Unipolarity and the Status Quo: An Exploration of Strategic Choice in Theory of

Unipolarity

by Will Wortham

Senior Thesis

2/15/16
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Abstract: This paper seeks to examine the conditions in which major powers can potentially challenge the current unipolar world order. While

many have argued that the United States is in decline and the world is heading towards multipolarity (Layne 2008; Posen 2009; Szabo 2015),

the world is still decisively unipolar in terms of military power. In Nuno Monteiros Theory of Unipolar Politics, he lays out the ways in which the

United States can act in relation to the status quo of the international system, and describes a strategy that should be most conducive to a

lasting unipolar arrangement. By reexamining cases from Theory of Unipolar Politics and applying Monteiros assumptions to case studies of

two major powers, this paper will explore the outcomes of strategies pursued by the United States. It should provide further insight about the

durability of the unipolar system in the wake of current events, and whether or not a return to multipolarity will take place as a result of certain

strategies. Finally, the paper may reveal shortcomings in Monteiros assumptions and categories of unipolar strategic choice.

Introduction

In the realist school of international relations, the international system is considered to be a

system of anarchy, where individual states are sovereign agents. In the absence of an overarching

governing authority, states must bear the responsibility of securing peace for themselves. While anarchy

does not necessarily entail imminent chaos and violence, it can be dangerous for those who do not

possess power of their own. An ancient example of this reality can be found in Thucydides account of

the negotiations between Athens and Melos during the Peloponnesian War. In 416 BC, the city-state of

Athens asked the island city of Melos to submit and pay tribute. Melos refused, and was subsequently

invaded and destroyed. During the negotiation, the Athenian envoy simply states, Right, as the world

goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak

suffer what they must. (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 5.89)

From the realist perspective, Thucydides historical account highlights the inherent nature of the

international arena. The unfortunate fate of Melos suggests that in the state of anarchy, distribution of

power is the ultimate determinant of outcomes. This notion that the nature of the international system

forces states to pursue power was introduced by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics

(1979). In Waltzs theory of structural realism (otherwise known as neorealism), the primary interest of

the state is survival and only by amassing power can a state ensure its own defense. Neorealists believe
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that the distribution of state power determines the structure of the international order; traditionally,

state power is measured by states military and economic capabilities. The term polarity specifically

refers to the distribution of power within the international system. For example, the system is said to be

unipolar when a single great power exists among other competitors. A bipolar system would have two

states that qualify as great powers, while a multipolar system contains more than two.

The exact definition of what constitutes a great power varies, but in general it refers to a state

whose capabilities are unsurpassed by any other. According to Nuno Monteiros definition, a great

power must possess the ability to defend itself from an equally or more powerful state, as well as the

ability to engage unaided in sustained politico-military operations in at least one other relevant region of

the globe beyond its own on a level similar to the most powerful state in the system (2014, 44). In

other words, a great power maintains a nuclear arsenal and a military force that can be projected

worldwide. As the sole great power within the international system, the unipole finds itself in an

unmatched systemic management role. No other state has the ability to shape the arrangement of the

international order to the degree that the unipole is able to do so, which gives it considerable leeway in

determining its strategic posture (Monteiro 2014, 63). In Theory of Unipolar Politics, Monteiro puts

forth a grand strategy for the unipole to pursue in order to sustain its dominant status. This paper

intends to explore the ways in which his strategy would play out, and provide insight towards the

relevance of structural realist theory in todays world.

Literature Review

Introduction to Unipolar theory

The international system has been considered unipolar by many scholars since the end of the

Cold War, when the United States of America was left standing as the worlds sole great power.

Traditional balance of power theory suggested that this unipolar period would be short-lived, as other
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great powers would inevitably rise to challenge the United States dominant status; scholars of

international relations were quick to make predictions about the inevitable end of unipolarity as soon as

the USSR crumbled (Waltz 1993). This notion was disputed by Wohlforth (1999), who argued that the

United States preponderance of power was not only durable but peaceful. He claimed that the

presence of a single great power not only discourages counterbalancing efforts by major rivals, as they

would have to overcome a significant gap in capabilities, but also provides an incentive for lesser powers

to ally themselves with the unipole and thus diminishes the need for regional security competition.

Power-transition theory, which contends that conflict occurs due to shifts in the global relative

distribution of power, supports the claim that unipolarity should be peaceful as long as it lasts: states

will be comfortable in a unipolar system where balancing is unnecessary (Kugler and Lemke 1996).

Another argument for the durability of unipolarity is based upon the institutional framework established

by the United States in the aftermath of World War II. Ikenberry (2011) asserts that the openness and

benefits associated with the current liberal hegemonic order provide an incentive for other states to

integrate into this existing arrangement, which ultimately makes challenges to US leadership less

feasible.

So far, the unipolar era has indeed been peaceful, at least in terms of conflict between major

powers. However, the durability of the current order remains a topic of contention. Critics point to a

number of factors that seem to indicate the United States unipolar status is on the decline, first and

foremost being the growth of potential competitors. According to Layne (2004; 2008), the emergence of

China as an economic superpower entails an inevitable geopolitical impact and signals the end of US

unipolarity. Other authors (e.g., Posen 2008; nay 2013) cite the general rise and increasing influence of

other major emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa) as evidence that the world is

quickly approaching a return to multipolarity. Another argument for the decline of unipolarity stems

from domestic, not international, forces: unsustainable trade and budget deficits, as well as costly
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military overreach, indicate that the United States strength is fading (Kennedy 2009). Woodley (2015)

argues that unipolarity has already ended, pointing to the gap between the United States military and

economic capabilities, as well as the descent to defensive retrenchment and reluctant multilateralism

in international affairs (p. 5). He also claims that the international order is no longer based on military

power, but is now a transnational strategic practice employed by powerful state actors for control over

global resources and markets.

Most of these critiques about lasting US preponderance highlight the importance of defining

unipolarity and what constitutes polar status. Claiming that the world is multipolar because other

major economies are quickly catching up to the United States does not address the military distribution

of power, and therefore would not be a sufficient argument about unipolarity. At least, this is what

structural realists such as Monteiro and Waltz (2014; 1993) would explain. Scholars from other schools

of international relations believe that the realist definition of polarity is simply becoming less relevant,

as the presence of nuclear weapons diminishes the prospect of conventional warfare between major

powers and thus amplifies economic and soft power competition (Ikenberry 2011, p. 314).

Grand Strategy and Defining Unipolarity

Nuno Monteiros Theory of Unipolar Politics lays out a comprehensive theory of unipolarity that

focuses on three key questions: is unipolarity peaceful? Is it durable? And what is the best strategy for

the unipole to pursue in order to maintain its preponderant status? According to Monteiros specific

definition of a pole, which he uses interchangeably with great power, is any state that possesses the

ability to guarantee its own survival in addition to the ability to project military power beyond its own

region. This offensive power projection characteristic separates the United States from all other nuclear-
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equipped states, which are classified as major powers1 (rather than poles). All remaining states are

classified as minor powers. It is very important to note that military power is the defining feature of

system structure in Monteiros theory; in fact, he emphasizes that unipolarity is compatible with the

presence of several major economic powers, so long as the unipoles economic capabilities are on par

with theirs. Economic power is important, because it is a latent form of military power, but it does not

determine system structure in the sense that it does not constrain the behavior of other states

(Monteiro 2014, p. 48).

Using structural realist assumptions and balance-of-power logic, Monteiro argues that

unipolarity is not more peaceful, but can be enduring so long as the unipole pursues a certain strategy

(2014, p. 31-33, 100). The unipole has three options in regards to maintaining the status quo of the

international order. It may pursue a strategy of offensive dominance, in which it seeks to revise one of

the elements of the existing status quo for its own benefit. Alternatively, the unipole may pursue a

strategy of defensive dominance, in which it takes action to defend the status quo against external

challenges. The final option is disengagement, in which the unipole does not seek to maintain or revise

the status quo in any way (2014, p. 65). Here the international status quo is defined as the particular

arrangement of national territories, international political alignments, and the distribution of military

capabilities. In the economic realm, the unipole may choose to accommodate the growth of other major

powers, or attempt to constrain them. Monteiro determines that major powers should have no

incentive to engage in balancing efforts so long as the unipole accommodates their economic growth

and does not threaten their long-term survival and ability to grow (p. 100), and therefore a strategy of

defensive dominance plus economic accommodation will sustain unipolarity.

Theory

1
Examples of current major powers: Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel,
and North Korea.
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As Monteiros theory is relatively new, there is a notable lack of literature that addresses his

particular definition of unipolarity or his argument on its grand strategy. At first glance, the reasoning

that Monteiro uses to arrive at this conclusion seems to be sound. He argues that major powers should

have no incentive to engage in balancing efforts so long as the unipole accommodates their economic

growth and does not attempt an offensive revision of the status quo (p. 228). In Theory of Unipolar

Politics, Monteiro presents a variety of cases that highlight the unipoles strategic options and their

historical or expected outcomes. For example, the primary case study on China does not empirically

prove that his strategy is correct, as it is still a rising major power, but so far the evidence supports his

argument of why China has not balanced (and is not likely to balance) against the United States.

However, his case studies on other forms of US strategies in the post-Cold War period are less

convincing. The grand strategy that Monteiro puts forth hinges on a point that he seems to completely

overlook: if we are making assumptions about how major powers will react in response to changes in

the status quo, we must consider how the status quo is conceptualized from the perspective of these

major powers. There are certain scenarios when the international status quo is disputed by various

accounts, and applying the rigid classification of offensive or defensive dominance is inherently

subjective. It is possible for the United States to trigger a balancing reaction because a competing major

power feels that the US is behaving in an revisionist manner, despite the fact that the US views its own

actions as a defense of the status quo. Therefore, I think an overarching strategy that includes defensive

dominance will ultimately threaten the sense of security among other major powers, specifically two of

the United States most powerful rivals: Russia and China.

Methods

The purpose of this paper is to explore the conditions in which major powers can challenge the

current unipolar world order. Monteiros grand strategy of defensive accommodation is based on two
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assumptions: for one, states possessing a nuclear arsenal will not feel that their immediate survival is

threatened by the unipoles preponderant military power; second, major powers must be satisfied with

international conditions that allow for their own continued economic growth. As I explained in my

theory section, my hypothesis is that USAs strategy of defensive dominance gives way for a return to

multipolarity.

To test this hypothesis, I will be looking at two major powers generally considered to be primary

rivals to the United States: Russia and China. Both of these states possess nuclear weapons with second-

strike capabilities, which (according to Monteiros assumptions) guarantees their immediate survival.

However, in regards to the second assumption of his strategy, neither China nor Russia appear to be

satisfied with the international status quo as it currently stands, due to certain factors that may limit

their economic growth or long-term survival in general. For starters, Russia has disrupted the

international order by annexing the region of Crimea and supporting separatist movements in parts of

Ukraine. Russia has also clashed with the US and other Western nations over its support for the Assad

regime in Syria. Through qualitative analysis and reconstructing the narrative of these events, I intend to

demonstrate how the United States effort to defend the status quo could potentially appear as

revisionist in nature, and trigger a response that ultimately results in Russia qualifying as a great power

by Monteiros definition. In the case of China, we have a nation of over two billion people with an

economy that is projected to become the worlds largest by 20302 (Monteiro 2014, p. 124). So far, China

has risen peacefully and its economy has thrived within the liberal international order established by the

United States after WWII. Monteiro (2014) uses China as the primary case study for his grand strategy

in action, determining that China is likely to focus on economic growth through cooperation with the

United States for as long as the latter continues to ensure the international conditions conducive to this

2
While Chinas economy has faltered recently and its rate of growth has slowed, Monteiro was using a conservative
estimate at the time of publication. The UK-based Centre for Economics and Business Research still projects Chinas
GDP to overtake the United States by 2029 as of December 28, 2015. (Soergel 2015)
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goal. (p. 142) In my analysis, I will explore how the United States strategy of defensive dominance in

Chinas own region could actually threaten Chinas vision of economic growth and long-term survival,

and thus trigger a balancing effort. The implications of this exercise will highlight what I perceive to be a

major flaw in Monteiros theory. To demonstrate how I will conduct my analysis of these two cases, I

begin with a review of Monteiros examples of the unipoles strategies in action. Here I explore how the

status quo is not a rigid state of being, but rather a flexible concept based on a certain perspective and

timeframe of events. The following cases from Theory of Unipolar Politics illustrate the types of

strategies that a unipole may pursue.

Review of Monteiros Cases

Iraq

Monteiros first example of the unipoles strategy in action examines the United States role in

the 1990-91 Gulf War. Iraq Kuwait over $80 billion after borrowing money during the Iraq-Iran war, and

there had been ongoing disputes over what Iraq saw as overproduction of oil by Kuwait (which harmed

Iraqs oil revenue) (Monteiro p. 188). In 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. This invasion was

immediately considered an act of aggression by the international community; in the following months,

the United Nations authorized a US-led coalition of thirty-four countries to use force in order to liberate

Kuwait. Saddam Hussein was not expecting to encounter significant resistance but miscalculated the

United States determination to defend the status quo in the Middle East (Monteiro p. 186). As the first

major conflict involving the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War signaled a defensive

dominance approach for the unipole. The classification of this case is quite sound, as it would be hard to

blame anyone other than Iraq for revising the status quo. However, the next case presents a much more

subjective classification.
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Serbia and Kosovo

Monteiros next example of the unipoles strategic choice concerns the NATO intervention in

Kosovo in 1999. Kosovo, a province of Serbia (within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) where the local

population was over ninety percent Albanian, saw a rise in interethnic tension and conflict during the

1980s following the death of Josef Tito and subsequent instability in Yugoslavia. In an effort to

strengthen Serbian control over the province, President Slobodan Milosevic sought to take away the

political autonomy that Kosovo had historically held. This led to the development of an armed resistance

movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army, which targeted Serbian government and security forces. By late

1998, fighting between KLA separatists and the Serbian military and police had resulted in widespread

displacement and killing of Albanian civilians by Serbian forces. In 1999, the two sides met in

Rambouillet, France, to discuss a peace agreement that had been proposed by NATO mediators.

In Monteiros account, this case represents offensive dominance strategy in action. At

Rambouillet, the settlement document was drafted without significant input from the Serbian or

Albanian delegations (Posen 2000); the final proposal was full of conditions that gave it no chance of

being accepted by the Serbian government. It called for the restoration of Kosovos autonomy;

evacuation of the majority of Serbian military and police from Kosovo; freedom of movement for a

28,000-strong NATO force within not just Kosovo but all of Yugoslavia; and finally, a referendum in three

years time to determine the final status of Kosovos territory (Posen 2000; Herring 2000). These

conditions laid out a peaceful path to end the conflict while simultaneously expanding NATO. When

Serbia, unsurprisingly, rejected the terms of the agreement and offered a counter-proposal, NATO

swiftly mobilized for war. According to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Rambouillet

agreement was a provocation, and excuse to start bombing (Posen 2000). Additionally, Ikenberry

points to NATOs specific strategy during the 78-day bombing campaign as evidence that the

humanitarian motive was not the central motivator of US action. The use of high-altitude bombing and
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cluster bombs against Serb targets when more precise methods were available raises question about the

United States sincerity as a humanitarian actor: at higher altitudes, the accuracy of NATOs bombs was

diminished, while cluster bombs are indiscriminate in their effects and therefore dangerous (and

potentially illegal) when used in civilian areas (Ikenberry 2011, p. 91). Therefore, the United States was

determined to revise the status quo by expanding NATOs influence into southeastern Europe, and the

Serbian forces, who lacked international support, posed no serious obstacle (Monteiro 2014, p. 191;

Johnstone 2000).

However, an examination of this case from a different angle reveals how Monteiros

classification of offensive/defensive dominance is open to interpretation. As these options are defined

in relation to the status quo, the concept of the status quo itself must be the main consideration. For

example, consider how the war in Kosovo developed. Kosovo was marked by ethnic tensions throughout

the twentieth century, but remained relatively peaceful until 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic removed

its autonomous status and imposed cultural oppression on the majority Albanian population. This

change was met with calls for independence by Albanian Kosovars, as well as the creation of the Kosovo

Liberation Army (in fact, Kosovo formally declared its sovereign status in 1992 but was only recognized

by neighboring Albania). The resistance movement was peaceful at first, but had turned violent by 1996

as KLA guerillas carried out attacks and killings on Serbian officials and civilians. It was in response to this

violent resistance that Milosevic cracked down on the KLA and began the ethnic cleansing of Albanian

civilians. From the perspective of the United States and other members of NATO that participated in the

campaign, military action was an appropriate response to the unraveling humanitarian crisis.

In contrast to the scenario that Monteiro describes, which considers the United States

responsible for revising the status quo, one can alternatively argue that Serbias withdrawal of Kosovos

political autonomy in 1989 was the most significant revision to the status quo. The KLA resorted to

guerrilla warfare tactics in order to restore their functional independence, which had been a feature of
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the pre-existing international order. Milosevic and the Serbian forces retaliated against Kosovo with

brutal force and in doing so, created a humanitarian crisis that drew the attention of the international

community and gave NATO a legitimate reason to get involved. From this perspective, the US-led

intervention was not a unipolar revision of the status quo but rather a multilateral campaign to restore

peace, order, and Kosovos historical autonomy. In other words, it was a campaign of defensive

dominance on behalf of the unipole.

These contrasting accounts of the United States action in Kosovo highlight my claim that the

international status quo is a flexible concept and may appear different depending on ones timeframe

and perspective. The following cases should illustrate how this dichotomy affects sources of tension

between the United States and its most often-cited rivals: the Russian Federation and the Peoples

Republic of China.

Analysis

Case One: Russia

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 signaled the end of bipolarity and the start of the unipolar era.

Although the Cold War had ended, the rivalry between Russia and the NATO alliance was never

completely extinguished, and tensions simmered throughout the 1990s. The early 2000s were marked

by cooperation between NATO and Russia as the two rivals faced off against a common terrorist threat,

yet tensions soon resurfaced as NATO extended invitations to even more states on Russias periphery,

and its members supported revolutions that took place in Georgia and Ukraine (Ratti 2002). After a brief

war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, Russia-Western relations have remained stable, if slightly
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uncomfortable. The Ukrainian revolution and subsequent events quickly eroded the post-Cold War

status quo. This crisis, which stems from fundamental disagreements on Ukraines status within the

established European order, highlights the importance of understanding the status quo from the

perspectives of all sides involved.

The crisis and civil war in Ukraine can be traced back to late November of 2013, when

thousands of protesters gathered in Kievs Independence Square to voice their opposition towards then-

President Viktor Yanukovychs refusal to sign a trade agreement with the European Union. The proposed

agreement would have increased integration between Ukraine and the EU, and was dependant on

Ukraine adopting a number of political and economic reforms. (Dearden 2014) Instead, Yanukovych

turned to Russia, and accepted a deal worth at least $20 billion in loans and gas subsidies. Ukraines

economy was performing very poorly at the time and the EU deal did not compare favorably to the

Russian bailout in the short term. (Marson 2015) However, the suspended agreement would have

marked a momentous step away from Russia and significant progress towards EU accession for Ukraine.

As protesters in Kiev grew rapidly in number and demanded the resignation of President Yanukovych,

they were met with a brutal police response. The anti-government demonstrators fought back, and

despite facing lethal force and sustaining hundreds of casualties, they ultimately forced Yanukovych to

flee the capital in February 2014.

While the Euromaidan revolution achieved victory in Kiev, a new wave of instability was

developing in eastern and southern Ukraine. In March, one month after the removal of Yanukovych, the

territory of Crimea voted in favor of Russian accession and was immediately annexed: this move was

condemned by Western nations, the interim government in Kiev, and the United Nations General

Assembly. Following the annexation of Crimea, demonstrations against Kievs new pro-western

government escalated into violence between separatists and Ukrainian forces in the region of Donbass

(a territory that refers to the two oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk together). The rebelling factions,
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which claim independence from Ukraine, have received significant support from Russia in the form of

weapons, supplies, and personnel. As of September 2015, over eight thousand soldiers and civilians

have been killed in the conflict (OHCHR 2015)3; however, a ceasefire is currently in place and the conflict

is at an effective stalemate as of today. As a result of the Euromaidan revolution and the ongoing war in

Donbass, tensions between Russia and the West have risen to a level unseen since the Cold War.

From the perspective of the United States, Russias involvement in the Ukrainian crisis

represents the behavior of a revisionist power. The annexation of Crimea was a clear revision of the

particular arrangement of territories, which is part of Monteiros definition of the status quo of the

international order. Ever since Crimea was annexed, the United States and other Western powers and

institutions have decried Russias move as an egregious violation of international law, claiming that it

completely usurped Ukraines sovereign rights to the territory (Psaki 2014; The Economist 2015).

Therefore, one would assume that a strategy of defensive dominance by the United States would be

focused on restoring Crimeas status as a Ukrainian territory and putting an end to Russias support for

separatist movements in the Donbass region.

On the other hand, Russia firmly believes that the European Union and United States

overextended their reach by trying to draw Ukraine away from Russia and into the Western sphere of

influence. (Barry and Myers 2014) While the Euromaidan protests demonstrated that hundreds of

thousands of Ukrainians desired EU integration and truly wanted Yanukovych gone, the procedure in

which he was removed from office was not in line with the Ukrainian constitution and technically illegal.

(Morrison 2014) Thus, Western support for the pro-EU movement that overthrew Yanukovych and

installed a temporary government is viewed by Russia as a deliberate tactic of destabilization on behalf

of the American and European governments (Tsygankov 2015). Russian President Vladimir Putin used

the notion of historical justice to defend Russias annexation of Crimea, which has strong cultural and

3
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights
 Wortham 14

historical ties to Russia. The illegality of the pro-EU coup in Kiev, combined with Russias intent to

protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Crimea, led the Russian government to accept a

referendum on March 16, 2014, in which a vast majority of Crimean voters elected to join Russia and

secede from Ukraine (a vote that has been widely condemned by the US and European states as

illegitimate). Ukraine itself has long served as a buffer state between Russia and the eastern border of

NATO. Given the new Ukrainian governments desire to integrate with the EU and potentially become a

member of NATO, Russia undoubtedly considers its actions in Ukraine and specifically Crimea to be

defensive measures. Therefore, in Monteiros terms, the Wests efforts to influence Ukraines

international political alignment (through EU integration) and the military distribution of power (through

eventual NATO expansion) may very well justify Russias response, as these are technically revisions to

the status quo.

Ukraines internal revolution highlights a fundamental difficulty in using Monteiros model of

strategic choice. Revolutions, coups, or regime changes demonstrate how the international status quo is

constantly evolving, often due to domestic, not international, forces. As a result, it is difficult to

determine whether a unipolar intervention is a revision of the existing order, or rather the defense of a

new order once internal forces have tipped the scales in the unipoles favor. This is evident in the

current disagreement between the US and Russia in Ukraine, which stems from conflicting accounts of

which party is responsible for breaking the status quo. According to Tsygankov, the Wests lack of

awareness towards Russias values and interests in Eurasia made conflict over Ukraine inevitable (2015,

p. 280). He states, With respect to Ukraine, the dominant Russian perception stresses strong cultural

and historical ties between the two peoples... Russians consider Ukrainian people to be brotherly and

are resentful of what they view as the Western nations attempts to challenge the established cultural

bond or to convert Ukraine into their own system of values. (2015, p. 288) While the Euromaidan

revolution was a clear victory for Ukrainians who support integration with the West, it is not
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representative of the entire country. Overall, Ukraine is deeply divided between support for Russia and

the Western world, with citizens in western regions favoring EU integration and those in the east

favoring closer ties to Russia. From the Russian perspective, the United States support for the pro-EU

revolution and government appears to be an explicitly offensive campaign that threatens the legitimate

interests of Ukrainians who desire eastward integration. Not only is this interference unjust, but it is a

clear effort to draw Ukraine into the Wests sphere of influence and thus revise a long-standing neutral

arrangement. Therefore, a defensive strategy in the eyes of the US (and the EU) ultimately produces

the same outcome that Monteiro would expect from an offensive revision. This reinforces my claim that

in order to achieve the results of a defensive dominance strategy, the unipole must operate with respect

to its rivals perception of the status quo.

The Ukrainian revolution has undoubtedly shaken the structure of the Eurasian status quo, and

for now it appears that their current government is committed to the West. After the US and EU

responded to the annexation of Crimea with coordinated economic sanctions, Russias economy has

faced significant contraction, inflation, and capital flight. While Russia surely regrets losing Kiev to

Western influence, the acquisition of Crimea is a worthy consolation, and so far Russia has been willing

to endure the negative economic repercussions (Nelson 2014). Moving forward, it appears that any

strategy that Russia would accept as legitimately non-threatening would have to accept Russian control

of Crimea, or at the very least least allow it to become independent (and then inevitably ally with or

become part of Russia). (Trenin 2015) The territory of Crimea has immense strategic value to Russia, due

to a naval facility in Sevastopol that serves as one of Russias few warm-water ports and the home of

their Black Sea Fleet. While Russia has begun construction of another Black Sea naval facility in

Novorossiysk, this new location lacks the natural deep-water harbor that the base in Sevastopol

provides, and access is limited by preexisting commercial activity. (Jones 2015) According to Russias

Maritime Doctrine for 2015, bolstering the facility in Crimea will be a main priority. (McCormac 2015)
 Wortham 16

The second issue involving Russia concerns its involvement in the Syrian civil war. In 2011,

thousands of Syrians gathered to protest against the repressive government of Bashar al-Assad, during

the wave of Arab Spring revolutions across North Africa and the Middle East. After a series of clashes

between demonstrators and police that resulted in civilian casualties, Assad responded by deploying the

Syrian army in an effort to fully extinguish the protests. When reports of human rights violations

surfaced, Western leaders including President Barack Obama called for Assad to step down, and began

supplying non-lethal aid to Syrian rebels. As Islamist extremist groups such as ISIL and the al-Nusra Front

carved out a significant presence within the anti-government opposition, the United States was forced

to adjust its strategy in order to confront this new threat. Today, the United States is simultaneously

pursuing two separate goals: destroying ISIL, and removing Assad from power.

These two objectives have appeared counterproductive at times, but the US and its allies

believe that Assads rule is responsible for fueling radicalism in the region. (Barnard 2015) They also

maintain that Assads use of chemical weapons must be punished (Obama 2013). Therefore, while the

US has struggled to develop a cohesive strategy towards the Syrian conflict, it remains committed to

supporting the anti-government opposition and ousting the Assad regime. This is an example of

offensive dominance, as regime change would alter the existing political alignment of Syria.

In contrast to the United States approach, Russia possesses a much clearer strategy towards the

Syrian conflict. Ever since Bashar al-Assads father aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War,

Syria has served as an important ally to Russia in the Middle East. Russias current strategy in Syria is

focused on destroying ISIL while supporting Assads regime through the supply of aid and use of air

power against anti-government factions. From the perspective of Russia, these two objectives are

clearly aligned with one another. Despite the claim that Assads rule is driving radicalist ideology, Russia

argues that a strong government presence is necessary in order to prevent the spread of the Islamic

State within Syria (Gerrans 2015).

 Wortham 17

By supporting the Assad regime and defending the status quo in Syria, Russia has once again

distanced itself from the majority of the international community. It stands with a small bloc of other

states that believe national sovereignty takes precedence over international humanitarian norms, and

that the principle of non-interference is more important than the right to protect. Despite the general

unpopularity of this notion, Russias stance has highlighted an issue that the West must face: simply

removing Assad from power is not a final solution to the Syrian crisis. The conflict between those who

want a free and secular government in Syria and those who desire to expand the caliphate governed by

strict Islamic law will not end once the regime is toppled. In order to guarantee that extremist

organizations such as ISIL do not succeed, those calling for Assad to go would have to develop a long-

term plan and commit the proper resources to make sure that the next government can defend its

people and meet their needs. After the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which represented

offensive dominance strategies in the Middle East (Monteiro p. 209), Western nations should be wary of

getting involved in another similar commitment.

While the current Syrian government is undeniably a brutal and repressive regime, it has had

the strange fortune of fighting an enemy that seems eager to prove itself as the most brutal and violent

terrorist organization in the whole world. The emergence of ISIL has put a great deal of pressure on the

nations calling for Assad to step down, because of the tremendous costs and uncertainties that would

be associated with regime change. Even if the US and its allies were to undertake the task of removing

Assad and supporting a new government, this revision could be expected to initiate a balancing effort,

as Iran and Russia would be compelled to defend their ally. As a result of these potential costs, a US

strategy of offensive dominance in Syria is unlikely to take place. If the US adopts a strategy of defensive

dominance, it must preserve the existing elements of the status quo. Bashar al-Assad may step down as

a condition of a final political solution, but the Russian-allied government and leadership must
 Wortham 18

ultimately remain in power. Otherwise, this would be a revision to the current international political

alignment, and an outcome that would trigger balancing against the US.

Maintaining the status quo has important implications for Russias global military capabilities. Its

alliance with Syria allows it to keep a military presence in the Mediterranean Sea via a naval base in the

port of Tartus. This base ensures that Russia can operate from the Mediterranean without having to

pass through the Bosphorus Strait, which is controlled by its rival Turkey. Furthermore, this location may

be used as a key point of anti-access/area denial against Russias major competitors in the region.

According to the top commander of NATO, the air defenses and air-to-air fighter aircraft that Russia has

brought to Syria are very sophisticated, and go beyond any air capabilities that ISIL or terrorist groups

could use; these systems are most likely designed to counter NATO operations in the Eastern

Mediterranean (Freedburg 2015). Overall, Russias activities in the Middle East appear to reflect its

considerable influence in the region.

Case Two: China

The rise of China has been described as one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century

(Ikenberry 2008). The emergence of a new superpower within the international system has been a

major point of focus for foreign policy analysts and scholars, especially in the United States. According to

Ikenberry, [Chinas] preference for multipolarity and periodic resentment at what it sees as the United

States assertion of special rights and privileges is...well established. He cites Easleys report on research

conducted by official Chinese Foreign Ministry sources, in which Chinese analyses of multipolarity

explicitly reflect the predicted preference for a flat hierarchy over one in which a single state has

primacy; that is, they express a preference for a world in which no power has a special claim to

leadership. (Ikenberry 2011, p. 63) Despite its stated preference for an equal hierarchy between great

powers, China has prospered within the current unipolar order, and its rise has been peaceful so far.
 Wortham 19

Nonetheless, experts continue to debate Chinas future role in the international system, and the United

States and its allies in East Asia remain curious and wary of Chinas aims.

While Chinas ascension to economic superpower status is generally accepted as inevitable, the

questions Monteiros theory seeks to address is whether or not China will be satisfied with the existing

international arrangement that accommodated its rise, and to what degree will it attempt to shape it. In

Theory of Unipolarity, Monteiro uses China as his primary case study. The absence of full-blown

militarization by China seems to provide support for Monteiros argument. Armed with a relatively small

but capable nuclear arsenal, Chinas immediate survival is guaranteed, and so long as the United States

does not threaten its long-term survival, there is little need to balance against the unipoles

conventional power preponderance. The fact that the Chinese defense budget grew slower than the

United States between 2003 and 2012 supports the notion that China is not actively pursuing a

balancing strategy, and is content to remain a major power (Monteiro 127).

However, Chinas lack of effort to establish itself as a pole (or great power) does not necessarily

mean that it will remain content with the status quo. As China overtakes the United States as the

worlds primary economic superpower, it may seek a greater hegemonic role. General-Secretary Xi

Jinping has advocated for China to take on a more assertive role on the international stage, and use its

economic and diplomatic leverage to reshape the regional security arrangement without resorting to

armed conflict (Qin 2014; Paal 2015). Additionally, some scholars have considered the fact that Chinas

peaceful rise may be a deliberate tactic. Playing the role of patient hegemon, China can wait until its

latent power is strong enough to support certain revisions. Deng Xiaoping supposedly advised, "Observe

calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at

maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership." (Legro 2008, p. 519) While Chinas current

foreign policy under Xi seems to be moving away from this hide-and-bide strategy, its latent power

will remain a force to be reckoned with if its interests are threatened directly. Shearman (2014) notes
 Wortham 20

that, Given the speed with which China builds cities, roads, airports, and fast trains, there is little

reason to believe that it will not also build up its military might in a very short time period. (p. 15)

Additionally, Monteiros conclusion about Chinas unlikely challenge to US unipolarity does not

account for the possibility of nationalism as a motivating factor. Tellis (2014) reminds us that Western

states that were once rising powers themselves are familiar with the relationship between expanding

economic strength and nationalistic awakenings. In recent years, Chinese nationalism has been

manifested in coercive actions that would have previously been viewed as excessively risky. For

example, the seizures of disputed territories in the South and East China Seas, as well as threats of

punishment towards traditional rivals, have been legitimized by social forces within the state or Chinese

citizenry. Tellis argues that This development effectively refutes the widespread expectation that

Chinas economic growth, deriving as it did from interdependence instead of from the autarkic means

that have led to the rise of other great powers, would produce a more pacific and cosmopolitan

population focused on securing self-government at home rather than the expansion of national

influence abroad. (p. 17) In other words, although the systemic conditions have allowed China to

prosper peacefully so far, it would be unwise to completely dismiss the possibility that rising Chinese

nationalism could turn into militarism in the future.

So far, Chinas rise has already put a great deal of pressure on the status quo in its own region.

Disputes over sovereign rights in the South China Sea have escalated into naval confrontations between

China and a number of other states. Most recently, Chinas development of artificial islands for military

purposes in the Spratly Islands archipelago has drawn criticism from the US, as well as Vietnam,

Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines, who all have territorial claims within the islands. The US

contends that construction on disputed territory is illegal and coercive, and has responded by increasing

its naval presence in the region (Cronk 2015).

 Wortham 21

Meanwhile, Chinas greater military efforts have been focused on naval anti-access area-denial

towards the United States, with no indication that they seek to develop ambitious blue-water

expeditionary goals. In response to this strategy, which is fundamentally defensive in nature, the US has

implemented a new air-sea battle concept aimed at maintaining its supremacy in Chinas own region

(Monteiro 132). The United States may have a legitimate concern that Chinas island-building and

defensive policies will disrupt trade in the South China Sea and intimidate neighboring states, but as

long as it continues to bolster its own capabilities in the region, China will most likely continue to step up

its own defenses. After all, this territory is in Chinas own backyard, and they view the US naval presence

as an infringement of sovereignty. Based on Monteiros assumption that states will engage in balancing

to improve their odds of survival and ability to grow, the United States effort to defend the status quo

in the South China Sea may have the same effect as an offensive revisionist strategy, as China feels

threatened by what it perceives as intrusive behavior.

Outcomes

This analysis has demonstrated how certain major powers may perceive the unipoles strategy

of defensive dominance as a threat to their survival. When taking into account my claim that the status

quo of the international order is a flexible concept, Monteiros logic produces a much different set of

outcomes. The question is whether these outcomes are enough to support the hypothesis that

Monteiros strategy is not conducive to unipolarity, but rather a return to multipolarity.

In the case of Russia, I believe the outcomes do support the hypothesis. While preserving

control of Crimea guarantees permanent access to the warm water port in Sevastopol and naval

dominance of the Black Sea, this is more of a security benefit within its own region. The most critical

outcome is Russias continued presence in Syria, as this can serve as a base for projecting military power

in both the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East. According to Monteiro, a great power is a state
 Wortham 22

whose preferences must be taken seriously on important issues involving relevant regions of the globe

beyond the one in which it is located - as seriously as those of any other state. (45) So far, Russias role

in the fight against the Islamic State as well as its support for Assad throughout the Syrian civil war

seems to meet Monteiros criteria.

Meanwhile, the results of defending the status quo in the case of China are less clear. The exact

manner in which China would go about balancing against the US does not manifest itself as clearly as it

does in the case of Russia, but as long as the United States continues to enforce the status quo in the

South China Sea, China is likely to continue building up its own defenses in response to this perceived

threat. This appears to be an example of the security dilemma unfolding in Chinas own region, and will

undoubtedly impact the overall US-China rivalry and heighten tensions between these two states.

Despite the significance of this outcome, it is not directly related to potential Chinese power projection

across the globe. Therefore, the case does not support my hypothesis, which addresses Monteiros

specific definition of polarity.

However, the rise of China presents a more complex challenge that seems to go beyond

Monteiros idea of what constitutes polar status. In a 2014 publication by the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, entitled Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing

China, Ashley J. Tellis outlines a variety of issues that are surfacing as a result of the US-China rivalry.

Assuming China continues to grow at a higher rate than the United States, it will eventually match and

surpass the US in terms of material (in other words, latent) power, which Tellis describes as the ability

of a state to protect its freedom of action through the possession of superior economic capabilities that

in turn enable the production of requisite military strength. China may not choose to transform its

latent capabilities into actual military force, and thus accept that the United States remains unmatched

when it comes to security competition. However, this option will remain a legitimate threat, and while a

power transition in the strict vocabulary of military capabilities may be avoided during Chinas ascent to
 Wortham 23

economic superpower status, Beijings capacity to challenge Washingtons interests in multiple arenas,

ranging from geopolitics to trade and from advancing human rights to protecting the commons, will only

increase as its power expands. (Tellis 2014) As it turns out, Chinese political leadership is apparently

well aware of the multidimensional aspect of global power. Shambaugh (2014) explains this fact in

detail:

Over a longer period of time, a distinguishing feature of Chinas modernization mission has been

the national pursuit of comprehensive power. The Chinese have wisely learned one key lesson

from studying the experiences of other previous powers: genuine global powers possess

multidimensional strength. Chinese strategists have observed the failings of other powers that

possessed strength in only a single dimension or a few, and they have thus concluded that it is

important to build and cultivate power comprehensively across a variety of spheres: the

economy, science, technology, education, culture, values, military, governance, diplomacy, and

other sectors. The Chinese grasp that idea that power is comprehensive and integrative, not

atomistic. Nor is power today the same as in the nineteenth or twentieth century, when

industrial and military power prevailed; today it must reflect a strong cultural and normative

dimension (soft power) as well. (p. 5-6)

Based on what this current literature is saying about Chinas multidimensional quest for global status, it

appears that evaluating the US-China relationship in strictly realist terms misses out on some of the

greater trends. As this relationship (or rivalry) continues to develop, it must be monitored in a

comprehensive manner.

Ultimately, the outcomes of the cases I have studied suggest that Monteiros grand strategy of

defensive dominance may not be conducive to a return to multipolarity, but the strategy does provide
 Wortham 24

an avenue for one major power to meet the criteria to be a pole, and thus reestablish bipolarity. This

has a number of significant implications. For starters, I am not arguing that Russia has suddenly emerged

as an equal competitor to the United States overall power preponderance. While it is certainly a

powerful state, Russias internal economic issues and demographic problems mean that its overall latent

power is diminishing (Monteiro p. 125). Yet, it remains a legitimate adversary to the US on preeminent

global issues, and it appears to qualify for Monteiros definition of a pole in the respects that I have

shown. The Middle East is only one truly external region where Russia can project power, but its vast

natural territory gives it an inherent geostrategic advantage, as it already projects power from the

Baltic Sea to East Asia, and the Black Sea to the Arctic.

The fact that Russia qualifies for polar status, especially when taking into consideration that

China does not, might further undermine the relevance of polarity. As Ikenberry and others have

argued, the invention of nuclear weapons has given certain states a certain guarantee of security and

diminished the relevance of structural realist arguments. In Theory of Unipolarity, Monteiro is only

concerned with the specific definition of unipolarity that measures states military capability (a fact that

he emphasizes numerous times). As a result, his theory is susceptible to criticism that he is missing the

point, by those who argue that other factors (such as economics, institutional integration, cultural

influence, values, etc.) play a more important role in determining international hierarchy. It is ultimately

possible for one to accept Monteiros explanation of neorealist politics while dismissing its overall

relevance to the modern world.

From the perspective that views military capability as the determining factor of system

structure, Monteiros theory provides a strong account of the mechanisms that dictate current

international order. However, when he presents his argument for a grand strategy that is supposed to

be conducive to lasting United States unipolarity, fundamental flaws in the theory appear. For a grand
 Wortham 25

strategy to make sense within the frame of unipolar politics, it should not hinge on subjective

assessments of the international status quo.

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