CONSTI LAW REV CASES

Risos-vidal v comelec

Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On
October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification cases against him prospered but he
only placed second in the results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of
the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public
office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification.
Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas right to seek public office has been effectively restored
by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to
disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous,
and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify which
political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estradas rights
of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardons text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines
possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and

pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the

President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:
(1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress
by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed
to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President
Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil
and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an
integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of
rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much
less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondents promise never to seek a public office again, the former
ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the
decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)

Republic v purisima

- Doctrine of state immunity

- Express cons ent of the Stat e m ay b e manifested through gen eral or sp ecial la w. Solicitor Ge neral cannot
validly waive immunit y from s uit. Only the C ongres s can (Republic v. Purisima, G.R. No. L36084, Aug.31,
1977).

Lim v brownell

When the State commences litigation, it becomes vulnerable to

a counterclaim [See: Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping, G.R. No. L-6060, Sept. 30,
1950]. Intervention by the State would constitute commencement of litigation,
except when the State intervenes not for the purpose of asking for any affirmative
relief, but only for the purpose of resisting the claim precisely because of immunity
from suit [Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345],

AMIGABLE V CUENCA

FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by
the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been
expropriated by the government.

Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She
also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis
should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

MINISTERIO V CITY OF CEBU

FACTS: Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its
authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of a national road, without paying just
compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or
return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.

HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen
but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and,
consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the court except with the consent of said Government. In as much as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.

Ato v ramos

ACTS: Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with an area of 985 square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and running
shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). Respondents agreed after negotiations to convey
the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated
verbal and written demands.

In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President
Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the
performance of governmental functions.

ISSUE

Could the ATO be sued without the States consent?

HELD: An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is
invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental
function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function
of government but was essentially a business.

CNMEG v sta maria

Executive agreement; requisites. An executive agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the former (a) does not require legislative concurrence;
(b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a narrower range of subject matters. Despite these differences, to be considered an executive
agreement, the following three requisites provided under the Vienna Convention must nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be between
states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it must governed by international law.

Indonesia v vinzon

This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and
voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor
Kasim waived their immunity from suit.

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James
Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was
to take effect in a period of four years.

When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he allegedly found respondents work and
services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated
the agreement.

The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the petitioners which
opposed by invoking immunity from suit.

Issues:

Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.

1. Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private capacities.

Discussions:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The
practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A contrary attitude
would unduly vex the peace of nations.

The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign
immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii (public acts of the government of a state), but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the commercial activities of a state.)

Araullo v aquino

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government
project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once
withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as
noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the
President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money
was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-
Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF
(Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various
petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5),
Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it
an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section
29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would
have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or
to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in
the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within
their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they
were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued,
or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition
of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of
the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used
if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to
reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the
DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal,
or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
PNB v Pabalan

-The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer
of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA).

Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint against Judge Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that
the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and therefore may not be garnished, attached or levied upon. The
PNB La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of non-suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued.

2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco deposited with the petitioner bank is valid.

Discussions:

The consent of the state to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. In this case, Consent to be sued was given impliedly when the State
enters into a commercial contract. When the State enters into a contract, the State is deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign
immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of public corporations could properly be made the object of a
notice of garnishment.

Rulings:

1. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The government has entered with them into a

commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is

subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued. Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.

2. The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB is subject for garnishment. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued

are not exempt from garnishment. Thus, the writ of execution be imposed immediately.

UP v Dizon

FACTS: On August 30, 1990, UP entered into an agreement with Stern builders Corp for the construction of extension building in UPLB. Stern
Builders submitted 3 billings but UP only paid for 2, the 3rd was not paid due to disallowance of COA. When the disallowance was lifted, UP still
failed to pay. So Stern Builders sued them. UP failed to file an appeal during the 15-day period. When they appealed on June 3, 2022 arguing that
they only received the copy on may 31, 2002, RTC denied it and issued a writ of execution on October 4, 2002. UP files with CA for certiorari
but was likewise denied. On December 21, 2004, RTC judge Dizon orders the release of the garnished funds from UP. On January 10, 2005, UP
files for certiorari the decision of CA. Petition was granted and TRO filed. After the 60-day period of TRO, RTC directs sheriff to receive the
check from DBP. On July 8, 2005, Dizon ordered the non-withdrawal of check because the certiorari is pending. On September 16, 2005, UP
files for certiorari which was denied on December 2005 but UP files for petition for review. On January 3, 2007, RTC judge Yadao replaced
Dizon, ordered the withdrawal. On January 22, 2007, UP filed TRO with SC which was granted. UP files petition for review for RTCs decision
to withdraw funds.

ISSUE:W/N the fresh-period rule in Neypes v CA can be givenretroactive application

HELD: Yes. The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the legal conception of retroactivity or is not subject to the general
rule prohibiting retroactive operation of statutes. Rather, its retroactivity is already given since by the nature of rules of procedure, no vested right
is impinged in its application.

HELD: govt properties not subject to execution/levy unless provided by statute or municipal ordinance. Determined by its usage.

GSIS v group management

FACTS: This case revolves around the petitions of the Lapu-Lapu Development & Housing Corporation (LLDHC), Group Management
Corporation (GMC) and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The three entities consistently filed cases for the same subject lots
from April 30, 1980, until this case. The cases were filed before both the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, where the subject lots are situated in, and the
RTC of Manila.

LLDHC entered into a Project and Loan Agreement with GSIS on February 4, 1974, involving seventy-eight lots situated in Barrio, Marigondon,
Lapu-Lapu City. GSIS agreed to a 25 million peso loan with LLDHC, the owner of the lots. LLDHC failed to fulfill all of its obligations
regarding the lots, which included the real estate mortgage in favor of GSIS, and so, GSIS closed the mortgage. Being the only bidder in the
public auction sale, GSIS won over the subject lots, and in time secured its ownership over the lots with the transfer certificate of titles issued to
its name. GMC offered to purchase on installment the subject lots with a collective area specified as 423,177 square meters from GSIS, with the
amount of 1,100,000 pesos. GSIS accepted the offer through a Deed of Conditional Sale on February 26, 1980. GMC then learned that the subject
lots was only 298,504 square meters and requested GSIS to reduce the price according to the actual proportion of the land. This proposal was
approved with an Amendment to the Deed of Conditional Sale, which reflected the agreement of GSIS and GMC. LLDHC filed a complaint
against GSIS before the RTC of Manila on April 23, 1980 for Foreclosure with Writ of Mandatory Injunction, known as Civil Case No. R-82-
3429. GMC filed a complaint also against GSIS on November 3, 1989, known as Civil Case No. 2203-L, for Specific Performance with Damages
before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. GSIS, in its defense, submitted a COA Memorandum dated April 3, 1989 disallowing in audit the sale of the
subject to the court, stating that there were apparent inherent irregularities, and that GMC bought the property at a value much lower than
GSIS purchasing price.
On February 24, 1992, with regard to Civil Case No. 2203-L, the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City decided in favor of GMC, and that GSIS was to
execute order of the court pertaining to damages, and actions needed to finalize the deed of absolute sale with GMC. On May 10, 1994, the RTC
of Manila also rendered its judgment that, aside from court orders, all claims and counterclaims by the parties against each other are dismissed in
Civil Case No. R-82-3429. LLDHC now used the Manila RTC decision as a means to file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the Lapu-
Lapu RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L, named CA-GR SP No. 34696, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. After this was a
series of filing petitions to appeal the judgment. Throughout the years, eventually, the three parties approached the Supreme Court, where, in G.R.
No. 167000, GSIS seeks to reverse and set aside the decision made on November 25, 2004 and January 20, 2005, and to annul and set aside the
March 1, 2004 and May 7 2004 orders from the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L. And in G.R. No. 169971, GMC seeks to reverse and
set aside the Decision made in September 23, 2005 and to annul and set aside the March 11, 2004 Lapu-Lapu RTC decision.

Issues: Whether or not the decisions of the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 shall be executory, despite the decision of Lapu-Lapu RTC
in Civil Case No. 2203-L. Whether or not the decision in CA GR SP No. 84382 and GSIS Petition in 167000 are barred by Res Judicata. Whether
or not due process was given to the parties/entities involved in the case. Whether or not GSIS can be immune to acting out the orders of the court.

Ruling: The petition in G.R. No. 167000 was denied by the court, and the petition in G.R. No. 169971 is granted.

Ratio Decidendi: The decision of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L does not in any way affect the orders from the Manila RTC in
Civil Case No. R-82-3429, since the former has been finalized on January 28, 1995, while the latter became final on May 30, 1997. Procedural
due process was extended to all parties, that there was no immediate dismissal of their cases before they were heard by the respective courts, even
if they have already had a rendered decision. However, the Supreme Court also recognized the doctrine of Finality of Judgment, where the
decisions, once final and executed cannot be appealed, unless of circumstances that happen after the finalization, void judgments, correction of
clerical errors and nunc pro tunc entries. The decision in CA GR SP No. 84382 and GSIS Petition in 167000 are barred by Res Judicata, which is
one of the reasons why G.R. No. 167000 was denied. GSIS acted jure gestonis, entering into a contract, and being solely liable for their
irresponsibility. They are not immune from acting out the orders of the court.

Akbayan v. Aquino,
G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, the Court
declared that non-governmental organizations, Congress persons, citizens and
taxpayers have legal standing to file the petition for mandamus to compel the
respondents to produce a copy of the Japan Philippines Economic Package
Agreement (JPEPA), as the petition is anchored upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern which is a public right. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted
their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations

Neri v senate comm

The claim of executive

privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of the inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as in the area
of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning and diplomatic
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others,

In Neri, a majority of the members of the Supreme Court upheld

the refusal of the petitioner to answer the three questions asked during the Senate
inquiry because the information sought by the three questions are properly
covered by the presidential communications privilege, and executive privilege w,as
validly claimed by the President, through the Executive Secretary. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power (the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries) of the President;
second, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President,
Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the proximity test,
he is covered by executive privilege; and third, there was no adequate showing by
the respondents of the compelling need for the information as to justify the
limitation of the privilege, nor was there a showing of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Senate v exec committee

Senate v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, on the
issue of the validity of Calibrated Preempted Response (CPR), Bayan Muna was
held to have locus standi because it is a party-list group with three seats in the House of Representatives entitled to participate in the legislative
process; the three Bayan Muna representatives, on the basis of their allegation that their rights and duties as members of the Hoouse of
Representatives had been
infringed; and Chavez, for having asserted a public right, his being a citizen is
sufficient.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni
-Philippines had the authority to try war criminals after World War II
- Doctrine of incorporation.our Courts have applied
the rules of international law in a number of cases even if such rules had not
previously been subject of statutory enactments, because these generally
accepted principles of international law are automatically part of our own laws
-The power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the
members of the armed forces, create military commissions for the punishment of
war criminals.

People v lagman

-In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to
join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be
killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army
to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision
but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

People v Zosa

-In People v. Zosa, supra., the invocation of religious scruples in

order to avoid military service was brushed aside by the Supreme Court

itching v hernandez

-Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business. The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought
an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.

The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.

The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions:

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the
statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered
through the medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally
accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced;
and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.

Sec of justice v lantion

-the doctrine of incorporation

dictates that rules of international law are given equal standing with, and are not superior to, national legislative enactments.. Accordingly, the
principle of lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties
may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

Philip morris case

where the Supreme Court said that the fact that international law
has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy
- of international law over national law in the municipal sphere

Bengzon v HRET

Effect of repatriation;

the act of repatriation allows the person to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Thus, respondent Cruz, a former naturalborn
Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship when he enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps, was deemed to have recovered his natural- born
status when he reacquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation.

Lopez v Comelec

To comply with the provisions of Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225, it is

necessary that the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal
- terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship

a Filipino-American, or any dual citizen cannot

run for elective public office in the Philippines unless he personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy is not sufficient; Sec. 5 (2)
of R.A. 9225 categorically requires the individual to state in clear and unequivocal
terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship, failing which, he is disqualified
from running for an elective position. The fact that he may have won the elections,
took his oath and began discharging the functions of the office cannot cure the
- defect of his candidacy.

Maquiling v comelec

-maquiling second place in the election, next to arnado who was a naturalized us citizen

-The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Jalover v osmena

On October 3, 2012, Osmea filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu. 10In his COC, Osmea
indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for fifteen (15) years prior to the May 2013 elections. Before running for the mayoralty
position, Osmea also served as the representative of the 3rd Congressional District of the Province of Cebu from 1995-1998, which incidentally
includes the City of Toledo.11

Soon thereafter, the petitioners filed before the COMELEC a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to
Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification,"12 docketed as SPA No. 13-079.

The Parties Claims and Evidence

Citing Section 7813 in relation with Section 7414 of the Omnibus Election Code,the petitioners alleged beforethe COMELEC that Osmea made
material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and likewise failed to comply with the residency requirement under Section 39 of the
Local Government Code.15 In particular, the petitioners claimed that Osmea falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a
resident of Toledo City fifteen (15) years prior to the scheduled May 13, 2013 local elections. 16

The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, tofulfill the residency requirement.

Latasa v. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829,

-December 10, 2003, the Court said that the framers of the Constitution
specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those
who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of prolonged stay in the same
office

- Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In
February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor,
and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now
running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
-
- Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since
the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from
filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
-
- The Comelecs First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration was not acted upon
by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue
 a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not
be counted.
-
- Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical
personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be
construed as vying for the same local government post.
-
- Issue:
-
- Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
-
- Held:
-
- As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X,
Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.

- Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three

years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of

time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
- An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur:
1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.
-
- True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the
city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
-
- The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in
order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should
he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.(Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

ABUNDO VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr.
(Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers
initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested
Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one
month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers disqualification to run.

The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as,
mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by
COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of Service

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the
2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due
proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially
reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he
cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.

Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the
pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not
serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was
Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

Lonzanida vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150 case brief summary

July 28, 1999

Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May
1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed
office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation was contested and resulted to declaring his opponent winning the election and ordered
Lonzanida to vacate the office. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for
disqualification on the grounds that it is a violation of the three-term rule. COMELEC granted the petition. Petitioner filed a petition challenging
the validity of the COMELEC resolution.

Issue: Whether petitioners assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1, 1998 is considered full term of office for the purpose of three-term
rule

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be considered a full term of office for two reasons, he cannot be considered elected as the
proclamation was void and he also did not voluntary renounce office, but was involuntary severance from office.
The petition is granted and the resolution of the COMELEC declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral
elections are hereby set aside.

BORJA v Comelec

-A petition to declare a
failure of election is neither an election protest nor a pre-proclamation controversy

-The three-term limit on a local official is to be understood to refer to

terms for which the official concerned was elected. Thus, a person who was elected Vice Mayor in 1988 and who, because of the death of the
Mayor,
became Mayor in 1989, may still be eligible to run for the position of Mayor in 1998,
even if elected as such in 1992 and 1995.

Aldovino VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In
September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a
criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that
he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit
rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC
granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to
avoid the three-term limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat more potent than the voluntary
renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.

ONG v ALegre
-for the threeterm
limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions must
concur: [a] the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and [b] he has served three consecutive terms.

Bagabuyo v comelec

-Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two
legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the
validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming
elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of
Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having
two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing
250,000 of the citys population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as
against the 500,000.

Paglaum v comelec
-The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record
of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow in
poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58

Pobre v defensor

-Senator Santiago explained that "those

statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge
of her duty as member of Congress or its com
mittee.

-The Court upheld her defense oh the ground

of parliamentary immunity but added that "the
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits
of decency and good professional conduct. It is
at once apparent that her statements in ques
tion were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as state
ing that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts
in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court
a "Supreme Court of idiots.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. 190582April 8, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization
under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it
was dismissed on moral grounds.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that the party-list system is a tool for the
realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify
that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that. That the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms. COMELEC reiterated that
petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus
Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.

HELD:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also directed the COMELEC to grant
petitioners application for party-list accreditation.

The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
 Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless
of sexual orientation.

D. Banat v. Comelec

-the twenty percent allocation

the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold
only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are "qualified" to have
a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third,the three-seat limiteach quali
fied party, regardless ofthe number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitledtoa maximum
of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation
the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be.computed "in proportion
to their total number of votes."

ZALDIVAR V SANDIGAN

-The resolution of the problem is made dif

ficult because the persons who seek to return
to the country are the deposed dictator and his
family at whose door the travails of the country
are laid and from whom billions of dollars be
lieved to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be
recovered. The constitutional guarantees they
invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the
exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech
and of expression, although couched in absolute
terms, admits .of limits and must be adjusted to
the requirements of equally important public
interests
-the Supreme Court
declared that to be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court. One
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.

-argument of Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzalez that it was error for the Court to apply
the visible tendency rule rather than the clear and present danger rule in
disciplinary and contempt charges, the Supreme Court said that it did not purport
to announce a new doctrine of visible tendency; it was merely paraphrasing Sec.
3 (d), Rule 71, Rules of Court. Under either the clear and present danger rule or
the balancing of interest test, the statements of Gonzalez transcended the limits
of free speech. The substantive evil consists not only of the obstruction of a free
and fair hearing of a particular case but also the broader evil of the degradation of
the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the court.

Osmena v pendatun- privilege of speech

-where the Supreme Court said that the determination of

the acts which constitute disorderly behavior is within the full discretionary
authority of the House concerned, and the Court will not review such
determination, the same being a political question.

-In the first place, the privilege is a protectioi

only against forums other than the Congress it
self. It doesnot protect the assemblyman agains
the disciplinary authority ofthe Congress but i
is an absolute protection against suits for libel
Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960). Ir
the second place, "speech or debate" include*
utterances made in the performance of officia.
functions, such asspeeches delivered, statements
made, votes cast, as wellas bills introduced anc
other acts done in the performance of officia]
duties.
Liban v Gordon

-petition to havSen. Gordon declared as having given up his seat in senate

-Puyat v De Guzman
An indirect appearance as counsel by an Assemblyman before
an administrative body circumvents the Constitutional
prohibition. A contrary rule would permit an Assemblyman to
influence an administrative body just by acquiring minimal
participation in the interest of the client and then
intervening in the proceedings.

Santiago v guingona

-where Senator Defensor-Santiago questioned the

election of Senator Guingona as Minority Floor Leader, the Supreme Court said
that it has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect
and uphold --- the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect
and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a co-equal branch prevent this
Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court
will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and the majesty of the law.

Springer v govt of the phi

-The appointing authority of the President,

however, should not be confused with the
authority ofthe legislature to impose additional
duties on existing offices

-Since appointment to office is an

executive function, the clear implication is that
the legislature may not usurp such function. The
legislature may create an office and prescribe
the qualifications of the person who may hold
the office, but it may neither specify who shall
be appointed to such office nor actually appoint
him. The "appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the [President], upon which no
limitations may be imposed by Congress, except
those resulting . . . from the limited exercise of
power to prescribe the qualifications to a given
appointive office."

Marcos v manglapus
-Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. These unstated residual
powers are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for the President to comply with his duties
under he Constitution.

- The right to return to ones country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of
the liberty of abode and the right to travel. Nevertheless, the right to return may be considered as a generally accepted
principle of International law, and under the Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate
from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the Intl. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.

Jeanette Tecsonv. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, o

-on the controversy surrounding the
citizenship of Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), presidential candidate. The issue of
whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen would depend on whether his father,
Allan F. Poe, was himself a Filipino citizen, and if in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of FPJ prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. The Court took note of the fact that Lorenzo Pou
(father of Allan F. Poe), who died in 1954 at 84 years old, would have been born
sometime in 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization
that the Philippine Bill of 1902 effected. That Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (father of FPJ), The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,

Respondent.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal) files a petition before the SC, challenging the constitutionality
of Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution, which provides:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose,"
he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a
seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has locus standi

Whether or not PET is unconstitutional

HELD: No. Petition Denied

POLITICAL LAW- The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

petitioners standing is still imperiled by the white elephant in the petition, i.e., his appearance as counsel
for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004
presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, because judicial
inquiry, as mentioned above, requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. Such appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunals constitution.

Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had
ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a seasonable
constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunals authority
over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the
proper invocation of this Courts power of judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be
dismissed outright.

POLITICAL LAW- The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under
the doctrine of necessary implication.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme
Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this
authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the
Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for
the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have
affirmed on numerous occasions.

Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be
likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first
instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and
domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a
provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were
previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional
directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed
simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years
and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for
good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and
Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006,
the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming
her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to
satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements,
and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read
Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC,
and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction
over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the
President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of
candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in
determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied
by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the
Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification
issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of
the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are
typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99%
chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her
parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under
Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the
absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is
based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings
either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the
need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to
some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the
country in which the foundling is found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in
acquiring a new domicile.

Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when
her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which
decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent
resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the
circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for
good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is
suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny
due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a
candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC
regarding her citizenship and residency

Mighell v sultan of johore

-The head of State enjoys personal immunity from the jurisdiction of

another State

-The states immunity extends to the Head of State who is the

personification of the state [See Mighell vs. Sultan ofJohore, 1 QB 149, where the
Sultan, who was certified by the British Minister of the Crown as having the status
of a head of state, was held to be immune from the jurisdiction of English courts

Estrada v desierto

-Once out of office, even before the end of the 6year term, immunity for nonofficial acts is lost. Such was the case of former
President Joseph Estrada. Immunity cannot be claimed to shield a nonsitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal
acts done while sitting in office.

-After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity

from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President
which were not performed in the exercise of official duties
soliven v makasiar-
(Rules on immunity during tenure )
-The SC held that the privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case where the President is a
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against the accused. Moreover,
there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. The President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
The Presidents immunity from suit extends beyond his term so long
as the act in question was done during his term.

-Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest. It is sufficient that the

judge personally determine the existence of probable cause. It is not

necessary that he should personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses

-the Supreme Court declared that

while the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting
suit. In Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534, it was held that the President is
immune from civil liability.

Minucher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97765,

September 24, 1992, where the Supreme Court held that the act of private
respondent Drug Enforcement Agent of the U.S. in the frame-up of petitioner was
unauthorized and could not be considered performed in the discharge of official
functions, despite a belated diplomatic note from the US Embassy; thus, suit against
the private respondent was upheld, being a suit against him in his personal and
private capacity. See also Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713, where it was
held that the immunity does not protect a public official who commits unauthorized
acts, inasmuch as such unauthorized acts are not acts of State. Accordingly, he
may be sued for such unlawful acts in his private capacity.

Neri v senate

-Claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. Simply put, confidentiality in executive privilege is
not absolutely protected by the Constitution. Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of
highlevel communications can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under
all circumstances

-majority of the members of the Supreme Court upheld

the refusal of the petitioner to answer the three questions asked during the Senate
inquiry because the information sought by the three questions are properly
covered by the presidential communications privilege, and executive privilege w,as
validly claimed by the President, through the Executive Secretary. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power (the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries) of the President;
second, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President,
Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the proximity test,
he is covered by executive privilege; and third, there was no adequate showing by
the respondents of the compelling need for the information as to justify the
limitation of the privilege, nor was there a showing of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Akbayan v aquno

-While the final text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Package

Agreement (JPEPA) may not be kept perpetually confidential, the offers exchanged
by the parties during negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted
their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations

-the Court
declared that non-governmental organizations, Congress persons, citizens and
taxpayers have legal standing to file the petition for mandamus to compel the
respondents to produce a copy of the Japan Philippines Economic Package
Agreement (JPEPA), as the petition is anchored upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern which is a public right.