Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:17-cv-02828-MHC
PETLAND, INC., BKG PETS, INC.,
PETS BKG LLC, PAWSITIVE
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendants
John E. Floyd
Steven J. Rosenwasser
Fredric J. Bold, Jr.
BONDURANT MIXSON & ELMORE, LLP
3900 One Atlantic Center
1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Telephone: (404) 881-4100
Facsimile: (404) 881-4111
Attorneys for Defendants BKG Pets, Inc. and Pets BKG LLC
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
B. Plaintiffs Allegations........................................................................4
I. Plaintiff Has Not Properly Pled Her Alleged Fraud Scheme ..................9
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CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................25
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ................................................................................. 15, 22
Bivens v. Roberts,
No. 208CV026, 2009 WL 891859 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2009) ........... 17, 18, 22
Byrne v. Nezhat,
261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001) ........................................................................2
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Crenshaw v. Lister,
556 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) ......................................................................12
Handeen v. Lemaire,
112 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1997) ........................................................................17
Pasha v. State,
273 Ga. App. 788, 616 S.E.2d 135 (2005) .....................................................24
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Windsor v. Huber,
No. 1:11-CV-2326-TWT, 2011 WL 4436491 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2011) .....25
STATUTES
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Defendants BKG Pets, Inc. and Pets BKG LLC (Petland Kennesaw) move
to dismiss plaintiffs civil RICO complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b).
California animal-rights activists filed this lawsuit on the false premise that
the ordinary business operations of one of the nations largest pet stores and some
of its commercial partners were conducted with criminal intent as part of a RICO
enterprise. Through press releases and social media, the Animal Legal Defense
Fund (ALDF) (who signed this complaint) and its allies have trumpeted this
lawsuit as part of their work[] across the country to combat puppy mills from
multiple legal channels.1 But whatever concerns the ALDF may have about so-
called puppy mills, and putting aside that Petland denies purchasing puppies
from any unlawful puppy mill, the ALDF does not and cannot cite any law or
regulation that Petland allegedly violated by purchasing puppies from any of its
ALDF, in an improper effort to gain press and try to put pressure on Petland,
based on the unfortunate death of one dog. It is clear that plaintiff and her
1
See http://aldf.org/cases-campaigns/features/what-is-the-animal-legal-defense-
fund-doing-about-puppy-mills/.
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supporters simply dislike Petlands lawful business and are willing to use this case
Petland franchisee, and every Petland preferred veterinarian in the country passed
off fraudulent health certificates on every puppy or kitten sold because those
animals were allegedly raised in puppy mills. See Compl. 23, 65. Based solely
on the alleged sources of those animals, plaintiff contends that defendants knew
they may very well have latent diseases, charged prices that were too high, and
tried to conceal that fraud from customers. See id. (emphasis added).
[p]articularly with regard to civil RICO claims, plaintiffs must stop and think
before filing them. Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1115 (11th Cir. 2001). Had
plaintiff done so here, she would have realized that another United States District
Court has already considered and dismissed the same frivolous RICO class action.
consumers and facilitating the fiction that a consumers new puppy is not a
sickly and/or dying puppy mill puppy. Martinelli v. Petland, Inc., No. CV-09-
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Recognizing that those plaintiffs failed to plead the supposed fraudulent scheme
with the required particularity and that Petland had no duty to make the
disclosures the activists preferred, the Court dismissed plaintiffs RICO claims.
Id. at **3, 6. The Court should treat this sequel the same way.
A. Petland Kennesaw
family-owned and operated local pet store in Kennesaw, GA. 2 In addition to pets,
the store also sells pet foods, supplies, and services, such as grooming and training.
Petland Kennesaw receives its puppies from three primary sources: (i) United
breeders as defined by the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. 2131; and (iii) locally
new levels and encouraging the highest standards of pet care in [its]
founded in 1967 and is a successful operator and franchisor of 131 U.S. stores.5
2
http://www.petlandkennesaw.com.
3
http://www.petlandkennesaw.com/kennesaw-puppies-faqs/.
4
http://www.petlandkennesaw.com/.
5
http://www.petland.com/about/index.htm; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petland.
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B. Plaintiffs Allegations
The Defendants. The complaint alleges that Petland works with several kinds
customers. Compl. 24-25. The complaint also referencesbut does not name
as defendantsMy Pets Vet Animal Clinic, LLC (My Pets Vet) and Dr. Walton
Waller, whom plaintiff alleges performs pre-sale health exams and serves as the
Plaintiffs Dog. Plaintiff alleges that on December 10, 2015 she bought a
dog from Petland Kennesaw for $2,400 plus a $500 membership in a Puppy for a
Lifetime program. Id. 29. Plaintiff alleges that, after subsequent treatment at My
Pets Vet, Dr. Waller reported that plaintiffs dog died on December 19, 2015. Id.
32-33. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Waller concluded that the dog died of liver
6
Plaintiff provides no specific allegations about (nor names as defendants) any of
Petlands other 130 franchisees across the country, each of which is alleged to have
its own preferred veterinarian (none of whom are defendants).
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disease but that a different veterinarian hired by plaintiff believed the dog died
from unnamed puppy and kitten mills. Id. 38. While plaintiff concedes that
many of the puppy mills are licensed by the USDA, she nonetheless
contends that it is generally known that these facilities may produce animals
with significant health defects. Id. 40. Without defining puppy mill or
identifying any specific puppy mill, plaintiff alleges that puppy mills often
degenerate to a point of disregard for animal welfare and produce animals that are
Petland Kennesaws animals arrived sick due to the conditions in which they were
raised. Id. 43. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Good resigned as preferred veterinarian
for Petland Kennesaw. Id. 48. Dr. Goods own affidavit states that he stopped
working as a veterinarian for Petland Kennesaw in 2005, well before the statute of
limitations period at issue here. See Exhibit A 5. In addition, the complaint fails
to reveal that Dr. Goods referenced testimony was procured by the defendant in
activist represented by the same counsel as has appeared for plaintiff here, which
franchisees obtain their animals for $50 to $200 and sell them at retail for
$2,000 to $3,000. Id. 38. Before a pet sale, plaintiff alleges [u]pon
information and belief that Petland pays a preferred veterinarian a fixed rate each
month in exchange for their agreement to inspect and certify pets as healthy. Id.
46. Plaintiff alleges that the veterinarians are financially incentivized to certify
Petland already owns the animals when the veterinarian inspects them. Id. 5.
For each purchase, plaintiff alleges that the consumer executes a Limited
Puppy Purchase Contract with the franchisee stating that, for example, the pet has
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been vet checked twice before being sold. Id. 45. Plaintiff also says that a
Veterinarian Health Exam report accompanies each sale stating that the animal is
free of any internal or external parasites and healthy and fit for adoption. Id.
Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant performs the examination or signs the
report. Plaintiff attaches the one exam report from her puppy; she makes no
with bogus health certifications and warranties. Id. 51. Plaintiff points to a
Petland franchise agreement and says that Petland and its franchisees have
alleges three additional business practices that she says Petland employs to hide its
alleged fraudulent scheme. First, Petland requires its customers to use PAWSitive
. . . as the point of contact for any health issues with their new pet. Id. 55
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veterinarians and restrict[s] them from going to independent veterinarians that are
not controlled by Petland. Id. 57-58. Third, plaintiff says that Petland gives
customers instructional sheets about hypoglycemia and canine cough that are
59-64. Plaintiff does not allege that any statement on either sheet is false.
transforms the defendants, all other Petland franchisees, and all other Petland
mail and wire fraud. Id. 96-103. According to plaintiff, defendants have
committed thousands of acts of mail and wire fraud through the (i)
financial data; (iii) payments; and (iv) ongoing receipt of revenues. Id. 99.
plaintiffs purchase of her one dog at Petland Kennesaw in December 2015, the
complaint does not identify any specific instances of alleged mail or wire fraud.
see id. 66, 68, plaintiff asserts three RICO claims. Count 1 asserts a violation of
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U.S.C. 1962(d). And Count 3 asserts identical violations of Georgias RICO law.
nationwide RICO scheme with criminal intent. Plaintiff does not meet her burden.
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
When a plaintiff ha[s] not nudged [her] claims across the line from conceivable to
required to accept the plaintiffs legal conclusions. Chandler v. Secy of Fla. Dept
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of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2012). Nor does the Court accept as
Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
In addition, [b]ecause of the specificity of the RICO statute and the stigma
associated with charges of racketeering, plaintiff must plead her entire complaint
with enhanced specificity under Rule 9(b). Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec)
To satisfy the Rule 9(b) standard, RICO complaints must allege: (1) the
precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time and
place of and person responsible for the statement; (3) the content and
manner in which the statements misled the Plaintiffs; and (4) what the
Defendants gained by the alleged fraud.
Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis added). It also bears emphasis that RICO requires plaintiffs to allege
indictable criminal conduct, Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116
F.3d 1364, 1381 (11th Cir. 1997), not merely unfair or deceptive schemes. See also
Avery v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 448 S.E.2d 737, 738 (1994) (same).
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sourced puppies from inhumane puppy mills that were unhealthy. Compl.
3-5. The term puppy mill is not self-defining, and plaintiff offers no
Indeed, among other deficiencies, the complaint (i) fails to identify a single so-
called puppy mill used by any defendant; (ii) offers no details about the
condition of any particular puppy mill used by any defendant; (iii) alleges no
details about the health of any specific puppy from a puppy mill; (iv) makes no
allegations about how many puppies Petland Kennesaw obtained from puppy
mills versus other sources; and (v) includes no allegations plausibly supporting
the conclusory allegation that all defendants knew that every puppy obtained from
a puppy mill was unhealthy. Plus, the complaint says nothing about any specific
kitten. Rather, plaintiff asks the Court to conclude that defendants have operated a
successful nationwide business for decades while selling nothing but sick pets.
animals health that it knows are false. But again, plaintiff provides no
allegationsliterally noneto support that claim. Indeed, wholly absent from the
complaint are any allegations that (i) any defendant instructed a veterinarian not to
to lie; or (iii) any specific Petland employee allegedly knew all examinations were
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false. And, not surprisingly, Plaintiff does notand cannotallege any specific
facts evidencing that any health examination that was performed was false,
even references is for plaintiffs own puppy, and even the claims as to that
examination are wholly speculative and conclusory; i.e., plaintiff claims that
Petland knew her puppy was unhealthy but fails to identify a single fact in support
of that claim other than suggesting that the puppy came from a puppy mill.
Plaintiff also mischaracterizes what the examination report is. While she
calls it a certification or warranty, the actual document shows only the results of
the veterinarians examination on a particular date. See Exhibit B (At the time of
claim, the Limited Puppy Purchase Contract attached to the complaint confirms
that neither Petland, Inc. nor Petland Kennesaw provides any such blanket
guarantee of health. Rather, the contract states that all puppies are sold as pet
quality only and details the specific warranty provisions, vet services, and refunds
provided by Petland Kennesaw for certain conditions and for certain periods of
time. Compl. Ex. A; see Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009)
(It is the law in this Circuit that when the exhibits contradict the general and
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Third, plaintiff alleges that Petland used its top-down corporate structure,
scheme throughout all franchisees and veterinarians. But those wholly innocuous
allegations establish only that defendants operated a business with a franchisor and
Petlands franchise activities are actually tools of fraud. No facts are alleged to
support the assertion that Petlands alleged unique system of operating its
successful business includes committing fraud. And no facts alleging the content of
any training, much less that the training constituted instruction in fraud. Rather,
plaintiff asks the Court simply to presume that features present in virtually every
7
See Thrailkill v. Champion Ford, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1486, 1488 (D.N.M. 1991)
(rejecting imposing civil RICO liability based upon the mere presence of a
franchisee/franchisor relationship without more).
8
See Almanza v. United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1073 (11th Cir. 2017)
(dismissing RICO fraud claim where the contract terms plaintiff relied on say
nothing about an illicit enterprise or a fraudulent scheme).
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Fourth, plaintiff alleges that Petland is able to hide its alleged fraudulent
restrict[s] them from going to independent veterinarians that are not controlled by
the complaint says the opposite: We understand that you may have a personal
relationship with a different veterinarian and because of this will provide for up to
the contract provides greater warranty coverage for a preferred veterinarian versus
an out-of-network veterinarian does not evidence fraud and is, in fact, a feature
Last, plaintiff alleges that Petland Kennesaw and its co-defendants engaged
plaintiff does not allege a single instance of any defendant refusing to honor any
warranty in the Limited Puppy Purchase Contract (the only applicable warranties
alleged). While plaintiff may not like the terms of the warranty that she agreed to,
no well-pled facts allege that any defendant had a preexisting criminal intent to
refuse to honor any warranty. Indeed, the complaint pointedly fails to allege that
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The Court must also dismiss plaintiffs complaint because she has failed to
meet her burden to rebut the obvious alternative explanation that exists.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009) (As
between that obvious alternative explanation for the arrests and the purposeful,
plausible conclusion.).
defendants are operating a RICO scheme rather than simply operating their
businesses. Plaintiff has offered no plausible explanation for why any of the
following allegations plausibly evidence fraud rather than being simply part and
Petland has a top-down corporate structure and also insists upon uniform
standards, methods, techniques, and expertise, procedures, and specifications
. . . . 51.
Petland franchisee training is extensive . . . . Petland, Inc.s website touts
these extensive training programs for its franchisees, promising to help
franchisees build[] a team of Pet Counselors and Animal Care Technicians
to help [them] carry out [their] business plan. 52.
Petland gives customers two instructional sheets regarding hypoglycemia
and canine cough (also called kennel cough) . . . . The handout makes clear
that illness and death due to hypoglycemia is the customers responsibility or
fault, not Petlands. 59, 62.
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Absent specific pleadings showing fraud, the obvious alternative explanation for
this alleged conduct is that defendants are operating a lawful business. The federal
courts soundly reject turning such ordinary business operations into a RICO
claim. 9
II. The Complaint Fails to Plead that Petland Kennesaw Conducted the
Affairs of the Alleged Enterprise or Had an Unlawful Purpose.
RICO, any one of which requires the Court to dismiss the entire complaint. See,
9
See, e.g., Almanza v. United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1071 (11th Cir. 2017)
(dismissing RICO claims where Plaintiffs have not explained why their economic
model should be accepted as plausible); Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d
1340, 1353 (11th Cir. 2016) (rejecting RICO liability on basis of wholly innocent
activity undertaken as a course of regular business for [the co-defendant]); Parm
v. Natl Bank of Cal., N.A., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2017)
(dismissing complaint where allegations, while creative, essentially attempt to
recast a contractual relationship as a RICO enterprise); AARP v. Am. Family
Prepaid Legal Corp., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 785, 796 (M.D.N.C. 2009)
(contractual relationships are not ordinarily the stuff of . . . RICO enterprises).
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e.g., Montoya v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 14-20474, 2014 WL 4248208, at *20-21
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2014); Bivens v. Roberts, No. 208CV026, 2009 WL 891859, at
participated in the conduct of the enterprises affairs, not just their own affairs.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993). The Reves rule is built upon a
recognition that Congress did not mean for 1962(c) to penalize all who are
employed by or associated with a RICO enterprise, but only those who, by virtue
affairs. Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1348 (8th Cir. 1997) (emphasis
added). There is a difference between actual control over an enterprise and mere
association with an enterprise; in light of that difference, the test for liability is not
involvement but control. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Contini, No. 4-CV-0104, 2005
10
This statute makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprises affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .
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allege facts supporting the allegation that the . . . defendants directed the
Even assuming that plaintiff has alleged a RICO enterprise, she does not
allege any facts showing that Petland Kennesaw took some part in directing the
enterprises affairs. Reves, 507 U.S. at 179. Her allegations must state how
The complaint fails that requirement by lumping together Petland to mean both
Petland, Inc. and Petland Kennesaw. See Compl. intro. Furthermore, the conduct
from puppy mills, using a preferred veterinarian to examine pets before they are
sold, and selling plaintiffs one dog, see Complaint 8, 14, 18, 20-22, 29-37is
Petland Kennesaw conducting its own business affairs, not directing anyone elses.
Indeed, the complaint does not allege facts showing that any defendant
11
See, e.g., American Dental Assn v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir.
2010) (affirming that plaintiff must allege facts with respect to each defendants
participation); Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1380-81 (RICO complaint must plead facts
showing the specific role of each defendant).
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conducted or directed any affairs other than its own. That is largely symptomatic of
plaintiffs failure to allege any enterprise with affairs of its own that anyone could
plaintiffs sole attempt to satisfy the Reves requirement is the rote recitation that
[e]ach member of the Enterprise plays a distinct role in carrying out the
Id. 88. The complaint contains not one plausible, non-conclusory allegation that
Petland Kennesaw directed its preferred veterinarian to lie about a pets health or
trained another franchisee how to commit fraud. And even for the enterprises
allegation: [u]pon information and belief, Petland, Inc. directed the affairs of the
Enterprise through its franchise agreements, its training of new employees and
Defendants. Id. 90. But pleading requires more than labels and conclusions;
formulaic recitation of the elements . . . will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
failed under Reves.12 Because plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that Petland
12
In United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. Walgreen Co., for example,
the plaintiff alleged that Walgreens pharmacy chain and a drug company (Par)
conducted an association-in-fact enterprise. The alleged common goal was to
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Kennesaw directed the affairs of the alleged enterprise, the complaint fails Reves.
The Court should also dismiss plaintiffs complaint because her theory of
fraud is predicated upon attempting to hold the defendants liable for failing to
Federal courts have repeatedly held that [a]bsent an independent duty, such
basis of a fraudulent scheme under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. 14 That
law makes sense in the retail context. For example, no consumer could state a
RICO class action against The Varsity and its hot-dog suppliers for claiming, We
take pride in all of our ingredients and recipes and know that you will taste the
difference yet failing to disclose to consumers from what kind of cows the Varsity
In the same way, because Petland Kennesaw is a retail business and plaintiff
triggers a duty for Petland Kennesaw affirmatively to disclose the basis of its
pricing or details about its vendors (although Petland Kennesaw actually does
disclose that).16 Absent such a duty, courts routinely dismiss civil RICO claims
alleging that defendants should have disclosed more information about their
15
https://www.thevarsity.com/food.
16
See Complaint n.3 (referencing Petland About Us page stating, Our puppies
come from three primary sources: . . . .); id. (HSUS estimates there are 8,000
unlicensed and unregulated breeders. These are NOT where Petland purchases
puppies.). In addition, plaintiff received a Medical Sheet at the time of purchase,
which she initialed four times, identifying the breeder of her puppy by name.
17
See, e.g., Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 1998); In re
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1218 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing
RICO claims based on non-actionable puffery and rejecting argument that
Defendants failed to disclose their overarching fraudulent scheme, relying on
California Architectural); Petland, 2009 WL 2424655, at *2 (The Court will
therefore grant Petlands motion to the extent the RICO claims are based on
allegations of non-disclosure.).
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ordinary business operations regarding one puppy constitute mail and wire fraud.
Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). To engage in a
least two predicate acts of racketeering activity over a ten-year time span, the
predicate acts must be related to one another, and the predicate acts must
criminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
her pattern allegations are vague and lack the specificity required by
Twombly/Iqbal and Rule 9(b). See, e.g., Compl. 105 (Defendants have likely
Second, the single paragraph that attempts to describe the general content
18
See, e.g., Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1381 ([T]he Amended Complaint fails to set forth
the time, place, and manner in which any specific predicate act occurred.); Bivens,
2009 WL 891859, at *7 (RICO complaint failed to allege mail fraud where it did
not allege, inter alia, the precise statements made in the mailings and the
content of the mailings); Perret v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 889 F. Supp.
2d 1333, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (dismissing under 9(b) for failure to plead, inter
alia, the precise statements made).
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and dates of specific instances of the use of the U.S. mails and wires does not
plausibly plead acts of mail and wire fraud. See Compl. 98. For example, when
Petland Kennesaw charg[ed] Plaintiffs credit card for the purchase of her pet . . .
on December 10, 2015, that is not wire fraud, it is simply Petland Kennesaw
completing a sale in the ordinary course of business. Id. For the same reasons
discussed above, all of the mail and wire fraud allegations are fatally plagued by
fraudulent. For one, those allegations fail to plead that Petland Kennesaw had the
specific criminal intent of committing wire fraud when it sold plaintiff her pet.
Third, stripped of its vague and conclusory allegations and allegations about
left with mail and wire fraud allegations about the sale of one puppy. That is not a
pattern. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239-40; Jackson v. BellSouth Commcns, 372
F.3d 1250, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). And allegations that similar or identical sales
occurred, without any specifics, does not satisfy the pattern requirement.
and 3. In United States v. Browne, the Eleventh Circuit held that the touchstone of
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allegation and proof that each defendant agreed on the overall objective of the
MasterCard International, Inc., this Court held, Where an underlying RICO claim
fails, and the plaintiff does not allege additional facts to support a RICO
conspiracy, the conspiracy claim must also fail. 21 Lawrie v. Ginn Development
Plaintiff alleges no additional facts that would save her conspiracy claims.
Her complaint makes no attempt to state when, where, or how any of the
19
505 F.3d 1229, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007) (outlining two methods for showing the
required agreement); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1269 (failure to allege
agree[ment] to violate . . . substantive provisions of the RICO laws is fatal).
20
Pasha v. State, 273 Ga. App. 788, 790, 616 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2005).
21
No. 1:14-CV-614-TWT, 2014 WL 5019917, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2014). See
J&D Intl Trading (H.K.) Ltd. v. MTD Equip., LLC, No. 1:13-CV-2526-RWS,
2014 WL 1683375, at **12-13 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 28, 2014) (same); Fuller v. Home
Depot Servs., LLC, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1295 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (same).
22
656 F. Appx 464, 474 (11th Cir. 2016); see also Flagg v. First Premier Bank,
No. 1:15-CV-324-MHC, 2017 WL 2703856, at *10 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2017)
(Cohen, J.).
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a single individual officer or employee of any defendant who entered into such an
agreement.23 Moreover, plaintiffs conspiracy allegations fail for many of the same
Feldman v. American Dawn, Inc., 849 F.3d 1333, 1342 (11th Cir. 2017).
Therefore, plaintiffs failure to state any claims under the federal act requires
dismissal under the Georgia act. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Wunder, No. 1:13-CV-
CONCLUSION
The Court should dismiss this case under Federal Rule 12(b)(6).
23
Windsor v. Huber, No. 1:11-CV-2326-TWT, 2011 WL 4436491, at *2 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 21, 2011).
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing document has been
prepared in accordance with the font type and margin requirements of Local Rule
5.1(B) of the Northern District of Georgia, using a font type of Times New Roman
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Case 1:17-cv-02828-MHC Document 16-1 Filed 09/29/17 Page 35 of 36
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
INC.S AND PETS BKG LLCS MOTION TO DISMISS with the Clerk of the
United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, using the CM/ECF
system, which will send notification of such filing to counsel of record as follows:
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Case 1:17-cv-02828-MHC Document 16-1 Filed 09/29/17 Page 36 of 36
Jessica J. Sleater
ANDERSEN SLEATER SIANNI LLC
1250 Broadway, 27th Floor
New York, New York 10001
jessica@andersensleater.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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