H.

Search and Seizure

Pollo v. Constantino-David, GR 181881, 18 October 2011

FACTS: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison
Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.

Petitioner Assails the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files upon the order of the Chairwoman of the
Civil Service Commission without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.

ISSUE:
1. Was there a violation of right to privacy?
2. Can the government as employer invade the private files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial
investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and without the latters consent or participation?

1. None.

DOCTRINE: To establish a violation of rights to privacy, one must first prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x
x x And, in order to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy, one must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable. x x x

In this case, Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his
personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open
to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On
the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even
unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown
people" and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting
cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly
had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer."46 Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. Moreover, The CSC in its Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" had
implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means.

2. Yes.

DOCTRINE: Government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace
for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct without meeting the "probable cause" or warrant
requirement for search and seizure, provided the search is reasonable in its inception and scope.

"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider whether theaction was justified at its inception, x x x ; second,
one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place," x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to
retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the [misconduct]." x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the search of Pollos computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace. It bears emphasis that the
CSC pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related
misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain
division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation
was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending
cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt
upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and
objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so,
otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

N. Double Jeopardy
Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, GR 172716, 17 November 2010

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71
(MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

ISSUE: Does Ivlers constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property?

Yes, the Supreme Court dismissed the Information against Ivler in Criminal Case No. 82366 (Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property)
against petitioner Jason Ivler pending with the MTC on the ground of double jeopardy.

DOCTRINES:
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible, unlike
willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional
crimes.

2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-offense since the crime of Reckless Imprudence is a
Single Crime; and its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense
of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.

3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature
crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
1
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two
or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do
no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and
only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.