Supreme Court upholds standards for public officials

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997. *
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 96-1-SDC(P)

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI,
Sharia District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
Civil Service Law; Public Officers; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees [RA 6713] inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the
State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service. Section 4 of the Code commands that (p)ublic officials and employees ** at all
times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
629
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 6

1997 29
Alawi vs. Alauya
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest. More than once has this Court emphasized that the conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary.
Same; Same; As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.Now, it does not appear to the Court
consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of
others, to couch denunciations of acts believedhowever sincerelyto be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, Alauya
is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires
that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm
to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot
justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the
Sharia Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a
judicial employee, it is expected that his accord respect for the person and the rights of
others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps
be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; The title of attorney is reserved to those
who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing, and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.As regards Alauyas use of the title of Attorney, this Court has already
had occasion to
630
6 SUPREME COURT
30 REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered counsellors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title of attorney is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing
company. Ashary M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawis agency, a contract was executed for the purchase
on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed
a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He wrote:
** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your companys branch
office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent
631
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 631
Alawi vs. Alauya
was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence
by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting
in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests.
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on

the grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent **; and closed
with the plea that Villarosa & Co. agree for the mutual rescission of our contract,
even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the
contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and
manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your
sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract.
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, Free Postage-PD 26, had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of
his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions
at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the manipulated contract entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without any authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent
was
632
ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that
there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who
concealed the real facts from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to
be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February
21,1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons
already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
of deductions from his salary on account thereof. He also wrote on January 18, 1996
a
to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and
to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary
in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which
he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by the scheming sales
agent. b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauyas UHLP loan effective May 1996, and
began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. for the buy-back of ** (Alauyas) mortgage,
and ** the refund of ** (his) payments. c
On learning of Alauyas letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia
Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996to which
she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, Free Postage-PD 26. In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1
_______________
aAnnexes B, B-1, B-3 of Alauyas Comment dated June 5, 1996.

bAnnexes F and G, id.
c Annex C-2, id.
1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also furnished the National
Home Mortgage Finance
633
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 633
Alawi vs. Alauya
1. 1.Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds

through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;
2. 2.Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;
3. 3.Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **; and
4. 4.Usurpation of the title of attorney, which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauyas references to her as unscrupulous, swindler, forger,

manipulator, etc. without even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with
the essence of truth, denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, all concoctions,
lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, and
asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya be dismissed from the service, or
be appropriately desciplined (sic) **.
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably
with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding
Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolutionin this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2
Alauya first submitted a Preliminary Comment in which he questioned the
3
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power

pertaining, according to him, not to a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating
an Executive Clerk of Court, but only to the District Judge, the Court
Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution
was the result of a strong link between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigans office. He
also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for
being not only the Executive Clerk of
_______________
Corporation. The Finance Management and Budget Office and the Financial Division of the Supreme
Court.
2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.
3 Dated April 19, 1996.
634
ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar, but also a scion of a
Royal Family **. 4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive,
even obsequious tones, Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the
5
complaint in order that he might comment thereon. He stated that his acts as clerk
6
of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia
Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature,
fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. He declared that7
there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: Free Postage-PD
26, were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and
sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); and 8
as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the

_______________
4 Rollo at p. 23.
5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES (or communications
informing) of Resolutions adopted by the Court En Banc or any of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the
parties by and over the signature of the corresponding Clerk of Court or his Assistant, the Courts
Resolutions being incorporated verbatim in said notices.
6 Dated April 22, 1996.
7 Rollo at p. 28.
8 Id. at p. 60.
635
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 635
Alawi vs. Alauya
use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed
with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, attorney, by the assertion that it is
lexically synonymous with Counsellors-at-law, a title to which Sharia lawyers
have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of attorney because
counsellor is often mistaken for councilor, konsehal or the Maranao
term consial, connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does
not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Courts compassion, alleging that what he did is expected of
any man unduly prejudiced and injured. He claims he was manipulated into
10
reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. He was induced to sign a blank
11
contract on Alawis assurance that she would show the completed document to him
later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite numerous letters and
follow-ups he still does not know where the propertysubject of his supposed
agreement with Alawis principal, Villarosa & Co.is situated; He says Alawi
12
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it
the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on
such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of fallacious,
malicious and baseless allegations, and complainant Alawi having come to the
_______________
9 Id. at p. 32.
10 Id. at p. 34.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.
12 Id. at p. 35.
13 Id.
636
ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being
apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier
letters both dated December 15, 1996all of which he signed as Atty. Ashary M.
Alauyain his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA.
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation. In those letters, Alauya had
written inter alia that:
1. 1)Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question by gross

misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;
2. 2)Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts
** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;
3. 3)Alawi was an unscrupulous (and swindling) sales agent who had fooled
him by deceit, fraud misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence; and
4. 4)Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with
Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will, and concealed the real
facts **.
Alauyas defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely

acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced
_______________
14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.
637
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 637
Alawi vs. Alauya
and injured, who had suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings
and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60
had been deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA 6713) inter aliaenunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code 16
commands that (p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of
others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. More than once has17
this Court emphasized that the conduct and behavior of every official and employee
of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to
the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others,
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary. 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs
or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believedhowever sincerelyto be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, Alauya is evidently convinced that he
has a right of action against So-
_______________
15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.

16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act with (1) a fine not
exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months salary, or (2) suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3)
removal, depending on the gravity of the offense, after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or
agency, and even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA 491; Angeles v.
Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 209 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v.
Asodisen, etc., 233 SCRA 68; SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
638
ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
phia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with
good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated,
that he act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
19
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Sharia Bar

and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent
tan for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected that his accord respect for the
20
person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should
be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation
from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by
his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauyas use of the title of Attorney, this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Sharia
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been
21
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counsellors, in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
attorney. The title of attorney is reserved to those who,
_______________
19 ART. 19, Civil Code.

20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should apply by analogy to
Members of the Sharia Bar. The Code also proscribes behavior in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession (Rule 7.03).
21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681, entitled Petition to
allow Sharia lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts;. SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of
Court.
639
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 639
Alawi vs. Alauya
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, counsellor or counsellor-at-law,
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not,
is of no moment. His disincilination to use the title of counsellor does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney. Finally, respecting Alauyas alleged unauthorized use
of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately establishing
the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashary M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the
use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Franciscoand Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Respondent Ashari M. Alauya reprimanded.

Notes.Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity,
honesty and uprightness and sheriffs, in particular, musts show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of their duties given the delicate task theyre
reposed with. (Bora, Sr. vs. Angeles, 244 SCRA 706[1995])
The court has reiterated time and again the rule that the conduct of every
employee of the judiciary must be at all times characterized with propriety and
decorum and above all else,
640

ANNOTATED
Caiza vs. Court of Appeals
it must be above and beyond suspicion. (Bilag-Rivera vs. Flora, 245 SCRA
603[1995]).
o0o
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
No. L-27664. February 18, 1970.
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY.VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN in L-27654, ANTONIO H.
CALERO VS.VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAYO
Remedial law; Civil procedure; Appeals; Review of Court of Appeals, discretionary.
The supervisory jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court over the Court of Appeals is
not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom Is implied in Sec. 4 of
Eule 45 of the Rules of Court,
Same; Same; Motion for reconsideration; Requirements.For a motion for
reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve
a copy of the motion upon the adverse party but also notify the adverse party of the time
and place of hearing.
Same; Legal ethics; Criticism of courts and judges.A lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, may criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the act of courts and judges. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide,and shall not spill over the walls of decencyand propriety.
Same; Same; Same; Acts as lawyer and citizen.In his relations with the courts, a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private con-
563
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 5
1970 63
In re Almacen
versations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may
subject the lawyer to disciplinary action.
Same; Same; Same; Post-litigation utterances and publications of lawyer critical of
courts may be the basis of disciplinary action.Post-litigation utterances or publications,
made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to
a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate
criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in
their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the
duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Same; Special civil action; Contempt; Termination of case is no defense.The rule that
bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification
thereof, however, came when, in People Vo Alarcon,69 Phil. 265, the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the
settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 42 O.G. 59, a contempt proceeding,
where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar examinations were conducted in a farcical
manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and
the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expresed by Chief Justice Moran
in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that there may still be contempt by publication even
after a case has been terminated. More than this however, is the fact that the pendency or
non-pendency of a proceeding is immaterial in a disciplinary action against a lawyer as an
officer of the court and to preserve the purity of the legal profession.
Same; Legal ethics; Disciplinary proceedings; Nature; Supreme Court does not sit as
judge, prosecutor and investigator in administrative proceeding against lawyers.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it
is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
564
5 SUPREME
64 COURTREPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the ltgal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Same; Same; Same; Indefinite suspension may be ordered.Where the demonstrated
persistence of the misconduct of the lawyer leaves the court unable to assess or determine
how long that suspension should last and that disbarment should not be decreed where a
lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, the erring lawyer was merely suspended
indefinitely. In such a case at any time after the suspension becomes effective, the lawyer
may prove to the Court thathe is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
PETITION to Surrender Lawyer^ Certificate of Title.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers

Certificate of Title/1 filed on Sep^ tember 25, 1967, in protest against what he
therein asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court.1 He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity. His clients he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Courts
565
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 565
In re Almacen
unjust judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy. In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
He then vows to argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum, so that the
people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court, and that
whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated. He ends his petition with a prayer that
x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in
the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to
assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition.
Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Timespublished statements attributed to
him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunals unconstitutional and obnoxious practice of arbitrarily denyingpetitions or
appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunals short-cut justice, Almacen deplored, his client was condemned
to pay F120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
x x x
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to oiir pleas for justice, who ignore
without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
x x x
He expressed the hope that bydivesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court wiii become responsive to all cases brought to
its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
566
566 SUPREME COURTREPORTS
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
unconstitutional and obnoxious lack of merit or denied resolutions. (Italics supplied)
Atty. Almacens statement that
x x x our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity,
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila
Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that
Atty. Almacen had accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court
must clear itself, and that his charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment.
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the
1
defendant The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client.
On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later,
or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of
hear* ing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for
execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, the trial court denied both
motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion
for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second
motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on
August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is,
on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
_______________
1Docketed as Civil Case 8909 on September 17,1966 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
567
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 567
In re Almacen
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Courts decision in Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965,
dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying
that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the
Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the
motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does
not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of
paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co,, Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No, L-16636,
June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled Latest
decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza. L-20417, decided by
this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed by defendant-appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636,
June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further
states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by
the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellants motion, the ruling is
contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds
568
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962. v hich was much earlier
than the date of promulgation o^ the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June
24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it without prejudice to appellees restoring the point in the brief/ In
the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza), the Supreme Court passed upon the
issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of
November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore
Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the
case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his
motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on
September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after
the said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by
filing his Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title/ already adverted to
a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore
reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is
as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold
action on his petition until he shall have actually -surrendered his certificate.
Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came froir him. So
he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously
offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder
he manifested that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-
27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay,said case is now final and executory; that this Courts
September 28, 1967 resolution did not
569
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 569
In re Almacen
require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not
accepted, he chose to pursue the negative act.
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for
contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to
require Atty. Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him. Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he
asked for permission to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him x x x in an open and public hearing. This Court resolved (on
December 7) to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof,
his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and
incident submitted for decision/ To this resolution he manifested that since this
Court is the complainant, prosecutor and Judge, he preferred to be heard and to
answer questions in person and in an open and public hearing so that this Court
could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person, To give him
the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation
and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers no
apology. Far from being contrite, Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad
of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.
Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Hoiy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged,
and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck
in thy brothers eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how canst thou say to thy
brother, Let me cast out the speck from thy eye; and behold, there is a beam in thy
570
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to
cast out the speck from thy brothers eyea.
Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them; for this is the Law
and the Prophets.
x x x
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his

petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyers oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he
vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE
are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members
df the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute;
and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
x x x
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with
the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, x x x
x x x
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE,
what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple
word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
x x x
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in
the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE.
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
571
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 571
In re Almacen
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of
reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement witn emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said:the story is current, though
nebulous as to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is
not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and
brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines.
x x x
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We
attack the decision of this Court, not the members, xxx We were provoked. We were
compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision.
We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in
the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has
placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not
performed your duties with ^circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom, your
Respondent rise to claim his God-given right to apeak the truth and his Constitutional
right of free speech.
x x x
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President, xxx
x x x
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Rolands famous apostrophe during the French revolution, O Liberty,
what crimes are committed in thy name, we may dare say, O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name or more appropriately, O JUSTICE, what
injustices are committed in thy name.
x x x
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public
opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
x x x
572
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added oniy two more symbols, that it is aiso deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that
Inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has
been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given xxx We refer to no human defect or
ailment in the above statement. We only describe the impersonal state of things and
nothing more.
x x x
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyers certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as
our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-
sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the
members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not
intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his
grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite
aware of the criticisms expressed against this Courts practice of rejecting petitions
2
by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state iiie facts and
the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial We have given this suggestion very
careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer whq tediously
collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments,
only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell,
however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and
_______________
2 See e.g. Mounting Discontent against the Supreme Courts Minute Resolution, 32 Lawyers J. p. 825;
Lack of Merit Resolutions are Obnoxious, 31 Lawyers J. p. 329.

573
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 573
In re Almacen
ought never to have been lodged at all, The rest do exhibit a first-impression
3
cogency, but fail to withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been
generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari. Be this as it may, were we
to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The
proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme
Court has defined it, is to decide only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved. Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland
vs. Baltimore Radio Shotv, 94 L. ed 562, 566 :
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result xxx.
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of tire
Courts business, in effect, within the Courts discretion. During the last three terms the
Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three
terms the Court denied, respectively, l,2G0, 1,105, 1,189 petitions calling for discretionary
review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief,
for refusing to take these cases. The time that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from
the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different
members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes
review undesirable.
_______________
3 In the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, this Court rejected by minute resolutions 803, 682 and 848
petitions, respectively, and resolved by extended decisions or resolutions 584, 611 and 760 cases,
respectively. For the period covering the first six months of the year 1969, this Court rejected by minute
resolutions 445 petitions, and resolved by extended decisions or resolutions 279 cases.
574
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
Six years ago, in Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al, L-21098, May 31, 1963 (60
O.G. 8099), this Court through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its
considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a lack of
merit resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief
Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before;
and we held that these resolutions are not decisions within the above constitutional
requirement, They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in
view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all
this time so understood it It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is
no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal hasas intendedhelped the Court in alleviating its
heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered dismissed.
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from
the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into
accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon
this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party
another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the courts
discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
1. (a)When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
575
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 575
In re Almacen
1. (b)When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacens petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing

examination of the pleadings and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and
applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings/ it traced the procedural lines etched by this
Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to
exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty.
Almacen knewor ought to have knownthat for a motion for reconsideration to
stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of
the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party
of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co.,
supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time
and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the parties concerned at least three days
in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by
the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the
motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, L-
18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa
v, Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The
reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would
have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he
objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period
within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to
576
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
review the lower courts judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence
caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of
right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for
a whipping boy. But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and,
in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying
this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would
thus appear that there Is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous
outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most
circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his
dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious
case. That is why lawyers are given wide latitude to differ with, and voice their
disapproval of, not only the courts rulings but also the manner in which they are
handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the
criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such
4 5
right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded

litigation, because then the courts actuations are thrown open to public
6
consumption. 7
_______________
4 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 48 Phil. 376; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil.
736 (Malcolm, J., dissenting); Austria vs. Masaquel, G.R. L-22536, Aug. 81, 1967; Cabansag vs.
Fernandez, et al., G.R. L-8974, Oct. 18, 1957.
5 In re Gomez, supra.
6 In re Gomez, supra; In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930); In re Abistado, 57 Phil.
668 (1932); People vs. Alarcon; In re Contempt Proceedings, Mangahas, 69 Phil. 265(1939). See Pennekamp
v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 90 L. ed. 1295; In re Bozorth, 118 A. 2d 432; In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d
432 (1959); In re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 474; Hill v. Lymttn, 126 NYS 2d 286; Craig v. Hecht, 68 L. ed. 293
(Concurring opinion of Justice Taft).
7 Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321 (1954),
577
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 577
In re Almacen
Our decisions and all our official actions/ said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted
8
right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial
officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the
chancery of public opinion.
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on ones
integrity, competence and honesty, with imminent danger to the administration of
justice, is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those
who assail their actuations. This danger lurks especially in such a case as this
9
where those who sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails
their actuations. For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
10
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence., as- citizen and officer of the court,
every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his
duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
_______________
8 State v. Bee Pub. Co., 83 N.W. 204, Sullivan, J. See also Slate ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct.,72 N. W.
193.
9 In re Jameson, 340 Pae. 2d 432 (1959).
10 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Cabansag v. Fernandez, L-18974, Oct.
18, 1957; Austria vs. Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967; Re Troy (1920), 111 Atl. 723; State ex rel. Atty.
Gen. v. Circuit Ct. (1897), 65 Am. St. Rep. 90; Goons v. State, 134 N.E. 194; Stale vs. Sweetland, 54 N.W.
415; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657.
11 State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (NS) 585; Re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 747; Ex
Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 637; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657; Brannon v. State, 29 So. 2d
918; Mcdgar Evers v. Stair, 131 So. 2d 653; Re Ades, 6 F 2d 467.
578
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of
12
their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary
13
is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both
_______________
12 A judge as a public official, said Justice Thornal in State v, Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, is neither
sacrosanct, nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office.

13 In re Bozorth, 118 Atl. 432: The harsh and sometimes unfounded criticism of the members of any of
the three branches of our Government may be unfortunate lot of public officials xxx, but it has always
been deemed a basic principle that such comment may be made by the public xxx. Nor should the judicial
branch xxx enjoy any more enviable condition than the other two branches.
In Bridges v. California, 86 L. ed. 192, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, said: x x x an
enforced silence, liowever, limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would
probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the minority opinion, said: Judges as persons, or courts as institutions,
are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions. Just because the
holders of judicial office are identified with the interest of justice they may forget their common human
frailties and fallibilities. There have sometimes been martinets upon the bench as there have sometimes
been wielders of authority whor have used the paraphernalia of power in support of what they called their
dignity. Therefore judges must be kept mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public
responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt. A man cannot be
summarily laid by the heels because his words may make public feeling more unfavorable in case the
judge should be asked to act at some later date, any more than he can for exciting public feeling against a
judge for what he already has done. xxx Courts and judges must take their share of the gains and pains
of t discussion which is unfettered except by laws of libel, by self-restraint, and by good taste. Winds of
doctrine should freely blow for the promotion of good and the correction of evil. Nor should restrictions be
permitted that cramp the feeling of freedom in the use of tongue or pen regardless of the temper of the
truth of what may be uttered.
579
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 579
In re Almacen
as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487)
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work
of the lawyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts.
In articles written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for all to see the flaws and
inconsistencies of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by
Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication
of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar.
They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in
constant attendance on the courts, x x x To say that an attorney can only act or speak on
this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and
livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his djity to attack and expose, is
a position too monstrous to be entertained, xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as
a citizen. (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat opportunity to become conversant
with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege,
as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench.
(State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart116 N.W. 212, 216)
580
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to
seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it
their duty to speak disparagingly. Under such a rule/ so far as the bar is
concerned, the merits of a sitting judge may he rehearsed, but as to his demerits
there must be profound silence. (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between
fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which
are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon
his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that
of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself with
all good fidelity x x x to the courts; and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
14
to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him to maintain towards the courts
15
a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.*
As Mr, Justice Field puts it:
x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice
and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules
_______________
14 Sec. 3, Rule 138.

15 Sec. 20(b), Rule 138.
581
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 581
In re Almacen
of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley,
v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyers duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients rights,
lawyerseven those gifted with superior intellectare enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be
the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a courts decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be
an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications or 16
_______________
16 See e.g. Re Chopac, 66 F. Supp., where an attorney was suspended for three years for writing a judge
a letter in which he said that the judge in signing an order took ad-vantage of your office to rule with
passion and vehemence. Also People v. Green, 3 P. 65, where an attorney was disbarred for stopping a
judge upon the street and addressed abusive, insulting language to him. See also Johnson v. State, 44 So.
671; In re McCawan, 170 P. 1101: State v. Calhoon, 102, 2d 604; Re Huppe, 11 Pac. 2d 793; State v.
Rhodes, 131 NW 2d 118; Re Rogers, 212 Pac. 1034; In re Griffin, 1 NYS 7; In re Wilkes, 3 NYS 753; Re
Manheim, 99 NYS 87; Re Greenfield, 262 NYS 2d 349- In re Klein, 262 NYS 2d 416; In re Smith, 36 A 130.
582
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring
17
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to
disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel
precedents.
1. Admitting that a judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to
public criticism of his conduct in office, the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Calhcan, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that any conduct of a lawyer
which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties, adding that:
It would be contrary to every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond
bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or
which are not aimed at the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice is the direct product of
false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA, which accused a
municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny
his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city
officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: They say that Justice is BLIND, but it
took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB! The court
did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
_______________
17 In re Humphrey, 163 P. 60; In re Thatcher, 89 KE. 39; In Snyders Case, 76 ALR 666; Re Troy, 111 A.
723; State v. Sprigs, 155 P. 2d 285.

583
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 583
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3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the
two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who
at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which
referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge
used his judicial office to enable said bank to keep that money. Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas
197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep, 637. In the first case mentioned
it was observed, for instance:
It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author.
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires
of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance
at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of
the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be
upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins,, 81 Pac.
220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso, v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set
aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave
the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter
began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected
from the libel, lies, and
584
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
perjury committed in the eases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action
as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such
dastardly work to go unchallenged/ and said that he was engaged in dealing with
men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the
attorneys disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
x x x Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the
law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust
criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, Cannot be permitted. The
letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the
discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorised suit, together with the
write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court
were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the
opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional
conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court
against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the peoples right, and interfere with the administration
of justice, xxx
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him
585
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1979 585
In re Almacen
of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions
of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached finai determination, are not exempt
from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the
limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is
always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rod-more, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of
the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he
fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was
the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court
said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and
thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the mpression that judicial
action is influenced by corrupt or in proper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as
every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in
whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial
officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is
false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such
charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them protected, xxx While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in
a ca^e decided against him, or the right of the public generally, to criticise the decisions of
the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial
officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the
officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the
community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; ana vhen such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to pro-
586
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
tect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional
misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative, and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
x x x the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo,
upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath
to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in
a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its
members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister
purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the
respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the
public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the
iaw itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. xxx
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right
of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members
of the bar who are
587
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 587
In re Almacen
sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where
justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the
public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and
honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a
municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the
thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy, wanton, and malignant misuse
of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose
rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the
part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retributionnot the court.
9. In Bar Assn of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit
by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms
criminal, corrupt, and wicked conspiracies, criminal confederates, colossal and
confident insolence/ criminal prosecution, calculated brutality, a corrupt
deadfall, and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of
the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney
claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally
adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the
integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain
appeais in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were
published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue advantage,
xxx The point is this: Is a proper
588
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated
intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar
association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law
School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member
of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the
decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six
months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found,
for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was
so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in
.their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and
humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in
regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by
passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard
to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods Fanctioned by law; and
for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury, The sending of a
libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an
actionable publication. 18 Am. & Eng, Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other
acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised
the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of
public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, frort the
penalty here sought to be
589
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 589
In re Almacen
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he
had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the
Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the
contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language
and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts/ Bradley v. Fisher,
13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the
principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced
by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed
to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think, entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod, supra.While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it
held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a
commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. Is it in the power of
any person/ said the court, *by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if
only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to
the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by
taking the law in his own hands? xxx No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office
under such conditions/
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been
directly decided. An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to
the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is
guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court/ Matter of Manheim, 133 App. Div.
136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87, The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y, 7 and in re
Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had
addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated,
in reference to his decision: It is not law; neither is it
590
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80/ And it was decided that, while such
misconduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be called to the
attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney. If, says the
court, counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges,
to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals
or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress
their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a
happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute/
The recent case of Johnson v. State(Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the
same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the
circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding
court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein
the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly
disbarred in having willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial
officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney/ As recognizing the same principle,
and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the follow-ing; Es parte
Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v.
Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo. 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep.
351; Smiths Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scoutens Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others, xxx
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F* 641, the court affirmed a lawyers suspension
for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of
being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac, 411, the court held that an attorneys unjustifiable
attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes moral
turpitude. There, the attorney was disbarred for criticizing not only the judge, but
his decisions in general, claiming that the
591
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 591
In re Almacen
judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a
case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after
the trial of cases,criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect
of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring
the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was
disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a
case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to
make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though
he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of
judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications,
made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether
amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or
to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of
justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited witk
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court
in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of
the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of
unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited
jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under
the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different
bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
592
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of
his motion for reconsideration as absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage
to the rights of the petitioaer Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls/ this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is
that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed
x x x an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Franciscos client x x x.
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press
Freedom Law, reaching to the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who,
invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper,
caused to be published in a local newspaper a statement expressing his regret that
our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more
putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members, and his belief that In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, xxx the only remedy to put an end
to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court, which tribunal he
denounced as a constant peril to liber-
593
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 593
In re Almacen
ty and democracy and a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary/ He there
also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then
forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals
of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press,
the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case,
which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme
Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this
Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and
narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. Bat the respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this
Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice x x x.
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices/ that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and
not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the
last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people los>e their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the
594
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without
such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
xxx an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from
the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A, [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3, In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce
Entile, et al., supra,where counsel charged this Court with having repeatedly
fallen* into the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous erroneous
pronouncements, in disregard of the law on jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations, our condemnation of counsels misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating
the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one
pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely
on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping
charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as
making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of
the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that
in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one
which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in
the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity
of and respect due this Court. They bring into question
595
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 595
In re Almacen
the capability of the membersand some former membersof this Court to render justice.
The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labeled as so-called
the rule against splitting of jurisdiction.
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases which, in the
18
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited casesall of them
involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So
that. in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may
ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes
while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, Atty. 19
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied
emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made
only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost
much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction.
The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs.
Alarcon the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the
20
majority,
_______________
18 Medinn vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba, Contempt
proceedings against Antonio Franco,67 Phil. 312, 315; People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 579; People vs.
Ventvranza, et al, 85 Phil. 211, 214; De Joya, et al vs. CFI of Rizal 99 Phil. 907, 914; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-
D270, April 29, 1959: Paragas vs. Cruz, L-24438, July 30, H.65: Cornejo vs. Tmu 85 Phil 772, 775.
19 In re Gomez, 41 Phil. 376; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; People vs.
Alareon, 69 Phil. 1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775. State vs. Dist. Court, 151 Pac. 2d 1002: In re
Shannon, 27 Pac, 352; State ex rel Grice vs. Dist. Court, 97 Pac. 1032; Weston vs. Commonwealth, 77 S.E.
2d 405; State vs. Kaiser,13 P. 964; State vs. Bee Pub. Co. 83 N.W. 204; Patterson vs. Colorado, 51 L. ed.
879; Re Hart,116 N.W. 212.
20 69 Phil. 265.
596
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A
complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re
Brillantes, a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was
21
adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar
Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity
of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was
an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent
in Alarcon to the effect that there may still be contempt by publication even after a
case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which
is summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to
destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts.
What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the
decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is
extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by
the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending
case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose
their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty, Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the
judgment in his clients appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said
appeal.
_______________
42 O.G. 59.
21
597
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 597
In re Almacen
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post-litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By
the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation
here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacens professional identity,
his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise
of the disciplinary power inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard the morals
and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The
sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by
removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to *be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office
of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional
mandate, ours is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for
22
admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding

authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved
themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to
admit attorneys to practiceand in this state that power is vested in this courthas the
inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, to exclude them from practice.
23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to

all that he is worthy of their
_______________
22 Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution.

23 Re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541.
598
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
confidence and respect. So much so that
x x x whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the
duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held
that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but
as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial
discretion.24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being
a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by
the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to
make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty,
Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyers certificate is, of course, purely potestative
on Atty. Almacens part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands
in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and
coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious
tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile
insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and
its members. Picturing his client as a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy/ he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be ftot only blind
but also deaf and dumb. With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually rakes this Court
and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of
silent injustices and short-cut justice while at the same time
_______________
Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.

24
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

25
599
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 599
In re Almacen
branding its members as calloused to pleas of justice. And, true to his announced
threat to argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum, he caused the
publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort to
startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court.
Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative
attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court
and its members, as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and
unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almaeens petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate
attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring this
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the
detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and
texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of
passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of
gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyers oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for
the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism.
Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not., and
should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and
discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort And more than
this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
requires detachment and disinterestedness,
600
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any
criticism of the Court must possess the quality of judiciousness and must be
informed by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in

the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court
are the complainants, prosecutors and judges all rolled up into one in this
instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the
nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is notand
does not involvea trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is
27
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a

prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
28
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to
_______________
26 See Norman Dorsen, Frontiers of Civil Liberties, pp. 60-61; Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes,
74 Harvard Law Review, 81, 94; Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States, (1961) pp. 176-
177; see also Freund, On Law and Justice (1968) ch. 4.
27 In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; De DuranL 10 Ann. Cas. 1913, 1220.
28 State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274; 286; Fairfield County Bar vs. Taylor, 22 Atl. 441.
601
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 601
In re Almacen
the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of
29
a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties.
Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate
court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly
constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their of-
fice. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it
30
can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereofas well as the
people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be
placed ab grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept,
this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as
much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So 31
that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of that power
_______________
29 Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33, 34; Treadwells case, 7 Pac. 724; Deles vs. Aragona, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 634, 644, and the cases therein cited.
30 Sarcos vs. Castillo, et al., L-29755, January 21, 1969.
31 Cf. Radiowealth, Inc. vs. Agregado, 47 O.G., No. 12 (Supp.) pp. 87, 89, citing Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, Vol. 2, P. 870; Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil. 552, 553; Ex parte Alabama State Bar Assn., 8 So.
768.
602
ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in ali
cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent,
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may
be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of
Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. The 32
discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course,
primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither
arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should
ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the
Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be
zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity
cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment
should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired,
and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of
some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample
room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under
the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of
determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled
to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not
alone be-
_______________
Section 27, Kuie 138, Rules of Court.

32
603
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 603
In re Almacen
cause jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even
33
without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority

to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why
indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling
outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by
the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long
or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further
orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor
General and the Court of Appeals for thfeir information and guidance.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes,
J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor,
JJ.,concur.
Fernando, J., did not take part.
Petitioner indefinitely suspended.
Notes.Criticism or attack directed to the Court.In In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376,
the respondent lawyer, who was an unsuccessful litigant, was alleged to have
remarked that the Supreme Court had decided an election contest
_______________
Melville vs. Wettengel, 57 Pa. 2d 699; People vs. Winogard, 287 Pac. 864; People vs. Kelly, 285 Pac.
33
767; People vs. Harris, 112 N.E. 978; People vs. Anderson, 112 N.E. 273; In re Gullickson, 181 Atl.
716; Haitmanek vs. Turano, 158 A. 878; Grimsell vs. Wilcox, 98 A. 799; States vs. Kern, 233 N.W. 629; In
re Borchardt, 192 N.E. 383; State vs. Trapley, 259 Pac. 783; State vs. Jennings, 159 S.E. 627; In re
Jacobson, 126 S.E. 2d 346; Mulvey vs. ONiell, 44 Atl. 2d 880; State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Assn vs.
Hatcher, 209 Pac. 2d 873; Cleveland Bar Assn vs. Wilkerson, 156 N.E. 2d 136; In re Eddy, 292 N.Y.S. 619.
604
ANNOTATED
Meris vs. Cuesta
in favor of his rival because of a secret conference and a banquet given by the
Governor-General to said rival and the Court. Upon being charged with contempt of
court, the lawyer was held to have been guilty of impropriety, but, in the interest of
liberty of the press and freedom of public comment, the court dismissed the matter
as one that should not be dignified by further proceedings.
It has also been held to be unprofessional, and deserving of the highest form of
rebuke, for a lawyer to attribute to a judge a statement which he did not make in
his decision (Ferrer vs. De Inchausti, 38 Phil. 905).
And in Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, it was ruled that the submission of a
motion, once previously denied by the appellate court which had granted the motion
foi new trial, and once previously denied by the trial court asking for the
disqualification of the judge on a ground not provided, which motion the judgment
construed as misbehavior intended to make the public believe he was not capable of
administering justice to the accused, left the judge no other recourse, if he was to
maintain his self-respect, than to take action in finding the attorney who presented
the motion for disqualification in contempt of court.

[Resolution, March 18, 1954]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates
of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.
1. 1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO COURT AND PUBLIC.

By its declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal
in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of the legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems evolved by
the times become more difficult.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; A JUDICIAL FUNCTION.In the judicial system from which ours has
been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys-at-law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its
continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most
solid of titles."
1. 3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER OR SUPPLEMENT

RULES.The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities governing the admission to the practice of law. The primary power
and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this
court. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
535
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 5
35
In re: Cunanan, et al.
1. promulgated by this court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS AND THAT OF SUPREME COURT MAY
BE HARMONIZED.Being coordinate and independent branches the power to
promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the
concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be
exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration
to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should
examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands
which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training
and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of
justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider
these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of
its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys-
at-law is realized. They are powers which, exercised within their proper
constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and
exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
1. 5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CLASS LEGISLATION.Republic Act No. 972 is a

class legislation. There is no actual nor reasonable basis to classify unsuccessful
bar candidates by years nor to exclude those of other years.
1. 6.ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS PROVISIONS.Article 2 of

Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins. Being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire
law is void.
1. 7.ID.; REPUBLIC ACT No. 972, PART OF SECTION 1 DECLARED TO BE IN

FORCE.There being no unanimity in the eight Justices who constitute the
majority of the court in this case, that part of article 1 Republic Act No. 972 which
refers to the examinations of 1953 to 1955 shall continue in force.
536
536 PHILIPPINE REPORTS
ANNOTATED
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and
Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest
and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of
1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a
candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent
in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14,
Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different
bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which
the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar
those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per
cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74
per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as f ully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and
passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against
(See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in
Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among
others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and
submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved
537
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 537
Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the
matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full
as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT No. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one
hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred
and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-
one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent
in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty
per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act,
any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of
the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and f forty-six shall be deemed
to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the
revision
538
ANNOTATED
of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To
avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.
972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are
to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed
petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by
this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No.
972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily
the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of
Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August) 206 121 18
..................................................................................
1946 (November) 477 228 43
.............................................................................
1947 749 340 0
.................................................................................................
1948 899 409 11
.................................................................................................
1949 1,218 532 164
.................................................................................................
1950 1,316 893 26
.................................................................................................
1951 2,068 879 196
.................................................................................................
1952 2,738 1,033 426
.................................................................................................
1953 2,555 986 284
.................................................................................................
Total ............................................................................. 12,230 5,421 1,168
Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and
only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said
Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by
section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five
different
539
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 539
examinations, but f ailed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating,
however, their highest grades in diff erent subjects in previous examinations, with
their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as
provided for by Republic Act 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is
therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33
who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration
which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had
presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably
affected by Republic Act No. 972,although as has been already stated, this
tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of
the legal prof ession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts
have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-
mentioned petitions f or admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic
Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance
of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally and in writing, on the
various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of
Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura
Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U. P. Women Lawyers'
Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando,
Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor,
Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of
counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo
and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and
540
ANNOTATED
Galema, themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the
court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the
matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by
the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion
was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all
suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the
Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed
bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
"The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has
to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation."
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236
passed. And i&w it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in
reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials"
and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid
examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation
and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice
of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal
profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves
tof
541
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 541
such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement
that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed
copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official
Gazette has been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad
have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with
revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new
set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be
supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of
applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had
an identical case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we
daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from
which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty
ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous juridical history of more than half
a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in
which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its
validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon
(State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the
opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which
the proponent of the contested law respects.
542
ANNOTATED
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had
been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them, without force or effect.
It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that
has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the lawthat of Cooper (22 NY, 81),
where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme Court
of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law
under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College
promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
"They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office.
Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses
the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice
in all the courts of this State." (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as
follows:
"Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had
previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they
possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power
had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission
to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at
this power, and the insertion of the provision respecting the admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of
this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the
543
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 543
Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word 'admission' in the
action referred to it is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to
admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
"These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act." (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it
provided that the possession 01 a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College
conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications
that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision
does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of
New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
"The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able
professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal
examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of
study before being entitled to a diploma as graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no
doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by
the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by
the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
"The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant,
and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope
should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely
to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act
contains nothing what-
544
ANNOTATED
ever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age,
citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation
of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent
evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone
it operates as a modification of preexisting statutes, and it is to be read in connection with
these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition
of the law on the subject." (p. 89)
* * * * * * *
"The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction Over the question of
admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases
upon that question." (p. 93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at
bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
1. (1)The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College
who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
2. (2)The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from
the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect,
it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
3. (3)The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely
different on the matter of admission to the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession
and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.
Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the
judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which
certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted
to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the prac-
545
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 545
tice of law, to our judgment the proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law is a legislative f unction, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous
judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be
revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the
act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious
study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs.Cannon (1932) 240
NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be
permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision
we quote the following paragraphs:
"This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorneys at law, but in England and in every state of the Union the act of
admitting an attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
"No greater responsibility rests upon this court than that of preserving in form and
substance the exact form of government set up by the people. (p. 444)
"Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly.
(Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing 6f qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it
sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
546
ANNOTATED
"But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will
serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose
other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
"Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the
powers of sovereignty, but each is supreme in that branch of sovereignty which properly
belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in
the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people
setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
"The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judical department of our state
government, under a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility for the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to
the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
"The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is
an attach6 of the courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.
445)
"Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars,
at least in the English speaking countries." (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
"Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercised the right of determining who should be
admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in, Matter of the Sergeants at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, 'constitutes the most solid of all titles.' If the courts and the
judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to
practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate
547
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 547
that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the
court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a
power belonging to the judicial entity cannot be denied. Our people borrowed from England
this judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate
independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along
with the power traditionally exercised to determine who should constitute its attorneys at
law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this
traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative
control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the f framers of our constitution was to make the
three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea
that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the
judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be
inferred in the absence of, express constitutional provision. While the Legislature may
legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, its power in that respect does not
rest upon any power possessed by it to deal exclusively with the subject of the qualifications
of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class f rom which the court must make
its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications
beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by
the course for the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power
to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the
prerogatives of an attorney at law." (p. 450)
"Furthermore it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite
likely true that the Legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in
pursuance of a legislative f unctions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous
that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the
states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their
admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte
Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 838, 18 L. Ed.
366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed. 285;
548
ANNOTATED
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843,115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43,
119 N. W. 1021,, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
"The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by
the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of a court in admitting an attorney
to practice is the judgment for the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems
clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial f unction, no
matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside." (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a
consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
"It is indispensable to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that
there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public
be protected f rom incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity f or doing
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C. L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N. Y.
456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A. L. R. 851: 'Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions.' One is admitted to the bar 'for something more than private gain.'
He becomes 'an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the court is due 'whenever justice would
be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has
been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and in England.
Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a
judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a
decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a
coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of
government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in
its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those
lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral char-
549
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1984 549
acter. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How.
9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, 'It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one
of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.' "
(p. 727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to
practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the
court said in part:
"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows:
"They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and f air private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In
this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of. the states to
which they, respectively, belong, for three years preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of
counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional
character is f fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties
possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and are entitled to appear
as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court,
and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, 7
How. (Miss. 127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 430. Their admission or their exclusion
is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has
been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the
matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. 'Attorneys and
Counsellors,' said that court, 'are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties
relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be intrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may
very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions."
(pp. 650-653).
550
ANNOTATED
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
"Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court."Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
"Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court."A. C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the
judicial and legislative departments of the government.
"The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is
that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in
matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary
determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and
not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decrees.
"The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government."16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
"If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of
them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so
directly, by settling aside their judgmentSj compelling them to grant new trials, ordering
the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress
of a judicial inquiry."Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to
1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgmenta judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court
during the afore-
551
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 551
cited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly
can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain
that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be
so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation
of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to
the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
"Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish increase
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are
hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."Constitution of the Philippines, Art.
VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this
Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law The
primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizescontinue to
reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any
rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted
to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this
Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain
vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary
552
ANNOTATED
power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may
admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate
group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or
supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need
for a better service of the legal profession requires it,. But this power does not
relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and
enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to
repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect
that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which
the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being
found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a
Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature
may, by means of repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency
that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a
good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the
legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the
elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective
that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which,
exercised within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
553
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 553
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took the
examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently
enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may
be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guaria and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This
Tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
"Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he
holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
"SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in
the Philippine Islands/ is hereby amended to read as follows:
"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under
the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice
of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the
Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, assistant prosecuting
attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila,
provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro
Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court."
"The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and
failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March
23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delin-
554
ANNOTATED
quent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this
affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of
learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to
the bar, we should grant him a license to practice law in the courts of these Islands,
without' first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that
occassion, he now 'possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability.'
"But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination
'upon motion before the Supreme Court' accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held
and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that
having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the
above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and
especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the
original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without
examination, the clause may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine
Islands without any examination.' It is contended that this mandatory construction is
imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and
to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised."
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United
States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to16 of Act 190, the
Court continued:
"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as
that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word 'may,' as used in the above
citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any act of the
commission which has the effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
555
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 555
"In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant.
But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
"In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant
was not ,and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to
the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further aMrmatively appears that he
was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission
to the bar.
"In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think
that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his
possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore
that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be
denied.
"In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points
short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the
fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the
Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him
to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited
provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by
general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of
the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule."(In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter
is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license.
The law in questionT like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found
also to suffer from the fatal defect
556
ANNOTATED
of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme
Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to
those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for
two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had
studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied
for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The
Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a
class legislation. The Court said:
"This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed
in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled 'An act to amend section 1 of an
act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors,' approved
March 28, 1894, in force July 1, 1874.' The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting
clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: 'And every applicant for a
license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the
bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law office or a
law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules'."In re Day et al., 54 N. Y., p. 646.
* * * "After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of
every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this
state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the
student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law
for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, 'and part in the aforesaid
law school,' and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by
the rules
557
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 557
of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is
claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and
establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar." (p. 647.)
"Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of
the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, and not by granting special and exclusive privileges to certain persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a
license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the
right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court.
The law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the
legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the
law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought.
There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation
as to the different classes, and not a purely arbitrary one, having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 111. 66, 35 N. E.
62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup.
Ct. 255.
"The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 111. 48, II N. E. 881); but the
place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such
basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void
(State vs.Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what
shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law. and. plainly, any classification
must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The
proviso is limited. first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November
4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classesFirst, those presenting diplomas issued
by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied
law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a
558
ANNOTATED
law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects
specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to
be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions
of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of
time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted
upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient.
Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice
law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify
themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes
named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the
next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years before the time
limit. The one who commenced on the 3d. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted
without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study,
while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly
useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to
the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing
privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441, where the
legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court
also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:
"But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power
to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner
here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case
of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: 'lt is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon
all persons of like age, sex, and condition. This right may in many respects be considered as
a distinguishing feature
559
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 559
of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like
conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and
great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed,
the 'estate' acquired in thernthat is, the right to continue their prosecutionis often of
great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than
their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal
opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring examinations to
establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he
may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time
of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement
upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517; see,
also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W.
345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.
"This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice
law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or
favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one
time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that
right. That fact in no manner affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great
body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
"A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court
to admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had 'serve in the military or
naval forces of the United States during the World War and received an honorable
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the
Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as 'World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and
whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this
Act." This Act was held unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality
clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178
Minn. 331, 227 N. W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12
Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
"The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be
valid must rest upon material differences
560
ANNOTATED
between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon
substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition,
must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial once. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must
be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other
individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be
defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation and
circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all
other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural reason for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens
and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a
clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and
not generally on all." (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar
examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and
those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent,
which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature
indicated by the above-mentioned authorities, f or this classification? If there is
none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the
general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of
the unsuccessful ul candidates of those years. This f act does not justify the
unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951,
1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said
years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of
examinations prior to 1946 does
561
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 561
not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an
equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its
retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is
constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure? Only from 1946 to 1949 were
there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who
did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only
72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent
and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which
was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules,
by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in
the passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or
criticized. Now, is it desired to undo what had been donecancel the license that
was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent? Certainly not.
The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what
has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not
consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as
sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of
judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity,
the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and
1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that
said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is
the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules
promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its
place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years
according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not
to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue
562
ANNOTATED
in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not
included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within
the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such
duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at
indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into
account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate
finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his
usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages.
In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title
of the Act. While this law according to its title will have temporary effect only from
1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. This is contrary to Section 21(1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates
and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is
obvious that its nullity affects the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the f ollowing grounds: first, because they are not
within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its
powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that
infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects
violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No.
972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the
following reasons, to wit:
1. 1.Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar
examinations of 1946-1952, and
563
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 563
1. who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of
these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they
are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the
Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This
is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2. 2.Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the
petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider
said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may
revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated
the Constitution.
3. 3.By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter
and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory
rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its
promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this
Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar,
inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is theref ore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according
to existing rules.
4. 4.The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law
makes, is contrary to f acts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the
admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
564
ANNOTATED
1. 5.Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article
1, the entire law is void.
2. 6.Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the
examinations in those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the
magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at
the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after
hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the
beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight
members of the Court who subscribe to this decision have voted and resolved, and
have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. 1.That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. 2.That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers
to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to
1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section
10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in
the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in
the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more,
without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subjcet, are considered as having
passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision
has become final, they shall be permitted
565
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 565
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the
date or dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resum of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953

inclusive follows:
August, 1946 1
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty.
Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan,
members.
Number of candidates 206
....................................................................................................
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
..........................................................
73's 6
...........................................................................................................................
72's 6
...........................................................................................................................
Number of candidates who passed 85
...............................................................................
Number of candidates who failed 121
..................................................................................
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
.....................................................
Percentage of success ....................................... (per cent) 41.62
.............................................
Percentage of failure ......................................... (per cent) 58.74
.............................................
Passing grade .................................................. (per cent) 72
...............................................
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro
who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
....................................................................................................
...........................................................
(72 per cent and above but below 73 per cent
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
.................................................................................
...................................................................................
......................................................
________________
1Designed as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners vice Mr. Justice Roman Ozaeta, resigned.
566
566 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Percentage of success 52.20
........................................................................ (per cent)
Percentage of failure 47.80
.......................................................................... (per cent)
Passing grade 72
..................................................................................... (per cent)
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la
Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Federico Agrava,
Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
.......................................................................................
..............................................
70.55 per cent with 2 subjects below 50 per cent 1
..................................
69 per cent 40
...............................................................................................
68 per cent 2
...............................................................................................
....................................................................
......................................................................
Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972 972
................................................
Percentage of success .......................................... (per cent) 54.59
.............................
Percentage of failure .............................................. (per cent) 45.41
............................
Passing grade ........................................................ (per cent) 69
.............................
NOTE.In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1
per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at
all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon.
Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty.
Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon.
Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
.......................................................................................
..............................................
71's 29
..........................................................................................................
70's 35
...........................................................................................................
.....................................................................
.......................................................................
Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972 11
.................................................
Percentage of success ............................................ (per cent) 62.40
.............................
567
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 567
........................................................................... (per cent) ......
Passing grade 70
...................................................................................... (per
cent) .......
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando
Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon.
Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates 1,218
.................................................................................................
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55
.................................................
...............................................................................
................................................................................
....................................................
Percentage of success .......................................................... 56.28
(per cent) ......................
Percentage of failure ............................................................. 43.72
(per cent) ....................
Passing grades ........................................................................ 74
(per cent) ....................
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo
1
B. Guevara, Atty, Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty.

Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor,
Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
....................................................................................................
..............................................................
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and
authority of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
..................................................................................
....................................................................................
_______________
1 In 1946 and 1947, the members of the Supreme Court were Hon. Manuel V. Moran, Chief Justice,
Hon. Ricardo Pars, Hon. Felicisimo Feria, Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Hon. Gregorio Perfecto, Hon. Carlos
Hilado, Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Hon. Manuel C. Briones, Hon. Jose Hontiveros, Hon. Sabino Padilla, and
Hon. Pedro Tuason, Associate Justices. In 1948, Justices Marcelino R. Montemayor and Alex. Reyes took
the place of Justice Hilado, resigned, and Hontiveros, retired. Justice Roman Ozaeta was returned to the
Court and Justice Sabino Padilla was appointed Secretary of Justice. In June, 1949, Justice Padilla was
returned to the Tribunal, as Justice Briones resigned. In October, 1950, Justices Fernando Jugo and Felix
Bautista Angelo were appointed to the Court, as Justice Perfecto had died, and Justice Ozaeta had
resigned. In 1951, Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran resigned and Justice Ricardo Pars was appointed
Chief Justice. In 1953, Justice Felicisimo R. Feria retired.
568
568 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
................................................................
.............................................................................................(per cent)....
...............................................................................................(per
cent)....
Passing grade 75
..........................................................................................................(per
cent)....
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, riz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor,
Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
.........................................................................................................
......................................................
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
......................................................................................
........................................................................................
...........................................................
.......................................................................................(per cent)....
.........................................................................................(per
cent)....
Passing grade 75
....................................................................................................(per
cent)....
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. . Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
.......................................................................................................
....................................................
....................................................................................
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
......................................................................................
.........................................................
.....................................................................................(per cent)....
.......................................................................................(per cent)....
Passing grade 75
..................................................................................................(per
cent)....
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty, Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
.........................................................................................................
......................................................
.....................................................................................
.......................................................................................
..........................................................
569
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 569
............................................................................................ (per
cent)....
............................................................................................... (per
cent)....
Passing grade 75
..........................................................................................................
(per cent)....
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by
the years in which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed
mere motions for reconsidration without invoking said law, which are still pending,
follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Ave.
MRD- 1. Agunod, 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
Filemon L.
...........
MRD- 2. Cunanan 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
Albino
..............
3. Mejia, Flaviano 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85
V. ..............
1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
R. ............
MRD- 5. Vivero, 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
Antonio Lu.
.........
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
Salud .............
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
...............
MRD- 8. Advincula, 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
David D. .........
9. Agraviador, 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
Alfredo L. .....
10. Alacar, Pascual 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
C. ...........
11. Amog, Pedro 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
M. .............
12. Apolinario, 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
Miguel S. .......
13. Aquino, 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
Maximo G.
.........
14. Asinas, 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
Candido D.
..........
15. Baldivino, Jose 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
B. ............
16. Balintona, 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
Bernardo .........
17. Banawa, Angel 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
L. ............
18. Bandala, 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
Anacleto A.
.......
19. Bandon, 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
Alawadin L.
.......
20. Baquero, 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
Benjamin
..........
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
....................
22. Buenaluz, 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85
Victoriano T.
.....
23. Canda, 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55
Benjamin S.
..........
24. Canon, 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9
Guillermo
............
25. Carlos, Estela 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8
S. .............
26. Cerezo, 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
Gregorio O.
........
27. Clarin, Manuel 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95
L. .............
28. Claudio 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4
Conrado O.
........
29. Condevillamar, 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65
Antonio V. ...
MRD- 30. Cornejo, 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4
Crisanto R.
........
570
ANNOTATED
Ave.
31. Corona, 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
Olvido D
...........
32. Dizon, 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
Marcial C.
............
33. Enriquez, 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
Agustin P.
.........
34. Espiritu, 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
Irineo E.
.............
35. Fernandez, 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
Macario J.
......
36. Gallardo, 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
Amando C.
.......
37. Garcia, 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
Freidrich
M. .........
38. Garcia, 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
Julian L.
...........
39. Garcia, 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
Leon Mo.
............
40. Garcia, 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
Pedro V.
.............
41. Garcia, 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
Santiago C.
..........
42. Genoves, 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
Pedro
...............
43. Gonzales, 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
Amado P.
........
44. Guia, Odon 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
R. de
............
45. Fernandez, 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
Simeon
..........
46. Jakosalem, 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
Filoteo
...........
47. Jesus, 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
Felipe D. de
...........
48. Jocom, 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
Jacobo M.
...........
49. Juares, 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70
Nicolas
.................
50. Kalalang, 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3
Remigio
...........
51. Layumas, 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
Vicente L.
........
52. Leyson, 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15
Amancio F.
........
53. Libanan, 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
Marcelino
..........
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15
....................
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4
....................
56. Linao, 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
Mariano M.
.......
57. Lopez, 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71
Angelo P.
.............
58. Lopez, 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
Eliezar M.
............
59. Lopez, 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
Nicanor S.
...........
60. Manoleto, 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
Proceso D.
......
61. Mancao, 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
Alfredo P.
.........
62. Manera, 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
Mariano A.
.........
63. Mercado, 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
Arsenio N.
.......
64. Miranda, 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
Benjamin
G. .......
65. Manad, 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
Andres B.
.......
1949
66. Orosco, 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
Casimiro P.
........
67. Padua, 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
Manuel C.
............
68. Palang, 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
Basilio S.
.............
69. Palma, 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
Cuadrato
..............
70. Paganiban, 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
Jose V.
.........
71. Pareja, 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
Felipe
..................
72. Patalinjug 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
jug,
Eriberto
......
73. Paulin, Jose 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
C.
..................
74. Pido, 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
Serafin C.
................
75. Pimentel, 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
Luis P.
...............
76. Plantilla, 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
Rodrigo C.
..........
77. Regalario, 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
Benito B.
..........
78. Robis, 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
Casto P.
................
79. Rodil, 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
Francisco
C. ..........
80. Rodriguez, 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35
Mariano I.
......
81. Romero, 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
Crispulo P.
........
571
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 571
Ave.
82. Saez, 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
Porfirio D.
..............
83. Saliguma, 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8
Crisogono
D. ....
84. Samano, 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
Fortunato
A. .....
85. Santos, 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
Faustina C.
.........
86. Santos, 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
Josefina R.
..........
87. Seludo 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
Ananias G.
..........
88. Semilia 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
Rafael I.
..............
89. Telan 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
Gaudencio
.............
90. Tesorero, 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
Leocadio T.
....
91. Torre, 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
Valentin S.
de la ...
92. Torres, 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
Ariston L.
...........
93. Veyra, 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
Zosimo C.
de ......
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
................
95. Villacarlos, 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
Delfin A.
.......
96. Villamil, 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
Leonor S.
..........
97. Zabala, 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
Amando A.
........
1950
MRD- 98. Cruz, 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
Filomeno
de la .......
99. Espaola, 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
Pablo S.
..........
100. Foronda, 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
Clarencio J.
......
101. Hechanova, 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
Vicente
....
MRD- 102. Pealosa, 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
Osias R.
..........
103. Sarmiento, 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
Floro A.
........
MRD- 104. Torre, 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
Catalino P.
...........
105. Ungson, 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
Fernando S.
......
1951
106. Abasolo, 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
Romulo
............
107. Adeva, 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
Daniel G.
............
108. Aguilar, 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
Vicente Z.
..........
109. Amodia, 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
Juan T.
.........
MRD- 110. Aosa, 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6
Pablo S.
.............
111. Antiola, 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
Anastacio
R. .....
112. Aquino, S. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
Rey A.
.......
113. Atienza, 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85
Manuel G.
..........
114. Avancea, 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8
Alfonso
..........
MRD- 115. Balacuit, 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25
Camilo N.
.........
116. Barinaga, 68 69 73 70 74 60 80 79 71.2
Jeremias L.
..
MRD- 117. Barrientos, 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25
Ambrosio
D. ..
MRD- 118. Benitez, 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2
Tomas P.
........
119. Biason, 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
Sixto F.
...........
MRD- 120. Brias, 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95
Isagani, A.
...........
121. Buela, 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
Arcadio P.
............
122. Cabilao, 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
Leonardo S.
......
123. Cabrera, 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
Ireneo M.
.....
124. Cacacho,
Emilio V.
.....
125. Calilung, 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 6.65
Soledad C.
.......
MRD- 126. Calimlim, 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
Jose B.
............
127. Calimlim, 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
Pedro B.
.........
128. Camello, 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
Sotero H.
........
129. Campos, 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
Juan A.
...........
130. Castillo, 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
Antonio del
........
MRD- 131. Castillo, 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1
Dominador
Ad. ...
572
ANNOTATED
Ave
MRD- 132. Castro, Jesus 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
B.
...................
133. Casuga, 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
Bienvenido
B. .........
134. Cabangbang, 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2
Santiago B.
.....
135. Cruz, 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
Federico S.
................
136. Dacanay, 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
Eufemio P.
...........
137. Deysolong, 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
Felisberto
..........
MRD- 138. Dimaano, 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
Jr., Jose N.
..........
139. Espinosa, 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
Domingo L.
.........
MRD- 140. Farol, 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25
Evencia C.
................
141. Felix, 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75
Conrado S.
...............
142. Fernan, 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35
Pablo L.
................
143. Gandioco, 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1
Salvador G.
......
144. Gastardo, 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
Crispin B.
..........
145. Genson, 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
Angelo B.
...............
146. Guiani, 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
Guinaid M.
...............
147. Guina, 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
Graciano P.
...............
MRD- 148. Homeres, 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35
Praxedes P.
..........
149. Ibarra, 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
Venancio M.
.............
150. Imperial, 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
Monico L.
..........
MRD- 151. Ibasco, Jr., 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85
Emiliano M.
........
152. Inandan, 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
Fortunato C.
...........
153. Jimenez, 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
Florencio C.
........
154. Kintanar. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
Woodrow
M. ........
155. Languido, 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
Cesar V.
..............
156. Lavilles, 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
Cesar L.
.................
157. Llenos, 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
Francisco U.
............
158. Leon, 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
Marcelo D.
de ...........
159. Llanto, 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
Priscilla
....................
160. Machachor, 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
Oscar
..............
MRD- 161. Magsino, 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
Encarnacion
.........
MRD- 162. Maligaya, 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
Demetrio M.
.......
163. Manio, 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
Gregorio
.................
164. Puzon, 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 68.05
Eduardo S.
..............
MRD- 165. Marcial, 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
Meynardo
R. .........
166. Martin, 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
Benjamin S.
............
MRD- 167. Monterroyo, 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
Catalina S.
.....
MRD- 168. Montero, 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
Leodegario
C. ....
169. Monzon, 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
Candido T.
.........
170. Natividad, 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
Alberto M.
.......
MRD- 171. Navallo, 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
Capistrano
C. ......
172. Nisce, 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
Camilo Z.
...............
173. Ocampo, 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75
Antonio F.
de ....
174. Olaviar, Jose 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
O. ...............
MRD- 175. Perez, 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 7.95
Cesario Z.
.............
176. Pogado, 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
Causin O.
..........
177. Ramos- 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2
Balmori,
Manuela
178. Recinto, 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
Ireneo I.
............
MRD- 179. Redor, 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70
Francisco K.
.......
MRD- 180. Regis, 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35
Deogracias
A. ......
181. Rigor, 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
Estelita C.
............
MRD- 182. Rimorin- 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15
Gordo,
Estela ..
183. Rosario, 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
Prisco del
........
184. Rosario, 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
Vicente D.
del .
573
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 573
Ave.
185. Saavedra, 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35
Felipe
.............
186. Salazar. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85
Alfredo N.
.........
187. Salem, 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
Romulo R.
............
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
...................
189. Santa Ana, 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
Candido T.
....
190. Santos, 72 66 69 65 63 70 81 71 71.7
Aquilino
..............
191. Santos, 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1
Valeriano V.
.......
192. Suico. 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
Samuel
.................
193. Suson, 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
Teodorico
...........
194. Tado, 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
Florentino P.
........
195. Tapayan. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
Domingo A.
......
MRD- 196. Tiausas, 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
Miguel V.
...........
197. Torres, 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
Carlos P.
.............
198. Tria, 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
Hipolito
...................
199. Velasco, 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
Avelino A
.........
200. Villa. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
Francisco C.
..........
201. Villagonzalo, 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
Job R. ........
202. Villarama, 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
Jr., Pedro
.......
1952
203. Abacon, 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
Pablo
.................
MHP- 204. Abad, 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
Agapito
.................
MllP- 205. Abella, 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7
Ludovico B.
.........
MRP- 206. Abellera, 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7
Geronimo F.
.....
MRP- 207. Abenojar, 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
Agapito N.
......
208. Alandy, 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
Doroteo R.
.........
209. Alano, 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
Fabian T.
.............
MRP- 210. Alcantara, 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65
Pablo V.
........
211. Arcangel, 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
Agustin Ag.
.....
212. Acosta, 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8
Dionisio N.
........
MUP- 213. Abinguna, 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
Agapito C.
.....
214. Adove. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
Nehemias C.
......
215. Adrias, 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
Inocencio C.
......
216. Aglugub, 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
Andres R.
.......
217. Andrada, 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
Mariano L.
.....
MKP- 218. Almeda, 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
Serafin V.
.........
219. Almonte- 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
Peralta,
Felicidad ...
MRP- 220. Amodia, 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4
Juan T.
...............
MRP- 221. Antonio, 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3
Felino A.
............
MRP- 222. Antonio, 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75
Jose S.
...............
223. Aonuevo, 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
Ramos B.
.......
224. Aquino, S. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
Rey A.
...........
225. Arteche, 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
Filomeno D.
......
MRP- 226. Arribas, 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2
Isaac M.
............
MRP- 227. Azucena, 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
Ceferino D.
......
228. Atienza, 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
Ricardo
.............
229. Balacuit, 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 7.3
Camilo N.
........
MRP- 230. Baclig, 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
Cayetano S.
........
231. Balcita. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
Oscar C.
............
232. Barilea, 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
Dominador
Z. ....
MRP- 233. Banta, Jose 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
Y. ...............
MRP- 234. Barrientos, 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7
Ambrosio D.
...
235. Batucan, 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
Jose M.
.............
574
ANNOTATED
Ave.
236. Bautista, 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
Atilano C.
..........
237. Bautista, 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
Celso J.
.............
238. Belderon, 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
Jose
.................
MRP- 239. Belo, Victor 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
B. ................
MRP- 240. Bejec, 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
Conceso D.
..........
MRP- 241. Beltran, 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
Gervasio M.
.......
MRP- 242. Benaojan, 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
Robustiano
O. ..
MRP- 243. Beria, 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
Roger C.
..............
MRP- 244. Bihis, 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
Marcelo M.
............
MRP- 245. Binaoro, 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75
Vicente M.
........
MRP- 246. Bobila, 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
Rosalio B.
...........
247. Buenafe, 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
Avelina R.
........
248. Bueno, 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
Anastacio F.
.......
249. Borres, 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
Maximino L.
......
MRP- 250. Cabegin, 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
Cesar V.
.........
MRP- 251. Cabello, 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 51 70.5
Melecio F.
.........
MRP- 252. Cabrera, 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3
Irineo M.
..........
253. Cabreros, 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
Paulino N.
......
254. Calayag, 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
Florentino
R. ......
MRP- 255. Calzada, 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85
Cesar de la
........
256. Canabal, 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7
Isabel
................
MRP- 257. Cabugao, 70 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8
Pablo N.
..........
258. Calagi, 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8
Mateo C.
...........
259. Canda, 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95
Benjamin S.
.........
260. Cantoria, 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71
Eulogio
............
261. Capacio, Jr., 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
Conrado .....
262. Capitulo, 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
Alejandro P.
......
MRP- 263. Calupitan, 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15
Jr., Alfredo
.......
MRP- 264. Caluya; 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9
Arsenio V.
...........
MRP- 265. Campanilla, 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65
Mariano B.
.....
MRP- 266. Campos, 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 78.25
Juan A.
..............
267. Cardoso, 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
Angelita G.
........
268. Cartagena, 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65
Herminio R.
.....
MRP- 269. Castro, 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 78.15
Daniel T.
..............
270. Cauntay, 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2
Gaudencio
V. .....
271. Castro, 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 78.35
Pedro L. de
..........
272. Cerio, Juan 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
A.
..................
273. Colorado, 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
Alfonso R.
.......
274. Chavez, 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 78.1
Doroteo M.
........
275. Chavez, 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 78.65
Honorato A.
.......
MRP- 276. Cobangbang, 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 78.85
Orlando B.
...
277. Cortez, 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
Armando R.
..........
278. Crisostomo, 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
Jesus L.
.........
MRP- 279. Cornejo, 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
Crisanto R.
.........
MRP- 280. Cruz, 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
Raymundo
..............
MRP- 281. Cunanan, 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
Jose C.
.............
282. Cunanan, 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
Salvador F.
.......
283. Cimafranca, 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
Agustin B.
......
284. Crisol, 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
Getulio R.
...............
MRP- 285. Dusi, 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.82
Felicisimo
R. .............
MRP- 286. Datu, 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
Alfredo J.
.................
287. Dacuma, 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
Luis B.
...............
MRP- 288. Degamo, 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
Pedro R.
............
575
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 575
Ave.
289. Delgado, 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
Vicente N.
.........
MRP- 290. Diolazo, 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25
Ernesto A.
..........
291. Dionisio, Jr., 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
Guillermo
.....
MRP- 292. Dichoso 71 71 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65
Alberto M.
.........
MRP- 293. Dipasupil, 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9
Claudio R.
.......
MRP- 294. Delgado, 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35
Abner
...............
MRP- 295. Domingo, 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
Dominador
T. ...
296. Ducusin, 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
Agapito B.
.........
MRP- 297. Duque, 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
Antonio S.
...........
298. Duque, 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
Castulo
................
299. Ebbah, 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
Percival B.
...........
300. Edisa, 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
Sulpicio
.................
301. Edradan, 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
Rosa C.
............
MRP- 302. Enage, 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2
Jacinto N.
............
MRP- 303. Encarnacion, 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65
Alfonso B.
....
304. Encarnacion, 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1
Cesar
...........
305. Estoista, 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
Agustin A.
...........
MRP- 306. Fabros, Jose 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05
B. ................
MRP- 307. Fajardo, 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
Balbino P.
..........
308. Fajardo, 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
Genaro P.
..........
309. Evangelista, 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15
Felicidad P.
....
310. Familara, 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.8.5
Raymundo
Z. .....
311. Farias, 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
Dionisio
...............
312. Favila, 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
Hilario B.
...............
MRP- 313. Feliciano, 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25
Alberto I.
..........
MRP- 314. Fernando, 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
Lope F.
...........
MRP- 315. Flores, 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
Dionisio S.
............
MRP- 316. Fortich, 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35
Benjamin B.
.........
MRP- 317. Fuente, Jose 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
S. de la
.........
318. Fohmantes, 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
Nazario S.
......
MRP- 319. Fuggan, 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
Lorenzo B.
...........
320. Gabuya, 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
Jesus S.
...............
321. Galang, 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
Victor N.
..............
322. Gaerlan, 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
Manuel L.
...........
323. Galem, 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
Nestor R.
.............
324. Gallardo, 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85
Jose Pe B.
........
MRP- 325. Gallos, 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
Cirilo B.
...............
326. Galindo, 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
Eulalio D.
...........
327. Galman, 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
Patrocinio
G. ......
328. Gamalinda, 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
Carlos S.
.......
329. Gamboa, 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
Antonio G.
.......
330. Gannod, 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
Jose A.
..............
MRP- 331. Garcia, 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8
Matias N.
............
MRP- 332. Ganete, 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
Carmelo
.............
333. Gilbang, 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 7.5
Gaudioso R.
.......
334. Gofredo, 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
Claro C.
...........
335. Gomez Jose 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
S. ................
MRP- 336. Gosiaoco, 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35
Lorenzo V.
......
MRP- 337. Gonzales, 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
Rafael C.
..........
MRP- 338. Gracia, 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
Eulalia L. de
..........
339. Grageda, 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
Jose M. A.
........
340. Guzman, 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
Juan de
..............
MRP- 341. Guzman, 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
Mateo de
...........
576
ANNOTATED
Ave.
342. Guzman, 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
Salvador B.
.......
343. Guzman, 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
Salvador T. de
.....
344. Habelito, 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
Geronimo E.
........
345. Hedriana. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
Naterno G.
.........
346. Hernandez, 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
Quintin B.
.......
1952
347. Homeres, 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
Agustin R.
.........
348. Ines, Leonilo 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
F. .................
349. Jamer, Alipio 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
S. ...............
MRP- 350. Ibasco, Jr., 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
Emiliano M.
....
MRP- 351. Jardinico, Jr., 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
Emilio ..........
MRP- 352. Jaen, 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
Justiniano F.
............
353. Jaring, 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75
Antonio S.
.............
MRP- 354. Javier, 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05
Aquilino M.
...........
355. Jomuad, 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
Francisco
...........
MRP- 356. Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
................
357. La O, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
................
358. Leon, Brigido 67 75 78 92 78 51 72 80 72.55
C. de .........
359. Leones, 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
Constante B.
......
360. Liboro, 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
Horacio T.
..........
361. Llanera, Cesar 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
L. ............
362. Lomontod, 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
Jose P. ..........
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
....................
MRP- 364. Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
..................
MRP- 365. Macasaet, 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
Tomas S. .......
366. Magbiray, 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05
Godofredo V.
.
367. Majarais, 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 7.85
Rodolfo P.
......
MRP- 368. Makabenta, 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
Eduardo .....
MRP- 369. Malapit, 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
Justiniano S.
......
370. Maloles, 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
Iluminado M.
....
371. Maniquis, 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
Daniel R. .......
372. Maraa, 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
Arsenio
...........
373. Marasigan, 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 7.75
Napoleon . ....
MRP- 374. Marco, Jaime 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
P. ............
MRP- 375. Martir, 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95
Osmundo P.
......
MRP- 376. Masancay, 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2
Amando E. ....
MRP- 377. Mati-ong, 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
Ignacio T.
.......
378. Mara, 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 7.35
Guillermo L.
..........
MRP- 379. Mercado, 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9
Felipe A. ........
MRP- 380. Miculob, 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8
Eugenio P.
........
381. Mison, Rafael 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
M. Jr., ......
MRP- 382. Monponbanua, 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1
Antonio D.
MRP- 383. Montero, 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
Leodegario C.
..
384. Morada, 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
Servillano S.
......
385. Mocorro, 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73
Generoso
.........
MRP- 386. Mosquera, 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15
Estanislao L.
...
387. Motus, 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75
Rodentor P.
.........
388. Macario, 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15
Pedro R.
...........
MRP- 389. Nadela, 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15
Geredion T.
........
MRP- 390. Nazareno, 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05
Romeo P. .......
391. Nieto, 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
Benedicto S.
.........
MRP- 392. Noguera, 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
Raymundo
.......
577
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 577
Ave.
MRP- 393. Nodado, 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
Domiciano R.
....
394. Nono, Pacifico 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
G. ............
MRP- 395. Nuval, Manuel 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
R. .............
396. Ocampo, 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
Augusto
............
397. Oliveros, 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
Amado A.
..........
398. Opia, Jr., 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
Pedro .............
MRP- 399. Olaviar, Jose 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
O. ..............
MRP- 400. Olandesca, Per 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
O. ..........
401. Orden, 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
Apolonio J.
..........
402. Ortiz, 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
Melencio T.
...........
MRP- 403. Pablo, 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
Fedelino S.
...........
404. Pacifico, 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
Vicente V.
.........
MRP- 405. Paderna, 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
Perfecto D.
........
406. Padlan, Crispin 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
M. ...........
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
...............
408. Padilla, Jr., 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
Estanislao E. ..
MRP- 409. Palma, 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
Bartolome
............
MRP- 410. Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
................
MRP- 411. Parayno, Mario 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
V. ..........
412. Paria, Santos 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
L. .............
MRP- 413. Pasion, 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
Anastacio
.............
414. Pastrana, Rizal 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
R. .............
MRP- 415. Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
................
MRP- 416. Pelaez, Jr., 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
Vicente C. ......
417. Pea, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
......................
418. Perez, Toribio 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
R. .............
419. Pestao, 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
Melquiades
........
MRP- 420. Pido, Serafin 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15
C. ..............
421. Pinlac, 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55
Filemon
................
422. Poblete, Celso 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
B. .............
MRP- 423. Piza Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8
.........................
424. Puzon, 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
Eduardo S.
...........
425. Quetulio, 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
Josefina D.
........
MRP- 426. Qupanes, 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
Melchor V.
......
MRP- 427. Quietson, 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85
Bayani R.
.........
428. Racho, 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
Macario D.
..........
429. Ramirez, Sabas 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
P. ............
MRP- 430. Raffian, Jose 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
A. .............
MRP- 431. Ramos, 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25
Patricio S.
...........
MRP- 432. Ramos- 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45
Balmori,
Manuela
MRP- 433. Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4
.....................
MRP- 434. Rayos Victor 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
S. ...............
435. Revilla, 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
Mariano S.
...........
436. Reyes, Abdon 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
L. .............
437. Reyes, 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
Domingo B.
..........
438. Reyes, 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
Francisco M.
........
439. Reyes, Lozano 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
M. ............
MRP- 440. Reyes, Oscar 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
R. ..............
441. Rigonan, Cesar 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
V. ............
442. Rivera, 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
Honorio
................
MRP- 443. Rivero, 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
Buenaventura
A. ..
MRP- 444. Robles, 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
Enrique
...............
578
ANNOTATED
Ave.
445. Rodriguez, 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
Orestes
Arellano
446. Roldan, 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
Jose V.
................
447. Rosario, 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
Adelaida
R. del ...
448. Rosario, 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
Restituto F.
del ....
MRP- 449. Sabelino, 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.96
Conrado S.
.......
450. San Juan, 77 86 72 89 69 76 65 72 71.6
Damaso
............
451. Saiel, 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
Felix L.
.................
452. Samaniego, 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
Jesus B.
.........
MRP- 453. Sandoval, 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.96
Emmanuel
M. ....
MRP- 454. Sanidad, 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
Emmanuel
Q. .......
455. Santiago, 75 76 84 93 63 65 69 70 71.8
Jr.,
Cristobal
......
456. Santillan, 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.26
Juanito Ll.
..........
MRP- 457. Santos, 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7
Rodolfo C.
...........
MRP- 458. Santos, 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75
Ruperto M.
..........
MRP- 459. Santos, 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8
Aquilino C.
..........
MRP- 460. Santos, 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
Rufino A.
.............
461. Suanding, 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
Bantas
..............
RTRP- 462. Sulit. Feliz 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5
M.
...................
463. Songco, 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.36
Felicisimo
G. .......
464. Soriano, 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
Aniceto S.
..........
465. Suarez, 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
Pablo D.
..............
MRP- 466. Sybico. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.06
Jesus L.
...............
467. Tabaque, 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
Benjamin
R. .......
MRP- 468. Tan Kiang, 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.96
Clarita
.............
MRP- 469. Tando, 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
Amado T.
............
470. Tasico, 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
Severo E.
.............
471. Tiburcio, 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.16
Ismael P.
...........
MRP- 472. Tiongson, 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 60 73.46
Federico T.
......
MRP- 473. Tolentino, 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
Jesus C.
...........
474. Torrijas, 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
Alfredo A.
..........
MRP- 475. Tobias, 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
Artemio M.
..........
MRP- 476. Trillana, 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
Jr.,
Apolonio
.......
MRP- 177. Trinidad, 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
Manuel O.
.........
478. Trinidad, 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
Pedro O.
...........
MRP- 479. Udarbe, 80 82 77 82 67 66 68 75 72.6
Flavio J.
.............
480. Umali, 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
Osmundo
C. .........
481. Umayam, 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
Juanito C.
........
MRP- 482. Usita, 73 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55
Gelacio U.
.............
483. Valin, 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
Francisco
M. .........
484. Varela, 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
Dominador
M. .....
485. Vega, 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
Macairog
L. de ......
MRP- 486. Velasco, 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
Emmanuel
D. .....
487. Velez, 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
Maria E.
................
MRP- 488. Venal, 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65
Artemio V.
............
489. Venus, 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
Conrado B.
..........
MRP- 490. Verzosa, 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
Federico B.
.......
MRP- 491. Villafuerte, 5 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2
Eduardo V.
.....
MRP- 492. Villanueva, 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.96
Cecilio C.
.......
493. Villar, 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
Custodio
R. ...........
MRP- 494. Villaseor, 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.16
Leonidas F.
.....
495. Viterbo, 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
Jose H.
...............
406. Yaranon, 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
Pedro
................
MRP- 497. Yasay, 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1
Mariano R.
...........
579
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 579
Ave.
MRP- 498. Ygay, 73 80 83 84 62 69 72 77 72.65
Venancio
M.
499. Yulo, Jr., 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 76 73.95
Teodoro
500. Zamora. 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
Alberto
501. Rigonan, 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2
Felipe C.
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed
in previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations
together with their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for
reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

Ave.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.65
....................................
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
....................................
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
....................................
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
................................
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
....................................
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
...................
1951 64 71 68 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
....................................
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
................................
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
................................
5. Ducusin. AsraDito B.
MRD- 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1949............................
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 66 89 68.1
....................................
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
............................
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
....................................
7. Luna, Lucito A.
1946 63 63 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
....................................
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
....................................
8. Maraa, Arsenio S.
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 76 69.35
....................................
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
....................................
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
....................................
1932 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
....................................
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
....................................
10. Pea, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
....................................
1951 74 61 62 65 69 65 75 57 68.2
....................................
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
....................................
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
....................................
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
....................................
580
ANNOTATED
Civ. Lan Merc Int Pol Crim Rem Leg Gen.
d . . . . . . Ave.
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.6
.................................... 5
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.0
.................................... 5
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
....................................
13. Rivera, Eulogio J.
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.3
.................................... 5
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
....................................
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.7
................................ 5
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
....................................
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
....................................
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
...............................
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
....................................
16. Santos, Constantino
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.6
.................................... 5
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
....................................
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.8
.................................... 5
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
................................
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
....................................
18. Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD- 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
1948............................
....
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
...............................
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
....................................
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
...............................
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.0
.................................... 5
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates85 in
allpresented motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the
provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates separating those who
filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid
Republic Act, is as follows:
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Ave.
1. Acenas, 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
Calixto R.
..............
2. Alcantara, 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
Pedro N.
............
3. Alejandro, 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
Exequiel
.............
4. Andres, 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
Gregorio
M. ...........
5. Arnaiz, 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
Antonio E.
...............
6. Asis, 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
Floriano U.
de .............
7. Bacaiso, 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
Celestino
M. ..........
581
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 581
Ave.
8. Bala, 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 679.
Florencio F.
.............
9. Baldo, 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
Olegario A.
............
10. Barrios, 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
Benjamin O.
.........
11. Buhay, 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
Eduardo L.
............
12. Burgos, 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
Dominador
C. ......
13. Cario, Eldo 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
J. ..............
14. Casar, 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
Dimapuro
..............
15. Castaeda, 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
Gregorio
.........
16. Estrellado, 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
Benjamin R.
.....
17. Fabunan, 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
Edilberto C.
.......
18. Feril, 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
Domingo B.
.............
19. Fernandez, 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
Alejandro G.
...
20. Gapus, 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
Rosita S.
(Miss) ....
21. Garcia, 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
Rafael B.
..............
22. Gracia, 73 68 75 69 80 51 72 71 71
Miguel L. de
.........
23. Gungon, 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
Armando G.
.......
24. Gutierrez, 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
Antonio S.
........
25. Ilejay, 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
Abraham I.
.............
26. Leon, 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
Benjamin La.
de .....
27. Lugtu, Felipe 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
L. ................
28. Lukman, 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
Abdul-
Harnid .....
29. Maloles, Jr., 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
Benjamin G.
..
30. Maloles, 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.76
Julius G.
.............
31. Mandi, 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
Santiago P.
...........
82. Margete, 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
Rufino C.
.......
33. Melocoton, 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
Nestorio B.
....
34. Molina, 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
Manuel C.
............
35. Muoz, 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
Mariano A.
......
86. Navarro, 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
Buenaventura
M.
37. Nodado, 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
Domiciano
R. .....
38. Papas, 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
Sisenando B.
.........
89. Pagulayan- 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
Sy, Fernando
...
40. Padula, 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
Benjamin C.
.........
41. Pasno, 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
Enrique M.
............
42. Pea, 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
Jr.,Narciso
.............
43. Peralta, 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
Rodolfo P.
...........
44. Pigar, 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
Leopoldo R.
...........
45. Publico, 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
Paciano L.
...........
46. Radaza, 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
Leovigildo
...........
47. Ramos, 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
Bernardo M.
.......
48. Rabaino 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
Andres D.
...........
49. Ravanera, 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
Oscar N.
..........
50. Renovilla, 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
Jose M.
............
51. Sabaot, 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
Solomon B.
..........
52. Sumaway, 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
Ricardo S.
........
53. Torrefiel, 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
Sofronio Q.
........
54. Vera, 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
Federico V.
de ........
55. Viray, 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
Venancio
Bustos .....
56. Ylaya, 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5
Angela P.
(Miss) ....

1. Ala Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5
......................
2. Alcantara, 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
Pedro N.
......
582
ANNOTATED
Ave.
3. Arellano, 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
Antonio L.
......
4. Buhay, 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
Eduardo L.
............
5. Calautit, 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 78.2
Celestino R.
.........
6. Casuncad, 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05
Sulvio P.
..........
7. Enriquez, 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
Pelagio y
Concepcion
8. Estonina, 80 74 64 89 81 66 68 82 72.4
Severino
............
9. Fernandez, 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
Alejandr Q.
....
10. Fernandez, 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
Luis N.
............
11. Figueroa, 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
Alfredo A.
.........
12. Formilleza. 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
Pedro
..............
13. Garcia, 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
Manuel M.
............
14. Grospe, 68 65 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
Vicente E.
............
15. Galema, 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
Nestor R.
(1952) .
16. Jacobo, 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
Rafael F.
..............
17. Macalindong. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
Reinerio L. ..
18. Mangubat. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
Antonio M.
......
19. Montano. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
Manuel M.
........
20. Plomantes, 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
Marcos
...........
21. Ramos, 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
Eugenio R.
...........
22. Reyes. Juan 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
R.
..................
23. Reyes, 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
Santiago R.
............
24. Rivera, 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
Eulogio J.
..............
25. Santos, 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
Constantino
P. ......
26. Santos. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
Salvador H.
..........
27. Sevilla, 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
Macario C.
...........
28. Villavicencio. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
Jose A. ........
29. Viray, 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25
Ruperto G.
.............
These are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this
resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach
a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing
general average in the bar examination of August and November of 1946; 69 per
cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75
per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since
1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill
No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the
profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring
to sections 14 and
583
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 583
16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
"SEC. 14. Passing average.In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political
Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject
in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken
into account in determining their general average in any subsequent
examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70
per cent in his third examination. he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some
subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
"SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants.-Any applicant who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in
any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before
us being:
"It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be
compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the
case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been
amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has
previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President
requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment
was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one
took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:
584
ANNOTATED
"The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides
that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass
the examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a
sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at
a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more
convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one
or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the ;time that he has passed the last
required subject, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the first subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in
those subjects- and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last
reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more than three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago,
another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with
no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one
to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.
* * * * * * *
"We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any
examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite
their
585
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 585
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing
general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.
"We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are
not exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent
to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we
have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar
examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment
would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average
of 70 per cent or more but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is
clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if
finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution
or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the
subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision,
order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and
of no effect.
"Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are
officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to
the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified
to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate
who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less
than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly
considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its
officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general
average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically
and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its
officer becau'Se he was "unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in
spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat,
that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously
considered."
586
ANNOTATED
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
"I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard
of the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
"Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent
in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held
after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding
oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically
one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949
and 1950 bar examinations.
"The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme
Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under
consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for
that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be
morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for
admission to other" prof essions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified
public accountancy."
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was
not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the
Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINA
TIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations
after July 4, 1946
587
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 537
up to the August 1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in
1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of
the Philippine Bar: Provided, however,That 75 per cent passing general average shall be
restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this
Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part
of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that
said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
"This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were
arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The
Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order
to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parti6s
concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing
the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952
bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar
examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the
passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any
subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent
passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the
available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those
years preceding the last world war.
In this bill we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration
588
ANNOTATED
of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
"The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill
would admit to the practice of law 'a special class who failed in the bar examination'. He
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience,
correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who
took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for whom this bill should be
enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of
the established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe
that such precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme
Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar
candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect,
was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous
resolutions.
"If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a 'valid classification' as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
" 'A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who
possess a common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and
substantial differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves
untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and
then have the diservered factions of the original unit designated with different rules
established for each.' " (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
"Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions
which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of
a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect
only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution
does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special
evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will
sustain the special form. * * * The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy,
with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse
will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs.Mayor
589
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 589
and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
"This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the
extent of the care or correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first
deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the, Rules of Court.
"For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) "PABLO ANGELES DAVID
"Senator"
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed.
The President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the
following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking
the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass
without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art.
VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the
President and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together,
however, they lost in the polls.
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive
privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this
Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the
principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense
that discretion
590
ANNOTATED
is used in its exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to
promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate
amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the
exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of
examInation, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the
scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has
made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this
Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and
lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say
that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in
1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the
examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this
Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with
grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an
arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore
objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953,
1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those
taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced
within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with
the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
PARS, C. J., dissenting:
Under section 14 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
591
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 591
below 50 per cent in any subject." This passing mark has always been adhered to,
with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of
successful candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per
cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12. candidates with
general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by
resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list
first released containing. the names of successful candidates covered only those who
obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for
reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to
75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original
list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more
but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar
candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates
with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15,
1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the
original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average
of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective
of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by
resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in eff ect made 69 per
cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted,
without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose
general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for
reconsideration.
592
ANNOTATED
invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were
uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and
professors, practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates
appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others,
for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent,
retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by
the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed
another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important
difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the
inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication
of names of the bar examiners before the holding of the examinations, and (4) the
equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants,
were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No.
972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in
doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking
for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average
of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent
in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in
the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said
Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any
subject in any examination after July 4, 1946,
593
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 593
shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades
shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the
approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average,
filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to
the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they
have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of
July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and
members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were
invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curi, the reason alleged f or said
hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter"
involved "a new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the
subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13,
provides as follows:
"The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines."
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has
the
594
ANNOTATED
power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to
see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the
admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers
bar examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets
aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of
law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon
the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place,
resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in
justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which
they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on
motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any given year, are subject to
revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the
motions were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is
that bar examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a
judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the
Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial
function involved, in the strict and constitutional sense of the word, because bar
examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do
not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining
boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution,
except only when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and
contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection of the
law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not
impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right
to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere
595
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 595
curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the
adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being
discriminated against, because we no longer have any record of those who might
have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always
been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war
bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any
rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the
legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we
can f airly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative
judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this
Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any
interference erence at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution.
Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is
essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of
creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties
and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say, the
statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had
obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who
have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80
per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then
destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court,
596
ANNOTATED
namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per
cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending
section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective
several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15,
1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or
more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or
more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect
amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held
in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per
cent) was supposed to be in force. It stands to reason, if we are to admit that the
Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission
to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the
passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69
per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations.
Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter
that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances
had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently
refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972
is against public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is
beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the Congress. As
already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that
the
597
VOL. 94, MARCH 20, 1954 597
Vea vs. Acoba, et al.
legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken
all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public
interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them,
should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act
No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the
exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious
manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the
situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the
right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should
therefore be given effect in its entirety.
Candidates who in 1953 obtained 71.5 per cent, without falling below 50 per cent
on any subject, are considered passed.
_______________
Bar Matter No. 553. June 17, 1993. *
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs.THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Attorneys; Words and Phrases; Meaning of Practice of Law.Practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
Same; Same; Same.When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the
case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
Same; The practice of giving out legal information constitutes practice of law.What is
palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided-for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of practice of law.
________________
*EN BANC.
379
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 3
79
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract
drafting, and so forth.
Same; Same.Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.
WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of
legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
Same; Same; The services offered by respondent cannot be performed by paralegals here
as distinguished from the United States.Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which
offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As
the concept of the paralegal or legal assistant evolved in the United States, standards
and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the
Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. In the Philippines, we still have a
restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service.
As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor.
Same; Lawyers may not advertise their services or expertise.Anent the issue on the
validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to
380
3 SUPREME COURT
80 REPORTS ANNOTATED
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyers position, and all other
like self-laudation.
Same; Exceptions.Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited.
The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or
solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of
two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions.
Same; Same.The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data.
Same; Same.The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable.
Same; Legal profession here has been under attack on its integrity.Secondly, it is our
firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate
what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at
times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach,
and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court.
381
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 381
R E S O L UT I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes A and B (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law.
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET
MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid
marriage.
Info on DIVORCE.
ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT.
VISA.
THE Please call: 521-
0767,
LEGAL 5217232,
5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria
Bldg., UN Ave.,
Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
382
382 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN
Ave.,
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy
CLINIC, Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
INC. 1
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as
a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of
law but in the rendering of legal support services through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and
Van OSteen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States
2
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised
herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine
Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women
Lawyers Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines
(WLAP), and (6) Federacion Internacional de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. The 3
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and
cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
________________
1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on the left side of The Legal
Clinic, Inc. in both advertisements which were published in a newspaper of general circulation.
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 87 S Ct. 2691.
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated December 10, 1991, Rollo, 328.
383
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 383
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it
proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position
papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda
submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. 1.Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the
two terms, i.e., legal support services vis-a-vis legal services, common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could
deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitute practice of law?
xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondents foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that
today it is alright to advertise ones legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondents act of
establishing a legal clinic and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court
to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field
of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx
A. The use of the name The Legal Clinic, Inc. gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers
________________
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal Affairs, 1, 10; Rollo, 209, 218.
384
ANNOTATED
and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services.
The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because
this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to
the very name being used by respondentThe Legal Clinic, Inc. Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like
a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term
Legal Clinic connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondents name, as published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services.
In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt
may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering legal support
services as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged
in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between legal
services and legal support services, as the respondent would have it. The advertisements
in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services
are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary
to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know
that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized,
and that is:
Article 26. x x x.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry
385
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 385
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered the dark side of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02.A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown
in Annex A of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words
Just Married on its bumper and seems to address those planning a secret marriage, if
not suggesting a secret marriage, makes light of the special contract of permanent
union, the inviolable social institution, which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article Rx for Legal Problems is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate.
The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a
bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the legal support services respondent offers do
not constitute legal services as commonly
386
ANNOTATED
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts
which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying
and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto.
It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled
but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of
the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted
time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from encroaching upon the legal profession will
deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a
lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both
are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but
also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in
the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of,
illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench
and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services.
Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may
be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings
because of the factual considerations involved.
387
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 387
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondents services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages
which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine Law. While respondent
may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it
must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is
not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted
before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a paralegal for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating
his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporations
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx
Respondent asserts that it is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondents acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
The Legal Clinic, Inc., and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within
the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme
Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondents own commercial advertisement which
________________
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on Bar Discipline, and Atty.
Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29; Rollo 414-416, 425-427.

388
ANNOTATED
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense.
From all indications, respondent The Legal Clinic, Inc. is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation,
rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in courtSee Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent The Legal Clinic, Inc. holds
out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious
vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to
court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it
nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal rightlimited to
persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent
but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical
law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers Association:
The Philippine Lawyers Associations position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are
to wit:
1. 1.The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. 2.Such practice is unauthorized;
3. 3.The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. 4.The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx
_______________
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Lawyers Rights and
Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del Rosario, President, 5-6; Rollo, 241-242.
389
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 389
Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders legal support services to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated
in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondents Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and
convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which
activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
the practice of law. 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers Circle:
In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be
given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards
which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may
now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact
remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to take measures to protect the general public from being
exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being
________________
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty. Mariano M. Magsalin, Vice-
President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.

390
ANNOTATED
paralegals without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which
may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are
prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an
entity staffed by paralegals. Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general
public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer
such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters, will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondents nameThe Legal Clinic, Inc.does not help matters. It gives
the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them.
Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there
are doctors in any medical clinic, when only paralegals are involved in the The Legal
Clinic, Inc.
Respondents allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose
of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned Starweek article. 9
5. Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines:
Annexes A and B of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against
the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex A of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay
________________
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo; 105-106.
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-371.
391
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 391
P560 for a valid marriage in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do
so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from
qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an
illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended
so that such as act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages
and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a
secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on
divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this
character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federation International de Abogadas:
xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.
x x x Of necessity, no one xxx acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
_______________
10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2;
Rollo, 169-170.
392
ANNOTATED
conduct which the law forbids. It seems x x x clear that (the consultants) knowledge of the law, and
his use of that knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law x x x. It is not only presumed
that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with the
broad features of the law x x x. Our knowledge of the lawaccurate or inaccuratemoulds our
conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular
business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specifications in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by
the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends,
a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are
not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him
and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of
industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them
are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matters, and without regard to legal training or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious
393
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 393
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or
that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so,
or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their
business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular
client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the
law defining his clients obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by
law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendants primary efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law.Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees wills.
Another branch of defendants work is the representation of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the
subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not
he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the
value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to
assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
394
ANNOTATED
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency
by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a
party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. Counsel here means a licensed attorney,
and other representative one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may
lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at
pp. 154-156.)
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
1. (a)The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;

2. (b)The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;
3. (c)No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succinctly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10 In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex
A, Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage
license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of
law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in Rx for Legal Problems
on the Sharon-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services,
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment
of marriage and visas (See Annexes A and B, Petition). Purely giving information
materials may not constitute practice of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines by himself
395
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 395
what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinics paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give
legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. x x x Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the
forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Daceys book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICETHE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems,
and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the defendants publication does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situationin the
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the unlawful practice of
law x x x. There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an, interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript
on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record
does fully support, however, the finding that for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant
gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise
in the preparation and presentation of the purchasers asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit
of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with refer-
396
ANNOTATED
ence to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed.(State v. Winder, 348 NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. It is not controverted, however, that if the services involve giving legal advice or
counseling, such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light
that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of
this case.
xxx
2.10. Annex A may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex B may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that
only paralegal services or legal support services, and not legal services are available. 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase practice of law becomes

exigent for a proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On
this score, we note that the clause practice of law has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service
that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of
________________
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty. Barbara Anne C. Migallos, 8-
12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.

12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.
397
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 397
legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in

three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients
to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and
appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in
proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in

the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal
15
rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after
the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding
16
the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper
17
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, after citing the doctrines in several
19
cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute practice
of law, thus:
Black defines practice of law as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court,
_______________
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.

14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile
Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.
16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).
398
ANNOTATED
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he:
x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State
ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177), stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
399
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 399
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.[R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the
perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute practice of law.
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondents own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals
to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the
extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such
as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
400
ANNOTATED
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational of employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation
like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that
do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services.20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information
to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent
and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls
squarely within the jurisprudential definition of practice of law. Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients
in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to
court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract
drafting, and so forth.
________________
Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.

20
401
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 401
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the
January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine
Star, entitled Rx for Legal Problems, where an insight into the structure, main
purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own proprietor,
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on
the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the
clients problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are specialists in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. When they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. Thats what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted
whats bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and
so on. Thats how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then its
referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment.
These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. Things like preparing a simple
deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital,
the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis.
Again, kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. Its just like a
common cold or diarrhea, explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive treatment are dealt with accordingly. If you
had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions
of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real
estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation
would be properly trained to deal with that problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to
arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
402
ANNOTATED
support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue
of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of
the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said
reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve
as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of
legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such
in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction wherefrom respondent

would wish to draw support for his thesis.
________________
21 Rollo, 130-131.
22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.
23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
24 Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al., 42 SCRA 302 (1971).
403
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 403
The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet
the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or
rules specifically so provide. The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
25
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute
and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been
recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling
them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law. The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to
26
the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondents position that the

concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law
profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent
cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative
action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by
respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees
in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As the concept of 28
the paralegal or legal assistant evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines
for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has
even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associa-
_______________
25 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, 863, 864.

26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.
27 Lowell Bar Assn. vs. Loeb, 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client 64, 865.
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
404
ANNOTATED
tions of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics,
such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of

what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons
not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in
behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited
in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
________________
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974) and Shayne, The Paralegal Profession, Oceana
Publications, 1977, Appendix II & III; Rollo, 116-117.
30 Illustrations: (a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law schools clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of Court);
1. (b)An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the
Government of the Philippines in a case in which the government has an interest (Sec. 33, Rule
138, id.);
2. (c)An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the purpose of conducting
the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
3. (d)A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, who is appointed
counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities where members of the bar are not available
(Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);
4. (e)Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine Patent Office (now
known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer) in trademark, service
mark and trade name cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases);
5. (f)A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations Commission or any Labor
Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party to the case; (2) he represents an organization
or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly
authorized; or (3) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by
405
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 405
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be
hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person
into the practice of law. That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
31
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance
only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
33
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or

claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give
34
something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in

return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of
35
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that
lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment,
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph
to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer
________________
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the
latter (New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission);
1. (g)An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a case falling under the
Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
2. (h)Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the studies of law in a
reputable university or school of law is deemed sufficient qualification for appointment (Sec. 233,
Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145.
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, 866; Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. of New York vs. U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
406
ANNOTATED
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the lawyers position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession codemn the lawyers advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The 37
proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business

rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in
the case of The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R. Bayot an 38
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present

proceeding, was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
39
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession. It being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old
defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer, * * * is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of the
character and conduct. (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
________________
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.

37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.
38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).
39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: Marriage license promptly secured thru our
assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of
parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
407
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 407
We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for
a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus
to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of
the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation
and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two
broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. Such data must not be misleading and may
include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-
public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented. 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published
________________
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.

41 Op cit., 80.
42 Op cit., 80, citing Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
408
ANNOTATED
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish
his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a
law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements
for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the
fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, which is 45
repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is

obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary
rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the
prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of
fees or an estimate of the
________________
43 Op cit., 80, 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 69 (Mar. 19, 1932); A.B.A. Op. 133 (Mar. 13, 1935); A.B.A. Op. 24
(Jan. 24, 1930); and Canon 43, Canons of Professional Ethics.

44 Op cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930); A.B.A. Ops. 53 (Dec.
14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941), 241 (Feb. 21, 1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25,
1952).
45 Supra, Fn. 2.
409
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 409
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Batescase contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that
state. This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
46
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at
bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association
after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing
television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly with 47
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy................................................................... from
71%
to
14%
Professional.................................................................. from
71%
to
14%
Honest........................................................................... from
65%
to
14%
Dignified....................................................................... from
45%
to
14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and
judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack
lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt
and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to
exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services
_______________
Id., 810, 825.

46
Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the American Bar Association Journal,
47
January 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.

410
ANNOTATED
except in allowable instances or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
48
law. Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
49
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this
matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just
like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some
so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the
concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding
quo warranto action, after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis
50
for the grant of respondents corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse
thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor
General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as
________________
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, supra, Fn 38.
49 U.S. vs. Ney & Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil. 968 (1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No. 902-A and Sec. 121,
Corporation Code.
411
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 411
Mendoza vs. Mabutas
Annexes A and B of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Meloand Quiason, JJ., concur.
Respondent restrained and enjoined from issuing or causing the publication of the
questioned advertisement.
Notes.Lawyers may not engage in forum-shopping by splitting actions or
appeals (Tan vs. Court of Appeals,199 SCRA 212).
Reason for award of attorneys fees must be stated in the courts decision
(Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 729).
o0o

ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991. *
RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.

SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; Practice of law
defined.Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. (111 ALR 23) Interpreted
in the light of the various definitions of the term practice of law, particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construc-tion intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poorverily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirementthat he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered by the Commission on
Appointments.The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public
hearings on Monsods confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
shall the Court interfere with the Commissions judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant
the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
________________
*EN BANC.
211
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 211
Cayetano vs. Monsod
PADILLA, J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; Definition of Practice of

Law".What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, practice refers to
the actual performanceor application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. To practice law,
or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.Therefore, a doctor of medicine
who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to
be in the practice of medicine. A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot
be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of
a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; Definition of Practice of

Law".The Constitution uses the phrase engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and
regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It means that one is
occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent
and attention during the ten-year period.
PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Appointments.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly

only legal issues are involved, the Courts
212
ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect
of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Italics supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be mem-bers of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.(Italics supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes
practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines practice of law as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters. negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Blacks Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
213
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 213
Cayetano vs. Monsod
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v, C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,
176177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; itembraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved
in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character; and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.],
p. 665666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Italics ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for
new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even
broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in
the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perfom those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. (111
ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term practice of law.
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make
a very brief statement? , -. . ..
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on
Audit Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that They must be
Members of the Philippine BarI am quoting from the provision'who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years/
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this
to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may
be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to
the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore. the answer is yes,
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
x x (Italics supplied)
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either
be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (italics supplied)
Corollary to this is the term private practitioner'' and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word lawyer. Today, although many lawyers do not engage
in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services. (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called sole practitioners. Groups of lawyers are called firms. The firm is usually
a partnership and members of the firm are the partners, Some firms may be
organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms,
there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called
associates. (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice
is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which
lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any
acts . .. . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State
Bar Assn v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most
publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate
and the litigating lawyers role colors much of both the public image and the
selfperception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business
counselor in this wise: Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know
that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted
in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling: than
in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in
law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective. (Business Star, Corporate Finance Law/' Jan. 11,1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a
number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at least
some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such
as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving
to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of
the relatively rare typesa litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of
much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range
of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting,
and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it
some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers work the constraints are imposed
both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, hereinbelow quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept
of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly modelmaking and
contingency planning, has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a model, of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively
little organized and
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless,
a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a masters or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business
Star, Corporate Finance Law, Jan. 11,1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
abogado de campanilla. He is the big-time lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it
is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some
large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms, Many others have
in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include,
inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in
board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission). and in other capacities which require an ability to
deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs
of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management.(Italics supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action,
or not understanding how ones work actually fits into the work of the organization. This
can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyers services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their international practice in law libraries. (Business
Star, Corporate Law Practice, May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: A bad lawyer is one
who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the
excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them. (Business Star,Corporate Finance Law,
Jan. 11,1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a shot in the arm, so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning:
(1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate
counsels management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as intersecting managerial jurisprudence, it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsels total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsels role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporations strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not
only with public entities but with each otheroften with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
Also, the nature of the lawyers participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained anew role as a stakeholderin
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Italics supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific
technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ
from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japans MITI is world famous. (Italics supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found
to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders.
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities
are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes,
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both
to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations, (Italics supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics, The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of systematic problemsphysical, economic, managerial, social,
and psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles
more accessible to managersincluding corporate counsels. (Italics supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise
the settlement value of litigation,
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases, (Italics supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools
provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in
these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to
illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsels responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar
facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive
of this nations evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of law is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy
work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsels Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firms strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make
or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyers aim is not the
understand all of the laws effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal constitution or makeup of the modern corporation. Business Star, The
Corporate Counsel, April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
aspect of their work, Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, Corporate Finance law, Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of
the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1901,' the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,1991, he took his oath of office.
On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of Monsods nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 197273. He has also
been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the
laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and
project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986)
and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsods work involved being
knowledgeable In election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmens Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasijudicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and
as a member of the Constitutional Commission (19861987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128
129 Rollo) (Italics supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to
be a member,
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers, Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Italics supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a countrys Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrowers
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13),
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries sovereignty. (Condensed from the
work paper, entitled Wanted; Development Lawyers for Developing Nations, submitted by
L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan
World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on
August 2631 , 1973).1973). (Italics supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation.Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). (Italics supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or
more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities
of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreementsan
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of
quiet genius and serene mastery. (See Ricardo J. Romulo, The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments, Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term practice of law,
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsods past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a Iawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poorverily more than satisfy the constitutional requirementthat he
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327,
the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide."(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law.(Italics supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of
four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by
the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President
issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of
bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14,1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by
Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
227
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 227
Cayetano vs. Monsod
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,
two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment,
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padillas separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition
of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution.Moreover, Justice Padillas definition would require generally a
habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlawsay, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this
is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in
my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means
nothing because the definition says that law practice " ... is what people ordinar-
ily mean by the practice of law. True I cited the definition but only by way of
sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous or defining a phrase by
means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what
the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should
not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine
Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts
of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
228
ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings
on Monsods confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commissions
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Courts
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following;
1. (1)If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
2. (2)In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
3. (3)If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life/'
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea
asked Delilah (who was Samsons beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that
229
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 229
Cayetano vs. Monsod
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an
iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samsons eyes.
This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah
was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: Did any blade
touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins? The procurator was clearly
relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Grio-Aquinoand Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., See brief concurrence.
Melencio-Herrera, J., In the result, 011 the same basis as Justice Narvasa.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Padilla, JJ., see dissents.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Bidin, J., I join in the dissent of Justice Gutierrez.
Sarmiento, J., On leave.
Regalado, J., No part due to intended personal association with respondent
Monsod.
Davide, Jr., J., No part, I was among those who issued a testimonial in favor
of Christian Monsod which was submitted by him to CA.
CONCURRENCE
NERVASA, J.:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only
in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that
the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments -that the
appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be
confirmedwas
230
ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY
the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the
Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman,
while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My
purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for
respondent Monsods disqualification. Moreover. a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent
Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsods comment, I am even more
convinced that the constitutional requirement of practice of law for at least ten (10)
years has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration
because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years. (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution).
Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to
judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v, Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139)
upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries.
231
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 231
Cayetano vs. Monsod
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years. It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such
standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, practice refers to
the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge: it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action. To practice law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
1
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the
tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the practice of medicine. A certified
public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as
an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive
or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva. 2
Practice Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or

customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding ones self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) x x x (italics supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes practice of law. It states:
________________
1Websters 3rd New International Dictionary.

214 SCRA 109.
232
ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
1. 1.Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding

ones self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law
(U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as, a lawyer
before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing
it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v,
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p; 1, 87 Kan, 864).
1. 2.Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood
or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence,
charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term practice of law (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer
in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. Peoples Stockyards
State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S.
462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v.
Arthur C. Taylor, 94 A-L.R. 356359)
2. 3.Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term practice of law. (Martin
supra)
3. 4.Attorney-client relationship.Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be
said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
3
________________
3 Commission on Appointments Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT CONSTITUTES

PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 67.
233
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 233
Cayetano vs. Monsod
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining
whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice
of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. 1.Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice
of law?
2. 2.Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. 3.Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the
records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were
isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as
practice of law; To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People
vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent
Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to
such position.
________________
4 14 SCRA 109.
234
ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
CRUZ,. J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must

dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ
with him while of course respecting his viewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications
of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we
are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointees credentials is made on
the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the
exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of
the appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who
both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we
said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this
Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot
disqualify an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on
Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in
an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no
less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be
examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to
be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase practice of
law as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that
one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as
his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock
broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition
as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely to become involved in
litigation.
235
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 235
Cayetano vs. Monsod
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation
is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of
such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code
and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the
modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or
government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact,
again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he
rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge
and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public
utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in
the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
performance of any acts, . , in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law, which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that
because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at
least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if
only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible
exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or
escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondents credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade
me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in
which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and
not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various
positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a business-
236
ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
man and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law.
Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for
agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional
Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law.
He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition;
DISSENTING OPINION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as
a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly
definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod
engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on
official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically
stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no
instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the
work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to
look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave
abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr.
Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in
manage-
237
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 237
Cayetano vs. Monsod
ment, educational background, experience in international banking and finance,
and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not
questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty.
He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of
the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational
limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his
life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of
law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What
kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real
estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working
in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active
and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal,
or extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It means that
one is occupied and involved in the enterprise: one is obliged or pledged to carry it
out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent
Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never
practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his fathers law firm. Even then his law practice
must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in
238
ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he
practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1 Respondent Monsods activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:
1. 1.19611963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 2.19631970: World Bank GroupEconomist, Industry Department; Operations,
Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East,
International Finance Corporation
3. 3.19701973: Meralco GroupExecutive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 4.19731976: Yujuico GroupPresident, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and
affiliated companies
5. 5.19761978: Finaciera ManilaChief Executive Officer
6. 6.19781986: Guevent Group of CompaniesChief Executive Officer
7. 7.19861987: Philippine Constitutional CommissionMember
8. 8.19891991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt
Member
9. 9.Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:
1. a.ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

2. b.Dataprep, Philippines
3. c.Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.
4. d.Semirara Coal Corporation
5. e.CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
1. a.Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

2. b.First Philippine Energy Corporation
3. c.First Philippine Holdings Corporation
4. d.First Philippine Industrial Corporation
5. e.Graphic Atelier
6. f.Manila Electric Company
7. g.Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
8. h.Philippine Electric Corporation
9. i.Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
10. j.Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
11. k.Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
239
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 239
Cayetano vs. Monsod
1. 1.Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation
(Rollo, pp. 2122)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the
claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a
lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal advice of legal
services, he was the one receiving that advice and those services as an executive but
not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to
equate engaged in the practice of law? with the use of legal knowledge in various
fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an
ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning.
Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know,
follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher,
policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice
of law?
The Constitution requires having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. It is not satisfied with having been a member of the Philippine bar for
at least ten years.
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but
also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of
any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract
or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must
be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assn v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Assn v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462,
176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
240
ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. Practicing law has been defined as Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of
advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving
of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge
or skill. Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in
People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Assn v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176
N.E. 901." (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For ones actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only
be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed,
habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was
asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions
where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: Very seldom. In answer to the
question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-
nine years of his business, he said: I have no idea. When asked if it would be more than
half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances,
he answered: I dont recall exactly what was said. When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and
charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal,
he answered: Well, I dont believe so, that is not a practice/ Pressed further for an answer
as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker,
he finally answered: I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate
is concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful
right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing
of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he
has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. x x x. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
241
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 241
Cayetano vs. Monsod
x x x. An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by
another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to
appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional
persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled attorneys in
fact; but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. Attorney/ A
public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally
qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainerof clients. The
principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage
the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. x x x His rights are
to be justly compensated for his services. Bouv. Law Dict. tit. Attorney. The transitive verb
practice, as defined by Webster, means to door perform frequently, customarily, or
habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming; x x x to carry on in
practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession,
trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine, etc. x x x. (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523;
Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA
109 [1965]):
x x x Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x ." (at
p. 1 12)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality
as a a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum
prepared and issued by it, to wit:
1. Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding ones
self out to the public as a lawyer (People v.
242
ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v, Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law
(U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil., 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from
his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of
isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law.
Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup
Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod
while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in
the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in
the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the
case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and
dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for
the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for
that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court
to obey its mandate,
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming the nomina-
243
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 243
Cayetano vs. Monsod
tion of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Petition dismissed.
Note.View that the court should not impose its view on areas within the
competence of policy makers. (Garcia vs. Board of lnvestments, 191 SCRA 288.)
o0o
244

ANNOTATED
Valencia vs. Cabanting
Adm. Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543. April 26, 1991. *
PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING,

respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW,
ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING,
respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant, vs.ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
Attorneys; Property; Art. 1491 prohibits sale to counsel of a property pending litigation;
Case at bar.Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while
the litigation is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775). In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer
Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari
proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation
over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of
the judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings,
that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to
conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the
judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in
progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this
malpractice is a ground for suspension.
Same; Disbarment and Suspension; Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions.Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far,
the most important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re:
Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts
show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112).
Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood
but is rather
_______________
*EN BANC.
303
VOL. 196, APRIL 26, 1991 3
03
intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and the
public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty.
Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Grave malpractice and

misconduct.
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio

Antiniw, Arsenio Fer Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an
MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of their legal
profession committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana
allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a
certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner.
However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in
their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty.
Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia
in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were
relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish
ownership if the Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino
exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed
that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to
settle their differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr., pp.
21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a
complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff,
versus
304
ANNOTATED
Paulino Valencia, Defendant. (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services
of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of
sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino
gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the
signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A Compraventa
Definitiva (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V,
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court
expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with
Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court
failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was
pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that
the decision in this case has already become final and executory (Exhibits 3 and 3-
A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty.
Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer
Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex A of Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said
counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of
the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under
litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petiton of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a
disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty.
Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of Compraventa Definitiva
and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys.
Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property
allegedly in violation of Article
305
VOL. 196, APRIL 26, 1991 305
1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging
Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents.
On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty.
Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one
Lydia Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary
Public by one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said
Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years before in the year 1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in
confabulation with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and
ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a
matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact executed by the supposed vendor Rufino
Rincoraya and so said Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and
declare void the said sales. (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias,involving the transfer of a piece of land by the
grandparents of Lydia Bernal (complainant) in favor of her parents, was lost during
the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a
deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights
over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother
still offered to sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to
strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from claiming the property).
On consultation, Atty. Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty.
Antiniw allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her
grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmothers approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property, filed a
complaint against her (Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification
of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack
306
ANNOTATED
of evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9,
1974, the resolution of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two
resolutions of the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975, Administrative
Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3,
1976, all of these cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of
these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch
50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged
threats against the person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the
transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, under the sala of Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal
of cases against Atty. Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting; dismissal of
Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in Administrative Case
No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the
suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him
guilty of malpractice in falsifying the Compraventa Definitiva.
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
307
VOL. 196, APRIL 26, 1991 307
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491
of the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying
notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx
(5) x x x this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they make take part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship
involved. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client.
Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any
violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re Attorney Melchor
Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70
Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the
litigation is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased
the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A
thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it
in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of
the judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic dictates, in certiorari
proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition.
Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has
terminated when the judgment of the trial court become
308
ANNOTATED
final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of
the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of
Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a
ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was
no attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering
that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The
transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of
P200.00 in consideration of his executing the document Compraventa Definitiva
which would show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw
simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater
weight than negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de
Ramos vs. CA, et al., L-40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individuals integrity is
challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that
he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is
expected of him. (De los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his
testimony, even if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can
be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and
confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification
of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty
in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84
SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union
vs. La Bu, 63
309
VOL. 196, APRIL 26, 1991 309
SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his clients success is
wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his clients cause in
utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty
to resort to illegal means for his clients interest. It is the duty of an attorney to
employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as
are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most
important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan
T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts
show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA
112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a
source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and
reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them.
(Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high
standards of the law profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos
should be dismissed for lack of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified
in full on direct examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination.
Several subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded. She eventually requested
the withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is
proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February
9, 1989). Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but
proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken
310
ANNOTATED
out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant,
Administrative Case No. 1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an
affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso facto result
in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer.
(Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss
the same because there was no evidence to substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is
predicated on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the
personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. Any evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not
on the witness stand. (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989,
p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in
Administrative Case No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove
her additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these

administrative cases conspired in executing the falsified Compraventa Definitiva
and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and
the Valencias are neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not
be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with
the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to
sue the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the
parties in a meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an
involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of
brotherhood among them. One of the four-
311
VOL. 196, APRIL 26, 1991 311
fold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing
counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility.
They may do as adversaries do in law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as
friends. This friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw
DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the
roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391
against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and
Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J., Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Dionisio Antiniw disbarred from the practice of law; Arsenio Fer. Cabanting
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months; case against Eduardo
Jovellanos dismissed.
Notes.Cases with simple subject and legal issues involved should never reach
the Supreme Court, an attorney may be censured due to tactics he employed to
obstruct the administration of justice. (FAR Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 157 SCRA 698.)
Complainant Macias and respondent Malig both found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the court. (Macias vs. Malig,157 SCRA 162.)
o0o
312

ANNOTATED
In re Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines
January 9, 1973.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integra-

23
VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 23
Philippines
tion submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the earnest
1
recommendation on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had
in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and consistently with the views and
2
counsel received from its [the Commissions] Board of Consultants, as well as the
overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar that this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible
through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule.
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526formally prays the Court to order the
integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On
August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were
orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, and all 3
parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
_______________
1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 for the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction, the Commission is composed of Supreme
Court Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then Court of Appeals Presiding
Justice) Salvador V. Esguerra, U.P. Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual, Ex-Senator Tecla San Andres
Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional Convention Delegate Feliciano Jover Ledesma
(Members).
2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno, Roman Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag,
Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the petition represented the unanimous consensus of
53 Bar Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached in convention at the Far Eastern University
Auditorium in Manila on June 23, 1962.
3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega, the Camarines
Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar Association and the Manila
Bar Association.
4 The petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted memoranda in favor of Bar
integration, while the Manila Bar Association submitted a memoranda opposing Bar integration.
24
ANNOTATED
Philippines
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments
relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong
nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission
on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the
Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor. The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law
provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as
it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this
Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in
the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with arguments on the constitutionality of
Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the
views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the
Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that
body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample
material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the
Philippine Bar at this time.
25
VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 25
Philippines
The following are the pertinent issues:
1. (1)Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
2. (2)Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
3. (3)Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of
Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and
the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court
The term Bar refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do
so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of
a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
Rule of Law, integration fosters-cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own
organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession,
pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
1. (1)Assist in the administration of justice;

2. (2)Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;
26
ANNOTATED
Philippines
1. (3)Safeguard the professional interests of its members ;

2. (4)Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
3. (5)Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public,
and publish information relating thereto;
4. (6)Encourage and foster legal education;
5. (7)Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law,
and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
6. (8)Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
1. (1)Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

2. (2)Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuses of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;
3. (3)Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
4. (4)Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its
own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
5. (5)Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
6. (6)Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
practice maintained through influence or position;
7. (7)Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
8. "(8)Provide placement services, and establish legal
27
VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 27
Philippines
1. aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the
poor may not lack competent legal service;
2. (9)Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in
many of our provinces;
3. (10)Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the
country;
4. (11)Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
5. (12)Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
6. (13)Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations,
on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the
Filipino lawyer; and
7. (14)Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of
the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the
nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine
Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part
of the Courts constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar,
Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Courts inherent
power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will
promote public interest or, more specifically, will raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively.
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional hinges on the effects
28
ANNOTATED
Philippines
of Bar integration on the lawyers constitutional rights of freedom of association and
freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the
Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege ; a privilege, moreover,
clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to
his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the
court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just
that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but
there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate
effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be
required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar
conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of
court that requires all-lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar
29
VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 29
Philippines
is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to
associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in
its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount. The issue, therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of
group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal
service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries
of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control.
Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction
30
ANNOTATED
Philippines
for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program
without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the
integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that
might result from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner
he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a members due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership
in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional
for the Bar to use the members dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was
established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a free speech
issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that
have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus
extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has
never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
31
VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 31
Philippines
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a
new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will
receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities
in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will
apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and
because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States,
Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among
the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better
and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the
Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7)
establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9)
better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities
to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the
Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of
integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations
will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not
be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its
affairs.
32
ANNOTATED
Philippines
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of
Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration
experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where
the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on
the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional
consciousness, energized the Bars responsibilities to the public, and vastly
improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official
statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar Integration show that in the national
poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the
Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have
turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar
integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per
cent) are non-committal. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar associations and
lawyers groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other
expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while
not a single local Bar association or lawyers group has expressed opposition
thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on
the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14
per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) voted against it, and 285 (or
2.06 per cent) are non-committal. All these clearly indicate an overwhelming
5
nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the
mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional
and legally unobjec-
_______________
5All figures are as of January 8, 1973.

33
VOL. 49, JANUARY 11, 1973 33
Cadano vs. Cadano
tionable, and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of
Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January
16, 1973.
Concepcion C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barred
o, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Integration of the Philippine Bar ordained.

Supreme Court upholds standards for public officials

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628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 96-1-SDC(P)

VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 6

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on

aAnnexes B, B-1, B-3 of Alauyas Comment dated June 5, 1996.

Home Mortgage Finance

1. 1.Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds

She deplored Alauyas references to her as unscrupulous, swindler, forger,

authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power

3 Dated April 19, 1996.

as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the

1. 1)Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question by gross

Alauyas defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely

15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.

vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Sharia Bar

19 ART. 19, Civil Code.

Respondent Ashari M. Alauya reprimanded.

640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

PETITION to Surrender Lawyer^ Certificate of Title.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his

Lack of Merit Resolutions are Obnoxious, 31 Lawyers J. p. 329.

Recalling Atty. Almacens petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing

right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded

sacrosanct, nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office.

14 Sec. 3, Rule 138.

723; State v. Sprigs, 155 P. 2d 285.

interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to

22 Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution.

Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.

Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in

in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a

Section 27, Kuie 138, Rules of Court.

without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority

1. 1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO COURT AND PUBLIC.

1. 3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER OR SUPPLEMENT

1. 5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CLASS LEGISLATION.Republic Act No. 972 is a

1. 6.ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS PROVISIONS.Article 2 of

1. 7.ID.; REPUBLIC ACT No. 972, PART OF SECTION 1 DECLARED TO BE IN

REPUBLIC ACT No. 972

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resum of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953

B. Guevara, Atty, Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty.

PETITIONERS UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

PARS, C. J., dissenting:

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs.THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

1. 1.Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

2. Philippine Bar Association: