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"Vietnam: the Longest War with Prolonged Effects:

The Impact of the Vietnam War on the Theology and


Practices of the United States Army Chaplaincy

Student ID. 1404305


MA Military History (DL)
Module: Dissertation Year 2
September 2017

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Introduction
The title of this dissertation comes from the third volume of the Official History of the United
States Army Chaplaincy. The essay asks the question: how did the Vietnam War change the
theology of the Chaplaincy and how was that manifested in practice?
Vietnam was a war unlike any other that America had experienced its history. The Military
Assistance Command Vietnam [MACV] History for 1969 stated, Never in the past has a war
been fraught with so much political/diplomatic sensitivity as is the case in the war in Vietnam.1
The 1967 History had also noted, there has been no other U.S. military action in which the
press has been more active than they have in their coverage of the war in Vietnam.2 In 1967
there were 2500 accredited journalists in Vietnam, 466 of whom were from America. The
presence of the press would prove pivotal to public support for the war and thereby to the
outcome.
The conflict was different from a military viewpoint. America became enmeshed over a
decade; the war was not thrust upon it, as with World War Two or Korea. It was primarily a
counter-insurgency operation. There were no rigid frontlines; operations were conducted
amongst the population which did not sit well with American military doctrine regarding the
use of firepower. The inability to adapt to the reality on the ground combined with a
determination to reinforce failure with increasing force made the war unwinnable from a
political point of view. For the chaplains deployed to Vietnam the war was also unlike any
other they had encountered and one for which they were not well prepared. This essay
concentrates on the Army chaplaincy and on chaplains assigned to combat units. It was at this
level that the intersection between the profession of faith and the profession of arms was most
problematic. It will, however, include some reference to the chaplains of the Marine Corps as
they also deployed on the ground and faced similar dilemmas as their Army counterparts.
Chapter 1 will outline the religious and political context in which the chaplains were operating.
The chaplains of the 1960's were working to the theology of the 1950's, a time of moral
absolutes and defined social norms. The Chaplaincy was influenced by the post-1945 fear of
Communism in America and the need to contain its spread. On this subject, most
denominations were united. A difference of opinion would emerge once the Vietnam War was
underway, but the overwhelming majority of religious bodies supported its commencement.
Religious revivals, sacramental and evangelical, flourished in the 1950s, and church
attendance grew during the decade. The influence of religion upon politicians was very evident,
in 1945 Truman stated,
I believe that Almighty God intends us to assume the leadership which He intended us to
assume in 1920 and which we refused. And I believe that if we do that, our problems would
almost solve themselves.3
This conflation of religion and nationalism produced what 1960s commentators called Civil
Religion. Patriotism became interwoven with religion until the distinction between them was
blurred. In this worldview, America had been founded as a fulfilment of God's plan. America
1
MACV Command History 1969 Volume III page XI-3
2
MACV Command History 1967, Volume II, p.959
3
M. Gustafson, Church, State and the Cold War 1945-1952, Church and State, (49) (1966) p .50

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was the epitome of democracy; it was the de facto defender of the Free World' and sworn
enemy of atheistic Communism. The implication of this for a chaplain was that, if he enabled
a man to be a better soldier, he was indeed doing Gods work. By the end of the war, this
situation had been reversed as most churches joined the anti-war movement. A new theology
emerged, informed by the Civil Rights movement, which focused on the lack of freedom in
America and other nations of the supposed Free World'. The role of the American Armed
Forces was heavily criticised, as were the clergy who worked within them. Chaplains were no
longer building up Christian Soldiers they were sustaining a war machine which was an
instrument of oppression.
Chapter 2 describes the deployment of chaplains to Vietnam and the regime in which they
operated. The official expectations of the Army are found in Regulations and Field Manuals.
The Field Manuals contain the guidelines for a chaplain's duties. Several iterations appeared
during the Vietnam conflict, and the revisions made reflect some of the issues raised by the
war. The reality is to be found in memoirs, chaplains periodicals and staff reports. Most
memoirs were written by combat chaplains, although the voices of those who served in other
branches are captured in a departmental history, He Was Always There, which was compiled
in 1989.
Chapter 3 will examine one responsibility of the Chaplain in greater detail- the Character
Guidance Program. The programme evolved in the 1950s in response to the promiscuity of
soldiers between 1944 and 1945 which resulted in a VD epidemic. Character Guidance was
devised by the Chaplaincy and offered as a solution to the perceived moral laxity of servicemen.
Having been gratefully accepted by the Secretary of Defense, it gained further importance after
the Korean War when many POW's succumbed to Communist indoctrination. This didactic
programme did not survive contact with the reality of Vietnam, and it was the Chaplaincy that
first saw the need for a new style of moral instruction
Chapter 4 examines the opposition to the war from religious bodies. At the outset, there was
widespread support for the war as a necessary response to Communist aggression. Support
declined in the face of reports that the government was, in fact, propping up a brutal and corrupt
dictatorship. The Chaplaincy was singled out for criticism because opponents felt that the
presence of clergy in uniform served to sanctify the war. They upbraided chaplains for not
exercising a prophetic ministry in which they should have spoken out against the war and its
prosecution. A minority of chaplains did register their protests, sufficient for the Chaplaincy to
pronounce upon the issue. In private many chaplains did hold reservations, but for them, their
ministry to soldiers came first.
Chapter 5 addresses three particular issues that emerged during the conflict; each had a
profound impact upon the Chaplaincy.
The first issue laid at the chaplain's door was the widespread use of drugs by troops stationed
in Vietnam. They were expected to be the primary responder because of the perception of the
problem as a matter of moral laxity. Once the Army realised the complexity of the issue,
prompted in no small part by the Chief of Chaplains, the chaplain became a member of a staff
team rather than a lone operator. The deployment of the chaplain as part of a team was a tactic
adopted more frequently as the Chaplaincy emerged from its wartime experience.

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One problem chaplains, in particular, were called upon to address was racial tension. The Army
was no exception to the racial tension exposed by the civil rights movement, and it also carried
its particular legacy of prejudice against black troops. In the early 70s the Army relied heavily
on its chaplains to try and diffuse the racial tensions that had developed. The Chaplaincy
showed an understanding of the issues involved and a determination to address them that sadly
lacking in other parts of society
The final challenge was one which caused the most soul-searching, not just for the Chaplaincy
but the Army and the nation. Did the conduct of some American troops in Vietnam constitute
war crimes? The most infamous atrocity was that committed in the village of My Lai in 1968.
The official enquiry into the massacre did not reflect well on the chaplains of the unit involved.
Despite Army assurances, My Lai was far from an isolated incident, and the response of
chaplains to other occasions of brutality was also found to be wanting. This omission is
something that the organisation acknowledged, and the response proved to be far-sighted.
The conclusion is informed by the deliberations of the Chaplaincy about its performance during
the war. It is the position of this paper that the Army chaplaincy showed a continuing
willingness to learn from its mistakes; it displayed a clear understanding of the altered
circumstances in which the Army was operating and a practical appreciation of what needed to
change if the Army was to fulfil its post-war role.
Two current historians address the Vietnam era Chaplaincy. Anne Lovelands Change and
Conflict in the US Army Chaplain Corps since 1945 describes the development of the
Chaplaincy from the end of the Second World War into the new millennium. The book
describes in detail the issues and the key players in the development of the institution. There is
perhaps an overemphasis of the part played in the narrative by chaplains from evangelical
denominations. The book is one of many Loveland has written in which she traces the
emergence of the Religious Right through the prism of the Chaplaincy. Evangelical chaplains
are held by her to be a disruptive element because of their alleged proselytising activities. She
does not give sufficient emphasis to the influence of the Catholic Church in the person of
Cardinal Spellman who was the Ordinary (senior cleric) for the Roman Catholic Chaplaincy
and who played an influential role in the politics surrounding Vietnam.
The second work is Jaqueline Whitts, Bringing God to Men: Americas Military Chaplains
and the Vietnam War, which examines the way in which chaplains struggled to reconcile their
prophetic calling to speak out against the war, with the pastoral needs of the soldiers they
served. She describes the ministry of presence, a term used by the chaplains themselves. This
type of ministry held that the primary role of a chaplain was to be with the troops whenever
possible, sharing their pain and alleviating their spiritual suffering. Any consideration of protest
against the war had to be weighed against the needs of the soldiers for succour. Chaplains had
to reconcile these two demands on a daily basis. Whitt contends that the chaplains accounts
and actions bear witness to their belief that they didn't allow either factor to dominate their
work. This conclusion, however, does not take account of the acknowledgement by individual
chaplains and the Chaplaincy itself that they could have played a greater role, at all levels, in
moderating the prosecution of the war.

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Chapter1. The Chaplaincy, Civil Religion and the New Breed
The Army Chaplaincy in the 1960s was a product of the religious thinking of 1950's America.
Society was dominated by a fear of Communism coupled with a sense of Americas divinely
appointed place in the world affairs. In 1951, President Truman made the following statement
to a Presbyterian congregation in New York,
Divine Providence has played a great part in our history. I have the feeling that God
created us and brought us to our present position of power and strength for some great
purpose. Our country is intended to do all it can to create peace and preserve peace in
the world. It is given to us to defend the spiritual values against the vast forces of evil
that seek to destroy them.4
This encapsulates Americas self-image in the immediate post-war period. In political and
economic terms America had had a good war. It became the predominant military power in
the nuclear age, challenged only by the Soviet Union. Continental America was unscathed, and
the nation was financially secure. A conflation of God's purpose with America's fortunes played
into the religious life of America in different ways. For evangelical Christians, Americas
prosperity was a sure sign of Gods favour on the nation. The Catholic Church took a more
Universalist view and supported Marshall Plan for the rebuilding of Europe, which by no means
a popular initiative. The Church still took advantage of increased prosperity with a massive
building programme of churches and schools. The fact that America needed a strong military
arm to preserve this position, for most denominations, was a given. It was left to the more
liberal Protestant denominations to sound a note of caution; in 1950 the National Council of
Churches stated, The preponderant majority reluctantly accept the necessity of military
strength to serve as a deterrent to aggression. We should guard against self-righteousness and
hatred which gives an impulse to a holy or preventative war.5
The equation of the nation with religion would be a problem for the Chaplaincy in the 1960's.
One cause of the problem was the First Amendment to the Constitution. There were two
elements to the Amendment; the first guaranteed the right of citizens to the free exercise of
their religion without interference by the State, the second forbade the establishment of any
one faith as the official state religion. The non-establishment clause was taken to mean that any
action by government which seemed to favour one denomination or faith group would be
unconstitutional. Government actions were closely scrutinised and objections raised to issues
such as tax exemptions for denominations and provision of free school transport. The two
clauses would be used by supporters and opponents of the Chaplaincy during the Vietnam War.
The eruption of the Korean War rocked this political and religious complacency. After the
initial victories of North Korea, McArthur's early success seemed to vindicate the view of
America as the defender of world freedom. The second shockwave came with the entry of
China into the war. U.N. troops were forced into an ignominious retreat from the Chinese
border. Although the independence of South Korea was eventually secured, the war had shaken
America. The ease with which the Chinese brainwashed American prisoners into making anti-
capitalist statements shocked the Army; some studies indicated that up to 90% of POWs were

4
Gustafson, Church, State and the Cold War, p.51
5
Gustafson, Church, State and the Cold War, p.51

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subverted.6 The fact that only one of the many chaplains taken prisoner returned from captivity
was not lost on Army chaplains.
The religious communities looked for an explanation of America's reverses in the war. The
moral weakness of the soldiers seemed to provide the answer. Individual Americans needed
religious renewal. Evangelists such as Billy Graham held public rallies; the Catholic Church
encouraged both public worship and private devotions. By 1955, a Gallup poll indicated that
96% of Americans expressed a belief in God.7 Catholics achieved a 75% church attendance
level. This collective identification left little room for individual conscience, and the views of
more liberal theologians were drowned out by the anti-Communist rhetoric of what was now
the mainstream. Billy Graham made the stark pronouncement; Communism is far more than
just an economic and philosophical interpretation of life. Communism is a fanatical religion
that has declared war upon the Christian God; it carries with it all the indications of the anti-
Christ.8A belief in God, even if it did not translate into church attendance, had now become
an essential part of what it meant to be an American.9
The Army needed its own religious revival and chaplains came to the fore because of the
Character Guidance Programme. Before this, they had been seen by many commanders as a
presence required by the free exercise of religion' clause. They could add the benefit of giving
spiritual strength to the troops which could act as a morale booster and thereby a force
multiplier. A pamphlet produced in 1950, The Chaplain and Military Morale, stated, The
chaplain is a specialist in religion, which is inherently concerned with goals and purposes and
the sacrificial spirit.10 Their duties were, nevertheless, primarily sacramental and liturgical
with an acknowledgement that their status as clergy lent itself to a part-time counselling role.
The Character Guidance Programme provided a soldier with a purpose that will lead him to
faithfully serve his home, his church, and his country whether in personal combat or in
captivity.11 The chaplains task was clear; he was to remind soldiers of the virtues they should
cultivate to be a better soldier and to provide them with the spiritual sustenance to maintain
this state of readiness. The first chaplains who deployed in Vietnam were career soldiers who
had served in Korea and, in some cases, World War Two. They were thoroughly schooled in
this approach to chaplaincy. The experience of Vietnam did little to shake some of them from
their surety. For other regular chaplains, Vietnam had a sobering effect and prompted the re-
evaluation of the meaning of chaplaincy. As the demand for chaplains grew, volunteers came
forward who were younger than the regular chaplains. Perhaps this enabled them to relate more
closely to the new generation of recruits. They also had a different theological outlook as many
of them had been exposed to the liberation of religious thinking in the 1960s. This new
approach found its expression in the Second Vatican Council, the meetings of the World
Council of Churches and the writing of theologians such as Harvey Cox and Robert Klitgaard.
In this movement, churchmen could no longer stand aside from public affairs, they had to

6
K. R. Speer, An Evaluation Technique for the United States Army Character Guidance Program, Dissertation
submitted to Baylor University, Waco, Texas (August 1973), p.16
7
J.E. Whitt, Bringing God to Men: Americas Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War, (University of Carolina
Press, 2014), p.25
8
Whitt, Bringing God to Men, p.29
9
Whitt, Bringing God to Men, p.26
10
A. C. Loveland, Change and Conflict in the US Army Chaplain Corps since 1945, (University of Tennessee
Press, 2014), p.147
11
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.148

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practice the Gospel in the world in which they lived, and they were expected to bear public
witness to its teaching even if that meant challenging authority. Harvey Cox christened the
socially-aware clergy The New Breed'.12 The regime under which chaplains in Vietnam were
expected to work did not reflect this theology which created a tension that individuals chaplains
had to resolve. It is their response to his challenge which informed the post-war debate about
the nature of chaplaincy in the army.

Chapter 2. Man of God or Man of War?


Two conflicting narratives describe the American involvement in Vietnam. Chaplains were
caught in the friction between these views, and their experience of this situation would prompt
many of the post-war changes in the Chaplaincy. In the government version, following the
withdrawal of France from Vietnam in 1954, America had given the fledgeling South
Vietnamese state sufficient military and economic assistance to enable it to survive Communist
subversion and terror attacks. This aid was restricted to a level that supported the South
Vietnamese as a bulwark against further Communist expansion. America only deployed ground
troops to Vietnam following attacks by North Vietnam on U.S ships in international waters
near the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964. America then fought a difficult war against an elusive
enemy until the level of American casualties became unacceptable to the population back
home. This change in public opinion meant that the withdrawal of American troops was
inevitable, despite military success on the ground. America then reverted to its original tactic
of enabling the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) was unable to do this, and despite America's best efforts, Vietnam became a
Communist state.
The second narrative espoused by the anti-war protestors claimed that by the time U.S. troops
deployed ground units to Vietnam in 1964, the government had been heavily involved in
Vietnam for well over a decade. American military advisors had been fighting alongside
ARVN units for many years. U.S. pilots had flown combat missions under the guise of training,
and the attacks on the U.S. Navy were a response to a sustained CIA-enabled terror campaign
in the North which included raids on the North Vietnamese coast. America had actively
encouraged South Vietnam to try and destabilise its Communist neighbour. Once this failed,
the Tonkin incident was used as an excuse for the deployment of American troops to
accomplish what the South Vietnamese had been unable to do. The Americans then tried to use
their overwhelming firepower to destroy their elusive enemies and in doing so inflicted
disproportionate damage to the people and the country they were there to save. Despite the
claims of success made by the Army and the President, the Tet offensive of 1968 seemed to be
a clear sign that the war was unwinnable. Whatever the initial justification, the war had now
become an example of American imperialism and had to be stopped. The reality of what
happened in Vietnam is still a subject for debate. The importance of the two viewpoints for this
essay is the impact they had on the work of the chaplains.
The first narrative produced widespread support for American intervention. It meshed well
with the view of America as the defender of freedom. Because of this support, the chaplains

H.G. Cox, The New Breed in American Churches: Sources of Social Activism in American Religion,
12

Daedalus, Volume 96:1(Winter 1967), pp135-150

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that accompanied the earlier deployments of troops faced less criticism of their role than those
who deployed in the late 60's and early 70's. By then, American military and Vietnamese
civilian causalities were considerable, and the extent of government duplicity had been exposed
by the leaks of the Pentagon Papers. Also, the methods the Armed Forces were using to fight
the war had been graphically revealed by the Press. During the Tet offensive T.V. coverage,
some of it live reporting, occupied 95% of the news and was watched by over 50 million
Americans.13 All these factors gave the second narrative greater currency. The opprobrium
attached to anyone involved in the fighting became intense. Soldiers were abused at airports
when they returned home. Chaplains were singled out by the anti-war protestors as war
mongers.
The views of the chaplains fell somewhere between the two narratives. Many felt that the
mission in Vietnam was justified and continued to do so after the war. Chaplain Marvin Trott;
I believe God made the United States the best nation on Earth to follow after
righteousness and peace and we failed to use our power to annihilate Hanoi and bring
it to its knees. We had a right to be there and help the South Vietnamese to win the war
against the North Vietnamese invaders. 14
Many had their doubts, even though they volunteered to serve in Vietnam,
The first few weeks in Vietnam I wondered whatever possessed me to volunteer.
The chaplain is most needed in combat situations, and that is where I gave the most
meaningful ministry. There was a great deal of frustration, frustration at the war itself
and anger every time I watched a young man die. But the ministry of the chaplain
remains, to bring comfort and encouragement to those involved in activities that are
horrible, whether right or wrong.15
There was one aspect of the war that united chaplains of all persuasions - their devotion to the
soldiers they served. Chief of Chaplains Hyatt recalled, just before his death in 1987,
It was my third war: my appreciation for and my pride in my fellow chaplains
grew and blossomed in Vietnam. Ive always thought Id a strong faith, but it was
strengthened, profoundly strengthened, by the military officers and men, by the
magnificent chaplains who administered Vietnam.16
There was a particular aspect of the war in which religion had a hand, the presidency of Ngo
Dinh Diem. The American government was looking to repeat the success in the Philippines of
a CIA sponsored leader, Ramon Magsaysay. Edward Lansdale of the CIA was looking for a
Vietnamese equivalent. In 1950 Diem was in America. He was a staunch Catholic and came to
the notice of Archbishop Spellman. He was impressed by Diem's virulent anti-Communism
and introduced him to Lansdale. Diem seemed the ideal candidate. He returned to Vietnam in
1954 and became President of the South Vietnamese Republic.

13
Vietnam: The Lost Film .T.V. series episode 8:24 minutes
14
Whitt, Bringing God to Men,p.190
15
H. Ackerman, He Was Always There, The U.S. Army Chaplain Ministry in the Vietnam Conflict, (Office of
the Chief of Chaplains, Department of the Army, Washington DC 1989), p.218
16
Ackerman, He Was Always There, p.19

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In 1952, the National Security Council (NSC) had realised that the security of Indochina will
depend upon the development of native governments able to command the support of the
masses of the people and national armed forces capable of maintaining internal security.17
With Diem as President, the first part of that requirement was impossible. Vietnam had a
Buddhist majority; any Catholic President would struggle to enjoy popular support. Catholics
had been the backbone of the French colonial administration and were viewed as collaborators.
Diem surrounded himself with Catholics further alienating himself from his people. He then
enforced a strategic hamlets tactic as employed by the British in Malaya. In his hands, this
became an instrument of oppression. The significance of this for chaplains was that they were
assigned a role in development work.To meet the second part of the NSC requirement, a
development programme was introduced called Civic Action. Although civilian agencies
would administer the programme, the Army provided the bulk of the men and machinery
required. The chaplain was an integral part of the Army contribution. His visibility as part of a
government programme did little to endear a chaplain to the majority of Vietnamese.
The first chaplains to deploy to Vietnam arrived on 3 March 1962. William Staudt was Catholic
and Elmore Lester Episcopalian. They were joined by John Lindvall of the Assemblies of God.
Their congregation numbered 6,000 and was widely dispersed. The chaplains became
helicopter hitchhikers, grabbing whatever ride they could to reach the disparate units. As the
numbers of troops increased so did those of the chaplains, although they were in short supply.
Lindvalls presence signalled a significant change in the Chaplaincy. Chaplains were only
accepted from recognised denominations. Before World War Two the Army only recognised
ten denominations, by the mid-60's this was over 150.18. Denominations had quotas of
chaplains based on census data. Some denominations struggled to meet these targets. To try
and meet the Catholic quota, home bases were stripped of their priests, leaving garrisons to the
domestic clergy. Chaplains were overwhelmingly Christian, in 1966 only two rabbis were
stationed in Vietnam. Where denominations left spaces, they were filled by others who could
provide chaplains. This dramatically increased the number of clergy from a non-conformist or
evangelical background. From 1962, for the first time, this included Mormons. Chaplain
numbers peaked in 1968. 700 chaplains were looking after the spiritual needs of over 530,000
troops. This represented over two-thirds of the Chaplaincy.19 Although first tours of duty in
Vietnam were voluntary, towards the end of the conflict career chaplains were being deployed
on a compulsory second tour.
The first chaplains worked to the 1958 Field Manual. Their duties were much as they were in
the 1952 version, to promote religion and morality in the armymake available to military
personnel opportunities for the public worship of God and instruction in religion.20 They
provided rites and sacraments, visited troops, offered counselling and delivered the Character
Guidance Programme. What was new in the 1958 manual was that these functions became the
responsibility of the unit commander, for whom the chaplain was now an advisor and
facilitator. The chaplain was now a full member of the commander's staff team. The chaplain

17
G. Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York; Oxford University Press 1978), p.5
18
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.205
19
Whitt, Bringing God to Men, p.45
20
The Chaplain, Field Manual 16-5, (Washington DC,1958), Chapter 1.2

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was not only concerned with the morals of the soldiers, but he was also key to the morale of
the unit.
Our nation was founded on principles that are rooted in religion. The Army,
pledged to the defence of the nation, must be a stronghold of these principles. A spiritual
sense of obligation to duty, will produce the best type of soldier in the American
tradition.21
The relationship with his commander was key to a chaplains success. The unit commander
conducted chaplain appraisals and promotion assessments. Any disagreement could be a
career-ending move. Joseph Dulany, a Protestant, found that his first commander, a Catholic,
had little time for him. After arguing over a trivial issue, Dulany found himself blocked for
promotion.22 Claude Newby, one of the first Mormon chaplains, found that his commander
tried to undermine his work. He was given false flight schedules, and so Newby was unable to
visit his men. The commander told him, I've been an atheist all my life. You are a bad influence
on the troops, and I am duty-bound to protect them from you. Ill do everything I can to hamper
your activities23. It was difficult to establish good relations with battalion commanders because
they were rotated on a sixth-month basis as opposed to the twelve-month rotation for junior
officers, enlisted men, and chaplains. Senior officers were queuing up to gain career-enhancing
combat experience. They exerted pressure on their officers and men to perform in a way that
reflected credit on their leadership. George Hiltons artillery unit did not put much effort into
Civic Action programmes. He was instructed by his commander to falsify a report that painted
the unit in a good light he put the directive to me that, if I wanted his support for the religious
program of the battalion, then I would see to it that a Civic Action report would go in each
month. 24
Chaplains were encouraged to be open and friendly with the men, but, the chaplain must never
lose sight of his military position or social status within the military.25 In reality, chaplains
often identified with their men rather than other officers. Regarding the chaplains role in
combat, the 1952 manual had directed the chaplain towards the aid station. This changed in the
1958 edition, this nation has expected the chaplains to accompany the combat troops into
battle, rendering to them those spiritual and moral of most relations so basic to the American
way of life.26 The chaplain was, however, reminded of his non-combatant status, a message
that needed repeating as the war expanded.
The chaplains role in the Civic Action programme brought into contact with the Vietnamese
people.
As a man of God, he cannot be indifferent to any human needs about him. When hostile
feelings, aggravated by propaganda, are prevalent among the civilian population, the
chaplain should strive to counteract these attitudes by exemplifying religious and

21
The Chaplain, Field Manual 16-5, (Washington DC,1958), Chapter 1.3
22
J.P. Dulany, Once a Soldier: A Chaplains Story (Private Publication, ISBN 0970883005, 9780970883001,
2001), p.80
23
Whitt, Bringing God to Men, p.68
24
G. Hilton, A Chaplain in Vietnam in H.G. Cox, (ed.), Military Chaplains: From a Religious Military to a
Military Religion,(New York: American Report Press.1971), p.123
25
The Chaplain, Field Manual 16-5, (Washington DC,1958) Chapter 2.10
26
The Chaplain, Field Manual 16-5, (Washington DC,1958), Chapter 8.108

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democratic ideals which should make him a symbol of fairness and consideration, hope
and confidence.27
Chaplains did undertake good work with communities; they helped to build schools, churches,
dispensaries and play parks. General Throckmorton, part of the Military Assistance Command
Vietnam (MACV), had noted that while this type of activity is not as dramatic as a military
operation, it is nonetheless necessary if the government of South Vietnam is to gain the support
of the people.28 Army and Marine chaplain memoirs and the official histories refer to work
with Christian communities. Churches are built and Christmas parties laid on, there is no
apparent inclusion of other communities. One chaplain recalled, I was so active that the local
Viet Cong put a price on my head. Then one day they ambushed my Jeep as my chaplain
assistant, and I were leaving the area where the Roman Catholic Church was being rebuilt.29
He was obviously unaware of the position of Vietnamese Catholics in society. Other chaplains,
such as Earl Kettler, did not fail to notice, the Catholic priests knew how to get a bigger share
of the aid than some of the other villagers.30 This lack of understanding of Vietnamese people
and their culture is illustrated by Curt Bowers opinion that, the Vietnamese appeared to be a
people with a hollowness and mistrust in their eyes. I wanted to share our affluence and the
Good News of Jesus Christ and how He could make a difference in their lives and in their
country.31 Bowers shows no comprehension that the Vietnamese had been suffering the
devastation of war since 1941. In that time, they had seen troops from seven different nations
occupy parts of their country32. By 1969 20% of the population were refugees.33 They had good
reason to be mistrustful. Some chaplains were more perceptive, Joseph Dulany realised that
the common farmer could not comprehend the complex issues of this politicised war. He only
wishes to be rid of these hairy, large men who had little respect for his property. 34 The lack
of understanding at official levels is summed up by the Marine Corps History for 1967 . This
refers to the fact that (in their area of operation near the border with the North), the presence
of an estimated 539,000 refugees at the close of October is a reflection of the growing
confidence of the Vietnamese people in their government. 35 If chaplains were providing aid
almost exclusively to Christians then, as far as promoting support for the South Vietnamese
Government was concerned, they were preaching to the converted.
The first chaplains were assigned on an area basis and ministered to any unit stationed within
their area of responsibilities. In this way, they covered all types of units from the front line to
the rear echelon. As numbers increased, chaplains were assigned to particular types of units.
Also, each level of army organisation had dedicated chaplains of an appropriate rank. The focus
of this essay is on the chaplains in the combat zone because they were faced with moral

27
The Chaplain, Field Manual 16-5, (Washington DC,1964) Chapter 8.112
28
R.R. Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace. The United States Army Chaplaincy 1945-1975,
(Washington: Office of the Chief of Chaplains,1977), p.151
29
Venzke, Confidence in Battle, p.180
30
E.C. Kettler, Chaplain's Letters; Ministry by Huey 1964-65, the Personal Correspondence of an Army
Chaplain from Vietnam (Cincinnati: Cornelius Books,1994), p.98
31
C. Bowers, with G. Van Dyne, Forward Edge of the Battle Area: A Chaplains Story, (Kansas: Beacon Hill
Press, 1989), p.44
32
Since the French occupation, parts of the country had been invaded or occupied by troops from Japan,
Nationalist China, Britain, Australian, New Zealand and America
33
Lewy, America in Vietnam. p.108
34
Dulany, Once a Soldier, p.52
35
Lewy, America in Vietnam, p.111

11
dilemmas on a more frequent basis. It was their experience of Vietnam, more than any other,
which was used as the basis for change in the Chaplain Corps.
When General Westmoreland took charge of the war in 1964 and instituted Search and
Destroy missions, the number of contacts with the enemy increased dramatically. At first,
chaplains tended to remain at a forward base when units were deployed on combat missions.
They would wait for the arrival of evacuation helicopters bringing back the wounded. They
soon felt the need to share their soldiers danger, in Vietnam, if a chaplain was assigned to a
combat unit, he had no choice but to be in combat- not fighting but present, because thats
where his men were.36 The extent to which chaplains did work within combat zones is reflected
by the awards given during the conflict: 2 Medals of Honor, 26 Silver Stars, 719 Bronze Stars,
66 Legion of Merit medals and numerous Purple Hearts. There were many instances of
chaplains rescuing wounded men while they were under fire. They would also stay with the
dying despite the danger to themselves. A chaplain of the 4th Cavalry Division remembered
that,
When working with the seriously wounded, the last words or questions were
about their faith or requests for prayer. Experiencing people dying all around you is not
easy to forget. Trying to remain steady, to show courage, as you seek to give faith and
hope to others when your own is being shaken to the core is not easy.37
As the number of chaplains increased, the issue of their non-combatant status became
problematic. Vietnam was so inundated with journalists that photographs began to appear
showing chaplains carrying weapons. The OCCH Historical Review for 1966 mentions Curt
Bowers by name having featured in news reports carrying a gun. The Chief of Chaplains
directed that Under no circumstances will a chaplain admit that arms have been issued to
him, or that he has arms in his possession, or be photographed carrying arms.38 The
frequency of reports resulted in the 1967 Field Manual revision regarding chaplains in combat
zones that stated,
Any violation of his non-combatant status by the chaplain may carry harmful
professional ramifications. Further, such action is detrimental to the status of all other
non-combatants and reflects discredit upon the chaplaincy.39
Chaplains continued to carry guns. In 1968, The New York Times featured a picture of Jerry
Autry standing on a tank carrying an M-16 rifle. The article christened him The Gun-Toting
Chaplain. Earl Kettler carried a weapon in his jeep, more for reassurance than effect.40 Joseph
Dulany was formally issued with a pistol and a grenade.41 Autry did fire his M-16 to stop a
night time infiltration of his camp. However, he fired into the darkness rather than at a human
target.42 Pictures of chaplains carrying weapons did little to improve their image at home.

36
J. Autry Finding my Religion/ Jerry Autry, the gun-toting chaplain, reflects on an Army Career. Online
interview www.sfgate.com/news/article. Interview conducted 29 May 2006, p.4
Autry interview, p.4
37
Ackerman, He Was Always There, p.177
38
Office of the Chief of Chaplains Historical Review 1965-66, p.64
39
The Chaplain, Field Manual 16-5, (Washington DC, 1967). 7.2
40
Kettler, Chaplain's Letters, p 31,
41
Dulany, Once a Soldier, p.58
42
J. Autry, Gun-Totin' Chaplain; a True Memoir (San Francisco: Airborne Press, 2006), p.183

12
In the field, chaplains spent most of their time with the men, conducting extemporised services
whenever conditions permitted. Most chaplains displayed an ecumenical spirit that was not
necessarily replicated at home. When they held communion services, they did not enquire too
closely about the denomination of those who stepped forward to partake. Jerry Autry heard
Confession in the absence of a Catholic chaplain. Rodney Spitler, an evangelical, was invited
by a Catholic Chaplain to join him in saying Mass.43
One service on which all chaplains found common ground was the commemoration of the dead.
Chaplains realised that they needed to mark the loss of a soldier as much for the benefit of the
living as the dead. Before causalities were taken from the combat zone, chaplains would try to
conduct some form of service to mark their passing. Catholic Chaplains had recourse to the
Last Rites. Father Joseph ODonnell administered the Sacrament to men who had been dead
for several days. I unzipped each body bag, and anointed whatever I found there. It was not
pleasant. But it was the most solemn and powerful prayer service I have ever experienced.44
The service was witnessed by over thirty comrades of those who had died. A chaplain from an
armoured unit believed that memorial services were especially important: to demonstrate our
belief in the sacredness of life, to provide closure following a loss of their comrades.45
The 1967 iteration of the field manual required the chaplain to advise the unit commander and
the Civil Affairs officer on local theology and culture- in so much as they affected the mission.
He was also enjoined to encourage soldiers to show respect for local traditions.
In stability operations, the role of the Army focuses on internal defence and
internal development. The liaison role that the chaplain is able to effect with indigenous
religious groups and leaders may be of inestimable value to the people and the national
interests of the United States.46
The chaplains were ill-prepared for this responsibility. Although most were graduates, few had
studied comparative religion. The Marine Corps had anticipated this instruction; in 1964
Marine General Brute Krulak had recognised that we can win everything in Vietnam but the
people, and suffer an abysmal defeat. We must start by knowing them as they are and building
from there.47 The Marines deployed on the border with the North around the ancient city of
Hue. The area was overwhelmingly Buddhist. By 1966 a handbook on local religion was being
distributed amongst Marine chaplains. The Army Chaplaincy took note and in 1966 made
comparative religion part of the initial chaplains training.

43
R. Spitler, A Chaplain Volunteers: My Two Years in Vietnam, ( Lulu e-book 2014), position 456
44
Whitt, Bringing God to Men,p.120
45
Ackerman, He Was Always There, p.179
46
The Chaplain, Field Manual 16-5, (Washington DC, 1967), 4.28-4.29
47
H.L. Bergsma, Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam 1962-71, (Washington: History and Museums Division
Headquarters U.S.M.C.,1986), p.100

13
Chapter 3. CHARACTER GUIDANCE

The Guidance Program was conceived, developed and delivered by the Chaplaincy. When it
was failing, it was the Chaplaincy that initiated the necessary change. In 1945 the American
Army experienced an epidemic of VD. The Army was blamed for this because of its sex
education classes and the provision of prophylactics. Religious bodies felt that this encouraged
immorality. The Chief of Chaplains, Luther D. Miller, offered to provide a programme of
religious instruction, moral education and good citizenship. The programme was eagerly
accepted by the politicians and Army Chiefs. Ability to deliver the programme became an
indicator of a chaplain's worth to a commander. Joseph Dulany remembered that the chaplain
adept at teaching Character Guidance was highly regarded within the Command.48
Miller believed that for the Army to be able to perform its mission, it must have moral and
spiritual nurture. Character rooted in the knowledge and worship of God makes a fighting
power and staying power.49 The programme had three strands, religion, character building and
citizenship. Religion formed the basis on which the other two traits rested. Chaplain Miller
concluded that an adequate program of education for citizenship in a democracy must place
the emphasis upon the character as well as intelligence, and in the realm of character, religion
has always had the greatest influence.50 Millers statement makes it clear that it was religious
conformity and not intellectual assent that was the important factor in making good soldiers.
Liberal Protestants objected to the programme because they felt it furthered the militarisation
of American society. They went unheard amongst the clamour for spiritual renewal post-Korea.
The programme became part of both basic and advanced training. Once out of training, enlisted
men had monthly sessions. The tone of the program is clear from the first session. The title
was, One Nation under God, words Eisenhower had introduced to the Pledge of Allegiance.
The lesson had two aims. The first was to help the individual to understand the effect that faith
in a Supreme Being has had on the origin and development of our country, the second, to
lead the individual to a recognition of the importance of the spiritual element in his training.51.
The lessons were didactic in delivery and authoritarian in tone. The soldier was taught to
recognise the virtues of the good citizen; integrity, courage, obedience, fair play and
persistence. The behaviours exhibited by the good citizen were patriotism, respect for authority,
and awareness of social responsibility. The programme manual reassured supervisors that the
course would give the American soldier a deeper knowledge of the country he serves, and a
better understanding of why it is worthy of his service, and, if need be, of his very life.52 The
soldiers were warned that Communism was an insidious enemy even it professed to liberate
the poor and the downtrodden. Soldiers were told that the freedom proclaimed by Communism
was slavery since it was mired in the material world and ignored spiritual realities. Although
politicians and senior Army staff expressed their approval of the programme, not all
commanders were convinced of its benefits, as some chaplains would find in Vietnam. This
was the era when the studies of S.L.A. Marshall and Shils and Janowitz were proposing that

48
Dulany, Once a Soldier, p.16
49
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.3
50
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.3
51
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.8
52
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.9

14
small unit cohesion and comradeship were the primary motivators in combat, not lofty ideals
or patriotism.53
One aspect of the programme was that it had brought a degree of authority to the chaplains
role. The programme involved the chaplain in unit training; he was not just a provider of
worship services. The compulsory nature of the programme gave chaplains a status which was
enhanced by memoranda sent out to commanders by Secretary of Defense George Marshall.
The change was not lost on one junior chaplain, Gerhardt W. Hyatt, who worked in OCCH in
1952, it appeared to me that [the Chaplain Corps] was not taken seriously.we were
tolerated we were not really integrated into the Army as a professional branch. 54 Hyatt
would become the Chief of Chaplains in 1971 and, more than any other leader, move the
Chaplaincy away from the moral certainties of Civil Religion.
The first serious opposition to the religious nature of the course came from the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) which used the First Amendment's non-establishment clause to
challenge the constant references to religion in the syllabus. The ACLU threatened to take legal
action against the government. The debate ran across the tenure of two Chief of Chaplains,
Charles E. Brown (1962-1967) and Francis L. Sampson (1967-1971) and involved the legal,
personnel and strategic commands of the Army. The first concession came when the Secretary
of the Army insisted that chaplains must adhere to lesson plans and not stray into preaching.
Also, chaplains must not conduct lessons in a chapel. In 1966, the lesson on One Nation under
God was dropped. In 1968 the Armys Judge Advocate General issued a judgement that
reference to religion in a mandatory course may constitute a breach of the First Amendment.55
The Chaplaincy fought back when Francis Sampson argued that without religious language the
programme would be meaningless since that excluded reference to most of the Constitution.
The Secretary of Defense eventually decreed that religious language was permissible, but the
non-religious nature of the programme had to be obvious. The Character Guidance Manual for
1968 reflects this change in thinking. Although it acknowledges that as a specialist it is the
chaplain who will present most of the sessions, it cautions that If the program as a whole
should become identified with the chaplain, a great many avenues to character development
will be blocked off.56 The programme was to be delivered by the medical, legal and personnel
staff members. Despite these alterations, the programme was still a target for anti-war
protestors who saw it as little more than an exercise in brainwashing. In the Christian Century,
Robert E. Klitgaard stated that the chaplains role in basic training served to sanctify what was
otherwise a dehumanising process.57
The experience of Vietnam pulled the programme to pieces. Soldiers were faced with situations
which were morally ambiguous. The moral absolutes expounded in training were difficult to
apply in a war with no clear enemy, in which little respect for life was shown by all sides. In
their confusion, they turned to the chaplain for guidance. Chaplains found that there were no

53
A.C. Loveland, Character Education in the US Army 1947-1977, The Journal of Military History, (64) (3),
2000, p.806.
54
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.16
55
L.F. Foreman Religion Conscience and Military Discipline, Military Law Review Vol 52, spring 1971,p.87
56
Character Guidance Manual, Field Manual 16-100 (Washington DC, 1968), p.17
57
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.42

15
easy answers and they were certainly not to be found in Character Guidance. Chaplain Dulany
felt that;
Every ounce of the chaplains imagination is required to present these classes
and the time allocated to them in an entertaining way. The required topics required
ingenuity to be presented in an appealing way to tired and disinterested troops.58
George Hilton was more scathing about the programme,
The Character Guidance Topic for January Truth! I grimaced as I read the
material a dung heap of trite clichs and patriotic dribble. So with the help of my
assistant, I developed something else. The Air Force has freed its chaplains from such
courses.59
There was another reason why the programme failed. It was completely out of step with civilian
society. A study of soldiers conduct in Korea had identified the desire for individual fulfilment
as contributing to the poor record of POWs.
The Army recognises that some civilian and environmental pressures tend to
stress values other than service to mankind and country. Pleasure, satisfaction of desires
for food, sex, drink, creature comforts, are often without necessary subordination to
traditional moral and spiritual controls.60
By the mid-1960s these values were at the heart of mainstream American consumerism and the
burgeoning youth culture. Many of the young men drafted into the Army were most certainly
influenced by the desires listed above.
By 1969, the work to replace Character Guidance was already underway. In his evaluation of
Character Guidance, Kenneth Speer refers to change already in motion, in the 1970's, the title
will be "the American Moral Heritage series. 61 Speer outlines the dual purpose of the new
programme, to build up the resilience of the soldier but also to make him a better citizen.62 One
difference was that moral behaviour was not presented as emanating from religious teaching
alone but also from the history of the nation, its leaders and its culture. Another change was
that the sessions should involve small numbers to allow group discussions of the topics. This
was a significant change from the lecture-style delivery of Character Guidance. The Chaplain's
Office stated that the aim of the course is not to impose a value system on the soldier, but to
assist him to develop his own meaningful value system.63 This approach was more in keeping
with contemporary thinking about morals.
Writing in The Chaplain magazine in 1970, Gerhardt Hyatt, by now the Deputy Chief of
Chaplains, put a different slant on the purpose of the course,
I am impressed with the progress of a revision of the Character Guidance
Programme called Our Moral Heritage. In the affairs of men, one's character is judged

58
Dulany, Once a Soldier, p.16
59
G Hilton, A Chaplain in Vietnam' p.126
60
K.R. Speer, An Evaluation Technique for the United States Army Character Guidance Program, Dissertation
submitted to Baylor University, Waco, Texas (August 1973), p.17
61
Speer, An Evaluation Technique, p.8
62
Speer, An Evaluation Technique, pp.2-4
63
Loveland, Character Education in the US Army 1947-1977, p.814

16
by his strength in the more important moral virtues, not by how his life might appear to
God. Our history is all too full of instances in which God's will has been identified with
our situations of privilege with the result that a 'holy cause' became strident and
manipulative towards other persons. The chaplain is constantly tempted to
accommodate the word of religion to the surface interests of a 'successful mission' or,
worst of all, to an uncritical praise of the righteousness of the United States.64
Hyatt's statement is one of the first indications that the Chaplaincy was rejecting its role as a
morale builder for the Army. The change in approach is shown when one compares it to
opinions expressed a short while before in a devotional book for soldiers, an easy response to
todays baffling questions is the well-worn phrase let your conscience be your guide. The
reliability of such unqualified advice is questionable. What kind of world would this be if
everyone lived strictly by ones own conscience?65
The Moral Heritage course did not last long. It was introduced in 1970 and was scrapped in
June 1971 when the Army discontinued mandatory character education outside of initial
training. In December 1971, OCCH unveiled a new programme called Human Self
Development (HSD). Although the chaplain had primary responsibility to deliver the course,
the commander and many of his staff were expected to deliver sessions and lead discussions
on each topic. The purpose of the course was to promote healthy mental, moral and social
attitudes.66 The commander was encouraged to use the programme to tackle, todays
challenging problems of racial tension, drug abuse, poverty, dissent and moral behavior.67
HSD drew upon the learning of behavioural science and sociology, not just scripture. OCCH
said the Army seeks to improve the soldiers self-image using a system of value educationto
develop his full potential and to seek healthy goals for his life.68
The course allowed for greater local discretion; although teaching materials were provided,
trainers were positively encouraged to adapt these to best effect. Unfortunately, because the
Army was gearing up to become an all-volunteer force, the prospect of lengthy discussion
sessions with recruits did not meet with enthusiasm. Commanders, when given discretion, often
chose not to run any courses at all. It was not just commanders who felt uneasy. For some
chaplains, this was a step too far towards secularism. Also, many did not feel able to run such
discussion sessions. In May 1976 Chaplain Kermit Johnson presented the results of a job
satisfaction survey of chaplains to the OCCH. Top of the list were the roles of preacher and
counsellor; at the bottom, was Self- Development trainer.69 Some chaplains were greatly
relieved when the programme was discontinued for good in 1977. The fact that the Chaplaincy
had been prepared to adapt to changes in the outside world and had tried to use the best material
it could find to meet the needs of the 1970s soldier showed a progression in its thinking.

64
J.S. Boozer, The Military Chaplaincy: One Calling Two Roles. The Chaplain, (November December 1970),
p.10
65
P Berger, D. Pinard, Military Religion: An Analysis of Educational Materials Disseminated by Chaplains, in
H.G. Cox, (ed.), Military Chaplains: From a Religious Military to a Military Religion,(New York: American
Report Press.1971), p.104
66
Loveland, Character Education in the US Army 1947-1977, p.813
67
Loveland, Character Education in the US Army 1947-1977, p.813
68
Loveland, Character Education in the US Army 1947-1977, p.815
69
K.D. Johnson, Factors Influencing Job Satisfaction Among Army Chaplains,(U.S. Army War College May
1976,p.45

17
Chapter 4: A Military Religion?
Opposition to the war in Vietnam evolved from the Civil Rights movement. The first protest
against the war is traced back to Berkeley University campus in September 1964.70 The protest
was about the racist actions of local media, it then expanded to include the war. Religious
leaders became involved in public protest through the Civil Rights movement. One example
was the rent strike by black residents living in New York. The residents were publicly
supported by local clergy, both black and white. The subject of Vietnam came into the sightline
of civil rights protestors following the Buddhist immolations and the assassination of Diem.
These events told a lie to the narrative that the South Vietnamese regime was a benign
democracy.
Protest bodies were ecumenical in composition, including Protestants, Catholics and Jews. In
1965, the Clergymans Emergency Committee for Vietnam comprised over 2,500 ministers,
priests and rabbis.71. The National Council of Churches, a Protestant ecumenical body, first
spoke out in 1965 asking the President to begin negotiations with North Vietnam. In 1966 it
published An Appeal to the Churches Concerning Vietnam and, on this occasion, they also
condemned the way in which the war was being prosecuted. They singled out the bombing
campaign against North Vietnam and the use of weapons such as napalm.72 Religious
opposition to the war was not confined to America. The World Council of Churches conference
of 1966 declared,
The massiveAmerican military presence in Vietnam and the bombing of villages in
the South and of targets just a few miles from cities in the North could not be justified.73
One of the most prominent anti-war bodies was "Clergy and Laymen Concerned about
Vietnam" (CALCAV) which was set up in 1967. Martin Luther King Jr. was appointed as one
of its co-chairmen. CALCAV held rallies, members wrote articles in journals and newspapers
and published books. The first, Vietnam a Crisis of Conscience, appeared in 1967. It did not
attack the Chaplaincy itself; rather it addressed the Administration that had sent America into
war. The stated aim of the volume was to offer sufficient treatment of the political and moral
issues that those who agree with us will offer public support for a change in policy. 74 It also
makes the case that the conflict, far from being a struggle with Communism, was a civil war in
which America should have no part. This was an interpretation that Chaplain Earl Kettler had
come to in 1964,
It seems to me that the war is about power, prestige and money for the ruling
class, but down where it hurts are the peasants who only want to live peacefully, tend
their bit of ground, live and let live. How can one blame them for that?75
Another book was Military Chaplains: From a Religious Military to a Military Religion, edited
by Harvey Cox. This time CALCAV bore down upon the chaplains. Their accusation was that
chaplains allowed their military identity to dominate their religious calling. This dominance

70
W.H. Capps, The Unfinished War: Vietnam and the American Conscience (Boston: Beacon Press,1990),p.54
71
J.H. Smylie, American Religious Bodies, Just War and Vietnam, Church and State Volume 11 (1969) p.388
72
Smylie, American Religious Bodies, Just War and Vietnam, p.401
73
Smylie, American Religious Bodies, Just War and Vietnam, p.401
74
R.M. Brown, A.J. Heschel, M.Novak, Vietnam: a Crisis of Conscience,(New York: Association Press,1967)
p.8
75
Kettler, Chaplain's Letters, p.30

18
made their presence in the Army a ministry to the military machine which served to sanctify it.
The anti-war view of chaplaincy varied from that of Gordon Zahn for whom the institution was
an abomination to that of Cox who saw a place for ministers in the Army but only if they
fulfilled their prophetic mission, spoke truth to power and protested about the war.
Fear about the chaplains identity as an officer was expressed in the Princeton Seminary
Journal. The concern is that, since the chaplain is an officer in the military, his conscience
may be violated because he must give priority to the military establishment and only what is
left over to his own views and conscience as a clergyman.76Jewish leaders went further; Rabbi
Eli Bohnen president of the rabbinical assembly, proposed last night the chaplains of all faiths
cease to be part of the military establishment so that they can counsel servicemen according to
conscience, not military rules.77
Although civilian clergy were very active in the anti-war movement, very few chaplains broke
ranks and protested against the war. Only a dozen resigned in protest.78 One chaplain did speak
out, Billy Libby served in 1967-68 but didnt preach against the war until 1972- to a military
congregation. Although his congregation were prepared to listen and debate with him
afterwards, Libby later found out that his career was over almost before he left the pulpit.79
The chaplains who did not speak out were not necessarily supporters of the war. Even the
Official History recorded the feeling of one chaplain after an ambush, A soldier was shot
through the chest. I was holding him when he died. One soldier was cursing, yelling God
dammit. I looked him in the eye and said, I agree with you. I wish God would damn this
whole war to hell.80 Earl Kettler had just buried a soldier when from my inner self the
thought arose that his death was purposeless and that we will have a hard time explaining it
to his parents.81 George Hilton, who was struggling with his commander, recorded that A
young first lieutenant said to me last night that people in the Battalion are wondering when the
system will break me as it did the last chaplain. I will not be a war priest, the military medicine
man in the army religion.82
Perhaps the reason that chaplains remained silent was that they knew that any protest
would see them sent back home or dismissed from service. They believed so fervently
in the importance of their ministry to the men that they sublimated any feelings against
the war to the needs of the soldiers, even if this came at a personal cost. Joseph Dulany
wrote,
Most men went to Vietnam out of a sense of duty. I came to understand that I
was there to do ministry. I went because the troops were there, and they needed a
pastor. It was my assumption that most parents did not want their sons to go into
harms way without spiritual support. I was personally affected as civilian clergymen

76
C. L Reaser, The Military Chaplain: Gods Man or the Governments? The Princeton Seminary Bulletin,
(1969) p.70
77
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: March 25, 1968. P.2
78
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.37
79
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.38
80
Ackerman, He Was Always There, p.132
81
Kettler, Chaplain's Letters, p.75
82
G. Hilton, A Chaplain in Vietnam, in H.G. Cox (ed) Military Chaplains: From a Religious Military to a
Military Religion,(New York: American Report Press.1971)

19
ceased to have fellowship with me because I was serving in Vietnam. I found it
difficult to relate to several family members as a result of differences associated with
the war.83
For some chaplains, there was no doubt about the morality of the mission. Curt Bowers
remembered that,
In Vietnam, there was not a great deal of time to think about the reason we were there.
We realise now that it was a time of great heart-searching in the United States. As a
soldier in the Army, I still find it difficult to understand the lack of patriotism and
loyalty during these years.84
He believed that the soldiers were sustained by a love of country and of freedom that motivated
them to offer their lives.85 For James Hutchens, Vietnam was a vivid foreshadowing of the
unprecedented glory of God that shall be unleashed upon a crooked and perverse generation
at the coming of the Lord.86Just as some chaplains gave their wholehearted support to the war,
so did certain denominations, the evangelical magazine, Christianity Today, which had the
backing of Billy Graham, maintained that,
The continuation of the United States resisting the Communists military effort
to take over South Vietnam is necessary. An aggressor must either be fought or allowed
to wreak his wrath on his victim. America wants peace and is forced to use war to
secure it.87
The question of religious support for the war is complex and resists oversimplification. It would
not be correct to state that denominations, and chaplains, of an evangelical persuasion, were all
in favour of the war. As a general rule only, the more politically conservative a denomination
was, the more likely that it would give its unqualified support to the war.
The role tension felt by chaplains in the field was not lost on supervisory chaplains. An editorial
in The Chaplain, stated,
Dissent over our involvement in Vietnam continues to disturb many
Americans. We are being asked to comment on the morality and wisdom of this
involvement. While chaplains are free to hold personal views, they are not charged with
commenting on national goals and policies. Our role is pastoral.88
Although chaplains did not join forces with CALACV, they had the same deliberations about
their role as their detractors. Jack Boozer writing in The Chaplain in 1970,
The clergymen as a chaplain is under serious and increasing criticism. A
clergyman cannot remain in the military simply as a morale officer of the command.
The continued credibility of the chaplains depends upon a joint effort with the religious
groups which ordain and sponsor them. Together they must work out the way in which
83
Dulany, Once a Soldier, p.24
84
Bowers, Forward Edge of the Battle Area,p.89
85
Bowers, Forward Edge of the Battle Area,p.89
86
Whitt, Bringing God to Men, p.187
87
D.E. Settje, Sinister Communists and Vietnam Quarrels: The Christian Century and Christianity Today
Respond to the Cold and Vietnam Wars, Fides et Historia, (32) (1) Winter/Spring, pp.92
88
The Chaplain May-June 1968, p.1

20
the chaplains can be the champion of the conscience, of the dignity of the military
person as a man, not as a military person.89
In its post-war reflections, the Chaplaincy would continue to develop this ministry to the man,
not to the uniform.

CHAPTER 6. Three Thorny Issues


Ministering to the Drug User
It is difficult to date the beginning of the drugs problem in Vietnam. For a long time
commanders denied its existence. Visiting Vietnam in 1968, the Chief of Chaplains Francis
Sampson, argued about the issue with a divisional commander. The commander refused to
accept his troops were using drugs. Sampson had just talked with one of his platoons who were
all completely "stoned".90 As a consequence of the visit, Sampson immediately instituted drugs
training for chaplains in the field. Only in April 1970 did the Department of Defense formally
acknowledge the issue and introduce an official treatment programme. The Armys approach
to the problem was to blame it entirely on the drug culture prevalent amongst recruits before
enlistment. At first, the Chaplaincy shared this view, the infatuation of many American youth
with the use of various drugs produced new problems which automatically spilt over into the
nation's Armed Forces. 91
The Army had been aware of problems for several years. The Command History for 1967
recorded that, Marijuana and certain types of narcotics were readily available to the US forces
in RVN. 92A total of 427 G.I.s were court-martialled for drugs offences that year, a figure
which counted only those soldiers that were caught. A military survey in 1971 admitted
that51% of army personnel in Vietnam had smoked marijuana, 28.5 percentage use narcotics
and 30.8% had used psychedelic drugs.93 Not only did soldiers use drugs in Vietnam, but
they also carried them when on leave. In several high-profile cases, G.I.s were arrested carrying
drugs and weapons into Australia. The media coverage of drug-taking amongst the troops
further eroded support for the war.
Opinion was divided as to the cause of the drugs problems. Curt Bowers, who as a regular
Army career chaplain, attributed the problem to the general moral malaise of America, the issue
arose partly because of the lack of will of our nation to support the war effort. 94 Another
chaplain who served two tours in Vietnam observed that The men I served with during my first
tour [1968] were some of the finest men I have ever known. They did not take drugs, they were
patriotic, and they were courageous. During my second tour, some men did take drugs, but
they were in the minority. 95 Here again, we see the implication that drug taking was a result
of moral weakness which is coupled with a denial of the extent of the problem. In the Air Force,
this attitude persisted after the war. A USAF review of drug taking in Vietnam published in

89
The Chaplain, December 1970, p.3
90
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.88
91
Venzke, Confidence in Battle, p.161
92
Command History 1967 Volume 2, p.811
93
Lewy, America in Vietnam, p.154
94
Bowers, Forward Edge of the Battle Area, p.50
95
Ackerman, He Was Always There, p.198

21
1975 noted that, the need for attention, latent homosexuality, narcissism, passive inadequacy,
and similar characteristics have been suggested as being important in the dynamics of
addicts.96 As long as the Army subscribed to the view that moral laxity caused drug addiction,
the unit chaplain was expected to address the problem as part of his remit under the Character
Guidance Program. The 1958 Manual had observed that,
The stress of war and the moral conditions that accompany physical destruction tempt
men to an excessive degree. False ideas of relaxation and recreation may incline men
to accept low moral standards. The chaplain must lead his troops to withstand
temptations. 97
This requirement was still in force in the 1964 and 1967 iterations of the manual. Didactic
approaches such as the Character Guidance Program were increasingly irrelevant to the 1960s
soldier. It was no surprise to the chaplains when their efforts bore little fruit.
In 1970, the Army's next attempt to tackle the problem was the formation of drugs teams, which
included the chaplain, but also the commanding officer, the unit physician and representatives
of the Military Police. The intervention consisted of four one-hour lectures that gave soldiers
factual information on the nature of the drugs that might be offered to them and the legal
consequences if they were caught using them. To divert soldiers from drugs use, sport and other
wholesome activities were provided. The chaplain's role involved the provision of further
counselling when requested. Some soldiers did engage and entered a more intensive
rehabilitation programme, but the overall success rate was poor. The Chaplaincy stepped
forward to propose a change of approach. They suggested that soldiers were drawn to drugs,
not from weakness but disillusionment with society, with their leadership and also from a
reaction to perceived double standards. For example, the problem of alcoholism in the Army
was as widespread as that of drugs, but was more a feature of the NCO and Officer groups, and
yet it was being ignored. The chaplains felt that they had a unique contribution to make. Drug
treatment was not a matter of information and warning but rather a ministry to individuals who
were struggling with the world in which they found themselves- at home and in Vietnam.
When the Chief of Chaplains requested further resources, he stated that
It was essential the chaplains be part of the counselling team. In many cases, drug
abuse is caused by frustrations induced by problems inherent in the present-day thrust
of life. These problems are responsive to spiritual ministry and the counselling
approaches of chaplains who give competent rehabilitative support in the areas of
meaning, values, and goals.98
Although the Chaplaincy was advocating this approach in 1968, it was not until 1971 that the
Army authorised the assignment of 82 chaplains to drugs teams. The Chaplaincy displayed an
approach to drugs problems and other personal issues that were lacking in other sections of the
Army. A whole issue of the Military Chaplains Review in 1972 addressed drug treatment.
Chaplain Clinebell offered the opinion that, we will get nowhere in helping any person with a
problem until we begin to see it from his perspective from the standpoint of his perceptual

96
R.B. Garver Drug Abuse in Southeast Asia, (United States Air Force Project, January 1975), p.20
97
The Chaplain, Field Manual 16-5, (Washington DC,1958), Chapter 8.111
98
Ackerman, He Was Always There, p.202

22
set.99 In the same issue, Chaplain Ben Smith cautioned against chaplains dabbling in
psychiatry and reminded them of their vocation, We must believe that loneliness, alienation,
anxiety, and lack of purpose have counters in our religious associations or our reason for being
is deficient.100 Army chaplains recognised that it was not enough to merely preach to soldiers
about the iniquity of drug taking. It was equally futile to present them with bald facts and leave
them to make moral choices. The only way to address this problem was to deal with him as an
individual. This view was supported by a review of Drug Education commissioned in 1973 and
conducted by outside scholars. They observed that,
No particular message, medium, or source used succeeded in motivating soldiers against
beginning or increasing the use of alcohol or drugs. Some young soldiers belonged to a youth
drug sub a culture which legitimises drug use; they use drugs because they enjoy them. Some
of the soldiers use drugs out of boredom or to relieve their personal problems. (The program)
has not successfully addressed either of these groups.101
The authors believed that the solution lay not only with the enlisted man. They recommended
that,
If the Army seriously intends to curb the use of hard drugs, it should undertake
a major augmentation of its Human Relations Program. We recommend that a major
part of the programme be devoted to training the leadership. This should have two
purposes; motivating to improve leadership behavior and imparting the skills which
will enable leaders to display the desired behavior. 102
The chaplaincy had promoted the development of the programme, and the unit chaplain was
front and centre of the Human Relations Program. What was different about the programme
was that it involved all ranks, not just enlisted men and NCOs. The views of the Chaplaincy
had been vindicated by the results of the study. It was no fault of the Chaplaincy that the drugs
teams were abandoned once the withdrawal from Vietnam was complete- even though some
soldiers were still struggling with addiction.

Racial Tension
The Official History locates the beginnings of explicit racial tension to 1971. Claude Newby
puts it slightly earlier; Where in 1966-67 and early 1969 infantrymen were infantry men
without regard to race or color, by 1970 even they showed evidence of succumbing to civilian
and rear-echelon trends of ...us and them.103
The majority of recorded incidents seemed to be in rear echelon units or when combats units
were out of the line. No analysis is offered as to why race became an issue during this period
other than the fact it was part of a general decline in discipline once it became clear that troops
would be withdrawn from Vietnam. Soldiers mounted subtle munities and either refused to

99
H.J. Clinebell Understanding and Counselling the Drug Dependent Person, Military Chaplains Review,
(1972:1) p.2
100
B.E. Smith, Preparing to Minister to the Drug Dependent Person, Military Chaplains Review, (1972:1), p.14
101
R.F. Cook, A.D. Little, A.S. Morton, An Assessment of Alcohol and Drug Education/Prevention Programs in
the United States Army (Army Research Problem Review 73-3, December 1973)1973. p.2
102
Cook, An Assessment of Alcohol and Drug Education, p.3
103
Whitt, Bringing God to Men, p.72

23
patrol or performed perfunctory operations. Officers and NCO who pushed them too hard
risked being "fragged, " i.e. being killed or wounded by their own men. It was in this void that
race problems appeared. Racial incidents became very violent very quickly. A black soldier
who was under close arrest in a guardhouse went to use the bathroom and was shot dead by a
nervous (white) guard. A riot ensued in the camp. Another incident involved racial slurs being
made during a card game. Later the same evening the offender was shot dead. A black chaplain
serving with a transportation company noted,
At night most of the camp was divided, blacks over here, whites over there.
The commander didnt go out at night, he had his own trailer, and he had guards all
around it. They had to disarm everybody then reissue weapons, so they knew what
everyone had.104
The first response of the Army was to turn to the Chaplaincy for help. Its first move was to try
and recruit more black chaplains. In 1963 there were a total seventeen Black chaplains on active
duty in the whole of the Army. By June 1971there were fifty-five. The OCCH held a conference
in May 1971 entitled Ministry to Blacks. Transcripts from the conference formed the first
edition of the Military Chaplains Review. The subject matter of the presentations by black
chaplains and ministers did not address issues in the Army; rather they were an attempt to
explain black culture and worship to a white Chaplaincy.
Having recruited more black chaplains, the next move proved problematic. Chaplain Herbert
Turner submitted a paper to the Military Chaplains Review in 1973 based on his experiences
as a black chaplain. He revealed that on his first assignment he was sent straight to the
commander who spoke about a grave matter that threatened the security of the post. He
[Turner] was the only person who could solve the issue.105 He wasnt assigned to an individual
unit but given responsibility for solving the racial tension on the base. He was suddenly an
expert on race relations. Turner noted that during a panel discussion at the OCCH conference,
the Chief of Chaplains stated that the Black Chaplain was part of the process of changing
beliefs. To the Chiefs comment I must add that white chaplains have the same obligation to
change beliefs.106 His experience was not unique. Black Chaplains were placed in an invidious
position between commanders and enlisted men. Turner offered the following advice.
Many Black chaplains have found themselves in situations where they are
called upon to perform a task because they are black. This can be a very dangerous
assumption. Many have found themselves in situations which required specialised
training. In most cases, they have not had this training. The Black Chaplain must not
be utilised as a CID agent, informer on blacks or dissidents, Uncle Toms or racists. The
role of racial fire man should not be ours. The time has come for mature professional
chaplains to deal with People Problems.107
Whatever progress was made during the period 1970-1973, like the drugs programme, the race
relations initiative was shelved once the troops were back in America. The attempt to deal with
racial tension became another lesson for the Chaplaincy that chaplains needed to deliver person

104
Ackerman, He Was Always There, p.206
105
H.M. Turner, The Changing Role of the Black Chaplain, Military Chaplains Review, May (1973), pp 3-22
106
Turner, The Changing Role of the Black Chaplain, p.13
107
Turner, The Changing Role of the Black Chaplain, pp.18-20

24
to person ministry if they were to be effective. Kenneth Hamstra had shown showed some
understanding of this in his article in The Chaplain in 1971,
We will discover that we seldom know how to talk with, or show love towards,
those from deprived backgrounds with little education. We had better learn fast! We
are, by and large, white collar Anglos. We must shed our perimeter jousting with drugs,
alcohol, and compulsive sexual exercise, and get into the maelstrom which produces
such behaviour. For, as we move towards a volunteer Force, here are our people. 108
This paragraph is one indication of how far the Chaplaincy had come, in content it would not
have been out of place in one of CALCAVs publications.

War Crimes
The third issue faced by the Chaplaincy concerned the way in which the war was prosecuted.
The focus on this section is the behaviour of troops on the ground as opposed to debates over
bombing and the use of napalm and other weapons. These were matters over which chaplains
had little influence. After his visit to Vietnam in 1968, Francis Sampson wrote in The Chaplain,
Today's long-haired, tight-trousered young men, whom elders tend to regard as
hopelessly undisciplined, are turning out to be some of the most highly disciplined soldiers of
current history.109
Just two months earlier, men from the Americal division entered the village of My Lai. When
they left, approximately 200 men women and children had been killed and the village
destroyed. Although rumours circulated at the time, the incident did not come to the attention
of senior commanders until a former soldier wrote to the Secretary of Defense with information
he had gathered from soldiers who had been involved. In November 1969, the Army appointed
Lt. General Peers to investigate the incident. For the Chaplaincy, what emerged was that two
chaplains in the Division had received significant information about the incident but had done
little other than pass vague details up the chain of command and make no further enquiries.
Peers described their actions thus,
It is clear from the actions and the acts of omission of chaplains Lewis and
Creswell, that while both were aware of the serious nature of the charges, neither took
adequate or timely steps to bring these charges to the attention of his commander. 110
The Army tried to maintain that the incident was an aberration. The Chaplaincy was equally
defensive, pointing out the strong moral teaching offered by the Character Guidance Program.
My Lai was far from being an aberration, and many chaplains were fully aware of this. Joseph
Dulany heard of rumours that civilians were being shot and staged with weapons.111 He saw an
elderly woman deliberately mowed down by an Army truck driver; he saw prisoners handed
over to the ARVN and tortured. He did nothing. He did preach against the mutilation of VC

108
J. Autry, The Military Chaplain and his Dilemma, M.A. paper presented to Ball State University, Indiana
(January 1973), p.18
109
F.L. Sampson, The New Breed of Soldiers in Vietnam, The Chaplain, May-June 1968, p.42
110
W.R Peers, Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into
the My Lai Incident, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1970.), Section 10-40
111
Dulany, Once a Soldier, p.53

25
corpses after he saw a soldier wearing an ear as a decoration. 112 Jerry Autry did intervene to
stop torture of a prisoner.113Claude Newby witnessed similar torture but did nothing.114 Parker
Thompson reported allegations of mutilations to his commander, and together they delivered
stern warnings to all junior officers about war crimes.115James Johnson witnessed his troops
sticking their plastic spoons into two Viet Cong corpses.116 He did nothing. Rodney Spitler
served two tours, on both occasions he witnessed atrocities. Working in a field hospital, he
witnessed an unidentifiable American and an ARVN officer torture a V.C who was on an
operating table awaiting treatment.117 He complained about the incident but was met with a
wall of silence. He also raised issues with commanders about V.C. bodies being left unburied,
having been stripped naked or even booby trapped. The response from the commanders
involved made it plain that they thought such matters were none of his business.118
There is one incident in which a chaplain played a major part in ensuring the investigation of a
war crime. In December 1969, Claude Newby was approached by a soldier who had refused to
take part in the gang rape of a V.C. nurse who was then murdered. He had been threatened with
being shot but still refused to take part. He reported the crime to his Lieutenant who dissuaded
him from taking it further saying Its war and she was a gook. The soldier came to Newby
because he believed that nothing would be done. Newby had been a civilian and military
policeman and contacted the M.P. s immediately; making sure that the matter was dealt with
effectively. The soldiers were prosecuted and imprisoned. 119
The Peers Reports strongest criticism was reserved for middle to senior ranking officers whose
lack of ethical leadership had helped to create the situation in which troops were out of control.
They had exerted such pressure on inexperienced junior officers to achieve high body count
figures that morality had been compromised. A Department of Defense study which used
captured V.C. documentation, estimated that figures were inflated by at least 30% 120 An
inspection carried out in 1970 found that more than half of the troops deployed in Vietnam had
not received their mandatory training in the laws of war.121 Such training as was given did not
include any information on a soldiers duty to refuse unlawful orders.
Chaplains knew that they had a role in maintaining ethical standards. The 1968 editorial of The
Chaplain stated clearly,
As morally responsible men, chaplains are not permitted to ignore the larger
context in which they serve. It is to be expected the chaplains will be alert and sensitive
to conditions of needless inhumanity and unlawful acts of war which might compromise

112
Dulany, Once a Soldier, p.73
113
Autry, Gun-Toting Chaplain p.189
114
Whitt, Bringing God to Men, p.102
115
Whitt, Bringing God to Men, p.97
116
Whitt, Bringing God to Men, p.103
117
R.W. Spitler, A Chaplain Volunteers: A Memoir of My Two Years In Vietnam (LuLu Publishing e-
book ISBN 978-1- 4834-1514-767,2014), p.344
118
Spitler, A Chaplain Volunteers, p.576,
119
C. D. Newby, It Took Heroes: A Cavalry Chaplain's Memoir of Vietnam (New York: Ballantine Books,
1998), pp 51-64
120
Lewy, America in Vietnam, p.79
121
G .Lewy, The Punishment of War Crimes: Have We Learned the Lessons of Vietnam?; Parameters, No
9:4,(1979) pp12 -19

26
their nation or undermined their own integrity and witness as ministers of the
Gospel.122
Deputy Chief Gerhardt Hyatt warned chaplains, The chaplain is constantly tempted to
accommodate the word of religion to the surface interests of a 'successful mission' or, worst of
all, to an uncritical praise of the righteousness of the United States.123 From the evidence
available, it would appear that chaplains did not always respond to incidents as effectively as
Newby did. What is very clear is that when chaplains did try to deal with issues through the
chain of command, they were often ignored.
Conclusion: The Longest War with Prolonged Effects
The war in Vietnam divided America. It also divided the Chaplaincy. Curt Bowers and Marvin
Trott represent those chaplains who still believe that America was right to fight North Vietnam
and that the war could have been won. Earl Kettler held the opposite opinion, expressed during
his tour in 1964, Im not convinced Southeast Asia is worth one American life. What has made
me a cynic about Vietnam? Too many lies I suppose.124 All those who have left a record of
their service in Vietnam agree that it was s the most important ministry they performed. One
chaplain who had also served in Korea said, I do not regret going to Vietnam. I would not
trade those years for anything in the world. I never felt more of a priest than when I was with
our men out there.125
The bravery of individual chaplains is attested to in the records. It is the contention of this paper
that the organisation was equally brave in that it identified its failings and took positive steps
to correct these. It drew upon the experiences of chaplains who had served in the field in
Vietnam, but it also went outside the organisation and took learning from the world of business
and academia. Credit for this must go to the two men who led the Chaplaincy during Vietnam,
Francis Sampson (Catholic) and Gerhardt Hyatt (Lutheran). They both served as chaplains in
World War Two and Korea.
Sampson was a priest of the pre-Vatican Council era, and one might expect him to have been
a conservative. When he visited Vietnam and saw the extent of the drug problem, he
immediately brought in training for his chaplains- three years before the Army officially set up
its own programme. He also stood his ground over Character Guidance. He recognised the need
to update the style and content but resisted the complete secularisation of the course.
Although chaplains had been expected to offer counselling for decades they had been given
little training, as the 1958 manual illustrates this was seen as a skill acquired by virtue of their
role; Counselling is an extension of his pastoral care. Some chaplains develop greater
counselling ability than others, but all chaplains acquire, and are called upon to use, some
skill in this important aspect of pastoral ministry.126 Sampson was aware of the lack of training
for chaplains, and he knew that counselling was too important to be left to chance. In 1970, he
introduced a Clinical Pastoral Education programme in the Walter Reed Army Medical Center
that was based on the training delivered in civilian hospitals. He started with hospital-based

122
The Chaplain, editorial May-June 1968, p.1
123
Boozer, The Military Chaplaincy, p.10
124
Kettler, Chaplains Letters, p.144
125
Venzke, Confidence in Battle, p.149
126
The Chaplain, Field Manual 16-5, (Washington DC,1958) Point.44

27
chaplains because they were delivering long-term counselling to the most seriously injured
soldiers. This is another example of the Chaplaincy's willingness to adapt learning from outside
the Army. The training was introduced into the training for all chaplains.
His successor, Hyatt, brought in some of the most far-reaching changes. It was Hyatt who tried
to tackle the issues of racial tension in the Army. The Chaplaincy had set up ad hoc human
relations councils in the field that operated down to grassroots levels. Hyatt tried to ensure his
chaplains had an increased awareness about race issues, organising conferences where black
ministers and chaplains shared their perspectives. In an interview with Soldier magazine in
1974, he showed his insight into some of the issues,
More important in my mind, church worship styles are white. We expect
parishioners of minority groups to find meaningful expressions in white terms. Perhaps
they dont. We dont want to practice racism. We do it unconsciously. We need to
convert the institution.127
Hyatt understood the pernicious nature of racism, and even though the Army had abandoned
the Vietnam race relations course, he knew the importance of continuing the fight. In a
newsletter, he reassured his chaplains.
I stand behind your attempts to improve our ministries to racial, religious and
cultural minorities. We must do all that we can to reduce the claim which prejudice and
racism have on the lives of the people we serve All human beings must be freed from
those personal or institutional abuses which rob life of meaning and fulfilment.128
He ensured that chaplains continued to influence the discussion by placing them on the staff of
the Department of Defense Race Relations Institute.129
Hyatt was not afraid to acknowledge what the Chaplaincy had got wrong. This included its
work with officers. The Peers Report laid the blame for the decline in discipline and standards
amongst troops in Vietnam at the door of senior commanders who had focused on what was
right for them and not what was right for their men. In response, the Army commissioned a
study on military professionalism in conducted in 1970.It made for difficult reading. There
was,
a stark dichotomy between the appearance and the reality of the adherence of
senior officers to the traditional standards of professionalism, which the words duty,
honour and country sum up. Instead, these officers saw a system that rewarded
selfishness, incompetence, and dishonesty.130
Hyatt understood the implication of this report for the Chaplaincy. Most of their efforts had
been focused on enlisted men and not on their officers. Soldiers could hardly be expected to
behave well if those who led them did the opposite. Chaplains needed to address the whole
organisation.
We need to view the Army system as being a soul that needs to be watched over
the commander is also a parishioner. The true pastor will look at the system, the unit,
127
Todays Chaplain Doesnt Just Punch Your Ticket. in the Soldier, April 1975, pp 5-12
128
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.94
129
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.94
130
The Chaplain Corps Journal, Editorial Spring/Summer 2014, p.3

28
as his parish. Where the system is thirsting, there are moral implications. The concept
of pastor and that of staff officer are in total accord. We have heard voices accusing
chaplains of being primarily staff officers rather than chaplains. That criticism is wrong.
The plain truth is that we have not been good enough staff officers because we have not
been good enough pastors.131
Hyatt used his personal connections with the Head of Training and offered the services of his
chaplains in the Senior NCO and officer training colleges. They would provide courses on
moral leadership, ethics counselling and human relations. This was a high profile risk, so Hyatt
chose the brightest and best as instructors. They delivered Personal Effectiveness Training in
which they passed on their experiences of dealing substance abuse, race and discipline
problems. One of the instructors was Jerry Autry who wrote about his experiences in the
Military Chaplains Review,
The chaplain is in a position to influence the system. A lucid example is the
Professional Ethics course which was originally taught following the conference
method, but evolved into a modified group process which worked better. The
educational technique now uses small group involvement in value clarification. Part of
the influence lies in his innovative and imaginative approach to instruction. Clinical
Pastoral Education, the Advanced Course at the Chaplain School, have given Army
chaplains a cutting edge that is too obvious to be overlooked either by us or by those
we serve.132
Autry was a good example of the new breed of chaplains that emerged after Vietnam. They
were not necessarily young in years or service but were exercising their ministry in a way that
was not dissimilar to that delivered by their civilian peers. Chaplains were encouraged to
analyse the department's performance in Vietnam and to examine alternatives. Autry had
submitted a paper on Role Conflict', and Kermit Johnson had looked at job satisfaction.
Francis Keefe even looked at the way the Chaplaincy dealt with P.R. His study was very frank,
While public relations of the whole area of public service has always been of vital importance,
the chaplaincy have been reluctant to openly admit to this importance and have suffered as a
consequence of their failure in this area"133
We have seen that the term ministry of presence had been used by many chaplains to describe
their wartime experience134. It was the intense one to one relationship with their troops that
convinced chaplains that their work had to begin where the individual was in their life rather
than where they should be. This was a significant change of emphasis from the style of ministry
practised before the war. Chaplains had recognised that preaching moral absolutes at soldiers
had little effect. They did, however, recognise their potential as influencers throughout the
Army. To increase their skills, Hyatt brought in Organizational Development training which
purloined the research of industrial psychologists and applied it to the military environment.

131
G.W. Hyatt, Chaplain as Pastor Military Chaplains Review, April 1973, p. 3
132
J. Autry, The Chaplain in the Military Service School, Military Chaplains Review, Spring 1975, p.19
133
F. Keefe, The Army Chaplain, His Public Image, Staff study submitted to U.S. Army Chaplain School, Fort
Hamilton New York (May 1963), p.1
134
Military Chaplains Review, Spring 1975, p.19

29
He brought in the National Training Laboratories to deliver courses in problem-solving and
conflict resolution.135
Hyatt reinforced his viewpoint at the 1973 conference for senior chaplains; The successful
religious program can only be achieved to the degree that we are able to establish and maintain
open communication, shared input to the decision-making process, quality pastoral
performance and personal responsibility.136 The initiatives described above suggest that the
Chaplaincy was taking the lead in modernising the Army. Chief Hyatt certainly believed this
to be true
Commanders are requesting Chaplains to develop in their units a more rewarding
quality of life. This demand is testimony to the confidence they have in us. I am
convinced that credence in our professional ability has never been greater, or more
deserved.137
The change of status is clear when one compares this statement with Hyatts words back in
1952. Kermit Johnsons survey did show that not all chaplains were on board with the new
approach and the debate about the nature of chaplaincy continues. It is the position of this paper
that the changes made, and the rate at which they were introduced would not have happened
without the experience of the Vietnam War. The conflict brought the issues of race and drugs
out into the open. It forced the Army to redefine its concept of leadership. The influx of a large
number of new ministers from more diverse religious backgrounds enabled the Chaplaincy to
adapt to challenges created by the war. Most of all the intensity of the experience created a
determination amongst chaplains to deliver the type of ministry the Army needed.

135
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.91
136
Ackerman, He Was Always There, p.214
137
Loveland, Change and Conflict, p.96

30
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