after including both variables in the analyses, two
significant higher-order interactions emerged. These interactions provided support for the
second and third hypothesis.
Specifically, it was hypothesised that participants with the same, lower EI scores
would rate a confederate as more attractive when in a state of physiological arousal compared
to a control. The first interaction between condition and Global EI with Traits as the
dependent variable demonstrated support for this hypothesis. The difference between arousal
and control conditions was significantly greater at lower levels of Global EI than at higher
levels of Global EI. This may be interpreted to mean that female participants with higher
levels of Global EI rate the attractiveness of a male confederate in a similar fashion regardless
of whether or not they are influenced by residual arousal. Comparatively, female participants
with lower levels of Global EI will rate the attractiveness of a male confederate differently
depending on the presence of residual arousal. Thus participants who have previously
experienced a physiologically arousing stimulus (operationalised through physical exercise),
are more likely to rate the confederate favourably and award higher attractiveness scores due
to the presence of residual arousal.
The second significant interaction between condition and Clarity EI with Traits as the
dependent variable produced similar results. Participants who had lower Clarity EI scores
rated the male confederate as significantly more attractive in the aroused rather than control
condition. Thus both significant interactions suggest female participants with high Clarity and
Global EI scores are more likely to recognise the nature of their inner feelings and emotions
and be able to accurately attribute the cause of physiological arousal to exercise rather than
interpreting these feelings as attraction toward a target. Conversely, participants with lower
Clarity and Global EI are more likely to misinterpret the cause of residual arousal as a
positive reaction toward the confederate, reflected by higher ratings on positive Trait factors.
This reflects a trend in EI research for EI traits to moderate rather than directly control or
direct thought processes and evaluative judgements (e.g., Extremera, Duran & Rey, 2009).
OTHER FINDINGS
In both significant interactions the reversed pattern was found in the control condition. In
the absence of physiological arousal, participants with higher Clarity or Global EI gave the
confederate higher Trait scores than participants with lower Clarity or Global EI. Whilst these
scores were not significantly different from high EI scorers in the aroused condition, both
interactions demonstrated this trend. A potential explanation for this effect may be that in the
absence of residual arousal, higher Clarity or Global EI scores are more likely to demonstrate
optimism and charitable feelings toward others. Thus in the presence of potentially
misleading residual arousal, higher EI capacities appear to effectively prevent biased
judgements; however in the absence of residual arousal, higher EI encourages more charitable
and optimistic judgements. This explanation has not been directly tested, but is indirectly
supported by previous descriptions of an emotionally intelligent character as well-adjusted,
genuine, warm, persistent, and optimistic (Mayer, DiPaolo & Salovey, 1990, pp. 773, 781;
Salovey & Mayer, 1990, pp. 199-200).
THE INFLUENCE OF RELATIONSHIP STATUS

Importantly, each interaction was only demonstrated for participants who were currently
single. The lack of a significant interaction for participants currently in a relationship aligns
with Meston and Frohlichs (2003) field study which used a rollercoaster to induce
physiological arousal. Comparative effects between the participants own romantic partner and
male confederate may account for the lack of a significant interaction between arousal, EI and
attraction for participants currently in a relationship. Consequently, these comparative effects
may override initial judgements of anothers attractiveness. This particularly being the case as
it may be assumed a current partner who has an intimate connection with the participant will
be favoured over a brief, limited depiction of a male stranger. Thus, being in a relationship or
the presence of a romantic partner was found to moderate the arousal-attraction link.
Consequently relationship status appears to also act as a moderating variable.
IMPLICATIONS
An important implication from the present findings is that acknowledging both external
(environmentally caused arousal) and internal variables (EI) leads to a more comprehensive
understanding of why the Excitation Transfer effect is not consistently reflected in all female
samples (e.g., Dienstbier, 1979; Dutton & Aron, 1974). EI may be understood to contribute to
the underlying the mental processing which translates situational information (externally
caused residual arousal) into evaluative judgements (interpersonal attraction). Accordingly,
the inclusion of EI within the Excitation Transfer paradigm lends to an increasingly precise
understanding of how a situation affects individuals differently depending on their internal
dispositions (Mischel, Shoda & Mendoza-Denton, 2002). Thus the present studys
investigation of personality-situation interactions makes a timely contribution to Excitation
Transfer research which was previously dominated by studies focusing primarily on
situational factors (Dutton & Aron, 1974; Foster, et al., 1998).
CONCLUSION
These findings must be interpreted within the broader results obtained by the study. A
larger pattern of non-significant relationships between different combinations of EI subscales
and factors suggest EI cannot uniformly predict the effects of arousal for all individuals.
Consequently, as the first study to combine EI and Excitation Transfer fields of research, the
present results cannot be considered as a definitive conclusion in this area. The present results
do, however, suggest that an individuals capacity to notice and accurately recognise ones
own feelings and their cause (Clarity EI) in addition to their general capacity to engage with
emotional information (Global EI) moderates the Excitation Transfer effect and the process of
using emotional information to form an evaluative judgment. The applied methodology also
contributes to EI research by potentially operationalising a situational measure of EI. Future
studies may investigate the Excitation Transfer effect as an alternative to self-report measures
of trait-EI. A further follow-up study may be a replication for male participants, potentially
generalising current results to other situations of Excitation Transfer such as aggression. Thus
this investigation of personality-situation interactions contributes to Excitation Transfer
research by suggesting that accounting for both external (environmentally caused arousal) and
internal variables (EI) leads to a more nuanced understanding of the processes underlying the
arousal-attraction link.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We would like to thank Dolf Zillmann and John Reid for their encouragement and Alan
Taylor for his invaluable statistical advice.
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Chapter 7
TAKE A BREAK: A LOOK AT THE INCUBATION

EFFECT ON CREATIVITY
Gerry Pallier and Niko Tiliopoulos

School of Psychology, University of Sydney
ABSTRACT
We outline the somewhat contentions construct of creativity followed by the working
definition we used in this chapter. That was the production of novel ideasalso known
as ideational fluencywhich is more readily amenable to empirical research than some
other definitions. An experimental study using that notion and involving both visual and
verbal creativity tasks, alongside measures of intelligence, is presented. Included in the
study was an assessment of the so-called incubation effect, operationalised via a break in
the testing protocol. The outcome indicated that a distinction existed between the visual
and verbal creativity tasks and the intelligence measures. Furthermore, there appeared to
be a difference between verbal and visual creativity, in that people were able to produce a
greater increase in visual responses after the break. This is unusual since, whilst extra
new ideas are commonly reported after a break, producing more responses after a break
than before it has not previously been reported. This outcome is discussed and possible
explanations are conjectured.
Keywords: Break Benefit, Creativity, Incubation effect, Intelligence, Intentional fluency
INTRODUCTION
Since the time of Galton, creativity has often been held to be a crucial component of
eminence or genius; however, the issue of how creativity is to be defined has proven
Ph: 61-2-9036 9223; Fax: 61-2-9036 5223; email: niko.tiliopoulos@sydney.edu.au

84 Gerry Pallier and Niko Tiliopoulos
contentious. It is an open question whether creativity is a unitary trait, or whether there exist
distinct forms of creativity for various domains of endeavour (Hocevar, 1981). Amongst those
who believe that creativity is unitary, there is disagreement over whether it can be captured by
the construct of novelty, or whether the appropriateness of the product should also be taken
into consideration when determining creativity (e.g., Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). In practice,
however, creativity is often conceived of as a form of problem solving, with problems being
broadly defined as goals to be reached (Lubart, 2000-2001). In this chapter we focus on that
conceptualization by examining an aspect of creativity that would seem to have considerable
utility in everyday life, namely the generation of novel ideas.
CREATIVITY AND PROBLEM-SOLVING

There is a considerable overlap between the literature on creativity and that on problem
solving. Historically, problem solving was a focus of theorising by Gestalt psychologists.
Wallas (1926) developed an influential model that involved four stages:
(i) Preparation, which involves defining a problem and consciously attempting to solve
it;
(ii) Incubation, wherein, when a solution has not been forthcoming, conscious work
ceases, but continues nonconsciously;
(iii) Illumination, which encompasses the moment of insight, and;
(iv) Verification, whereby the solution is refined and confirmed.
Whilst the preparation and verification stages have been the subject of considerable
research within both cognitive and differential psychology, the incubation phase is somewhat
more mysterious, and has proven less amenable to scientific investigation.
THE INCUBATION EFFECT

Many readers will have experienced the phenomenon of a solution suddenly springing to
mind when one has given up working on a problem, and the occurrence of the Aha! or
Eureka! phenomenon is well documented in the creativity literature. Anecdotal accounts of
creative ideas or solutions springing to mind after a period of incubation abound, but
research on that topic has been sparse, and the few empirical results have been mixed (e.g.,
Dorfman, Shames & Kihlstrom, 1996).
Although some studies have supported the existence of an incubation effect, most of
those used a convergent problem-solving task (e.g., Dreistadt, 1969; Murray & Denny, 1969),
whereby individuals have been aware that they have not found a solution, and, thus, may
consciously have still been seeking a resolution. Fulgosi and Guilford (1968), and Snyder,
Mitchell, Ellwood, Yates and Pallier (2004b) are the only researchers to have found evidence
for an incubation effect using a divergent thinking task. Snyder, et al. (2004b) undertook
preliminary research on the value of a break in a creativity task that required participants to
generate as many possible uses for a piece of paper. When participants had seemingly
Take a Break: A Look at the Incubation Effect on Creativity 85
exhausted their supply of ideas, they were told that the task was over, and were interviewed in
order to collect biographical information. Afterwards, to their surprise, participants were
asked once again to provide uses for paper. Results demonstrated that participants produced a
burst of new ideas after the break. The researchers concluded that this might be an instance of
nonconscious idea generation. That finding inspired our investigations, which sought to
examine further the possibility of an incubation effect by comparing the idea production of
individuals on seemingly disparate tasks. In addition, the discriminant validity of the task
employed by Snyder et al. (2004b), a measure of so-called Ideational Fluency (IF, see Carroll,
1993), was examined in relation to established measures of intelligence derived from the
framework of the theory of fluid and crystallised abilities (Gf/Gc: see, e.g., Horn & Noll,
1994).
EXPLAINING THE INCUBATION EFFECT
In cases such as those cited above, where an incubation effect has purportedly been
demonstrated, accounts in terms of nonconscious processing have proven contentious
(Dorfman, Shames & Kihlstrom, 1996), partly because they rely on unobservables (see, e.g.,
Feldhusen, 1995). Post-Behaviourism, many psychologists have explained away the
incubation effect, claiming that the value of a break lies in enabling recovery from fatigue, or
relief from functional fixedness (Posner, 1973).
Explanations formulated in terms of recovery from fatigue state that a break relieves
neural fatigue within an individual, providing them with renewed energy to attempt a
solution. Proponents of functional fixedness claim that a rest allows individuals to break their
mindset, to restructure the problem and approach it differently, either by reducing the
recency value of inappropriate strategies, or by selectively forgetting less useful memories
in favour of more relevant ones (Ochse, 1990, p.198).
Several studies involving convergent tasks have failed to find support for an incubation
effect (e.g., Dominowski, 1972; Dominowski & Jenrick, 1972; Olton & Johnson, 1976;
Olton, 1979). However, implicit in those studies has been the view that incubation can only
be evidenced by the achievement of a correct solution. Nevertheless, it may be argued that
any ideas produced after conscious work on a problem has ceased could be considered as
indicative of the presence of an incubation effect.
THE INCUBATION EFFECT AND NON-CONSCIOUS PROCESSING

Despite the mixed nature of the results reported above, theories of creativity that rest on
nonconscious processing, and on Wallas model, are still tenable. There exists both anecdotal
and empirical evidence for the existence of an incubation effect, and it is a phenomenon in
need of explanation. Neither is incubation as intractable to the scientific method as is
commonly held. As noted by Fulgosi and Guilford (1968), the employment of a divergent
thinking task makes it possible to inform people that they have completed a problem-solving
task, introduce a distracting break, and then resume testing, which is a promising
methodology for investigating the incubation effect. Presumably, that particular experimental
manipulation precludes, to a large extent, the active seeking of solutions to an unresolved
problem. Moreover, nonconscious processing need not be disregarded on theoretical grounds.
Dorfman, et al. (1996) proposed that implicit memory provides a means by which to
reconceptualise nonconscious processes, making possible the readmission of the study of
incubation to a scientific psychology. Holyoak (1995) pointed out that the existence of neural
networks provides a means of grounding theories of nonconscious aspects of problem
solving. Elaborating on that proposition, Gabora (2002) provided a neural network-inspired
model of creativity. She based her account on the premises that memory is sparse and
distributed, in that each item is stored across many locations, and each location helps to store
many items. Additionally, memory is content-addressable, insofar as each memory is
characterised by a specific pattern of excitation and inhibition across neurons. Associated
memories share activation in common. Individuals differ in the richness of their associations,
or the extent to which their memories overlap. According to Gabora (2002), those with
greater associative richness have access to a larger, more varied number of responses in
creativity tasks.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Differential psychologists have been less averse to studying creativity than have modern
cognitive psychologists. According to Ochse (1990), Guilford articulated the most influential
factor-analytical account of creativity and problem solving, basing his theory on the existence
of distinct cognitive abilities, of which creativity is one. Carroll (1993) examined fluency
and creativity factors, particularly those associated with what Guilford (1967) referred to as
divergent production. In his reanalysis of some 477 data sets, Carroll (1993) identified an
Ideational Fluency factor, which included tasks in which the subject was required to
produce, within a fairly liberal time limit, a series of different words or phrases concerned
with a specified topic or concept (Carroll, 1993, p.396), which is identical to French,
Ekstrom and Prices (1963) construct of the same name.
1. [Title] 2. [Title] 1.Pencil 2. Road
Figure 1. (a) Example of the blank Visual Creativity Task & (b) two solutions.
The study reported in this chapter investigates the incubation effect from the perspectives
of both individual differences and experimental cognitive psychology. This makes possible
the examination of whether idea generation is a cognitive ability upon which people differ,
which may contribute to successful life-outcomes, and affords a greater appreciation of what
incubation might involve. Unlike traditional tests of Ideational Fluency, the tests used
included a distracting break halfway through. That made it possible to establish whether a
break increases response output when, to the participants surprise, the task is resumed. To
the extent that a break enhances performance, it may be that nonconscious processing or
incubation is occurring.
Numerous past accounts, both anecdotal and scientific, have indicated that taking a break
(Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren & van Barren, 2006; Einstein, 1949a; Fulgosi & Guilford, 1968;
Gregory, 2004; Hadamard, 1949; Mazzarello, 2000; Poincare, 1913; Snyder, et al., 2004b)
or literally sleeping on it (Cohen, Pascual-Leone, Press & Robertson, 2005; Fenn, Nusbaum
& Margoliash, 2003; Stickgold, Malia, Maguire, Roddenberry & OConnor, 2000; Wagner,
Gais, Haider, Vergler & Born, 2004)can enhance idea production. Commonly, a burst of
new ideas follows a break, but never has the number of ideas produced in the post-break
session been reported as greater than in the pre-break period. Recently, there has been an
upsurge of interest in the, apparently nonconscious, phenomenon of additional solutions
appearing after a break from problem solving (see, e.g., Dijksterhuis, et al., 2006; Snyder et
al., 2004b). Whilst most reports have considered verbal or mathematical problems, the
research we report here concentrates on comparing verbal and visual creativity. We wondered
whether a break would differentially advantage creative idea production in the visual over the
verbal domain.
Wallass (1926) account singled out incubation as essential to the creative process and to
problem solving, stating that the benefit of breaks results from nonconscious production of
ideas. Whilst this has some empirical support, others have sought to explain the value of a
break in more prosaic terms, contending that the benefit lies in enabling recovery from neural
fatigue, or relief from functional fixedness (Posner, 1973). We investigated the incubation
effect from the perspective of nonconscious idea generation.
Most investigations have utilised convergent tasks, with a single correct solution (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Fenn et al., 2003; Hadamard, 1949). However, we contend that
convergent problem solving is not necessarily equivalent to creativity. For this reason, our
method used tasks with multiple solutions in the verbal and visual domains, which we believe
to be superior markers of creativity. Notably, no previous accounts have compared an
advantage of verbal versus visual creativity following a break. We did so, with the aim of
examining whether or not there is a difference between modalities.
First year psychology students from the University of Sydney (N=107, 32 (27%) males
and 75 (64%) females), with an average age of 19.79 years (range 18-49, S.D. 4.02),
participated in the study. Participants first language may affect performance on verbal tasks
and this information was obtained: 86% of people stating that English was their first
language. In the outcome, this did not appear to affect scores on the verbal tasks and was thus
not considered further.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE

Apart from the Verbal Creativity Test (Snyder et al., 2004b), and the Visual Creativity
Test (Pallier, 2005), we administered standardised psychometric tests (derived from within
the Cattell-Horn-Carroll framework) of fluid intelligence (Gf), crystallised intelligence (Gc)
and visualisation ability (Gv). To help clarify the research protocol the task structure is
presented below.
Pre-break Verbal Creativity Test: this task was based on Cattells Uses Test (French,
Ekstrom & Price, 1963), and required participants to list as many possible different
uses for a piece of paper, (paper was chosen as it is presumably equally familiar to all
and, thus, required no specialist knowledge, a factor that may account for differences
in performance). The Test was administered on computer and ceased automatically
when no response was provided for 30 seconds, after which participants were told
(by the computer) that the task was over. The 30 second time lag was taken as being
indicative of participants being unable to rapidly produce new ideas.
Pre-break Visual Creativity Test: the experimenter instructed participants to construct as
many varied drawings as they could utilising a series of parallel lines, presented in
paper-and-pencil format, adapted from Torrances (Torrance, 1966) test battery.
Examples of stimuli and outcomes are presented in Figure 1, below.
When a participant had ceased producing drawings for 30 seconds, the
experimenter announced that the Test had ended and to begin the computerised
cognitive ability tasks.
Participants were then given six tests of intelligence, which included an
equivalent number of visual and verbal tasks. This was because relief from neural
fatigue has been suggested as an alternative to nonconscious idea production (Posner,
1973). Having participants complete verbal and visual intelligence tests during the
break maximised the possibility of detecting a genuine incubation effect, rather than
a beneficial relief from neural fatigue in either modality.
Matrices (Gf): in this Test (Stankov & Roberts, 2001), participants were presented with a
series of 3x3 matrices, with all but the bottom right-hand block containing patterns
made up of os, +s, and blanks. Participants were required to identify the logical
series, and to fill in the empty square with the appropriate selection of os, +s, or
blanks that logically completed the matrix pattern. The task involved two practice
and ten test items.
Letter Swaps (Gf): this Test (Stankov & Crawford, 1993) presented participants with
three letters (J, K and L) in various orders, and required them to carry out (mentally)
a number of letter swaps (e.g., Swap the 1st and 3rd letters) and identify the resulting
order of letters. There were two practice and eight test items, employing either 2, 3,
4, or 5 Swaps operations (i.e., 2 presentations of each difficulty level).
Vocabulary (Gc): in this Test (Stankov, 1997), participants were asked to select the most
appropriate definition (from four alternatives) for a series of words. The Test
comprised two practice and ten test items.
Paper Folding Test (Gv): this Test measured the primary mental ability of visualisation
(French et al., 1963). It consisted of two rows of figures. The top row represented a
square piece of paper being folded, with the final figure indicating where holes had
been punched into the paper. The bottom row presented five alternative
representations of how the paper would look when unfolded. The task was to pick the
correct solution. There were two practise and ten test items.
Proverb Matching (Gc): this Test was developed by Stankov and Roberts (2001). Each
item showed a typical proverb and a selection of five alternative proverbs, one of
which had a very similar meaning to the test item. The requirement was to identify
that proverb. There were two examples and ten test items.
Hidden Figures (Gv): another task developed by Stankov and Roberts (2001), this Test
measures the ability to identify a simple figure hidden amongst a complex pattern.
Participants were presented with a set of five alternative shapes and a complex set of
intersecting lines within a rectangle. The task requirement was to identify which of
the alternatives was hidden within the rectangle. There was one example and six
test items.
Post-break Verbal Creativity Test: this was identical to the first trial.
Post-break Visual Creativity Test: this was also identical to the pre-break trail.
Creativity tests may be evaluated in several ways (see, e.g., Torrance, 1990; Snyder,
Mitchell, Bossomaier & Pallier, 2004a; Snyder et al., 2004b), the most germane here being
the number of ideas produced (technically known as Fluency). The questions of interest were
after running out of ideas, does a break induce extra solutions? and does this break benefit
differ between verbal and visual tasks? (Note that breaks in past research have generally
been of longer duration, often literally involving a period of sleep; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006;
Fenn et al., 2003; Mazzarello, 2005; Wagner et al., 2004).
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The scores on the verbal task were as expected from previous studies using that test (e.g.,
Snyder et al., 2004a, b)people can immediately produce some extra solutions, even when
they seemed to have run of ideas before the break. However, the outcome of the visual
creativity test was unexpectednot only did people produce extra ideas after the break but,
unlike the verbal test, they produced more ideas than in the first session. Overall, scores for
intelligence exhibited means and standard deviations similar to those reported elsewhere
using the same (or very similar) tests and participant populations (e.g., Danthiir, Roberts,
Pallier & Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 2002). Thus, the current sample did not appear to be
unusual.
To examine the relationship between the creativity and cognitive ability test scores, an
exploratory factor analysis was conducted. A parsimonious three factor solution was preferred
as it best indicates the aims of the study. The factors were interpreted as follows: Factor 1:
clearly represented an intelligence or cognitive ability factor. Factor 2: was defined solely
by fluency on the visual creativity task and was interpreted as visual creativity. Factor 3: was
defined solely by fluency on the verbal creativity task and was interpreted as verbal creativity.
The inter-correlations between the factors showed a virtually zero relationship between the
factors (i.e., they represent quite distinct abilities). This outcome supports the view that
creativity is domain dependent.
The difference in break benefit for verbal versus visual creativity cannot, in this case, be
easily explained in terms of relief from neural fatigue as the participants worked on
cognitively demanding tasks of a similar nature for roughly an hour between creativity
sessions. Furthermore, it is unlikely that there is a differential effect of neural fatigue for
visual and verbal abilities, particularly since equally demanding tasks were presented in both
modalities. Neither is conscious processing of additional solutions a likely explanation
because: 1) participants had no reason to believe that they would be asked to produce more
ideas at a later time, in fact they were clearly told that the task was over, and; 2) people were
asked at the end of the session if they had been thinking about the creativity tasks during the
intelligence tests, and they reported that they had not. In fact, they were surprised to be asked
to produce more responses.
Therefore, we suggest that these results point to nonconscious idea generation taking
place in both tasks, but in the visual task this leads to more creative ideas after the break than
before it. This is the first time that such a combination of tests has been used in conjunction
with the investigation of a break benefit to the creative process. Furthermore, whilst a number
of studies have looked at sleeping on it in a literal sense (Cohen et al., 2005; Fenn et al.,
2003; Stickgold et al., 2000; Wagner et al., 2004)i.e., being re-tested after an overnight
breakour investigation contributes to the relatively sparse knowledge regarding briefer
interludes. What essentially differentiates our research from previous studies is the shorter
break time employed, alongside our choice of both visual and verbal tasks. We hypothesise
that nonconscious processing occurs continuously, independent of the type of break or its
duration.
CONCLUSION
We can only speculate on the cause of our unexpected outcome. Perhaps what we are
seeing is a division of thought processes involving the two modalities (visual and verbal),
providing further evidence that the Whorfian hypothesis in its extreme form (Whorf, 1956) is
overstated. Not all thought appears dependent on language. Anecdotal accounts, perhaps best
thought of as case studies, of the differentiation between verbal and visual processing abound.
For example, Einstein stated that his thinking processes were mainly visual The words or the
language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of
thought (the) elements are, in my case, of (the) visual type. (1949, pp. 142-143).
Researchers are yet to fully explore possible differences in the neural underpinnings of
incubation for artistic versus verbal creativity. Recently, however, neuropsychological
investigations into creative insight have indicated the involvement of the right anterior
superior temporal gyrus (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Flech & Kounios, 2005; Jung-Beeman et
al., 2004). There is also an increase in alpha-band followed by gamma-band activity
accompanying insightful solutions for verbal tasks (without a break) (Bowden et al., 2005;
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). A fruitful line of research would be to examine the extent to
which these purported neural correlates apply during and after breaks and for both verbal and
artistic creativity tasks.
Even though there is a break benefit to creativity in both modalities, the size of the effect
appears reliant on whether verbal or visual creativity is involved, strongly favouring the latter.
The results reported here suggest that, whilst meeting deadlines is important, performance
could well be enhanced by taking time out during the decision-making processes, particularly
for tasks with a visual component.
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of motor skill memory: A double dissociation of goal and movement. Proceedings of the
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American Journal of Psychology, 81, 241-248.
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Pallier, G. (2005). A test of artistic creativity. Unpublished test, available from the School of
Psychology, University of Sydney.
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R. D. (2002). The role of individual differences in the realism of confidence judgements.
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Snyder, A., Mitchell, J., Bossomaier, T., & Pallier, G. (2004a). The creativity quotient: An
objective scoring of ideational fluency. Creativity Research Journal, 16, 415-420.
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Chapter 8
THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY IN LEARNING

PROCESSES AND LEARNING OUTCOMES IN
APPLIED SETTINGS
Paul Ginns, Gregory Arief D. Liem and Andrew J. Martin

Faculty of Education & Social Work, University of Sydney
ABSTRACT
Researchers and practitioners working in applied settings, such as schools,
workplaces and physical activity/exercise contexts, have identified a range of factors
related to learning processes and learning outcomes. In this chapter, we focus on
personality factors associated with learning processes and outcomes in each of these
settings, drawing on meta-analytic reviews of widely used explanatory frameworks (e.g.,
the Big Five) and more recent theoretical and empirical developments in applied
personality research (e.g., the HEXACO model). We discuss major findings in these
areas and the implications of these findings for personality and psycho-educational
researchers seeking to more fully account for important learning processes and outcomes
in applied settings.
Keywords: Big Five, Personality, Learning processes & outcomes, Traits
INTRODUCTION
Learning can be reflected in changes in an individuals factual, conceptual, procedural,
inter-personal, or meta-cognitive knowledge base (Anderson, et al., 2001) as indicated by
performance, achievement, learning-relevant self perceptions (e.g., academic resilience, self-
Ph: 61-2-9351 2611; Fax: 61-2-9351 5027; paul.ginns@sydney.edu.au

94 Paul Ginns, Gregory Arief D. Liem and Andrew J. Martin
efficacy), and processes that lead to learning. Even more broadly, engagement or
disengagement in learning-related processes or settings (e.g., school or workplace retention;
adherence to an exercise or diet regime) may also be considered valid indicators of learning.
For many years now, researchers and theorists have sought to identify factors relevant to and
predictive of these many learning indices. Although individuals vary across many dimensions
associated with the process of learning, including prior knowledge and general mental ability
(Jonassen & Grabowski, 1993), over the past three decades some consensus has emerged
regarding the role of personality factors and the specific facets that comprise them.
In this chapter, we review the Big Five Model (McCrae & Costa, 1997) and consider how
the Big Five factors relate to learning processes and outcomes (as defined above) across
applied settings in education, work, and physical activity/exercise. Because of the voluminous
research literature regarding personality in applied settings, we emphasise integrative meta-
analytic findings to describe these relationships. In particular, we focus on the constructs of
Conscientiousness and Neuroticism (and their component facets), as these constructs appear
to play the clearest role across the applied settings examined. Following consideration of
evidence for the relations between particular personality traits and learning processes and
outcomes, we consider the relative utility of interventions targeted at changing broad
personality traits (e.g., Conscientiousness) and those seeking to target related behavioural
indicators or processes (e.g., goal-setting, self-control). Lastly, we consider a more recently
proposed six-factor model (HEXACO; Ashton & Lee, 2007) that contends an additional
factor, Honesty/Humility, which may also impact on a variety of learning processes and
outcomes in the settings considered here.
THE BIG FIVE MODEL

The Big Five Model (McCrae & Costa, 1997) posits that five broad personality factors
Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism
underlie most of the personality trait descriptors present in any given consideration of the
issue. McCrae and Costa note that such traits are abstractions which researchers and theorists
infer from observing patterns of behaviour, rather than being directly measurable. These traits
may be summarised as follows:
Openness to Experience. This trait captures preferences for novelty and complexity
versus conventionality in an individuals intellectual life. It is captured in descriptors
such as creative, intellectual, and complex, versus direct, practical, and
pragmatic.
Conscientiousness. This trait captures the urge to accomplish goals, and is characterised
by the extent of an individuals carefulness, planning, and self-discipline. It is
captured in descriptors such as organised, systematic, and neat, as compared to
disorganised, inefficient, and untidy.
Extraversion. This trait describes the extent to which an individual is interested in people
and events in the external world, as opposed to preferring ones own company and
being more focused on ones own inner life. Commonly used descriptors of
The Role of Personality in Learning Processes and Learning Outcomes 95
extraverts are outgoing, energetic and talkative, compared to introverts as

shy, reserved, or quiet.
Agreeableness. This trait captures the degree to which someone feels a need to be part of
a larger community, and focuses strongly on interpersonal relationships. It is
captured in descriptors such as sympathetic, warm, and cooperative, as
compared to inconsiderate, harsh, and rude.
Neuroticism. This trait (also referred to as Emotional Stability) describes the character of
commonly felt emotions in an individuals life. Individuals scoring highly on this
trait are typically described as anxious, tense, and moody, while more
emotionally stable individuals are often described as calm, poised, and
unenvious.
As indicated above, of these five personality traits, Conscientiousness and Neuroticism

hold particular appeal in relation to learning in school, work, and physical activity/exercise.
Discussing these traits in relation to work performance, for example, Barrick, Mount, and
Judge (2001) argue that it is hard to conceive of a job where it is beneficial to be careless,
irresponsible, lazy, impulsive, and low in achievement striving (low conscie-
ntiousness)similarly, being anxious, hostile, personally insecure and depressed (low
emotional stability) is unlikely to lead to high performance in any job (p. 11). Given that
success in work and learning settings requires sustained, focused effort closely aligned with
Conscientiousness and Neuroticism, we argue that these factors can be expected to hold
important explanatory power across a variety of learning settings. Indeed, we review evidence
for this assertion below.
PERSONALITY AND LEARNING IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Poropat (2009) used meta-analysis to determine average correlations between Big Five
dimensions and academic achievement. Primary studies included eight studies from primary
education settings, 24 from secondary settings, and 75 from tertiary settings. Poropat found
that the sample-weighted meta-analytic correlations, corrected for reliability, varied
substantially by academic level for all dimensions except Conscientiousness. These results are
summarised in Table 1.
Table 1. Meta-analytic correlations of Big Five personality variables with academic

achievement (Poropat, 2009)
Academic Openness to Conscientious- Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism

Level Experience ness
Primary .24 .28 .18 .30 .20
Secondary .12 .21 -.03 .05 .01
Tertiary .07 .23 -.01 .05 -.01
Total .12 .24 .00 .07 .02
sample
The above results indicate, with the exception of Conscientiousness, that the relations
between Big Five personality dimensions and academic achievement diminish with academic
level, often to negligible amounts. In contrast, the magnitude of the relationship between
Conscientiousness and academic achievement remained relatively stable across academic
levels. In reviewing these results, Poropat noted that the increasing variability in curriculum
as students progress through academic levels, and suggested that this factor might cloud the
relationship between overall correlations between personality and achievement. More fine-
grained matching of specific personality dimensions and their facets with specific academic
criteria, including changes over time, may therefore be warranted. We explore several such
relationships below using contemporary studies.
Lievens, Ones, and Dilchert (2009) investigated the extent to which the criterion-related
validities of Big Five personality scales change over the course of study at university/college
(in this case, in medicine). They noted that earlier subjects in medical education tended to
focus on declarative and procedural knowledge acquisition, whereas later subjects
emphasised application and internship performance, with a particular reliance on
interpersonal interactions. Given these changes in emphasis, they hypothesised that the
pattern of predictive validities might change over time. Using the entire 1997 cohort of
students enrolled in Belgian medical degrees, over a seven-year time-frame, Lievens et al.
found the validity of Conscientiousness increased from .18 to .45; the validity of Extraversion
changed from -.11 to .31; and the validity of Openness changed from .02 to .30. While the
above results for Conscientiousness are consistent with Poropats (2009) meta-analysis for
tertiary education settings, the results for Extraversion and Openness stand in marked
contrast. This set of results, while again highlighting the predominant role of
Conscientiousness, raises the potential that additional personality traits should be considered
in professional education when the focus of skills under development changes over time.
NEUROTICISM AND ANXIETY IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

As noted earlier, each of the Big Five traits is comprised of a number of facets which may
be more or less predictive of particular learning outcomes and indicators Anxiety is an
example of a specific facet of the Neuroticism dimension with clearly demonstrated
implications for student learning. In educational settings, many students experience test
anxiety, a combination of cognitive and physical responses that are aroused in testing
situations or in similar situations in which a person believes that he or she is being personally
evaluated (Cizek & Burg, 2006, p. 1). A large body of research has identified a range of
negative effects of (test) Anxiety on learning processes and outcomes, including diminished
effort during tests, negative self-evaluations, inappropriate test behaviours, reduced
motivation for learning, and leaving school (Cizek & Burg, 2006; Hembree, 1988).
More recent research has examined the relations of Anxiety to emerging educational
constructs such as academic resilience and academic buoyancy, two other factors embedded
in the learning process (Martin & Marsh, 2006, 2008). Martin and Marsh (2008) define
academic buoyancy as students ability to successfully deal with academic setbacks and
challenges that are typical of the ordinary course of school life (e.g., poor grades, competing
deadlines, exam pressure, difficult schoolwork) (p. 53). In an initial investigation of the
construct, Martin and Marsh (2006) used a construct validation approach to examine
hypothesised adaptive and maladaptive predictors of this construct, and educationally salient
outcomes such as school enjoyment, class participation, and general self-esteem. Self-
efficacy, control, planning, low anxiety, and persistence were found to predict academic
resilience, with Anxiety (e.g., When exams and assignments are coming up, I worry a lot)
being the strongest negative predictor (r = -.66; partial r = -.60). Martin and Marsh (2008)
used longitudinal modelling to examine the causal salience of the predictors described above
at Time 2, holding the effects of these predictors and academic buoyancy as measured at
Time 1 constant. Consistent with the results of Martin and Marsh (2006), by far the most
important predictor of buoyancy at Time 2 was Anxiety, with this variable largely mediating
the observed gender difference in buoyancy. Taken together, these findings underscored the
salience of facets within Neuroticism (in this case, Anxiety) on the academic learning
landscape.
PERSONALITY AND LEARNING IN WORK SETTINGS

Whereas mass education (e.g., compulsory attendance of school until at least the age of
15) is a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of human development, workplaces have
been a much more longstanding feature of human endeavour. As knowledge, skills and
attitudes can provide competitive advantage for organisations, workplace and organisational
psychologists have sought to identify individual differences, including personality variables
that predict how easily these knowledge, skills, and attitudes might be developed.
Colquitt, LePine, and Noe (2000) used meta-analytic path modelling to review the
research literature on training motivation, its personological and situational antecedents, and
the relationship of these variables with learning outcomes. Personality variables including
Conscientiousness and Anxiety (as discussed above, a facet of Neuroticism) were examined
for their relations to hypothesised intervening mechanisms (e.g., pre-training self-efficacy; the
valence of training outcomes; or job/career variables such as job involvement) as well as
motivation to learn, learning outcomes (e.g., declarative knowledge, skill acquisition, post-
training self-efficacy), post-training transfer, and job performance. Hierarchical meta-analytic
path analyses, holding antecedent variables constant, revealed variable relationships between
personality factors and learning processes and outcomes. Anxiety, but not Conscientiousness,
was related to motivation to learn. Across the learning outcomes, Conscientiousness was
related to declarative knowledge development, skill acquisition, post-training self-efficacy,
and training reactions, while Anxiety was related to declarative knowledge development, skill
acquisition, and post-training self-efficacy, but not training reactions. Conscientiousness and
Anxiety were also related to training transfer back to the workplace, and ultimately to job
performance. Consistent with the results for educational settings described above, these
results support arguments for the importance of personality (viz. Conscientiousness and
Anxiety) in understanding learning at work.
While the above meta-analytic results will be applicable across many organisational
settings, idiosyncrasies of particular jobs and/or workplaces may mean other personality traits
are also important in some settings. For example, Campbell, Castaneda, and Pulos (2010)
performed a meta-analysis of studies using Big Five personality measures to predict military
aviation training success. The meta-analysis focused on measures of Big Five constructs
(Neuroticism and Extroversion) and component facets (Anxiety). The strongest corrected
correlation with training success was for Neuroticism (r = -.25), then Extroversion (r = .17),
then Anxiety (-.14). Of particular note for these authors was the similarity in predictive
validity of Neuroticism and Anxiety, leading them to conclude that anxiety might be the key
facet accounting for the observed association between Neuroticism and training performance.
PERSONALITY AND LEARNING IN PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND EXERCISE

The bulk of research relating personality to physical behaviour and performance has
focused on whether, for example, athletes differ from non-athletes, or elite versus non-elite
athletes, on key constructs such as Extraversion, Neuroticism, or Tough-mindedness (e.g.,
Clough, Earle, & Sewell, 2002; Piedmont, Hill, & Blanco, 1999). An additional and relatively
understudied line of research has focused on associations between personality factors and
physical activity and exercise (e.g., Van den Auweele, De Cuyper, Van Mele, and Rzewnicki,
1993). Physical activity and exercise are a foundation for healthy lifestyles, physical health,
and psychological wellbeing (Martin et al., in press). A compelling question, then, is the
connection between personality and learning processes, indicators or outcomes in the physical
activity and exercise domain.
In relation to physical activity, Rhodes and Smiths (2006) meta-analysis suggested that
individuals higher in Extraversion (r =.23) and Conscientiousness (r = .20) and lower in
Neuroticism (r = -.11) were more likely to engage in a physically active lifestyle. Conducting
a meta-analysis of the links between Conscientiousness and health-related behaviours, Bogg
and Roberts (2004) found that Conscientiousness was a positive correlate of physical activity
and a negative correlate of risky health-related behaviours such as unhealthy eating. Among
Conscientiousness facets, Industriousness and Traditionalism were the strongest predictors of
physical activity and unhealthy eating. Interestingly, some of these findings were moderated
by age such that, for example, Conscientiousness significantly predicted physical activity for
younger participants (< 30 years), but not so much for older ones (> 30 years). Thus,
consistent with findings in relation to learning indicators in education and work, learning
indicators and outcomes in the physical domain (e.g., activity levels, diet adherence) are
associated with Conscientiousness.
More recent research has centered on social cognitive factors, such as motivational
beliefs, in mediating and moderating the links between personality traits and health-related
processes and outcomes. For example, Hoyts, Rhodes, Hausenblas, and Giacobbi (2009)
showed that activity and self-discipline (facets of Extraversion and Conscientiousness,
respectively) were significant positive predictors of affective and instrumental aspects of
attitudes towards exercise and perceived behavioural control in exercising. Interestingly,
Hoyts et al. found a moderating effect suggesting that the relationship between exercise-
related intention and behaviour was stronger for less anxious individuals. In another study,
Bogg, Voss, Wood, and Roberts (2008) investigated the associations between values,
personal goals, personality traits and health-related behaviours and outcomes. The results
showed that, over and above the independent effects of values and personal goals, domain-
general Extraversion predicted domain-specific physical activity Extraversion which in turn
predicted physical fitness. Taken together, these findings demonstrated that Extraversion and
Conscientiousness are directly or indirectly predictive of learning outcomes and indicators in
the physical activity and exercise domain.
PERSONALITY AND LEARNING: FOCI FOR INTERVENTIONS

The associations described above between personality constructs and learning
indicators/outcomes across applied settings raise questions about where interventions should
be focused. One such question relates to whether it is meaningful and/or desirable to aim to
change an individuals personality in order to improve learning processes and outcomes, or
whether the focus should be placed on (for instance) developing skills for better test anxiety
management (cf. Neuroticism) or goal setting (cf. Conscientiousness).
While there is substantial evidence for the relative stability of personality over time (e.g.,
Costa & McCrae, 1992), there is also evidence that intensive psychotherapy may modify
personality traits. To the extent that this is the case, such interventions can also impact upon
learning outcomes and indicators influenced by the relevant personality trait. Jorm (1989), for
example, meta-analysed 63 studies comparing psychotherapy groups with no-treatment
controls, where measures of trait Anxiety or Neuroticism were used as a dependent variable.
Therapies included psychotherapies (e.g., rational-emotive therapy, group counselling) and
skills-based therapies (e.g., muscular relaxation, study skills training). The mean effect across
all types of therapy was moderate (d = 0.52), with rational-emotive therapy in particular
producing a substantially larger mean effect (d = 1.25).
Based on these results, then, it is clearly possible for shifts in traits to take place. At the
same time, however, the resource-intensiveness of psychotherapy may preclude its use in
many applied settings. In such cases, it may be more realistic to focus on developing specific
skills which can be embedded in applied settings (e.g., Hembree, 1988). Similarly, rather than
changing the trait of Conscientiousness per se, educators may help students set realistic,
achievable goals (Locke & Latham, 2006) that are cognitive-behavioural facets of
Conscientiousness. Hence, this is a strategy which addresses a variety of cognitive-
behavioural indicators of Conscientiousness (e.g., planning, organisation), and which has
been demonstrated to enhance learning across diverse applied settings. For a recent example
from tertiary education, see Morisano, Hirsh, Peterson, Pihl, and Shore (2010).
PERSONALITY AND LEARNING IN APPLIED SETTINGS:

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
Recently, a competing model to the Big Five has emerged. The HEXACO Model
developed out of lexical studies of personality structure, which found a six-factor rather than
five-factor space was replicated across a variety of Indo-European and non-European
languages (for a review of this research, see Ashton & Lee, 2007). While the above Big Five
constructs still emerged with varying levels of clarity in these studies, an additional factor,
termed Honesty/Humility, was also found. This dimension is captured by terms such as
sincere, honest, modest, and fair-minded versus sly, greedy, pretentious, and hypocritical, and
appears to capture moral conscience (Marcus, Lee, & Ashton, 2007, p. 4).
To date, very few studies have examined the relations of Honesty/Humility to learning
processes and outcomes, but the nature of the construct suggests an explanatory role in
academic misconduct that represents maladaptive orientations to the learning process. Marcus
et al. (2007), for example, examined relations between measures of integrity, the HEXACO
dimensions, and self-reports of counter-productive academic behaviours (e.g., cheating, low
personal standards, duplicity, and misrepresentation) by German and Canadian university
students. Using hierarchical multiple regression, they found Honesty/Humility self-reports
predicted additional variance in counter-productive behaviours over and above demographic
variables, self-reports of integrity, and Big Five constructs. Future research on cheating in
academic settings may benefit from simultaneous considerations of personological and
situational factors, in order to determine their relative salience.
CONCLUSION
Advances in research and theorising regarding the key dimensions of personality over the
past three decades have provided a better understanding of the dynamics of learning in
applied settings. In particular, major meta-analytic reviews of the educational and
organisational training research literatures have concluded that conscientious learners are
more likely to engage in and succeed at learning. In contrast, students with higher levels of
Anxiety (a facet of the broad personality factor of Neuroticism) will face greater learning
challenges than less anxious students. While the research literature on learning in physical
activity and exercise contexts is not as comprehensive as that conducted in the other two
settings, similar conclusions can be reached if learning indicators such as physical activity,
physical fitness, and healthy eating are considered. Across all three applied domains, the
impact of Honesty/Humility on learning processes and outcomes is currently poorly
understood, but we contend its role in maladaptive learning-related behaviours is likely to be
considerable and deserving of further study. Taken together, the findings hold substantive and
methodological implications for researchers studying issues relevant to personality and
learning in diverse applied settings, and are also relevant to practitioners seeking to enhance
learning outcomes that rely in large part on core personality traits and their component facets.
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American Psychologist, 52, 509-516.
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Chapter 9
SOMETHING ABOUT METACOGNITION:

SELF-CONFIDENCE FACTOR(S) IN
SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN
Sabina Kleitman, Karina Mak, Sarah Young,

Phoebe Lau, and David Livesey
ABSTRACT
Prior research into the area of metacognition has demonstrated evidence of the stable
and reliable construct of self-confidence in adult populations. However, few studies have
demonstrated evidence of this construct among children. The current chapter discusses
the results of several studies which examine the self-confidence construct in primary
school children aged 9-12, across several cognitive and physical tasks. The results from
these studies demonstrated that there are stable individual differences in confidence
ratings. However, there was a clear domain separation for cognitive and physical
domains, as two Self-confidence factors were apparent in children. We also examined
parental perceptions of their childs metacognition and parental confidence ratings. The
results suggest that there might be an interesting difference in the strength of the
relationship between the child's level of confidence and each of paternal and maternal
levels of self confidence. Overall, these results have significant theoretical and practical
implications, and provide directions for future research.
Keywords: Decision-making, Individual differences, Metacognition, Self-confidence, Self-

regulated learning
Ph: 61-2-9351 7701; Fax: 61-2-9351 2603; sabinak@psych.usyd.edu.au

104 Sabina Kleitman, Karina Mak, Sarah Young et al.
INTRODUCTION
Metacognition refers to the executive processes involved in reflecting on ones own
thinking: that is, thinking about thinking (Flavell, 1979) or knowing about knowing
(Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994). Most theories distinguish between two major components of
metacognitionknowledge about cognition and regulation of cognitionthe latter consisting
of monitoring and control of cognition (Nelson & Narens, 1994; Schraw & Dennison, 1994).
Monitoring of cognition, the focus of this chapter, is defined as the ability to watch, check
and appraise the quality of ones own cognitive work in the course of doing it (Schraw &
Moshman, 1995). Confidence judgments reflect these instances by deliberately evoking
subjective feelings of certainty that one experiences in connection with decision-making and
action-regulation (Allwood & Granhag, 1999; Stankov, 1999). Understanding the factorial
structure underlying confidence judgments across cognitive and non-cognitive domains could
provide a powerful window into the taxonomy of metacognitive processes.
This chapter provides a broad literature review based on the studies conducted by our
Individual Differences laboratory and aims to answer three novel questions: (1) Do primary-
school children display habitual general levels of self-confidence within test and across
different cognitive domains? (2) Do these levels generalise across cognitive and physical
domains? and; (3) What are the relationships between a childs levels of self-confidence with
those of his/her parents?
SELF-CONFIDENCE AS AN ASPECT OF
METACOGNITIVE SELF-MONITORING
This work relies on a definition that captures the main purpose of self-monitoringthe
ability to judge the quality of ones own performance in the course of doing it. In such an
instance, immediately after responding to an item in a test, participants are instructed to give a
confidence (or sureness) rating indicating how confident/sure he or she is that their chosen
answer is the correct one. The level of confidence is expressed in terms of percentages and/or
verbal statements. The starting point (the lowest confidence) on a rating scale is defined in
terms of the number of alternative answers (k) given to a question (100/k). That is, in
multiple-choice questions with five alternative answers, 20% is a starting point because 20%
is the probability of answering the question correctly by chance.
Allwood and colleagues (2006) piloted different types of confidence scales with children
aged 11 and 12 years. There were no differences between these scales in calculated
calibration indices or in levels of confidence, suggesting equivalence in their ability to capture
confidence levels and the adequacy of this procedure with children of this age group.
Subsequently, Allwood and co-workers (Allwood, Innes-Ker, Homgren, & Fredin, 2008)
demonstrated that children as young as 89 years show comprehension of these scales. The
studies overviewed in this chapter use two such scales (pictorial and line) (see Figures 1.1 and
1.2).
Something about Metacognition 105
Figure 1.1. Pictorial confidence rating scale used for the four-choice multiple-choice achievement tests
items (Kleitman & Moscrop, 2010).
How sure are you that this answer is right?
Absolutely unsure 20% Absolutely sure100%
Figure 1.2. Line confidence rating scale (Allwood, et al., 2006).
The confidence rating procedure follows the cognitive act of providing a response to a
typical cognitive test item, rather than relying on a general perception of ones own way of
acting. Thus, it serves as a more accurate measure of self-confidence than the self-report
items such as I feel self-assured and Im self-confident (Stankov, 1999; Kleitman, 2008).
Interestingly, studies conducted on adults indicate limited or no relationships between
confidence levels and personality factors which include these types of self-report questions
(e.g., Extroversion). The only exception to this is the Openness to Experience dimension
which shares a positive correlation of low to moderate size (rarely above .30) (see, Kleitman,
2008 for a review).
There are numerous findings in relation to confidence judgments in the adult population
(see Kleitman, 2008; Stankov, 1999 for reviews). Confidence judgments have high internal
consistency in adults (reliability estimates are typically higher than .90) (e.g. Kleitman, 2008;
Stankov, 1999) and robust testretest estimates (Jonsson & Allwood, 2003). There is
overwhelming empirical evidence showing individual differences in confidence ratings in
adult populations (Kleitman, 2008; Stankov, 1999). The correlations between accuracy and
confidence scores from the same test are significant (average between .40 and .50).
Nevertheless, correlations between confidence ratings from a broad battery of cognitive tests
(reflecting diverse cognitive abilities) have been consistently high enough to define a strong
broad Self-confidence factor which reflects the habitual way in which adults assess the
accuracy of their cognitive decisions. That is, adults who are more confident on one task,
relative to their peers, also tend to be more confident across other tasks.
Three studies conducted by our laboratory stemmed from psychological and educational
traditions, using the individual differences approach to examine these findings in respect to
primary-school children (aged 9-12). In this chapter, we review the results of these studies.
OUR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Self-confidence Traits in Children
The studies conducted in our laboratory employed a variety of cognitive and achievement
tests with confidence ratings: Ravens Progressive Matrices (RPM; Raven, Raven, & Court,
1998); Mathematics, Vocabulary and Reading achievement tests (PAT, Australian Council
for Educational Research, 2001; 2005); and those based on a school curriculum (see Kleitman
& Moscrop, 2010). Results in all studies clearly indicated that reliability estimates for
confidence ratings within each test were uniformly high, ranging between .84 and .96,
indicating a high level of consistency in confidence assessments within the task.
Employing confirmatory factor analytic techniques, Kleitman and Moscrop (2010)
examined the consistency of confidence judgments across different tests. They demonstrated
that when three cognitive tests with confidence ratings were utilised (Ravens Progressive
Matrices, Vocabulary and Mathematics; N = 197, age ranged from 9 years 1 month to 12
years 11 months), two broad factors were apparent: (1) Cognitive Abilities, defined by the
accuracy scores from the RPM, Vocabulary, and Mathematics tests; and (2) Self-confidence,
exclusively defined by the high loadings of the confidence scores from all three cognitive
tests (see Figure 2).
16.92
Vocabulary
Accuracy
.44
..64
Vocabulary 9.48
Factor 1
Confidence
Accuracy .81
Mathematics
.70 22.17
Accuracy
.56 .61
.69 .97 Mathematics 16.07
Confidence
Factor 2
Confidence Ravens PM 13.77
.63 Accuracy
.16
Ravens PM 8.16
Confidence
Figure 2. Results of the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Kleitman & Moscrop, 2010).
Table 1. Results of the EFA (ML, Promax Rotation), Gibson & Kleitman (2009, N = 178)
Factors
Gc Confidence Gf h2
PAT Reading Confidence .77 .79
PAT Vocabulary Confidence .95 .86
PAT Maths Confidence .45 .75 .80
PAT Reading: Accuracy .73 .61
PAT Vocabulary: Accuracy .78 .77
PAT Maths: Accuracy .80 .71
Gc: Accuracy .59 .68
Gf: Accuracy .63 .54
Factor Inter-correlations
Gc 1 .42 .53
Confidence 1 .41
Gf 1
2
Note: Only factorial loadings above .30 are presented; h =communalities; Gf=Fluid Intelligence;
Gc=Crystallised Intelligence; PAT = Progressive Achievement Test.
Although the majority of the fit indices for this model were within the ranges that signal a
good model fit (2/df = 3.23, GFI = .97, TLI = .92, and CFI = .97), RMSEA and its CI were
greater than the desirable maximum (RMSEA = .11, .05 < 90%CI < .17). This demonstrated
that the model might be problematic when generalised to a different sample. The error terms
for the items within the same test were allowed to correlate. This indicated that in this study
the errors were not random, and were linked to the nature of the test. Thus, given a broad
RMSEA estimate and non-random nature of the error terms (albeit within the same test), a
replication of these results with a broader selection of cognitive tests was needed.
In a subsequent Gibson and Kleitman study (2009) (N = 177; age ranged from 10 years 1
month to 12 years 7 months), confidence ratings were utilised in three standardised
achievement tests (Vocabulary, Reading and Mathematics). The study also utilised separate
markers of Gf and Gc which did not contain confidence ratings. The results indicated a clear
presence of two cognitive ability factorseach defined by the accuracy scores on tests that
are markers of Crystallised Intelligence (Vocabulary, Reading and Gc tasks) and Fluid
abilities (Gf and Mathematics tests) (see Table 1). There was also a separate broad Self-
confidence factor defined solely by confidence ratings from three achievement tests (see
Table 1). Not surprisingly, the two ability factors have positive associations with each other
(.53). The Self-confidence factor, although it shared medium size positive correlations with
two ability factors (.42 with Gc and .41 with Gf), separated clearly from them.
Thus, when measured across different cognitive items, cognitive tests, and knowledge
domains, a cognitive Self-confidence factor emerges to reflect the stability of confidence
judgments within a cognitive domain. This occurs regardless of the diverse nature of test
selection (whether they are markers of Gf, Gc or aptitude tests). However, the question
remained: does this stability generalise to domains other than cognitive test-taking?
How sure are you that you

I know
could do this? I am I am I am not
that I
very sure pretty sure very sure
couldnt
Figure 3. Example of the Perceived Movement Confidence item.
Our most recent study (N=189; age ranged from 10 years 4 months to 13 years) aimed to
bridge this gap and employed different cognitive tasks as well as a measure of confidence in
the physical domain (Mak & Kleitman, 2009). In this study, we employed the Stunt
Movement Confidence Inventory measure (SMCI; Griffin & Keogh, 1982). According to
these authors, evaluating movement confidence involves examining perceived movement
competence (evaluating personal skills and situational demands) and perceived movement
sensation (evaluating expected and preferred movement sensation). Movement confidence is
argued to represent an outcome state of an interactive cycle among three major variables that
constitute movement competence and movement sensation. The three variables are: (1)
competence in performing the task; (2) the potential for harm, and; (3) the potential for
enjoyment in the performing of the task. The SMCI captures five variablesperceived
movement confidence, experience with task, enjoyment, competence and harmin relation to
six movement tasks presented in pictorial format (see Figure 3).
The measure utilises Harters (1982) nonstandard response format when presenting
statements measuring enjoyment, competence and harm variables. Perceived movement
confidence is measured with an item that uses similar language to self-confidence line scales,
as seen in Figure 3. This measure differs from a traditional way of capturing confidence levels
in the cognitive domain (verifiable responses linked to the actual decision-making act) and
relies on a perception of movement competence. Being aware of this limitation, we also
examined the convergence pattern between these perceptions and different self-concept
measures in an attempt to determine their veracity. Moreover, previous research indicates that
by the age of 11, children develop adequate movement competence beliefs. Coote and
Livesey (1999) found that while 6-yr-old children demonstrated optimism bias with regards
to their ability to perform various motor tasks, 11-year-olds estimates of performance
matched their ability. Jacobs, Lanza, Osgood, Eccles and Wigfield (2002) also reported a
decline in childrens sports competence beliefs over this period but also found further
declines into adolescence.
The results indicated that the Cronbachs alpha reliability estimate for Movement
Confidence Perceived was .70, while the reliability coefficient for the Experience with Tasks
was low (alpha = .68) and ranged between .80.86 for the other three SMCI scores. The
results of the Exploratory Factor Analyses were unambiguousthere was a clear separation
in childrens assessment of confidence across physical and cognitive domains (see Table 2).
Table 2. Results of the EFA (ML, Promax Rotation), Mak & Kleitman (2009; N =189)
Factors
1 2 3 4 h2
Movement Competence .88 .81
Movement Confidence Perceived .88 .79
Experience with Task .80 .65
Movement Enjoyment .78 .67
Movement Harm -.75 .61
PAT Vocabulary Confidence .98 .89
PAT Reading Confidence .76 .72
PAT Math Confidence .57 .39 .61
PAT Vocabulary Accuracy .76 .66
MHVS .73 .74
PAT Reading Accuracy .56 .32 .67
PAT Math Accuracy .72 .56
Ravens Progressive Matrices Accuracy .61 .55
Factor Inter-correlations
F1: Physical confidence/competence factor 1 .08 .06 0
F2: Cognitive Self-confidence factor 1 .52 .43
F3: Gc 1 .55
F4: Gf 1
Note: Only factorial loadings above .30 are presented; h2 =communalities; PAT = Progressive
Achievement Test; MHVS = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scales; Gc = Crystallised Intelligence; Gf =
Fluid Intelligence.
That is, perceived movement confidence loaded together with the assessments of
movement competence, experience with the tasks, movement enjoyment and harm (with a
negative loading), defining a physical confidence/competence factor (Factor 1). Confidence
ratings from cognitive tests defined a separate general cognitive Self-confidence factor
(Factor 2). Consistent with the previous studies, accuracy scores from the cognitive tests
defined two ability factorsGc (Factor 3, defined by accuracy scores of the Vocabulary,
Reading and Mill-Hill Vocabulary tests and Gf (Factor 4, defined by the accuracy scores of
the Ravens Progressive Matrices and Mathematics tests).
Both confidence factors were predicted by the relevant self-concept measures and out-of-
school activities: while the cognitive Self-confidence factor was predicted by
academic/metacognitive self-concepts, the physical Self-confidence/competence factor was
predicted by physical self-concept. These findings suggest that confidence ratings from each
domain have meaningful relationships with beliefs that are relevant for each domain. Thus, it
demonstrates the veracity of a cognitive and physical split of confidence/competence
assessment, likely to be based on the domain of test-taking activities rather than a method of
assessment (verifiable performance for the cognitive domain and self-reports for the physical
domain).
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENTS AND CHILDRENS

METACOGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS, SELF-CONFIDENCE AND ACCURACY
We also examined parental perceptions of their childs metacognition and parental
confidence ratings (189 children, 57 mothers and 23 fathers). This study is the first to attempt
to link child and parental levels of self-confidence (Lau & Kleitman, 2009). Parents were
asked to complete the Esoteric Analogies Test (EA; Stankov, 1997) which included
confidence ratings. In this cognitive test, each item contains a pair of words in a particular
relationship, and a third word with its pair word missing. Parents were required to identify a
logical relationship between the third word and one of four multiple choice words to complete
the second pair. For example, CHICK is to HEN as CALF is to: 1. BULL, 2. COW, 3.
COAT, 4. ELEPHANT (answer = COW). Parents and children also completed the
Metacognition Rating Scale adapted from the Teacher Rating Scale (Sperling, Howard,
Miller & Murphy, 2002). This scale, originally designed to measure teachers perceptions of
their students level of metacognition, was modified in three ways: (1) to provide a more user-
friendly layout; (2) to gauge parents (instead of teachers) awareness of their childs
metacognition, and; (3) to capture the childs own perception of his/her metacognition. Five
items asked what the parent thinks of the childs attention, study planning/learning strategies
and performance monitoring accuracy using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1=Never,
to 5=Always. Table 3 summarises the Pearson zero-order correlations between: (1) parental
confidence levels, and; (2) parental perceptions of childs metacognition (for both mother and
father separately) with the relevant childs variables.
The most salient correlations between parents and childrens metacognitive perceptions,
self-confidence and accuracy will be reviewed here. Childs rating of their own metacognition
correlated positively with their levels of confidence and their accuracy of performance on
standardised achievement tests (r = .43. p < .05, n = 189; r = .26. p < .05, n = 181). This
suggests that ones own perception of competency of metacognitive skills predicted higher
levels of childs performance and relevant confidence levels, and that the strength of these
relationships was somewhat stronger for confidence than for accuracy scores. There were also
positive correlations between childrens rating of their own metacognitive abilities and
mothers and fathers perception of their childs metacognitive abilities (r = .27, p < .05, n =
57; and r = .23, p > .05, n = 23 respectively). While the sizes of these correlation coefficients
were similar, the coefficient for fathers did not reach statistical significance. However, this
might be due to a limited sample size of fathers who volunteered to take part in this study (23
fathers compared to 57 mothers). Confidence scores for mothers and fathers shared
significant positive correlations (r = .52, p < .05, n =15). The correlation between the
accuracy scores was also positive, although it did not reach statistical significance (r = .24, p
> .05, n = 15). Childrens accuracy scores were meaningfully but not significantly correlated
with parents accuracy scores (r = .23, p > .05, n = 57 and r = .34, n = 23, p > .05). The most
intriguing finding, however, was a pattern of correlations between childs and parents
confidence levels: a childs confidence correlated highly and positively with fathers, but not
mothers levels of confidence (r = .42, p < .05, n = 23 and r = .03, |p > .05, n = 59
respectively).
Table 3. Pearson Zero-Order Correlations Between Parents & Childrens

Metacognitive Perceptions, Self-confidence & Accuracy Scores (Lau & Kleitman, 2009;
N =1 89)
MRT Rating
Confidence
Confidence
confidence
Childrens
Childrens
Accuracy
Accuracy
Mothers
Mothers
Mothers
Fathers
Fathers
Fathers
Rating
Rating
MRT
MRT
EAT
EAT
EAT
EAT
EAT
MRS: Fathers r .83** 1
Rating n 19 23
MRS: r .27 *
.23 1
Childrens
Rating n 57 23 189
MRS:Mothers r .04 .35 .16 1

Confidence n 55 19 19 57
*
Fathers EAT r .46 .15 .29 .52** 1
confidence n 19 23 23 19 23
Childrens r -.03 .34 .43 **
.03 .42* 1
EAT
Confidence n 57 23 189 57 23 189
*
Mothers EAT r -.19 .08 .07 .39 .388 .32* 1
Accuracy n 57 19 59 57 19 59 59
**
Fathers EAT r .23 .13 .24 .130 .59 .36 .24 1
Accuracy n 19 23 23 19 23 23 19 23
Childrens r .22 .33 .26 **
-.13 .26 .57 **
.23 .34
EAT
Accuracy n 57 23 181 57 23 189 59 23
MRS = Metacognition Rating Scale, EAT = Esoteric Analogies Test; n = number of available
responses; r = zero-order Pearson correlation coefficient.
DISCUSSION
Metacognition is one of the three fundamentals of self-regulated learning, along with
cognition and motivation (Schraw et al., 2006). Efficient test-taking behaviour and test-taking
outcomes signify academic success. Moreover, the metacognitive confidence judgments
which students assign to their on-going performance are at the core of this test-taking
behaviour. The studies overviewed in this chapter were the first to examine the existence of
the Self-confidence trait in primary school children. We identified the existence of a habitual
response pattern of confidence levels, or a trait, which is stable across different cognitive
tasks and across movement competence reports, but not across both domains. We were also
the first to attempt relating a childs self-confidence with the confidence levels of parents.
Taken together, our results allow us to draw conclusions as to whether confidence judgments
are task or domain-specific in middle childhood. The results support the domain-specific
stability of the cognitive Self-confidence factor, and its independence from the physical
confidence/competence factor. Thus, within a relative domain, self-confidence exists as a
stable and identifiable metacognitive factor in children as young as 9-13 years of age, just as
it does in adults. Within each domain, but especially cognitive, confidence scores exhibited
high reliability coefficients, suggesting their stability within tasks and across the tasks within
the same domain. These novel findings signify that self-confidence is a stable and domain-
specific component of a childs thinking repertoire in primary school. Thus, these three
studies provide a foundation for describing developmental theories of the self-confidence
trait.
Our most recent study was also the first to examine the relationships between parental
evaluation of their childs metacognitive abilities and parental levels of self-confidence, and
those constructs of their child. Although the sample sizes are small, an interesting pattern
emerged. Parental perception of their childs metacognitive abilities had a similar strength of
positive relationship with the childs cognitive and metacognitive performance (positive,
similar low size correlations, albeit statistically significant for mothers but not for fathersa
likely result of a smaller sample size of fathers). However, there seems to be an intriguing
difference in the strength of the relationships between maternal and paternal levels of
confidence and those of a child: moderately strong for fathers and non-existent for mothers.
Although further replications with larger sample sizes are required, this study is the first to
examine such relationships and this finding is not trivial as it suggests possible different
learning roots of self-confidence within a family. Given the obvious limitations of this study,
no conclusions could be offered, but this study provides a new direction for future studies into
the origins of confidence levels.
The results overviewed in this chapter may also assist with improved metacognitive
development. For example, knowledge that a child as young as nine is already habitually
assessing their own thinking is a crucial and powerful tool, one which can undoubtedly assist
parents, teachers, school counsellors and child psychologists to foster self-regulated learning
(see Schraw et al., 2006 for a review). Investment in the development of students
metacognitive skills could assist in improving performance in academic areas. Moreover, to
foster accuracy of performance, many teachers repeatedly tell children to check their work.
The use of a confidence rating technique (as part of regular in-class practices), could make
these teaching practices more efficient. Teachers can also use self-monitoring measures as
informal assessment to determine students level of understanding in specific Key Learning
Areasfor example, Literacy and Numeracy. In addition, teachers and school counsellors
often meet with parents to provide them with strategies they can use to assist their children
who struggle with learning. In such meetings, parents understanding of their childrens
metacognitive skills should be promoted to empower parents involvement in their childrens
cognitive and physical development.
Furthermore, academic performance is only one part of a childs development. With a
significant rise in obesity problems, children would undoubtedly benefit from the process of
healthy self-reflection within the physical domain, which seems to clearly separate from the
cognitive domain. Findings such as those by Wigfield, Eccles, Yoon, Harold, Arbreton, and
Blumenfeld (1997) and Jacobs et al. (2002) indicate that changes in self-perceptions of
competence are related to changes in value for an activity over time and that this is likely to
affect participation in the activity. This is a particular problem that has been noted in children
with movement difficulties (Henderson, 1993; Piek, Baynam & Barrett, 2006). Children with
movement difficulties avoid situations in which these are displayed, hence missing
opportunities to practice and develop such skills, thus exacerbating the problem.
CONCLUSION
The exploratory nature of our studies limits the scope of conclusions drawn. A
longitudinal research design with larger sample sizes and with a greater control for
background factors and common causes (e.g., pre-school levels of cognitive and
metacognitive development, previous achievement) could greatly assist in determining
developmental trajectories of the Self-confidence traits. It could also suggest the age at which
they become both habitual within a domain and also domain-specific. Within such studies,
parental metacognitive variables should also be assessed to determine possible links between
parental levels of confidence and those of their child. Future research would also benefit from
a larger selection of variables to mark each construct. Finally, future studies should utilise the
same method of assessment of confidence in cognitive and physical domains, the method
which allows for the immediate verification of the veracity of confidence ratings.
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451-469.
PART B: CULTURE, RELIGION, AND SPIRITUALITY
Chapter 10
SPIRITUAL-HYPNOSIS ASSISTED THERAPY:

A NEW CULTURALLY SENSITIVE APPROACH
TO THE TREATMENT AND PREVENTION
OF MENTAL DISORDERS
Luh Ketut Suryani

Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine
Udayana University, Denpasar, Bali 80114, Indonesia
The Suryani Institute for Mental Health, Denpasar, Bali 80237, Indonesia
ABSTRACT
The chapter describes the therapeutic approach of Spiritual-Hypnosis Assisted
Therapy (SHAT), originally developed in Bali, Indonesia, and its applications to
treatment, intervention, and prevention of mental illness among individuals, groups, and
communities. A background of the Balinese culture and religion is also presented to show
how it was integral to the development of the method. SHAT is being extensively and
successfully used in clinical practice in Bali for over a decade now and for a variety of
mental disorders, emotional distress (specifically grief and bereavement), sexual,
relational, and sexual orientation problems, and PTSD.
Keywords: Cultural psychology, Mental health, Personality change, Spiritual hypnosis

assisted therapy
Ph: 62-361-462306; Fax: 62-361-462878; suryani@suryani-institute.com. Originally published as: Lesmana,

C.B.J., Suryani, L.K., Tiliopoulos, N, & Jensen, G.D. (2010). Spiritual-Hypnosis Assisted Therapy (SHAT): A
new culturally sensitive approach to the treatment and prevention of mental disorders. Journal of Spirituality in
Mental Health, 12(3), DOI: 10.1080/19349637.2010.498696. Reproduced & adapted with permission.
120 Luh Ketut Suryani
INTRODUCTION
Throughout life one faces many problems. Some people can handle most of them well,
while others find it difficult to cope successfully. Experiencing and dealing with problems
may make one a stronger individual, or in certain cases may negatively influence thought,
behaviour, and emotions and potentially result in mental illness. Although the unconscious
mind always tries to resolve these problems, the individual may still be unhappy and out of
balance, albeit still psychologically functional. Problems can have genetic, organic,
experiential, psychological, or a combination of these causes.
Past traumas can act as pathological triggers, resulting in the above causes entering
dysfunctional or psychopathological states (Bolton et al., 2004). Should one follow the
current psychobiological evidence-based approaches (e.g., Canli, 2006; Zuckerman, 2005),
one would, arguably, conclude that psychology, and in particular personality, begins
developing through proto-experiences in the womb, as soon as the foetal nervous system is
formed through the process of neurolation. These proto-experiences influence and shape the
biological foundations of thought, emotion, feeling, behaviour, response to stimulation, and
adaptation to new situations. Should these proto-experiences be traumatic, they will
contribute to the dysfunctional dispositions of the psychobiological systems, and
subsequently increase the individuals vulnerability to stress and their ability to successfully
cope with problems later in life.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce, describe, and discuss the therapeutic approach
of Spiritual-Hypnosis Assisted Therapy (SHAT), developed in Bali, Indonesia. The approach
focuses on memory and the unconscious mind, and considers the effects of proto-experiences
on the (dys)functional psychological development of the individual. It utilises spiritual,
psychodynamic (in particular clinical hypnosis), CBT, and humanistic therapeutic elements. I
propose SHAT as a new, alternative, and both culturally and spiritually sensitive method of
treatment and prevention of mental health problems. A background of the Balinese culture,
spiritual beliefs, and religion is also presented, to assist with fully understanding the origins
and development of the approach.
BALINESE HINDUISM
The island of Bali is geographically located about 8 degrees south of the equator and
about 18 degrees north of the western end of Australia. Bali is a small island (5633 square
kilometres), one of 13,000 islands that make up the archipelago of Indonesia, the fourth
largest nation in the world (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2007a). The total Indonesian population of
approximately 220 million is mostly Muslim. Most of the 3.2 million inhabitants of Bali are
Hindu (83%), and they constitute less than 2% of the total population of Indonesia (Badan
Pusat Statistik, 2007b).
The Balinese Hindu religion is unique. It has its roots in India, but was developed largely
in Java. It has been influenced by Buddhism, by the aboriginal Balinese culture, and by
Balinese pre-Hindu animistic and ancestral cults (Jensen & Suryani, 1992). Furthermore, its
relatively isolated naturebeing practised almost exclusively on the island of Balimakes it
a unique sect, having both function and content that at times largely deviate from mainstream
Spiritual-Hypnosis Assisted Therapy 121
Hinduism in fact, it is this cultural uniqueness of the Balinese society, combined with its
relativistic/collective structure, that has made it the focus of major anthropological and
sociological research (e.g., Bateson & Mead, 1942; Edge, 1996; Geertz, 1973; Suryani &
Jensen, 1993).
CENTRAL CONCEPTS IN THE BALINESE RELIGION

Panca Srada, the five principal beliefs, and Tri Hita Karana, the concept of harmony and
balance, infuse all aspects of the Balinese daily life: (1) The principle of one Supreme God
(Sang Hyang Widi Wasa), who is the highest power in ones life and a source of life for all
people in the world; (2) The principle of the (personal) spirit, the eternal soul (Atman), which
is part of God and the source of life and human ability; (3) The principle of Hukum Karma or
Karma Pala, which means that current human conditions and behaviours are both a result of
past lives and the foundations of the future ones. Karma applies not only to oneself, but also
to one's descendants; (4) The principle of reincarnation (Punarbawa) , the continuing cycle of
birth, death, and rebirth into the world, which is repeated until one attains the perfect life, at
which point it ends, because one is unified with God. (5) The principle of unity with God
(Moksha), which may be experienced during one's lifetime or after death in heaven. Once
Moksha is achieved, the cycle of birth-rebirth ends.
Human relationships are governed by a cosmology that places humans in a middle
world, between the spirit worlds above and below. As such, life revolves around finding and
maintaining harmony and balance among gods, humans, and nature. Traditionally, the
Balinese believe that three factors are crucial to a person's well-being, happiness, and both
physical and psychological health: (1) the microcosm (Buana alit), which is made up of
individual persons; (2) the macrocosm (Buana agung), which comprises the universe; and (3)
the supreme God (see Jensen & Suryani, 1992).
Peace, both external (interpersonal) and internal (psychological and spiritual), is attained
by doing good deeds and by maintaining a holistic self-balance. For these reasons, Balinese
strive to maintain good relations among each other, with the environment, their ancestors, the
many gods (Dewa) and the supreme God. Harmony in relationships creates a prosperous,
peaceful, and happy life (Rahayu). Imbalance and disharmony affect both natural (Sekala)
and supernatural (Niskala) elements that in return influence humans, causing both mental
disorders and physical illness. The Balinese Hindus believe that ritual ceremonies can redeem
karma, and lead to the experience of a peaceful life.
The primary Balinese solution for overcoming psychological problems is through ritual
ceremonies, with the full understanding that the result ultimately depends on God (Suryani &
Jensen, 1993). One accepts whatever happens as the best thing that could happen, treating it
either as a test, an opportunity to redeem past misdeeds, or to achieve a better result in the
days to come1. God is above all, so if one strives to unite with God, one will be rewarded with
the best for the future.
1
The terrorist bombings in 2002 and 2005 were an example of the operation of these principles. While fully
cognizant of the horror of so many deaths, grief and much suffering, the Balinese responded by seeking to
identify the imbalance in their own actions that may have brought it about. Along with numerous ritual cleansing
ceremonies performed at ground zero and across the island, there was an attempt to re-evaluate what they did in
For the Balinese the dichotomies of good and evil are constantly present in all conditions
of life; it is simply a matter of which one is dominant at any given time. Similar to Western
existentialism, good and evil are always present within everyone. Whether one becomes a
good or a bad person depends on which of these forces is or becomes dominant in them.
Balinese aim to harmonise both of them in their daily life. For example, the demon Buta Kala
can cause mischief, if we have bad relationships, but will assist us positively if our
relationships are good. Balinese Hindus are taught about these tenants of spirituality from the
early days of their life, either by their families, religious leaders, or throughout schooling.
There principles are fundamental components of the SHAT approach (Suryani & Wrycza,
1996).
SPIRITUAL-HYPNOSIS ASSISTED THERAPY (SHAT)
Biopsycho-Spirit-Sociocultural Approach
I have proposed, developed, and successfully been using (and improving) for the past 10
or so years the SHAT approach. I have been treating patients both as a Balinese spiritual
healer (Balian) and a psychiatrist (Edge & Suryani, 2002; Edge et al., 2005; Suryani, 1984;
Suryani, 2004; Suryani & Entus, 2004; Suryani & Jensen, 1992; Suryani & Stephen, 2000;
Suryani et al., 1988; Suryani et al., 2006).The former identity is rooted in the concepts of
Balinese culture and Hinduism, while the latter is based on Western concepts and training. In
my clinical practice, I integrate these concepts and the ideas behind them in what I call the
biopsycho-spirit-sociocultural, and thus holistic, approach (Suryani, 1995)2. Within the
context of this term, and the Balinese Hinduism, every person consists of mind, body, and
spirit, which largely constitute one's biology and psychology, and are influenced by and in
return affect, positively or negatively, ones sociocultural environment and religious/spiritual
beliefs (see also Lesmana & Tiliopoulos, 2009).
The Concept of SHAT
Our personal spirit (atma) is primarily made of our mothers, fathers, and Gods energy,
and it comes into existence at conception. It is the source of our life, ability, knowledge, and
aspirations. Personal spirit influences both physical and mental development. Psychological
proto-development in the womb is, thus, influenced by the personal spirit, the mother's
physical and mental condition, and also by the father, the family, the environment, and God.
The quality of the foetus proto-experiences in the womb is largely determined by the
pregnant mothers psychophysiological states (e.g., feeling happy, calm, stressed, angry, or
being physically or psychologically ill; see also, Schwerdtfeger & Goff, 2007). Positive and
tourism. It was perceived as a wake-up call, signalling that tourism had gone out of sync with Balinese values,
and an opportunity to rethink priorities.
2
Aspects of my treatment were recently shown (30 May 2009 and 14 March 2010) on two documentaries on
Australian national television, which can be viewed online at the following addresses:
http://www.sbs.com.au/dateline/story/about/id/600049/n/Bali-s-Shame http://www.sbs.com.au/dateline/story/
watch/id/600377/n/Bali-s-Miracle-Worker
negative proto-experiences are encoded in the foetuss proto-memory, and serve as elements
of the biological basis of ones personality. Although, with the advent of logical thinking and
the increasingly dominant cortical functions our proto-experiences tend to be forgotten rather
early in our life, the formed proto-memories can still influence subsequent thought, emotions,
learning, behaviour, and adaptive approached to dealing with stress, through acting almost
exclusively on unconscious psychological processes. If the foetal experiences were largely
negative or aversive, the born individual may not be able to understand them, learn from
them, and utilise them (even at the unconscious level) for their personal growth. If that is so,
the individual may develop into becoming apathetic, irritable, hostile, antisocial (i.e., highly
psychotic), or emotionally disturbed (i.e., highly neurotic), and when or if they are
subsequently exposed to stressors, they may be more prone to developing a mental disorder
(see also, Lemelson & Suryani, 2006).
SHAT brings the patient to an awareness of the feelings and desires of their unconscious
mind. It enables them to reframe an experience (e.g., with family, friends, co-workers) or
proto-experience, laden with distressing feelings or conflict, into a positive one. The patient is
brought to see and feel memories of the past, place them into their present, project them into
their future life, and understand and reframe them. The patient actively expresses emotions
from their unconscious mind, and develops a different understanding of these memories. The
hypnotic state further enables them to modify past situations and feelings, and record these as
newly changed in conscious memory.
The method does not urge nor imposes change by the therapist. Dealing with their
unconscious mind in the hypnotic state helps and allows the patients to overcome their
problems, and achieve, or at least work toward, desired personal goals. In hypnosis, the
patient is allowed to make their own choices, and follow their desires regarding personal
relationships. Finally, hypnotic suggestions may not be given to change sexual orientation.
SHAT combines and modifies treatment elements of psychoanalysis, CBT, humanistic
therapies, and religious/spiritual counselling. However, it significantly differs from the
conventional therapeutic practices of these approaches through: (a) the absence of systematic
desensitization; (b) imagery is replaced with re-experiencing and re-evaluating the past; (c)
the presence of a non-guided regression process; (d) the modified role of the unconscious,
and; (e) the elements of faith, in particular that of the personal spirit, that play a central and
constant role in the therapeutic discourse of SHAT and that tend to be absent or of peripheral
or eclectic importance and utility in most conventional mainstream hypnotherapies and
psychotherapies.
THE METHOD: INDIVIDUAL THERAPY

In order for SHAT to be successfully utilised, the patient must trust the therapist, not be
delusional or hallucinating, and not have a (comorbid) panic or anxiety disorder. Should the
mentioned symptoms be present, SHAT is used in combination with psychotropic medication.
In any case, the patient is interviewed in depth; the clinical diagnosis is based on the
ICD-10 diagnostic criteria; additional information is also collected, in order to understand
their background, their childhood, adolescence, and adulthood history, the main complaint(s)
that brought them to seek counselling, and to begin establishing a good relationship with them
and gaining their trust.
The patient may sit on a chair or lie on the couch. They are asked to feel comfortable and
relaxed. After they relax, they are asked to focus only on the therapists voice. Through this
process, they are initially instructed to meditate with their eyes closed; after meditating for
approximately five minutes, they are instructed to breathe deeply through their nose and
slowly exhale through their mouth. These instructions are repeated five times. These deep
breaths last for one minute. Subsequently, the participants breathing tends to remain constant
and deep, without any further guidance from the therapist, at approximately five breaths per
minute. At that stage, the therapist may wish to monitor certain behavioural cues on the
patients, such as their arm rigidity and immobilisation, their eye catalepsy, and their inability
to communicate, all of which are widely accepted indicators of a hypnotic statewhich
within the context of SHAT is referred to as a trance state.
When in trance, patients are verbally guided, through suggestion, to be sensitive of their
personal spirit, and to go back to memories of an unhappy experience, where they felt angry,
disappointed, ashamed, sad, scared, worried, or the specific situation of relevance to their
problem, if it were clearly identified during the clinical interview. When they remember, feel,
or see the experience(s), they are asked to express all unpleasant feelings by, for example,
shouting, crying, or even hitting something. The purpose of this is for them to release the
emotional burden that has been stored in their memory. They are led to their culturally
familiar concept that the power of God would help them gain strength to cope with their
emotions. These emotional discharges are different to abreactions, because the experience of
catharsis is absent, since the participants are in a hypnotic state, and thus unaware of
experiencing any conflictual material. When they have finally expressed their emotions and
have returned to a calm state, they are asked to see the experience(s) again, in order to help
them understand why they touched and affected them in such a way. They are then instructed
to accept this happening in their life and to understand that the experiences were important in
developing them to be or become an adult, and that they enabled them to face new challenges
in life.
In the last step, they need to accept that these experiences belong to the past, and it is
made continually clear to them that the past is the past, and that their reality is life today,
tomorrow, and the day after. If they are not able to understand, or see the situation again, or
are unable to reframe it into a positive context, they are asked to look deeply (even in a
figurative sense) into the eyes of their mother, who, if possible, should be present at this stage
and feel her eyes. In so doing, a positive meaning of the experience tends to emerge, and
subsequently the patients tend not to be influenced by their old emotions. They reframe the
experience into having a positive meaning and carrying positive emotions, and accept it as an
important element of them becoming a fully psychologically developed individual.
Continuing in hypnosis, they may be asked to go to the past, when they were children, in
order, once again, to reframe early-life traumas or bad memories. They may feel memories of
their mother, father, nuclear family, peers, friends, and environmental surroundings. Negative
experiences are reframed to have a positive meaning. An example of a suggested reframing
could be Although you were angry (or scared) when your father hit you, he did it to help you
become a better person. For them to feel safe, loved, and respected by their parents it is
important to positively influence and guide their thoughts, emotions, behaviour, adaptation,
and their ways of communicating and relating to others.
Table 1. Treatment statistics of individual SHAT, broken down by disorder diagnosed
Main problem diagnosed (ICD-10) Number of patients treated since 2003 Success
rate*
Anxiety disorders 50 80%
Childhood trauma 20 80%
Depression 85 76.4%
Drug abuse 10 70%
Identity disorders 5 100%
Marital problems 75 80%
Panic disorders 10 80%
Psychoses 15 66.6%
PTSD 20 90%
Sexual abuse 25 100%
Total number of patients: 315 Mean success rate: 82.3%
*
Success refers to the absence of observed symptomatology, clinically assessed immediately after the
treatment and a month later.
In the final part of the session, they are asked to find the way to happiness in future life
material and spiritual. Toward the end of the session, forgiveness and apology may be
suggested. At the end of the session, the patient is guided back to their usual state of
consciousness and may be given brief explanations to help them understand the psychological
interpretation of the experience(s) expressed and felt while in trance. The entire session
usually lasts for over an hour and up to three hours (see Table 1 for specific treatment
information and outcomes).
For continuing results, the patients are instructed to meditate for 10 to 15 minutes, twice a
day, morning and evening, or before going to sleep. Meditation helps with the maintenance of
a psychophysiological homeostatic state, and as a result, it allows the self-modification of
memories to work faster and be more efficient.
Table 2. Demographic information of group-SHAT participation between 1999-2009

(total N = 6880)
Attendance: 100-200 people per session

Gender Age (in years)
Female: 59.3% M: 38
Male: 40.7% SD: 13
Range: 16-70
Education Marital Status
Elementary: 6.7% Never married: 35%
Junior high: 11.9% Married: 59.1%
High school: 47.5% Divorced: 0.8%
Diploma: 8.5% Widowed: 4.2%
University: 25.5% Separated: 0.8%
Religion Treatment satisfaction
Buddhist: 4.2% Very satisfied: 42.2%
Christian: 5.1% Satisfied: 37%
Hindu: 83% Somewhat satisfied: 17.8%
Muslim: 7.7% Not Satisfied: 3%
THE METHOD: GROUP-THERAPY

The above procedure can also be used in group-therapy setting, although the instructions
may need to be more general to apply to all the patients present, and the sessions are usually
shorter (around 30 minutes). In addition, for this mode of therapy to be more effective,
patients should be matched on symptomatology severity and preferably on the primary
diagnosed problem.
For example, I used group-SHAT in the treatment of children suffering from
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after the 2002 Bali terrorist attack (Lesmana & Suryani,
2007; Lesmana et al., 2009). The aim of that study was to assess the effectiveness of group-
SHAT for treatment of PTSD in children. All children, age 6-12 years (N=226; 52.7%
females), who experienced the terrorist bomb blasts in Bali in 2002, and subsequently were
diagnosed with PTSD were studied, through a longitudinal, quasi-experimental (pre-post
test), single-blind, randomised control design. Of them, 48 received group-SHAT (treatment
group), and 178 did not receive any therapy (control group). Statistically significant results
showed that SHAT produced a 77.1% improvement rate, at a two-year follow up, compared
to 24% in the control group, while at the same time, the mean PTSD symptom score
differences were significantly lower in the former group.
A similar to the above, but yet unpublished, case occurred in 2005. A male teachers was
arrested for serially sexually abusing children in an elementary school in East Bali
(Karangasem regency). The victims were 15 girls between the ages of 6-13 years old, and
they had been repeatedly abused from weeks to 3 years. Two sessions of group-SHAT were
run to treat their trauma. Children were assessed a week after the last session, six months
later, and four years thereafter. No residual symptoms relating to their trauma were observed
in any of the children.
Group-SHAT sessions are being run regularly four times per year since 1999, and
descriptive information of the participating individuals is shown in Table 2. The sessions are
advertised in the local newspapers, where people, who believe they have (subclinical) mental
health problems, are invited to participate. Given that these sessions usually attract large
numbers of people, between 100-200, they are not appropriate for clinical cohorts, or
delusional or hallucinating individuals. On the treatment day, the participants register and get
screened by psychiatrists. However, even if no obvious symptomatology is observed,
participants are still allowed to take part in the session. Before the therapy begins, they are
introduced to the procedure and the concept of SHAT is briefly explained to them. After the
session, which usually lasts for 30 minutes, the participants are asked how satisfied they were
by the treatment and are given the option of individual follow-up sessions (see Table 2).
THE METHOD: COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTATIVE INTERVENTION

SHAT may also be, and is being used in Bali as a preventative approach to mental illness
through community-based interventions (Suryani et al., 2006). The way this is done in Bali
has as follows: A public announcement in the newspapers usually brings more than 200
people to participate in the program, which runs, free of charge, on a weekly basis (this
program is independent to the group-SHAT described above). Potential participants in this

program should not have any subclinical or clinical mental health problems.
Besides the verbal instructions, which are similar to the group-SHAT sessions, recorded
music is played to help initiate and maintain the participants trance, dissociation, or
meditative state. When in a meditation state, they are asked to feel who they are in terms of
their weaknesses and strengths. They are instructed to feel a past unhappy experience, and,
while in a dissociative state, draw on a paper with colour pastel of their choice what they are
feeling. Subsequent to this exercise, they are asked to stand up, feel the music enter their
body, and let their body follow the music and express their emotions through movement.
Then, participants are instructed to put their hands in front of their chest and shout loudly
while shaking their fists. Next, they sit down in a meditation position, and they are, once
again, asked to see their unhappy experiences and to understand why they happened to them.
Feeling these experiences is important for them to become functional individuals. They are
told that this was the past and that their reality is their life today. After that, they are
instructed to lie down, close their eyes, and relax. They are asked to think of happy childhood
memories, to feel their mothers and fathers love, respect, and the safety in their presence.
They are asked to feel their family, peers, friends, and the surrounding environment. During
this stage, they may sleep awhile if they feel sleepy. Next, they are asked to stand up, close
their eyes, and, while still recalling a happy experience when they were children, move with
the cheerful music that is being played at that stage.
Similar to the individual therapy, in the final part of the session, they are guided to find
the way to get happiness in future life. Once again, they are instructed to meditate 10 to 15
minutes, twice a day, morning and evening, or before sleep. This session tends to run for
approximately 4 hours. At the conclusion of the session, the general meaning of what they
have experienced is explained to them. They are asked to rest at home for half to one hour. It
is also suggested to them that they should use the rest of the day to relax, go to bed early
without watching TV, or otherwise avoid being busy with any personal activities, and the next
day resume their activities as usual. Most participants tend to leave these sessions with a
serene or happy mood.
Summary of the SHAT procedure
Prior initial detailed interview; establish trust

Relax in chair or on couch
Enter trance to therapists voice
In trance, recall an unhappy experience
Feel the emotion and let it out
See it again to understand its importance
Accept it as in the past
Revisit a childhood trauma
Feel memories of family and friends
Reframe experiences to positive meaning
Find the way to get happiness in future life
Meditate 10 to 15 minutes, 2 times a day
CONCLUSION
Future research needs to provide us with an understanding of the specific genetic or
otherwise biological vulnerabilities that make certain individuals especially susceptible to the
disorganizing effects of traumatic stress. Among the biological markers, the roles of the
hippocampal volume and that of certain neurotransmitters in trauma need to be further
explored (Bremner et al., 2008). Furthermore, a better understanding of the importance of
specific regions of the brain to (proto-) memory may further inform intervention and
therapies. More specifically, research on the mechanisms that affect memory storage
reversibility, and that seem to work or at least interact with my specific hypnotherapy
technique is needed in order to acquire a better understanding of, primarily, the arguably
unique therapeutic effects of the spiritual elements in SHAT. Finally, assuming that SHAT is
indeed a worthy approach in clinical hypnosis, future studies should assess its combined
therapeutic effect with currently practised approaches, while at the same time compare it with
other forms of hypnotherapy, to allow for its refinement and eclectic integration into
mainstream interventions.
It is my conviction that SHAT is relatively easy to master, economic, and it appears to be
highly effective. Although, currently the use of the concept of the personal spirit, as presented
in this paper, is based on the Balinese Hindu culture, a spiritual-therapeutic connection can be
made with any group of patients, if consonant with their religious/spiritual beliefs. If so,
SHAT can potentially have application in many cultures.
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University Press.
Chapter 11
MILITANT EXTREMIST MINDSET
Lazar Stankov
National Institute of Education, Naynang Technological University,
1 Nanyang Walk 637616, Singapore
Gerard Saucier
Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene Oregon 97403-1227, USA
Goran Kneevi
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia
ABSTRACT
Militant extremist mindset refers to a fixed set of beliefs that motivate people to
engage in violent activities directed toward specific others. In our previous work we have
identified three components that together define militant-extremist mindset, and have
been identified across different cultures. These are broadly known as nastiness, grudge,
and excuse: nastiness represents anti-social and pro-violent attitudes; grudge is a feeling
of animosity and resentment typically directed toward some other group which serves as
a trigger for action; and excuse represents a higher-order justification for engaging in
militant extremism. These ingredients of militant-extremist-mindset are defined more
specifically according to the context and vary according to culture and setting. For
example excuse typically represents a particular set of religious beliefs. Further
empirical work may reveal whether this mindset is present to some extent in the general
population. If so, these measures of militant-extremist mindset might be useful in
assessing population-wide attitudinal changes or the effectiveness of anti-terrorist social
interventions.
Keywords: Cross-cultural, Extremism, Mindset, Terrorism
Ph: 65 6219 6171; Fax: 65 6316 4787; lazondi@rocketmail.com; lstankov@nie.edu.sg

132 Lazar Stankov, Gerard Saucier and Goran Kneevi
INTRODUCTION
"Morality is personal. There is no such thing as a collective conscience, collective kindness,
collective gentleness, collective freedom. ... To talk of social justice, social responsibility, a
new world order, may be easy and make us feel good, but it does not absolve each of us from
personal responsibility."
Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990
(Draft notes for her address to the October 1979 party conference. In the end these comments
were ignored by her speechwriters)
At the dawn of the 21st century, as reminders of the threat of terrorism become part of
daily life for manywhether this be in the form of airport security measures, public transport
announcements during the daily commute, or a failed bombing attempt on civilian targets
psychologists have turned their attention back to the darker aspects of human nature that
attracted a lot of interest in the years following World War II. Positive psychology and the
study of happiness and well-being that were of interest to many in the 1980s and 1990s have
given way to renewed attempts to understand what lies behind behaviours that lead people to
commit acts of violence against their fellow human beings.
Our interest has been in the extremist (fanatical) mindset. A dictionary definition of
mindset reads: A fixed mental attitude or disposition that predetermines a person's responses
to and interpretations of situations. In our own previous work, it is defined as a pattern of
beliefs, feelings, thoughts, and motivations that tends to be mobilised under facilitating
conditions (see Stankov, Saucier and Kneevi, 2010a). In his foreign-policy speech in
Cairo, in June 2009, President Obama carefully avoided using the word terrorism,
preferring violent extremism 1, thereby emphasising both cognitive (extremism) and
behavioural (violent) features of terrorists, rather than the effects (terror) of their
activities.
We distinguish two types of extremismbenign and militantand the focus of our work
is on the latter. Much of our effort to date has been motivated by a desire to establish if the
construct of militant extremist mindset (MEM) can be measured and, if so, whether: a) it
represents an extreme level of the already known constructs and therefore can be measured in
the general population, or; b) it is a characteristic of a small group of people who can be
classified as standing outside the normal range. Since the evidence (described below)
favors the first position, what are the main psychological ingredients of militant extremist
mindset? In this chapter we shall provide an overview of the approaches used in our studies of
MEM and summarise the main findings.
Consistent with Lady Thatcher's viewpoint, our approach to the study of MEM is
psychological in nature and implies personal responsibility: the sources of MEM are within
the individual. We assume that they can be measured by asking people to agree or disagree
with statements that describe one's feelings towards other people, institutions and courses of
action. Crucial, of course, is the choice of statements. They have been carefully selected to
approximate those endorsed by people who have engaged in or supported violent activities.
1
See Nicholas Lemann's piece in the New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2010/
04/26/100426crbo_books_lemann?currentPage=1#ixzz0o2tHXaTm
Militant Extremist Mindset 133
Similar procedures have been successfully used in studies of personality and related
constructs.
Nastiness, Grudge and Excuse
Our definition of MEM rests on a series of empirical studies that employ procedures of
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. The outcomes of these studies have been
described elsewhere (see Saucier, Akers, Miller, Stankov & Kneevi, 2009; Saucier et al.,
(in press); Stankov, Saucier & Kneevi, 2010a; and Stankov, Higgins, Saucier & Kneevi,
2010b). The present chapter draws on the report of Stankov, Saucier & Kneevi (under
review). We refer to the three main factors that emerged from these studies as 'the ingredients
of MEM' and name them Nastiness, Grudge, and Excuse.
a) Nastiness
In Stankov et al. (2010a), nastiness is captured by the factor labeled War: Justification of
violent acts. In Stankov et al. (2010b; under review) nastiness is captured by the Pro-
violence factor. The War and Pro-violence factors identified in our studies are
conceptually identicali.e., they both indicate the acceptance, justification and even
advocacy of violence in dealing with enemies. We believe that high standing on this factor is
not restricted to those prone to committing terrorist acts. The sub-population of people who
have committed criminal acts (including those who have never been caught) is likely to have
an elevated standing on this factor as well. In general, people do not agree with statements
that capture Nastiness. The arithmetic means on a five-point Likert scale with 1 representing
strongly disagree are slightly over 2 (disagree). Needless to say, there are group differences
in the levels of endorsement, with males and some cultural groups (e.g., Korea, China)
standing being somewhat higher than other countries included in our samples.
b) Grudge
The Grudge factors identified in our studies to date differ in terms of specificity. In
Stankov et al. (2010b) this factor is somewhat narrow and it is labeled as West: Sins of the
Western nations. Two themes are running through the items that define this factor. First, the
West is seen as an aggressor that has committed violence against other countries in the world,
implying that revenge against the West is acceptable. As I point out below, its narrow nature
derives at least in part from the preponderance of Islamic groups in contemporary writings
that reflect militant extremism. Second, the West is seen as morally rotten, and the statements
that fall into this category can be interpreted as attempts to demonise the enemy. In Stankov
et al. (2010a; under review) this grudge factor is not limited to the West and it reflects general
dissatisfaction with the conditions in the world today (e.g., the world is heading for
destruction and that human race is facing calamity). It is labeled as Vile World. In Stankov
et al. (under review), however, the vileness of the world is also related to aspects of human
nature (competitiveness, crisis of values), not to some general feature of the world we live in.
Again, a common feature of all three factors identified in our studies is a grudge that may
motivate some people to take action. Criminals (e.g., thieves or those committing homicides)
differ from nasty revolutionaries with respect to Grudge, not in terms of Nastiness. Whilst
criminals may hold a grudge, this might be more personal or localizedin contrast to the
revolutionary, whose grudge is cast wider and is more socially orientedRobin Hoods are
rare in our societies. In agreement with the results from our other studies, the means of the
Grudge items are around 3 on a five-point Likert scale and gender differences are not
pronounced. Participants from two countries (Serbia and Malaysia) score relatively high and
those from China score low on Grudge.
c) Excuse
The Excuse factor also takes different forms in our studies. All forms of it represent
justifications in peoples own minds of the nasty and violent things they tend to condone. The
items classified under the rubric of excuse bring into focus higher moral principles and
therefore imply noble motivation behind such acts. In Stankov et al. (2010b) the excuse factor
is labeled as God: In the name of God. In Stankov et al. (2010a) the factor is labeled as
Divine Power. In Stankov et al. (under review) this factor is labeled Utopianism. Since
we see Excuse not to be restricted to religiosity, Utopianism may accommodate MEM groups
with atheistic orientation. The three factors of Excuse are conceptually different, more so than
factors of Nastiness and Grudge. Nevertheless, even though they invoke different sources of
moral authority such as God or some kind of Divine Power or Utopian ideals, the common
thread running through all these sources is a justification or an excuse. In the present context,
higher moral principles that derive from spiritual power or from an idealistic goal of creating
a better world represent an excuse for being proviolent and having a grudge. Again, in
agreement with the results from our other studies, the means of the Excuse items are around 3
(neutral) on a five-point Likert scale. Although significant, the size of gender differences on
this factor is small and in favour of femalesfemales are slightly more likely to endorse
positively statements with religious and idealistic overtones. The highest standing country on
this factor in our studies is Malaysia, with Chile and Guatemala closely behind it.
Sometimes psychologists develop a theory about a particular construct and proceed with
the development of measures of this construct only to find out that correlations between a
new measure and some existing constructs are too high to warrant its usefulness vis-a-vis
what is already known. In our work with MEM we have taken care to obtain correlations of
our new measures and assessments of personality traits, value orientations, social attitudes
and social norms all of which at least in theory, may have elements in common with MEM.
Our findings are that the elements of Excuse with clear religious orientation (i.e., God, Divine
Power and Utopianism) are substantially the same as traditional measures of religiosity.
Measures of Nastiness and Grudge, however, cannot be reduced to other psychological
constructs. This is not to say that they do not correlate in a meaningful way with other
constructs. Thus, Nastiness (Pro-Violence) factor has moderate correlation with Saucier's
Betaism (unmitigated self-interest and dismissal of political correctness) while Grudge (Vile
World) scale correlates with measures of Psychoticism and Social Cynicism.
THE USE OF INGREDIENTS OF MEM MEASURES

One proposed use of these scales is for the detection of the levels of radicalization in the
general population, particularly when a society is experiencing social and political upheavals
(Stankov et al., 2010b; under review). It is to be expected that current items within each scale
may need to be modified or supplemented by new statements appropriate for a particular
society. Another area of potential application will be in assessing the effectiveness of
currently popular de-radicalization efforts in several, mostly Muslim, countries that have been
plagued by terrorism.
Group comparisons such as cross-cultural comparisons between and within countries on
three ingredient processes of MEM may be useful for an improved understanding of cultural
differences. This information can supplement commonly studied differences in noncognitive
traits such as personality traits, values and social attitudes and norms. One area that has
already shown promise is the similarity of MEM findings and studies of cross-cultural
differences in noncognitive constructs other than those that belong to MEM. Two empirical
findings are particularly relevant for our purposes here. Stankov (in press) and Stankov, Lee
and van de Vijver (under review) show that countries and cultures can be ranked in terms of
their standings on the Harshness vs Softness dimension. This dimension is defined by social
attitudes like Toughness and Maliciousness on the Harshness side and by measures of
personality like Agreeableness and Conscientiousness on the Softness side. Harsh countries
are from the Confucian Asian region and soft countries are from Latin America and East
Europe. Importantly, the same differences between Confucian Asian countries and Latin
America emerge on the Nastiness factor. Thus, there is substantial agreement between studies
of MEM and studies of noncognitive constructs that do not involve MEM measures. Stankov
(in press) argues that harsh and unforgiving Confucian culture may be able to explain both the
high ranking of Confucian countries on achievement tests used in international comparisons
(e.g., PISA and TIMSS projects) and also high test anxiety and self-doubt that is also
observed in these countries.
At the time of this writing, we have no empirical data to show that those convicted for
terrorist activities score higher than the average member of the population on any of the three
ingredient processes. We assume that this will be the case since the statements included in our
surveys reflect the opinions and are sometimes taken verbatim from writings produced by
terrorist groups. Even when such important validity data become available, on their own our
measures of Nastiness, Grudge and Excuse will not be suitable for screening potential
terrorists for the purpose of psychological profiling. Given that our data indicate only small or
moderate correlations between the three MEM ingredients, a single MEM score may not be
useful for decision making. Future research may suggest that high standing on all three
ingredient processes (a profile score) together with additional clinical data may be indicative
of problem behaviour or perhaps of psychopathology in need of intervention.
THE POTENTIAL MILITANT EXTREMIST INSIDE EACH OF US?

The approach we have employed for the development of our MEM scalesthe selection
of statements reflecting MEM and their validation among members of the general
populationmay lead one to the conclusion that ingredients of MEM exist within all of us.
While this is true in theory, the real situation is similar to what happens in medical diagnosis
of some diseases that rely on assessments of particular conditions like cholesterol levels.
Although we all have cholesterol in our blood stream, only those of us with high levels of
bad cholesterol are candidates for intervention. This analogy may be extended further to
include additional risk factors. Thus, the differing mean levels between groups defined by
gender or country of origin, and potentially many others, may provide for a better definition
of extremism relative to the society or group to which the person belongs. For example, since
Malays as a group score high on the Grudge factor, an extreme score on this factor in
Malaysia must be much higher than the extreme score on this factor in, say, China where
perhaps the average Malay score may be seen as extreme. Similarly, different cut-off scores
for extremism may exist for males and females. If such cut-off scores were to be deemed
useful, careful further psychometric studies will have to be carried out in future.
Given the three ingredients of MEM, it is reasonable to raise the question whether they
are equally important for evaluation or whether differential weights should be assigned to
each. Of the three, Excuse is perhaps the least important. This is because it seems to imply an
after-the-event activity. Furthermore, in its most common versionGod or Divine Power
this is mostly a measure of religiosity and since there are so many religious people, some of
whom may be fanatic with respect to their religious belief, high standing on the Excuse factor
on its own may not be indicative of MEM and may lead to too many false positive
classifications. This is not to say that Excuse is useless; rather, it should be used in
conjunction with the other two MEM ingredients2.
From among the other two constructs, high standing on the Nastiness factor is the most
important if we are interested in identifying those who are likely to spring into action. As
mentioned earlier, high standing on this factor is conceptually linked to criminal behaviour.
Thus, these are the people who are less opposed to the use of violence, see it as acceptable
under certain circumstances and, presumably, would see fewer obstacles to the use of force.
Nastiness is best thought off as an example of social attitudes, akin to dogmatism,
authoritarianism or conservatism and, like these latter constructs, it is related to personality
traits and therefore relatively immutable.
The third ingredient, Grudge, represents a trigger for action. If a person is high on
Nastiness factor perhaps it can be expected that his/her threshold for action will be lowered
whatever the Grudge. Stankov et al. (under review) argue also that Grudge is perhaps the
most amenable to intervention. Personal Grudge that may be linked to forms of criminal
behaviour may be possible to change by clinical interventions. Grudge in the sense used in
our work that is more social in nature and is a precursor of terrorist actions in the world today,
can perhaps be affected by media and education campaigns that address misconceptions about
particular groups or events in social and political life. Terrorists, even suicide bombers, are
best seen as rational actorsthat is, what they do is explicable in terms of their beliefs and
desireswho respond to the set of incentives that they find before them. Perhaps they can be
fought by means of using a cool recalibration of their incentives.
It may be argued that, among the three factors identified in our work to date only one,
Nastiness, represents a true psychological trait. Grudge and Excuse are defined with respect
to outside sources and have a pronounced sociological and political component. This means
that psychology on its own cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of militant extremist
2
It is possible to take the opposing view to our interpretation of the role of Grudge factor. For example, as pointed
out by Dr. S. Morony, this may be seen as the factor that overcomes any niggling doubt that what you are doing
might be wrong. It also makes the group highly cohesive, and presumably silences any voices of dissent.
mindset. Here, as is often the case in life, psychology rubs shoulders with other sciences in
order to achieve a better understanding of human behaviour.
MEASURES OF MUSLIM OR ANY TYPE OF

MILITANT EXTREMIST MINDSET?
From the beginning, our approach to assessing MEM was deliberately developed in order
to capture the generalist view of the construct (see Saucier et al., 2009). Needless to say, we
were not entirely successful in our endeavor and one of our measures of MEM (Stankov et al.,
2010b) still has a flavor that links it to the Muslim world. We refer to this version as
contemporary to distinguish it from a more general and perhaps timeless versions reported
in Stankov et al. (2010a; under review).
Items in the contemporary version of MEM were developed using linguistic analysis in
the following way. Over the internet we collected texts written by, or about, terrorist groups
(target) and also control texts written by members of legitimate political parties in countries
where terrorist groups originate. We then carried out linguistic/statistical analyses to
determine what words best distinguish target texts from the control texts. The first column in
Table 1 contains the first fifteen most critical words. As can be expected, contemporary target
texts contain a number of Muslim words (Allah, Muhammad, Islamic, Islam, Muslims,
Jihad). Several words (e.g., I, we, you, our) are also not linked to terrorism. In addition to the
fifteen listed words, close to 500 additional words did show significant differences between
the corpora. We used an extended list of words to select the fifteen critical MEM related
words also listed in Table 1). These latter words were then used to select the target statements
for the final version of the scale.
As can be seen in the second column of Table 1, the sentences chosen contained words
that were less Islamic in nature (Martyr perhaps being an exception). Nevertheless, despite
our efforts some statements that survived psychometric analyses and are now included in
measures of MEM still have an Islamic flavor. The most notable are two statements that
employed West as the key word (It has become clear that the West has an unspeakable
hatred for Islam and Western leaders have forced their people to believe that Islam is the
cancer of the world, thus it must be eliminated) and retained Islam in the stem. The
remaining 22 statements that are a part of the MEM measure in Stankov et al. (2010b) do not
make references to Muslims or Islamic themes.
The issue that still needs to be addressed is broadness of the measures of MEM. This is
related to the frequently discussed distinction between domain specificity and domain
generality. Is it better to have statements that are indicative of general MEM or is it better to
include statements that reflect the views of a targeted terrorist group? Closely related, of
course, is the question of practical vs theoretical utility of the MEM measures. As mentioned
above, we have opted for generality/theoretical utility which, in the long run may work better.
Practical needs of granting agencies, however, may on occasion dictate the development of
more specific measures in future. Of course, a combination of both specific and general
approaches may be the optimal solution.
Table 1. Most frequent words that distinguish contemporary terrorist writings from
language used by legitimate political parties & words used to select statements
(Stankov, Higgins, Saucier & Kneevi, 2005b)
Most Frequent Words in Terrorist Writings Selected Words

1. Terrorist Bomb
2. Terrorism Homeland
3. Allah Peace
4. We Brother
5. Muhammad Kill
6. You Terror
7. Suicide Enemy
8. I Leader
9. Islamic Terrorism
10. Islam Force
11. Our Martyr
12. Will War
13. Muslims God (Allah)
14. Jihad Path
15. Kill West
WORK STILL TO BE DONE

Our approach to the development of MEM measures is frankly empirical. We collected
our statements with no theoretical preconceptions about the possible nature of militant
extremism. This may be seen both as an advantage and otherwise. The outcome of our work
appears meaningful and perhaps a coherent psychological theory that elaborates on our
findings may be developed. Of particular importance may be the need to arrive at a better
understanding of the Grudge ingredient of MEM. What aspects of our social life makes
people angry? And why? In other words, a motivational theory about MEM is needed.
Another theoretical aspect is the relationship of the ingredient processes of MEM and a
variety of noncognitive constructs that are of interest to social psychologists. Some of these
have been related to MEM but many remain unexplored. For example, we know little about
the relationship of MEM to measures of individualism and collectivism, social axioms, moral
foundations, tightness-looseness and many others.
Another area that needs to be covered is the relationship of MEM to demographic
variables and especially to criminal behaviour. If, as we believe, Nastiness captured by the
MEM scales is similar to that of incarcerated individuals, this will need to be shown
empirically. Relatedly, we need to know what categories of convicted criminals agree or do
not agree with measures of Grudge and Excuse. Furthermore, while Nastiness has been
essentially the same across our studies, Grudge and Excuse have sub-components. It may be
useful in future to develop measures of these latter two MEM ingredients that have not been
covered in our previous work. For example, the mindset of eco-terrorists may be poorly
captured by our current measures.
Finally, while we know that there are cross-cultural differences on measures of MEM we
still do not know whether these measures will be sensitive enough to detect changes in the
overall levels of radicalization in the population. Given that this is one of the main intended
uses of our instruments, we need additional data to establish the sensitivity to changed social
circumstances. This aspect of the work may be especially hard to accomplish since the effects
can be examined only if an extraordinary event that shakes the society at its core were to take
place in a particular country.
CONCLUSION
This chapter summarises the work carried out by our team over the past few years. The
main aim of this research effort was to develop an instrument that can be used for the
assessment of militant extremist mindset in the population. Three different rationales and
procedures were employed for the selection of items, and two empirical studies based on
samples from several countries were conducted in order to examine psychometric properties
of the scales.
In the outcome, three different ingredient processes of MEM were identified: Nastiness
(condoning and advocating violence), Grudge (dissatisfaction with the existing conditions of
the group one belongs to) and Excuse (justification of violence in the name of some higher
moral power). Nastiness is a psychological trait that is best understood as belonging to the
category of social attitudes, similar to dogmatism and authoritarianism. Like most social
attitudes, Nastiness is likely to be resilient to attempts to modify it and it is not only
characteristic of terrorists but is likely to be present to a significant degree in the minds of
persons convicted of criminal activity. The ingredient of MEM we refer to as Grudge has at
least two but potentially more than two facets. One of these is the tendency to apportion the
blame for contemporary ills in the world to the West or, relatedly, that West is sinful. The
other aspect of the Grudge factor is the perception that the world is rotten and devoid of moral
principlesi.e., Vile World. Grudge is not a pure psychological trait like Nastiness. Its
impact derives from the interaction with the external world and it contains sociological and
political overtones. The third ingredient of MEM, the Excuse, is perhaps the least interesting
because its main incarnation religiosity is not a new construct. The other two sub-
components of ExcuseDivine Power and Utopianismare approaching separation from
God but, in the final analyses, do not change its interpretation.
Our measures of MEM are general not group-specific even though a contemporary
version of the survey (Stankov et al., 2010b) that is based on linguistic analyses of the
published material from different terrorist groups contains statements that relate to Muslim
culture. We believe that potential users of the scale will require both generalist and group-
specific versions of the scales. Future work on MEM should focus on providing validity
evidence for the measures and, in particular, on their concurrent validity by correlating MEM
with measures of terrorist (and criminal) behaviour.
Primary uses of our militant extremist mindset measures are anticipated to be in studying
general populations not aberrant groups. The main focus may be either on cross-cultural
comparisons or on the detection of changes in attitudes and belief systems following dramatic
events that affect the society.
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Stankov, L., Lee, J. & van de Vijver, F. (under review). Country-level dimensions of cultural
differences.
Stankov, L., Saucier, G. & Kneevi, G. (under review). Militant extremist mindset and the
assessment of radicalization in general population.
Chapter 12
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AMONG CHURCH

LEADERS: APPLYING THE SCHUTTE EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE SCALE WITHIN NEWFRONTIERS
Leslie J. Francis1,, Andrew Ryland2 and Mandy Robbins1

1
Warwick Religions and Education Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of
Warwick, Coventry, England CV4 7AL, United Kingdom
2
Beacon Church Runnymede, Church Office, 12 The Sainsbury Centre, Chertsey
Surrey, England KT16 9AG, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT
The present project introduced the notion and measurement of emotional
intelligence to research among church leaders. A sample of 154 individuals
serving in a range of leadership roles within local churches associated with the
Newfrontiers network completed the Schutte Scale of Emotional Intelligence in
order to address three research questions. In response to the first question, the data
supported the overall internal consistency reliability of the instrument among
church leaders. In response to the second question, the data demonstrated that
these church leaders recorded lower mean scores of emotional intelligence than
those recorded by the participants in Schuttes foundation study. In response to the
third question, the data drew attention to those aspects of emotional intelligence on
which church leaders demonstrated low levels of endorsement, including in
particular certain aspects of non-verbal communication.
Keywords: Church leaders, Britain, Emotional Intelligence, Psychology, Religion
Ph: 44-0-24-7652 2539; Fax: 44-0-24-7657 2638; leslie.francis@warwick.ac.uk

142 Leslie J. Francis, Andrew Ryland and Mandy Robbins
INTRODUCTION
The notion of emotional intelligence is a relatively recent and highly attractive construct
which has been both conceptualised and operationalised in a variety of ways. For example, in
the back cover blurb of his pioneering book, Emotional Intelligence, Goleman (1995) offered
the following powerful overview of the notion:
Emotional intelligence includes self-awareness and impulse control, persistence, zeal and
motivation, empathy and social deftness. These are the qualities that mark people who excel:
whose relationships flourish, who are stars in the workplace.
In his subsequent publication, Working with Emotional Intelligence, Goleman (1998)

argued as follows:
Emotional intelligence refers to the capacity for recognising our own feelings and those of
others, for motivating ourselves, and for managing emotions well in ourselves. It describes
abilities distinct from, but complementary to, academic intelligencethe purely cognitive
capacities measured by IQ. Many people who are book smart but lack emotional intelligence
end up working for people who have lower IQs than they but who excel in emotional
intelligence skills (p.327, italics as in the original).
Golemans (1998, pp. 26-27) classification of the components of emotional intelligence

falls into two broad categories: personal competence and social competence. Personal
competence includes self-awareness, self-regulation, and motivation. Social competence
includes empathy and social skills.
In their popular book, Executive EQ: Emotional intelligence in leadership and
organisations, Cooper and Sawaf (1997) related emotional intelligence to four key
components: emotional literacy, which includes knowledge of ones own emotions and how
they function; emotional fitness, which includes emotional hardiness and flexibility;
emotional depth, which involves emotional intensity and potential for growth; and emotional
alchemy, which includes the ability to use emotion to spark creativity.
In their review of the construct, Mayer and Salovey (1997) proposed the following four
components: perception, appraisal, and expression of emotion; emotional facilitation of
thinking; understanding, analyzing and employing emotional knowledge; and reflective
regulation of emotions to further emotional and intellectual growth.
MEASURES OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Initial measures of emotional intelligence proposed somewhat lengthy and multi-faceted
instruments. For example, the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (Bar-On, 1996),
employed 133 items to generate 15 distinct scales, proposing measures of emotional self-
awareness, assertiveness, self-regard, self-actualisation, independence, empathy, interpersonal
relationships, social responsibility, problem solving, reality testing, flexibility, stress
tolerance, impulse control, happiness, and optimism. The Style in the Perception of Affect
Scale (Bernet, 1996) employed 93 items to distinguish preferences for three different styles of
Emotional Intelligence among Church Leaders 143
responding to feeling, defined as body-based, evaluation-based and logic-based perception of

affect.
A constructive and user-friendly contribution to the assessment of emotional intelligence
was made by the 33-item Emotional Intelligence Scale proposed by Schutte, Malouff, Hall,
Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, and Dornheim (1998). This instrument was grounded in the work
of Salovey and Mayer (1990) who suggest that emotional intelligence comprises three
categories of adaptive abilities: appraisal and expression of emotion; regulation of emotion;
and utilisation of emotions in solving problems. The 33 items were selected from an original
pool of 62 items by means of factor analysis conducted on data provided by 346 participants
recruited from a variety of settings in a metropolitan area in the south eastern United States.
They generated an alpha coefficient of .90.
The construct validity of Schuttes measure was established alongside a range of other
instruments, including the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Taylor, Ryan, & Bagby, 1985), the
Attention, Clarity and Mood Repair subscales of the Trait Meta Mood Scale (Salovey, Mayer,
Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995), the Optimism subscale of the Life Orientation Test
(Scheier & Carver, 1985; Marshall, Wortman, Kusulas, Hervig, & Vickers, 1992), the Zung
Depression Scale (Zung, 1965), the openness to experience scale of the Revised NEO
Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992a, 1992b), and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). The mean scale scores also demonstrated predicted
differences between men and women (with women recording higher scores of emotional
intelligence), and predicted differences between psychotherapists and prisoners (with
psychotherapists recording higher scores of emotional intelligence).
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AMONGST CHURCH LEADERS

Against this background the objective of the present study is to assess the application of
the Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale in a study among church leaders. This application
will allow three specific research questions to be addressed. The first research question
concerns assessing the internal consistency reliability of the instrument among a well-defined
population for whom no data currently exist on its psychometric properties. Do the items
cohere among a highly religious population in a similar way to that in which they function
among other populations? The second research question concerns comparing the mean scale
scores of emotional intelligence recorded by church leaders with the scores recorded by other
groups: do church leaders (as individuals engaged with ministry among people) overall
display higher levels of emotional intelligence? The third research question concerns profiling
the emotional intelligence characteristics displayed by church leaders: does close inspection
of the ways in which church leaders respond to the emotional intelligence survey provide
indicators that may be helpful in shaping educational programmes concerned with their
continuing personal and professional development?
Table 1. The Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale: Item endorsement & item rest-of-test
correlations
r agree
%
I know when to speak about my personal problems to others .43 80
When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles .37 82
and overcame them
I expect that I will do well on most things I try .14 64
Other people find it easy to confide in me .38 67
I find it hard to understand the non-verbal messages of other people* .49 24
Some of the major events of my life have led me to re-evaluate what is
important and not important .37 83
When my mood changes, I see new possibilities .14 50
Emotions are one of the things that make my life worth living .29 41
I am aware of my emotions as I experience them .38 82
I expect good things to happen .21 66
I like to share my emotions with others .30 48
When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last .28 31
I arrange events others enjoy .29 75
I seek out activities that make me happy -.06 72
I am aware of the non-verbal messages I send to others .53 44
I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others .16 59
When I am in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for me .30 71
By looking at their facial expressions, I recognise the emotions people are .50 80
experiencing
I know why my emotions change .42 62
When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas .15 72
I have control over my emotions .09 49
I easily recognise my emotions as I experience them .34 70
I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to tasks I take on .31 48
I compliment others when they have done something well .32 90
I am aware of the non-verbal messages other people send .53 68
When another person fells me about an important event in his or her life,
I almost feel as though I have experienced this event myself .38 40
When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas .27 14
When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail* .21 4
I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them .49 40
I help other people feel better when they are down .48 74
I use good moods to help myself trying in the face of obstacles .31 43
I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice .40 67
It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do* .44 14
alpha .81
*
These items were reverse coded to generate the item rest-of-scale correlations.
r = correlations between individual items and the sum of the remaining items.
f = sum of agree and agree strongly responses.
METHOD
Sample
A total of 262 questionnaires were distributed to individuals serving in leadership roles

within local churches associated with the Newfrontiers network, including elders, staff,
volunteer leaders and highly committed members sharing in leadership. The 154 respondents
represented the satisfaction response rate of 59%. Of these respondents, 68 were male, 84
were female, and 2 failed to disclose their sex; 15 were under the age of thirty, 27 were in
their thirties, 49 were in their forties, 37 were in their fifties, 17 were in their sixties, 7 were
aged seventy or over, and 2 failed to disclose their age.
Measure
Emotional intelligence was assessed by the 33-item Emotional Intelligence Scale

proposed by Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, and Dorheim (1998). Each
item was assessed on a five-point scale: agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree,
disagree, and disagree strongly.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the scale properties for the Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale in terms
of the item endorsement (sum of the agree strongly and agree responses) and the item rest-of-
test correlations (the correlations between each item and the sum of the remaining items),
together with the alpha coefficient.
The first conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the Schutte Emotional
Intelligence Scale demonstrates satisfactory internal consistency reliability: the alpha
coefficient of .81 is well in excess of the threshold of acceptability of .65 proposed by
DeVellis (2003). The item rest-of-test scale correlations, however, demonstrate that not all
items contribute well to a unidimensional scale: 6 of the 33 items record an item rest-of-scale
correlation below the level of .20. Internal consistency reliability could be enhanced by
dropping some of these items, but only at the cost of reducing the breadth of the way in which
emotional intelligence was conceptualised by the test constructors.
Table 2. Mean scores of emotional intelligence for church leaders compared with Schuttes
standardisation data
Leaders Norms
N mean SD N mean SD t p<
Male 68 116.62 10.65 111 124.78 16.52 -4.017 .05
Female 84 120.41 10.56 218 130.94 15.09 -6.848 .05
Table 2 presents the mean scale scores of emotional intelligence recorded by male and by
female church leaders considered separately
Although there are no recognised normative data published for this scale, the mean scores
published by the test constructors can at least serve as a helpful reference point. These scores
were generated from a heterogeneous sample of individuals recruited from a variety of
settings in a metropolitan area in the south eastern United States, including university
students, psychotherapists and prisoners. In line with the sex differences reported by the test
constructors (Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dornheim, 1998), female
church leaders recorded higher scores of emotional intelligence in comparison with male
church leaders. Table 2 also demonstrates that both male and female church leaders recorded
significantly lower scores of emotional intelligence in comparison with the men and women
who comprised Schuttes sample. A second point of reference can be provided by the study
conducted by Zeng and Miller (2003) among 594 undergraduates attending an introductory
psychology course at Midwestern University. Although Zeng and Miller (2003) did not report
scores separately for men and women, their mean score of 126.04 (SD = 14.8) falls midway
between Schuttes standardisation of 124.78 for males and 130.94 for females.
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROFILE OF CHURCH LEADERS

Given the finding that church leaders may not be displaying particularly high levels of
emotional intelligence, it is constructive now to return to table 1 in order to chart the profile
of church leaders against their responses to the individual items comprising the scale.
At least 80% of the church leaders believe that they possess the following positive
characteristics: 90% compliment others when they have done something well; 83% recognise
that some of the major events of their life have led them to re-evaluate what is important and
what is not important; 82% are aware of their emotions as they experience them; 82% say
that, when they are faced with obstacles, they remember times when they faced similar
obstacles and overcame them; 80% feel that they know when to speak about their personal
problems to others; and 80% recognise the emotions people are experiencing by looking at
their facial expressions. Over two-thirds of the church leaders arrange events that others enjoy
(75%); help other people feel better when they are down (74%); seek out activities that make
them feel happy (72%); are able to come up with new ideas when they are in a positive mood
(72%); find that solving problems is easy for them when they are in a positive mood (71%);
easily recognise their own emotions as they experience them (70%); are aware of the non-
verbal messages other people send (68%); believe that other people find it easy to confide in
them (67%); and can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice (67%).
Fewer than half of the church leaders, however, are able to endorse the following
characteristics: 31% say that when they experience a positive emotion they know how to
make it last; 40% believe that when another person tells them about an important event in his
or her life, they almost feel as though they have experienced the event themselves; 40% know
what other people are feeling just by looking at them; 41% believe that emotions are one of
the things that make life worth living; 43% use good moods to help themselves keep trying in
the face of obstacles; 44% are aware of the non-verbal messages they send to others; 48% like
to share their emotions with others; 48% motivate themselves by imagining a good outcome
to tasks they take on; and 49% feel that they have control over their emotions.
DISCUSSION
The present paper set out to address three research questions. The first research question
concerned assessing the internal consistency reliability of the Schutte Emotional Intelligence
Scale among a group of church leaders. Two main findings emerged from the research data in
respect of this question. On the one hand, the alpha coefficient of .81 demonstrated that
overall the 31-item Likert-type instrument achieved a sufficiently satisfactory level of internal
consistency reliability to commend its application for research among church leaders. On the
other hand, the item rest-of-scale correlations drew attention to one item that completely
failed to correlate with the sum total of the other 32 items (r = -.06) and five further items that
failed to achieve correlations with the sum total of the other 32 items in excess of .2. The item
that completely failed to correlate with the sum of the other items was this I seek out
activities that make me happy. The poor performance of this item could reflect the reluctance
of church leaders to seek out personal hedonism in contrast with their commitment to serve
God and to serve other people. In this sense the item might function in a distinct manner
among a highly religious constituency compared with a broader population survey. The other
five items with relatively low correlations may simply reflect the breadth of the construct of
emotional intelligence being accessed by the Schutte Scale. While the psychometric
properties of the instrument could be improved by the omission of these items, such
improvement would only be achieved at the costs of narrowing the width of the construct and
of losing comparability with other studies that have used this instrument. On balance,
therefore, the recommendation is to commend the application of the instrument among church
leaders in its original form.
The second research question concerned comparing the mean scale scores of emotional
intelligence recorded by church leaders with the scores recorded by other groups. The main
finding emerging from the research data in respect of this question was unambiguous. Taking
the mean scale scores of the 218 women and 111 men who participated in the foundation
study (Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dornheim, 1998) as normative
data, both male and female church leaders reported significantly lower levels of emotional
intelligence. This finding remains vulnerable in light of the non-representative nature of the
sample on which the foundation study was based. Nonetheless, the direct comparison made
between the two studies raised a proper question regarding the level of emotional intelligence
displayed by church leaders.
The third research question concerned profiling the emotional intelligence characteristics
displayed by church leaders in terms of the item endorsement given to the 33 individual items
that comprise the Schutte Scale of Emotional Intelligence. The detailed findings to emerge
from the research data in respect of this question provide those who have responsibility for
the continuing personal and professional development of church leaders with a detailed
agenda on which to work. For example, these data draw particular attention to the difficulties
church leaders may experience with non-verbal communication. Well under half of those in
the present sample were aware of the non-verbal messages they send to others (44%). It is
likely that skills in these areas could be enhanced by effective educational programmes.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the present study has demonstrated the value of introducing the notion and
measurement of emotional intelligence to programmes of research among church leaders.
There are, however, three main limitations with the present study that need to be addressed by
future research. The first main limitation concerns the sample, namely a relatively small
number of diverse church leaders within one well-defined church context. What is required
now are larger samples of clearly defined church leaders recruited from other denominational
contexts.
The second main limitation concerns the reliance on just one measure of emotional
intelligence. Given the diverse ways in which this construct has been conceptualised and
operationalised, there would be clear value in some future research among church leaders
employing the Schutte Scale of Emotional Intelligence (to ensure comparability with the
present study) alongside one or two other well-chosen measures of emotional intelligence (to
extend the present study).
The third limitation concerns the way in which the present study has discussed emotional
intelligence in isolation from other related psychometric constructs, including, for example,
indices of personality and empathy (to link with theories shaped by the psychology of
religion) or indices of theological belief (to link with themes shaped by empirical theology).
REFERENCES
Bar-On, R. (1996). The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): A test of emotional intelligence.
Toronto: Multi-Health Systems.
Bernet, M. (1996). Emotional intelligence: Components and correlates. Toronto: Annual
Convention of the American Psychological Association.
Cooper, R. K., & Sawaf, A. (1997). Executive EQ: Emotional intelligence in leadership and
organizations. New York: Grosset/Putnam.
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992a). Normal personality assessment in clinical practice:
The NEO Personality Inventory. Psychological Assessment, 4, 5-13.
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992b). Revised Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) and NEO
Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI): Professional manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological
Assessment Resources.
DeVellis, R. F. (2003). Scale development: Theory and applications. London: Sage.
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books.
Goleman, D. (1989). Working with emotional intelligence. London: Bloomsbury.
Marshall, G. N., Wortman, C. B., Kusulas, J. W., Hervig, L. K., & Vickers, R. R. (1992).
Distinguishing optimism from pessimism: Relations to fundamental dimensions of mood
and personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 1067-1074.
Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1997). What is emotional intelligence? In P. Salovey & S.
Sluyter (Eds.), Emotional development and emotional intelligence: Educational
implications (pp. 3-31). New York: Basic Books.
Patton, J. H., Stanford, M. S., & Barratt, E. S. (1995). Factor structure of the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51, 768-774.
Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, Cognition and
attention, clarity, and repair: Exploring emotional intelligence using the trait Meta-Mood
Scale. In J. W. Pennebaker (Ed.), Emotion, disclosure and health (pp. 125-154).
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1985). Optimism, coping and health: Assessment and
implications of generalized outcome expectancies. Health Psychology, 4, 219-247.
Schutte, N. S., Malouff, J. M., Hall, L. E., Haggerty, D. J., Cooper, J. T., Golden, C. J., &
Dornheim. L. (1998). Development and validation of a measure of emotional
intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 25, 167-177.
Taylor, G. J., Ryan, D., & Bagby, R. M. (1985). Toward the development of a new self-report
alexithymia scale. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 44, 195-199.
Zeng, X., & Miller, C. E. (2003). Examination of measurements of emotional intelligence.
Erogemetika, 3, 38-49.
Zung, W. K. (1965). A self-rating depression scale. Archives of General Psychiatry, 12, 63-
70.
Chapter 13
OMINOUS SIGNS: SCHIZOTYPY

AND RELIGIOUS ATTACHMENT
Lisa Hancock
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2050, Australia
ABSTRACT
Considering the importance of religious factors in the psychosis spectrum, the
unexplored relationship between religious attachment (RA) and schizotypal traits is of
strong theoretical and clinical interest. This chapter presents novel research linking these
traits in a broad undergraduate Christian sample. Three hierarchical regressions found
that RA was a significant positive predictor of cognitive and interpersonal but not
disorganised schizotypy traits. There was a specific relationship between anxious RA and
cognitive schizotypy, replicating prior findings in a narrow Evangelical sample. Adult
peer attachment and neuroticism appeared to be involved in these relationships. The
finding highlights RA as a promising new avenue for schizotypy research which may
drive important theoretical and clinical developments.
Keywords: Attachment, Christianity, Psychosis, Religion, Schizotypal personality
INTRODUCTION
In delusional insanity, paranoia, as they sometimes call it, we may have a diabolical
mysticism, a sort of religious mysticism turned upside down. The same sense of ineffable
importance in the smallest events, the same texts and words coming with new meanings, the
same voices and visions and leadings and missions, the same controlling by extraneous
powers; only this time the emotion is pessimistic: instead of consolations we have desolations;
Ph: 61-2-9385 3595; Fax: 61-2-9385 3641; email: l.hancock@unsw.edu.au

152 Lisa Hancock
the meanings are dreadful; and the powers are enemies (William James, 1960/1902, The
Varieties of Religious Experience, p.106).
For the psychosis-prone religion seems to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, the
terrifying religious delusions to which James alludes represent a pathological extreme, and
even in nonclinical populations, schizotypal or psychosis-like personality traits are associated
with religious preoccupation (Diduca & Joseph, 1997) and religious experience (Maltby &
Day, 2002). On the other hand, for highly functioning schizotypal individuals, religion can
sometimes provide an organising framework which helps to make sense of anomalous
experiences, perhaps protecting against the associated distress and breakdown in functioning
(Jackson, 1997). Psychosis patients report extensive use of religion to understand their
experiences, and it seems that this can be both beneficial and harmful (Mohr, Brandt, Borras,
Gillieron & Huguelet, 2006). It makes sense, then to investigate psychological factors which
might influence religions function as risk or resource for the schizotypal. Religious
attachment is one such factor which has remained unexplored.
In a rather radical extension of Hazan and Shavers adult attachment theory (1987),
Kirkpatrick and Shaver (1990) observed that relationship with God as described in the Bible
has features of parent-child and romantic attachment bonds, and that many religious
behaviours are attachment-like. For example, prayer and church attendance look like
proximity-seeking and these behaviours increase in times of distress or danger. Supporting
the concept of God as an attachment figure, implicit affective and cognitive responses to
religious attachment-cues (such as God has abandoned me) parallel responses to other
attachment cues (such as mother has abandoned me) (Mikulincer, Dolev & Shaver, 2004).
Self-report measures of religious and peer attachment describe two dimensions of
attachment insecurity: anxiety about abandonment, and avoidance of intimacy or dependence;
these are associated with negative working models of self and other, respectively (Brennan,
Clark & Shaver, 1999). Attachment working models are based on past and present attachment
experiences and tend to modestly correspond across parent, peer and religious domains; due
to a self-confirming influence on information processing, affective experience, and behaviour
they are difficult, but not impossible, to revise (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2009). God may be
attractive as a figure who can compensate for unmet attachment needs, but the psychological
function of such compensatory religious attachments is complex and not yet fully understood
(Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2008).
Unlike many religious variables, insecure religious attachment (RA) reliably predicts low
general and spiritual wellbeing (Beck & McDonald, 2004). Rowatt and Kirkpatrick (2002)
found anxious RA predicted negative affect, low positive affect, and neuroticism over and
above social desirability and other religious variables and suggested that a stress-buffering
function of secure RA may underlie religions generally positive association with mental
health. Some support for the stress-buffering function is provided by a prospective study in
which secure RA prospectively predicted improved adjustment following surgery of a loved
one, an effect mediated by positive religious coping (Belavich & Pargament, 2002). This
finding requires further confirmation, however, as no reliable multi-item RA measure was
available at that time, and the religion (if any) of participants was not known.
Ominous Signs: Schizotypy and Religious Attachment 153
SCHIZOTYPAL TRAITS
Schizotypal traits are normally distributed and predict later psychopathology such as
schizotypal personality disorder (Raine & Benishay, 1995). They include social withdrawal or
flattened affect (interpersonal schizotypy), odd/eccentric behaviour and beliefs (disorganised
schizotypy), and unusual perceptual experiences, suspicious, magical or referential cognition
(cognitive-perceptual schizotypy). Despite high heritability, schizotypal trait expression is
sensitive to a range of short term psychological and environmental influences (see Raine,
2006 for review).
A small but growing body of research has linked schizotypal traits with insecure adult
peer attachment (AA). A fairly consistent association between anxious AA and cognitive-
perceptual schizotypy traits such as paranoia (Berry et al., 2006; Meins, Jones, Fernyhough,
Hurndall & Koronis, 2008; Tiliopoulos & Goodall, 2009) has been interpreted within
cognitive models proposing that anxious attachments negative schema of self may contribute
to paranoid interpretations of hallucinations and other anomalous experiences (Peters et al.,
2006). Others propose that the association stems from common biologically based
vulnerabilities such as neuroticism (Tiliopoulos & Goodall, 2009), a variable which has not
yet been controlled for in studies of schizotypy and AA.
In the only study to investigate religious attachment and schizotypy in any form, Hancock
and Tiliopoulos (2010) found that less secure RA and specifically the anxious RA dimension
predicted cognitive-perceptual, interpersonal and disorganised schizotypy in Evangelical
Christians. The relationship between cognitive schizotypy and anxious RA could not be
accounted for by peer attachment or neuroticism. This intriguing pilot finding suggests that
schizotypy and RA-related difficulties may share common diatheses or be causally related in
some fashion. For example, extending the ideas of Rowatt and Kirkpatrick (2002), secure
religious attachment might buffer generally against stress and its exacerbating effect on
schizotypy.
In the absence of any other research or explicit theory linking the two constructs,
however, this pilot finding requires replication. A further limitation of this study was the
narrow sample characteristics: participants were all active in campus Christian societies of a
conservative Evangelical persuasion, a rather narrow and religiously homogenous population
which is also likely to select for religiously active and sociable individuals. Evidence exists
that indicates that schizotypal traits and their associations with religious variables vary across
different religious and cultural groups (Johnstone & Tiliopoulos, 2008; Lesmana &
Tiliopoulos, 2009; Tiliopoulos, & Crawford, 2007; Tiliopoulos & Hancock, unpublished
manuscript), so it is questionable whether RA relates to schizotypal traits outside this narrow
population. It is of clinical interest to know whether this association applies more generally,
and if so, whether this reflects correspondence with insecure adult attachment, or is rooted in
more general temperamental co-vulnerabilities, such as neuroticism.
Accordingly, the present study aimed to extend knowledge about religious attachment by
determining whether RA is related to schizotypy in a broader religious population. It was
expected that as for Evangelicals, schizotypal traits will be predicted by less secure RA, and
more specifically, by the anxious RA dimension. A secondary aim was to explore the role of
two potential covariates, adult attachment and neuroticism.
154 Lisa Hancock
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 106 first year psychology students who identified themselves as
Christian and reported experiencing a relationship with God (an assumption of the RA
measure). 60.6% prayed at least weekly. Mean age was 18.95 (SD: 1.55). Two participants
did not specify gender; of the remaining 104, 77 (74.0%) were female. There were no other
missing values in the dataset. All relevant variables met the assumptions for multivariate
analysis.
Materials
Schizotypal Personality QuestionnaireBrief (SPQ-B) (Raine & Benishay, 1995): A

brief self-report instrument based on the DSM-IV-TR criteria for SPD, assessing cognitive-
perceptual (8 items), interpersonal (8 items), and disorganised schizotypy (6 items).
Experiences in Close RelationshipsRevised (ECR-R) (Fraley, Waller & Brennan,
2000): A self-report measure of adult peer attachment assessing avoidance of intimacy or
dependence (18 items) and anxiety about abandonment (18 items).
Attachment to God Inventory (AGI) (Beck & McDonald, 2004): A self-report measure
based on the ECR-R and assessing two dimensions of RA insecurity: anxiety about
abandonment (14 items), and avoidance of intimacy and dependence (14 items).
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) Emotional Stability/Neuroticism subscale
(Goldberg, 1999): This subscale consists of 10 items chosen from 2036 IPIP items as having
high loadings on the Big Five Neuroticism factor. Higher scores indicate lower emotional
stability (i.e., higher neuroticism).
The Eysenck Personality QuestionnaireRevised, short version (EPQ-R-S) Lie scale: A
valid 12-item index of lying or faking good (Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1985). Higher
scores represent lying.
Procedure
Students were invited to participate in an Online religion, personality and relationships

study for course credit. Participants were blind to the constructs being assessed, and order of
presentation of questionnaires was randomised. Demographic and religious indicators were
also assessed.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and reliabilities for continuous variables are summarised in Table 1.
The SPQ-B cognitive subscale and EPQ lie scale showed relatively poor reliability and
should be treated with caution. For total SPQ-B score, 9 students scored over 17, the 90th
percentile cut-off suggesting high risk of SPD in the original US college sample (Raine &
Benishay, 1995).
Cognitive schizotypy was elevated relative to scale norms. One-way ANOVA found
more avoidant RA (large effect of group, 2 = .23, df = 200) and cognitive schizotypy
(moderate effect of group, 2 = .07, df = 200) than in the prior Evangelical sample, and
prayer was less frequent (r = .54, p<.05).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics & reliabilities
Scale Subscale Observed [norms] M (SD)

SPQ.B Cognitive .58 [.72] 4.13 (1.91) a
Interpersonal .69 [.76] 3.04 (2.11)
Disorganised .71 [.73] 2.65 (1.83)
AGI Anxiety .82 [.87] 2.53 (.58)
Avoidance . 78 [.86] 2.92 (.58)
ECR-R Anxiety .91 [.91] 3.72 (1.01)
Avoidance .92 [.94] 3.00 (.92)
EPQ Lie .58 [.73-.77] 2.66 (2.06)
IPIP Neuroticism .82 [.86] 2.86 (.76)
Note. Normative reliabilities are in square brackets. a Mean discrepant from scale norms at a = .005,
two-tails.
Table 2. Pearson correlations (upper diagonal) & partial correlations (lower diagonal)
controlling for age, gender, & lying
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
** ** ** ** **
1. Cognitive .27 .30 .31 -.16 .36 .14 .38 -.08 -.05 -.15
** ** ** ** **
2. Interpersonal .28 .38 .16 .17 .31 .42 .26 .02 <|.01| .01
** ** ** ** **
3. Disorganised .29 .38 .15 .06 .37 .26 .43 -.13 -.02 -.07
** ** **
4. RA anxiety .30 .15 .13 -.12 .40 <|.01| .27 -.16 <|.01| -.17
*
5. RA avoidance -.17 .20 .05 -.08 .08 .18 -.06 -.10 -.10 .15
** ** ** ** ** ** *
6. AA anxiety .37 .32 .36 .38 .09 .35 .56 -.20 .08 -.09
** ** **
7. AA avoidance .19 .44 .27 .02 .14 .36 .19 -.11 .07 .23*
8. Neuroticism .38** .28* .44** .26** -.03 .56** .23* -.83 .18 -.21*
9. (log of) Age -.09 .21*
10. Gender -.14
11. Lie scale

*
p < .05. **p <.01.
156 Lisa Hancock
Table 3. Hierarchical multiple linear regressions predicting schizotypy dimensions
Cognitive-perceptual Interpersonal Disorganised

SE R2 SE R2 SE R2
Block1 .11** .06* .03
(.17**) (.10**) (.13**)
** * * **
Anxious RA .29 (.42 ) .31 .18 (.23 ) .35 .16 (.34 ) .31
Avoidant RA -.13 (-.04) .31 .19 (.16) .35 .07 (.04) .31
Block2 .08* (.02) .17**(.12**) .13**(.06*)
Anxious RA .17 (.33**) .33 .11 (.09) .35 .03 (.21) .32
Avoidant RA -.18 (-.04) .30 .11 (.10) .33 .01 (.07) .30
Anxious AA .29** (.20) .20 .14 (.21) .22 .31** .20
(.33**)
Avoidant AA .07 (-.05) .20 .35** (23*) .22 .15 (-.18) .20
Block3 *
.03 (.00) .01 (.00) .08**(.00)
*
Anxious RA .16 (.32 ) .32 .11 (.09) .35 .01 (.23) .31
Avoidant RA -.15 (-.04) .30 .13 (.10) .33 .04 (.07) .29
Anxious AA .16 (.19) .23 .06 (.21) .25 .12 (.36**) .22
Avoidant AA .06 (-.05) .20 .35**(.23*) .22 .15 (-.19) .19
Neuroticism .23* (.03) .30 .14 (.01) .33 .33**(-.08) .29
Note. Corresponding statistics from an Evangelical sample (Hancock & Tiliopoulos, 2010) are
presented in brackets and bolded where regression coefficients were outside the 95% confidence
interval for the current sample. The VIF results for all predictors were below 2, indicating absence
of multicolinearity. *p < .05; ** p < .01.
Three hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses were conducted to evaluate

predictors of schizotypy dimensions (see Table 3). Anxious and avoidant RA were entered in
the first step. To explore the role of potential mediators, AA dimensions were entered in the
second step, and neuroticism in the third step.
As shown in Table 2, age, gender and lying did not correlate with any of the schizotypy
or RA dimensions or moderate their inter-relationships, and therefore were not included in the
regression model.
Overall, RA dimensions accounted for a significant 11% and 6% of the variance in
cognitive and interpersonal schizotypy respectively, but only 3% of disorganised. For
cognitive schizotypy, there was a unique relationship with Anxious RA. This appeared to be
mediated by adult attachment and neuroticism, both of which added to the model. For
interpersonal schizotypy, AA added a substantial additional 17% of the variance, and
avoidant AA was the strongest predictor in the final model. Neuroticism did not add to the
model. For disorganised schizotypy, AA again added to the model, and anxious AA was a
moderate positive predictor of disorganised schizotypy. However, this relationship appeared
to be mediated by the shared influence of neuroticism, which was the only unique predictor in
the final model.
DISCUSSION
The positive association between schizotypal traits and insecure religious attachment in
Christians replicates pilot findings in a narrower Evangelical sample (Hancock & Tiliopoulos,
2010). There were interesting discrepancies in the mediating role of adult peer attachment and
Neuroticism relative to the pilot. The pattern of relationship between RA and schizotypal
traits in our broad undergraduate sample was generally similar to that in Evangelical society
members, but rather weaker.
Anxious RA was a unique predictor as expected, but only for cognitive schizotypy,
suggesting that Christians with anxious RA are more likely to also experience paranoid
ideation, ideas of reference, and/or unusual perceptions. The anxious RAcognitive
schizotypy association replicates findings in Evangelicals and also parallels findings for AA
anxiety. RA anxiety may contribute to schizotypy in similar ways to AA anxiety, such as by
promoting threat expectancy and more paranoid religious attributions of meaning, potentially
bringing together cognitive (Peters et al., 2008) and religious (Jackson, 1997) theories.
Unfortunately the SPQ-B does not allow subscales for paranoia and hallucinations to be
generated, but future studies using more detailed schizotypy measures could explore whether
theories about paranoia development should be extended to include religious attachment
attribution biases.
It is interesting that AA and Neuroticism appeared to be of greater relative importance in
understanding RAs role in the current sample. This highlights the importance of attending to
the religious characteristics of the sample in studies of RA. Considering the greater religious
involvement, lower RA avoidance, and greater frequency of RA-relevant activities such as
prayer among the Evangelical society members, one could speculate that in some intensely
religious populations the religious attachment bond may be so important to experience and
cognition that it overwhelms the role of temperament in the development of cognitive
schizotypy. For those who believe God is intimately involved in ordering the details of their
lives, and have an anxious RA, almost any every day event might be taken as an ominous sign
which activates religious attachment distress. The resultant attachment system hyperactivation
could escalate schizotypal tendencies by increasing vigilance for further signs confirming
their inability to elicit Gods care or protection. In contrast, for those with more secure RA a
sense of special significance or presence in the everyday could be interpreted as a comforting
and calming affirmation of a secure bond with God. Further examinations of RA
characteristics across religious subcultures are required, perhaps particularly with regard to a
groups experiential focus and emphasis on personal relationship with the deity.
INTERPERSONAL SCHIZOTYPY
Interpersonal schizotypy was also predicted by insecure RA. The pattern of specific
findings was remarkably similar to the pilot finding, with adult attachment but not
neuroticism accounting for additional variance, and avoidant AA the most important unique
predictor. This is consistent with adult attachment findings (Tiliopoulos & Goodall, 2008).
There is certainly conceptual overlap between the schizotypal aloof interpersonal style and
avoidant attachment, but causal explanations are also possible: AA could increase relationship
158 Lisa Hancock
distress and exacerbate schizotypy; alternatively, and perhaps more likely, early schizotypal
deficits could interfere with development of secure peer attachments. This might then transfer
to RA difficulties.
DISORGANISED SCHIZOTYPY
Disorganised schizotypy was not predicted by RA and anxious RA was not a unique
predictor, in contrast to evangelicals. Adult attachment added to the model, and anxious AA
was a moderate positive predictor, just as in the Evangelicals. However, in a broader sample
this relationship appeared to be explained by the shared influence of neuroticism, which was
the strongest predictor of disorganised schizotypy in clear contrast to its negligible role for
evangelicals. Again, possibly RA is of lower relative importance among less intensely
religious Christians, but it is more difficult to explain why anxious AA should also be of
lower importance relative to neuroticism and avoidant AA a positive rather than negative
predictor of disorganisation. It would be interesting to explore whether for some Evangelical
society members disorganisation items such as Some people think that I am a very bizarre
person (item 6) actually tapped perceived marginalisation by peers on the basis of visible
group identity or evangelistic outreach activities on campus, perceptions which might be
biased by adult attachment anxiety (negative working model of self).
Adult attachment related to schizotypy in expected ways, consistent with prior findings
linking interpersonal schizotypy with avoidant AA, and cognitive and disorganised
schizotypy with anxious AA. There was modest correspondence across religious and peer
domains for attachment anxiety but not for avoidance, in contrast to US norms using the same
measures in college and community samples (Beck & McDonald, 2004) but consistent with
the prior Australian study (Hancock & Tiliopoulos, 2010). This is puzzling; possibly RA
avoidance, or reporting thereof, is more reflective of a religious cultures teachings on
intimacy than an individuals attachment working models, at least in Australia.
DIFFICULTIES IN INTERPRETATION
There are several reasons why the present findings were difficult to interpret. Firstly,
there is no theory explicitly linking RA and schizotypy to guide interpretation. Even theories
linking other forms of attachment and schizotypy rely on cross-sectional data and are not well
developed in terms of causal processes.
Secondly, the SPQ lacks rigorous validation and norming in homogenous religious
populations, so it is not known whether particular religious views or practices confound
measurement of schizotypy and hence its association with RA. Distinguishing between
normative and pathological religious experiences is not easy, and clinician administered
measures may be preferable. The SPQ-B cognitive schizotypy subscale showed rather poor
reliability in both samples and in the current sample it was elevated relative to both scale
norms and Evangelicals. Perhaps particular cognitive schizotypy items were endorsed on the
basis of religious beliefs or experiences which are normative within a more experiential
Christian subculture, such as those tapping experiences of guidance or presence.
Thirdly, very different relationships with RA might be found in clinical populations, and
this needs to be investigated. Related research questions are RAs relationships with religious
distress, information processing biases, and clinical outcomes in schizotypal patients. If future
research finds RA difficulties to be prevalent clinically, promoting or priming secure RA
might buffer against religion-related distress and paranoia by encouraging more adaptive
interpretation of schizotypal experiences and improving use of religious resources and coping
strategies. Attachment difficulties and impairment in relationship functioning with God might
translate more naturally to therapeutic intervention than do religious beliefs and values.
Furthermore, according to the broaden and build model (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2009),
secure RA might also have positive effects beyond the religious domain, such as by
enhancing use of social or religious community support or promoting emotion regulation and
prosocial behaviour in schizotypal individuals.
CONCLUSION
Finally, the terms prediction and mediation should not be taken to suggest that these
cross-sectional analyses tested causal association. In early adulthood both schizotypy and
religious attachment may be in flux, meaning tests of mediation could be hopelessly biased by
unmodelled auto-regressive effects (Maxwell & Cole, 2007), and there is insufficient theory
to assume temporal precedence or rule out the possibility of important omitted variables.
Although RAs status as a predictor tends to be assumed, presumably because of its roots in
infant behaviour, both schizotypy and insecure attachment in adults are sensitive to past and
present psychosocial experiences, while themselves impairing relationship functioning and
information processing. It is therefore entirely possible that schizotypal deficits and
cognitions interfere with secure RA development, or that aspects of schizotypy and insecure
RA develop in mutual influence with one another and are sustained by their negative effects
on peer, parental and religious experiences. Careful longitudinal and experimental studies of
RA and schizotypy are clearly required to resolve these fascinating questions.
Regardless of these limitations, the discovery of a replicable association between insecure
RA and schizotypy among Christians is an important development which challenges us to
adapt our understanding of other religious and attachment processes and their relationship to
schizotypy. This line of enquiry could help illuminate religions multifaceted functioning
within personality and potentially even stimulate new therapeutic approaches for psychosis
spectrum disorders.
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Australian Christians.
Chapter 14
SHAM REASONING, HUMPTY DUMPTY AND

THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Fiona J. Hibberd
ABSTRACT
Slife and Reber ask of psychologists that they recognise their prejudice against
theism and the incompatibility between theistic and naturalistic worldviews. Yet, the
subtext of their paper is that theism and naturalism are equally valid and that
psychologys secularism is a mistake. Given that theism is not beyond reason, the only
sufficient ground for charging psychologists with prejudice is if: (i) theism has survived
serious attempts at conceptual and empirical test, and; (ii) psychology ignores or
disguises this fact. So, the grounds for believing in the reality of a supernatural existent
are highly relevant to the authors allegation. However, their concept of God affords no
such grounds. They disavow the logic involved in the ordinary meaning of the term
incompatible and they ignore a crucial distinction between conditions of existence and
qualities of things or processes. The consequence is that either God is this-worldly and
there is no ontological basis to Slife and Rebers incompatibility thesis, or Gods mode of
existence is quite different from the mode of existence of ordinary things and all the
problems of dualism follow. Either way, their charge of prejudice is without foundation.
The burden of proof rests with the defender of theism and, for now, psychologys
secularism can be considered a mark of the disciplines (sometimes questionable)
rationality.
Keywords: Dualism, Logic, Rationality, Relations, Theism
Ph: 61-2-9351 2867; Fax: 61-2-9036 5223; fiona.hibberd@sydney.edu.au. From Hibberd (2009a). Copyright
2009 by the American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission.
164 Fiona J. Hibberd
INTRODUCTION
Slife and Rebers (2009) central thesis is that psychologists exercise an unintentional and
pervasive prejudice against theism. They think they are bias-free because their discipline
remains non-committal on the topic of God. Yet introductory texts omit discussion of theistic
concepts, psychologists assume that their findings, explanations, interpretations and theories
apply to atheists and theists alike, their methodologies presume atheism, and they ignore the
theism present in theories that they seek to appropriate. Therein lies the prejudice and,
according to Slife and Reber, it exists because many psychologists continue to incorrectly
assume that theism is compatible with naturalism. The authors claim not to object to a secular
psychology, but merely to the compatibility assumption and to the lack of any warning given
to theists who may wish to access psychological research and services.
Slife and Rebers paper is marked by conceptual looseness, contradiction and
unsupported empirical claims1. However, I shall bypass much of this and go straight to the
crux of the matterthe papers subtext. Consider the following statements: there is a ...
subtle discrediting of theism as a serious interpretative and explanatory framework (p. 2);
naturalism ... makes the pre-investigatory assumption that the supernatural is not needed ...
in psychological science (p. 4); most psychologists mistakenly think that their naturalistic
findings are equally relevant to both theists and naturalists (p. 5); given the incompatibility
between theism and naturalism, psychology ... violate[s] the assumptions and values of the
former (p. 6); ... the systematic biases against theism in psychology are part of the social
imaginary of the discipline (p. 23); researchers ... still do not consider ... that God, as one
of several constitutive necessary conditions, had something to do with the participants
images of God (p. 25); ... many psychologists ... have attempted to understand and apply
his [Bubers] philosophy of the I-thou to psychology without theism (p. 26). Despite the
authors conditional support for a secular psychology (p. 30), the subtext of their paper is that
theism is as valid as naturalism and psychologists err in their disregard of the former;
psychologys neglect of theism is a mistake.
Slife and Reber do not say this, of course. They are marked by philosophys twentieth
century linguistic turn, its preoccupation with the supposed futility of metaphysics and
classical logic, and postmodernisms intrusion into theoretical psychology2. As a
consequence, their grip on the concepts of truth, error and rational inquiry is marginal.
Instead, their focus is ... the worldviewor world of meanings in the Heideggerian sense
and not the physical world per se ... (p. 10), thereby avoiding the rather difficult matter of
why secular psychology in general, and the atheist psychologist in particular, is wrong.
Heideggers theory of meaning involves a conception of language as the universal
medium or house of Being (Kusch, 1989). This undermines the aboutness of language and,
1
Of the latter, the following are noteworthy: many psychologists ... believe in God (p. 6) and most ... have
conducted their research and formulated their theorizing with this understanding [the compatibility of theism and
naturalism] (p. 9). These claims are central to Slife and Rebers argument but the reader cannot discern whether
they refer only to American psychologists or to some more general class. Moreover, if the authors analysis of
research practices in the second half of their paper is right, some psychologists are behaving not at all as
compatibilists but, conceivably, as atheists who acknowledge the incompatibilities between naturalism and
theism. In fact, psychologists recognition of the incompatibilities is implied by the authors when they invoke
this as motivation for the exclusion of theism from psychology (p. 19).
2
Of the twentieth century, Strawson (2000) notes that it was ... the silliest of the centuries, philosophically
speaking (p. 12).
Sham Reasoning, Humpty Dumpty and the Burden of Proof 165
although Slife and Reber provide a definition of theism (its sense), they are not concerned to
address whether its key concepts actually refer, i.e., whether what theism purports to be about
is true. They recognise that semantic matters are underpinned by ontological assumptions (p.
3), but prefer the unsuccessful strategy of certain social constructionists, viz., frame your
analysis in terms of semantics, forget that signifiers must at some stage in the chain of
signification be grounded in uninterpreted reality, and remain ontologically mute (e.g.,
Gergen, 1994). Unsurprisingly, then, the spirit of Slife and Rebers paper is relativist. It
assumes from the outset that theism and naturalism are equally valid worldviews and it offers
the reader no means of evaluating this assumption, i.e., no means of determining its truth or
epistemic merit. One is reminded of Peirces observations about the demise of conceptual
rigour when philosophy is in the hands of theologians: ... it is no longer the reasoning which
determines what the conclusion shall be, but it is the conclusion which determines what the
reasoning shall be. This is sham reasoning (1931-1958, paragraph 57, emphasis added).
I appreciate that every argument rests on assumptions that are not always argued for and
that it was never the authors intention to address the truth of theism. Their manifest intent is
to bring out the incompatibility between the naturalist and theist worldviews and
psychologists prejudice against the latter. However, the only sufficient reason for charging
psychologists with prejudice is if (i) theism has survived serious attempts at conceptual and
empirical test, and (ii) psychology ignores or disguises this fact. It follows that the grounds
for believing in the reality of a supernatural existent are highly relevant to their allegation.
Slife and Reber might object to (i) because it assumes that faith or knowledge from
revelation should be subject to the same probatory considerations (conceptual, empirical) as
scientific knowledge-claims. Recall, for example, their (invalid) inference that ... attempts to
use the insights gleaned from a naturalistic worldview to inform or correct the understandings
of a theistic worldview constitute a significant prejudice against the latter (p. 3). This may be
their attempt to limit the scope of reason. It has all the features of postmodernisms late
twentieth century criticisms of science: science, as the embodiment of Enlightenment reason,
is a presumptuous, dogmatic, grand narrative that seeks to exclude other equally valid
voices; its belief in a perspectiveless, Gods-eye view of the world is a conceit. Arguments
against the alleged defects of a universalistic conception of rationality (e.g., Siegel, 1987) are
typically ignored and the misrepresentation continuesscience is just one narrative or system
of meanings amongst many. And perhaps we should not be surprised if Slife and Reber do
object to (i) because history tells us that when reason and faith are at odds, the theist is more
inclined to conclude that something is wrong with reason. The sagacity of John Locke
(1706/1924, bk. IV, ch. XVIII) is relevant: I find every sect, as far as reason will help them,
make use of it gladly; and, where it fails them, they cry out, It is a matter of faith, and above
reason (p. 355).
However, if the history of philosophy is anything to go by, religion does not belong
solely to the province of faith (e.g., Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley presented what
they thought were proofs of Gods existence), and Slife and Reber do gesture towards the
importance of critical inquiry (p. 9). Moreover, the idea that examining any notion of God
involves standing outside the theists system of meanings and, thereby, missing the point, is
misguided. First, it mistakenly attributes meanings to non-symbolic phenomena, viz., to
what people take to be the case. What theists believe is either true or false and such beliefs
can, like any other belief, be tested. Second, whilst we cannot stand outside, or above, society
and cultural/historical contexts, this does not entail that our statements cannot be universal
and either true or false. Whether what we state is true depends on whether the world is as
described, not on where we are (spatio-temporally) located when we do the stating (Hibberd,
2005).
A WORD OF CLARIFICATION
Before I return to Slife and Rebers paper, it may be prudent to make some pre-emptive
clarifications. I assume that:
1. as inquirers we are fallible. No knowledge-claim is incorrigible;

2. philosophy and science are neither always rational nor always moral and so are not
themselves immune from criticism;
3. reasons can provide justification for various knowledge-claims and philosophical
inquiry or conceptual analysis can provide answers that are either true or false;
4. religion is an inherently valuable subject;
5. to comment on theism is not to comment on the broader subject of religion, the
importance of texts (such as the Bible or the Quran), nor on how religious practices
and interpretations continue to shape our behaviour and values.
THE AUTHORS CONCEPT OF GOD

Consider what Slife and Reber mean by theism. It includes non-natural (supernatural)
events and processes ( ... God for theists, p. 4) that are not mere epiphenomena (they ...
exist in a difference-making way (p. 4). ... [A] currently active God (or Gods) is necessary
for understanding the world; the world is indissolubly connected to God, including the
psychological world ... . The good life is inconceivable without God ... . God is already
and always intimately acting in nature which depends from moment to moment ... upon
divine activity (p. 4). It is ... a functionally existent God, one that relates to the events of the
world ... in a practical sense (p. 13). God has the ability to ... act otherwise ... (p. 13) and
acts ... concurrently in nature so that everything that happens is both fully a divine action and
a fully natural action (p. 14); ... God ... [plays] a role in the development of peoples
images of God (p. 26); God s constant involvement confers meaning on even the smallest
of subatomic events (p. 31).
These statements are not to be interpreted as figures of speech. They purport to be about
Gods existence and Gods activities. Typically (though not always) in philosophy, such
statements are said to involve a form of dualism between a supernatural world and the natural
world. Although Slife and Reber are aware of the problems that arise from dualisms two-
worlds argument, they appear to think that these problems are not relevant to their
characterisation of God, presumably because they believe it makes no appeal to two worlds.
Their explicit appeal is only to a functionally existent God actively involved in this world.
Even so, they do invoke the concepts supernatural and divine and, therefore, the logically
prior ontological question is: can the natural and supernatural co-exist or co-occur? One
interpretation of Slife and Rebers concept of God is that the supernatural is a this-worldly
kind of process, quite different from natural processes, but one that interacts with them (see p.
14), i.e., the natural and super-natural can co-exist or co-occur. Yet, if this is the case, there
are no ontological grounds to their incompatibility thesis.
Alternatively, we can interpret the authors as treating the supernatural not as a kind of
process but as a kind of existence quite different from existence as it is ordinarily understood.
This is consistent with the Christian theists usual understanding of God (as transcendent and
independent of the natural world). However, the problem here is that it unwittingly invokes
another realm because existence is said to be of a different type. This yields all the difficulties
associated with dualisms two-worlds argument. Although these difficulties are usually well
understood, here they are worth repeating because, if Slife and Reber do mean that Gods
existence is of a different type, they have not (contrary to their belief) avoided dualism.
Dualism is the thesis that that some things have a distinct type of existence from others,
that there are two realms or two different ways of being. Yet, entities in one realm are said to
participate in, imitate, share in, or interact with entities in the other. The consequence is
that the original distinction cannot be maintained. Passmore (1970) refers to this as the
Humpty Dumpty argument because:
... once we break up any system in a certain kind of way, it becomes quite impossible to put
the pieces together again in a single situation: and yet, unless they can be so put together, the
whole point of the breaking-up is lost (p. 40).
Opposing dualism, then, is not to endorse a monism that makes all differences unreal. It
is to endorse only a monism about existence. That is, there are not types, classes, levels,
modes or orders of existence because existence is not a predicate3. It makes no sense to say,
for example, some kangaroos exist and some do not. Contra Heidegger, then, existence is
not a characteristic shared or possessed by existing objects (Edwards, 2004). Existence is not
a quality or process. There are many different kinds of things or processes, but only a single
way of being or existing. This is a pluralistic conception of a single reality.
If Gods mode of existence is different from the natural mode of this world, then God, as
non-natural, is not of this world. Another realm or world has been invoked, albeit unwittingly.
The difficulty now lies in explaining the interaction between realms or modes or worlds.
There has to be some kind of relation between God (not located in this world) and Gods
effects (which are said to occur in a difference-making way in this world). Regardless of
what that relation is, if it obtains in the non-natural world (Gods realm) then so must the
other term of the relation, Gods effects. This is because items or entities have to be located in
the same realm for there to be a connection between them. It is not logically possible (and,
therefore, not empirically possible either) for a connection or relation between God and Gods
effects to obtain across different realms or different orders of existence. To be connected is to
be in a spatio-temporal relation within the one realm of being.
The upshot is that if Gods effects are real, God is not transcendent or supernatural
because transactions between the natural and supernatural are a logical impossibility. The
distinction between the natural and the supernatural, as different modes of existence, goes the
same way as the distinction between mind and body or that between universals and
3
Existence is signified in the use of the copula is. Is is an occurrence or something being the case. Logically,
there is no alternative to either is or is not or to either being or not being, i.e., there are no types or modes
of existence.
particularsit collapses4. Alternatively, there is no God, just as there is no Cartesian mind

and no pure universals.
Passmore (1970) notes that the rejection of dualism is indeed one of the few points
on which almost all the creative philosophers of modern times have agreed (p. 38). Perhaps,
then, we should return to the possibility that God is this-worldly and immanent. Such a notion
contradicts Slife and Rebers incompatibility thesis and I imagine that, to many theists, a this-
worldly God is no God at all. Yet it is worth more attention because the authors concept of
God is sometimes pantheistic. God is said to be constantly involved in this world, always ...
acting in nature ... (p. 4), a functionally existent God ... that relates to the events of the
world ... in a practical sense (p. 13). These descriptions are at odds with their general
description of theism because a this-worldly God rules out a divine reality, a worldly
connection to God, and a God concurrent with nature. Each of these assumes a dualism:
between the divine and its opposite; between the non-natural and the natural; between the
worldly and something outside of the worldly, and so on. Still, if we set these contradictions
aside, we can focus on the notion of a this-worldly God.
First, Slife and Rebers expression functionally existent. What it means is not clear.
Perhaps the idea is that God is constituted through what he does? If so, this ignores the logic
of relations, in particular the ontological distinction between relations and the items that stand
in those relations (see Hibberd, 2005, 2009b). A simple example will suffice to make the
point. You (that is, your physical being) are not constituted by your interactions with
colleagues, students, members of your family, etc. It is logically necessary that you exist
independently of those interactions in order for those interactions to occur. Likewise with a
this-worldly God. But Slife and Reber refer to God as uniquely active (p. 14, emphasis
added) suggesting perhaps that God is active in a way that no existent from this world is. If
this is the case, the authors are again invoking conditions of existence that are different for
God which, again, leaves their account mired in the problems of dualism5. Avoiding dualism,
just means that God is subject to the same conditions of existence as everything and
everybody else, and this means that Gods existence is not constituted through Gods
interactions in nature.
Second, if we allow a this-worldly God, then God exists in the ordinary sense and is just
one finite being among others, albeit one with unique qualities that no other existent
possesses. Now we are considering a scientific claim as opposed to a philosophical one. If
God belongs to this world, then Gods activities can, at least in principle, be understood in
terms of a material being that engages with other worldly events and processes. As a scientific
claim, it would presumably be immune from empirical testing. What testable hypothesis can
be derived from a claim of Gods existence as opposed to a claim of belief in God, or an
experience of God, or knowledge of God through revelation? Of course, some theists (or
should that be many theists?) are unconcerned about the issue of Gods existence (logically
independent of epistemic considerations). But the ontological matter remains: to have faith in
me presupposes that I exist and, if the problems of dualism are to be avoided, that same logic
4
A solution is not to be found in postulating another metaphysical entity (e.g., a soul) which is said to have a foot
in both worlds because this (i) obviates the need for two worlds, and (ii) only repeats the dilemma about the new
entitys relations to both worlds (Passmore, 1970).
5
Dualism is also present in the authors reliance on the concept of agency (Slife & Reber, p. 13). Space prevents me
from developing this point. Suffice it to say, a concept of agency is mistakenly thought to be compatible with the
doctrine of determinism. On the contrary, agency presupposes an alternative set of conditions of existence.
holds for God. Receiving communications from God, or experiencing God, or praying to
God, presupposes that God exists. The theists claim that God, Jesus and the Holy Spirit are
persons united into one Godhead is just an obfuscation. A strict identity cannot obtain
because the same individual cannot be both corporeal and incorporeal. Similarly, the term
God cannot be said to refer to the historical figure Jesus, for that makes theism redundant
and all talk of an eternal, infinite God particularly strange. The fact that people employ a term
intending it to refer to some thing, does not suffice to show that the intended reference is or
could be achieved.
In short, a this-worldly God must exist under the same conditions as any other existent if
dualism is to be avoided. It cannot be constituted by its activities in this world and it cannot
be incorporeal. Its status is that of any hypothetical entity in science and the question is Does
the term God successfully refer? The burden of proof lies with the defender of theism.
Finally, a comment about the authors use of the term incompatible. Incompatibility is
not a recognised logical relation and all that Slife and Reber offer in making clear what they
mean by this term is a statement about what they do not mean. They do not mean
incommensurable or incomparable (p. 9). In the absence of any positive definition, the
reader is left to assume that the word incompatible is intended in its ordinary sense, meaning
incapable of being held together, opposite in character, incongruous, irreconcilable. It
is then a point of logic that claims which distinguish one worldview from its incompatible
opposite must stand in either contrary or contradictory relations to each other. They cannot
both be true and may both be false, i.e., at least one of the worldviews is wrong. Framing the
discussion in terms of ...meanings from the world of the naturalist [or theist] ... (p. 10)
doesnt sidestep the logical point. If the theists claims are true, any contrary claim is false. So
much for naturalism! And so much for the authors presumption that theism and naturalism
are equally valid.
CONCLUSION
It has been variously said of theism that it violates the rules and conditions of intelligible
discourse, that it is contrary to not only science and philosophy but also to common-sense,
that it cannot be reconciled with rational thinking, that there are no grounds for a belief in
God. Slife and Rebers paper does nothing to counter these perceptions.
Instead of explaining why theism is as valid as naturalism and, therefore, why
psychologists err in ignoring it, the authors take the intellectually easier and less
confrontational optionassume theisms validity from the outset and demonstrate only the
incompatibility between the two worldviews and psychologys allegedly prejudicial
practices. However, Slife and Rebers notion of incompatibility is sufficiently vague as to
render their demonstration implausible. And when we examine theisms validity through
their concept of God, we find their definition of theism self-contradictory. The authors
ignore a crucial distinctionthat between conditions of existence and qualities of things or
processes. They seem unaware that existence is not a predicate and, therefore, not something
of which there are types. Their notions of supernatural or divine could be interpreted as
qualities of something this-worldly, in which case the authors have offered a concept of God
at odds with theism and a scientific hypothesis which renders implausible their
incompatibility thesis. On the other hand, these notions could be interpreted as a mode of
existence distinct from a natural mode, in which case they have unintentionally waded into
the Humpty Dumpty consequence of dualism.
The upshot of Slife and Rebers paper is that it nicely illustrates the conceptual
difficulties that theism faces. It also shows their charge of prejudice to be groundless
psychologists are not making prejudicial judgements when claims about Gods existence as
divine or supernatural are contrary to reason6. And it serves to demonstrate that psychologys
secularism is a mark of the disciplines commonsense. The burden of proof lies with the
theist. Until then, it is only authentic for psychologists who are agnostic or atheist to behave
in a manner consistent with their beliefs7. Contra Slife and Reber, this does not involve
practising with intentional prejudices (p. 9) and discriminating against those who think
differently.
Consider, finally, the education of psychologys students. Helping to develop in students
the disposition and ability to think critically is a fundamental educational aim and moral
obligation. Slife and Reber do not lead by example. Their paper supports an acquiescence to
theism, not an active inquiry into it.
REFERENCES
Edwards, P. (2004). Heidegger's confusions. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Gergen, K. J. (1994). Realities and relationships: Soundings in social construction.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hibberd, F. J. (2005). Unfolding social constructionism. New York: Springer.
Hibberd, F. J. (2009a). Sham reasoning, Humpty Dumpty, and the burden of proof. Journal of
Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 29, 91-96.
Hibberd, F. J. (2009b). Anderson's development of (situational) realism and its bearing on
Psychology today. History of the Human Sciences, 22, 1-30.
Kusch, M. (1989). Language as calculus vs. language as universal medium: A study in
Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Locke, J. (1706/1924). An essay concerning human understanding (5th ed.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Passmore, J. (1970). Philosophical reasoning (2nd ed.). London: G. Duckworth & Co.
Peirce, C. S. (1931-1958). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. In C. Hartshorne & P.
Weiss (Eds.) (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Siegel, H. (1987). Relativism refuted: A critique of contemporary epistemological relativism.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing.
Slife, B. D., & Reber, J. S. (2009). Is there a pervasive implicit bias against theism in
psychology? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 29, 63-79.
Strawson, G. (2000). Esprit de core. A new way of viewing "the movie-in-the-brain". Times
Literary Supplement (October 27), 12-13.
6
Relevant, too, are the arguments that theism is not necessary in explaining how the world works and that theism
can itself be explained by psycho-social-cultural theory.
7
I appreciate that a theistic commitment is unlikely to be moved by reason.
Chapter 15
WILL RIGHT-BRAINERS RULE THE FUTURE?
John Reid
School of Psychology, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania 7001, Australia
ABSTRACT
During the 20th century as the technological age developed, there was high demand
for logical, left-brained thinkers such as engineers and scientists. This was the golden era
of IQ testing, where IQ scores were excellent predictors of performance on the job.
However, the trend in the West since the downsizings of the 90s has been to outsource
expensive cognitive left-brain tasks, like electronic engineering and computer
programming, to low-cost countries like China and India. However, by moving these
activities offshore, the question arises as to what will constitute viable career options in
future in the West. This study explores Pinks (2005) claim that individuals that have
right-brain hemisphericity will be better adapted to the future work environment in the
West. The participants in this study were 145 psychology students and their family (mean
age 33.5, SD = 14.5) who completed a test battery which included hemisphericity,
emotional intelligence, verbal reasoning and big five factor personality questionnaires. It
was found that older participants were less right-brain oriented than the younger
participants. The general characteristics of right-hemisphericity participants included
lower conscientiousness, and higher openness, neuroticism and attention to emotion
scores. These results have implications for organisational psychology in the future.
Keywords: Big Five, Emotional intelligence, Hemisphericity, Left-brain, Right-brain
INTRODUCTION
Hemisphericity, especially right-brained thinking preference, has been proposed as a
major success factor for individuals for future careers (Pink, 2005). Pink argues that the
Ph: 61-2-9439 8820; Fax: 61-2-9439 8072; jra@jreid.com.au

172 John Reid
period from the industrial era through the information age required left-brained thinkers who
specialised in logical and linear thought processes. These logical thinkers who made major
contributions during the last century were employed in a diverse range of positions such as
engineers, computer programmers, accountants, auditors, actuaries and so on. The left-
brained or logical thinking period reached its zenith with the introduction of the personal
computer and the internet and the myriad of applications that they both spawned. Computer
applications that previously required an expensive mainframe could now be developed in the
home on a low cost personal computer. This enabled third world communities to become part
of the information age. During the same period, the World Wide Web allowed information to
be sent simply and cheaply to any point in the globe.
With the corporate downsizings and cost reductions in the West in the mid-90s, and the
rising skill base in China and India, organisations sought to reduce costs by sending work
offshore for processing in countries that paid employees lower wages. The range of jobs
outsourced overseas in the early part of the 21st century include a diverse range of
applications such as engineering, computer programming, auditing of company records, and
processing tax returns for individuals and corporations. The countries accepting this work are
mainly China and India with their vast resources of university-educated and skilled engineers,
IT specialists, and accountants (Pink, 2005). This trend has continued to the point where the
local industries perform very little engineering design or application development for
computers. In addition, intellectually-intensive tasks such as auditing and tax return
preparation can be performed cheaper in India.
The thrust of Pinks thesis (2005) is to draw attention to the trend of sending work
overseas thereby reducing the range of work-options available in Western countries, such as
Australia and the USA. Having identified the problem inherent in outsourcing complex work
offshore, Pink developed a rationale for future jobs and activities that are potentially resistant
to being outsourced to lower-paid labour forces elsewhere. He proposes that activities that are
not susceptible to being easily outsourced are right-brain skills that include: design, story-
telling, complex pattern recognition, empathy, play, interpreting and providing meaning in
todays world. He concludes by predicting that right-brainers will rule the future.
It is generally believed that the right-hemisphere provides a dominant and holistic focus
on the task at hand, while the left-hemisphere deals with detail and logical processes after the
right-hemisphere has holistically surveyed the big picture (Jackson, 2009; Martindale, 1999).
These findings generally divide brain hemispherical functions into global, parallel and holistic
processing in the right-hemisphere, with logical, verbal, numerical, sequential and analytical
processing occurring in the left-hemisphere. Creativity as a right-brain activity including
Pinks design and story telling skills finds considerable support in the literature (e.g., Morton,
2002; Martindale, 1999; Hermann, 1975, 1989).
Many hemisphericity researchers have used dichotic hearing preference as an indication
of right versus left-brain preference (e.g., Jackson, Furnham, & Miller, 2001; Jackson, 2002,
2005, 2008; Morton, 2002, 2003; Williams, 1986). However, this study was designed to be
delivered over the internet, and the dichotic listening test could not be controlled, so was
therefore omitted. Further, we assumed that a hemisphericity test based on a questionnaire
would be more suitable for organisational use; an area where we planned future studies.
An alternative potential method of determining hemisphericity was the rotating figure
(Times, 2007). The rotating figure has appeared in popular psychology articles for some
Will Right-brainers Rule the Future? 173
years, and would be a quick and valuable test if it provided a reliable indicator of
hemisphericity. The rotating figure test was therefore included in the internet survey.
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Since the publication of Golemans (1995) book on Emotional Intelligence (EI) there has
been a growing recognition of the value of EI in the workplace (e.g., Caruso, Mayer &
Salovey, 2002; Cherniss, 2001; Matthews, Zeidner & Roberts, 2004). There is a general
assumption that EI is a right-brain holistic activity; this is supported by neurological evidence
(e.g., Damasio, 1994; Lane, 2000; Springer & Deutsch, 1998). Jackson (2002) also found that
the right hemisphere provided facilitation of emotional expression. This study provided an
opportunity to test the assumption that right-brain orientation is related to emotions and EI;
therefore, it included the necessary scales to examine whether hemisphericity and EI were
convergent or divergent constructs. To this end the Trait-Meta Mood Scale (TMMS) EI scale
(Salovey et al., 1995) was employed in the study.
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT ISSUES

Since the data was not available to determine employability of participants and thus
include it in the statistical analysis it was decided that the study would focus on the
personality differences between individuals categorised as having a right or left-brain
preference. If Pinks hypothesis (2005) is correct that right-brainers will rule the future,
then it behoves organisational psychologists to seek an insight into the personality issues at
play in the workplace of the future. In order to examine personality differences as a function
of hemisphericity, a range of questionnaires including hemispheric preference, verbal and
numerical skills, personality and emotional intelligence were included in a single battery
delivered to participants over the internet.
STUDY OVERVIEW
The study first determined the hemispheric preference of participants using the
Zenhausern preference questionnaire (Zenhausern, 1978). The hemisphericity score was then
compared with personality, emotional intelligence and verbal/numerical cognitive markers to
identify significant personality traits related to hemisphericity. The overall purpose of the
study was to examine the relationships between hemisphericity and personality
characteristics, with a view to understanding the psychological issues that may arise in the
workplace of the future.
174 John Reid
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Participants with higher right hemispheric preference scores will have
higher emotional intelligence scores.
Hypothesis 2: Participants with higher right hemispheric preference scores will have
lower verbal and numerical reasoning scores.
Hypothesis 3: The rotating figure test will demonstrate convergent validity with the
Zenhausern hemisphericity preference questionnaire.
Hypothesis 4: There will be notable differences between personality factors for right and
left-brain oriented participants.
METHOD
Participants
The sample of 145 participants (mean age 33.5, SD = 14.5, 63% female) was made up of
55 students enrolled in an advanced 4th year research methods class, plus parents and friends
recruited by the students. The participants provided their age, sex and country of birth and
then proceeded to complete a web-based battery consisting of the following questionnaires.
Rotating Figure
This putative test of hemisphericity has been widely circulated on the internet (e.g.,
Times, 2007) and was included to determine its veracity. The figure is an animated graphics
file (.gif) of a slowly rotating dancer. If the participant perceives it to be rotating in a
clockwise direction they are assumed to use more of their right-brain, and alternatively, more
of their left-brain if they perceive anti-clockwise rotation.
Zenhauserns Preference Questionnaire

This hemisphericity questionnaire consisted of 20-items scored on a 10-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 = Very unlike me to 10 = Very like me (in Morton, 2002; Zenhausern,
1978). Examples of typical items are: My decisions based upon objective facts rather than
feelings (left hemisphericity); I am artistically or musically creative (right); My thinking
consist of mental pictures or images (right). Three questions that were directly related to
verbal skills, such as I am good at solving crossword puzzles, were removed to reduce method
variance with the verbal reasoning skills test.
Numeric and Verbal Reasoning Markers

These brief cognitive tests (Stankov, 1997) were included to determine the relationship
between IQ and hemisphericity scores. The numeric reasoning test consisted of spotting the
odd-one-out in a set of numeric sequences, while the verbal reasoning consisted of items such
as: Horse is to Animal as Chair is to _______.
Big Five Personality Inventory

A brief personality inventory (Saucier, 1994) was included to determine the relationships
between the Big Five and hemisphericity.
Trait Meta-Mood Scale

This is a brief EI questionnaire (Salovey et al., 1995) used to determine the relationship
between EI and the hemisphericity scores. It includes three subfactors: Attention to Emotions,
Clarity of Emotions, and Repair of Emotions.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 below. Correlations between variables are
shown in Table 2.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables used in this study (N=145)
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation

Zenhausern right-brain score 50.00 120.00 83.72 15.30
Numeric reasoning score .20 1.00 .74 .16
Verbal reasoning score .40 .95 .79 .12
TMMS Attention to emotions score 2.46 5.00 3.88 .52
TMMS Clarity of emotions score 2.27 5.00 3.56 .64
TMMS Repair of emotions score 2.00 5.00 3.74 .75
Age 18.00 71.00 33.46 14.46
Openness 18.00 40.00 30.39 4.65
Conscientiousness 17.00 40.00 29.93 5.62
Extraversion 15.00 40.00 27.01 5.89
Agreeableness 17.00 40.00 32.59 4.55
Neuroticism 7.00 33.00 19.55 5.55
Table 2. Correlations between the variables used in this study

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Zenhausern Right- 1
brain score
2. Numeric -.02 1
Reasoning score
3. Verbal Reasoning -.16 .14 1
score
4. TMMS Attention .42** .00 .07 1
5. TMMS Clarity -.07 .07 .09 .14 1
6. TMMS .03 .08 .06 .11 .32** 1
Repair
7. Age -.34** -.05 .17* -.13 .22** -.07 1
8. Openness .31** -.17* .03 .21** .07 .00 -.17* 1
9. Conscientiousness -.39** -.03 .18* .18* .18* .01 .25** -.06 1
10. Extraversion .06 -.11 -.04 .14 .10 .30** -.22** .06 -.06 1
11. Agreeableness .10 .00 .24** .40** .23** .30** .06 .17* .25** .08 1
12.Neuroticism .34** -.01 -.17* .22** -.27** -.36** -.24** .13 -.07 -.03 -.17*
176 John Reid
Tests between Means

An independent samples t-test showed that there was a significant relationship between
the perception of the direction of rotation of the dancer and the Zenhausern test of
hemisphericity (t(143)=2.27, p=.02). Unfortunately, the significant difference was in the
opposite direction to that expected (Times, 2007), with anti-clockwise rotation being
associated with higher right-brain scores. An independent samples t-test did not indicate a
significant positive relationship between EI (TMMS total score) and hemisphericity
(t(143)=1.24, p=.22); however, the right-brain score was significantly related to the TMMS
EI Attention to Emotions subfactor (r(144)=.42, p<.01).
DISCUSSION
It was proposed in hypothesis 1 that participants with higher right hemispheric preference
scores would be significantly higher in total EI scores. This was not confirmed; however,
participants did have significantly higher Attention to Emotion subfactor scores (p<.01). This
hypothesis was therefore partially supported.
It appears that hemispheric preference is somewhat convergent with the Attention to
Emotions EI subfactor (see Table 2). However, this translates into an overlap of only 18% of
shared variance between the two variables, suggesting that the two constructs are different.
Clearly, the Attention to Emotions scale assesses a different construct to the Zenhausern
hemisphericity scale and could not be used as a proxy for hemisphericity. The implication of
this finding is that there is a place for both hemisphericity and the EI concept, and the two can
potentially contribute to a better understanding of human behaviour.
In hypothesis 2 it was proposed that participants with higher right hemispheric preference
scores would have significantly lower verbal and numerical reasoning scores. While the right-
brain score negatively correlated with both the verbal and numerical reasoning scores, verbal
reasoning scores just missed out on reaching significance (p = .054), while the numeric
reasoning relationship was nowhere near significant (p = .79).
The general assumption that left-brained individuals perform better in numeric and verbal
reasoning was apparent in the results, and verbal reasoning came close to reaching
significance, and would have reached significance if the sample size had been larger. It can
therefore be assumed that logical verbal operations are related to left-brain preference, with
the caveat that statistical significance was just missed. Numeric reasoning was not found to be
significantly correlated to hemisphericity (p = .79). This finding supports those by Szirony et
al. (2007), where mathematical ability was found to be not significantly related to left brain
function.
The overall conclusion was that hypothesis 2 was partially supported, and there was some
evidence that verbal reasoning was a left-brain function, but there was little support for
numeric reasoning being a left-brain function. Perhaps a broader battery of verbal and
numeric reasoning items could be used in a future study to confirm their putative left-brain
association.
In hypothesis 3 the effectiveness of the rotating figure as a measure of hemisphericity
was examined. Although there was a weak (r = .21) but significant relationship between the
rotating figure and the Zenhausern preference questionnaire, the direction of rotation was in
the opposite direction to that expected. Using binary logistic regression it was found that the
rotating figure would only correctly predict hemisphericity in 59% of the cases, even with the
rotation reversed. Therefore, since the rotating figure predicted at only slightly above chance,
and in the wrong direction, this pop psychology indicator of hemisphericity must be rejected
as a scientifically useful tool.
With regard to Hypothesis 4, it was proposed that there would be notable differences
between personality factors for right and left-brain oriented participants. This study found that
Openness and Neuroticism were positively related, and Conscientiousness negatively related
with right-brain oriented participants (p < .01, see Table 2). Further, the age of participants
was negatively related to the right-brain score. This indicated that younger participants were
significantly more right-brained than the older participants (Table 2).
These findings are quite robust with all correlations being significant at the p < .01 level.
One implication is that if you want to hire right-brain oriented individuals then the younger
the better. However, if the hiring preference was biased towards hiring younger employees,
then an organisation would need to ensure that they did not transgress any age discrimination
laws.
CONCLUSION
Considering the personality factors, it would appear that if you hire more right-brained
individuals, they would be more open to experience, which hopefully would translate into
them being more creative than an average group. On the other hand, our results suggest that
these right-brain individuals would be less mentally stable, and less conscientious than
average. Overall this appears to be a somewhat mixed blessing attendant with right-brainers.
Based on Pinks (2005) assumption that future job opportunities in the West will favour
right-brain thinkers, one implication for organisations arising from this study is that future
workers will score higher on Neuroticism. This may lead to more conflict in the workplace,
increased absenteeism, and more need for Employee Assistance Programs (EAP).
Organisations will need to plan and adjust to these anticipated changes.
Another finding was that right-brained individuals showed increased Openness to
Experience; this would be valuable in enhancing the creativity of an organisation. However,
on the downside there is a concern that the reduced Conscientiousness of right-brained
individuals could reduce the productivity of an organisation and contribute to absenteeism.
A final caution should be added noting that using age as a hiring indicator, with youth as
a predictor of right-brain candidates, could be found to contravene age discrimination laws.
Hiring based on handednesswith left handedness indicating more right-brain activation
could also fall foul of anti discrimination laws.
It would appear that right-brainers provide a mixed blessing for an organisation with
increased openness and creativity, but with the dark side of increased neuroticism and lower
conscientiousness. Further studies in this area, especially employment success versus
hemisphericity, would be valuable in confirming or disproving Pinks thesis. The
confirmation of a general shift to right-brained employees could have significant implications
for organisations and organisational psychology.
178 John Reid
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Chapter 16
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY

AND PERSONHOOD
Hoyt L. Edge
Department of Philosophy & Religion, Rollins College
Winter Park, Florida 32789 USA
Cokorda Bagus Jaya Lesmana
Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, Udayana University,
Denpasar, Bali 80114, Indonesia
ABSTRACT
The study of personality in psychology developed within the Western tradition and
has been criticised as embodying implicit Western assumptions. The popularity of a
culturally sensitive approach to personality has seen a recent resurgence because of
research in cross-cultural psychology and social psychology. In this chapter we discuss
three of our studies comparing Americans and Balinese, representing an individualist and
a collectivist culture, respectively. The first one focuses on the cultures understanding of
volition and supports the view that aspects of this concept seem to hold cross-culturally
while other aspects are culturally sensitive. The following two studies lend further
support for the view that there are elements of personality that are intimately tied to
cultural differences. The second study points to culturally different cognitive preferences
in responding to an ethical scenario, with Americans responding in an abstract manner
while Balinese respond in a concrete manner. The third study probes aspects of
individualism and collectivism, illuminating differences in aspects of personality traits.
We argue that psychologists need to develop a more culture-sensitive psychology
because there are aspects of the person that are culture-sensitive. As we expand our
notions of person through cross-cultural studies, we will concomitantly expand our notion
of personality to incorporate traits that are located in interrelationships.
Ph: (407) 646-2178; Fax: (407) 646-2517 email: hedge@rollins.edu

182 Hoyt L. Edge and Cokorda Bagus Jaya Lesmana
Keywords: Bali, Cognition, Collectivism, Cross-cultural, Determinism
INTRODUCTION
As Markus and Kitayama (1998) have effectively argued, the study of personality
developed within the Western tradition and embodies to an unknown degree implicit Western
assumptions. As a result, it is far from certain that theories of personality apply cross-
culturally. It may be the case that certain personality traits can be found cross-culturally while
other traits cannot; indeed, it may even be the case that the concept of traits is itself a Western
construct and not one that is easily transportable cross-culturally. Some researchers have
recognised this complexity, and more culturally sensitive approaches to personality have been
proposed. The popularity of these approaches has risen and fallen over the last 80 years, but
there has been a recent resurgence of them because of research in cross-cultural psychology
and social psychology (see Matsumodo, 2001).
In this chapter we will argue that personality theorists need to engage in cross-cultural
research and incorporate cultural factors. The Western view of the person as an integrated,
bounded, stable, autonomous, and free entity is not a view that is fully consistent with the
experience of non-EuroAmericans. Based on our research comparing responses to surveys in
the US and in Bali, Indonesia, we will argue for a culture psychology in which one seeks
persistent patterns both across cultures and within cultures. We view the research discussed
here as providing evidence for the necessity of such an approach. Our approach and
perspective makes use of research from several disciplines.
CULTURE PSYCHOLOGY
As others note (e.g., Markus, 2004), personality theorists traditionally have assumed that
their theories apply to all people and that foundational features of personality apply cross-
culturally. Employing an essentialist approach to knowledge, psychologists and philosophers
have focused on what they assumed were essential features of human personality, and they
believed that any cultural differences were secondary and derivative. These thinkers believed
that since the person was an integrated, bounded, and stable entity, they could focus on this
entity and ignore cultural concerns as not being central to personality.
Let us be clear from the outset that we are not suggesting that the concept of personality
should be abandoned, or that there is no aspect of the personality that is universal; in fact, we
will present some evidence from our own research to suggest cross-cultural consistency in an
important aspect of personality. Nevertheless, we believe that cross-cultural conceptions of
the person are so radically different and so fundamental in how people in various cultures
experience themselves that they complicate any notion of a unified understanding of
personality cross-culturally. Rather, the evidence that we and others have developed suggest
that a culture psychology (Markus & Kitayama, 1998), which is sensitive to cultural
differences in personality, should be pursued.
Cultural Perspectives on Personality and Personhood 183
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSONALITY
A definition of personality is itself not a straight-forward task. Pervin (1996) defines
personality as the complex organization of cognitions, affects, and behaviours that gives
direction and pattern (coherence) to the persons life (p. 414). Carver and Scheier (2000)
similarly define it as a dynamic organization, inside the person, of psychophysical systems
that create a persons characteristic patterns of behaviour, thoughts, and feelings (5). For our
purposes, we will employ the general view that personality refers to distinctive patterns in
how a person thinks, behaves and feels. Given the focus of this anthology on personality and
intelligence, we will turn our attention to research that we have carried out on patterns of
thinking, or cognition, in the US and in Bali, Indonesia.
We believe that there are aspects of the person that seem to be found cross-culturally.
Although inconsistent in their results, a number of researchers have had success employing
the five-factor model (see McCrae, et al., 1998; McCrae & Terracciano, 1979; Yamagata, et
al., 2006). Our own research (Edge & Suryani, 2002) focused on the concept of volition, or
willing, a concept central in Western philosophy; it describes the ability of humans to act
intentionally in the world. Volition designates the agency through which people affect the
world; it is the active aspect of the person as contrasted with the more receptive aspect of
receiving information. In our study we surveyed 162 Americans and 282 Balinese using a
questionnaire of 82 statements, and through factor analysis we found four factors that
indicated high volitional competence in both cultures: Persistence/Initiative, Helping and
Influencing Others, Positive Self-Image, Handling Outside Influence. These identical factors
were also found in a sample in Edinburgh, Scotland. Those individuals possessing high
volitional competence displayed similar traits. Thus, this research suggests that one may find
patterns of personality that are similar cross-culturally. However, while we believe that lines
of research that seek to find cross-cultural similarity in patterns of personality are important,
we want to spend the rest of the paper suggesting that such an approach to personality, while
necessary, is not sufficient to develop robust theories of personality that apply cross-
culturally. Notions of the person are so fundamentally different between EuroAmerican and
non-EuroAmerican cultures that any personality theory must take these differences into
account. We present both empirical data and theoretical reasons in support of this view.
A number of psychologists and anthropologists have written about the distinction
between two characteristic views of the person. The Western view of the person has been
called variously independent (Markus & Kityama, 1991), individuated (Marsella, 1985),
egocentric (Schweder and Bourne, 1984) or atomistic (Edge, 1994). Clifford Geertz (1983)
captured this Western approach to the person with an emphasis on individualism in his
famous description: The Western conception of the person [is] a bounded, unique, more or
less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion,
judgment, and action organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against
other such wholes and against the social and natural background (p. 59). Geertz goes on to
point out that this Western conception of the person is, however incorrigible it may seem to
us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the worlds cultures (p. 59).
This view of the individuated, independent self can be juxtaposed to the dominant non-
EuroAmerican view, which has variously been described as sociocentric (Shweder & Bourne
1984), unindividuated (Marsella,1985), interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and
relational (Edge, 1994). As opposed to the idea of a bounded, independent personality, a non-
EuroAmerican approach to the person emphasises the person in relationship with others,
intimately part of social structures, and they cannot be fully differentiated separate from these
relationships. Research has shown that this difference between the two cultures views of the
person results in behavioural differences. Nisbett and his research team (Nisbett 2003; Nisbett
& Peng 2001; Nisbett & Masuda 2003) have produced a significant body of research
displaying these differences in cognition, attention, and perception. Our focus in this paper
will be in the area of cognition.
DIFFERENCES IN COGNITIVE PREFERENCES IN THE US AND BALI

To study cultural aspects of personality, one should seek to understand how patterns of
responses differ systematically cross-culturally. Of all the areas involved in personality, it
may seem that cognition has the best chance of being displayed consistently cross-culturally.
Western philosophy has assumed that rationality is universal and is captured by the axioms of
logic. Going back at least to the Greeks, the dominant strain of Western thinking has
emphasised a universal approach to truth, assuming that rationality applied cross-culturally.
Just as any cultural aspects of the person were viewed as secondary and derivative of the
integrated, stable person, so any local cognitive differences were relegated at best to colorful
but insignificant variations, but at worst it was argued that whole cultures were designated as
pre-logical.
Nesbitt has argued, however, that what is accepted as rational differs fundamentally in
EuroAmerican and non-EuroAmerican cultures. The analytic tradition of the West views
cognition as making abstract distinctions apart from context, and putting arguments in
syllogistic form, while the holism of the East emphasises relationships and works within
concrete contexts. This distinction can be found in early work of Luria (1971), Scribner
(1997), and Cole, Gray, et al. (1971), who investigated why non-industrialised people (in
Siberia and in Africa) often gave quite different answers to syllogisms from those of the
West. For instance, Scribner asked a non-literate Kpelle (African) farmer: All Kpelle men
are rice farmers. Mr. Smith (a Kpelle name is used) is not a rice farmer. Is he a Kpelle man?
A Kpelle might say in response, I dont know the man in person. I have not laid eyes on the
man himself (p. 107). When asked to just think about the question, the man responds: if
you do not know the person, if a question comes up about him, its hard for you to answer it
(p. 107). When given a series of classical syllogisms, to which they must respond either yes
or no, Kpelle gave syllogistically correct answers only 53% of the time, at chance level,
versus 86% solution rate of third grade students in the US (Hill, 1961).
The researchers argued that these differences were not due to cognitive deficits but to
different characteristic modes of cognition. The pattern of concrete, context-dependent
thinking was found consistently in this research, and this type of cognition paralleled their
understanding of themselves as personsrelated individuals within specific contexts. Thus,
people in Western cultures display both abstract, context-free notions of self and employ
cognition emphasizing the same characteristics, while non-EuroAmerican concepts of self
and cognitive preferences can be described as concrete and context-dependent. How they
think about themselves as persons and their characteristic patterns of cognition are
systematically related. In one research project among the Kpelle, of the 171 wrong answers to
syllogisms, there was not a single case in which a theoretical [abstract] reason is given for a
wrong answer (Scribner 135). The Kpelle displayed a cognitive preference for thinking
concretely, but they were quite capable of thinking abstractly.
The same difference in cognition was found in our research in US and Balinese cultures.
We gave American and Balinese the following vignette (in each sample, half were university
students and half were not students).
Question 1: Imagine a universe in which everything that happens is completely caused by

whatever happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the universe, so that what
happened in the beginning of the universe caused what happened next, and so on right up to
the present. This is true not only of large phenomena such as the movement of the stars, but it
is also true of even the smallest physiological response on your body and brain.
In this universe Susan accidentally found out, during a doctor visit, that Alices mother
has contracted a dangerous virus. Susan tells this to her friend Mary but makes her promise
that she will not tell Alice. Now Mary is facing a situation where she has promised Susan that
she will not relay this bad news to Alice, but Mary knows that Alice would be better off if she
received the newsshe would be able to focus on keeping her mothers spirits up in this
difficult time. Mary makes a decision to tell Alice.
In this situation (check one):
_____ is the decision that Mary makes necessarily caused by the past?
_____ or does Mary have the possibility of making a decision in this situation without it
being caused solely by the past?
We found that there was a statistically significant difference between the choice
of the two cultures, x2 (1, N=169)=28.2, p < .001. Although the American preferences
were almost split in half between the two choices (55.7% for choice 1 vs. 44.3% for
choice 2), 83.3% of the Balinese went for the 2nd choice.1
What accounts for this highly significant difference? We believe we find the answer in
the different ways that the cultures responded when we asked them to comment on their
answers. 44 of the 80 American participants (or 55%) offered a usable comment. The main
pattern we found in these comments (from 72% of these comments) indicated that they
thought abstractly, in syllogistic form: given the premise in the first paragraph that everything
is completely caused, then the conclusion has to follow that the decision was necessarily
caused by the past. In doing so, the respondents essentially ignored the concrete information
given in the second paragraph. Examples of their responses are:
If everything that happens is completely caused by whatever happened before it, then
there is no possibility of making a decision without it being caused solely by the past.
This question seems rather obvious. You already said that everything was caused by
the thing before it. So naturally, Mary had no choice. It was predestined by her past,
according to your stated prerequisites.
Well if the universe is one in which everything happens by whatever happened
before it then Marys decision is caused from the past.
1
We wish to thank Dr. Niko Tiliopoulos for his statistical help in studies two and three.
On the other hand, the Balinese reasoned differently. Of the 44 comments among those
who responded that Marys decision was not necessarily caused by the past, the majority of
them (24) explained their decision by referring to some moral aspect of the situation,
employing information found in the second paragraph. These comments essentially ignored
the first paragraph, the abstract information, the exact opposite cognitive strategy found in the
American sample. Not one response offered any of the syllogistic responses that were seen in
the American responses. Here are some examples (the names are Balinese):
Made [Mary] wants to help Mrs. Asti [Alice] recover quickly.

I think the decision is taken to a greater level. Although he has pledged not to notify
[her], it may be better to break the promise for the safety of Astis mother.
Because Made has compassion with Astis mother so she tells Asti about the
situation so that Asti can maintain and encourage her mother to be strong in the face
of the illness.
Why is there this stark difference? We want to argue that there is a parallel between how
Westerners and non-Westerners conceive of themselves as persons and their cognitive
responses. Insofar as the self is viewed as bounded and abstract and separate, one tends to
employ a cognitive strategy that is abstract, defaulting to syllogistic reasoning. The difference
in cognitive patterns between Americans and Balinese mirrors the atomistic and relational
definitions of the person. EuroAmericans focus on the person who is a bounded, unitary,
enduring entity, while non-EuroAmericans view the person as context-dependent. While
Americans typically respond by ignoring the concrete, contextual information, the Balinese
respond in the opposite way. Each cognitive preference, therefore, is appropriate given the
different conceptions of the self. There is a systematic interrelationship between views of
themselves as persons and patterns of cognition; the two are intimately related. Such a view
has implications for a conception of personality: those traits that are sensitive to context are
emphasised in non-EuroAmerican contexts, with more individual and abstract traits being
emphasised in the US. As the sense of the person is sensitive to contexts and relations with
other people (and those relationships also dependent on context), then it is hypothesised that
traits will be understood as more context-sensitive in non-EuroAmerican cultures.
OTHER EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

To pursue this hypothesis, we administered a survey to 60 American and 60 Balinese
university students, seeking to investigate more fully what these differing notions of self may
entail. We hypothesised that if the Balinese view themselves as defined relationally, in the
context of relationships with others in community, and the Americans view themselves as
bounded and independent2, we would find a significant difference in how people in these
cultures find it important to fit in with others expectations and how willing they were in
doing so. We asked them to indicate their response to the statement: I am willing to align my
actions if it fits better with the expectations of the community, and gave them a 7 point
2
We take Lockes (1980/1690) notion of the social contract as the paradigm of the American view of how self and
others are connected.
Likert scale ranging from no willingness to a lot of willingness. As expected, to a

significant degree Balinese responded that they were more willing to align their actions to the
expectation of the community. On average, US individuals (M = 4.12, SD = 1.34) tended to
be less willing to align their actions with the expectations of their community than Balinese
ones (M = 5.59, SD = 1.28), t(164)=7.22, p < .0005, two-tails.
Then we focused on one specific aspect of this difference in the notions of self. We
hypothesised that Americans, who sense themselves as independent and bounded, would feel
more comfortable in being alone than Balinese. Based on theory and our own experience
within these cultures, we hypothesised that persons in individualist cultures value being
alone, having a need to retreat to privacy to find their inner, real selvesbeing alone charges
the batteries of the individualist person, allowing space to re-center and revitalise
themselves as separate individuals. On the other hand, people in relational cultures value
being in relationship and being with others. Thus, it was hypothesised that Americans would
find being alone as important to their sense of the individual self and even revitalizing to
them, while Balinese would find being alone as uncomfortable. We asked: How do you feel
when you are alone? giving them a 7 point Likert scale from extremely uncomfortable to
mentally revitalised. As anticipated, we found a significant difference in the responses in
the expected direction. On average, US individuals (M = 4.77, SD = 1.44) tended to feel far
more comfortable and mentally revitalised when alone than the Balinese (M = 3.66, SD =
1.54), t(164)=4.78, p < .0005, two-tails.
It is important to understand that these are fundamentally different approaches to persons.
Balinese do not simply feel themselves to be connected to others in a close way, an
experience that is well known in the West, but they feel themselves to be importantly defined
by those relationships. The connection they have with the community is so fundamental that
they cannot conceive of themselves apart from the community. Aristotle made an analogous
suggestion when he said that the connection between a person and the community is so strong
that an individual apart from a community might be conceived of as a god or a beast but not
as a person. The ancient Greeks also defined themselves as part of a community.
The difference between being defined by relationships within the community and simply
being associated with other people (e.g., through voluntary association a la Locke) can be
seen in the following results. We asked these Americans and Balinese to respond to the
statement: I am open to the influence of other people in my life, with responses on the 7-
point Likert scale ranging from No openness to A lot of openness. US individuals (M =
5.24, SD 1.05) tended to be more open to the influence of other people in their lives than the
Balinese (M = 4.32, SD = 1.22), t(164)=5.21, p < .0005, two-tails). This result might be
surprising if a person does not make the distinction between Balinese, who define themselves
in terms of their community, and EuroAmericans who view themselves as bounded wholes
that choose to associate with others. In other words, Balinese do not identify with other
people, but they identify with the community of which they are a part. They would be open
to the community influence, but not from others (who may or may not be part of the
community). Hence, there was no identification of the self with an undifferentiated other
people, and so they were even less open to their influence than individualist Americans. The
trait of openness can be understood only within the differing understandings of personhood.
IMPLICATIONS
The differences found in this study are robust and suggest that there are aspects of
indigenous views of the person that differ significantly. Western theories of personality have
tended to valorise individualist traits, assuming that the person is an autonomous, bounded,
individuated entity. Action that was inner directed, signalled a mature person, and Westerners
have applauded persons creating situations of separateness, of being alone, where individuals
could focus on this internal self and develop it. However, our data suggests that these
personality traits are not held in the same esteem in Bali, and by implication by other non-
EuroAmerican cultures.
Hence, we may find different personality traits as valorised in different cultures, and even
if the same traits are valorised cross-culturally, it is likely that they are understood in
fundamentally different ways in different cultures, given their differing definitions of
personhood. It may even be the case that traits are viewed in non-Western cultures as
describing relationships among people rather than attaching to individuals (see Sampson,
1977, for an argument for this position).
CONCLUSION
To develop a robust culture psychology in which we understand personality in non-
EuroAmerican cultures adequately, we will need to continue research into how non-
EuroAmerican patterns of cognition, feeling, and behaviours differ from EuroAmerican ones.
We have presented evidence that it is likely that a culturally-sensitive understanding of
personality will find patterns of cognition, emotion, and values that are consistent cross-
culturally, on the one hand, but also patterns that differ cross-culturally, on the other hand.
Our conception of personality is grounded in our conception of the person, and much research
indicates that there are fundamentally different views of personhood in EuroAmerican and
non-EuroAmerican cultures. Concomitant with these different conceptions of personhood are
different patterns of cognitive responses; such differences suggest that any attempt at
understanding personality cross-culturally by examining only universal traits will be
insufficient to establish a robust cultural psychology.
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PART C: CONTRIBUTIONS TO CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY AND ASSESSMENT
Chapter 17
GENETIC VARIATION IN DRD4,

CRIMINALITY, AND CONDUCT DISORDER
Tara M. Thompson
Child Study Center, Yale University, USA
Marya Getchell
School of Public Health, Harvard University, USA
Britt af Klinteberg
Institute of Psychology, Stockholm University, Sweden
Roman A. Koposov
Department of Psychology, University of Troms, Norway
Lars Oreland
Department of Neuroscience & Pharmacology, Uppsala University, Sweden
Andrew J. Pakstis
Department of Genetics, Yale University, USA
Vladislav V. Ruchkin
Karolinska Institute & Skonviks Psychiatric Clinic, Sweden
Yale University, USA
Carolyn M. Yrigollen
Department of Genetics, University of California, Davis
Elena L. Grigorenko
Child Study Center, Department of Psychology, Department of Epidemiology & Public
Health, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06519-1124, USA
Ph: 203-737-2316; Fax: 203-785-3002; Elena.grigorenko@yale.edu. Elena L. Grigorenko is also associated with
Columbia University, USA, & Moscow State University, Russia.
194 Tara M. Thompson, Marya Getchell, Britt af Klinteberg et al.
ABSTRACT
Conduct disorder is the most commonly referred psychological problem in child
psychiatric and mental health services (Sholevar, 1995). It is characterised by
externalizing behaviours such as aggression and antisocial behavior, and is often
associated with impulsivity and hyperactivity. Research has shown that externalizing
behaviour has a sizable genetic component and is thought to be associated with the
dopaminergic system, in which the dopamine D4 receptor gene (DRD4) plays a role. The
current study explores whether detainees or conduct disorder individuals can be
differentiated from controls based on the variation in genetic polymorphisms of DRD4.
Allele, genotype, and haplotype frequencies for the exon 3 VNTR and the C_1611535
(rs58688157), rs9366, rs11246226 SNPs in the DRD4 gene were compared in 179
incarcerated adolescent delinquents and 60 matched controls. Results indicated that
genetic variation in DRD4 is associated with criminality (i.e., incarceration) and conduct
disorder. Understanding the influence of DRD4 on externalizing behaviour problems
associated with conduct disorder is important for understanding etiological mechanisms
of conduct problems.
Keywords: Conduct disorder, Dopamine, Dopamingeric system, DRD4 gene, Endo-

phenotypes
GLOSSARY
Allele: One of the variant forms of a gene at a particular locus, or location (site), on a
chromosome.
Candidate Gene: A gene, located in a chromosome region suspected of being involved in a
disorder or trait, or whose protein product suggests that it could have a role in the
pathophysiology of the disorder.
Chromosome: One of the threadlike "packages" of genes and other DNA in the nucleus of a
cell. Different kinds of organisms have different numbers of chromosomes. Humans have
23 pairs of chromosomes, 46 in all: 44 autosomes and two sex chromosomes. Each parent
contributes one chromosome to each pair, so children get half of their chromosomes from
their mothers and half from their fathers.
Conduct Disorder: a behavioural and emotional disorder of childhood and adolescence.
Children with conduct disorder act inappropriately, infringe on the rights of others, and
violate the behavioural expectations of others.
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA): The nucleic acid that carries the genetic information in the
cell and is capable of self-replication and synthesis of RNA. DNA consists of two long
chains of nucleotides twisted into a double helix and joined by hydrogen bonds between
the complementary bases adenine and thymine or cytosine and guanine. The sequence of
nucleotides determines individual hereditary characteristics.
Detainee: A person held in custody or confinement.
DRD4: The Dopamine Receptor 4 gene, one of five receptor subtypes for dopamine.
Dopamine: A neurotransmitter in the brain that has both excitatory and inhibitory functions
related to motor control, motivation, learning, and reward pathways.
Genetic Variation in DRD4, Criminality, and Conduct Disorder 195
Endophenotype: Measurable components connecting disease and distal genotype.

Exon: The region of a gene that contains the code for producing the gene's protein. Each exon
codes for a specific portion of the complete protein. In some species (including humans),
a gene's exons are separated by long regions of DNA (called introns) that have no
apparent function.
Externalizing behaviours: Behaviours that are overt, disruptive, and often involve the
violation of societal norms, the destruction of property, and harm towards others.
G protein: Any of a class of cell membrane proteins that function as intermediaries between
hormone receptors and effector enzymes, and enable the cell to regulate its metabolism in
response to hormonal changes.
Gel electrophoresis: The process in which molecules (such as proteins, DNA, or RNA
fragments) can be separated according to size and electrical charge by applying an
electric current to them. The current forces the molecules through pores in a thin layer of
gel, a firm jelly-like substance. The gel can be made so that its pores are just the right
dimensions for separating molecules within a specific range of sizes and shapes.
Gene: The functional and physical unit of heredity passed from parent to offspring. Genes are
pieces of DNA, and most genes contain information for making a specific protein.
Genetic variation: A phenotypic variance of a trait in a population attributed to genetic
heterogeneity.
Genotype: The combination of alleles at a particular locus (e.g., CC, CT or TT at a CT
polymorphism).
Haplotype: A group of alleles within a gene or across different genes on a single chromosome
that are closely enough linked to be inherited as a unit.
Hybridization: The process of joining two complementary strands of DNA.
Neurotransmitter: A brain chemical that transmits signals between neurons.
PCR: Polymerase chain reaction; a technique for copying the complementary strands of a
target DNA molecule simultaneously for a series of cycles until the desired amount is
obtained.
Phenotype: Observable characteristics of an organism produced by the organism's genotype
interacting with the environment.
Polymorphism: A common variation in DNA in which alternate sequences occur in
populations.
Proband: An individual or member of a family being studied in a genetic investigation.
SNP: A single nucleotide polymorphism, a variation in the gene sequence that occurs at a
single locus (one nucleotide base).
VNTR: Variable number tandem repeats.
INTRODUCTION
Conduct disorder (CD) is the most commonly referred psychological problem in child
psychiatric and mental health services (Sholevar, 1995). It is characterised by externalizing
behaviours (e.g., persistent aggression, theft, vandalism, violent behaviour, defying authority)
that challenge social rules and regulations and, therefore, are often referred to as anti-social.
CD, like other externalizing disorders (e.g., Oppositional Defiant Disorder, ODD), is also
characterised by a propensity to express distress outwardly (Krueger, et al., 2002), so that

affected individuals are prone to anger, impulsivity, and low attentional and behavioural
regulation. Unfortunately, CD has proven to be highly resistant to psychosocial interventions;
as a result, youth diagnosed with this disorder may develop other serious behavioural and
emotional problems in adulthood (e.g., substance abuse, antisocial personality disorder,
criminal behaviour, and alcoholism). It has been observed that CD is familial, i.e., the risk for
first degree relatives of individuals with CD appears to be higher than for unrelated
individuals (Sholevar, 1995). Both genetic and environmental factors are thought to underlie
this familiality (Slutske, et al., 1997). The biological machinery underlying CD is unclear, but
genetic factors are considered to be important (Rhee & Waldman, 2002). One such factor is
the genetically controlled functional variation in the dopaminergic (DA) system (Moffitt, et
al., 2008). Here we explore the association between selected genetic characteristics of the DA
system and CD.
Children and adolescents with CD exhibit a persistent behaviour pattern in which major
age appropriate societal norms or rules, or the basic rights of others are repeatedly violated.
These behaviours constitute four main groupings (as per DSM-IV): aggressive behaviour that
either threatens or causes harm to others; non-aggressive property destruction; covert
aggressive behaviours of deceitfulness or theft; and rule violation. For a diagnosis to be made,
a child must show at least three criterion behaviours during the past 12 months, with one
behaviour present in the last 6 months. The DSM-IV criteria have been shown to have
internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and validity (Lahey, et al., 1994). In a longitudinal
twin study, researchers tested the concurrent, convergent, and predictive validity of DSM-IV
conduct disorder in children 5 years of age (Kim-Cohen, et al., 2005). They found that 5 year
olds diagnosed with CD were significantly more likely than comparison participants to have
behavioural and educational difficulties 2 years later despite their apparent remission from
CD. Long-term studies have also shown that true recoveries from CD are exceedingly rare
because, although not all children diagnosed with CD grow up to have antisocial personality
disorder, virtually all children with CD have mental disorders and poor functioning in
adulthood (Kim-Cohen, et al., 2005). Yet, the literature indicates that interventions for
preventing and remediating CD can be effective if applied early in life (Kim-Cohen, et al.,
2005). Thus, it is important to identify, if possible, genetic risk markers associated with CD
that can be used in prevention and remediation practices.
ENDOPHENOTYPES
Endophenotypes are vital to understanding the relationship between genes and complex
traits, externalizing behaviour notwithstanding. The conceptual purpose of endophenotype is
to divide behavioural symptoms into more stable componential phenotypes that have a clear
genetic connection (etiology). Endophenotypes have a potential to increase the power of
genetic linkage and association analyses by identifying individuals with particular genetic
susceptibilities across samples, subtypes, situations, levels of severity and the presence of co-
morbidity (McBurnett & Pfiffner, 2007). Externalizing problematic behaviour is related to a
variety of mental health disorders such as CD, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), and anti-social personality disorder. In turn, these externalizing behaviours have
been associated with such endophenotypes as impulsivity, aggression, and flawed decision-
making. For example, there is a considerable overlap between CD and ADHD both at the
genotypic level and the phenotypic level. Some researchers argue that this overlap may result
from common, underlying core psychopathological processes that are strongly influenced
genetically (Krueger, 1999). Thus, candidate genes for ADHD may also be relevant
candidates for CD. Genes related to dopamine turnover are plausible candidates for ADHD,
based on biological and pharmacological evidence; these genes might also be of relevance to
CD (Krueger & Tackett, 2006).
DOPAMINE AND THE DOPAMINERGIC SYSTEM

Dopamine (DA) is an important neurotransmitter in the brain that controls various
functions, including motor activity, cognition, motivation and emotion. Genes in the
dopaminergic system have been systematically and increasingly associated with externalizing
behaviours. Thus, molecular-genetic investigations have identified associations between
ADHD and a number of dopamine-related genes, most notably, the dopamine transporter
gene (DAT1) and two dopamine receptor genes, DRD4 and DRD5 (Dawei, Sham, Owen, &
He, 2006). These and other (Genro, Kieling, Rohde, & Hutz, 2010) findings strongly
implicate the involvement of brain DA systems in the pathogenesis of externalizing
behaviours associated with ADHD. Moreover, clues to DAs role in externalizing behaviours
have come from many animal studies (e.g., Arias-Carrin & Pppel, 2007; Hejjas, et al.,
2007; James, et al., 2007; Pecia, Cagniard, Berridge, Aldridge, & Zhuang, 2003).
DA signaling in the brain is supported by a number of genes, including the genes
producing proteins responsible for synthesizing, delivering, binding, and metabolizing DA.
Here we focus on a particular DA receptor, receptor 4. DA receptors belong to a class of
metabotropic G protein coupled receptors. In the human brain dopamine can bind to five DA
receptor subtypes (D1 to D5), which are split into two families: the D1-like family
(excitatory) or D2-like family (inhibitory). The D1 and D5 receptors belong to the D1-like
family and the remaining receptors (D2, D3, and D4)to the D2-like family. Intracellularly,
the dopamine D4 receptor interacts with inhibitory G-proteins. This interaction inhibits
adenylate cyclase, an enzyme that can catalyse the production of cyclic AMP (cAMP), one of
the most important messengers in the cell. When stimulated, cAMP exerts several
biochemical changes such as activating genes and influencing the opening and closing of
calcium and potassium (i.e., ion) channels; corresponding inhibitory interactions with cAMP
have the opposite effect. The D4 receptors are mainly found in the regions of the brain that
are part of the limbic system, which is thought to be an underlying substrate for emotion and
memory; correspondingly, it has long been assumed that variation in DRD4 is associated with
variation in attention, motivation and memory (DeYoung, et al., 2006).
THE DRD4 GENE

The DRD4 gene is located on chromosome 11p15.5; its size is 3400bp and it is
considered to be one of the most variable human genes known (Dawei, et al., 2006). Both due
to the role of D4 in the human brain and the variation in DRD4, polymorphisms in this gene
have received considerable attention both in studies of individual differences in related
psychological functions in typical individuals and in studies of various mental health
disorders. The most studied polymorphisms within the DRD4 gene are a variable number
tandem repeat (VNTR) in exon 3, a polymorphic deletion of 12bp in exon 1, and single
nucleotide polymorphisms resulting in amino acid substitutions in exon 1 and exon 3
(Seaman, Fisher, Chang, & Kidd, 1999). The gene contains numerous other less studied
polymorphisms. To illustrate, the association between the variation in the DRD4 exon 3
VNTR and the variation in inattention, response inhibition, impulsivity, and monitored
activity level was examined in a study with 133 children ranging in age from 6 to 13 years
(Langley, et al., 2004). A particular variant in this polymorphism, the so-called 7-repeat
variant, was of special interest. Based on the presence/absence of this allele, the children were
divided into two groups: those with one or more DRD4 exon 3 7-repeat allele(s) and those
without. It was reported that the group of children possessing one or two copies of this allele
was characterised by higher rates of ODD and CD compared to children who had other
variants at this polymorphism.
Based on these convergent lines of the literature, we explored in this study instances of
genetic association between the variation in the DRD4 gene, criminality (i.e., having
committed a crime and serving a sentence in a residential facility), and the diagnosis of CD.
METHOD
Participants
The detainee group (N=179) consisted of a group of male adolescent inmates who were
court ordered to the only juvenile detention facility in the Arkhangelsk region of northern
Russia, an area with a population of 1.5 million. In this ethnically homogeneous region,
approximately 98% of the population is of Russian ancestry. The convictions of the
participants varied, with the most severe violations including property crimes (51%),
violence-related crimes (38%), rape or other forms of violence (6%), and murder (5%).
Normative participants (N=60) were recruited from one of the public schools in the city of
Arkhangelsk. In both groups, the participants were matched by gender and age.
Grouping
The actual status at the time of data collection (i.e., incarcerated vs. not) was used as the
first grouping scheme. The second grouping scheme utilised the diagnosis of CD. The
diagnoses were determined using the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for
School-Age Children (K-SADS-PL), a widely used, extensively validated, semi-structured
psychiatric interview (Kaufman, et al., 1997), carried out by two psychiatrists who had
received standard K-SADS training from the author of the instrument. K-SADS data were
available for 174 offenders, but for only 39 controls because of attrition (psychological
assessments were carried out following specimen collection but took substantially more time,
which decreased the participation rate). Diagnoses were based exclusively on information
collected from the participants. Participants were placed in the CD group if they received
DSMIV diagnoses of either current or past CD. Among the incarcerated youth, 130
individuals (74.7%) received the diagnosis; in the control group, there were 11 (28.2%)
individuals with the CD diagnosis. This difference in frequencies was significant ( = .38, p <
.000; (1) = 140.7, p < 0.001).
DNA Sampling, Processing, and Analyses
After completing the assessments and reports, blood samples were obtained by two
nurses from the participants arm veins. The DNA was extracted from the samples and
collected via 5ml vacutainer tubes containing ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA), and it
was then subsequently amplified with Repli-G technologies and genotyped using the ABI
TaqMan platform. Once a sufficient amount of DNA was available for each sample, SNPs
within the DRD4 gene were genotyped. DNA from the blood samples were purified using the
Qiagen FlexiGene DNA kit. The blood sample in each tube was transferred, along with any
residual liquid, into a 50ml centrifuge tube and 25ml of buffer FG1 was added and mixed by
inverting the tube 5 times. The tubes were then centrifuged (2000g) for 5mins and the
supernatants were discarded leaving DNA pellets. Buffer FG2 (5ml) and Qiagen protease
(50l) were added to the tube and the tubes were immediately vortexed until the pellets were
completely homogenised. The tubes were inverted three times and placed in a water bath to
incubate at 65C for 10mins. The tubes were vortexed again for 5s to complete
homogenization and 5ml of 100% isopropanal was added to the mixture. The tubes were
mixed thoroughly by inversion until the DNA precipitate became visible as a clump. The
tubes were then centrifuged (2000g) for 3mins and the supernatants were discarded leaving
the pellets. The DNA pellets were rinsed with 5ml of 70% ethanol followed by a 3 min
centrifuge to remove any remaining salts. The ethanol was carefully discarded from each tube
and the DNA pellets were air dried until all the liquid was evaporated. The pellets were re-
suspended in 1ml of buffer FG3, vortexed for 5s at low speed and dissolved by incubating for
1hr at 65C in a water bath. The concentration of DNA in each sample was analysed using a
NanoDrop ND-1000 spectrophometer. The nanodrop was calibrated to zero absorbance
using samples of TE buffer and distilled water. The absorbance of a 1l aliquot of each
sample was analysed and the concentration of DNA was calculated based on the constant:
1OD (Optic Distance) =50g/ml of DNA. The DNA bands were visualised using E-Gel 96
High Range DNA Markers. These markers are used as a molecular weight standard in agarose
electrophoresis. The marker is supplied in gel loading buffer and can be applied directly to an
agarose gel. These fragments can be visualised by ethidium bromide staining. Samples were
loaded (96 in each plate) with 10l of water, 2l of loading dye and 1l of each DNA sample.
The gels were run for 12 mins and then digitally photographed to visualise the bands.
Four polymorphisms, C_1611535 (12,220 bp from 5' end), rs936461 (809 bp from 5'
end), 48-bp tandem repeat (exon 3), and rs11246226 (488 bp from 3' end) were genotyped in
DRD4. Polymorphisms were detected through methods based on the TaqMan technology
used for allelic discrimination. Allelic discrimination detects different forms of the same gene
that differ by nucleotide substitution, insertion, or detection (Applied Biosystems). The
Allelic discrimination assay combines PCR amplification and detection into a single step.
This allelic discrimination is based on a traditional PCR in which two fluorescent probes
directed to the polymorphism locus studied are additionally included. The probes were
labelled with FAM (6-carbonyl-fluorescein) or VIC fluorescent dyes (Applied Biosystems)
and designed to match perfectly either one or other alleles. Fluorescent signals are only
produced when the probe matches the DNA genomic sequence, indicating the presence of one
or more SNPs. The exon 3 VNTR was genotyped using agarose gel technology. Genotyping
was carried out both in Drs. Oreland and Grigorenkos laboratories.
Statistical Analyses
Chi-square analyses were used to analyze the genotype, allele and haplotype frequencies
and determine statistically significant associations. For all of the statistical tests, results were
considered significant at p< 0.05. All of the analyses were performed with SPSS for Windows
(version 15; SPSS, Inc., Chicago).
RESULTS
A total of 239 participants were included in this study. These participants data were
analysed by means of group-based comparative analyses (i.e., incarcerated individuals vs.
controls and individuals with and without CD) with regard to the variation in DRD4. The
allele, genotype, and haplotype frequencies for each polymorphism in each group were
examined to determine any statistically significant differences between groups. In a nutshell,
for the incarcerated versus control group comparison, the C_1611535 polymorphism was the
only polymorphism differentiating the groups. In the CD versus no CD group comparison, the
same polymorphism, C_1611535, as well as the rs11246226 polymorphism were found to be
statistically informative for group differentiation. For the haplotype analyses, 15 haplotypes
were investigated and they revealed a number of interesting, statistically significant results in
differentiating both the incarcerated versus control and CD versus no CD groups. Finally,
there were some statistically significant findings for YSR. In summary, the variation in the
DRD4 gene appears to be associated with risk for incarceration, CD, and externalizing
behaviours. The specifics of this conclusion are presented below.
Group Analyses 1: Incarcerated versus Control Samples
Analysis of Allele Frequencies
The allele frequencies for the three polymorphisms are given in Figure 1 (a-d) below.
There were no differences in allele frequencies for any of the genotyped polymorphisms.
Although no statistically significant associations were found, Figure 1 shows slight
differences in the frequencies between the detainees and controls.
Genotype frequencies for each polymorphism in each group are shown in Table 1 and
Figure 2. Of note is that, for the exon 3 VNTR, we grouped all but the 7-repeat alleles into a
single group. The genotype frequencies did not differ significantly between the two groups
for the rs9366, rs11246226, or exon 3 polymorphism. There were, however, statistically
significant differences in genotype frequencies at the C_1611535 (rs58688157)
polymorphism (X2(2) =6.63, p=0.036, with the genotype GG being present in incarcerated and
absent in control individuals. Figure 2 shows that there appears to be no drastic difference
between the frequencies of each genotype, with the exception of the GG genotype located at
C_1611535.
Number of Alleles
Number of Alleles
Detainees Detainees
Controls Controls
(a) (b)
Number of Alleles
Number of Alleles
Detainees Detainees
Controls Controls
(c) (d)
Figure 1. (a-d). Allele frequencies at the three SNPs C_1611535(a), rs9366(b), rs11246226(c) & Exon 3
VNTR (d).
Table 1. Counts for DRD4 genotypes in incarcerated vs. control groups
N C_1611535 rs9366 Exon 3 VNTR rs11246226

GG AG AA GG AG AA X-X X-7 CC AC AA
Detainees 179 11 62 103 80 63 34 53 126 38 75 55
Controls 60 0 29 29 3 29 8 23 37 14 15 14
Detainees
Controls
Individual SNPS
Figure 2. Genotype frequencies in incarcerated vs. control groups.
Table 2. Estimated DRD4 haplotype frequencies with their standard errors for groups
of detainees & controls for C_1611535, rs9366, the exon 3 VNTR polymorphisms, &
rs11246226
Haplotype Controls Detainees

Frequencies Standard Error Frequencies Standard Error
1 (AAXA) .132 .031 .104 .016
2 (AGXA) .292 .042 .380 .026
3 (GAXA) .041 .018 .022 .008
4 (GAXC) .047 .020 .050 .011
5 (AAXC) .052 .020 .118 .017
6 (GA7C) .073 .024 .058 .012
7 (AGXC) .237 .039 .110 .017
8 (GG7A) .038 .018 0 0
9 (GG7C) .033 .017 .063 .013
10 (GA7A) .004 .006 .010 .005
11 (AA7C) .024 .014 .007 .005
12 (AG7C) .015 .011 .019 .007
13 (GGXC) .013 .010 .022 .008
14 (AG7A) 0 0 .021 .008
15 (GGXA) 0 0 .016 .007
Analysis of Haplotype Frequencies

Haplotype analysis was carried out with the HAPLO program (Hawley & Kidd, 1995).
As indicated above, 15 haplotypes with frequencies >5% in at least one out of the two groups
were revealed (see Table 2). Significant differences in frequencies of DRD4 haplotypes
across the C_1611535 (rs58688157), rs9366, exon 3 VNTR, and rs11246226 polymorphisms
were registered (X2(14)=40.2, p<0.001). It is interesting to note that the 8th haplotype was
present in the control group but not in the detainee group. The 14th and 15th haplotypes,
however, were present in the detainee group but not in the control group.
Figure 3. Allele frequencies at the three SNPs C_1611535(a), rs9366(b), rs11246226(c) & Exon 3
VNTR (d).
Group Analyses 2: Conduct Disorder vs. no Conduct Disorder Samples
Analysis of Allele Frequencies

The allele frequencies for three SNP polymorphisms are provided in Figure 3 (a-d).
Similar to the group analyses presented above, there were no differences in allele frequencies
for any of the genotyped SNPs. Although no statistically significant associations were found,
Figure 3 shows slight differences in the frequencies between the participants with and without
CD.
Analysis of Genotype Frequencies

Genotype frequencies for each polymorphism in each group are presented in Table 3 and
Figure 4. These frequencies, mostly, did not differ significantly between the two groups for
genotypes at rs9366 However, there was a significant difference at rs11246226 (X2(2)=6.39,
p=0.041).
Analysis of Haplotype Frequencies

Haplotype analysis revealed significant differences in patterns of DRD4 haplotype
frequencies across the four studied polymorphisms among the individuals diagnosed with CD
and those who were not (X2(14)=37.7, p<0.001). Table 4 shows that the 8th haplotype was
present in the no CD group, but absent in the CD group. The 12th and 13th haplotypes,
however, were absent in the no CD group and present in the CD group.
Table 3. Counts for DRD4 genotypes in groups with & without CD
N C_1611535 rs9366 Exon 3 rs1124622

VNTR
GG AG AA GG AG AA X-X X-7 CC AC AA
Conduct 141 10 49 80 65 47 27 46 95 28 65 36
Disorder
NO 72 1 33 37 25 34 13 22 50 20 20 24
Conduct
Disorder
CD
No CD
Individual SNPS
Figure 4. Genotype frequencies in groups with & without Conduct Disorder.

Table 4. Estimated DRD4 haplotype frequencies with their standard errors for groups
with & without conduct disorder for C_1611535, rs9366, the exon 3 VNTR, and
rs11246226
Haplotype No Conduct Disorder Conduct Disorder

Frequencies Standard Error Frequencies Standard Error
1 (AAXA) .145 .029 .095 .018
2 (AGXA) .282 .037 .376 .029
3 (GAXA) .035 .015 .014 .007
4 (GAXC) .062 .020 .055 .014
5 (GA7C) .074 .022 .111 .019
6 (GA7C) .059 .019 .064 .015
7 (AGXC) .199 .033 .124 .020
8 (GG7A) .011 .009 0 0
9 (GG7C) .038 .016 .076 .016
10 (GA7A) .004 .005 .015 .007
11 (AA7C) .041 .016 .006 .005
12 (AG7C) 0 0 .015 .007
13 (GGXC) 0 0 .018 .008
14 (AG7A) .010 .008 .026 .010
15 (GGXA) .042 .017 .005 .004
DISCUSSION
In a sample of 179 male adolescent delinquents and 60 matched controls, it has been
found that variation in DRD4 is associated with risk for externalizing problems, for both
incarceration and CD. In the present analyses, Incarceration and CD were studied separately;
nonetheless, differential patterns of genotype and/or haplotype frequencies across the DRD4
gene indicate an association between the variation in this gene and broadly defined
externalizing problems (Krueger, et al., 2002; Krueger & Johnson, 2008). Yet, in interpreting
the results, it is important to discuss a number of issues.
First, although our data supports a connection between the variation in DRD4 and
externalizing problems, they do not explain the particular role of the 7-repeat allele of the
exon 3 VNTR. The literature on the association between this allele and externalizing
problems is contradictory (e.g., DeYoung, et al., 2006; Leung, et al., 2005); this particular
allele might or might not substantiate the role of DRD4 in these behavioural problems.
Second, the results presented here feature the C_1611535 (rs58688157) and rs11246226
polymorphisms as interesting markers to consider in further analyses. To our knowledge,
these SNPs have not been previously investigated in the context of studying externalizing
behaviour and, thus, might be of interest in future studies. Third, it is important to note that
the analyses of allele frequencies did not reveal any significant differences for either of the
two grouping analyses. This highlights the importance of analysing polymorphisms of DRD4
or any candidate gene at different levels, covering allele, genotype, and haplotype
frequencies. Fourth, haplotype frequencies showed significant associations with both
criminality and conduct disorder. A haplotype refers to a cluster of polymorphisms within a

gene (or across multiple genes) that might form a unit, transmitted across a generation. The
haplotype analyses presented here revealed the most interesting findings. Analysing
haplotypes (which is not common for psychological research) is vital because it can provide
insight on factors influencing the dependency among genetic markers (Liu, Zhang, & Zhao,
2008). It is important, in conducting analyses of genetic bases of complex human behaviours,
to acknowledge the complexity of genes as structures. Genes cannot be adequately captured
by single polymorphisms but can be represented by multiple measurements, similar to what is
used for the representations of complex latent variables. These results demonstrate the
advantage of using multiple markers clustered into haplotypes in considering group
differences. Haplotypes appear to be more informative in differentiating groups of interest,
seem to result in a higher power of differentiation, and are less vulnerable to the adjustments
of p-values since they require fewer comparisons.
Finally, this work has a number of limitations to consider. First, genetic association
studies have a tendency to lack the power to detect a statistically significant association
(Salanti, Sanderson, & Higgins, 2005) and, thus, replications are essential (Fonseca &
Denton, 2007). Despite the fact that information provided by genetic association studies is
valuable, we must interpret these associations with great caution.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the present study adds to the research on the dopamine D4 receptor genes
relationship with externalizing behaviours, re-assures the presence of this association, and
provides some of the first support for the role of the C_1611535 (rs58688157) and
rs11246226 sites in contributing to these relationships.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research was supported by funds from the American Psychological Foundation and
Successful Intelligence to Elena L. Grigorenko; by funds from the Swedish Royal Academy
of Sciences to Britt af Klinteberg and Elena L. Grigorenko; by funds from the Soderstrom
Koenig Fund to Lars Oreland and Britt af Klinteberg; by funds from the Mobilizing Against
Drugs Committee, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Sweden, to Britt af Klinteberg and
Lars Oreland; by funds from Swedish Medical Research Council Grant 4145 to Lars Oreland;
and by funds from the Rutgers Aresty Research Grant to Tara Thompson. We express our
gratitude to Ms. Mei Tan for her editorial assistance. We are also grateful to the participants
in this research, for their willingness to collaborate, and for their time and efforts.
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Kim-Cohen, J., Arseneault, L., Caspi, A., Tomas, M. P., Taylor, A., & Moffitt, T. E. (2005).
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(2002). Etiologic connections among substance dependence, antisocial behaviour, and
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Krueger, R. F., & Johnson, W. (2008). Behaviour genetics and personality: A new look at the
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106, 266-279.
Chapter 18
THE ASSESSMENT OF DEPRESSION,

ANXIETY AND TENSION/STRESS IN YOUTH
Marianna Szab
ABSTRACT
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; S. H. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is
a widely used measure of negative affect in adults, both in normal and clinic-referred
populations. It was originally developed to assess the full range of core symptoms of
anxiety and depression while also providing maximal differentiation between these two
affective states. During its development, a third specific factor emerged empirically, and
was labelled stress or tension/stress by the researchers. This third emotional state has
subsequently been shown to be uniquely associated with excessive and uncontrollable
worrying in adults. A measure similar to the DASS is not yet available to assess negative
emotional states in children and adolescents. Nevertheless, extant research suggests that
there are similarities in the structure of negative affect across different developmental
stages. For example, the core symptoms of depression in primary-school aged children
and in adolescents appear to be highly similar to those previously identified in adults by
S. H. Lovibond and Lovibond. However, anxiety and tension/stress has not yet been
successfully differentiated from each other as two specific emotional states in
respondents younger that 15-18 years of age. Further research is now underway to
identify the age at which these two emotional states are first observable via self-report
questionnaires, and to develop a new measure of anxiety, depression and tension/stress
for children and adolescents.
Keywords: Adolescence, Anxiety, Children, Depression, Depression Anxiety Stress Scales,

Stress
Ph: 61-2-9351 5147; Fax: 61-2-9036 5223; email: marianna.szabo@sydney.edu.au

210 Marianna Szab
INTRODUCTION
Anxiety and mood disorders are among the most prevalent psychiatric disorders in
children and adolescents (Sawyer, Arney, Baghurst, Clark, Graetz, Kosky, et. al., 2000), as
well as in adults (Andrews, Hall, Teesson, & Henderson, 1999). These disorders often persist
into adulthood and increase young peoples risk for other mental health problems, for
example, drug and alcohol abuse, eating disorders, and suicide (Bulik, Sullivan, Fear, &
Joyce, 1997; Hale, Raaijmakers, Muris, Van Hoof, & Meeus, 2008; Kim-Cohen, Caspi,
Moffitt, Harrington, Milne, & Poulton, 2003). To improve mental health and reduce the
burden of disease, a better understanding, prevention and treatment of anxiety and depression
in youth is crucial. A critical issue hindering progress in this field, however, is our limited
knowledge concerning the conceptualisation and valid assessment of negative affective states
in children and adolescents (Andrews, Szab, & Burns, 2002; Cartwright-Hatton, 2006;
Schniering, Hudson, & Rapee, 2000).
As in many other areas of research, developments in our understanding and assessment of
negative emotion in youth have lagged behind advances in adult research (Clark & Watson,
l991; S. H. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Such advances have initially been stimulated by
reports of a limited discriminant power of popular assessment tools. Scales purporting to
assess anxiety frequently correlated as highly with depression scales as with other anxiety
scales, and depression scales showed a similar lack of specificity. Very high rates of
comorbidity between anxiety and depressive disorders were also seen as partly reflecting a
difficulty differentiating between these two constructs in clinical settings (Clark & Watson,
1991). Mirroring similar findings in adults, popular child self-report instruments such as the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC; Spielberger, Edwards, Montuon, &
Lushene, 1970) or the Children's Depression Inventory (CDI; Kovacs, 1981) have been
shown to have a limited discriminant power and to assess a mixture of symptoms of both
affective states as well as symptoms of general distress (Cole, Truglio, & Peeke, 1997; Finch,
Lipovsky, & Casat, 1989; Joiner, Catanzaro, & Laurent, 1996; Szab & Lovibond, 2006).
IDENTIFYING THE SPECIFIC SYMPTOMS OF

ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION
To explain such findings in adult populations, Clark and Watson (1991) suggested that
anxiety and depression share certain characteristics with each other, but that they also have
unique symptoms, specific to each. To better differentiate anxiety and depression from each
other, assessments of these two emotional states need to de-emphasise their common
characteristics and emphasise their specific symptoms. In a series of factor analytic studies,
these researchers (e.g., Watson, Clark, Weber, Assenheimer, Strauss, & McCormick, 1995)
identified symptoms of Physiological Hyperarousal (PH; e.g., racing heart, sweaty palms, dry
mouth) as specific to anxiety, and low Positive Affect (PA; i.e., a lack of pleasure or
enthusiasm) as specific to depression. They suggested that symptoms of irritability, tension,
worry, sad or anxious mood, concentration or decision making difficulties, or sleep and
appetite disturbances are common to both anxiety and depression, and they reflect Negative
Affect (NA) or psychological distress in general.
The Assessment of Depression, Anxiety and Tension/Stress in Youth 211
While this tripartite model of negative affective states (Clark & Watson, 1991) has
made important contributions to current knowledge, it has also been criticised for its overly
restrictive definition of anxiety and depression. For example, Burns and Eidelson (1998)
pointed out that physiological arousal on its own does not assess the core aspect of anxiety,
since it can also occur in many other states, such as intense anger or excitement. Similarly,
low positive affect is likely to be only one of several specific features of depression. Other
such features also need to be identified and included in any comprehensive assessment tool.
THE DEPRESSION ANXIETY STRESS SCALES (DASS)

Consistent with Burns and Eidelsons (1998) critique, S. H. Lovibond and Lovibond
(1995) aimed to develop a self-report instrument that is able to assess the full range of core
symptoms of anxiety and depression, while obtaining maximal discrimination between the
two affective states. The results of a series of factor analyses in more than 30 samples
indicated that the unique symptoms of anxiety include a subjective awareness of anxious
affect and escape or avoidance tendencies, as well as physiological hyperarousal. The unique
symptoms of depression were found to include hopelessness, devaluation of life, self
deprecation and inertia, in addition to low positive affect. The item content of the Depression
Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS, S. H. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) reflects these additional
symptoms. Similar to Watson et al.s (1995) findings, Lovibond and Lovibond reported that
several other symptoms, including appetite and sleep disturbances, fatigue, or poor
concentration, had no specific loading on either the Depression or the Anxiety factor. These
items were considered to indicate emotional distress or negative affect in general and were
excluded from the DASS in order to increase its specificity and discriminant power.
A unique feature of the DASS is its inclusion of a Stress scale in addition to the
Depression and Anxiety scales. This scale emerged empirically during the development of the
Depression and Anxiety scales, via an aggregation of such items as difficulty relaxing,
tension, impatience, irritability and agitation. It was initially labelled Stress or
Tension/Stress by the researchers (S. H. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Knowledge about
the precise nature of the construct assessed by this scale is still developing. Some researchers
(e.g., Brown, Korotitsch, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1997) argue that scores on the Stress scale
largely reflect the construct of general distress or Negative Affect (NA), as described within
the framework of the tripartite model (Clark & Watson, 1991). However, others have
provided compelling evidence that the Stress scale in fact measures a specific, independent
emotional syndrome, empirically distinguishable from a common general negative affect
construct as well as from anxiety or depression (Henry & Crawford, 2005; Lovibond, 1998).
For example, Henry and Crawford (2005) conducted a stringent test of the specificity of
the three DASS scales in a large adult sample by testing whether a quadripartite structure
underlies the DASS. This quadripartite model builds upon the original DASS model first
proposed by S. H. Lovibond and Lovibond (1995), which involved the three correlated factors
of Depression, Anxiety and Stress (see Figure 1).
212 Marianna Szab
Figure 1. The correlated three-factor model of Depression, Anxiety & Stress underlying the 21-item
brief version of the DASS, originally proposed by S. H. Lovibond & Lovibond (1995). Note: Error
terms are omitted for reasons of clarity.
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the Quadripartite model originally proposed by Crawford &
Henry (2005). Note: Error terms are omitted for reasons of clarity.
In the quadripartite model, these three factors are assumed to be orthogonal, and a fourth
orthogonal factor, labelled General Psychological Distress, is added. The Anxiety,
Depression and Stress factors are each defined by the items originally specified by S. H.
Lovibond and Lovibond. However, each item is also allowed to load on the fourth, common
214 Marianna Szab
General Distress factor. Thus, the quadripartite model implies that scores on each item of the
DASS reflect a common underlying construct as well as their specific Anxiety, Depression or
Stress constructs (see Figure 2).
To further explore whether Stress is in fact a specific emotional state or, alternatively, it
is synonymous with the construct of general distress, Henry and Crawford compared the
quadripartite model with an alternative model in which no specific Stress factor was included
and all Stress items were instead set to load on the common General Distress factor only
(see Figure 3). Results showed that all three scales of the DASS index a substantial
proportion of common variance, explaining the correlations among their manifest scores.
However, items on each scale were also found to contain a significant amount of specific
variance, unique to their underlying factor. The quadripartite model was shown to be superior
to the alternative model, and was reported as the optimal model to summarise adults
responses to the DASS-21. These results provide strong supportive evidence for the
specificity of the items comprising the DASS, and for the specificity of the Stress construct in
particular.
Concerning the nature of this construct, it has recently been shown that scores on the
DASS Stress scale are strongly associated with a diagnosis of DSM-IV Generalised Anxiety
Disorder (GAD, American Psychiatric Association, 2000) in clinical samples and with
excessive and uncontrollable worrying in general populations (Brown et al., 1997; Szab, in
press; Huang, Szab, & Han, 2009). Moreover, items that form the DASS Stress scale have
uniformly strong associations with worrying (Szab, in press). These studies are the first to
demonstrate that GAD and worrying are associated with a specific emotional syndrome.
Emphasising the symptoms reflected in the DASS Stress items in future revisions of DSM
may lead to increased discriminant validity of the diagnostic category of GAD, and to a more
clear delineation of its boundaries from depression and from the other anxiety disorders (cf.
Andrews, Hobbs, Borkovec, Beesdo, Craske, Heimberg, et al., 2010).
Since its first publication, several independent research groups have reported on the
favourable psychometric properties of the DASS, both in its original 42-item version and its
brief 21-item version, in clinical and in non-clinical samples (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, &
Swinson, 1998); Brown et al., 1997; Clara, Cox, & Enns, 2001; Crawford & Henry, 2003;
Henry & Crawford, 2005; Lovibond, 1998; P. F. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; Taylor,
Lovibond, Nicholas, Cayley, & Wilson, 2005). It has been translated into 24 languages and
shown to be a reliable and valid measure in several cultures (de Beurs, Van Dyck, Marquenie,
Lange, & Blonk, 2001; Daza, Novy, Stanley, & Averill, 2002; Norton, 2007). Its factor
structure is stable and essentially the same in clinical and nonclinical samples (Antony et al.,
1998; Brown et al., 1997; Clara et al., 2001), supporting the idea that clinical disorders
represent an extreme or maladaptive manifestation of basic emotional syndromes.
Thus, the DASS is a unique self-report measure in that it is able to assess the full range of
the specific symptoms of both anxiety and depression, as well as of stress or tension/stress
in one brief instrument. It measures pure emotional states without reference to stimuli that
evoke these states (i.e., social situations, animals, contamination) making it useful as a
measure of anxiety or depression associated with a broad range of DSM-defined disorders. At
the same time, because it has been developed empirically, independent of DSM-derived
constructs, its use is unaffected by any future changes to DSM diagnostic criteria.
THE ASSESSMENT OF NEGATIVE AFFECT

IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
Similar to the adult instruments from which they have been developed, popular child self-
report measures of negative emotion have been shown to have limited discriminant validity
(e.g., Finch et al., 1989). Recent attempts to compensate for the limitations of these measures
have taken two different directions. Some researchers (e.g., Chorpita, Yim, Moffitt,
Umemoto, & Francis, 2000; Spence, 1998) constructed new self-report scales for 7-18-year-
olds to assess dimensions of anxiety and mood disorder symptoms as defined by DSM-IV-TR
(APA, 2000). Others (e.g., Chorpita, Daleiden, Moffitt, Yim, & Umemoto, 2000; Laurent,
Catanzaro, & Joiner, 2004; Laurent, Catanzaro, Joiner, Rudolph, Potter, Lambert, et al., 1999)
developed measures of pure emotional states independent of DSM-defined constructs,
typically using Clark and Watsons (1991) tripartite model of negative affect as a guide to
item selection.
In spite of its central role in the assessment of negative emotional states in adults, no self-
report questionnaire similar to the adult DASS (S. H. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is as yet
available to assess negative emotion in children and adolescents. Such an instrument would
fill an important need by providing assessments of pure emotional states that transcend DSM-
derived constructs, as well as by complementing the more restrictive item content of measures
based on the tripartite model. Importantly, none of the existing measures of childhood
negative affect is able to assess the stress or tension/stress construct in youth. Establishing
the age at which a specific tension/stress syndrome is first distinguishable from anxiety,
depression and general negative affect would have important implications for our better
understanding of the development of increasingly differentiated emotional states. In addition,
it would represent a crucial first step towards identifying the emotional symptoms associated
with excessive worrying and generalised anxiety disorder in youth, as this question has
remained unanswered to date (Kendall & Pimentall, 2003; Tracey, Chorpita, Douban, &
Barlow, 1997; Szab & Lovibond, 2004).
DEVELOPING AGE-APPROPRIATE ITEMS TO ASSESS DEPRESSION,

ANXIETY AND TENSION/STRESS
So far only one published study attempted to assess depression, anxiety and
tension/stress, as defined by the DASS, in primary-school-aged children (Szab & Lovibond,
2006). A sample of 577 7-14-year-olds completed a 76-item exploratory questionnaire that
included the item content of established measures of childhood anxiety and depression (i.e.,
STAIC, CDI) as well as new items developed by the authors. A series of exploratory factor
analyses was conducted. The discriminant validity of such symptoms as fatigue, indecision,
and appetite or sleep changes was first evaluated. Although these symptoms are included in
popular measures of childhood negative affect, it was hypothesised that, as in adults, they
would reflect general distress and have no strong specific association to either anxiety or
depression. Findings provided strong support for the hypothesis and suggest that, as in adults,
216 Marianna Szab
measures of negative affect in children should de-emphasise such symptoms to maximise

specificity and discriminant power.
The analyses further indicated that the core symptoms of depression in 7-14-year-olds are
highly similar to those previously identified in adults and reflected in the item content of the
DASS. In addition to using items from existing scales (i.e., STAIC, CDI) we developed new
items to assess symptoms that are not included in current youth depression scales but are core
symptoms of depression as defined by the DASS (e.g., devaluation of life, hopelessness,
inertia). Each item was found to have strong specific associations with the underlying
depression construct in our analyses. These results are in accordance with earlier
suggestions (S. H. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) that in adults depression is defined by a
broader range of symptoms than low Positive Affect alone (c.f. Watson et al., 1995), and
extend this finding to children and adolescents. To date, no existing child self-report measure
of depression provides a comprehensive coverage of such core symptoms while also de-
emphasising non-specific symptoms.
Although a Depression factor was successfully identified, we were unable to differentiate
the anxiety and tension/stress constructs in this study. Instead of a 3-factor model of
Depression, Anxiety and Stress, a 2-factor model involving Depression and a combined
Anxiety-Stress factor appeared to best summarise the data. These results are consistent with
suggestions that negative emotional states become increasingly differentiated as young people
mature (Cole, et al., 1997). However, our inability to differentiate the anxiety and
tension/stress constructs may have also reflected the limitations of the draft items developed
for this study. For example, the adult DASS items concerning autonomic arousal point it out
to the respondents that they refer to autonomic arousal experienced in the absence of physical
exercise (e.g., I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion). Such
information was omitted from the simplified items to increase their readability and
comprehension (e.g., My heart was beating fast). However, omitting this information may
have reduced the items validity and precision. Similarly, items intended to assess the
irritability and impatience aspects of tension/stress may have reflected anger or externalising
tendencies in youth, needing further refinement.
THE LATENT STRUCTURE OF THE DASS IN ADOLESCENT SAMPLES

Reflecting the need to provide a psychometrically sound self-report measure of negative
affect for youth, researchers have begun to explore the construct validity of the adult DASS in
adolescents. First, Duffy, Cunningham, and Moore (2005) conducted Confirmatory Factor
Analyses (CFA) to test whether the underlying constructs of depression, anxiety and
tension/stress are observable in 11-15-year-olds, using the brief 21-item version of the adult
DASS. Results did not support the hypothesised three-factor structure. After testing several
alternative models, the authors concluded that young adolescents do not differentiate between
depression, anxiety, and stress when responding to the adult DASS-21; instead they report on
physiological arousal and generalised negative affective states. However, Duffy et al.s data
may have reflected the characteristics of a small sample recruited from a single school.
Tully, Zajac, and Venning (2009) included larger and more diverse samples of both
younger (aged 12-14 years) and older (aged 15-18 years) adolescents in a similar study. These
researchers found that a model involving a Depression and an Anxiety factor, with all Stress
items loading on a common factor, fit the data best (see Figure 3). Although the authors claim
that their results provide evidence for Clark and Watsonss (1991) tripartite model, they in
fact did not select items to assess low Positive Affect and Physiological Hyperarousal as
defined by that model. Instead, Tully et al.s results appear to show that while Depression and
Anxiety, as defined by the DASS, may be assessable via the adult DASS-21 in adolescents, no
specific Stress factor is observable. However, such a conclusion may be premature, as the
authors omission to test the quadripartite model (Henry & Crawford, 2005; see Figure 2) in
that study greatly limits the interpretability of their findings.
So far, only two studies have tested the quadripartite model in adolescent samples. Szab
(2010) explored the underlying structure of young adolescents responses to the DASS-21 in
a sample of 481 11-15-year-olds. A correlated three-factor model comprising Depression,
Anxiety and Stress, as originally proposed by S. H. Lovibond and Lovibond (1995; see Figure
1) was tested first and found to fit the data adequately. However, correlations among the three
factors, especially between Anxiety and Stress, were very high. Several alternative models
were tested to explain such correlations. These included a one-factor model, a two-factor
model involving a Depression and a combined Anxiety-Stress factor (Szab & Lovibond,
2006), and the quadripartite and general distress models first offered by Henry and
Crawford (2005, see Figures 2 and 3, respectively). As in adults, the quadripartite model was
found to have superior fit to all other models.
Specific factor loadings in the quadripartite model were less clear than those previously
found in adult samples, however. Six of the seven Depression items and five of the seven
Anxiety items had significant loadings on their own factor, in addition to the common factor.
The only item that originally intended to assess Depression but failed to load on the specific
Depression factor reflected a lack of initiative (I found it difficult to work up the initiative to
do things). Interestingly, this item has been found to perform poorly in adult samples as well
(e.g., Antony et al., 1998). Both items that failed to load on the Anxiety factor were originally
intended to assess physiological hyperarousal (I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g.,
excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion); and I was
aware of dryness of my mouth). The poor performance of these items may reflect either
comprehension difficulties or a limited awareness of the somatic symptoms of anxiety among
young adolescents. Importantly, the majority of the items originally aimed to assess
tension/stress failed to have significant positive loadings on their allocated Stress factor, in
addition to their loadings on the common factor. These results question whether 11-15-year-
olds experience the specific emotional state of tension/stress, or whether they are able to
report on this experience via the items comprising the adult DASS. Again, it is likely that the
findings have been influenced by the complex wording of some of the items on the adult
DASS Stress scale. Adolescents asked for clarification for several of these items, and missing
values were most common when items included such words as tolerate, agitated or
irritable, most of which belong to the Stress scale (Szab, 2010).
We conducted a follow up study to test whether older adolescents responses to the adult
DASS reflect a clearer underlying symptom structure (Szab, 2009 November). A sample of
690 15-18-year-olds completed the DASS-21 and Confirmatory Factor Analyses were used to
test alternative models. Although the original correlated three-factor DASS model (S. H.
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) achieved adequate fit, correlations among the factors were
again very high. Therefore, several other models were tested, following the procedures
218 Marianna Szab
reported by Szab (2010). As expected, results showed that the quadripartite model provided
the best summary of the underlying structure of 15-18-year-old adolescents responses to the
adult DASS-21. Importantly, extending Tully et al.s (2009) findings, the quadripartite model
provided superiour fit to a model implying that DASS Stress items assess a common General
Psychological Distress factor only (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Graphical representation of the General Distress model originally proposed by Crawford &
Henry (2005). Note. Error terms are omitted for reasons of clarity.
An inspection of item loadings in the quadripartite model indicated that each of the 7
items originally allocated to the Depression factor had significant positive loadings on this
factor, in addition to the common factor. As expected, the item reflecting a lack of initiative
again had a very low, albeit statistically significant, loading. All seven Anxiety items loaded
as expected, suggesting that the symptom structure of Anxiety is highly similar in 15-18-year-
olds to that previously found in adults. However, only five of the seven Stress items had
significant positive loadings on their allocated factor. Two items that were hypothesised to
reflect the Stress construct but failed to contribute significant amount of variance to the
specific Stress factor were I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy and I found it
difficult to relax (Szab, 2009 November).
CONCLUSION
While new research is developing to provide improved assessment of negative affect in
children and adolescents, our knowledge concerning the specific core symptoms of
depression, anxiety and tension/stress across developmental stages is still limited. Extant data
to date suggest that there are age-related differences in the extent to which the constructs of
Depression, Anxiety and Stress are observable via self-report.
It appears that the core symptoms of Depression are highly similar in adults (S. H.
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), older adolescents (Szab, 2009 November), younger
adolescents (Szab, 2010), and primary school aged children (Szab & Lovibond, 2006). In
each of our studies, a clear Depression factor was found, defined by symptoms of
hopelessness, devaluation of life, anhedonia, self deprecation and (albeit less strongly),
inertia. In contrast, clear anxiety and stress constructs were not yet distinguishable in primary-
school-aged samples. Although an anxiety construct similar to that previously found in
adults was observable in young adolescents (Szab, 2010), we were only able to assess
stress via self report in individuals older than 15 years of age (Szab, 2009 November). The
age at which this specific emotional state first emerges is currently unknown.
Further work towards identifying the specific core symptoms of depression, anxiety and
stress in youth is now needed. In addition to its theoretical importance, such work would lead
to improved assessment of depression and anxiety, as well as providing the first self-report
measure to assess tension/stress in youth. An ability to assess tension/stress would enable us
to document any age-related changes in the emotional correlates of excessive worrying and
Generalised Anxiety Disorder, and would contribute to a better understanding of the
development of this chronic disorder. Our research group is currently examining the
psychometric properties of original and modified versions of the DASS at different ages.
These studies will contribute to establishing the lower age limit for the reliable and valid use
of the adult DASS in adolescent populations, and will inform our work towards constructing
age-appropriate items to assess depression, anxiety and tension/stress in children. Ultimately,
improved assessment will facilitate detection, prevention and treatment of a wide variety of
emotional disturbances involving depression, anxiety, stress and excessive worrying in youth.
220 Marianna Szab
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Chapter 19
UNCONSCIOUS SCHEMAS, BULIMIC TENDENCIES

AND THE INFLUENCE OF SUBLIMINAL
ABANDONMENT AND UNIFICATION CUES ON EATING
Kathleen Mairet and Simon Boag

ABSTRACT
Recent research suggests that negative schemas (i.e., core beliefs) that are not
directly related to eating, shape and weight may play an important role in bulimias
manifestation (Jones, Harris & Leung, 2005). Since these schemas may be prevented
from awareness due to defensive processes, subliminal stimulation may be an effective
means for treatment and serve as an adjunct to current therapies. To examine this, a
sample of one hundred and twenty undergraduate women was divided into one of three
visual subliminal stimuli groups: an abandonment related cue lonely, a unification cue
friendship or a neutral cue gallery. After subliminal stimulus presentations
participants were then left alone for 5 minutes with a bowl of biscuits to eat and the
weight eaten was recorded. Contrary to what was predicted, women who received the
subliminal abandonment cue did not eat significantly more than women in the control
group. Furthermore, mixed support was found for Waller and Barters (2005) suggestion
that women presented with a subliminal unification cue would eat significantly less than
the women in the control group. While an overall difference was not found, women in the
unification group who spoke English as a second language ate significantly less than
those women in the control group. The implications of the findings for both theory and
treatment concerning bulimia are discussed, along with suggestions for future research.
Keywords: Abandonment, Bulimia, Defenses, Early maladaptive scheme, Subliminal,

Unconscious processes
Ph: 61-2-9850 8024; Fax: 61-2-9850 8062; simon.boag@psy.mq.edu.au

224 Kathleen Mairet and Simon Boag
INTRODUCTION
Eating disorders are notorious for their persistent course and poor prognoses (Jones et al.,
2005). Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) has been the most widely studied treatment for
bulimia (Bowers & Andersen, 2007) and is generally considered the most effective form of
therapy (Wilson, Grilo & Vitousek, 2007). This model emphasises the manifestation of
dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours originating from societal expectations (sociocultural
influences) concerning food, body shape and weight (Leung & Price, 2007). Recently,
however, the effectiveness of CBT has been called into question with research indicating that,
on average, only 50% of patients cease binge eating and purging behaviours subsequent to
treatment (Halmi et al., 2002; Meyer et al., 2005; Wilson, 1996). Consequently, CBT appears
to be valuable but not always sufficient for treatment. As such, building upon Youngs (1999)
Schema-Focused Therapy, Waller, Kennerley and Ohanian (2007) have recently proposed a
Schema-Focused Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy which accentuates both the behavioural
traits and underlying maladaptive beliefs (or schemas) associated with the disorder.
There has been much debate within eating disorder literature as to whether individuals
with bulimia are categorically different from sub-clinical bulimic and non-eating disordered
individuals (the discontinuity hypothesis) or whether they represent the end-point of an eating
disorder continuum (the continuity hypothesis) (Stice, Killen, Hayward & Taylor, 1998).
While several authors have generally supported the discontinuity hypothesis (Dykens &
Gerrard, 1986; Garfinkel et al., 1995; Ruderman & Besbeas, 1992), recent studies tend to
advocate the continuity hypothesis which places undisturbed eating at one end of the
continuum (i.e., asymptomatic group), clinical eating disorders at the other end (i.e., eating
disordered group) and milder forms of disturbed eating at an intermediate point (i.e.,
symptomatic group) (e.g., Dingemans et al., 2006; Stice et al., 1998; Tylka & Subich, 1999).
BULIMIC BEHAVIOURS AND DEFENSE

It has been suggested that bulimic behaviours (i.e., binging and purging) serve a
defensive function by either reducing the individuals awareness of negative affects
(McManus, Waller & Chadwick, 1996; Meyer & Waller, 1999), a process Luck et al. (2006)
have termed secondary avoidance of affect, or alternatively by narrowing the focus of
attention to the immediate stimulus environment and sensations (i.e., cognitive narrowing)
(Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). For instance, research suggests that feelings of loneliness
precede the onset of bulimia, as well as help to maintain the disorder (Lacey, Coker &
Birtchnell, 1986). In support of this contention, Pyle, Mitchell and Eckert (1981) report that
88% of individuals with bulimia recall a significant event involving the separation from, or
loss of, a significant relationship prior to the onset of their disorder. The loss of a significant
other is likely to result in the development of automatic thoughts associated with that event as
well as increased abandonment concerns (Meyer & Waller, 1999). Young, Klosko and
Weishaar (2003) propose that these early maladaptive schemas (EMS) are primarily the result
of dysfunctional experiences with significant caregivers during childhood.
In an attempt to differentiate the core schemas conditional to binge eating disorder,
bulimia, and control women, Waller (2002) had female participants complete the Young
Unconscious Schemas, Bulimic Tendencies and the Influence 225
Schema Questionnaire (Young, 1994). Whilst the two clinical groups had broadly similar
levels of negative core schemas, they differed significantly in the nature of the schemas that
most clearly characterised the groups. When compared to both the control and binge eating
samples, women with bulimia were distinguished by heightened fears of abandonment.
Congruent with the above results, a study conducted by Jones et al. (2005) investigating the
cognitive factors contributing to eating disorder recovery reports that women with current
bulimic eating patterns displayed significantly higher fears of abandonment than individuals
with anorexia. Of significance was the finding that fears of abandonment were equally high in
both currently eating-disordered and recovered women. As such, these fears may not only
represent a risk for purging behaviours but also for relapse.
UNCONSCIOUS MALADAPTIVE SCHEMAS

Maladaptive schemas can occur without conscious awareness (Meyer & Waller, 1999).
This poses a potential problem for traditional CBT as individuals are unlikely to be able to
identify maladaptive schemas in order to challenge them (Waller & Barter, 2005). It has been
suggested that the most valid and reliable methodology used to examine the impact of
preconscious cues is the subliminal visual processing task (Meyer & Waller, 1999). Such
tasks involve brief presentations of visual stimuli below the level of awareness, usually for a
duration less than 5 milliseconds (ms), using a tachistoscope to control the necessary
illumination levels and speed to render the stimuli undetectable. It is believed that perceiving
a stimulus without awareness is, in part, effective because it bypasses defences and as such
can influence later behaviour (Silverman, 1983). These effects, however, are typically not
observed when the test stimulus is presented so that it is easily recognised (Weinberger &
Silverman, 1990).
In an attempt to assess the impact of preconscious abandonment cues on womens eating
behaviour, Patton (1992) presented either abandonment (i.e., Mama is leaving me) or
neutral (i.e., Mama is loaning it) stimuli to 40 high eating disordered and 40 low eating
disordered women. During a subsequent 10 minute bogus taste discrimination task, women
with unhealthy eating attitudes ate significantly more after exposure to the subliminal
abandonment cue. Although these findings are compatible with other models of bulimic
psychopathology, several methodological issues need to be addressed. First, the amount eaten
by participants may not reflect the individuals avoidance of threats, but rather their difficulty
in taste differentiation or decision-making. Second, it is possible that overeating reflected a
response to threat processing in general, rather than the specific threat of abandonment.
The first two of these methodological limitations were addressed in a later related study.
Waller and Barter (2005) examined whether the behavioural impact (eating) of abandonment
cues can be countered by the subliminal presentation of contradictory (or counterschematic)
information (unification cues). Ninety-six non-clinical women were presented with a
subliminal abandonment cue (lonely) that either preceded or followed a neutral (gallery)
or unification (friendship) cue. After excluding participants with an Eating Disorder
Inventory (EDI) score above 30 participants were then left alone in a room with a bowl of
crackers and the opportunity to eat (rather than implementing a taste discrimination task).
Relative to the impact of the neutral cues, presenting the subliminal unification stimuli before
or after the subliminal abandonment cue significantly reduced the amount eaten (p < .001).
Only one other study has implemented a unification cue when assessing eating
symptomology. Hallings-Pott, Waller, Watson and Scragg (2005) exposed participants to a
subliminal neutral (gallery) as well as a threat (lonely) cue to assess state dissociation and
then later used the unification cue friendship to successfully reduce their participants
affective arousal to baseline levels.
IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF PAST RESEARCH

While these results have important implications for the understanding and treatment of
bulimia, several limitations to Waller and Barters (2005) study necessitate mention. First, the
number of participants in each group was relatively small (n = 24). Second, with evidence
suggesting that eating disorder behaviours and traits exist along a continuum it was
questionable to remove participants with scores above 30 on the Eating Disorder Inventory
(EDI). As noted earlier, related research has inconsistently dichotomised groups into high and
low EDI groups using a controversial method known as the extreme groups approach (EGA)
(Preacher, MacCallum, Rucker & Nicewander, 2005). As a result, the current study will
employ a dimensional as opposed to categorical, approach to eating disorders. Further,
Fariburn et al. (2003) suggests that there is a pressing need for more treatment research that
extends beyond adolescent and young women to include older individuals. Finally, each of
the four groups in Waller and Barters (2005) study included an abandonment related cue. As
such, there was no control group to allow for baseline comparisons.
Subliminal presentations have been found to have behaviourally positive effects (e.g.,
Silverman & Weinberger, 1985; Waller & Barter, 2005) and this study may indicate the
possibility of using subliminal cues in conjunction with other forms of therapy, such as CBT
or Schema-Focused Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, to have a therapeutic effect for
individuals with bulimia. As such, the following question will be investigated: Is there an
association between bulimic tendencies, subliminal presentations of abandonment and
unification cues, and eating behaviours? It was hypothesised that women presented with a
visual abandonment cue will eat significantly more when compared to individuals in the
control group, while women presented with a visual unification cue will eat significantly less
when compared to individuals in the control group. Furthermore there will be an increase in
significance when treating group differences as a categorical rather than continuous variable,
and scores on the Eating Disorder Inventory will moderate the relationship between groups
and the amount eaten, with women high on bulimic tendencies eating relatively more within
each group.
METHOD
Design
The study employed a between-subjects experimental design, which compared the

amount eaten by the participants in the 5 minutes after exposure to one of the three visual
subliminal cues. Participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions only (n = 40
in each group), to avoid cue contagion and expectancy effects. Each group was defined by the
subliminal cue presented (neutral, unification or abandonment). Participants completed a self-
report measure concerning eating psychopathology.
Participants
The participants were 120 female first year university students who received course credit
for their participation. Ages within the sample ranged from 18 to 62, with a mean age of 21
(SD = 5.66). Although the majority of the sample (68.3 %) was aged between 18 and 20, a
univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that the age differences among the groups
did not approach significance. In terms of relationship status, 52.5% were single, 41.7% were
dating, 3.3% were married, 1.7% were in a defacto relationship and 0.8% identified
themselves as a widow. Of the participants, 67.5% affirmed that English was their first
language.
Measures and Procedure
The Eating Disorder Inventory-3 (EDI-3) (Garner, 2004) is a self report measure
assessing the psychological and behavioural constructs shown to be clinically pertinent to
individuals with eating disorders. The EDI-3 is an expansion and improvement upon the
earlier inventory, the Eating Disorder Inventory-2 (Garner, Olmstead & Polivy, 1983), a well
established measure of eating disturbances, such as bulimia and anorexia. As an improvement
upon the EDI-2s 11 scales, the EDI-3 implements 12 scales (3 eating disorder specific scales
and 9 psychological scales). Although revised, there is considerable overlap between the EDI-
2 and EDI-3s 91 items, both conceptually and in content, allowing comparisons to be made
across inventories (Cumella, 2006). For the purposes of this study, and in line with previous
research (e.g., Meyer & Waller, 1999; Patton, 1992; Waller & Barter, 2005), only the 3 scales
directly assessing eating behaviours were used (Drive for Thinness, Bulimia and Body
Dissatisfaction). Due to the assessment of eating attitudes using a self-report inventory, the
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (M-C Form C) (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was
employed as a measure to control for biased self-presentation. The M-C Form C contains 13
items, 4 of those items were incorporated into the EDI-3 to disguise their purpose.
Subliminal Stimuli and Task
Three cues were used for the stimulus presentation. Following Meyer and Waller (1999),
Waller and Barter (2005) and Hallings-Pott et al. (2005) the neutral cue used was gallery
and the abandonment cue was lonely. Similarly to Waller and Barter (2005) and Hallings-
Pott et al.s (2005) studies the unification cue presented was friendship. These three words
were matched for frequency of use in the English language, using the criteria of Johansson
and Hofland (1989).
Participants were tested individually and resembling previous methodologies (e.g.,

Waller & Barter, 2005), a cover story was provided to participants to disguise the purpose of
the study until the debriefing at the completion of the study. Participants enrolled in a study
titled Subliminal Messages and the Effects that Mild States of Hunger have on Visual
Sensitivity. As such, they were asked to abstain from eating for 2 hours prior to undertaking
the task. Participants were first asked to complete a demographics questionnaire. Having
completed these brief questions, the participants completed the tachistoscopic presentations.
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Patton, 1992; Waller & Barter, 2005), participants were given
an eyesight test via the PsyTec tachistoscope (Persona AB, Stockholm, Sweden) to control for
any vision difficulties and concerns which would confound a participants ability to read the
cue.
In each of the conditions a single cue was presented 10 times for 5ms and each cue was
separated by 5s. Having completed the stimuli exposures, participants were asked to identify
the cue presented using a free-recall test. Signal detection research indicates that second
guesses are more accurate than chance (Patton, 1992). As such, each participant was asked to
provide a first and second guess. Similarly to previous research (Patton, 1992; Waller &
Barter, 2005), no participant reported being able to correctly identify the cue.
Previous research indicates that binge eating behaviour often occurs in secrecy and so it
was decided that the experimenter would leave the room during the 5 minute eating phase
(Loeb, Pike, Walsh & Wilson, 1994). Upon leaving, the researcher said In case you are
hungry after not eating for so long, there are some biscuits for you. Please feel free to help
yourself. Fantastics Delites Sour Cream and Chives biscuits (calorific value = 451 kcal per
100g) were chosen because they are small and of equal size and weight. The researcher then
ate a predetermined biscuit to augment the cover story and reduce ambivalence towards
eating before leaving the room. The participants were then given the opportunity to complete
the survey. Finally two short questions devised for this study concerning the biscuits provided
were 1. Did you like the brand of biscuits left for you to eat? Yes/No 2. Do you often eat
biscuits that are similar to the ones that were left? Yes/No. If not, why not e.g., allergies.
While previous research (e.g., Meyer & Waller, 1999; Patton, 1992; Waller & Barter, 2005)
did not ask these two questions, biscuit preferences were considered to be a potential
confound to the amount eaten. Ninety-four percent of participants liked the biscuits presented.
Participants were then debriefed. The researcher then weighed the remaining biscuits (roughly
42grams per bowl to begin with).
RESULTS
Although the amounts eaten by participants in the different conditions were in the
predicted direction, with women receiving the abandonment stimuli eating the most and
women receiving the unification stimuli eating the least, an analysis of co-variance
(ANCOVA) suggested that these differences were not significant (F(1,110) = 1.192, p = .31).
Unlike the variables age (F(1,114) = .253, p = .62), relationship (F(4,109) = 1.123, p = .34)
and EDI total (F(1,114) = 1.007, p = .32), the variables like biscuit (whether one likes the
biscuits provided) and language (whether English is your first or second language) were
entered into the analysis because they displayed significant main effects, F(1,113) = 17.39, p
< .0005 and F(2,114) = 3.13, p < .05, respectively. As previously mentioned, evidence
suggests that language considerably influenced the amounts eaten by women. As such,
follow-up univariate and pairwise comparisons were carried out. There were no significant
differences between condition and language for women whose first language was English (n
= 81). However, there were significant group differences (F(2,114) = 3.99, p = .02) when
comparing women who spoke English as a second language (n = 39) placed in the control (M
= 3.69) group to those in the unification (M = 2.59) group (F(2,114) = 3.99, p = 0.25). This
suggests that women in the unification group whose first language was not English ate
significantly less when compared to women who speak English as their first language (see
Figure 1).
Figure 1. Amounts eaten by participants in each group for whom English is either their first or second
language.
An analysis was carried out in order to test whether the significant results found in
previous studies were influenced by the transformation of eating disorder scores from a
continuous to categorical variable. There did not appear to be an increase in significance
(F(2,114)=1.73, p = .18). Finally, it was predicted that scores on the Eating Disorder
Inventory (EDI) would moderate the relationship between groups and the amount eaten, with
women high on bulimic tendencies eating relatively more within each group. A GLM analysis
was carried out with language entered as a fixed factor. Contrary to what was predicted, this
interaction was not significant, F(2, 111) = .884, p =.42. A second GLM was carried out to
test whether priming effects may have influenced the results with participants receiving the
subliminal presentations and eating before completing the EDI. This analysis did not indicate
any priming effects (F(2,120) = 1.87, p = .83).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the current experimental study was to examine the relationship between
subliminal abandonment and unification stimuli, early maladaptive schemas and womens
eating behaviours. Unlike previous research, where the subliminal presentation of the cue
lonely resulted in increased compensatory eating behaviours when compared to women in
the control group (Meyer & Waller, 1999; Patton, 1992; Waller & Barter, 2005; Waller &
Mijatovich, 1998), the present study did not find a significant difference between the amounts
eaten by women in the control and abandonment groups. The present study did, however,
provide partial support for Waller and Barters (2005) contention that women who receive the
unification cue friendship will eat significantly less than women who received the neutral
cue gallery with the unexpected finding that English as a first or second language plays an
important role in the amounts eaten. Here, women who spoke English as a second language
ate significantly less than those women in the control group. Contrary to what was predicted,
the aforementioned results held irrespective of whether Eating Disorder Inventory (EDI)
scores were formalised as a continuous or categorical variable. Finally, the present study did
not find any evidence that the psychological and behavioural constructs shown to be clinically
pertinent to women with bulimia moderate the relationship between group and the amounts
eaten. As such, it does not appear that an interaction exists between EDI scores, group and the
amounts eaten for this sample.
A possible explanation for the finding that women in the abandonment group did not eat
significantly more than those women in the control group may come from Weiss distinction
between the loneliness of social isolation (i.e., an experienced lack of social contacts,
intimacy or supportvan Baarsen, Snijders, Smit & van Duijn, 2001) and that of emotional
isolation (DiTommaso & Spinner, 1997). While social isolation is thought to result from the
absence of an engaging social network and results in feelings of boredom and aimlessness,
the loneliness of emotional isolation stems from the absence or loss of a close attachment
relationship, such as a parent, and produces a sense of utter aloneness and feelings of
abandonment (DiTommaso & Spinner, 1997). However, as DiTommaso and Spinner (1997)
contend, research relating loneliness to mental health rarely distinguishes between these two
different forms of loneliness. This finding is noteworthy given that the subliminal cue
presented, lonely, may not have adequately reflected Youngs (1999) conceptualisation of
fears of abandonment by significant others, but rather a sense of loneliness due to the lack of
friendships. Further, one can be lonely but not necessarily abandoned by significant others.
As such, prospective research examining the effect that subliminal abandonment cues have on
eating behaviours should distinguish the differing forms of loneliness (social and emotional)
and their implication for subliminal stimuli. Comparisons of present findings with current
conceptualisations of abandonment with cues that might reflect the construct more
accurately would be particularly valuable. For instance, the cue mother/father abandoned
me may interact with fears of abandonment by significant others more specifically than the
present cue lonely.
Although this distinction provides avenues for future research and may have contributed
to amounts eaten by women in the abandonment group, the present study did not replicate
previous research using the identical cue (i.e., lonely). A possible explanation for this might
be that approximately half (46.7%) of the women in the present study were in some form of
relationship. While other studies do not report the relationship status of their participants
(e.g., Meyer & Waller, 1999; Patton, 1992; Waller & Barter, 2005; Waller & Mijatovich,
1998) it is possible that being in a romantic relationship mitigates feelings of being
abandoned by friends or family. Prospective research would do well to explore the effects that
being in some form of romantic relationship has on the women who are subliminally
presented with abandonment cues.
CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
It was discovered that women in the unification group whose second language was
English ate significantly less when compared to women in the control group. Bulimia has
long been considered to have important cultural determinants (King, 1993). However, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., or DSM-IV-TR) (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000) criterion for the disorder is based almost exclusively on
research with Caucasian North American and European samples (Herzog & Delinksy, 2001).
Similarly, friendships (i.e., the voluntary association between individuals) invariably
occur within a cultural context (French, Bae, Pidada & Lee, 2006). Triandis et al. (1988)
suggest that friendships can be best understood within the framework of individualistic and
collectivist cultures. While the aforementioned authors suggest that individuals from more
individualistic cultures interact with many groups and easily develop new friendships,
individuals from more collectivist cultures are thought to develop friendships that are more
intimate and long lasting. For instance, within the United States the label friend is used to
describe a wide variety of relationships, ranging from acquaintances to individuals who are as
close as family members, whereas the same label within Chinese, South Korean (French et
al., 2006) and Greek (Malikiosi-Loizos & Anderson, 1999) populations is limited to fewer,
more intimate friends. As such, it is possible that the meaning of the unification cue
presented, friendship, may have influenced the amount eaten by women depending upon
the culture from which they came. Related subliminal research (Meyer & Waller, 1999;
Patton, 1992; Waller & Barter, 2005; Waller & Mijatovich, 1998) has not accounted for the
cultural differences within the predominantly Western samples, nor discussed the
implications of such disparities. These findings accentuate the need to look at how culture
influences the aetiology of eating disorders as well as how subliminal stimuli are
conceptualised in disparate cultures. It also highlights the need for prospective research to
assess and report upon differential and individualised responses to treatment based on client
diversity.
While supporting Waller and Barters (2005) finding that unification cues can have
ameliorative effects for some women with bulimic tendencies, it is worth prospective
researchers who are examining unification cues within the context of Youngs (1999) schema
theory to find counterschematic stimuli that originate from the perceived healthy bonding
with parents (e.g., mother/father loves me). Similar to research concerning the use of
abandonment cue lonely, it would be valuable to compare these findings with present
subliminal research.
In line with the current conceptualisation of eating disorders as existing along an
eating disorder continuum, it was predicted that there would be an increase in significance
when group differences were considered categorical (using methods such as EGA) rather than
continuous, and that scores on the EDI would moderate the relationship between group and
the amount eaten by each woman. While these predictions were not supported, it is hoped that
this study will provoke future thought about the use of EGA in eating disorder literature given
that this approach often reduces individual differences into simple binary codes. Researchers
often consider that a given construct is dichotomous by nature despite evidence suggesting
that the instrument used to assess it, such as the EDI, displays essentially continuous scores
(Preacher et al., 2005). In addition, there is also the possibility that scores on the EDI were
not reflective of the pathological attitudes and behaviours of women with the disorder or that
women with bulimic tendencies may have denied or distorted their responses due to a lack of
insight or shame, despite the use of social desirability items. While this is the first study
assessing the moderating effects of EDI on the relationship between group and amounts eaten
within subliminal research, it would be worth assessing these effects within a clinical sample
where effects may be more pronounced.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings of the present study have a number of implications. First, the present study
lends some support to Waller and Barters (2005) contention that counterschematic
subliminal presentations can have an ameliorative effect on some women with eating
disturbances. While the overall sample did not show a significant decrease in the amounts
eaten following the unification cue friendship, women who spoke English as their second
language ate significantly less than those women in the control condition. Helping women
become aware of their concerns about relationships can allow them to cope more effectively
when there are real or perceived threats to friendships, for example, by extending upon
existing social networks.
To date, there does not appear to be any subliminal research conducted on women with
anorexia. Previous research indicates that women with anorexia display comparatively higher
scores on self-sacrifice indices when compared to women with binge eating disorder and
bulimia (Unoka, Tlgyes & Czobor, 2007). As such, the visual subliminal paradigm might
also be extended to develop our current understanding of other eating disorders and the
implication this might have for alternate forms of treatment. Future research would also
benefit from determining whether abandonment and unification cues have similar effects on
other forms of escape behaviour, such as alcohol abuse (Waller & Barter, 2005).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this study extends current understandings of bulimias aetiology, and
provides confirmatory evidence for several fundamental aspects of Youngs (1999) schema
theory and Waller et al.s (2007) Schema-Focused Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy. The
findings, and their implications for the treatment of bulimia, subliminal research, and current
theories of negative schemas associated with the disorder, appear to warrant further
investigation outside the realms and exclusivity of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Dr Alan Taylor for his invaluable statistics advice and Dr
Wayne Warburton for his thoughtful input.
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Chapter 20
MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING CHANGES

THE TREATMENT TRAJECTORY OF GROUP
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL THERAPY FOR ANXIETY
Weiwen Yang and Esben Strodl

School of Psychology & Counselling, Queensland University of Technology
Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
ABSTRACT
Anxiety disorders have been viewed as manifestations of broad underlying
predisposing personality constructs such as neuroticism combined with more specific
individual differences of unhelpful information processing styles. Given the high
prevalence of anxiety and the significant impairment that it causes, there is an important
need to continue to explore successful treatments for this disorder. Research indicates
that there is still room for significantly improving attrition rates and treatment adherence.
Traditionally Motivational Interviewing (MI) has been used to facilitate health behaviour
change. Recently MI has been applied to psychotherapy and has been shown to improve
the outcome of CBT. However, these studies have been limited to only considering pre-
and post-treatment measures and neglected to consider when changes occur along the
course of therapy. This leaves the unanswered question of what is the impact of pre-
treatment MI on the treatment trajectory of therapy. This study provides preliminary
research into answering this question by tracking changes on a weekly basis along the
course of group CBT. Prior to group CBT, 40 individuals with a principal anxiety
disorder diagnosis were randomly assigned to receive either 3 individual sessions of MI
or placed on a waitlist control group. All participants then received the same dosage of 10
weekly 2 hour sessions of group CBT. Tracking treatment outcome trajectory over the
course of CBT, the pre-treatment MI group, compared to the control group, experienced a
Correspondence concerning this chapter should be addressed to Esben Strodl, School of Psychology and
Counselling, Queensland University of Technology, Victoria Park Road, Kelvin Grove 4059, Queensland,
Australia; email: e.strodl@qut.edu.au; phone: +61 7 3138 8416
238 Weiwen Yang and Esben Strodl
greater improvement early on in the course of therapy in their symptom distress,

interpersonal relationships and quality of life. This early advantage over the control group
was then maintained throughout therapy. These results not only demonstrate the value of
adding MI to CBT, but also highlight the immediacy of MI effects. Further research is
needed to determine the robustness of these effects to inform clinical implications of how
to best apply MI to improve treatment adherence to CBT for anxiety disorders.
Keywords: Anxiety Disorders, CBT, Motivational Interviewing, Personality, Treatment

trajectory
INTRODUCTION
Twenty thousand Australians are found to have a mental illness every year, of which
anxiety disorders are most common, affecting one in ten Australian adults (AIHW, 2008).
Anxiety disorders have been associated with pervasive economic, social, and physical
consequences (Martin-Merino et al., 2010). The reduced quality of life reported in individuals
with anxiety disorders has been found to be comparable to and in some instances even worse
than other major medical illnesses, such as cancer (Somers et al., 2006). Given the high
prevalence of anxiety and the significant impairment that it causes in those who experience it,
there is an important need to continue to explore successful treatments for this disorder.
The Five-Factor Model of Personality has provided a meaningful framework for
formulating and testing hypotheses and has helped advanced the understanding of how adult
personality relates to psychopathology (Krueger & Tackett, 2003). A recent meta-analysis on
the relationship between the Five-Factor Model and symptoms of clinical disorders found that
measures of clinical disorders are typically associated with high Neuroticism, low
Conscientiousness, low Agreeableness and low Extraversion (Malouff, Thorsteinsson, &
Schutte, 2005). Research into evolutionary personality psychology has proposed that social
anxiety disorder may be due to personality vulnerabilities (maladaptive rank styles) to
perceptions of people being inferior to others (Michalski & Shackleford, 2010). Anxiety
disorders have long been seen as manifestations of broad underlying predisposing personality
constructs such as neuroticism and negative emotionality combined with more specific
individual differences of unhelpful information processing styles (e.g., anxiety sensitivity,
attribution style etc.) (Clark, Watson & Mineka, 1994).
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is widely recognised as the current most effective
treatment for anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2008; Haby, Donnelly, Corry, & Vos, 2006; Westen
& Morrison, 2001). However in spite of its recognised status as a gold standard intervention,
there is also clear evidence of problems with treatment adherence (Issakidis & Andrews,
2004), treatment completion (McKay, Taylor, & Abramowitz, 2009) and efficacy in that a
significant portion of participants reach clinical improvement at the end of therapy (Federici,
Rowa, & Antony, 2009). There is emerging evidence that motivation to engage in therapy is
an important predictor of the outcome of psychotherapy. Moreover there is preliminary
evidence that individual differences such as learning goal orientation (Dweck, 1986, 2000)
may mediate motivation to engage in psychotherapy (Michalak & Holtforth, 2006; Yang &
Strodl, 2010a; Zweig & Webster, 2004). As such interventions designed to modify these
Motivational Interviewing Changes the Treatment Trajectory 239
individual differences should change motivation to engage in therapy which in turn should
change the outcome of CBT.
MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING
Motivational Interviewing (MI) has been demonstrated to be an effective short-term
treatment for enhancing treatment outcome (Bisono, Manuel, & Forcehimes, 2006; Burke,
Arkowitz, & Melanchola, 2003; Hettema, Steele, & Miller, 2005). Motivational Interviewing
can be defined as a client-centred, directive method for enhancing motivation to change by
exploring and resolving ambivalence (Miller & Rollnick, 2002, p.25). It is centred on the
client in that it focuses on the current concerns of the client and respects the clients choices.
Unlike CBT, it does not focus on teaching new coping skills or trying to influence patterns of
thoughts or behaviours. MI is directive in the manner of therapists selective responding to
client speech in a way that is tuned to resolve ambivalence and move the client towards
change. The decision was made to utilise MI as a pre-treatment to CBT given recent emerging
research that has suggested that it may be effective as an adjunct intervention with CBT for
anxiety (Murphy et al., 2004; Maltby & Tolin, 2005; Westra, 2004, Westra & Dozois, 2006;
Westra, Arkowitz, & Dozois, 2009).
While these studies have provided promising evidence that MI can enhance the
effectiveness of CBT for anxiety, they have all only relied on examining change using pre and
post measures. Although this provides useful information that the addition of MI to CBT does
result in greater changes in anxiety over the course of therapy, it does not provide more
detailed information on when change may occur during the course of therapy. Such
information is important because it provides guidance on how to maximise MIs effectiveness
(i.e., at what stage of CBT MI may be most appropriately added). For example, if the effects
of MI are seen at the start of therapy with no ongoing enduring effects, then this would
support an argument for an additional MI session mid-therapy. If the effects of MI continue to
show additive effects consistently throughout therapy, then such an argument would not be
sustained. Another example would be if the effects of MI are delayed and only seen towards
the end of therapy. In this scenario, it would be helpful to know how many sessions are
needed before the effects of MI are manifested, and it may also suggest that MI should be
provided at least a minimum time period before the onset of CBT. As such we believe that
measuring the trajectory of change of anxiety during the course of therapy is an important
improvement over previous research in this area. That is, it will extend our knowledge beyond
just answering the question of whether MI enhances CBT to also answering important
questions about how best to apply MI to best enhance CBT for anxiety.
So far no study has specifically looked at the trajectory of MI upon CBT for anxiety,
however a meta-analysis from 72 outcome studies showed that MI tends to have an early
effect upon health behaviour change and diminish across a year of follow-up (Hettema,
Steele, & Miller, 2005). As such this study aims to test the hypothesis that MI would indeed
have an early effect upon anxiety change during CBT and that this will be sustained through
treatment. The full content of the intervention is described in detail elsewhere (Yang &
Strodl, 2010b) and is summarised below. This paper reports part of the larger study conducted
and narrows the scope examining the impact of MI on treatment trajectory of group CBT.
METHOD
This paper draws its methodology from a pilot study by Westra and Dozois (2006) who
conducted a randomised controlled trial with pre-treatment MI for CBT with Anxiety.
Procedure
Participants were recruited from media releases and treatment was carried out within the
university psychology clinic. Potential participants were first screened over the telephone and
then in person to determine eligibility for treatment. The face-to-face screening was
conducted using the SCID-IV structured clinical interview. The study population were adults
aged 18-65 who met criteria for a principal Axis I Anxiety Disorder. Individuals were
excluded from consideration for the study if they had: (a) current psychotic symptoms; (b)
concurrent psychological treatment; (c) any major deficits in neurocognitive functioning (e.g.,
learning disability, illiteracy); (d) active substance abuse; and/or; (e) any evidence of suicidal
or homicidal intent. Individuals were not excluded if they met criteria for another DSM-IV-
TR diagnosis as long as their principal diagnosis was for an anxiety disorder. Individuals who
met criteria DSM-IV-TR Axis II disorders were assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Participants were randomly assigned to receive either a pre-treatment MI intervention
consisting of 3 individual weekly hour-long MI sessions (pre-MI) or no pre-treatment
(control) prior to participating in 10 weekly 2 hour-long group CBT sessions. Each CBT
group consisted of 6-8 participants and were facilitated by two therapists (1 primary therapist
and 1 co-therapist). The primary therapists were registered psychologists with extensive
knowledge and experience in CBT, whilst co-therapists were postgraduate clinical
psychology students. In administering pre-treatment MI, there was a single research therapist
in the study who was a final-year doctoral level clinical psychology student with over 5 years
of clinical experience. This therapist was trained in MI1 and was supervised closely by the
second author who has over 14 years of clinical experience. To avoid any clinician bias, the
research therapist delivering MI was not directly involved in the group CBT administration
and CBT therapists were blind to participant group membership (pre-MI or control). All
sessions were videotaped and then randomly assessed for treatment integrity and fidelity by
an external assessor.
Treatment
The MI pre-treatment was based on the principles of MI (Miller & Rollnick, 2002)
generalised to be applicable specifically to anxiety. This manual was adapted from a
treatment manual for MI of Anxiety by Westra and Dozois (2006)2. The treatment embodied
all of the core strategies and principles of MI (expressing empathy, rolling with resistance,
1
Training included (a) multiple viewings of MI training DVDs by Miller, Rollnick & Moyers (1998); (b)
videotaped role-plays between the student and 1st year Clinical Psychology postgraduate students; (c) extensive
use of MI in students own placements with clients; and (d) continued MI supervision with research supervisor.
2
In personal communication with H. A. Westra, who has written extensively on various applications of MI, she had
generously provided us with the use of her treatment manual (Westra & Dozois, 2003).
developing discrepancy, and enhancing self-efficacy) and focused on ambivalence about both
anxiety change and treatment procedures to manage anxiety (e.g., doing exposure, reducing
worry, and reducing avoidance). The MI intervention was conceptualised as having two
phases, with each phase consisting of specific objectives and strategies that may overlap
depending on the circumstances (Westra & Dozois, 2006). Motivation for change was
cultivated in the first phase (importance phase) by examining and resolving ambivalence,
enhancing the importance of change, and bolstering self-efficacy. The second phase
(confidence phase) was designed to strengthen the clients commitment to change by
considering change options, setting goals, and making plans. Progression from the first to the
second phase of the intervention was determined by the individuals readiness to change.
The CBT treatment manual was based on well-evaluated treatments for anxiety (Craske
& Barlow, 2008) and modified to suit the context of this study (Strodl, 2008). The group CBT
protocol included four general components: (a) education and corrective information
regarding the aetiology and maintenance of anxiety; (b) mental strategies such as cognitive
restructuring and problem solving; (c) physiological strategies such as breathing and
relaxation exercises; and (d) behavioural strategies such as interoceptive exposure and
behavioural experiments.
Measures
A principal DSM-IV-TR Anxiety Disorder diagnosis was assigned to each participant at

baseline assessment through the use of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I
Disorders (SCID-IV; Spitzer, Williams, & Gibbon, 1994). Given the scope of this paper to
consider treatment trajectory, we used the Outcome Questionnaire 45 (OQ45; Lambert et al.,
1996) which is a brief 45-item, self-report outcome measure that is designed for repeated
measurement of client progress through the course of therapy and following termination. It is
broadly applicable to adults in behavioural health treatment. Specifically, the OQ45 contains
3 subscales: (a) symptom distress; (b) interpersonal relations; and; (c) social role. Test-retest
reliability has been found to be 0.84, with internal consistency of alpha value 0.93 (Lambert
et al., 1996). Participants were asked to fill in the OQ45 at the start of every group CBT
session; beginning from the second session through to the last session (10th).
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the group participants (n=40) who met criteria for an
anxiety disorder (ascertained following a telephone and face-to-face clinical interview). As a
whole, the study sample was predominantly female (67.5%) and all except one participant
(Asian) were Caucasian (97.5%). The mean age of participants was 44 years of age (SD 13.5,
range 20 to 68 years). All anxiety disorders in the sample were based on DSM-IV-TR Axis I
diagnoses; the most common were GAD (25%) and Panic Disorder with agoraphobia (30%).
As indicated, the pre-treatment MI and control groups did not differ significantly on baseline
demographic characteristics. As such, none of these variables were included in the main
analyses.
Figure 2 shows the OQ45 treatment trajectory across all 10 CBT sessions separated by
pre-treatment grouping. An independent t-test confirmed that there were no significant
differences between the pre-treatment MI and waitlist control group at session 1 (baseline), t
(38) = .283, p = .778.
93 interested participants 9 dropped out

whilst on waitlist
15 ineligible
from telephone
Enrolment screening
12 dropped out
from face-to-face
screening
55 randomised to pre-tx MI or control group 2 excluded due to

non-compliance
of baseline
measures
Pre-tx MI group Waitlist Control group
28 allocated to pre-tx MI. 27 allocated to control.

24 received intervention. Pre-treatment: 3weeks 24 remained in control.
2 dropped out before 3 dropped out during

intervention (1 disinterest, 1 waitlist (2 disinterest, 1
no response) transport)
2 dropped out during

intervention (1 scheduling,
1 parental preference)
Group CBT: 10weeks
24 allocated to intervention. 48 allocated to group CBT 24 allocated to intervention.

21 received intervention. 19 received intervention.
40 received intervention
3 dropped out (1 disinterest, 5 dropped out (3 disinterest,
1 scheduling, 1 no 2 no response)
response)
Figure 1. Participant flow through the study.

Figure 1. Participant flow through the study.
Table 1. Demographic & DSM-IV-TR Axis I diagnostic characteristics of participants
Variable pre-tx MI (N = 21) Control (N = 19)

n % n % Pdiff
Demographic characteristics
Gender female 13 61.9 14 73.7 .427
Mean Age 43.6 (14.8) - 44.74 (12.3) - .229
(SD)
Education .704
Yr 12 7 33.3 6 31.6
TAFE 6 28.6 5 26.3
University 8 38.1 8 42.1
Marital status .979
Married 15 71.4 13 68.4
Single 5 23.8 5
Divorced 1 4.8 1
Had previous tx before 7 33.3 9 47.4 .366
Currently on medication 6 28.6 6 31.6 .836
Diagnostic characteristics .455
Panic disorder w agora 5 23.8 7 36.8
Panic disorder wo agora 4 19 0 0
Social phobia 5 23.8 4 21
GAD 5 23.8 5 26.3
OCD 1 4.8 2 10.5
PTSD 1 4.8 1 5.3
Note. The Pdiff column shows significance levels based on t and on group differences.
To determine whether there were any main effects across groups, a repeated measures
ANOVA was performed with time (baseline, post-CBT) by group (pre-MI, control) as
independent variables and scores on the individuals OQ45 as dependent variables. A
repeated measures ANOVA reflected a significant main effect of time, F(1, 39) = 8.79, p =
.005, suggesting that there was a change in OQ45 scores over the course of treatment. A non-
significant time by group interaction, F(1, 39) = 1.69, p = .202, however indicated that OQ45-
identified symptom distress, interpersonal relationships and quality of life does not
significantly change over time across groups.
Viewing the lined trajectory of the pre-MI groups OQ45 scores also indicates a dip in
session five. Reviewing the scatterplot of the individual participants data did not show any
strong outliers and there were no significant differences found between control and pre-MI
group. It was identified that most MI participants experienced a drop in OQ45 after session 5
and that this mean was not pulled down by any outliers. Although no significant time-group
interactions were found, line analysis revealed a consistent OQ45 trend between participants
who did/ did not receive pre-treatment MI. Participants who received pre-treatment MI
appeared to gain greater improvement early on in the course of therapy in their symptom
distress, interpersonal relationships and quality of life. This early advantage over the control
group was then maintained throughout therapy.
85
80
75
OQ45 scores
70
65
60
55
MI
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
session Control
Figure 2. OQ-45 treatment trajectory for participants in pre-treatment MI & waitlist control group.
DISCUSSION
Broadly, these results demonstrate the value of adding MI to CBT for anxiety disorders,
confirming the growing research pointed in this direction. The synergistic effect that MI has
with CBT can be conceptualised as follows: MI directed at increasing motivation and
resolving ambivalence about change blends nicely as a prelude to CBT which is directed at
helping the client achieve the desired changes. Whilst MI strives to increase ones motivation
to change, CBT works by providing the tools for one to engage in that change.
Our results also confirm the immediacy of effect of MI. MI showed a strong influence on
CBT treatment outcomes within the first half of therapy. This is important to note considering
the fluctuating levels of motivation that have often been cited throughout therapy (Miller,
1996; Miller & Rollnick, 2002; Resnicow et al., 2002). Based on a conservative interpretation
of these results, considering the immediacy and maintenance of MI effects, it is reasonable to
venture that pre-treatment MI works optimally with CBT. However, if we considered the
increase in OQ45 scores after session five to be due to the wearing off of MI effects, then a
mid-treatment booster MI session on top of pre-treatment sessions may be beneficial. This has
been confirmed in other randomised controlled trials that have utilised booster MI sessions at
various follow-up periods (Kemp et al., 1998, McCambridge & Strang, 2004).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Results from completer analyses (data including only subjects who completed the
treatment) may have been biased by the tendency of participants who were doing either very
poorly or very well to drop out of the trial. Follow-up data from drop-outs could have
provided a clearer picture as to possible reasons for drop-out. While the sample size was
respectable for a pilot study, a larger sample size in future studies will provide more power to
allow greater confidence in the generalisability of the results. There also needs to be the
consideration that the use of MI with anxiety is a new development. Further research is
needed to determine the robustness of MIs additive effects on CBT to inform clinical
implications of how to best apply MI to improve treatment outcomes to CBT for anxiety.
Despite MIs widespread efficacy across diverse populations, there are instances in which
MI may not be ideal. For clients who indicate readiness to change, MI may be less useful, and
some findings indicate that it can be counterproductive (Hettema, Steele, & Miller, 2005;
Project MATCH Research Group, 1997). From the perspective of the trans-theoretical model,
clients who are in the action stage may not benefit from MI (DiClemente & Valesquez,
2002). It has been suggested that attempting to engage clients to explore ambivalence and
develop discrepancy may only serve to annoy clients who are ready to implement a change
(Moyers & Waldorf, 2006). In this context, it may have further indicated to the client that any
more therapy that they receive would not be helpful, which may have led to their premature
termination of treatment. In order to be consistent with previous similar studies, this study did
not screen participants on their level of motivation prior to allocation to MI or waitlist
controlinstead relying on a random allocation. However it is possible that the effect size of
the MI may be even greater if only participants who were screened to have low motivation to
change were included in the study. As such, screening to determine how ready individuals
were to change could provide a more appropriate randomisation to the pre-treatment MI
allocation which could benefit clients (Heather et al., 1999).
Finally, as highlighted by Westra and Dozois (2006) in their pilot study, this present
study did not provide a comparison pre-treatment group to MI. As such, the better outcomes
of the pre-treatment MI group could merely have been due to some participants receiving
additional treatment and not from MI per se. It is not possible to discern whether specific
ingredients of the intervention were critical to its effectiveness; further controlled studies
comparing other forms of pre-treatments to enhance motivation would be helpful to determine
the mechanisms of change of effective pre-treatments.
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
The present study demonstrates that MI holds promise as a pre-treatment for group CBT.
Research presented is preliminary considering the need for further large scale randomised
controlled trials examining the efficacy of MI for psychological problems. Nevertheless, in
the case of anxiety disorders, the results from this study support growing evidence that
indicates that MI enhances treatment outcomes (Westra & Dozois, 2006; Westra, Arkowitz,
& Dozois, 2009). The importance of motivation for the success of any psychotherapeutic
treatment cannot be understated. Given that motivation in treatment is an important predictor
of psychotherapy outcome, enhancing our participants motivation to engage in therapy is
important to improve and broaden response rates to treatment.
The results from this study indicate that the gains in improving outcome in psychotherapy
occur early in therapy and are maintained through the course of therapy. As such,
Motivational Interviewing pre-treatments provide one possible answer to enhancing treatment
effectiveness. Given the high prevalence and burden of disability of anxiety disorders, and the
current limitations in CBT interventions, it would seem prudent to consider pre-treatment
motivational interviewing as a useful adjunct to standard CBT interventions for anxiety.
CONCLUSION
This study aimed to explore the impact of a standard intervention for motivation to
engage in therapy (i.e., motivational interviewing) on improving the outcome of CBT. Seeing
that this link has been established, the next step is to clarify changes in which possible
individual difference factors (arguably learning goal orientation) may mediate the impact of
motivational interviewing upon CBT outcome.
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Chapter 21
WHAT DO SELF-REPORT MEASURES OF

DISINHIBITION REALLY MEASURE?
Elliroma Gardiner
School of Psychology, University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia
Chris J. Jackson
Australian School of Business, University of NSW, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
ABSTRACT
We compare and contrast the use of various self-report instruments to measure
Disinhibition. Disinhibition, as conceptualised by Patterson and Newman's (1993)
response modulation model, characterises disinhibited individuals as having a tendency
towards rapidly approaching situations of conflict and also as being prone to having
deficits in passive avoidance learning. According to this model, Disinhibition occurs only
in situations of competing approach/avoidance goals and is also thought to be driven by
Neuroticism. Different subjective measures such as Zuckermans Sensation Seeking
Scale, Dickmans Impulsivity Inventory and the Barrett Impulsivity Scale have been used
interchangeably to measure Disinhibition. However, little consideration has been directed
towards understanding how these scales map on to definitions of Disinhibition. Based on
a comprehensive literature review, the current research will highlight the tendency of
many popular self-report measures to be heavily focused on reporting the resultant
disinhibited behaviour, rather an interest in understanding its underlying mechanisms.
The current research will also demonstrate how this bias can influence the reporting and
meaning of this construct. This 'construct confusion' has important implications for
Disinhibition research.
Keywords: Disinhibition, Impulsivity, Self-Report measures, Sensation Seeking
Ph: 61-7-3346 7326; Fax: 61-7-3365 1688; e.gardiner@uq.edu.au

250 Elliroma Gardiner and Chris J. Jackson
INTRODUCTION
Despite the lack of a uniform definition, disinhibition is generally thought to occur as a
result of a cognitive-attention deficit that impairs an individuals ability to inhibit behaviours
and to reflect upon and learn from the consequence of those behaviours (Gorenstein &
Newman, 1980; Patterson & Newman, 1993). For example, upon approaching a yellow traffic
light a person running very late for an important meeting will need to make a quick decision
about whether to run the yellow light or stop. An individual high in Disinhibition is more
likely to continue with the approach behaviour; that is, they are more likely to run the yellow
light rather than stop. Disinhibited approach has been associated with a number of negative
outcomes such as alcoholism (Earleywine & Finn, 1991), substance abuse (Kosson,
Steuerwald, Newman, & Widom, 1994; McGue, Slutske, Taylor, & Iacono, 1997; Sher &
Trull, 1994; Thompson, Whitmore, Raymond & Crowley, 2006), and problem gambling
(Gupta, Derevensky & Ellenbogen, 2006; McCormick, 1993). Given the many different ways
in which disinhibited tendencies can be observed it is unsurprising that this construct is
largely considered to be multifaceted (e.g., Colder & OConnor, 2002; Dindo, McDade-
Montez, Sharma, Watson & Clark, 2008; Nigg, 2000). Unfortunately, whilst this is a true
assertion, it has become an overused and overly simple solution to the more complex issue of
actually defining Disinhibition. Conceptualizing Disinhibition as multifaceted has also led to
blanket applications of methodologically different measures by researchers investigating this
behaviour.
The aim of this chapter is to compare and contrast subjective measures of Disinhibition to
demonstrate how the theoretical framework and item content of these tools influence the
reporting and conceptualisation of Disinhibition. This aim will be achieved by firstly
discussing the methodological implications of incorporating a self-report methodology in
study design. Following this, we will highlight and discuss two causes of the construct
confusion surrounding Disinhibition. The first issue is concerned with divergent
conceptualisations of the same self-report tools across studies and the second issue focuses on
the ubiquitous use of terms such as, impulsivity, to also refer to Disinhibition and vice versa.
We argue that these issues stem from an over focus of self-report measures on the resulting
end behaviour of Disinhibition rather than its underlying mechanisms and the situational
aspects which elicit this behaviour.
A CASE FOR SELF-REPORT MEASURES

There are a number of good reasons to employ self-report measures in experimental
design. For instance, self-report scales are inexpensive, easy to administer and interpret and
generally have very good psychometric properties (Kline, 1993; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007;
Westen & Rosenthal, 2005). However, this method has been criticised for having little
overlap with behavioural and physiological measures (Barratt & Patton, 1983; Brenner,
Beauchaine & Sylvers, 2005; Gomez & McLaren, 1997) and for being too reliant on the
participant possessing adequate self-awareness (Enticott & Ogloff, 2006; Judd & McClelland,
1998; Kagan, 1988).
Table 1. A selection of studies which have utilised self-report measures to investigate disinhibited behavior
Measure Authors Study Aim Conceptualisation N M:F Sample

Barrett Keilp et al. Determine the types of tasks and cognitive Impulsivity/ 58 21:37 Community
Impulsivity (2005) functions that are associated with impulsiveness Inhibition
Scale (BIS; ratings.
Patton et al., Loxton et al. Investigated the relationship between biologically Impulsivity/ 110 62:38 Clinical
1994) (2008) based dimensions of impulsivity in problem Disinhibition
gamblers with and without alcohol problems, and
non problem gamblers.
Rosval et al. Investigate role of response inhibition, planning Response Inhibition/ 182 0:182 Clinical (121)
(2006) and attention in eating disorders. Impulsivity Community (61)
Ledgerwood Determine levels of impulsivity in pathological Impulsivity/ response 102 51:51 Clinical (61)
et al. (2009) gamblers with and without substance use disorders inhibition Community (41)
versus health controls.
Hanson et al. Examine reward-related decision-making and Impulsivity/ 81 49:32 Clinical (52)
(2008) impulsivity among Disinhibition Community (29)
methylenedioxymethamphetamine users while
controlling for polydrug use via appropriate
comparison groups.
Flory et al. Examine the structure of dimensional impulsive Impulsivity/Novelty 421 235:186 Clinical
(2006) personality traits in a large normative sample seeking/Behavioural
Disinhibition/
Nonplanning
Dickmans Stahl & Investigate Extraversion-related individual Impulsivity/Inhibition 50 0:50 Student
Impulsivity Rammsayer differences in response orientation.
Scale (DII; (2007)
Dickman, 1990) Jackson Test the utility of aural attentiveness x Disinhibited 145 39:106 Student
(2008) Neuroticism in the prediction of Disinhibition. Approach/
Impulsivity
Table 1. Continued
Lansbergen Test whether impulsivity within the normal Impulsivity/ 435 78:357 Student
et al. (2007) population is associated with weaker interference Interference control/
control Response inhibition
McAlister et Explored predictors of young people propensity Impulsivity 123 46:77 Student
al. (2005) to engage in unfaithful activities while dating.
Smillie & Determine the fit of Dickmans (1990) descriptive Impulsivity/ 299 105:194 Student
Jackson concept of Functional Impulsivity with Grays Behavioural
(2006) (1970) Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory. Inhibition
Vigil-Colet Investigated the relationship between impulsivity, Impulsivity 241 107:134 Student
& Morales- intelligence, and academic failure in a sample of
Vives (2005) secondary students.
Foster & Demonstrate the value of incorporating Impulsivity/ 193 49:144 Student
Trimm approachavoidance motivation into the study of Uninhibited
(2008) narcissistic behaviour.
Disinhibition Gupta et al. Determine personality characteristics and risk- Disinhibition/ 817 417:400 Student
scale from (2006) taking characteristics among adolescent gamblers. Impulsivity
Zuckermans Reio & Investigate sensation seeking as an inhibitor of job Disinhibition/ 233 152:81 Workers
Sensation Sanders- performance. Sensation seeking
Seeking Scale Reio (2006)
(ZSSS, Form V: Ledgerwood Determine levels of impulsivity in pathological Impulsivity/ response 102 51:51 Clinical (61)
Zuckerman et et al. (2009) gamblers with and without substance use disorders inhibition Community (41)
al., 1978) versus health controls.
Hanson et al. Examine reward-related decision-making and Impulsivity/ 81 49:32 Clinical (52)
(2008) impulsivity among Disinhibition Community (29)
methylenedioxymethamphetamine users while
controlling for polydrug use via appropriate
comparison groups.
Linnet et al. Investigate differences in episodic chasing Impulsivity/Sensation 100 65:35 Clinical (61)
(2006) between pathological gamblers and non- Seeking Community (49)
pathological gamblers.
Leeman et al. Identify prospective predictors of problem Disinhibition/ 337 137:205 Student
(2009) drinking in undergraduates. Impaired Control
Beck et al. Evaluate the psychometric properties of the Behavioural 103 0:103 Clinical
(2009) BIS/BAS Scales and the Sensitivity to Punishment Inhibition/
and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ) Impulsivity
in eating disordered patients.
Impulsiveness Fallgatter & Determine whether the electrophysiological Impulsivity/Inhibition 22 12:10 Workers
and Herrmann correlates of cognitive response control are related
Venturesome (2001) with I7-impulsivity in healthy participants.
scale from Kane et al. Determine the role of impulsivity in women with Impulsivity 23 0:23 Clinical
Eysenck (2004) eating disorders.
Impulsiveness Lansbergen Test whether impulsivity within the normal Impulsivity/ 435 78:357 Student
Scale (EIS; et al. (2007) population is associated with weaker interference Interference control/
Eysenck et al., control Response inhibition
1984; Eysenck Lijfijt et al. Investigate whether there is an association Impulsivity 62 17:45 Student
& Eysenck, (2004) between trait impulsivity in the normal population
1980 and inhibitory motor control.
Marsh et al. Compare women with high and low trait Impulsivity/ 86 na Community
(2002) impulsivity to test response-disinhibition and Response
reward-choice models of Disinhibition. Disinhibition
Reynolds et Compare behavioural with self-report measures of Impulsivity/Inhibition 70 na Student
al. (2006) impulsivity.
Using the earlier example of the individual running the yellow light, Disinhibition occurs
in situations of high emotional arousal and in this instance, it was the anxiety about being late
for the meeting which motivated the individual to continue with their approach goal despite
the potential negative consequences (i.e., having an accident or getting a traffic fine). Given
that Disinhibition is elicited in circumstances of intense emotional conflict, self-report
measures have been widely perceived as inadequate in capturing the high emotional valence
required to elicit a true disinhibited response (Bechara, 2004, 2005; Enticott & Ogloff, 2006;
Thompson et al., 2006). However, it can also be argued that Disinhibition, similar to other
personality traits is perceptual in nature and therefore, appropriately measured by self-report
(e.g., Howard, 1994; Schmitt, 1994; Spector, 1994). In spite of these issues, self-report
remains to be the most popular method of measurement for personality researchers (Kagan,
2007; Vazire, 2006).
DEFINING DISINHIBITION
Disinhibition has been a construct of central interest in psychopathology research,
although there has also been much work linking together cognitive and neuropsychological
perspectives (Nigg, 2000). Table 1 lists the details of a selection of studies that have utilised
popular self-report measures of disinhibited types of behaviour. This table also demonstrates
that typical participant samples employed in Disinhibition research include those who are
pathological gamblers (e.g., Ledgerwood, Alessi, Phoenix, & Petry, 2009; Linnet, Rojskjr,
Nygaard, & Maher, 2006), substance users (e.g., Hanson, Luciana, & Sullwold, 2008; Kane,
Loxton, Staiger, & Dawe, 2004), or clinical (e.g., Beck, Smiths, Claes, Vandereycken, &
Bijttebier, 2009; Flory et al., 2006; Rosval et al., 2006).
Due to these taxonomies and varied samples, self-report measures of Disinhibition have
been largely focused on linking Disinhibition with a wide range of related constructs such as
urgency (Cyders & Smith, 2008), impulsivity (Clark, 1993; Clark & Watson, 1999), lack of
restraint (Watson & Clark, 1993), sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1979; Zuckerman, Kuhlman
& Camac, 1988), effortful control (Moriya & Tanno, 2008) and Eysenck and Eysencks
(1975) Big Three factors (Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005). These tools have focused on
the resulting disinhibited behaviour and not on differentiating between Neuroticism and
Impulsivity as the mechanisms underscoring Disinhibition. Thus, despite Disinhibition being
considered a multifaceted construct there still remains a lack of a uniform agreement as to
what Disinhibition is and is not (Harnishfeger, 1995; Nigg, 2000).
DISINHIBITION AND CONSTRUCT CONFUSION

Research focused on surface level descriptions of Disinhibition has contributed to
construct confusion by failing to adequately contribute to the development of the theoretical
basis of this behaviour (e.g., Clark, 1993; Dindo et al., 2008). Definitions of Disinhibition
have been broad and inconsistent across authors. For instance, some define Disinhibition as
acting impulsively and without control (e.g., Clark & Watson, 1999; Colder & OConnor,
2002), acting with no restraint (e.g., Dindo et al., 2008), as a preference for smaller-sooner
What do Self-report Measures of Disinhibition Really Measure? 255
reward versus larger-later rewards (e.g., Dickman, 1993), as a form of high risk, sensation
seeking or carelessness (e.g., Dindo et al., 2008; Markon et al., 2005; Schalling, 1978;
Zuckerman, 1979) and as a combination of low Agreeableness and low Conscientiousness
(e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1995; Watson, Clark & Harkness, 1994). Ambiguous definitions of
constructs make it difficult to draw conclusions and to ensure consistency in purpose,
conceptualization and measurement (Ruddell, 2002). Informed by Patterson and Newmans
(1993) response modulation model, we view Disinhibition as occurring only in situations of
conflicting approach and avoidance goals. Also in line with Patterson and Newmans (1993)
model, we define Disinhibition as a lack of inhibition resulting from Neuroticism.
The first part of our definition is based on evidence that individuals high in Disinhibition
demonstrate poor response modulation when they are presented with conflicting stimuli
(Avila, Molt, Segarra, Torrubia, 1995; Avila & Parcet, 2000; Avila & Torrubia, 2005;
Gorenstein, & Kelsey, 1983; Gorenstein & Newman, 1980; Newman, Windom & Nathan,
1985; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman, Scerbo et al., 1990). Using the previous example,
the individual running late was presented with a choice of either running the yellow light to
achieve their goal (getting to their meeting on time) or halting their approach behaviour (and
risk being late for their meeting). Under these conflicting conditions individuals high in
Disinhibition tend to pay too much attention to reward stimuli at the expense of paying too
little attention to punishing cues. Again, using this example, this individual was focused on
making the meeting on time rather than the possible financial or safety costs associated with
running a yellow light. This is further supported by a lack of significant differences between
individuals high in Disinhibition and comparison groups in reward only or punishment only
tasks (e.g., Newman et al., 1985; Newman et al., 1990).
Similar to other popular conceptualisations of Disinhibition we view this behaviour as
being strongly driven by Neuroticism or other components of the Avoidance system (e.g.,
Patterson & Newman, 1993; Robinson, 2007). Empirical evidence identifying Neuroticism as
an important predictor of increased sales performance (e.g., Jackson, 2008; Smillie, Yeo,
Furnham & Jackson, 2006), impaired response modulation (i.e., an inability to switch
response sets), disinhibited behaviour (e.g., Wallace, Bachorowski, & Newman, 1991), and
faster reaction times on a reversal learning task (e.g., Gullo, Jackson & Dawe, 2010) further
support our inclusion of Neuroticism in our definition.
We also explicitly exclude the traits of riskiness, recklessness, sensation seeking and
impulsivity from our definition. Impulsivity has often formed part of definitions of
Disinhibition (e.g., Clark & Watson, 1999); however, given the lack of an agreed upon
definition of impulsivity (e.g., Arnett, 1994; Carrillo-de-la-Pena, Otero, & Romero, 1993;
Enticott & Ogloff, 2006; Leshem & Glicksohn, 2007), its basis in the approach as opposed to
the avoidance system, and the almost non-existent argument that impulsivity has a basis in
conflict, the utility of this construct when researching Disinhibition is questionable.
Nevertheless, as illustrated in table 1, the terms Impulsivity and Disinhibition have been used
interchangeably in a number of different studies.
Our definition is necessarily prescriptive and narrow and is similar to other
conceptualisations of Disinhibition (e.g., Gullo & Dawe, 2008). Whilst some researchers may
be at odds with our conceptualisation (e.g., Sher, Bartholow & Wood, 2000; Watson & Clark,
1999; Zuckerman, 1979) and others may advocate for more vague and descriptive definitions
(e.g., Avila, 2001; Gorenstein & Newman, 1980) where Impulsivity forms part of the
definition of Disinhibition, there is some evidence which suggests that differentiation of
Disinhibition from other related traits is well overdue (e.g., Enticott & Ogloff, 2006; Nigg,
2000).
ISSUES IN MEASURING DISINHIBITION

Table 1 lists a number of self-report measures that have been used to measure
Disinhibition; however, although many instruments are used to measure this behaviour and its
underlying mechanisms, few are actually specifically designed to do so. This problem raises
two concernsone of construct validity and one of extrapolating beyond the data. Table 1
also demonstrates how researchers typically measure other constructs, like Impulsivity (e.g.,
rash impulsivity, Loxton, Nguyen, Casey & Dawe, 2008; rapid response impulsivity,
Thompson et al., 2006) to make inferences about disinhibited behaviour.
The Barrett Impulsivity Scale (BIS, Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995), Dickmans
Impulsivity Inventory (DII; Dickman, 1990) and Eysencks Impulsiveness Scale (EIS;
Eysenck et al., 1985) are three examples of Impulsivity measures listed in table 1 which have
been used to investigate disinhibited behaviour. The BIS purports to measure impulsive
thoughts and behaviours and was originally developed to relate anxiety and impulsivity to
psychomotor efficiency (Barratt, 1959; Patton et al., 1995; Stanford, Greve, Boudreaux,
Mathias & Brumbelow, 1996). Some example items include, I act on impulse, I act on the
spur of the moment and I buy things on impulse. Analogous items can be found in
Impulsiveness scale of the Eysenck Impulsiveness Scale (EIS; Eysenck et al., 1985) such as,
Do you usually make your mind up quickly? and Do you often do things at the spur of the
moment?. Similarly, the EIS and the Dysfunctional Impulsivity scale from the DII
(Dickman, 1990) are widely used self-report measures that claim to tap into unconscious risk
and failure to assess risk and undirected impulsive behaviour. Representative items from DII
include, I often get into trouble because I dont think before I act and I would enjoy
working at a job that required me to make a lot of split-second decisions. Whilst the focus of
each scale is slightly different, it is interesting to note that at the core of each measure is
Impulsivity and manifestations of rash, maladaptive and nonplanned behaviour.
We argue that Impulsivity and Disinhibition are different constructs, disagree with the
interchangeable use of this terminology and advocate for Impulsivity and Disinhibition to be
considered independently. We acknowledge that both individuals high in Disinhibition and
Impulsivity are liable to act without sound judgement; however, we maintain that different
situational constraints and mechanisms underlie this behaviour. Explicitly, we claim that
individuals high in Impulsivity are likely to display rapidly expressed behaviour in any
situation. In contrast, individuals high in Disinhibition are likely to exhibit rapidly expressed
behaviour only in situations of opposing approach-avoidance goal conflict. Using our earlier
example of the yellow traffic light, whilst an individual high in Disinhibition and an
individual high in Impulsivity are both as likely to run the light rather than stop, we argue that
the individual high in Impulsivity would have continued to drive regardless of whether they
were running late for a meeting or not.
DISINHIBITION AND NEUROTICISM

Based on theoretical models of Disinhibition (e.g., Patterson & Newman, 1993;
Robinson, 2007) and some emerging empirical evidence (e.g., Jackson, 2008; Moeller &
Robinson, 2010; Robinson, Wilkowski & Meier, 2008), we argue that Disinhibition is the
result of mechanisms related to Neuroticism. Therefore, in situations of competing approach
and avoidance stimuli, individuals high in Disinhibition act without restraint to avoid
punishment rather than to seek reward. Thus, Impulsivity and Disinhibition are not
synonymous. Impulsivity can be regarded as either a direct result of Disinhibition or as a by-
product of a lack of inhibition and the resulting lack of reflection (Enticott & Ogloff, 2006;
Newman & Wallace, 1993).
Table 1 also demonstrates the popularity of Zuckermans (1979) Sensation Seeking Scale
as a measure of Disinhibition. Zuckerman (1994) characterised sensation seeking as a trait
defined by the seeking of varied, novel, complex and intense sensations and experiences and
the willingness to take physical, social, legal and financial risks for the sake of such
experience (p.27). Sensation seeking can be viewed as similar to the dimensions related to
impulsivity in Eysencks and Cloningers models (Acton, 2003). Zuckermans Sensation
Seeking Scale (SSS-V, Zuckerman, Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978) consists of four subscales,
Thrill and Adventure Seeking, Disinhibition, Experience Seeking and Boredom
Susceptibility. For the purposes of this review we will restrict discussion to the Disinhibition
scale. The Disinhibition subscale assesses social sensation seeking through drinking, sex, and
parties (Zuckerman, 1994). Some example questions include I like wild uninhibited
parties, I enjoy the company of real swingers, and I often like to get high (drinking liquor
or smoking marijuana). We view this measure as inappropriate for investigating
Disinhibition as it is so heavily focused on risk and sensation seeking. This measure fails to
take into account the underlying mechanisms and prerequisite situational aspects of
Disinhibition.
Disinhibition occurs in situations of competing conflict (e.g., Arnett, Smith & Newman,
1997; Patterson & Newman, 1993). Individuals high in Sensation Seeking actively seek and
find themselves in highly stimulating conflict situations more often than individuals low in
Sensation Seeking. Therefore, they may engage in more disinhibited behaviour; however, we
claim that this is a result of their situational exposure and their underlying high Neuroticsm
which leads them to experience conflict rather than their actual level of Disinhibition per se.
This position is partially supported by Robertis (2004) conclusion that the relation between
behavioural disinhibition and drinking habits appears to be the result of a connection with
each other and a preference for sensation seeking (p.265). Furthermore, claims that the
Disinhibition scale of the SSS-V suffers from criterion contamination make its use
problematic (Action, 2003).
Close examination of table 1 also demonstrates that despite utilising the same self-report
measure, labelling of the focal construct varies across studies with some researchers labelling
the behaviour response inhibition, others Disinhibition and several Impulsivity. It is also
worth noting that labelling not only varies across studies, but also within studies. This further
contributes to construct confusion and makes it difficult to disentangle Disinhibition from
other related behaviours.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to compare and contrast subjective measures of Disinhibition
to demonstrate how the framework and item content of these tools influenced the reporting
and conceptualisation of Disinhibition. We then discussed the issues surrounding the lack of a
definition of Disinhibition, put forward our own prescriptive and narrow definition of
Disinhibition and presented a summary of studies investigating disinhibited approach to
demonstrate some causes of the construct confusion surrounding this behaviour.
The most important issue this chapter has highlighted has been the inability of these
instruments to measure the underlying aspects of Disinhibition. These measures are heavily
focused on the resulting end behaviour and have not been concerned with understanding what
mechanisms are responsible for the elicitation of Disinhibition. Collectively, these self-report
instruments do not determine whether the motivation towards disinhibited behaviour is driven
by Impulsivity or Neuroticism. Exacerbating this issue is the failure of instruments to
integrate situational aspects relevant to Disinhibition into the item content and overall
instrument conceptualisation. An item such as When I feel anxious I often make quick
decisions would be a more meaningful and conceptually coherent way to measure
Disinhibition via self-report. By imbedding items within a conceptual framework the focus of
the instrument becomes more closely aligned with Disinhibition and its underlying
mechanisms rather than being subsumed by other related behaviours. This requires only a
small semantic change in item content yet will have large effects with regards to
differentiating Disinhibition from other related constructs. Another possibility is to use two
self report measures at the same time. Jackson (2008) proposes that disinhibition can be
measured by the interaction between neuroticism (which provides a measure of anxiety and
likely predisiposition to conflict) and ear preference which is argued to be a biological marker
for hemispheric asymmetries related to lack of restraint.
Nevertheless, in spite of these issues, we expect that self-report will remain to be a
popular option for personality researchers. We believe that future research should aim to
correct the issues mentioned in this paper and highlight the merits of enlisting a multi-method
approach to take advantages of the positive aspects of both self-report and behavioural
measures of Disinhibition. There are a number of benefits to enlisting self-report and by
taking into account the underlying and situational aspects of Disinhibition this methodology
will remain to be a viable option for Disinhibition researchers.
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Chapter 22
CAN EMPLOYERS SCREEN JOB APPLICANTS FOR

POTENTIAL WHITE COLLAR FRAUD OFFENDERS?
Jennifer Keen and Julie Fitness

ABSTRACT
High profile business failures resulting from white collar fraud have prompted calls
for employers to identify potential offenders among internal and external job applicants.
However, the success of any intervention is dependent on the availability of a reliable and
valid tool for this purpose. The question of whether employers can or should identify job
applicants who are likely to engage in white collar fraud is thus addressed in several
stages. First, the context within which these calls are being is made is described. Next,
the validity of different types of screening tools currently being used by employers is
reviewed. Evidence about the stability and pervasiveness of personality traits assumed to
typify people who are likely to engage in white collar fraud is also examined. The chapter
concludes with a brief description of research being undertaken to develop a conceptual
framework that can be used to address the limitations of existing research in this field,
improve existing fraud reduction strategies and reduce the significant the costs associated
with these behaviours.
Keywords: Employment screening, Fraud, Integrity tests, Narcissism, Psychopathy, Validity
INTRODUCTION
White collar fraud comprises diverse behaviours with diverse and frequently devastating
consequences. Corrupt employees deprive their employers of the benefits they were expected
to negotiate on their behalf. Insider trading reduces confidence in the stock market,
Ph: 61-2-9850 6755; Fax: 61-2-9850 8062; jennifer.keen@mq.edu.au.

266 Jennifer Keen and Julie Fitness
threatening the value of pension funds, investment portfolios and the capacity of
organisations to raise funds from investors to expand their business activities. Finance
providers who lend their customers money on the basis of falsified financial statements stand
to lose both the loans advanced and the profits they would have made on the transactions
when their customers are unable to repay the money advanced to them. Cash and inventory
stolen from employers and their customers in the U.S have been estimated as amounting to
7% of their annual revenues (i.e., US$994 billionAssociation of Certified Fraud Examiners,
2008). A survey of organisations in Australia and New Zealand (KPMG, 2009) revealed that
little, if any, of amounts stolen are recovered. These losses may be further compounded by the
costs of establishing how much has been stolen, reconstructing the accounting records to
correctly state the organisations financial position and/or pursuing the offender to recover the
theft proceeds. Estimates of between five and thirty percent of business failures being
attributed to fraud (Murphy, 1993) highlight the diversity of stakeholders adversely impacted
by fraud, with losses including colleagues employment, investors income and capital, and
debts owed to suppliers and taxation authorities. Victims of white collar fraud have reported
symptoms of depression, anxiety and suicidal ideation comparable to those experienced by
victims of violent crime (Ganzini, McFarland, & Bloom, 1990; Spalek, 2007).
These costs have prompted calls from several sources for employers to reduce the risk of
white collar fraud by screening job applicants for potential offenders. Corporate governance
legislation introduced in America in the wake of high profile corporate collapses resulting
from white collar fraud requires many organisations to establish and maintain procedures to
reduce the likelihood of fraud (Sarbanes Oxley Act,, 2002). While such measures were a
commercial imperative before the enactment of this legislation, the scope of processes to
which these measures apply has been expanded from implementing accounting policies and
procedures to reduce these risks to include the people who execute those policies and
procedures (Waller, 2006). PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) developed a framework for
implementing this legislation that includes a recommendation that background checks be
conducted for job applicants. Employers themselves appear keen to embrace screening, with
87% of organisations surveyed in Australia and New Zealand either currently conducting
screening checks on job applicants or intending to do so (KPMG, 2009).
Perceptions that the risks of fraud may be increasing rather than decreasing in the face of
corporate governance regulations (Smith, 2007; Standards Australia, 2008; Zahra, Priem, &
Rasheed, 2005) give further weight to calls to screen for potential offenders among job
applicants. Increasing complexity in the business environment, the speed with which
transactions are processed and a tendency to allocate resources to income generation at the
expense of business administration, have been cited as factors increasing those risks (Holmes,
Langford, Welch, & Welch, 2002). Given the imperatives for reducing the likelihood of white
collar fraud and employers willingness to embrace screening, now is a good time to evaluate
whether it is currently possible to accurately screen job applicants for potential white collar
fraud offenders.
Can Employers Screen Job Applicants 267
TOOLS CURRENTLY BEING USED TO SCREEN JOB APPLICANTS FOR

POTENTIAL WHITE COLLAR FRAUD OFFENDERS
Background Checks
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) recommend that background checks include an

examination of educational background, employment history and criminal records. While
confirming education and employment history provided by an applicant in their resume or
during an interview may reveal how truthful they have been about these disclosures, their
usefulness in exposing potential offenders may be limited. Exaggerating previous work
experience to improve ones prospects of employment is not necessarily predictive of fraud.
Glowing references from previous employers may reflect applicants ingenuity in making
career moves before their behaviours are uncovered. Suspicions of fraud held by a previous
employer may not be disclosed to a reference checker because the amounts involved were
minor, for fear of being sued for defamation, or because they do not want to reveal that their
organisation has been the victim of such behaviour.
The existence or absence of a criminal record also provides no guarantee that applicants
will or will not commit white collar fraud in future. Most fraud offenders are first time
offenders (Australian Institute of Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003; Kapardis
& Krambia-Kapardis, 2004) and thus are unlikely to have a record. Applicants may have
committed fraud but their crimes may not have been detected. Offences may have been
detected but criminal charges not brought or pursued; or charges may have been brought but a
conviction not secured. Offenders may conceal their criminal record from an employer by
changing their name by deed poll. Applicants with criminal records may not reoffend and if
they do, they may not necessarily be capable of, inclined to, or occupy a position in which
committing white collar fraud is possible.
Polygraph Tests
Although polygraphs have generally been outlawed in most private organisations in the
United States, they may be used for recruitment purposes in federal, state and local
government bodies in that country (United States Department of Labor). Polygraphs have also
been proposed as a screening tool in South Africa (Polygraph Institute of South Africa) by an
organisation reported as conducting twenty to thirty thousand polygraph tests a year on behalf
of employers (Sibali, 2008). However, criticisms about the degree of subjectivity involved in
interpreting polygraph test results and the interpretation of those results without reference to
normative standards (Goldberg, Grenier, Guion, Sechrest, & Wing, 1991) undermine their
reliability and validity for any purpose. Murphys (2000) observation that polygraphs are
intended to detect deception at a particular point in time rather than predicting honesty in
general further undermines the case for their use in employment screening.
Integrity Tests
Integrity or honesty tests are based on the premise that individual differences in honesty
or integrity are stable and predictable (Murphy, 2000). They comprise overt and personality
based measures (Murphy, 2000; Sackett, Burris, & Callahan, 1989). Overt tests measure
admissions of and attitudes towards theft and other counterproductive workplace behaviours
(e.g., absenteeism, tardiness, and substance abuse). Past transgressions are assumed to predict
future behaviour. Personality based integrity tests measure personality constructs thought to
predict counterproductive behaviours. Earlier research suggested that conscientiousness was
such a predictive construct (Murphy, 2000), although agreeableness and neuroticism have
also been identified as additional relevant constructs (Ones & Viswesvaren, 1998). Some
authors (Camara & Schneider, 1995; Lilienfeld, Alliger, & Mitchell, 1995) have questioned
whether conformity and conventionality are being measured rather than conscientiousness.
Opinions surrounding the validity of integrity tests are divided (Goldberg, et al., 1991;
Ones, Viswesvaren, & Schmidt, 1995; U.S. Congress: Office of Technology Assessment,
1990). These appear to be underpinned by differences in methodologies and in the level of
detail available to researchers. Ones and Viswesvaren (1998) claim integrity tests are useful
for predicting counterproductive workplace behaviours on the basis of the correlation co-
efficients arrived at in their meta-analysis of 27 integrity tests. These correlations were
derived from both peer reviewed studies and data provided by test providers. The American
Psychological Association (Goldberg, et al., 1991) and the U.S. Congress (U.S. Congress:
Office of Technology Assessment, 1990) both commissioned teams to evaluate evidence
about the validity of integrity tests used in pre-employment screening. Several data sources
were used including literature reviews, publishers test manuals, test booklets, unpublished
research reports, marketing materials, and interviews with subject matter experts or interested
parties. The Congress report concluded that the existing research is insufficient as a basis for
supporting the assertion that these tests can reliably predict dishonest behaviour in the
workplace (U.S. Congress: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990, p.10). The APA report
was not quite as restrictive in its findings, observing that a few integrity tests are supported by
adequate documentation about their validity (Goldberg, et al., 1991).
Test publishers materials were criticised for several reasons. These included a lack of
independent research to corroborate publishers claims, restrictions in what could be reported
about the material because it was provided on condition that it not be identified in the task
force reports, and observations that for some tests, the only validation data available were
claims by the publishers that their tests were valid, with some of these claims being described
as bordering on fraudulent (Camara & Schneider, 1995; Goldberg, et al., 1991; U.S.
Congress: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990). Goldberg et al.s (1991) observation that
insufficient information about cutting scores for integrity tests is available provides a means
for reconciling the disparate views on integrity testing. While Ones and Viswesvarens (1998)
results indicate that higher scores on integrity tests are associated with lower ratings of
counterproductive behaviours, this does not provide evidence that the cut-off scores on
specific tests are appropriate.
ARE INTEGRITY TESTS VALID?

Although it has been suggested that research undertaken subsequent to the APA and U.S.
Congress reports has strengthened the case for the validity of integrity tests (Murphy, 2000;
Sackett & Wanek, 1996), their validity does not necessarily extend to reliably predicting
white collar fraud for several reasons. As Lilienfeld et al. (1995) suggested, people who score
poorly on overt integrity tests are likely to be those who are honest about their previous
dishonesty. While Murphy (2000) argues that people who respond to tests in this way may do
so because such dishonesty was normal in their work environment, people who commit white
collar fraud often conceal their transgressions to avoid discovery. This suggests that they
recognise that their behaviours may be subject to challenge. It also suggests that they may
have sufficient insight to identify the purpose of these tests and to respond in a way that
presents them as attractive to a potential employer.
The inclusion of absenteeism and drug abuse in integrity tests and the validation of test
results against supervisor ratings of job performance has raised questions about whether
honesty is being measured by these tests (Goldberg, et al., 1991; U.S. Congress: Office of
Technology Assessment, 1990). In the absence of evidence linking absenteeism, drug abuse
and poor job performance to white collar fraud, the validity of these tests in predicting fraud
remains unestablished. Ones and Viswesvaren (1998) suggest that the validity of integrity
tests for predicting major embezzlement has not been established because of the low base
rates of these behaviours while at the same time providing validity statistics for theft. This
highlights assumptions about possible qualitative and quantitative differences between
offence types and offenders that need to be explored further. Despite this, the validity statistic
for theft was low (.13), casting doubt on the utility of integrity tests regardless of how fraud is
conceptualised.
The description of a psychometric tool as an integrity test provides obvious appeal to
employers eager to embrace diverse strategies for reducing their exposure to fraud. However,
using a tool that has not been established as a reliable and valid predictor of white collar fraud
may provide a false sense of security about the protection afforded by such a measure. This
risk highlights the need for decisions about the use of any psychometric tool to be made by
people with: (i) detailed knowledge about the requirements of the role and the environment in
which the incumbent is to function; (ii) sufficient skill and objectivity to be able to identify
tools that may reliably and validly predict the behaviours of interest, and; (iii) knowledge of
employment and other relevant laws in the prevailing jurisdiction to ensure that the choice
and use of tool is made within these parameters.
Although background checks, polygraphs and integrity tests have been described above
as being limited in their usefulness in predicting white collar fraud, it is worth exploring the
possibility that increasing the accuracy with which perpetrators are identified may be possible
if screening tools include more appropriate constructs.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS POTENTIALLY ASSOCIATED

WITH WHITE COLLAR FRAUD
Psychopathy and Narcissism
White collar fraud offenders have been described as being psychopathic (Cleckley, 1955;
Haapasalo, 1994; Hare 1999) or narcissistic (Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, & Klein, 2006).
Such people are supposedly characterised by superficial charm, manipulation of people for
their own ends and a lack of empathy for victims. However, some degree of caution needs to
be exercised in the application of these labels to fraud offenders because of the validity of the
constructs and the varying characteristics of offenders.
Not everyone who is charming and manipulative necessarily commits white collar fraud,
and not everyone who commits fraud is necessarily charming and manipulative. Empathy
may be irrelevant to white collar fraud if, as Farrell and Healy (2000) observed, perpetrators
consider their crimes victimless. As fraud is a crime of deception and success in perpetrating
it is dependent on victims ignorance of their status, victims will not be displaying suffering
that perpetrators could fail to empathise with at the time the offences are being perpetrated. A
pervasive pattern of anti-social behaviour and offending is a key feature of psychopathy
(Kapardis & Krambia-Kapardis, 2004; Williams & Paulhus, 2004). However, as most white
collar fraud offenders do not have criminal records (Australian Institute of Criminology &
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003), they do not appear to demonstrate the pattern of offending
that typifies psychopaths. Williams and Paulhus (2004) argue that white collar criminals are
not psychopaths because their offences fall outside the scope of those that define psychopaths
i.e., drug abuse, violent assault, and bullying. Research by Hare and Jutai (1983) suggests that
fraud is as likely to be committed by non-psychopaths as psychopaths.
The superficial charm and manipulation of others that characterises narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD) is intended to elicit the admiration that such individuals believe
they are entitled to because of their grandiose sense of self-importance (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). While some individuals with NPD may begrudge others their possessions,
this is not a central feature of the disorder. Such thoughts are an example of envy of others
that results from a fragile self-esteem, not a sense of entitlement to other peoples money.
While some white collar fraud offenders may well display superficial charm and manipulate
others, this could reflect diversionary tactics engaged in to prevent discovery of their
intentions or behaviours. Such perceptions could also be post hoc evaluations that reflect a
victims reaction to having been deceived by a fraud perpetrator.
Disagreement about what comprises psychopathy, overlaps between psychopathy and
narcissism, and the potential for confusion about what a sense of entitlement attaches to
highlights the need to adequately formulate and differentiate these constructs before
attempting to categorise anyone using these constructs. Perhaps research exploring the Dark
Triad of psychopathy, narcissism and Macchiavellianism (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) may
contribute to such a solution. Until then, Farrell and Healys (2000) description of
perpetrators as trusted, innocuous employees who do not draw attention to themselves
suggests the need to expand the criteria explored for predicting potential white collar fraud
offenders.
STATES OR TRAITS?
Screening job applicants for potential white collar fraud offenders carries an assumption
that all the variability in who commits these offences lies with the individual. This approach
contrasts with research and practices that focus on organisational factors associated with
fraud. Mumford et al. (2001) suggest that situational variables are better predictors of
counterproductive behaviours than individual variables. Within the accounting literature, the
focus of fraud prevention has typically focused on establishing policies and processes that
remove opportunities for fraud and that increase the likelihood of discovery if fraud does
occur (i.e., internal controls). Within the organisational justice literature, Greenberg (2007)
proposes a need to redress perceptions of injustices committed by an organisation against its
employees as a motivating factor for workplace theft. As not all people with the opportunity
to steal do so, and some people go to considerable effort to commit fraud, the occurrence of
these behaviours is likely to reflect an interaction of both characteristics of individuals and the
circumstances in which those individuals find themselves.
Fine et al. (2010) explored the relationship of both situational and individual factors to
scores on integrity tests and counterproductive workplace behaviours (CWBs). They found
that the relationship between internal controls and employee engagement, and CWBs was
moderated when integrity was low but not when integrity was high. Although these findings
support the validity of integrity tests for predicting CWBsand such validity has been
questioned abovethe value of Fine et al.s (2010) work lies in their recognition of the need
to identify and explore the full range of organisational and individual factors that may impact
on fraud and the relationships between those factors.
CONCLUSION
Some current screening tools may identify some potential offenders some of the time. As
with any psychometric tool, the risk of false negatives and false positives exist. The costs of
engaging a person who defrauds their employer have been described. Evidence that the
majority of candidates failing integrity tests are not detected as stealing from their employer
(U.S. Congress: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990) suggests the false positive rate as
being high. In a skills-short labour market, false positives may also impose costs on
employers. Employee recruitment costs may be unnecessarily inflated as the candidate pool is
expanded or searched more thoroughly than is necessary to find a suitable applicant. If a
suitable applicant cannot be found because the candidate pool has been unnecessarily
restricted, employers may lack the skills sets essential for their businesses. The limitations of
these tools and the costly consequences of false negatives and false positives posed by these
tools support the need for further research to explore whether these false hit rates can be
improved.
Duffield and Graboskys (2001) observation that no single psychological feature
characterises fraud offenders, and literature highlighting gambling as a growing factor in
fraud (Standards Australia, 2008) raises several issues for consideration. Perhaps some latent
characteristic that typifies these offenders is yet to be identified. Perhaps organisational
factors are a better predictor of who perpetrates fraud. Perhaps white collar fraud is best
predicted by a taxonomy of offenders that incorporates both characteristics of perpetrators

and the contexts in which their behaviours occur.
The development of such a taxonomy is currently being tackled by the authors via two
studies. The first comprises a content analysis of judgements handed down in white collar
fraud court cases. A diverse range of offender characteristics, the behaviours they engaged in
and the circumstances in which the offences were committed are described in those
judgements. Preliminary analyses appear to support the development of a taxonomy of
offenders who commit different types of offences under different circumstances rather than a
stereotypical offender who engages in a unitary offence. Results from this study are being
used to develop an attributions framework to explore fraud offences from the perspective of
the perpetrators. It is hoped that integrating observer perspectives on white collar fraud with
those of perpetrators and existing literature will contribute to reducing the likelihood of fraud
occurring by reducing the opportunities for fraud within organisations and increasing the
likelihood of predicting people who are likely to take advantage of opportunities if they do
arise.
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Holmes, S. A., Langford, M., Welch, O. J., & Welch, S. T. (2002). Associations between
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Kapardis, A., & Krambia-Kapardis, M. (2004). Enhancing fraud prevention and detection by
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KPMG (2009). KPMG Forensic Fraud Survey 2008. Sydney: KPMG.
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Chapter 23
REFLECTIONS ON THE FACTOR STRUCTURE

OF THE OCCUPATIONAL STRESS INVENTORY-REVISED
Richard E. Hicks
Department of Psychology, BondUniversity, Gold Coast, QLD 42299, Australia
ABSTRACT
Many studies have identified jobs or occupations where incumbents are most at risk
of occupational stress, though stress appears endemic across the whole spectrum of work.
The oft cited jobs whose members are most at risk include those of air traffic
controllers, nurses and other health professionals, the police, those in management,
teachers, and more. But trying to understand the factors involved that lead to the stressful
outcomes, even when people are selected for their jobs on relevant criteria, remains a
problem. A difficulty lies in the fact that findings from studies of the relationships
between stress and well-being at work across different work groups are confused because
different instruments are used to measure stress and well-being. Specially designed
questionnaires for the particular work group are often cited as being necessary. This may
well be the case for some aspects within given jobs. However, using different measuring
instruments both clouds and compromises the ability to do cross-group comparisons. One
measuring instrument, the Occupational Stress Inventory-Revised (OSI-R), shows
promise for use across different occupational areas and if validated would thus allow
comparisons on a common base of stress levels, strain experienced and the coping
resources used across the various groups. Reflections on the OSI-R and its use in this way
and its value for assessing factors associated with stress are given in this paper.
Keywords: Occupational stress, Occupational Stress Inventory-Revised, Stress assessment
Ph: 61-7-5595 2580; Fax: 61-7-5595 2540; rhicks@bond.edu.au

276 Richard E. Hicks
INTRODUCTION
The incumbents of jobs such as those in air traffic control, defence and police services,
health services and teaching (among many) experience high levels of workplace stress,
though all incumbents in most jobs experience some level of stress at least, from time to time.
Reported studies of workplace stress suggest stress is endemic; such studies include those
emphasizing general workplace stress (Beehr, 1995; Byrne, 2003; Caulfield, Chang, Dollard,
& Elshaug, 2004; Cooper, 1998; Daniels, 2006; Johnson, Cooper, Cartwright, Donald,
Taylor, & Millet, 2005; Murphy, 1996; Osipow, 1998; Zapf, Dormann, & Frese, 1996), stress
in management (cf. Cooper, 1998; Donaldson-Feilder, Yarker, Lewis, & Flaxman, 2007; La
Montagne, Keegel, Louie, Ostry, & Landsbergis, 2007), stress among educationists (cf.
Boyle, Borg, Falzon & Baglioni, 1995; Hicks, Fujiwara, & Bahr, 2006; Kinman, 2001;
Kyriacou, 1998; Manthei & Gilmore, 1996; Rudow, 1999), stress in the health and service
industries (e.g., Barton, 2009; De Jonge, Le Blanc, Peeters, & Noordam, 2008; Dollard,
Winefield, & Winefield, 2003; La Montagne, Keegel, & Vallance, 2007; Lewig & Dollard,
2003; Peterson, 2005; Snow, Swan, Raghavan, Connell, & Klein, 2003; Toch, 2002), and
among students (e.g., Christopoulos & Hicks, 2008; Paspaliaris & Hicks, 2010).
STRATEGIES FOR MEASURING STRESS AT WORK

The ability to make comparisons of levels and kinds of stress experienced across the
different occupational and student groups is limited because most studies use different
strategies to gather their data: including individual interview or focus group open discussion
methods, open written response methods, and different surveys or short-answer/ multiple-
choice surveys. There is also a common emphasis on specially designed surveys for the
group being studied (e.g., educationists, entrepreneurs, the police, nurses and so on; cf. in
education, Kyriacou, 1998).
Need for a Common Questionnaire in Cross-occupational Comparisons of

Stress
It would be useful to have available questionnaires or surveys that could enable

comparisons across all variables that relate to and impact on stress in workplaces (cf. Boyle et
al., 1995; Dollard & de Jonge, 2003; LaMontagne, Keegel, & Vallance, 2007). There have
been some attempts to build models that incorporate the variables of importance and relate
stress to the environment, personal experiences and personal coping capacities (Coopers
extensive work in this field can be citedcf. Cooper, 1998), but there are few models in
practice along with associated measuring instruments that operationalise the full context.
Recent work in the UK using the ASSET model (cf. Johnson et al., 2006 cited above) may
yield fruit, though that model fails to emphasise personal coping skills and attributes in its
survey measurement. Most other stress models are limited mostly to one or two related
personal stress dimensions as in assessments in mental health using the biopsychosocial
model of stress (e.g., the Depression Anxiety & Stress Scales of Lovibond & Lovibond,
Reflections on the Factor Structure 277
1995), medical emphases as in the Personal Stress Navigator (Miller & Smith, 1999), and
other occupational stress inventories including the Job Stress Survey (Spielberger & Vagg,
1999), and the Occupational Stress Indicator (Cooper, Sloan, & Williams, 1988). Very
common in stress research in specific occupations is the use of open-ended questions
(interview or written). These questions involve personal or group responses as to how (say)
teaching is for the teachers, and their reactions to the issues they face (cf. Fujiwara, 2004;
Kyriacou, 1998). Lists of issues or concerns are also often used and the respondents mark
those issues that are relevant.
However, one model of stress that appears potentially attractive as covering many areas
in common across occupations is that of the Occupational Stress Inventory-Revised (OSI-R,
Osipow, 1998). This model assesses interaction between the role demands of the job, the
experience of stress (strain) and the personal resources of the incumbents. The model uses the
OSI-R to assess these three areas, across 14 scales. This paper reflects on how well this
inventory operates as a comparative model across different occupational groups. The
inventory-model itself is described next and Table 1 defines the 14 scales.
Table 1. Scale descriptions of the OSI-R: 14 scales with 10 items per scale
Scale What each scale measures

Occupational Roles Questionnaire (ORQ)
Role Overload Job demands, resources, and ability to complete tasks
Role Insufficiency Fit between skills and job, needs for recognition,
boredom
Role Ambiguity Awareness of ones work expectations
Role Boundary Level of conflict in loyalties and priorities in workplace
Role Responsibility Feeling of responsibility for the welfare and
performance of others
Physical Environment Exposure to stressful work environment (e.g., heat,
noise)
Personal Strain Questionnaire (PSQ)
Vocational Strain Attitudes towards work, problems in work quantity and-
or quality
Psychological Strain Whether employees are experiencing psychological
problems
Interpersonal Strain Degree of disruptions in interpersonal relationships
Physical Strain Symptoms of physical illness and worries about
personal physical health
Personal Resources Questionnaire (PRQ)
Recreation Level of recreational and leisure activities engaged in
Self-Care Participation in stress-reducing habits (e.g., adequate
sleep)
Social Support Feeling of having support and help from others
Rational/Cognitive Coping Knowledge and use of cognitive techniques to deal with
stress
BACKGROUND TO THE OCCUPATIONAL STRESS INVENTORY

REVISED: ITS DIMENSIONS
The OSI-R was built on a broad theoretical base and has normative data across several
professional groups. The OSI-R assesses three inter-related dimensions or factors assessing
aspects of occupational adjustment: occupational role stress, personal strain and coping
resources. Occupational role stress includes six sub-scales, while Personal strain and
Personal resources each include four subscales (see Table 1).
The OSI-R theoretical model hypothesises that: (i) work environment stressors and
coping resources influence perceptions of work roles, and; (ii) that interactions between work
stressors and stress-inducing work roles produce personal or psychological strain, with that
strain influenced also by the variety, strength and level of personal resources of the
individual. This model therefore provides the basis for meaningful comparisons across a
variety of groups, on the three main dimensions and the 14 scales of the questionnaire. Does
the questionnaire meet expectations? First the professional manual (Osipow, 1998) of the
OSI-R shows all 14 scales (each of ten items) possess high levels of internal consistency
(Cronbach Alpha coefficients from .70 to .89). However, would the three-factor
(questionnaire) model be reproduced in studies? This aspect is handled next.
THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL STRESS

INVENTORY-REVISED
A series of confirmatory factor analyses have been conducted and further studies are
under way as part of a programmatic study examining the OSI-R and its structural integrity,
resilience across samples, and ability to highlight similarities and differences across different
groups. The first of the studies examined 141 secondary school teachers (Fujiwara, 2004;
Hicks, et al., 2006) and partially supported the model with confirmation of the 14 scales but
suggested the underlying structure of the model needed further study. This early study,
however, raised other issues of importance supporting the concern to find a questionnaire that
assessed stress reliably and in such a way as to enable comparisons across occupations. Just
how stressed were the teachers in the study and were they more stressed or less stressed than
other professionals? We were able to use the data from the professional manual (Osipow,
1998) to make some beginning comparisons showing that teachers in this sample were indeed
more stressed in at least one of the 14 scales (Role Overload) than the great majority of
professionals in other occupations listed in the Manual. This indeed underlined an important
value in the use of the OSI-R as a cross-occupational comparison instrument.
However, the integrity of the underlying factor or questionnaire structure of the inventory
needed more extensive study. The second of the studies revisited the inter-correlational data
given in the professional manual of the OSI-R (see Hicks, Bahr, & Fujiwara, 2010) using
more than 900 respondents. The results indicated that the underlying structure of the OSI-R
was confirmed for the Personal Strain and the Personal Resources questionnaires, but not for
the Occupational Roles questionnaire: this questionnaire or dimension could be divided
sensibly into two or three different factors (Role Clarity; Role Workload, and perhaps
Environmental Impacts). Role Clarity involves the three scales of Role Ambiguity, Role
Boundary, and Role Insufficiency. Role Workload includes the Role Overload and the Role
Responsibility scales, while the third factor would be the remaining scale regarding the
physical work environment itself. Further research is being conducted into the Occupational
Roles Questionnaire of the OSI-R and the results will be reported in due course.
POSITIVE PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL OUTCOMES

The technical results overall for the 14 separate scales involved in the OSI-R are all
positive (Hicks et al., 2006) and there is therefore support for the use of the 14 scales or sub-
scales of the OSI-R in both practical (clinical, organizational) and theoretical (research)
contexts. The 14 scales provide substantial information about stressors (role and
environmental pressures), experienced personal strain, and personal resources of individuals.
In practice, organisations have been helped to identify which areas seem to be most related to
stress in the workplace (through examining grouped section or departmental results from
completion by individuals of the OSI-R); they are thus able to use the information for
decision processes within the organisation to alleviate stress points. Individuals themselves
have been helped to identify their own strengths and weaknesses in personal resources and
responses (levels of strain) to the various work role areas assessed by the OSI-R. Thus the
OSI-R appears to be working in practice.
CONCLUSION
Further data collection across a variety of employed and unemployed groups and student
groups has occurred under support from Bond Universitys Research and Consulting Services
and the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. More than 1000 Australian students,
educational administrators, managers, unemployed persons and others have now completed
the questionnaires and several student theses have been completed on how the OSI-R
questionnaires and sub-scales relate to a variety of psychological and social dimensions (such
as well-being, depression, anxiety, emotional intelligence, and personality factors). Further
studies are being conducted with colleagues and data gathered in other countries including in
Turkey where studies of teachers are being completed. The data on the individual groups, and
the combined data on the OSI-R, will help extend our understanding of how the OSI-R model
might be improved in practice.
There are good indications that the OSI-Rs 14 scales are useful, and reasonably
comprehensive and effective. Identifying and reporting on what would be an optimal
explanatory model for these scales (four or five factors) and what are the main health, well-
being, and personality correlates of the scales of the OSI-R, based on the data already
gathered from the programmatic studies, are the next steps currently being given attention.
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Occupational Health Psychology, 1, 145-169.
Chapter 24
INTRODUCING THE YWEDO ONLINE

COGNITIVE LABORATORY
Chris J. Jackson
School of Organisation & Management, University of new South Wales
ABSTRACT
YWEDO (Jackson, 2007; available at: http://www.ywedo.com/experiments/) is an
on-line psychology laboratory that offers interactive experiments, data collection, and
easy data output. The laboratory is designed to be an instructional, educational and
research resource for academics. The aim of this chapter is to introduce YWEDO to the
academic audience as it is likely to prove useful to other researchers. The chapter
discusses advantages and disadvantages of online data collection and outlines the
modules available for research via the YWEDO laboratory. Strengths of the YWEDO
laboratory and suggestions for avoiding problems with online research are discussed.
Keywords: 2D:4D, Baddeley Reasoning Test, Balloon Analog Reaction Task (BART),
Bisecting lines, Chimeric faces, Colour Stroop, Global & specific biases, Navon, Online
Laboratory, Time estimation, Towers of Hanoi, Trail Making Test, YWEDO, Work
performance
INTRODUCTION
For the last 20 years, I have worked hard collecting data from applied settings and
relating these dependent variables to psychological mechanisms. Each study has been unique
and required a large amount of effort to generate just a small amount of data. In about 2005, I
Ph: 61-2-9385 9715; Fax: 61-2-9662 8531; c.jackson@unsw.edu.au

284 Chris J. Jackson
realised that there might be an easier way of going about things. From this line of thinking,
the YWEDO (why-we-do) online laboratory was born in 2007.
YWEDO provides a generic platform to deliver a range of psychological tests and
surveys to participants with a sophisticated online configuration which includes recordings of
reaction times, a pre-configured database, and a script for writing and retrieving data from the
database. Table 1 gives a list of the modules currently running at YWEDO. YWEDO is
modular such that researchers can pick and choose whichever modules are required for their
research. Moreover, it is reasonably easy to add new modules. At the moment, YWEDO
follows a translational model of internet use in which previously used ideas are translated for
internet use (Skitka & Sargis, 2006).
ADVANTAGES
The main advantages of conducting online experiments can be classified as follows: large
sample size and diversity, increased participants motivation and experimenters absence
(Reips, 2002; Skitka & Sargis, 2006). In terms of sample size and diversity, YWEDO
provides fast access to participants from across the world (in contrast to laboratory studies
where local participants are only useable and only small numbers can use a laboratory at any
one time). The range of possible participants at YWEDO is only limited by online access and
peoples online habits such that access to very specific target groups is possible and limited
only by the creativity of the researcher.
Many people might think that participants motivation in online studies is likely to be
limited in comparison to participants in laboratory studies. However in some situations this
seems unlikely to be the case. My use of YWEDO involves participants who are monitored
and only rewarded for providing meaningful, complete and non-random data. In such cases,
participants are likely to be motivated. When I have collected data from surfers then such
participants are unlikely to be motivated and the data are untrustworthy. The idea that good
management of participants leads to highly motivated participants fits in with the literature
(Rickman, Kiesler, Weisband & Drasgow, 1999).
Table 1. Modules of the YWEDO online laboratory
Colour Stroop
Trail marking Test
Towers of Hanoi
Time estimation
Balloon Analog Reaction Task (BART)
Navon style global and specific biases of perception
Bisecting Lines
Chimeric Faces
Baddeley Reasoning Test
Self reported digit ratio and digit length
Supervisor and third party ratings of work performance
Survey data collection
Introducing the YWEDO Online Cognitive Laboratory 285
The absence of an experimenter at YWEDO suggests that a study will be free from
experimenter bias and, after set up costs, will be much easier and cheaper to run. The absence
of an experimenter may also enable collection of sensitive data although at the same time it
seems likely that online participants will need extensive reassurance regarding the security of
the data and the uses that will be made of the data. Universities require ethical approval and
usually demand detailed descriptions of how research data will be used so university research
generally can be expected to provide such reassurance. Moreover the use of University
information sheets will generally reassure participants, and the use of instructions to convey
the need for honesty usually leads to improved honesty in participants.
DISADVANTAGES
The strong advantages YWEDO need to be set against the disadvantages of data
collection using this online methodology. Disadvantages include having to use internet-
connected samples which may not be representative of the actual population (Lenhart,
Horrigan, Rainie, Allen & Boyce, 2003), lack of environmental control, dropout and possible
multiple submission (and see Birnbaum, 2004; Reips, 2002). Problems of lack of
environmental control for example lead to the absence of the ability to verify instructions
being followed and the absence of equipment leads to any number of likely effects resulting
from background noise, lighting, viewing angle, music, TV, third parties etc. Data collected
from the YWEDO online laboratory is limited by these environmental variables. However, it
is important to note that generally the effect of these variables is to reduce the chance of
finding significant results not increase it.
YWEDO does not minimise environment differences by preloading experimental
materials as it was thought that this might lead to more problems than it would solve (such as
increasing doubts over participation). Instead, file sizes of experimental materials are
minimised and reaction times are measured as accurately as possible given the constraints.
This leads to potential concerns about precision and control including whether participants
can load web pages, speed of loading, speed of internet access, type of browser being used
and type and size of monitor. At YWEDO precise measurement is not possible but in most
cases precise measuring of response times to the nearest millisecond is not required. Again,
the effect of imprecision is likely to reduce the chance of finding significant effects, but such
limitations need to be acknowledged.
Unlike lab experiments participants, participants are known to frequently dropout in
online experiments and this can have an adverse effect upon the quality of data obtained.
First, and mostly obviously, it reduces the sample size and hence decreases likelihood for
detecting an effect. However, large sample sizes are easily obtained in online experiments
hence the reduction in sample size due to dropout is not in itself a serious problem.
Nevertheless dropout can be a problem if there is a non-random reason for dropout as this
might adversely affect results. In my research work using the YWEDO, dropout is not a
problem because I have only paid participants for completion of a research study. Completion
of each module and overall completion of a research study is measured in the YWEDO online
laboratory.
Multiple submission is a very important problem for online research which is not faced
by laboratory research. YWEDO records IP address of each participant. Although this is not
an infallible way of checking identity, it is a reasonably effective way of identifying multiple
submission. Another problem faced by YWEDO is that of filtering meaningless data provided
by participants. Researchers can often spot participants who are not completing a project
properly in a laboratory but this is not possible at YWEDO. To help offset this problem,
YWEDO records completion times for each project such that a researcher can identify
participants who are too slow or too fast at completing test modules. Moreover, YWEDO was
designed to export data easily into SPSS such that SPSS can be used to spot meaningless data.
A final problem faced by YWEDO is the increasing and real problem of hacking. Despite
password security, some participants may find ways to fake participation, download
confidential data, or find other ways of undermining the YWEDO laboratory. The reality is
that no online system is 100% secure, yet YWEDO does incorporate many modern methods
of reducing the likely successful outcome of a hacking operation. Given that there are more
interesting and lucrative targets for hacking, YWEDO is unlikely to be hacked.
THE YWEDO MODULES

As already noted, the YWEDO online laboratory consists of a growing collection of
modules representing tasks, surveys, experiments or questionnaires. Data are currently stored
in an MS Access database and the script is asp or similar.
Colour Stroop
The Colour Stroop (derived from Stroop, 1935) is one of the best known classic
psychology experiments and is quite widely measured online (e.g., Krantz & Dalal, 2000). It
involves the presentation of the names of colours presented in different colours (e.g., the word
red presented in red or presented in a different colour such as green). Beneath this are
presented four different colour options (red, blue, green, pink, grey) in four boxes for the
participant to select their response. In some trials, the words are presented in the colour
associated with the word, and in other trials the words are presented in a different colour to
the word. Participants are asked to identify not the word but the colour of the word.
The Colour Stroop task indexes the ability to inhibit well-learned responses. This ability
to inhibit is measured by the difference in reaction time to respond between the simple or
congruent condition (where the spelling of the word matches the colour of the word) and the
complex or incongruent condition (where the spelling of the word does not match the colour
of the word). This measure of interference control (inhibition of practiced response in favour
of a less practiced response) is a widely used measure of executive function and attention
(e.g., Semrud-Clikeman, Steingard, Filipek, Biederman, Bekken, Renshaw, 2000). Also
measured and recorded is the number of incorrect responses on each colour and the overall
time to complete the Colour Stroop.
Trail Marking Test
The Trail Making Test (derived from Reitan, 1958) consists of 20 squares distributed
across the monitor. Again there is a simple or congruent task and a complex or incongruent
task. In the simple task, the squares are numbered 1 20, and the participant clicks on each
square in ascending numerical order. In the complex task, the squares consist of numbers (1
10) or letters (A J) and the participant is asked to click on the squares in ascending order but
with the added task of alternating between the numbers and letters (i.e., 1-A-2-B-3-C, etc.).
Reaction time to completing the two trails is recorded. Errors are notified to the
participant and the participant must correct the error before continuing. Errors therefore affect
the completion time for the task. This is standard method of dealing with errors for this task
(Bowie & Harvey, 2006). Similarly to the Colour Stroop Test, the difference between the two
tasks is seen as a measure of interference control and therefore a measure of executive
function. Others see the results as being related to overall intelligence and neurological
deficits (Bowie & Harvey, 2006). Also recorded in the YWEDO online laboratory is the
overall time taken to complete the Trail Marking Test.
Towers of Hanoi
The Towers of Hanoi is a mathematical game invented in the late 19th Century and again
is often used to investigate executive functions related to planning, organising and problem
solving. The YWEDO version consists of three rods, and four disks of different sizes which
are initially all placed in a stack in ascending order of size such that the smallest is at the top
and the largest at the bottom. The objective of the puzzle is to move all the disks from one rod
to another rod whilst following these rules:
Only one disk may be moved at a time.

Each move consists of taking the upper disk from one of the rods and moving it to
another rod such that it can only go on top of any disks already present.
No disk may be placed on top of a smaller disk.
The YWEDO version of the Towers of Hanoi task instructs a participant to complete as
many 4 disk solutions as possible within a 2 minute period. The participant moves disks by
clicking on a disk and then by clicking the rod where it is to be placed. A message informs the
participant if a move is illegal and a countdown provides time information. Feedback is
provided to the participant and the opportunity to see how the task is performed is offered.
The Towers of Hanoi Task provides a measure of executive function which is different to
interference control as measured by the Colour Stroop and the Trail Marking Test. This is
because the Towers of Hanoi task requires that a sequence of moves is planned, executed,
monitored, and revised in advance of action (Wright, Hardie & Rodway, 2004). A variety of
summary measures are recorded in the Tower of Hanoi Task including: (a) number of
solutions achieved; (b) total number of moves; (c) number of moves per solution achieved;
(d) average time to pick up a disk, and; (e) average time to put down a disk. Also recorded are
the details of every move and the time taken to make the move.
Time Estimation
Time estimations are made by participants based on the well established prospective time
paradigm in which participants are informed in advance that they will be asked to judge the
duration of a time interval. Participants are instructed to estimate time at the following
intervals and in the following order (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 seconds). Participants press a
start button clearly labelled with the time to be estimated. Once the perceived time to be
estimated had passed the participant presses the button again.
At present the YWEDO time estimation module consists of three conditions. In condition
1, participants are simply presented with the amount of time to estimate; in condition 2,
participants are distracted by reading aloud randomised numbers which are presented, and
which range in presentation time to prevent subvocal counting; and in condition 3,
participants are asked to count according to their natural rhythm (but not to use artificial
counting methods to mark the passage of time). Condition 1 is always presented first and then
the remaining conditions are presented in random order.
Time Estimation is regarded as a key cognitive skill as the ability to estimate short time
intervals plays an important role in everyday life in which a response is required at an
appropriate point in time. Moreover, it appears to be a cognitive skill related to attention and
learning as it is important to monitor and check the progression of time (Taatgen, van Rijn &
Anderson, 2007). Accurate perception of time in the presence of a distractor is often
conceived as being an executive control task in which people who attend to the task are likely
to be the better performers.
Data from each time interval are collected as well as overall time taken to complete the
module. SPSS code standardises the time estimates and they are then added together to
provide a measure of total time estimated. Standardization is necessary so that each time
interval equally contributes to the total time estimated. The data are also converted into
Absolute Errors by subtracting absolute differences between the estimated time interval and
actual time interval. Absolute error shows the proportional difference between objective clock
time and judged time, and it is used to assess overall level of accuracy of time judgment
(Brown, 1985); an absolute error of zero indicates perfect performance.
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART)
In the BART a participant is presented with a picture of a small balloon that can be
inflated incrementally with pumps. A pump wins points. After each balloon pump, the
participant can choose to stop and collect the points or can choose to collect more points by
pumping again. If the balloon pops then the money is lost and the participant begins again
with another balloon. If the participant chooses to collect the points then the points are saved
and the participant begins with another balloon. There are 20 balloons in the YWEDO
implementation of BART.
Participants undertake one of two conditions. In one condition of the BART, the
probability of the balloon bursting increases with each pump such that after 20 pumps there is
a 100% chance of the balloon bursting. The probability of the balloon bursting after the first
pump is zero, the second pump was 1/19, after the third pump was 1/18, and so on, until the
twentieth pump, where a balloon burst was certain.
In the second condition of the BART, the task is divided up into first a reward
condition of 10 balloons and then a punish condition of 10 balloons. In the reward
condition the probability of the balloon bursting is the chance and in the punish condition
the probability of the balloon busting is twice the chance of the first condition.
Summary measures which are recorded include number of balloon pops, total points won,
total points lost, points finished, and time taken across 20 conditions and across the reward
and the punish conditions. Also recorded is information about each balloon including points
obtained, number of pumps, total time taken to pump and average pump time. The BART is
thought to provide insights into the underlying mechanisms of poor decision-making (Lejuez
et al., 2002). Each pump can be interpreted as a risky decision that can result in a gain of
points or a loss of all points if the balloon pops. The BART is therefore thought to model real
world risk-taking and provide a measure of an individuals tendency to engage in risky
behaviours (i.e., make risky decisions).
The BART has been associated with measures of safety and health risk behaviours
(e.g., drug use, gambling, stealing, unprotected sexual intercourse), which are real-world
manifestations of poor decision making (Lejuez et al., 2002). The reward and punish
condition is interesting as it transforms the BART into a measure of disinhibition such that it
is possible to see how people learn to respond in a reversal learning task in which people are
first conditioned to respond and then punished for making that response.
Navon Type Measure of Global and Spatial Attention
Letter stimuli (C, H, I, S, T, U, O, D, X) were employed for this version of the Navon
task (Navon, 1977) in which larger letters are constructed from a series of smaller letters.
There are 36 presentations and each letter is presented four times. On half the occasions, trials
are congruent (e.g., large A made of smaller As) and on the other half then the trials are
incongruent (e.g., large A made up of small Cs). Navon (1977) reported a global precedence
effect was apparent in which there was a bias towards attending to the global as opposed to
the local and slower processing of the local as a result of interference from the global. A
participants performance on the Navon task seems therefore to be influenced by local versus
global and by attentional control mechanisms.
Participants are instructed to report the smallest sized letter that they see by choosing
from one of five buttons and the time taken to make the decision is recorded as well as the
accuracy of the decision. Buttons are only available once the picture of the letter has been
fully downloaded and the order of the buttons is random. Results can be used to compare
congruent accuracy and time taken with incongruent accuracy and time taken. The measures
provide indexes of how much a person focuses on the global or the specific image.
There are a number of uses of this task which include using it as a measure of executive
control (i.e., how much an incongruent task interferes with a congruent task), using it as a
measure of global versus specific analysis, or using it as a measure of hemispheric asymmetry
given that there are known global versus local differences in hemispheric functioning.
Bisecting Lines
Visual line bisecting is quite often used as a measure of relative hemisphere activation. It
is frequently used to measure the balance of activation between the two cerebral hemispheres
(Bradshaw, Nathan, Nettleton,Wilson, & Pierson, 1987). Like EEG measures of lateral
asymmetry of activation, it appears to be stable over time (Tomarken, Davidson, Wheeler, &
Doss, 1992). Jewell and McCourt (2000) have provided a meta-analytic review of 73 studies
of line bisecting.
Eight horizontal lines are randomly selected between 4 in. (10.16 cm) and 6 in. (15.24
cm) in length and presented together, with their centres offset from a common centre. The
participants are asked to use their mouse and click on the centre of each line such that they
divide it into two equal segments without measuring. Participants are also instructed to keep
their heads towards the centre of the screen and shoulders parallel to the screen. YWEDO
records time taken to finish the task, the length of the line and the distance from the left of the
line that the participant clicks on the line to represent the centre. Bisecting a line to the right
of its true centre represents more attention toward the smaller (right) line segment, and is
interpreted as a sign of relatively greater contralateral (left) activation.
Chimeric Faces Test
The Chimeric Faces Test (derived from Levy, Heller, Banich, & Burton, 1983) involves
36 presentations of 9 photographs. In each presentation, pairs of faces are presented one on
top of the other (the top is an exact mirror image of the one on the bottom). Half of the time
the chimera on top have the smile to the participant's left, and the other half have a smile to
the participants right. Participants must choose which of the faces (top or bottom) is happier
and are not provided with a "can't decide" response.
Left is considered indicative of a left-visual-field bias (LVF) and is interpreted as a sign
of right-hemisphere control of face perception (and vice versa). In the original study by Levy
et al. (1983), most right handers chose happy features to the left; a result interpreted as use of
right side of the brain and which is thought to be better at recognizing faces and emotional
expression in faces.
In YWEDO, a laterality quotient (LQ) is computed as the number of times a participant
reports a face to the right is happier minus the number of times the face with the smile to the
left is happier, divided by the total number of face pairs (36). A positive number indicates a
participant chose the face with the smile to the right more and a negative number means the
smiling face to the left was chosen more. Reaction times for each presentation are also
computed. The counter starts when the picture is fully downloaded reduce differences in
download times as a result of environmental variables such as internet access.
The Baddeley Reasoning Test (Baddeley, 1968)
This 64-item ability test is administered in 3 min and measures logical reasoning. Each
item is presented in the form of a grammatical transformation and is answered with
true/false, e.g., A precedes B-AB (true) A does not follow B-BA (false). The test has
been employed extensively in the past (see Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2006) to obtain a
quick and reliable indicator of peoples intellectual ability as it represents one the quickest
ways of providing a reliable measure of gf. YWEDO reports the overall score and the
accuracy of each answer. Scores can range from 0 to 64.
Self-reported Digit Ratio and Digit Length
The relative lengths of the index finger or 2nd digit and the ring finger or 4th digit
(2D:4D) are thought to be sexually dimorphic and the dimorphism is argued to be a correlate
of prenatal testosterone and oestrogen. Many gender-related traits have been claimed to
correlate with 2D:4D.
YWEDO asks people to self-report their digits. In my laboratory research, I have asked
research assistants to use rulers and callipers to report digit lengths of participants to the
closest millimetre. YWEDO also includes a virtual ruler presented on the monitor which
aims to report millimetre level accuracy but given different sized monitors this has not in fact
proved too easy to achieve. Participants also report whether they self-report digit lengths
based on use of rulers or the online virtual ruler.
Supervisor and Third Party Ratings of Performance
This module emails a link to third parties such as work supervisors that enables them to
provide survey assessments of the participant. In my research, I have achieved a 50% success
rate with workers. Once the third party provides the assessment then the personal details of
the third party are deleted from the database in the interests of privacy.
Survey Data Collection
The current library of self-report questionnaires and surveys available on YWEDO is

quite extensive. Any self-report questionnaire can be administered from within YWEDO.
Questionnaires presently enabled include the learning styles profiler (Jackson, 2008) and the
Jackson 5 measure of revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (Jackson, 2009).
DEBRIEFING AND OUTPUT

Many of the modules in YWEDO provide brief feedback to participants regarding their
resultsthe aim being to maintain interest and provide a service to participants. Skitka and
Sargis (2006) report that only 41% of online studies to date make specific mention of
providing debriefing to participants.
A key feature of the YWEDO is that data are output as comma separated variables
which are easily input into analytical packages such as SPSS. Prior to input it is important to:
(a) delete any multiple submissions by test takers, and; (b) identify any exponential numbers
in the output which SPSS cannot process. An automated module deletes multiple submissions
by test takers and should be run prior to exporting the data.
CONCLUSION
YWEDO is designed to be a modular online laboratory and the aim of YWEDO is to
continually expand and develop the available modules to match current research interests.
YWEDO is also developing an online research panel of participants to support research being
conducted using the online laboratory or elsewhere. Please contact Chris J. Jackson for access
(c.jackson@unsw.edu.au; admin@ywedo.com).
REFERENCES
Baddeley, A. D. (1968). A three minute reasoning test based on grammatical transformation.
Psychonomic Science 10, 341-342.
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test. Nature Protocols, 1, 2277-2281.
Bradshaw, J. L., Nathan, G., Nettleton, N. C., Wilson, L., & Pierson, J. (1987). Why is there a
left side underestimation in rod bisection? Neuropsychologia, 25, 735-738.
Birnbaum M. H. (2004). Human research and data collection via the Internet. Annual Review
of Psychology, 55, 803-832.
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retrospective paradigms and task demands on perceived duration. Perception and
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Chamorro-Premuzic, T., & Furnham, A. (2006). Personality, intelligence and approaches to
learning as predictors of academic performance. Personality and Individual Differences,
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Jackson, C. J. (2007). The YWEDO online Cognitive Laboratory. Sydney, Australia:
Cymeon.
Jackson, C. J. (2008). Measurement issues concerning a personality model spanning
temperament, character and experience. In G. Boyle, G. Matthews, & D. Saklofske
(Eds.), Handbook of Personality and Testing (pp. 73-93). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publishers.
Jackson, C. J. (2009). Jackson-5 Scales of revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (r-RST)
and their application to dysfunctional real world outcomes. Journal of Research in
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performance factors in line bisection tasks. Neuropsychologia, 38, 93-110.
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Birnbaum (Ed.), Psychological Experiments on the Internet (pp. 35-60). Orlando, FL:
Academic.
Lejuez, C. W., Read, J. P., Kahler, C. W., Richards, J. B., Ramsey, S. E., Stuart, G. L.,
Strong, D. R., & Brown, R. A. (2002). Evaluation of a behavioral measure of risk-taking:
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). Journal of Experimental Psychology:

Applied, 6, 75-84.
Lenhart, A., Horrigan J., Rainie L., Allen K., Boyce A., et al. (2003). The Ever-Shifting
Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and the Digital Divide. Washington,
DC: Pew Internet Am. Life Proj.
Levy, J., Heller, W., Banich, M. T., & Burton, L. A. (1983). Asymmetry of perception in free
viewing of chimeric faces. Brain and Cognition, 2, 404-419.
Martinez, B. B. (1994). The role of cognitive changes in immediate and remote prospective
time estimation. Acta Psychologica, 85, 99-121.
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees: The precedence of global features in visual perception.
Cognitive Psychology, 9, 353-383.
Reips, U. D. (2002). Standards for internet based experimenting. Experimental Psychology,
49, 243-256.
Reitan R. M. (1958). Validity of the Trail Making test as an indicator of organic brain
damage. Perception and Motor Skills, 8, 271-276.
Richman W., Kiesler S., Weisband S., & Drasgow, F. (1999). A meta-analytic study of social
desirability distortion in computer-administered questionnaires, traditional
questionnaires, and interviews. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 754-755.
Semrud-Clikeman, M. Steingard, R. J., Filipek, P., Biederman, J., Bekken, K. & Renshaw, P.
(2000). Using MRI to examine brain behavior relationships in males with attention deficit
disorder with hyperactivity. Journal of American Academy of Child Adolescent
Skitka, L. J., & Sargis, E. G. (2006). The internet as psychological laboratory. Annual Review
of Psychology, 57, 529-555.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 18, 643-662.
Taatgen, N. A., van Rijn, H., & Anderson, J. (2007). An integrated theory of prospective time
interval estimation: The role of cognition, attention and learning. Psychological Review,
114, 577-598.
Tomarken, A. J., Davidson, R. J., Wheeler, R. E., & Doss, R. (1992). Psychometric properties
of resting anterior EEG asymmetry: Temporal stability and internal consistency.
Psychophysiology, 29, 576-592.
Wright, L., Hardie, S, M., & Rodway, P. (2004). Pause before you respond: handedness
influences response style on the Tower of Hanoi Task. Laterality, 9, 133-147.
PART D: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY
AND STRUCTURE
Chapter 25
SIX SOLUTIONS TO THE CIRCULAR NATURE OF

TRAIT PSYCHOLOGY
Jonathan P. Gerber
ABSTRACT
This chapter explores non-circular explanations of personality. Trait psychology has
sometimes used illogical, circular reasoning when trying to explain behaviour. Circularity
is seen when behaviour is used to define a trait and then this trait being used to explain
the same behaviour. However, personality theory has also attempted to move beyond
pseudo-explanation by offering many ways to jump outside the trait-behaviour circle.
This chapter collates and critiques non-circular accounts of personality, focusing on
biology, evolution, human development, learning, factor analytic accounts, and
perception. It is recommended that researchers avoid substituting self-report measures for
biological or developmental measures, that factor account analytic accounts not be
considered definitional, and that greater care is taken to understand the items involved in
measuring a trait.
Keywords: Circularity, Personality, Rejection sensitivity, Trait psychology
INTRODUCTION
Nigel Tufnel: the numbers all go to eleven. Look right across the board eleven, eleven,
eleven and...
Marty DiBergi: Oh, I see. And most amps go up to ten?
Nigel Tufnel: Exactly.

Jonathan P. Gerber is now at Gordon College, MA. Ph: 1-978-867-4821; Fax: 1-978-867-4671;
jonathan.gerber@gordon.edu.
298 Jonathan Gerber
Marty DiBergi: Does that mean it's louder? Is it any louder?

Nigel Tufnel: Well, it's one louder, isn't it? It's not ten.
(This Is Spinal Tap: The official companion, 2002, pp. 29-30)
Much like Nigel Tufnel chasing his tail explaining the volume of his amplifier, some
(e.g., Skinner, 1965, Boag, in press) have argued that trait explanations of personality are
sometimes flawed because they commit a key logical fallacy: circularity. If such a charge is
true then personality psychology offers little in the way of explanation and instead much post-
hoc meandering. The purpose of this chapter is to explore whether the charge of circularity is
correct when applied to personality psychology and, in particular, trait theories of personality.
We will find that trait psychology is often actively engaged in seeking non-circular
explanations of behaviour.
CIRCULARITY
Circularity occurs when the construct used to explain some effect (the explanans) is
equivalent to the effect that it is said to explain (the explanandum) (Boag, in press, p.6). In
trait psychology terms, it is when we define a trait on the basis of a group of behaviours and
then use the resulting trait to explain that same group of behaviours. A recent example of
circularity is the Big Five model of personality. For example, if someone likes to go to parties
they are assumed to be extraverted. If we then ask why someone likes to go to parties, it is
assumed to be due to their extraversion. The explanation (extraversion) is equivalent to that
which is purportedly explained (liking for parties). A simple way of putting this is illustrated
in Figure 1. A set of behaviours is used to define and trait and then the trait is used to explain
the same set of behaviours. The definition and the explanation are circular because they refer
to the same set of behaviours. There is nothing outside the circle. 1
Trait causes Behaviour
is used to define
Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of circularity. Note: Circularity: behaviours are used to define a trait (the
black arrow) & then that same set of behaviour is used as an explanation for the behaviour (the grey
arrow).
1
Closely related to circularity is a second logical fallacy called reification. Reification occurs when a relationship
between two entities is taken to be an entity in itself. For example, mathematical ability, a relationship between
each test taker and the test, is sometimes reified and used to explain performance on a maths test. This reification
is circular because the definition and explanation involve the same two terms, even though the two terms (maths
ability and test performance) are disguised by a reified relationship (Passmore, 1935). Given that most cases of
reification in personality psychology also involve circular explanations, this chapter will focus only on the
challenge of circularity and not reification.
Six Solutions to the Circular Nature of Trait Psychology 299
Are there dangers in circularity? In many cases, circularity does not matter. Circularity is
fine when we wish to offer descriptions. Even a great circle-breaker like Skinner noted that
circularity is no big deal when defining and describing phenomena (Skinner, 1954). However,
when circular reasoning is involved in explanations then there are two reasons why it is
destructive. Firstly, as outlined above, circular explanations are redundant. To define a trait in
terms of observed behaviour and then use that trait to explain behaviour adds nothing to the
original phenomena. There is nothing added to the circle, so to speak. Second, circular
explanations are untestable. If maths ability is axiomatically defined by performance on a
maths test then maths ability will always (by virtue of its definition) perfectly explain maths
performance, with no chance for it to be proven right or wrong. Circularity obscures
knowledge and impedes progress in understanding the trait in question. For the remainder of
this chapter I will explore the means by which trait psychology has attempted to overcome
circularity and show that trait psychology is often non-redundant and testable.
REJECTION SENSITIVITY
To illustrate non-circular explanations I will refer to a relatively new personality
construct, rejection sensitivity (Mehrabian, 1976; Downey & Feldman, 1996). Rejection
sensitivity is defined as the extent to which an individual expects rejection and interprets
ambiguous social situations as instances of rejection. Highly rejection sensitive individuals
expect rejection and interpret ambiguous situations as rejection. Low rejection sensitive
individuals are less likely to expect rejection and do not interpret ambiguous situations as
rejection. Rejection sensitivity is typically, although not exclusively, assessed using the
Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Respondents are given a
variety of ambiguous situations (e.g., You ask your parents for extra money to cover living
expenses or You ask someone you dont know well out on a date), then answer two
questions for each situation: how concerned or anxious they would be about the situation, and
the likelihood of this situation leading to rejection. The situations are relatively ambiguous;
for example, parents could be upset or accepting of the request for extra money. Those high in
rejection sensitivity are likely to expect and perceive rejection (i.e., believe their parents will
not help them) while those low in rejection sensitivity are likely to interpret the situation as
non-threatening (i.e., believe their parents will probably help them out).
The causes and consequences of rejection sensitivity are being actively explored. High
rejection sensitivity is associated with specific brain activity when viewing pictures of
rejection (Kross, Egner, Ochsner, Hirsh & Downey, 2007). Rejection sensitive individuals
tend to have elevated startle reflexes (Gyurak & Ayduk, 2007) and are more likely to have
conflict in close relationships (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Paradoxically, rejection sensitivity
is self-fulfilling; highly rejection sensitive individuals tend to react defensively to ambiguous
situations which in turn elicits hostility from those around them (Downey & Feldman, 1996).
Early rejection episodes are associated with later rejection sensitivity (Butler, Doherty &
Potter, 2007; London, Downey, Bonica & Paltin, 2007). Given this variety of findings,
rejection sensitivity can illustrate the different approaches to non-circular explanation in trait
psychology.
300 Jonathan Gerber
SOLUTION 1: BIOLOGICAL SUBSTRATES

Trait psychologists have long used biological substrates as a non-circular mode of
personality explanation and Boag (in press) notes that this is an obvious and promising
direction for non-circular trait accounts (pp. 27-8). Eysencks ARAS (Eysenck, 1967) and the
BIS/BAS model of personality (Gray, 1972, 1982) both posit underlying biological individual
differences that explain differences in behaviour. The biology exists outside the circle to
define the trait of interest with the behaviour an outcome of the biologically defined traits
(Figure 2). Note that the behaviour itself does not come back to redefine the biology,
removing the circularity.
Biological explanations are non-redundant, they specify additional biological systems,
and are testable (e.g., do individual differences in biology correlate highly with observed
behaviour?). However, for ease of conducting research, researchers often substitute self-
report measures for biological measures of the trait. For this to be valid, the convergent
validity between biology and self-report needs to be strong. This is clearly not the case with
rejection sensitivity, the RSQ only correlates 0.5 - 0.6 with measures of brain activity (Kross
et. al., 2007). The substitution of self-report measures for biological measures where
convergent validity is not demonstrated undermines attempts to break the circularity of trait
psychology. However, the possibility of poor convergent validity also shows the testable and
non-circular nature of the biological approach.

defines
Biology
Figure 2. Biological trait theories. Note: Behaviour does not come back to define biology, & hence the
definition is non-circular.
SOLUTION 2: EVOLUTION
Evolutionary accounts of personality (e.g., Buss, 1991) also attempt to break circularity
by stressing distal factors in individual differences (see Figure 3) and their distal nature makes
them only partially useful. Evolutionary explanations are also comparatively hard to test, and
have difficulty explaining the different expressions of behaviour between individuals
(Skinner, 1956).
Alertness to rejection could be evolutionarily adaptive because it helps individuals stay in
social groups, providing a survival advantage (Spoor & Williams, 2007). Similarly, rejection
sensitivity may be adaptive because it develops in those most likely to be excluded from the
group and hence suffer losses due to exclusion. In any event, individual differences cannot be
measured evolutionarily and researchers must resort to other measures. Therefore, the
evolutionary account, while logically well-intentioned, is unable to provide a practical
solution for assessing individual differences.

defines
Evolution
Figure 3. Evolutionary trait theories. Note: Although non-circular, it is hard to define traits by
evolution.
SOLUTION 3: LIFESPAN DEVELOPMENT

Developmental accounts of personality offer more proximal explanations of personality
traits, suggesting that traits develop in an individuals past, encompassing both genes and
environmental influences (Figure 4). Attachment theory (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall,
1978), for example, argues that early experiences with caregivers can lead to lasting
individual differences in relationship outcomes (Hazan & Shaver, 1987).
Developmental accounts suggest traits arise in two ways, from genes and environmental
influences on biology, and from learning due to the environment. Genes and environmental
influences have been dealt with under Solution 1, while learning approaches will be
considered more fully in Solution 4.
Learning approaches to development of traits are strong because the prior experiences
that lead to a trait may not have involved any behaviour on part of the individual. For
example, early rejection experiences are said to lead to the development of rejection
sensitivity. But we note that it is the amount of rejection experiences, and not the reaction of
the individual, that is the developmental cause. Given that rejection sensitivity is a perception
of ambiguous situations and defensive reactions, the developmental definition (i.e., rejection
experiences) is logically distinct from the trait itself (i.e., reactions to ambiguous situations).

defines
Development
Figure 4. Developmental trait accounts. Note: Development comprises both genes, environmental
influences on biology, and classical and instrumental conditioning.
These earlier behaviours can be viewed directly using longitudinal designs or recounted
via self-report, allowing for testable definitions of the construct of interest. The testing of the
link between definition and later outcome demonstrates the non-circular nature of
302 Jonathan Gerber
developmental trait accounts. However, as in biological measures, the correlation between the
longitudinal measure and the later self-report scales are essential to ensure that one can be
substituted for the other. In the case of rejection sensitivity, although rejection sensitivity
could be measured by early rejection experiences, little direct observation has been made of
these early experiences and the correlation between the widely used RSQ and early
experiences remains untested, making the substitution of the RSQ unreasonable.
SOLUTION 4: LEARNING
Learning accounts of traits suggest that differential reinforcement of behaviour leads to
individual differences in traits. The trait is a sum of previous learning experiences (Figure 5).
Where developmental accounts suggest that an individuals experience impacts upon later
traits, learning accounts explicitly note the importance of the behavioural response to
experience.
Trait causes
Learning
Figure 5. Learning trait theories. Note: Past experiences (i.e., learning) are separated in time from the
later behaviour, providing a weak form of non-circularity.
Rejection sensitivity can be explained by learning. Ambiguous situations are associated

with defensive reactions in rejection-sensitive individuals. These negative reactions are
punished by hostile reactions from relational partners (Downey & Feldman, 1996),
paradoxically reinforcing the perception that ambiguous situations will lead to rejection.
Learning accounts are not technically circular. To say that an individual in the past
responded to a situation in one way and then did so again in the future is not circular because
the situations are unique in time. However, personality psychology tends to assume that
situations are functionally and psychologically equivalent, so an explanation of a future
behaviour from a similar past behaviour is not very compelling, even though it is non-
circular.
SOLUTION 5: COMPONENTS AND HIERARCHY

Trait theories often appeal to components of underlying constructs to explain higher-level
traits (Figure 6). Factor analytic approaches to intelligence (e.g., Carroll, 1991) and
personality (Costa & McCrae, 1991) typify these approaches. Within the factor analytic
tradition, component behaviours are combined into broader factors via an analysis of
covariance.
In intelligence, this has resulted in a high level factor called g. Among many other
criticisms of g, it has been criticised for being undefined. The lack of definition of g is
actually a strength because if g is defined by the components then circularity follows: the
behaviour we wish to explain by g is contained in the totality of the definition of g. Less fear
about leaving things undefined can help avoid circularity. To avoid circularity, g (and the Big
Five) need to be defined apart from their constituent parts.
Circularity arises when we then combine these components into our measures of the trait
and then operationalise the trait. In general, it is better when the behaviour used to measure a
construct is of a different type to the overarching construct. In addition to providing non-
redundant information, defining the construct without reference to the component parts allows
for a test of the definition, difficult though such a test may be.
Rejection sensitivity has avoided this trap by only including one component of the
definition, interpreting ambiguous situations, in its operationalisation in the RSQ. Defensive
reactions to rejection are not assessed by the RSQ. This leaves the broader concept slightly
larger than the operational definition. We have here a situation of partial circularity, although
the link between defensive reactions and the RSQ is testable and not circular, the perception
of ambiguous situations is largely circular.
Overarching Behaviour
A, B, & C Trait causes
construct A, B, & C
provide evidence for defines
Figure 6. Factor analytic trait accounts. Note: The higher level trait is commonly not defined by the
components but is typically stated at a more molar level uncapturable by the individual components.
SOLUTION 6: INTRA-INDIVIDUAL COGNITIVE PROCESSES

The last solution is to look at intra-individual psychological processes that may underlie
personality traits (Figure 7). For example, highly anxious individuals tend to have biased
attention; they pay attention to threatening stimuli in different ways to non-anxious
individuals (Benoit, McNally, Rapee, Gamble & Wiseman, 2007). In the attention fixation
and lexical decision tasks, people are presented with words (singly or in pairs) and then asked
to indicate which words are words or non-words while also measuring the participants
attention via eye movement data. Alertness to threat would be tested by giving subjects
threatening words such as fear or danger. Words such as these are not directly related to
the behaviour in question nor explicitly to any social situation and hence the issue of
circularity is removed.
304 Jonathan Gerber
Cognitive
process Trait causes Behaviour
defines
Figure 7. Cognitive processes accounts of personality. Note: Cognitive processes can be measured
independently of the later behaviour.
Rejection sensitivity might similarly be construed in attentional terms, with individuals

perceiving rejection where there is none. The correlations between these attentional biases
and behaviour could later be tested, demonstrating the non-circular nature of the explanation.
CONCLUSION
Trait psychology has offered many logical, coherent explanations of personality. While
some explanations turn out to be empirically unsupported, the ability for these explanations to
be tested shows the non-circular nature of the explanation. In the case of rejection sensitivity,
nearly all the approaches to breaking circularity have been pursued. Biological underpinnings,
evolution, infant development and learning accounts have all been explored to understand the
basis of the rejection sensitivity trait. Rejection sensitivity may be the product of early
rejection experiences, or there may be no association. Rejection sensitivity may involve
heightened startle reflexes, or it may not. Rejection sensitivity might arise from early
experiences and develop into a consistent perceptual bias, adding further information to the
definition. This research on rejection sensitivity shows that the explanations used in trait
psychology do not show the redundant and untestable nature of circular explanations.
Rejection sensitivity research illustrates the paradox of circular explanations: failure to
find support for an explanation in psychology is disheartening at an empirical level but also
heartening because it proves the logical nature of the explanatory attempt. One of the key
problems of circularity is that the explanation is essentially non-testable. Explanations of
rejection sensitivity have not always been supported (e.g., the moderate correlations between
brain behaviour and RSQ) but at least the explanation could be disproven. Being able to be
wrong empirically is a good way to ensure being correct logically. I suggest that much of trait
psychology may similarly be logically correct but empirically untrue.
To suggest that trait psychology is necessarily circular is misleading and unfair to the
breadth and depth of much trait psychology. While some explanations are circular (e.g., Big
Five, as identified by Boag, in press) researchers are pushing for explanations of personality
that do not involve mere re-descriptions of the behaviour themselves. We should remain
vigilant to ensure that circularity does not creep in, we should always be aware of the detail of
our assessment items, we should avoid blindly substituting self-report for biological or
developmental measures, we should avoid converting factor-analytic accounts into
definitions, we should be unafraid of empirical failures, but we should not be deluded into
believing that trait theory has made little progress since the critiques of Skinner and Passmore
three generations ago.
REFERENCES
Ainsworth, M. D., Blehar, M., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A
psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Benoit, K. E., McNally, R. J., Rapee, R. M., Gamble, A. L., & Wiseman, A. L. (2007).
Processing of emotional faces in children and adolescents with anxiety disorders.
Behaviour Change, 24, 183-194.
Boag, S. (in press). Explanation in personality psychology: Verbal magic and the Five-
Factor Model. Philosophical Psychology.
Buss, D. M. (1991). Evolutionary personality psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 42,
459-491.
Butler, J. C., Doherty, M. S., & Potter, R. M. (2007). Social antecedents and consequences of
interpersonal rejection sensitivity. Personality and Individual differences, 43, 1376-1385.
Downey, G. & Feldman, S. I. (1996). Implications of rejection sensitivity for intimate
relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 1327-1343.
Eysenck, H. J. (1967). The biological basis of personality. Springfield, IL: Charles C.
Thomas.
French, K. (Ed.) (2000). This is Spinal Tap: The official companion (2000). London:
Bloomsbury.
Gray, J. A. (1972). The psychophysiological basis of introversion-extra-version: A
modification of Eysenck's theory. In V. D. Nebylitsyn & J. A. Gray (Eds.), The biological
bases of individual behaviour (pp.182-205). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Gray, J. A. (1982). The neuropsychology of anxiety: An enquiry into the functions of the
septo-hippocampal system. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gyurak, A., & Ayduk, O. (2007). Defensive physiological reactions to rejection: The effect of
self esteem and attentional control on startle responses. Psychological Science, 18, 886-
892.
Hazan, C., & Shaver, P. (1987). Romantic love conceptualized as an attachment process.
Kross, E., Egner, T., Ochsner, K., Hirsh, J., & Downey, G. (2007). Neural dynamics of
rejection sensitivity. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 945-956.
London, B., Downey, G., Bonica, C. & Paltin, I. (2007). Social causes and consequences of
rejection sensitivity. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 17, 481-506.
Mehrabian, A. (1976). Questionnaire measures of affiliative tendency and sensitivity to
rejection. Psychological Reports, 38, 199-209.
Passmore, J. A. (1935). The nature of intelligence. Australasian Journal of Psychology and
Philosophy, 13, 279-289.
Skinner, B. F. (1965). Science and human behavior. New York: Free Press
Spoor, J. R., & Williams, K. D. (2007). The evolution of an ostracism detection system. In J.
P. Forgas, M. Haselton, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), The evolution of the social mind:
Evolutionary psychology and social cognition (pp. 279-292). New York: Psychology
Press.
Chapter 26
A PROPOSITION FOR A PARSIMONIOUS TAXONOMIC

CONVERGENCE OF PERSONALITY TRAITS
Niko Tiliopoulos
ABSTRACT
Personality traits taxonomies are normatively based on the pre-structuring of test-
components and factor analytic (FA) interpretations. These procedures have been
criticised, especially FAs limitation to accurately identify the underlying structure of
constructs. This chapter examines whether the five factor model of traits, as measured
through the NEO-PI-R, contains the same trait structures when analysed through
alternative statistical procedures. Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling (NMDS) was
employed alongside FA techniques (N = 384). FA indicated the presence of five factors,
but NMDS suggested a more parsimonious arrangement, comprising three (similar to
Eysencks PEN model), or even two super structures. Furthermore, a circular trait
arrangement was a reasonable alternative, suggesting that traits can be meaningfully
(re)classified based on their kind and their integrative centrality. Over-reliance on FA
models might not be the most appropriate approach for a better understanding of
personality.
Keywords: Circular regression, Big-3, Big-5, Multidimensional scaling, NEO, Radex, Traits
Ph: 61-2-9036 9223; Fax: 61-2-9036 5223; email: niko.tiliopoulos@sydney.edu.au; Reprinted from Personality
and Individual Differences, 48/1, Tiliopoulos, N., Pallier, G., & Coxon, A.P.M., A circle of traits: A perceptual
mapping of the NEO-PI-R, 34-39, Copyright 2010, with permission from Elsevier.
308 Niko Tiliopoulos
INTRODUCTION
Attempts to uncover the structure of personality have been a focal point in psychology
for over 50 years. The trait approach to personality is arguably one of the currently dominant
perspectives in the field, despite the fact that it has experienced both theoretical and empirical
falls and rises in popularity through the years. From within this approach it has been
repeatedly argued that an understanding of traits is essential for understanding personality as
a whole (e.g., Mathews, Deary, & Whiteman, 2003). However, a variety of, at times polemic,
traits typologies, taxonomies, models, and theories have been and are being proposed,
following primarily the lexical or the psychobiogical approach to personality (for an overview
see Boyle, Matthews, & Saklofske, 2008; John, Robin, & Pervin, 2008). One of the most
popular and widely used such typologies is the five factor model (FFM) (Costa & McCrae
1988; Goldberg, 1993). Over the past 50 or so years, countless analyses of lexical traits
markers, or assessments of such, resulted in the same number of five dominant factors (e.g.,
Bagby et al., 1999; Egan, Deary, & Austin, 2000; Fiske, 1949; Guilford, 1975; Norman,
1963; Tupes & Christal, 1961). This led to Goldbergs (1981, p. 160) comment that any
model for structuring individual differences will encompass these big-five dimensions and to
Digman (1990) noting that the FFM is capable of explaining nearly all accounts of personality
traits.
Arguably, the most used instrument for assessing the FFM is the NEO Personality
Inventory (NEO-PI-R, Costa & McCrae, 1992). The NEO-PI-R comprises 240 statements, to
which the participants respond on a Likert-scale by indicating the degree of their agreement to
whether a particular statement is relevant to themselves. The NEO-PI-R provides an overall
measure of the five broad dimensions of Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness to
experience (O), Agreeableness (A), and Conscientiousness (C). Each of these domains
comprises 6 facet-scales (with 8 items per scale). Thus the NEO-PI-R is capable of giving a
fine-grained analysis of personality, and possesses very good validity and reliability indices.
Two of the more fundamental criticisms of the FFM relate to the necessity (if not
fundamental existence) of the five factors and the assumed orthogonality across them. Indeed,
Eysenck (1992; and elsewhere) is an acknowledged critic of the FFM (and by implication the
NEO). Accordingly, he argued that, whilst the N and E dimensions are present in his own
three factor model (often called the PEN model or the Big-3), A, C and O are not. In
Eysencks view A and C are subsumed by his Psychoticism dimension, while the O
dimension is to be dismissed altogether as a reflection of intelligence and hence, not really a
part of the structure of personality. Such proposals have implications for both the
measurement and the underlying theoretical structure of the FFM.
Additionally, if one considers the typical procedures of test-construction then these
implications become readily apparent. When a new questionnaire is devised it is usual to
begin with many more items than are intended for the final version. By examining the
intercorrelations and reliability data of individual items in comparison to other questions, it is
possible to identify those which do not appear to be similar to the proposed scale. These items
are then eliminated until the test constructers arrive at a selection of questions which appear
to conform to their expectations. Thus, a somewhat arbitrary process takes place in which
the subjective interpretations of the researchers are fulfilled, including the (desired)
orthogonality of the expected factor structure. Indeed intercorrelations between the five NEO
A Proposition for a Parsimonious Taxonomic Convergence of Personality Traits 309
domains have been reported (e.g., Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991), with N and C being
correlated at -.49 and a correlation between E and O of .43, thus not lending great support to
the assumption of orthogonality. If we consider the fact that a correlation of .3 could justify
the notion that two scales are measuring a broader super-trait, then this would potentially
support the idea that maybe there is too much overlap between the traits and thus the
variance could be more parsimoniously accounted for by fewer dimensions. Draycott and
Kline (1991) appear to agree, arguing, for example, that C may indeed be little more than an
aspect of Eysencks Psychoticism.
Furthermore, an attempt to examine the theoretical parameters of the FFM using
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the NEO-PI-R found a poor fit between the obtained
factorial structure and the hypothesised dimensions corresponding to the FFM (Parker,
Bagby, & Summerfield, 1992). A comparative analysis of the NEO PI-R as a measure of the
FFM and the six-factor personality questionnaire (6FPQ) found that the NEO-PI-R could
equally represent the six-factor model of personality (Jackson, Ashton, & Tomes, 1996). In
fact, the NEO-PI-R can easily support both a five-factor as well as a three-factor solution,
which leads to the conclusion that whilst factor analysis is seen as the tool to resolve issues
such as five versus three factors, in reality the techniques employed cannot live up to that
expectation (Caruso & Cliff, 1997). Since the FFM is rooted in the method of factor analysis,
we, as researchers, can only truly evaluate this model with a thorough understanding of this
method of analysis. Block (1995) argues that the present and powerful effects of pre-
structuring are often not sufficiently recognised in relation to the FFM, and that simply the
sameness of the variable-set may account for the fact that the FFM has been recovered in so
many diverse samples. There are others who also advise us to use factor analysis in
personality research with caution (Hammond, 1987; Maraun, 1997). For example, Maraun
(1997) argues that there are crucial problems in relying upon the Dimensional Interpretation
and Simple Structure Process (DISS). For example, most commonly only correlations above
.3, or .4 are considered as valid, thus actively ignoring much of the interrelationships
between the variables. He notes that this process is used throughout the FFM literature and
yet Maraun comments that the combination of factor analysis and the DISS process does not
actually allow the researcher to accurately represent the structure. The argument is that this
procedure, by systematically ignoring numerous features of the structure, makes it premature
to claim that the structure of traits is five orthogonal dimensions. Considering then that: (a)
there seem to be questions surrounding the over-reliance on factor analysis in understanding
the structure of personality; (b) the FFM has not always been found to be recoverable through
other statistical approaches, and; (c) a three-factor taxonomy can also be found in the Big-5
data, it is surprising that attempts to replicate the FFM using other methodologies are
practically nonexistent or at best sparse.
Table 1. Mean, standard deviation and Cronbachs alpha of the NEO-PI-R dimensions
(N = 384).
M SD alpha
N 94.18 26.01 .97
E 111.25 20.60 .75
O 110.05 16.09 .77
A 122.29 16.50 .71
C 109.85 21.72 .83
The aim of this chapter was to look, along side the more traditional forms of FA, at the
usefulness of an alternative technique, viz. Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling (NMDS), in
order to investigate whether the latter can provide further insight into the underlying structure
of personality and the relationship between the FFM and Eysencks Big-3.
METHOD
Participants and Procedure
A total 384 adults completed the NEO-PI-R and a brief demographic questionnaire.
Participants were recruited using several methods, ranging from invitations to existing
volunteer participant databases, posters, newspaper articles and adverts. In order to collect a
reasonably representative population sample, care was taken to ensure that the participant
pool reflected a broad range of ages and educational backgrounds. There were 273 females
(71.4%) and 109 males (28.6%), while two people did not reveal their sex. Six age ranges
were represented: 17-24 years (23%), 25-34 years (26%), 35-44 years (18%), 45-54 years
(14%), 55-64 years (13%) and 65+ years (6%), their mean age being 38.2 years (SD = 15.4
years). Of the sample, 113 (29.4%) individuals were classified as university students, 267
(69.5%) were in various occupations, while 4 (1%) participants were undetermined.
RESULTS
Reliability and FA
Summaries of trait means, standard deviations and Cronbachs alpha reliabilities are
presented in Table 1. The dimensions appear highly reliable, especially N and C.
A Principle Components Analysis with Varimax rotation was then performed on the 30
facet scales of the NEO-PI-R. The retained first five factors explained 60.6% of the variance
and the rotated solution converged in six iterations (Table 2). As it is evident from Table 2,
the five factors represent almost unequivocally the five dimensions of the NEO, and the
results closely resemble the ones presented in the NEO-PI-R manual (Costa, & McCrae,
1992, p. 44). However, three facets (shown in bold) did not behave as expected.
Activity (E4), altruism (A3), and assertiveness (E3) cross-loaded. However, their
behaviour did not deviate highly from the one reported in the NEO manual (pp. 44, 45). In the
manual, these facets are expected to cross-load in the way they do, albeit not at this
magnitude. With the use of Fishers z distribution, approximate values for the confidence
intervals (CI) of the observed loadings of these facets on other than the dimensions they
belong were calculated. The approximate 95% CI for the observed loadings of E4 on C were
.36 to .52; for A3 on E were .45 to .59; and finally, for E3 on A were -.36 to -.52. As it can be
seen, the expected loadings for these facets tend to fall well within those intervals, with the
exception of the loading of E3 on A, which falls .04 points above the lower limit (loading
reported in the NEO manual: r = -.32). Overall, and by taking into account my introductory
discussion, it seems reasonable to suggest that the NEO-PI-R exhibits quite acceptable
coherence and reliability.
Table 2. Internal structure of the NEO-PI-R facets after principal components analysis
with Varimax rotation
Domain
Facets N C A O E
(14.89%) (13.17%) (10.93&) (10.88%) (10.75%)
Anxiety (N1) .84 (.81)
Depression (N3) .83 (.80)
Self-consciousness (N4) .77 (.73)
Vulnerability (N6) .75 (.70)
Angry hostility (N2) .73 (.63)
Impulsiveness (N5) .48 (.49)
Self-discipline (C5) .78 (.75)
Achievement-striving .76 (.74)
(C4)
Competence (C1) .74 (.64)
Dutifulness (C3) .73 (.68)
Order (C2) .71 (.70)
Activity (E4) .45 (.42) .45 (.54)
Deliberation (C6) .40 (.57)
Straightforwardness .69 (.68)
(A2)
Compliance (A2) .69 (.77)
Modesty (A5) .64 (.59)
Tender-mindedness (A6) .62 (.64)
Assertiveness (E3) -.45 (-.32) .36 (.44)
Trust (A1) .43 (.56)
Aesthetics (O2) .75 (.73)
Ideas (O5) .74 (.75)
Fantasy (O1) .71 (.58)
Values (O6) .65 (.49)
Feelings (O3) .57 (.50)
Actions (O4) .55 (.57)
Warmth (E1) .80 (.66)
Gregariousness (E2) .74 (.66)
Positive emotion (E6) .64 (.74)
Altruism (A3) .52 (.55) .53 (.53)
Excitement seeking (E5) .51 (.58)
Numbers in brackets next to the domains refer to the percentage of the total variance explained by each
after rotation. Numbers in brackets next to the loadings show the reported loadings in the NEO
manual (p. 44). Bold facets require special attention. Loadings below .40are not shown, except
for the bold items.
Facet-level NMDS Analysis
MDS is a family of statistical modelling techniques that attempt to generate a visual

representation of the latent structure of the data in a low-dimensional space these techniques
are also known as perceptual mapping, spatial analysis or smallest space analysis (Borg &
Groenen, 1997; Cox & Cox, 2001; Coxon, 1982; Coxon, 2004; Kruskal & Wish, 1978).
MDS, like factor analysis, seeks to identify the underlying structure (including, but not
privileging the dimensional structure) of a set of data. Unlike, however, factor analysis,
NMDS has the ability to generate reasonably accurate representations of a set of variables
in a low dimensionality (e.g., two or three dimensions), as it can represent less stringent
nonlinear or monotonic relationships (Shepard, 1962a, 1962b). Furthermore, MDS and FA
are not merely mathematical transformations of each other, not least due to the iterative
nature of the solution in MDS and the fact that the sampling distribution of Stress is
unknown. Therefore, provided that the distances or similarities between the variables are
meaningful, the MDS solutions tend to be more parsimonious and interpretable. Kruskals
nonmetric monotone regression algorithm was used (Kruskal, 1964a, b), because it does not
require any metric assumptions for the data (such as multidimensional normality or linearity),
and it tends to produce a clearer picture of the distances between the variables in comparison
to a metric alternative, when the fewest possible dimensions are desirable.
Nonmetric MDS (NMDS) was performed on the facet level of the NEO-PI-R using the
PROXSCAL approach. In order for these results to be comparable to Marauns solution, I
followed precisely the same procedure as he did (see Maraun, 1996, p. 637). Thus, distances
were calculated from the correlation matrix of the 30 facets, by using the initial Torgersons
(1958, pp. 254-259) classic metric MDS configuration with a primary approach to ties. The
use of a metric starting configuration for non-metric scaling is strongly recommended if one
wishes to avoid sub-optimal/local minimum solutions (see also, Lingoes & Roskam, 1973). A
scree plot of the stress values for each dimensionality suggested the retention of two or three
dimensions. A 2-dimensional solution was preferred (Stress1 = 0.1714) as the most
parsimonious one, which accounted for 37.4% of the variance and maintained 51.8% of the
rank ordering of the dissimilarities (solution converged in 12 iterations). Figure 1 presents a
scatterplot of the 2D space.
A parallel solution to that provided by PROXSCAL was run using a similar, stable, but
two-phase algorithm, viz. the Roskam-Lingoes Smallest Space Analysis program (Lingoes &
Roskam, 1973) in the NewMDSX series (Coxon, Brier, & Hawkins, 2004). The
transformation was again monotonic and the model was Euclidean distances. The data in the
latter case were the original product-moment correlations, but since Pearson correlation
coefficients and Euclidean distances are (inversely) monotonically identical, this should make
no difference to the solution. The resulting two-dimensional solution was almost exactly
identical to the PROXSCAL configuration in Figure 1 (except for a trivial reflection in the
vertical axes). The Stress1 value was also identical, and was confirmed by the Spence
measure in the MINISSA solution as being an excellent fit (the Spence measure is based upon
a large number of simulations of random configurations of p points in r dimensionsSpence,
1979). The expected Spence Random Stress1 for 30 points in 2D is 0.2964, whereas my
obtained Stress1 is almost twice as small as that, indicating an excellent fit. Furthermore, the
Shepard diagram (Fig. 2), giving the co-plot of data (correlations) and solution distances with
the best-fitting monotone-fitting quantities (Kruskals dhat values), shows that the rescaling
transformation is virtually linear. This indicates that linearity is satisfied, rather than imposing
it as an assumption, as is the case in FA. A final analysis of the data using a linear/metric
transformation (MRSCAL in NewMDSX) confirmed once again that my recovered solution
and facet structure segmentations are both reliable and stable.
Since the axes of the solution in a Euclidean distance MDS model are not dimensionally
invariant, but are purely convenience co-ordinates and therefore not an integral part of the
solution, nor necessarily relevant to interpretation compared to other structural characteristics,
I attempted to describe and understand the space through non-dimensional references. The
emerging picture suggests that traits tend to occupy unique regions, and by partitioning the
space into five conical segments radiating from a common origin, each with a derived angle
of multipliers of 40o (although other configurations may still be plausiblecf. Blas & Forzi,
1998; Hofstee, de Raad & Goldberg, 1992), the regional arrangement of the facets becomes
even clearer. This arrangement appears almost identical to the one reported by Maraun (1997,
see Fig. 3), with the arbitrary mirroring of the y-axis. Deliberation (C6) seems to be isolated
from the rest of the C facets and it appears to be closer to A.
Figure 1. A 2-dimensional representation of the NEO-PI-R at a facet-level through NMDS. N, O, A, C,

occupy conical regions each of an 80o angle, while for E the angle is 40o. Superimposed is the circle of
best fit.
Figure 2. Co-plot of data (correlations) & solution distances, with the best monotone-fitting quantities
(Kruskals dhat values).
Figure 3. Marauns (1997, p. 638) NMDS 2-dimensional representation of the NEO-PI-R facets.
In addition, three facets do not plot in the regions defined by their domains. Excitement-
seeking (E5) appears in the O region, while both trust (A1) and altruism (A3) fall in the
region of C (incidentally, my alternative MDS algorithms, discussed above, also identified
these misplacements). This seems to suggest that perhaps theses facets may be structurally
and conceptually closer to those domains. The NMDS solution also suggests that only N
appears to form a rather distinct personality domain. The boundaries between the rest do not
seem to be so clearly defined. In fact, E, O, A, and C appear to form pairs (E with O, and A
with C), which may be addressing common, underlying concepts, and perhaps supporting
Eysencks convergence toward the Big-3 argument. In order to further explore this facet-
grouping, an agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis was performed on the NMDS facet-
coordinates. Various clustering methods were tested. The unweighted group average linkage
with Euclidean distances was preferred, because it produced the highest cophenetic
correlation coefficient (rc = .75). The use of a cluster configuration distance of d = 1 as a cut-
off point (1 = .28) suggested the retention of three clusters. Fig. 4 shows cluster membership,
with the retained three clusters appearing in bold. This result gives a clearer picture of the
formation of the three conceptually distinct groups by the NEO-PI-R facets that arguably
resemble Eysencks PEN configuration.
Overall, the NMDS solution(s) thus provides additional support for the FFM structure
and the internal consistency of the NEO-PI-R. At the same time, however, it also suggests
that two dimensions may be adequate to explain the structure of the personality traits of the
model.
Figure 4. Hierarchical structure of the NEO-PI-R facet-level NMDS coordinates. The preferred final
cluster solution is marked in bold lines.
Circular Regression
The NMDS map appears to suggest that traits, besides occupying distinct regions, are
also arranged in a circular formation on a 2D plane. To test the validity of this observation, a
least square circular regression was performed on the 2-dimensional Cartesian coordinates of
the facet-scores (Fisher, 1993; Jammalamadaka & SenGupta, 2001). Circular regression is a
special type of non-linear regression through which, given the Cartesian or polar coordinates
of a set of data, one seeks to generate a circle such that the sum of the squared distances of the
data points from the perimeter of that circle is minimised. In the current model, the centre of
the circle of best fit was fixed at X, Y = (0, 0). The analysis converged in two iterations and
generated a circle with a radius of r = 0.17 (standard error = 0.009, t = 18.01, p < .00001), and
an overall RMSEA of .053 (the circle of best fit is superimposed in Fig. 1). The circular
regression results suggest that the facets appear to exhibit a strong circular arrangement. This
new evidence allows for a polar categorization of the NEO facets, and consequently the FFM,
in respect to their angular displacement and their integrative centrality (i.e., their distance
from the centre of the regression circle).
DISCUSSION
One outcome of this investigation is quite clear: Using traditional methods of factor
analytic procedures, previous results have indeed been replicated and the FFM appears to
possess a sane structure. Nonetheless, as was pointed out previously, this may give a false
impression and lead to unnecessarily complex or even wrong interpretations. The underlying
structure of personality may well be explained by more parsimonious models, with as few as
two factors or dimensions. In that case, viewed from a different perspective (i.e., through
NMDS), the discrepancy between the FFM and Eysencks PEN could disappear. The NMDS
analysis certainly suggests this to be so. If the NEO and EPQ can both result in a two-
component outcome then the more parsimonious answer may well lie with Eysencks
taxonomy. In light of this, I suggest that the study of personality makes more use of the wide
spectrum of multivariate statistics available, to allow for the development and refinement of
both empirically and theoretically sound models. MDS is an excellent multivariate technique
for identifying and representing latent structures in a more parsimonious way. A potential
limitation of traditional factor analytic techniques is that they pre-commit to a linear and
dimensional interpretation, while at the same time they tend to project latent structures onto
unnecessarily high dimensionality. MDS, on the other hand, generates structural
representations at lower dimensionality, which, coupled with its ability to reveal other non-
dimensional arrangements, such as clustering, allow for greater interpretability. Therefore,
whenever possible, MDS may be used in parallel with other structural or factorial models to
assist with the deeper understanding of the structures sought, and to prevent data-analytic
artefacts being presented as latent realities.
CONCLUSION
Probably the most interesting outcome of this study is that personality traits may fall into
a circular continuum. This implies that a simpler structural categorisation of personality may
involve the interplay between the kind of trait (angular displacement) and the intensity or
fundamentality of trait manifestation (integrative centrality). From my recovered
arrangement, it appears that the, arguably, more fundamental dimensions of N and C tend to
occupy rather distinct regions further away from the centre, while the rest tend to be drawn
toward it. In a post-hoc attempt to try to understand that behaviour, I rotated by 90o the 2D
picture of Fig. 1 on the x-axis, and thus, in a sense, observed the xz data-configuration. It
seems that the facets that appear to move closer to the xy centre are actually moving upwards
and inwards on the z-axis, while the N and C ones appear to be, more or less, on the same
plane. Interestingly, the 3D arrangement of the facets appears to be conical. In order to get
a preliminary statistical impression of this observation, I devised a rather rough least square
conical regression algorithm and ran it on the 3D Cartesian coordinates of the facets. The
initial results suggest that a conical shape (where the N and C facets make up the
circumference of the base and the rest of the facets fall on the sides and toward the apex)
appears to have a near excellent fit (RMSEA = 0.035). However, this result and its potentially
fascinating implications are beyond the scope of this chapter, and I would simply like to point
it out as a focus for future studies.
In any case, I make clear my conviction that a constructive way forward for the
discipline of traits personology is through the development of a parsimonious taxonomic
convergence and the ultimate unification of the models that attempt to explain the structure of
personality.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I would like to thank my co-authors in the original publication of this study for their
invaluable contribution and David White for his help with the development and proofing of
the circular and conical algorithms.
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WADS Technical Note No. 58-61.
Chapter 27
THE ROLE OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS IN

PERSONALITY RESEARCH
Simon Boag
ABSTRACT
The proliferation of personality and individual differences constructs is
testament to the vibrancy of research in this field. Furthermore, all such constructs
would make some claim to receiving empirical support. However, while additional
empirical research will help further determine the merit of these conceptions, this
paper proposes that conceptual analysis is another tool available to researchers to
help critically evaluate our constructs of interest. Conceptual analysis involves
assessing both the clarity and coherency of our constructs as well as examining the
relations between them. A useful direction here is scrutinising constructs in terms
of intrinsic properties (what something is) and relations (what something does) to
help both clarify and evaluate the coherency of these constructs, as well as build
bridges between apparently disparate concepts. Given the perceived need for
unification in psychology, conceptual analysis provides yet another tool for
assessing the relationship of constructs to one another and contributing to a
coherent account of persons. While conceptual analysis may appear to be too
philosophical to some, it is none other than our critical thinking skills in action.
Implications for personality psychology are discussed.
Keywords: Circular reasoning, Conceptual analysis, Personality, Reification, Relations
Ph: 61-2-9850 8024; Fax: 61-2-9850 8062; simon.boag@mq.edu.au.

322 Simon Boag
INTRODUCTION
As early as 1930 the field of personality research was expanding to encompass a wide
variety of definitions of personality such that Allport and Vernon (1930) write, there seem to
be as virtually as many definitions of personality, character and temperament as there are
writers on these subjects (p. 681). These authors, however, go on to note that while at first
glance the problem resembles chaos the principal disagreements concern the point in a
definition where the emphasis falls (p. 681). That is, the various definitions of personality
are not mutually exclusive and the differing approaches embrace a number of common
personality facets (to varying degrees). Since the 1930s, the number of constructs now found
in personality research is even greater, and the International Personality Item Pool
(http://ipip.ori.org/ipip/) lists some 200 constructs and scales for assessing various personality
components.
Given that human beings are complex then it might come as no surprise that such a
variety of constructs are available, since these personality facets simply reflect various
aspects of persons. Recently, however, some authors have raised concerns about the
fragmentary nature of psychology generally and the need for a unified psychology (e.g.,
Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2001). One specific problem noted involves theoretical and
conceptual redundancy, whereby a wide variety of constructs used by different schools appear
to be describing the same (or similar) phenomenon. Concurrently, some propose that
personality psychology should act as an integrating perspective that reconciles the various
sub-disciplines within psychology (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 1996; Funder, 2001; Mayer,
2005). Here personality can be viewed as the study of the whole person and Funder (2001)
writes that the institutional mission of personality psychology is to provide an integrative
force in an era of scientific specialisation and fragmentation. Personality psychology seeks to
bring together the contributions of developmental, social, cognitive and biological psychology
into an understanding of whole persons and the dimensions of difference that allow them to
be psychologically distinguished from one another (p. 198).
However, others have noted that the field of personality itselfas it presently stands
provides a conflicting or confusing array of personality facets that are not easily consolidated
into a coherent account of persons (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 1996; Mayer, 2005). While some
have attempted such a synthesis (e.g., Mayer, 2005; McAdams, 1996, 2001), it should be
recognised that any such synthesis involves our conceptualisation of persons and thus
necessarily involves analysing both the concepts involved and their interrelationships. For
instance, Mayer (2005) suggests that personality elements must be relatively distinct from one
another and map either onto nervous system or social functions (much like the original
tripartite division into motivation, emotion and cognition). However, for this to occur first
requires clearly conceptualising what these elements precisely are and then determining their
relation to other elements. Consequently some means is required with respect to delineating
any particular element or component part. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the role of
conceptual analysis in scientific research and specifically in relation to the field of
personality. This chapter first discusses the science of conceptual analysis and its relation to
empirical research. The nature of conceptual research is then described with particular
reference to the distinction between relations and terms standing within relationsand
identifying problems that occur when this distinction is not satisfactorily appreciated.
The Role of Conceptual Analysis in Personality Research 323
THE SCIENCE OF CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH

While we would all probably agree that empirical research is an essential character of
science, the appreciation of the importance of conceptual research in the scientific process is
not always explicitly recognised. As Machado and Silva (2007) however write, [s]cience has
always included the screening of concepts and arguments for clarity and coherence (p. 680),
and it is difficult to imagine that as scientists we would shy away from wishing to critically
evaluate the concepts we employ in our research. Conceptual and theoretical work involves
extricating the logically sound features of theories and rejecting the incoherent aspects, before
attempting to execute empirical tests (Michell, 2000). Conceptual research also contributes to
the interpretation of empirical findings (Wakefield, 2007), as well as shaping meaningful and
valid avenues for future research directions. Consequently, rigorous theoretical and
conceptual work provides the underlying backbone of the whole scientific endeavour (Bell,
Staines & Michell, 2000; Machado & Silva, 2007).
On the other hand, when rigorous critical thinking is neglected then confusion results,
particularly with respect to understanding the findings from various empirical fields. For
instance, the neuroscientific dream debate has become confused with respect to interpreting
the evidence for and against Freuds theory of dreams because basic theoretical issues have
not been adequately addressed and so leading to contradictory claims (Boag, 2006a, 2006b).
Similarly, the empirical investigation of Freudian repression has lead to seemingly
paradoxical findings since researchers have failed to sufficiently articulate the theory in
question (Boag, 2006c). Furthermore, the subliminal perception literature is also mired in
controversy since the basic premises of the research field have not been coherently
conceptualised (Boag, 2008a). Accordingly, critical theoretical discussion is not without
practical implications, since it both highlights valid avenues of empirical research, as well as
saving both time and resources that are otherwise wasted when researchers are ignorant of the
theory that is purportedly being tested. Accordingly, science, as an intellectual enterprise,
cannot neglect the critical examination of conceptual issues.
Of course, conceptual research will sound too philosophical for some and may appear to
threaten the emancipation of psychology from its philosophical past. However, given that as
scientists we both develop, use, and test constructs, then carefully scrutinizing what we are
talking about cannot be ignored. In fact, any scientist conducts conceptual research, more or
less implicitly or explicitly, since (for example) formulating scales and tests must be guided
by some conceptualisation of what one is looking for. Furthermore, we all attempt to publish
our research and communicate our ideas, and so conceptual clarity from conceptual research
is a basic element necessary for clear communication (cf. Wakefield, 2007).
CONDUCTING CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH

There are many possible approaches to conceptual research (see, for instance, Moors &
De Houwer, 2006; Wakefield, 2007), but the approach discussed here has a basis in what can
be called a realist position (postulating a real world that we can objectively come to know)
and a specifically useful foundation here is the determinist, empiricist position of Scottish-
born John Anderson (1962a, 1962b, 1962c, 1962d), and developed by Boag (2005, 2008b),
324 Simon Boag
Hibberd (2005), Mackay (1996), Maze (1983, 1987), Medlow (2008), Michell (1988), and
Petocz (1999). This hyper-critical theoretical framework provides a cogent position for
rigorously examining the coherency of theories and concepts, in part due to it clarifying the
important, but often poorly appreciated, distinction between qualities (or properties), entities
(or things) and relations. As Mackie (1962) writes, a quality is an intrinsic feature of a thing,
it belongs to the thing itself, whereas a relation holds between two or more things (p, 266).
More specifically, relations involve at least two or more distinct terms that must have their
own intrinsic properties (to constitute what stands in the relation):
Anything that can stand . in any relation at all, must have at least some intrinsic properties.
If that were not the case then we could not understand what it was that was said to have
those relationships. A relation can only hold between two or more terms, and a part of what is
involved in seeing those terms as related is being able to see them as distinct, that is, as each
having its own intrinsic properties, so that we can say what the terms are that are related. This
means that each term of the relation must be able in principle to be described without the need
to include any reference to its relation to the other (Maze, 1983, p. 24, his italics; cf. Maze,
1954, p. 231; Michell, 1988, p. 234).
By term is not meant some linguistic entity but rather whatever is said to stand in
relation to something else, and any relation (e.g., spatial, logical, etc.) can only exist if there
are independently existing terms. For instance, if I say that John is different from Mike, then
both John and Mike must exist (i.e., have properties) to make such a comparison. Relations,
however, should not to be taken as things or properties themselves since a relationship cannot
be reduced to either of the terms of the relationship (i.e., relations refer to how the various
things stand with respect to one another and are not reducible to either). For example, to say
that John is different from Mike is to note a relation between John and Mike and not a
property of either (i.e., difference cannot be reduced to either John or Mike). However,
again, this is not to say that that John and Mike do not have characteristics that they differ on;
only that the relation is between those properties rather than being a property itself.
Additionally, there is no suggestion here that relations thereby have a second-rate existence
compared to the terms standing in relation or are any less important in terms of the subject
matter of scientific research. On the contrary, relations are real features of situations (existing
in the same spatio-temporal universe as the things standing within relationships), and so are
just as open to scientific enquiry as anything else. In terms of conceptual analysis, then, any
personality construct needs to be examined with respect to whether the term refers to a
property or quality of something, or to an entity of some description (that consists of its own
intrinsic properties), or whether the term refers to specific relations between qualities or
entities.
Another way of thinking about this is in terms of what something is and what it does. If a
quality or property exists then it should have properties that can be identified independently
of any relation entered into, which would mean describing the property independently of any
particular performance or activity (Maze, 1983). This allows us to examine, clarify, and group
our constructs that refer to activities (i.e., what things do rather than what they are). Consider,
for instance, constructs such as impulse-control, risk-taking, sociability, adaptability,
cautiousness and conformity. Such constructs suggest activitiescontrolling impulses,
taking risks, adapting to circumstances, being cautious, or conforming to the groupand
specifically as relations (e.g., something controlscall this the subject term (S)such that S
controls x, or S conforms to y). Recognising these as relations then allows asking questions
concerning exactly what is controlling, taking risks, or conforming, etc. as well as to what the
causal antecedents are that lead to these activities. Similarly, identity appears to involve
something identifying with something else (such that a subject S identifies with x), and
appreciating this relation of identifying also then allows asking questions about S, x, and the
specific nature of the relation involved (see, also Boag, in press, with respect to traits as
relations). Additionally, the wide variety of self-constructs found within the personality
literatureself-acceptance, self-monitoring, self-confidence, self-concept, self-esteem, self-
efficacy or self-controlcan all be analysed in terms of whether these are activities and ask
the further question about what precisely the self may be in all such cases (see Boag, 2005
for further discussion here).
RELATIONS AND THE ERROR OF REIFICATION

The critical importance of recognising the distinction between relations and terms
standing within relations (or in terms of what something is and what something does) allows
avoiding confusing the two. However, when this distinction is not fully appreciated then
confusing the two can lead to the problem of reificationoften understood as confusing the
abstract with the concretebut more coherently thought of in terms of mistaking a relation
with either an entity or an intrinsic property (Passmore, 1935). Specifically, reification occurs
when relationships between things are mistakenly taken to be either properties (or qualities)
of things standing within relationships, or taken to be the entities themselves. For instance, to
say that John is more sociable than Mike is to note a relationship between John and Mike
and, as such, sociability cannot be reduced solely to a property of either. However, to
mistakenly consider this difference between John and Mike to be an intrinsic feature of either
person would be to reify the relationship (i.e., to mistake a relationship for a property).
Unfortunately, any personality term that is based on either descriptions of behaviour (e.g.,
extraversion, psychoticism) or comparison between individuals may be easily reified, just as
the Five-Factor Model has recently been criticised for confusing between-subject with within-
subject variables (Borsboom, Mellenbergh & van Heerden, 2003; Cervone, 1999, 2005; see
also Beckmann, Minbashian & Wood, this volume).
DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION IN PERSONALITY RESEARCH

Another area where conceptual analysis provides clarification is with respect to
description, causality and explanation. Description typically involves identification and
classification, whereas explanation involves providing an account of origins, development,
and causal relationships. For instance, in biology, biologists propose classification systems
and taxonomies, and then attempt to explain differences and changes through various
mechanisms and processes (see Bechtel, 2005). The same generally holds for personality
psychology, which involves both describing personality and providing explanations for both
various developments of personality and how personality (however defined) may influence
326 Simon Boag
other aspects of the person. There is, of course, nothing wrong with description (in and of
itself), and not knowing the causes of certain relationships does not preclude using description
fruitfully for predictive utility.
There are, however, problems with confusing description with explanation, particularly
with respect to circular explanations. The issue of circular explanation involves saying A
causes B when A is equivalent with B. For instance, if we observe someone being sociable
(an activity), then name that extraversion, and then claim that extraversion causes that
sociable behaviour, then we have provided a circular explanation (A causes B when A = B).
Trait accounts can easily suffer from circularity when invoked as causes of behaviour and
cognition (see Boag, in press) since if traits are behaviourally defined then we would be using
behaviour to explain behaviour (cf. Bandura, 1999, p. 203). While one may here retort that
prior constellations of behaviour are distinct from present constellations we are though still
talking about correlations between past and present behaviour rather than actual causes. None
of this is to say, however, that there may not be legitimate trait-explanatory accounts and
Jonathon Gerber (this volume) has gone some way to providing solutions to using traits as
explanations. Rescuing trait-explanatory accounts, however, requires more than determining
distinct causes of trait-behaviour (such as biological factors, etc.) and, instead, what needs to
be made explicit is whether certain biological factors (etc.) are the traits in question. Of
course, no one is suggesting that various causal factors (e.g., biological processes) do not
underlie such trait-behavioural consistencies (see, for instance, Eysenck, 1991, 1997), but if
the trait is defined in terms of the behaviour to be explained, then an issue of circularity
cannot be avoided.
A similar issue of circularity can be raised against supposed functional modules
discussed in evolutionary psychology (e.g., Buss & Greiling, 1999; Tooby & Cosmides,
1990), which are generally discussed in terms of activities rather than properties. While not at
all doubting the reality of the basic principles of Darwinian evolution, nor claiming that such
activities are without causes (or that genetics and brain functioning are not important here),
such modules may easily be seen as post- or ad-hoc reifications inferred simply from
performance (see also Cervone, 2000). Postulating modules based on observed activities is
then not indistinct from the same reasoning that invokes a moral faculty to explain moral
reasoning (cf. Passmore, 1935; Boag, in press), or what Maze (1954) refers to as verbal
magicgiving a name to a certain kind of event and then using that name as if it accounted
for the occurrence of that kind of event (p. 226; cf. McMullen, 1982). Such explanatory
tactics only provide pseudo-explanations and add nothing to our understanding of the actual
causal factors involved.
AVOIDING CIRCULAR EXPLANATIONS

Avoiding circularity is relatively straight-forward, insofar as when we say that A causes
B, then both A and B should be distinct from one another (i.e., describable independently of
one another) and conceptual research can help here with clarifying testable from untestable
hypotheses. Consider the following statement: high mathematical ability causes good
mathematics performance. How would one test such claims? In the first case, one would have
to be clear about what it meant by high mathematical ability. If ability here simply means
what one is able to do then the claim is circular (John performs well because he is able to
perform well) and it would be a waste of time attempting to research whether the hypothesis
is accurate or not (see also Howe, 1990). At the same time, if it was determined that ability
in this instance meant particular brain processes then the circularity would be subverted since
the postulated cause can be described independently of performance. It is, in fact, most likely,
that when the term ability is used it is probably meant as a short-hand for the underlying
hidden cause (or causes) of performance and one might possibly then argue that the term is
itself therefore harmless. However, by postulating an ability to explain performance
suggests a tendency to propose a single cause. It should, though, be borne in mind that there
may be multiple causes for any effect (not to mention taking into account the causal field
within which cause and effect operatesee Anderson. 1962c, 1962d), or that two sets of
distinct causes may lead to the same effect. Consider, for instance, any test performance
whereby a variety of factors may be causally implicated (such as personality variables,
motivation, fatigue, emotional state, etc.Revelle, Humphreys, Simon, & Gilliland, 1980;
Richardson, 2002). Consequently, if personality psychology is to make substantive
explanatory claims it must carefully conceptualise its variables, avoid over-simplifying
complexity, and demonstrate that circular reasoning is being avoided. Such conceptual work
can only bolster the field of personalitys claim to being a rigorous, disciplined scientific
pursuit.
CONCLUSION
In attempting to objectively understand personality, and communicate this understanding
to others, we cannot help engage in conceptual research. Since science and precision go hand
in hand, precisely understanding what we are talking about (or at least working towards it)
should be given the highest priority in scientific research, including our investigations of
personality. Conceptual analysis is one tool here for helping achieve this aim. Appreciating
the distinction between relations and terms standing in relations provides both an avenue for
conceptualising our constructs coherently and avoiding problems of reification and
circularity. While some researchers may fear (legitimately!) a tendency to get lost in
philosophical word-games, we nevertheless communicate using language, and the meanings
that we ascribe to our terms are the lasting legacy of our empirical endeavours. Consequently,
given that it is so easy for us to fall into error, there is no excuse for not making use of all the
tools available at our disposal for achieving our scientific aims. Personality psychology can
only benefit from providing greater focus to such conceptual issues.
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INDEX
alexithymia, 149
A algorithm, 207, 312, 317
allele, 198, 200, 204, 205, 208
abuse, 125, 196, 210, 232, 240, 247, 250, 261, 268,
altruism, 310, 315
269, 270, 272
ambivalence, 228, 239, 241, 244, 245
academic performance, 102, 112, 292
American Educational Research Association, 64
academic settings, 100
American Psychiatric Association, 3, 4, 5, 7, 214,
accessibility, 2
220, 231, 233, 270, 272
accounting, 69, 70, 75, 77, 79, 98, 157, 266, 271
American Psychological Association, 82, 115, 148,
accuracy, 72, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 269, 288,
149, 163, 179, 234, 235, 246, 247, 260, 268, 273,
289, 291
281
achievement test, 105, 106, 107, 110, 135
anger, 196, 211, 216
acid, 194, 198, 199
anorexia, 225, 227, 232, 233
acquaintance, 68
anorexia nervosa, 233
activity level, 98, 198
ANOVA, 155, 227, 243
adaptability, 13, 324
antecedent variables, 97
adaptation, 4, 120, 124, 220, 330
anthropologists, 183
ADHD, 196, 197, 207, 208
antisocial behavior, 194, 261, 272
adjustment, 80, 152, 278
antisocial personality, 196, 263
administrators, 279
antisocial personality disorder, 196, 263
adolescents, 80, 114, 196, 207, 208, 209, 210, 215,
anxiety, 64, 80, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 123, 135, 140,
216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 305
152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215,
adulthood, 123, 159, 196, 210, 318
216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 237, 238, 239, 240,
advantages, 6, 100, 258, 283, 284, 285
241, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 254, 256, 258, 259,
advocacy, 133
266, 279, 281, 305
aetiology, 4, 231, 233, 241
anxiety disorder, 123, 214, 215, 220, 221, 222, 237,
affective experience, 152
238, 240, 241, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 305
affective reactions, 19
anxious mood, 210
Africa, 184, 267, 273
appetite, 210, 211, 215
agencies, 137
aptitude, 27, 32, 107
aggregation, 211
architecture, 19, 328
aggression, 68, 79, 194, 195, 197
Aristotle, 187
aggressive behavior, 82
arousal, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,
agoraphobia, 241, 246
80, 81, 82, 211, 216, 220, 226, 254, 264, 329
alcohol abuse, 210, 232
Asia, 189
alcohol consumption, 260
Asian countries, 135
alcohol problems, 251
assertiveness, 142, 310
alcohol use, 259, 260, 261
alcoholism, 196, 247, 250, 262
332 Index
assessment, iv, 1, 4, 5, 6, 21, 32, 34, 41, 56, 71, 83, burnout, 47, 281
108, 109, 112, 113, 139, 140, 143, 148, 189, 210, business environment, 266
211, 215, 219, 220, 221, 222, 227, 241, 259, 260, buttons, 289
261, 263, 273, 275, 291, 304, 317
assessment tools, 6, 210 C
assimilation, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 61, 62, 64
calibration, 104, 114
asymmetry, 289, 290, 293
campaigns, 136
asymptomatic, 224
cancer, 137, 238
attachment, 3, 6, 129, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157,
candidates, 136, 177, 197, 271
158, 159, 160, 161, 230, 305
carefulness, 94
attachment theory, 6, 152, 160
caregivers, 224, 301
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, 207, 208
casting, 269
attentional bias, 304
categorization, 65, 316
attribution, 80, 157, 238
category a, 15
attribution bias, 157
catharsis, 124
authoritarianism, 136, 139
causal antecedent, 325
authorities, 266
causal relationship, 325
automatic processes, 24
causality, 325, 328
automaticity, 22
causation, 329
autonomy, 13
central executive, 29
avoidance, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 178, 211, 221,
cerebral hemisphere, 290
224, 225, 234, 241, 249, 252, 255, 256, 257, 258,
CFI, 107
259, 260, 262, 263
childhood, 5, 111, 114, 123, 127, 160, 194, 215, 220,
B 224
Chile, 134
background noise, 285 chimera, 31, 290
barriers, 2 China, 133, 134, 136, 171, 172
base rate, 269 cholesterol, 135
behaviors, 101, 272 Christianity, 151
belief systems, 3, 139 Christians, 153, 157, 158, 159, 161
benign, 132 chromosome, 194, 195, 197
bias, 2, 6, 48, 56, 108, 113, 164, 170, 240, 249, 285, churches, 141, 145
289, 290, 304 citizenship, 15, 16, 19, 273
Big Five traits, 96 clarity, 17, 82, 99, 149, 178, 212, 213, 218, 321, 323
biological markers, 128 class, 97, 112, 164, 174, 195, 197
biological processes, 326 classical logic, 164
biological systems, 300 clients, 240, 245, 248
body shape, 224 clinical assessment, 3
bombing, 132 clinical diagnosis, 123
bonds, 114, 152, 194 clinical disorders, 214, 238, 247
boredom, 230, 277 clinical psychology, 5, 6, 240
brain, 6, 28, 29, 31, 34, 128, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, close relationships, 160, 299
175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 185, 194, 195, 197, 198, cluster analysis, 315
290, 293, 299, 300, 304, 326, 327 clustering, 31, 315, 316
brain activity, 172, 299, 300 cognition, 12, 28, 30, 33, 47, 52, 104, 111, 115, 153,
brain damage, 293 157, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 197, 260, 293,
brain functioning, 326 305, 322, 326, 329
breakdown, 152 cognitive abilities, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 69, 86, 91, 105
breathing, 124, 217, 241 cognitive ability, 33, 87, 88, 89, 91, 107
bulimia, 6, 223, 224, 226, 227, 230, 232, 233, 234, cognitive capacities, 142
235 cognitive deficit, 184
bulimia nervosa, 233, 234, 235 cognitive deficits, 184
bullying, 270 cognitive domains, 104, 108
Index 333
cognitive function, 21, 26, 30, 251 core personality traits, 100
cognitive models, 153 corporate governance, 266
cognitive performance, 25, 30 correlation, 27, 75, 98, 105, 110, 111, 134, 145, 268,
cognitive process, 25, 26, 27 280, 302, 309, 312, 315
cognitive psychology, 87 correlation coefficient, 75, 110, 111, 312, 315
cognitive tasks, 108, 111 correlations, 23, 28, 29, 57, 74, 89, 95, 96, 105, 107,
cognitive theory, 63, 328 109, 110, 112, 134, 135, 144, 145, 147, 155, 177,
cognitive variables, 26 214, 217, 268, 304, 309, 312, 314, 326
coherence, 183, 311, 323, 328 corruption, 274
collectivism, 138, 181, 235 cortex, 24, 33, 35
college students, 233, 261, 263 cost, 29, 145, 171, 172
community, 95, 126, 158, 159, 186, 187, 188, 220, country of origin, 136
221, 222, 233 covering, 205, 277
community support, 159 creative process, 87, 90
comorbidity, 4, 210 creative thinking, 92
competitive advantage, 97 criminal activity, 139
competitiveness, 133 criminal acts, 133
complexity, 27, 29, 33, 80, 92, 94, 182, 206, 266, criminality, 194, 198, 206
327 criminals, 134, 138, 270
compliance, 246, 274 critical thinking, 321, 323
comprehension, 104, 216, 217 critics, 132, 328
computer technology, 13 cross-cultural comparison, 135, 139
conceptualization, 84, 255, 258 cross-cultural differences, 135, 139
conditioning, 301 cues, 17, 80, 124, 152, 225, 226, 227, 230, 231, 232,
conduct disorder, 6, 194, 196, 205, 206, 207, 208 234, 235, 255
conductance, 260 cultural barriers, 2
conference, 132 cultural differences, 135, 139, 140, 181, 182, 231
configuration, 284, 312, 315, 317 cultural studies, 181
configurations, 312, 313 culture, 5, 6, 47, 56, 119, 120, 122, 128, 129, 131,
confinement, 194 135, 139, 140, 158, 181, 182, 188, 189, 231, 318
conflict, 80, 123, 177, 249, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, current limit, 245
261, 262, 277, 299 current relationship, 72
conformity, 268, 324 curriculum, 96, 106
confounding variables, 72
conscientiousness, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 30, 95, D
171, 177, 268, 273, 318
danger, 152, 303
conscious awareness, 225
Darwinian evolution, 326
consciousness, 125, 311
data collection, 198, 279, 283, 284, 285, 292
consensus, 23, 27, 28, 30, 94
data set, 43, 56, 73, 86, 280
construct validity, 28, 34, 101, 143, 216, 235, 256,
database, 284, 286, 291
264, 273
decision task, 303
consumption, 247, 260
decision-making process, 91
contamination, 214, 257
declarative knowledge, 97
content analysis, 272
defamation, 267
control condition, 55, 56, 57, 59, 62, 72, 75, 76, 77,
deficit, 196, 207, 208, 250, 293
78, 232
delinquency, 273
control group, 22, 24, 77, 126, 199, 200, 202, 203,
delusions, 152
223, 226, 230, 231, 237, 241, 242, 243, 244
demographic characteristics, 241
controlled studies, 245
dependent variable, 44, 56, 57, 58, 76, 77, 78, 99,
controlled trials, 244, 245
243, 283
controversies, 208
depression, 40, 46, 48, 149, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215,
convergence, 108, 315, 317
216, 219, 220, 221, 222, 246, 247, 266, 279, 280,
conviction, 128, 267, 317
281
334 Index
desensitization, 123
destruction, 133, 195, 196 E
detainees, 194, 200, 202
eating disorders, 210, 224, 226, 227, 231, 232, 233,
detection, 134, 139, 199, 219, 228, 273, 305
234, 235, 251, 253, 263
detection system, 305
eating disturbances, 227, 232
detention, 198
educational background, 267, 310
determinism, 168
educational objective, 100
devaluation, 211, 216, 219
educational programs, 30
developmental theories, 112
educational psychology, 23
deviation, 77, 309
educational research, 20, 93
diagnosis, 3, 7, 123, 135, 196, 198, 214, 222, 237,
educational settings, 96, 97
240, 241
effort level, 13, 14
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
electric current, 195
Disorders, 3, 231
electrophoresis, 195, 199
diagnostic criteria, 123, 214
elementary school, 115, 126
differential psychology, 26, 84
emotion, 37, 38, 45, 46, 47, 65, 69, 80, 120, 142,
dimensionality, 312, 316
143, 144, 146, 151, 159, 171, 183, 188, 189, 197,
dimorphism, 81, 291
210, 215, 220, 234, 259, 311, 322
direct observation, 302
emotion regulation, 159
disability, 240, 245
emotional conflict, 254
disadvantages, 6, 283, 285
emotional disorder, 194
disclosure, 82, 149, 179
emotional distress, 119, 211
discrimination, 177, 199, 211, 225
emotional exhaustion, 281
disorder, 6, 121, 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 189, 194,
emotional experience, 38, 222
195, 196, 205, 206, 207, 208, 215, 219, 220, 221,
emotional hardiness, 142
224, 226, 227, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237,
emotional information, 69, 79
238, 240, 241, 243, 246, 247, 248, 261, 263, 270,
emotional intelligence, 5, 6, 80, 81, 82, 141, 142,
293
143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 171, 173, 174, 178,
displacement, 316, 317
279
disposition, 132, 170
emotional reactions, 48, 69
dissatisfaction, 133, 139
emotional responses, 42
dissociation, 91, 127, 226, 234
emotional stability, 95, 154
distress, 80, 119, 152, 157, 158, 159, 196, 210, 211,
emotional state, 209, 210, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219,
214, 215, 217, 221, 238, 241, 243
222, 327
disturbances, 210, 211, 219, 227, 232
emotional valence, 254
divergent thinking, 84, 85
emotionality, 238, 262
diversity, 231, 266, 284
empathy, 80, 142, 148, 172, 240, 270
DNA, 194, 195, 199, 200
empirical studies, 38, 133, 139
dogs, 207
employability, 173
dominance, 178, 179, 263
employment, 85, 177, 266, 267, 268, 269, 272, 274
dopamine, 34, 194, 197, 206, 207, 208
enemies, 133, 152
dopaminergic, 194, 196, 197, 207
engineering, 171, 172
dosage, 22, 237
England, 141, 264
double helix, 194
English language proficiency, 54
downward comparison, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46
entrepreneurs, 276
draft, 3, 63, 216
environmental control, 285
drawing, 93
environmental factors, 196
DRD4 gene, 194, 197, 198, 199, 200, 205
environmental influences, 153, 208, 301
dream, 323, 328
ERA, 64
drug abuse, 269, 270
ethanol, 199
drug consumption, 247
etiology, 196, 208, 234
dualism, 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170
excitation, 68, 71, 80, 81, 86
exclusion, 52, 64, 65, 164, 300
Index 335
executive function, 26, 28, 29, 33, 286, 287

executive functioning, 33 G
executive functions, 26, 287
gambling, 250, 261, 262, 271, 289
executive processes, 24, 26, 28, 29, 104
gel, 195, 199, 200
exercise, 5, 67, 68, 71, 72, 78, 93, 94, 95, 98, 100,
gender differences, 64, 134
101, 127, 164, 216
general intelligence, 33, 34
exertion, 68, 72, 216, 217
general knowledge, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62
experiences, 3, 37, 38, 39, 40, 47, 70, 104, 120, 122,
generalized anxiety disorder, 220, 246
124, 127, 152, 153, 158, 159, 224, 257, 276, 301,
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, 221, 222
302, 304
genes, 194, 195, 196, 197, 206, 207, 301
experimental condition, 68
genetic factors, 196
experimental design, 226, 250
genetic information, 194
expertise, 24, 25, 30, 34
genetic linkage, 196
exploration, 159
genetic marker, 4, 206
exposure, 52, 225, 226, 241, 257, 269
genetics, 4, 207, 326, 330
externalizing disorders, 195
genotype, 194, 195, 200, 201, 205
extinction, 259
geography, 189
extraversion, 12, 16, 262, 298, 325, 326
Germany, 114, 178
eye movement, 303
Gestalt, 84
F goal setting, 99
goal-setting, 94, 101
facial expression, 144, 146 God, 3, 8, 121, 122, 124, 134, 136, 138, 139, 147,
factor analysis, 74, 89, 133, 143, 183, 220, 280, 309, 152, 154, 157, 159, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168,
312, 319 169, 170
faith, 3, 123, 159, 165, 168 good deed, 121
false negative, 271 governance, 266, 274
false positive, 136, 271 grades, 41, 46, 58, 61, 96, 114
family conflict, 261 Greece, 234
family members, 231 Greeks, 184, 187
feedback, 72, 291 grounding, 86
feelings, 11, 12, 14, 39, 42, 45, 46, 67, 68, 69, 78, group identity, 158
79, 104, 123, 124, 132, 142, 174, 183, 224, 230, group interactions, 243
231 group membership, 240
fidelity, 240 grouping, 198, 205, 242, 315
field trials, 207 Guatemala, 134
financial crisis, 6 guidance, 124, 158, 239
first degree relative, 196
fitness, 99, 100, 142 H
five-factor model, 11, 12, 16, 101, 102, 183, 189,
hallucinations, 153, 157
247, 318
handedness, 177, 293
flexibility, 19, 142
haplotypes, 200, 203, 204, 206, 207
fluid, 5, 21, 26, 33, 34, 35, 85, 88, 92
happiness, ix, 42, 121, 125, 127, 132, 142
fluid intelligence, 5, 21, 33, 34, 35, 88, 92
health problems, 120, 126, 127, 210
foundations, 91, 120, 121, 138
health services, 194, 195, 276
fragments, 195, 199
heart rate, 71, 75, 260
fraud, 6, 265, 266, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274
hedonism, 147
free recall, 113
hemisphere, 172, 173, 179, 290
freedom, 75, 132
hemispheric asymmetry, 289
frequencies, 194, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205,
hemisphericity, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177,
207
178
friendship, 223, 225, 227, 230, 231, 232
heterogeneity, 195, 247
functional fixedness, 85, 87
high school, 46, 263
336 Index
high school grades, 46 inferiority, 39, 45, 48

holism, 184, 188 information processing, 152, 159, 237, 238, 259
honesty, 267, 268, 269, 273, 285 informed consent, 54
hopelessness, 211, 216, 219 inhibition, 28, 29, 86, 198, 251, 252, 253, 255, 257,
hostility, 299, 311 259, 260, 262, 263, 286, 328
human behavior, 305 inhibitor, 252, 262
human brain, 128, 178, 197, 198 insecurity, 152, 154
human condition, 121 integration, 12, 33, 128, 161, 207
human development, 1, 97, 297 intelligence, 5, 6, 21, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
human nature, 7, 132, 133, 247, 328, 330 34, 35, 54, 55, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 88, 89, 90, 92,
humanistic psychology, 329 114, 115, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149,
hydrogen, 194 171, 173, 174, 178, 183, 252, 263, 279, 287, 292,
hydrogen bonds, 194 302, 303, 305, 308, 329
hyperactivity, 194, 196, 207, 208, 293 intelligence scores, 174
hyperarousal, 211, 217 intelligence tests, 88, 90
hypnosis, 119, 120, 123, 124, 128, 129 interaction effect, 57, 59, 62
hypnotherapy, 128 interaction effects, 57, 59
hypothesis, 44, 45, 46, 57, 61, 70, 71, 75, 77, 90, 96, interdependence, 15
97, 168, 169, 173, 176, 186, 187, 215, 216, 219, interference, 29, 252, 253, 286, 287, 289, 293
224, 226, 235, 239, 309, 319, 327 intermediaries, 195
internal consistency, 43, 56, 69, 105, 141, 143, 145,
I 147, 196, 241, 278, 293, 315
internal controls, 271, 273
ideal, 189, 245
Internal structure, 311
idiosyncratic, 52
Internet, 292, 293
image, 289, 290
interpersonal conflict, 80
imagery, 64, 123
interpersonal interactions, 96
images, 92, 164, 166, 174
interpersonal relations, 1, 95, 142, 160, 238, 241,
imagination, 129
243, 277
immigration, 31
interpersonal relationships, 95, 142, 160, 238, 243,
impacts, 1, 274, 302
277
implicit memory, 86
intervention, 17, 23, 24, 119, 128, 135, 136, 159,
impulses, 324
238, 239, 240, 241, 245, 246, 247, 265, 281
impulsive, 95, 251, 256, 259, 260, 262, 263
intimacy, 152, 154, 158, 230
impulsiveness, 251, 259, 261
introns, 195
impulsivity, 194, 196, 197, 198, 207, 250, 251, 252,
introversion, 305
253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263
inversion, 199
inattention, 198
investors, 266
incarceration, 194, 200, 205
IP address, 286
INCOM, 42, 43, 44
IQ scores, 32, 171
incompatibility, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169
irritability, 210, 211, 216
incumbents, 275, 276, 277
Islam, 137, 138
independence, 14, 112, 142
isolation, 148, 230, 235
independent variable, 44, 243
Israel, 263
India, 120, 171, 172
individual differences, iv, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 16, J
28, 37, 38, 39, 40, 47, 48, 63, 69, 87, 91, 97, 101,
103, 105, 128, 198, 232, 237, 238, 247, 251, 262, Java, 120
268, 281, 300, 301, 302, 308, 318, 321, 328 job performance, 13, 15, 18, 26, 97, 252, 262, 269
individualism, 138, 181, 183 job satisfaction, 15, 16, 19, 281
individuality, 329 jurisdiction, 269
Indonesia, ix, 119, 120, 128, 129, 181, 182, 183 justification, 131, 133, 134, 139, 166
inertia, 21, 32, 211, 216, 219
inferences, 13, 256
Index 337
marriage, 7, 189
K mathematics, 56, 57, 62, 326
matrix, 22, 75, 88, 312
knowledge acquisition, 24, 27, 30, 96
media, 136, 240
Korea, 133
mediation, 159, 160
L medication, 123, 243
membership, 240, 315
labour force, 172 memory, 21, 22, 25, 26, 33, 34, 35, 86, 91, 120, 123,
labour market, 271 124, 128, 129, 197, 207
landscape, 97 memory capacity, 34, 35
language proficiency, 54 memory performance, 207
languages, 99, 214 menopause, 70, 80
laptop, 70, 71 mental ability, 34, 88, 94
laterality, 290 mental development, 122
Latin America, 135 mental disorder, 4, 7, 119, 121, 123, 129, 189, 196,
leadership, 141, 142, 145, 148, 178 207, 220, 221, 272
learning, 5, 18, 20, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 35, 91, 93, mental health, 3, 4, 120, 126, 127, 129, 152, 194,
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 110, 111, 195, 196, 198, 210, 220, 222, 230, 233, 276, 281
112, 113, 114, 123, 188, 194, 207, 238, 240, 246, mental illness, 4, 119, 120, 126, 129, 238
249, 255, 260, 262, 263, 288, 289, 291, 292, 293, mental image, 64
297, 301, 302, 304 mental imagery, 64
learning environment, 113 mental processes, 3
learning outcomes, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100 messages, 144, 146, 148
learning process, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 messengers, 197
learning styles, 291 meta-analysis, 18, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 208, 238,
learning task, 255, 289 239, 247, 268, 292
left-hemisphere, 172 metabolism, 195
legislation, 266 metabolizing, 197
limbic system, 197 metacognition, 5, 103, 104, 110, 114
Limitations, 46, 63, 226, 244 metacognitive skills, 110, 112
linear model, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20 methodological implications, 100, 250
linearity, 312, 313 methodology, 13, 14, 79, 86, 225, 240, 250, 258, 285
literacy, 142 military, 97, 101
local government, 267 misconceptions, 136
locus, 64, 81, 194, 195, 200 modelling, 13, 14, 15, 26, 97, 312
logical reasoning, 290 moderates, 69, 79, 178
loneliness, 224, 230, 233, 234, 235 modification, 125, 305
longitudinal study, 101, 318 modules, 283, 284, 286, 291, 292, 326
long-term memory, 25lying, 154, 155, 156 molecular weight, 199
molecules, 195
M monitoring, 69, 104, 110, 112, 113, 325
mood change, 69, 144
Machiavellianism, 273 mood disorder, 210, 215
machinery, 196 mood states, 221
major depression, 220 moral reasoning, 326
majority, 2, 16, 23, 75, 107, 186, 217, 227, 271, 278 motivation, 20, 30, 33, 96, 97, 101, 111, 134, 142,
Malaysia, 134, 136 164, 189, 194, 197, 238, 239, 244, 245, 246, 248,
management, 24, 54, 99, 274, 275, 276, 280, 281, 252, 258, 260, 284, 322, 327, 329
284 motor activity, 197
manipulation, 41, 46, 77, 86, 270 motor control, 194, 253, 261
mapping, 307, 312 MRI, 293
markers, 4, 68, 72, 87, 107, 128, 173, 179, 196, 199, multidimensional, 3, 82, 233, 247, 312, 318, 319
205, 308 multiple regression, 44, 100
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, 227
338 Index
multiple-choice questions, 104 orthogonality, 308

multivariate statistics, 48, 316 overlap, 84, 86, 157, 176, 197, 227, 241, 250, 309
N P
narcissism, 46, 47, 270 Pacific, 273

narcissistic personality disorder, 270 pain, 46, 48, 222
nationality, 56 panic disorder, 246
negative affectivity, 40, 45, 46, 262 parallel, 22, 88, 152, 172, 186, 290, 312, 316
negative consequences, 254 paranoia, 151, 153, 157, 159
negative emotions, 39, 40, 45 Parisians, 31
negative outcomes, 250 password, 286
negative reinforcement, 80 path analysis, 101
neglect, 31, 164, 323 path model, 97
nervous system, 120, 322 pathogenesis, 197
Netherlands, 37, 42, 43 pathology, 235
neural network, 86 pathophysiology, 194
neural networks, 86 pathways, 194, 262
neurons, 86, 195 pattern recognition, 172
neuropsychological tests, 261 PCR, 195, 199
neuropsychology, 305 Pearson correlations, 155
neuroscience, 28, 33 peer review, 268
neurotransmitter, 194, 197 percentile, 155
New South Wales, 11, 21, 65, 151 perceptual learning, 91
New Zealand, 101, 246, 266, 272, 281 perceptual processing, 52
Nietzsche, 38, 39, 48 performers, 288
noise, 277, 285 permission, 119, 163, 307
nonconscious, 5, 85, 87, 88, 90 perpetrators, 269, 270, 272
normal distribution, 56 personal communication, 42, 240
North America, 2, 6, 189, 231 personal goals, 20, 98, 102, 123
Norway, 193 personal identity, 52
nuclear family, 124 personal problems, 144, 146
nucleic acid, 194 personal relations, 123, 157
nucleotides, 194 personal relationship, 123, 157
nucleus, 194 personal responsibility, 132
nurses, 199, 275, 276 personality characteristics, 12, 40, 173, 252
personality constructs, 99, 161, 237, 238, 268
O personality differences, 173
personality dimensions, 17, 18, 96
obesity, 112
personality disorder, 4, 8, 153, 161, 196, 236, 263,
objectivity, 269
270
obstacles, 136, 144, 146
personality factors, 3, 5, 12, 30, 93, 94, 97, 98, 105,
occupational groups, 277
174, 177, 279, 319
OCD, 243, 247
personality measures, 97
offenders, 198, 258, 262, 265, 266, 267, 269, 270,
personality research, 12, 51, 52, 93, 254, 258, 262,
271, 272, 273
309, 322
omission, 147, 217
personality scales, 96
openness, 12, 17, 30, 143, 171, 177, 187
personality traits, 4, 16, 18, 20, 68, 70, 75, 94, 95,
openness to experience, 12, 17, 30, 143
96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 114, 129, 134, 135, 136, 152,
opportunities, 30, 32, 113, 177, 208, 271, 272
160, 161, 173, 181, 182, 188, 189, 248, 251, 254,
Oppositional Defiant Disorder, 195
258, 265, 301, 303, 308, 315, 317, 318
optimism, 78, 80, 108, 142, 148
personhood, 187, 188
organism, 195
persuasion, 153
organizational stress, 281
pessimism, 80, 148
Index 339
phobia, 48, 243 proposition, 86

photographs, 290 proteins, 195, 197
physical activity, 93, 94, 95, 98, 100, 101, 102 psychiatric diagnosis, 7
physical exercise, 5, 68, 71, 78, 216 psychiatric disorders, 210
physical fitness, 99, 100 psychiatrist, 122
physical health, 80, 98, 277 psychoanalysis, 123, 328, 329
physiological arousal, 68, 70, 71, 77, 78, 211, 216 psychobiological systems, 120
pilot study, 240, 244, 245, 248 psychological assessments, 198
PISA, 135 psychological development, 120
plasticity, 23, 26, 27, 33, 128 psychological distress, 80, 210
platform, 199, 284 psychological functions, 198
pleasure, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 46, 48, 210 psychological health, 121
political parties, 137, 138 psychological problems, 121, 235, 245, 277
polymorphism, 195, 198, 200, 204, 208 psychological processes, 13, 18, 123, 189, 303
polymorphisms, 194, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, psychologist, 164
205, 207 psychometric properties, 69, 139, 143, 147, 214, 219,
poor performance, 147, 217 250, 253
positive correlation, 105, 107, 110 psychopathology, 4, 7, 135, 153, 225, 227, 234, 238,
positive emotions, 124 247, 254, 260, 262, 263, 264
positive mood, 144, 146 psychopaths, 262, 263, 270, 273
positive relationship, 112, 176 psychopathy, 207, 270, 273
postmodernism, 164, 165 psychosis, 129, 151, 152, 159
posttraumatic stress, 126, 128, 129, 247 psychosocial factors, 80
potassium, 197 psychosocial functioning, 128
prayer, 152, 155, 157 psychotherapy, 7, 99, 129, 237, 238, 245, 247
predicate, 167, 169 psychotic symptoms, 161, 240
predictive validities, 96 psychoticism, 4, 325
predictive validity, 98, 196 PTSD, 119, 125, 126, 129, 243, 247
predictor variables, 44 public schools, 198
prefrontal cortex, 24, 33 pumps, 288, 289
prejudice, 163, 164, 165, 170 punishment, 255, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262
prejudices, 170
prevention, 119, 120, 196, 210, 219, 271, 273 Q
primary school, 103, 111, 219
quality of life, 238, 243
priming, 53, 63, 64, 159, 230
questioning, 2, 4
prior knowledge, 94
prisoners, 143, 146 R
proactive interference, 29
probability, 104, 259, 288, 289 random configuration, 312
probe, 200 rash, 256, 259, 261
problem drinking, 253, 261 rating scale, 104, 105
problem solving, 35, 84, 86, 87, 142, 241, 287 rationality, 114, 163, 165, 184
problem-solving, 24, 27, 84, 85 reaction time, 255, 284, 285, 286
problem-solving task, 84, 85 reactions, 19, 33, 48, 68, 69, 97, 277, 293, 301, 302,
procedural knowledge, 96 303, 305
processing biases, 159 reading, 3, 56, 57, 62, 288
productivity, 177 realism, 91, 113, 114, 170, 329
professional development, 143, 147 reality, 64, 124, 127, 142, 163, 165, 167, 168, 286,
programming, 171, 172 309, 319, 326
project, 32, 123, 141, 185, 286, 316 reasoning, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 165,
proliferation, 321 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 186, 290, 292, 297, 299,
promax rotation, 74 321, 326, 327
property crimes, 198 reasoning skills, 174
340 Index
recall, 14, 113, 224, 228 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 274

receptors, 195, 197 scaling, 307, 312, 318, 319
recognition, 69, 164, 172, 173, 271, 277 Scandinavia, 220
recommendations, iv, 234 schema, 153, 231, 233, 234, 236
redundancy, 322 schizophrenia, 161
reflexes, 299, 304 schizotypal personality disorder, 153, 161
regression, 44, 100, 123, 156, 177, 246, 307, 312, schizotypy, 6, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158,
316, 317 159, 160
regression model, 44, 156 school activities, 109
reinforcement, 80, 263, 302 schooling, 26, 122
reinforcers, 259 science education, 114
rejection, 168, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305 scientific knowledge, 165
relatives, 196 scientific method, 85, 329
relativism, 170 sclerosis, 207
relaxation, 99, 241 SCO, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46
relevance, 1, 3, 30, 54, 55, 124, 197, 264 screening, 71, 135, 161, 240, 245, 265, 266, 267,
reliability, 43, 56, 70, 81, 95, 105, 106, 108, 112, 268, 269, 271, 274, 323
141, 143, 145, 147, 154, 158, 196, 207, 241, 267, SEC, 274
273, 308, 311 second language, 58, 60, 62, 223, 228, 229, 230, 231,
religion, 3, 5, 7, 8, 119, 120, 148, 152, 154, 159, 160, 232
165, 166 secondary students, 252
religiosity, 134, 136, 139, 161 secularism, 6, 163, 170
religious beliefs, 129, 131, 158, 159, 160 self esteem, 305
religiousness, 161 self representation, 52
repair, 82, 149, 178 self-awareness, 142, 234, 250
replication, 68, 79, 107, 153, 194, 318 self-concept, 5, 45, 51, 52, 63, 65, 101, 108, 109,
resentment, 39, 48, 131 114, 325
residuals, 14 self-confidence, 5, 33, 103, 104, 105, 108, 110, 111,
resilience, 93, 96, 101, 102, 278 112, 113, 114, 325
resistance, 240, 259 self-control, 80, 94, 325
resolution, 84 self-discipline, 94, 98
resource allocation, 263 self-doubt, 135, 140
resource management, 54 self-efficacy, 20, 94, 97, 241, 325
resources, 23, 25, 159, 172, 266, 275, 277, 278, 279, self-esteem, 40, 45, 46, 97, 270, 325
280, 323 self-evaluations, 61, 62, 96
response format, 108 self-interest, 134
response time, 285 self-monitoring, 104, 112, 325
responsiveness, 17 self-perceptions, 112
restructuring, 241 self-presentation, 227
reversal learning, 255, 260, 289 self-reflection, 112
rewards, 208, 255, 274 self-regard, 142
rhythm, 288 self-regulation, 17, 114, 142, 262
right hemisphere, 173 self-reports, 63, 100, 109, 318
rights, iv, 194, 196 self-worth, 114
risk factors, 136 sensation, 108, 252, 254, 255, 257, 263, 264
risk-taking, 252, 263, 289, 292, 324 sensation seeking, 252, 254, 255, 257, 263, 264
RMSEA, 107, 316, 317 sensations, 224, 257
RNA, 194, 195 sensitivity, 48, 71, 139, 238, 259, 261, 262, 263, 297,
Royal Society, 81 Serbia, 131, 134
Russia, 193, 198 setting goals, 241
sex, 64, 145, 146, 174, 194, 257, 264, 310
S sex chromosome, 194
sex differences, 64, 146
sampling distribution, 312
Index 341
sexual activities, 261 social support, 160, 281

sexual dimorphism, 81 social withdrawal, 153
sexual orientation, 72, 119, 123 socialization, 261, 263
shape, 3, 55, 56, 81, 120, 166, 223, 224, 317 software, 13, 25, 27, 71
shortness of breath, 68, 72 South Africa, 81, 267, 273
short-term memory, 25 South Korea, 231, 233
Siberia, 184 spatial ability, 64
SIGMA, 56, 64 spatial location, 22
signals, 14, 195, 200 speech, 71, 132, 166, 239
significance level, 57, 243 spelling, 286
signs, 20, 157 spirituality, 3, 5, 122, 161
simple linear regression, 44 stakeholders, 266
Singapore, 113, 129, 131 standard deviation, 72, 73, 77, 89, 309, 310
skill acquisition, 97 standard error, 14, 74, 202, 205, 316
skills training, 99 stars, 142, 185
skin, 260 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children, 210, 222
slavery, 31 statistics, 43, 48, 125, 154, 155, 156, 175, 233, 269,
sleep disturbance, 211 316, 319
smoking, 257 stereotypes, 21, 32
SNP, 195, 204 stimulus, 22, 52, 71, 78, 223, 224, 225, 227
soccer, 53 storage, 22, 28, 128
sociability, 324, 325 stressors, 123, 278, 279, 281
social anxiety, 238 structural changes, 25
social attitudes, 134, 135, 136, 139 structural characteristics, 313
social behaviour, 53, 64, 261, 270 structuring, 307, 308, 309
social cognition, 305 subgroups, 235
social comparison, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, subjectivity, 267
48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, substance abuse, 196, 240, 247, 250, 261, 262, 268
65 substance use, 251, 252, 254, 258, 260, 261, 262,
social comparison theory, 37, 38, 39, 40, 47 263
social competence, 142 substitution, 199, 300, 302
social construct, 165, 170, 329 substitutions, 198
social context, 52 substrates, 300
social contract, 186 success rate, 125, 291
social costs, 280 suicidal ideation, 266
social desirability, 152, 232, 234, 293 suicide, 136, 210
social environment, 5, 38 suicide bombers, 136
social group, 300 supernatural, 121, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170
social identity, 65 supervision, 240
social institutions, 31 supervisor, 240, 269
social justice, 132 supervisors, 291
social life, 138 suppression, 129, 160, 259
social network, 230, 232 survey, 139, 143, 147, 173, 186, 228, 266, 276, 280,
social norms, 134 291
social phobia, 48 Sweden, 193, 206, 228
social programs, 32 syllogisms, 184, 185, 189
social psychology, 47, 49, 65, 181, 182, 261 symbolism, 329
social responsibility, 132, 142 sympathy, 38, 47, 48
social rules, 195 symptomology, 226
social sciences, 328 symptoms, 4, 80, 123, 126, 161, 196, 209, 210, 211,
social situations, 214, 299 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 233, 238,
social skills, 42, 142 240, 247, 266, 281
social structure, 184 syndrome, 211, 214, 215
342 Index
synergistic effect, 244 transformation, 43, 56, 229, 290, 292, 312
synthesis, 194, 322 transformations, 312
systematic desensitization, 123 translation, 221
systemic sclerosis, 207 transmission, 129
transport, 132
T trauma, 125, 126, 128, 129
trial, 22, 89, 240, 244, 246, 248
tandem repeats, 195
triggers, 120
task conditions, 22
trustworthiness, 272, 273
task demands, 292
Turkey, 279
task difficulty, 15
turnover, 197
task performance, 15, 27, 34
typology, 233
task-specific strategies, 24
taxonomy, 12, 100, 104, 272, 309, 316, 319 U
temperament, 157, 292, 322
tenants, 122 UK, 19, 33, 34, 65, 91, 114, 276, 280, 281
tension, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 222 underlying mechanisms, 249, 250, 256, 257, 258,
terrorism, 132, 135, 137 289
terrorist acts, 133 uniform, 250, 254
terrorist groups, 135, 137, 139 United Kingdom, 132, 141
terrorists, 132, 135, 138, 139 universality, 2, 330
tertiary education, 96, 99 universe, 121, 183, 185, 324
test anxiety, 96, 99, 101, 135 universities, 31
test items, 88, 89 unusual perceptions, 157
test scores, 89 unusual perceptual experiences, 153
testing, 6, 14, 31, 35, 83, 85, 96, 142, 168, 171, 211, use of force, 136
216, 238, 268, 273, 301
testosterone, 291 V
test-retest reliability, 56, 196
valence, 80, 97, 254
theft, 195, 196, 266, 268, 269, 271
validation, 82, 97, 135, 149, 158, 221, 233, 260, 268,
theoretical psychology, 164
269
therapeutic approaches, 159
variations, 4, 15, 68, 184
therapeutic intervention, 159
video, 67, 71, 72, 73
therapeutic practice, 123
video-recording, 71
therapy, 5, 6, 99, 119, 126, 127, 129, 224, 226, 233,
violence, 132, 133, 136, 139, 198
234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 243, 244, 245,
violent behaviour, 195
246, 247, 248
violent crime, 266
think critically, 170
visions, 151, 329
thoughts, 11, 12, 14, 124, 132, 183, 224, 239, 256,
visual processing, 90, 225, 234
262, 270
visual stimuli, 22, 81, 225
threats, 225, 232, 234
vocabulary, 114, 234
thymine, 194
vulnerability, 4, 120
time periods, 75
time variables, 62 W
time-frame, 96
traditions, 2, 105 wages, 172
traffic control, 275, 276 Wales, 11, 21, 65, 151, 283
training, 5, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, Western countries, 172
33, 34, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 122, 198, 240 white-collar, 6, 272
training programs, 21, 32 William James, 3, 152
trait anxiety, 101 withdrawal, 34, 153
trajectory, 23, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244 witnesses, 45, 113
transactions, 167, 266 work environment, 18, 171, 269, 277, 278, 279
transcendence, 3 work roles, 278
Index 343
workers, 104, 123, 177, 280, 281, 291 World Wide Web, 172
working memory, 21, 22, 26, 33, 34, 35, 207 worldview, 3, 164, 165, 169
workplace, 5, 11, 12, 94, 97, 142, 173, 177, 178, worry, 97, 210, 220, 222, 241
268, 271, 273, 276, 277, 279, 280, 281
work-related stress, 280 Y
world order, 132
young women, 226
World War I, 132

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PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH PROGRESS

PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL

Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

NOTICE TO THE READER

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

1. Personality. 2. Individuality. I. Tiliopoulos, Niko. II. Boag, Simon.

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Part B: Culture, Religion, and Spirituality

Chapter 23 Reflections on the Factor Structure of the Occupational Stress

Impossibility is a result of an absence of belief in oneself.

Learning from experience is the best way to reach success.

No need for regrets; everything has an effect on the development of ourselves.

There is always a chance, if we are willing to try.

Everybody can change; they just have to want to.

Before trying to change others, change yourself first.

Luh Ketut Suryani

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY AND

ORGANISATION AND SCOPE

Part A: Processes & performance

INTEGRATING THE STUDY OF WITHIN- AND

Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian

Keywords: Five-factor model, Experience sampling, Organisational psychology, Personality,

Ph: 61-2-9931 9187; Fax: 61-2-9931 9199; nadin.beckmann@unsw.edu.au

BACKGROUND TO AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

Experience Sampling Method (ESM)

To study the within-person aspects of personality we require a design that allows

Hierarchical Linear Modelling

Integrating within-person and between-person variability raises several data-analytic

QUESTIONS WITHIN AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

Between-person relationships: Individuals differ systematically in their typical levels

Broader focus. More research is required to evaluate within- versus between-person

DELIBERATE PRACTICE AND THE TRAINABILITY OF

Keywords: Deliberate Practice, Fluid Intelligence, Working Memory, Training

Ph: 61-2-9931 9484; Fax: 61-2-9931 9199; d.birney@unsw.edu.au

JAEGGI, ET AL.S RESEARCH

EVALUATION OF JAEGGI, ET AL.S FINDINGS

WHY HAS THIS INTERVENTION WORKED?

CAN DELIBERATE PRACTICE LEAD TO GF GAINS?

knowledge representations while avoiding automatisation. Automatisation here can be

WHAT IS BEING MODIFIED? IMPLICATIONS

FLUID INTELLIGENCE (GF)

Fluid intelligence could be considered the prototypical FCF. It is frequently considered to

Gf and Neuronal Plasticity

WORKING MEMORY (WM)

A clear consensus regarding the nature of WM remains somewhat elusive (Conway, et

WM as a System of Executive Processes

NON-COGNITIVE MODERATORS OF GF GAINS

Implicit Theories regarding Malleability of Intelligence

Personality and Goal Orientation

Trait-based personality is typically conceptualised by five distinct and independent

IMPLICATIONS FOR REAL-WORLD ACHIEVEMENTS

performance. In R. J. Sternberg & E. L. Grigorenko (Eds.), The psychology of abilities,

THE EFFECTS OF COMPARISON STATUS AND

Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk

Ph: 61-2-9850 8009; Fax: 61-2-9850 8062; chekaluk@mq.edu.au

Keywords: Emotion, Negative affect, Schadenfreude, Social comparison theory

LINKING SCHADENFREUDE AND SOCIAL COMPARISON THEORY

SCHADENFREUDE AND TARGET COMPARISON STATUS

SCHADENFREUDE AND SOCIAL COMPARISON ORIENTATION

SCHADENFREUDE AND DIRECTIONAL SOCIAL

THE PRESENT STUDY

Schadenfreude towards upward and downward comparison others can be explained by