THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123361. March 3, 1997]

TEOFILO CACHO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN, respondents-
appellees.

DECISION
MELO, J.:

The late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of
land situated in what was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were
within the limits of Military Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp Overton".
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were
jointly tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this Court in Cacho vs.
Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914]) the trial court made the
following pronouncements:

Re: Case No. 6908

The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased

by the applicant, Doa Demetria Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel
Salzos. The title of Gabriel Salzos is founded on a deed of sale in
his favor, executed and signed by a Moro woman named Alanga,
who acted for her husband, a Moro named Dorondon. It appears
that the husband of Alanga, Datto Dorondon is alive yet and before
admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered that a deed from
Dorondon be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel
of land object of Case No. 6908. It is further ordered that the
applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Dorondon on
or before March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
 The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is
the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares or more than
90 acres. This was purchased by the applicant from the Moro Datto
Bunglay.
Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance
from his uncle Datto Anandog who died without issue and the
balance by his own possession and cultivation.
A tract of land 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by
the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of
thousands of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size
of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very
much if a Moro with all his family could cultivate as extensive a
parcel of land as the one in question.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho
is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the
deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel
object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the
rest of the land solicited in said case is denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton
and had another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the
limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog. The court set stakes
marking the N.E., S.E., & N.W. corners of the land found to have
been cultivated by Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance
with the points mentioned. It is further ordered that one half of the
costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half
by the Government of the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of
the said deed and the new plan.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole
heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two
original certificates of title under Republic Act 26, and docketed under the
original GLRO Record No. 6908 and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the
Philippines, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
 Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the
Republic and the NSC, the lower court dismissed the petition because it found
the evidence inadequate to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be
restored. The same order stated further that the proper remedy was for the
reconstitution of decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and
6909, Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were already issued. The
same trial court specifically found that since the decrees had, in fact, been
issued, the judgment of this Court in Cacho vs. U.S., supra, although by itself
expressly dependent upon some conditions, must have indisputably become
final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to
admit amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to
this Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara,
G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court,
ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-
issuance of decrees under the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961)
and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 (1968), and the
lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the omnibus
motion should have been heard as a motion to re-issue the decrees in order to
have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in
their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to
accept the amended petition subject to the private respondents being given
the opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already
on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing
evidence shall be given the parties.

(p. 59, Rollo.)

Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard it as one
for re-issuance of the decrees.
In their "Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition" to the amended petition,
respondents Republic of the Philippines and NSC raised the defenses that the
petition suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner was not the real
party in interest; that petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria Cacho was
not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees
covering the properties were ever issued in the name of Demetria Cacho; and
that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
 On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan, Branch 1) rendered
its decision decreeing the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees No.
10364 and 18969. The pertinent portion of the said decision reads:
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for
the issuance of the subject decrees.
This Court has already ruled that Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18959
were issued in these LRC Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909, respectively, and
that the issuance of the decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had
already become final. Oppositors never disputed the cited pronouncements
and therefore these should now be considered final and conclusive
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through its
then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy Clerk of
Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, all
certified that according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land
Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record No.
6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908.
(Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "M").
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC
Commissioner Santiago Kapunan in compliance with an order of this
Court, confirmed that the proceedings undertaken by the LRC in the
original petition for reconstitution have been regularly and properly done
based on existing records; that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have been issued
and recorded in LRC's Record Book of Decrees; that the plan and
technical description of the lots involved were found to be correct,
approved by the LRC and transmitted to this Court, (Exh. "M").
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos. 43 and
63 in which this Court affirmed the issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and
18969 in the name of Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A.
Arandilla, Deputy Clerk of Court of the LRC which identified and
validated the report of the LRC to this Court on the present petition, (Exh.
"M"), shows that the decrees registry of the LRC had recorded the fact and
date of issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969 in GLRO Rec. No. 6908
and 6909 and the approval of the plans and corresponding technical
descriptions of the lots involved in the aforesaid record numbers and
decrees (Exh. "T").
 It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by Oppositors' counsel,
Arandilla produced for scrutiny the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary
Registration Cases, which contained therein the entries showing that
Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913 in Case No. 6908 and
Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 7, 1915 in Case No. 6909. (Exhs.
"T", "P" and "19").
From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds that the
existence of the decrees have been established sufficiently and indubitably
by the evidence submitted by the petitioner, and therefore, said amended
petition has to be granted.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

1. The amended petition is hereby granted and approved. Declaring

Decrees No. 10364 and No. 18969 as reconstituted.
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), (formerly Land Registration Commission)
to reissue Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869 existing at the LRC Registry
Book of Ordinary Registration Cases in the name of Demetria Cacho upon
payment by the petitioner of the required legal fees.
SO ORDERED.

(pp. 62-65, Rollo.)

From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the Court of

Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel Corporation in their
joint brief assigned the following errors:

The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cacho's amended petition for
reconstitution of decrees of registration purportedly issued in LRC Record Nos. 6908
and 6909. Notwithstanding that

I. The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmities;

II. The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government of the United States,
28 Phil. 616, that final decision in LRC Cases 6908 and 6909 had been
reserved pending compliance by the applicant therein of certain conditions
albeit, as of Date, No competent evidence exists showing compliance with
the imposed conditions and/or the rendition of a "final judgment" and/or the
issuance of decrees pursuant thereto;
 III.The petition is barred by laches; and
IV.The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person and/or a party who
does not have a lawful interest in the case.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)

Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the trial court erred:
1. In giving due course to "Teofilo Cacho's" petition for reconstitution of titles
when the same is already barred by laches.
2. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution when there is no proof that
Teofilo Cacho actually exists and is a real party in interest.
3. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution even in the absence of
sufficient proof to the effect that land registration Decree Nos. 10364 &
18969 were indeed issued to Demetria Cacho.
4. In reopening the case despite the finality of the order dated 16 April 1979
dismissing the original petition for reconstitution of title.
5. In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land already owned by appellant
City of Iligan pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 469 (dated 4
October 1965) which ownership was affirmed by the Supreme Court on
26 February 1988 [City of Iligan versus Director of Lands, et al., 158
SCRA 158].
(pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the proceedings below and
brushed aside respondents' claim of jurisdictional infirmities. It also
acknowledged the issuance and existence of the registration decrees in favor
of Demetria Cacho, to wit:
As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold that Decree
Nos. 10364 and 18969 were issued in GLRO Record No. 6908 and
GLRO Record No. 6909, on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively,
according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration
Case. Then Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission
Santiago M. Kapunan (now Justice of the Supreme Court), submitted a
Manifestation, dated November 2, 1978, in compliance with an order at
the lower court, confirming that the plan and technical description of the
land involving both Lots 1 and 2 were correct, that said lots are decreed
properties, and that all the proceedings undertaken by the LRC were
regularly done based on existing records.

(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)

 This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
lower court and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364
and 18969, with prejudice, for the following reasons:
First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho vs. Government of the
United States on December 10, 1914, now appearing in 28 Phil. 617,
regarding GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, denied in part and granted in
part the application for adjudication and registration of the two parcels of
land of Demetria Cacho, appellee's predecessor-in-interest. Final decision on
the cases was reserved pending compliance with conditions set forth therein.
1.) Re: Case 6908, "x x x before admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered
that a deed from Dorondon . . . be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small
parcel of land object of Case No. 6908" (28 Phil. 629).
2.) Re: Case No. 6909, "the parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No.
6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares . . . (28 Phil. 619). The
court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of
land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the
large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest
of the land solicited in said case is denied." (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th day of
December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection for the
purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog . . . with previous
notice to the applicant and her husband and representative Seor Vidal. Having arrived
late, Seor Vidal did not assist in the ocular inspection . . . But the court, nevertheless,
set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and N.W. corners of the land found to have been
cultivated by the deceased Anandog" (28 Phil. 630); "And it is ordered that the new
survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned . . ." (28 Phil. 630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to in the
Manifestation dated November 2, 1978 of the Acting Commissioner of the
Land Registration Commission and the plan submitted by Demetria Cacho in
Case No. 6909 are the same as to the area, which is 37.87 hectares, and as to
the date of approval, which is November 15, 1910. Since the Supreme Court
decision in Cacho vs. US "ordered that the new survey be made in
accordance with the points mentioned"; that applicant Demetria Cacho is
owner only of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto
Anandog; and that her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in
case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the new survey, if it was made, must
have a smaller area and a later date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO
No. 6909, re-issuance of the decree cannot be made in the absence of the
"new survey" on which to base the area and technical description of the
parcel of land in Case No. 6909.
 Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered property through
continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original
registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover
back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of
laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove:
a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to act earlier;
b. that they were misled by appellee's inaction into believing that appellee
would not assert the right on which he bases his suit;
c. the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would accrue to them in the
event that relief is accorded to the appellee or that the suit is not held barred;
and
d. that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of the property covered
by the decree.
The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless the
contrary is shown, are presumed to be public lands, under the principle that
all "lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by (the King), or
in his name, or by the kings who preceded him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence and that he is a
real party interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to be enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the
present petition because allegedly, the Court of Appeals decided questions of
substance in a way not in accord with the law and applicable decisions of this
Court:

First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a reopening of

Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 issued on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively,
when it required proof of compliance with conditions for their issuance. These
conditions are conclusively presumed to have been complied with before the original
decrees were issued and can no longer be inquired into.
Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and standing doctrines
pronounced in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315, when it applied laches as a bar to the reissuance of decrees.

Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions of this Honorable

Court when it applied laches despite the total absence of proof to establish the
requisite elements for its application.

Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the "Regalian doctrine" to

dispense with proof of the essential elements of laches.

Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial responsibility to uphold the
stability and integrity of the Torrens system.

Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted proof on the identity and
existence of petitioner and allowed itself to be swayed by wild and gratuitous
allusions to the contrary.

(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

The petition having been given due course and the parties having filed
their respective memoranda, we shall now resolve the case.
We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore, the decree of
registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the
Government and its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were
personally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have
appeared and filed an answer to said application, because all persons are
considered as notified by the publication required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final shall be
deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and
determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the
land registration proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the then
Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner
Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished member of this Court), its Deputy
Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration,
the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that
decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench. It is
likewise beyond dispute that such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of
one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to once again be
subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs. U.S. would be
tantamount to setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after the
lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695
[1960]). Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the
Torrens System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring
petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a
derogation of the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the
subject decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of
such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration
Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is
also worth noting that the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired
finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908,
the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or
before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9,
1913); and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per
decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on
December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8,
1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance
of the decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case
nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must
be stressed that the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and
these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature
of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible
assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of registration
because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive.
As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction is that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason
therefor may be gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is
not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is
so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is
to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding
 to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing
party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is merely
declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against
the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty
both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission ...
(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuver (25 SCRA
316 [1968]) that a final decision in land registration cases can neither be
rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. This was
reiterated in Vda. De Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]).
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of petitioner and his being
a real party in interest, records show that petitioner has sufficiently established
his existence and identity as well as his legal interest.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the
property in question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner under Doc. 1355,
Page 128, Series of 1985 of the Consulate General of the Philippines in
Chicago. The fact of adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was
published in the Times Journal. Petitioner also appeared personally before
Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the Philippine Consulate General of the
Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to represent him in this case.
The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of
Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to
assail and controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who
alleges the contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by
merely casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting
preponderant evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason
shall the same rule apply in the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly
sworn before the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the
Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering oath being of itself a
performance of duty by a public official.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the
Twelfth Judicial Region stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No.
CLR (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993, is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.