Charland - Incommensurability Thesis and The Status of Knowledge

The Incommensurability Thesis and the Status of Knowledge
Author(s): Maurice Charland

Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2003), pp. 248-263
Published by: Penn State University Press
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The Incommensurability Thesis and the Status
of Knowledge
Maurice Charland
The view that inquiry can be understood in terms of rhetorical theory can
be traced to Thomas Kuhn's influential work, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962). Kuhn is often cited by scholars concerned with the
discursive strategies by which the natural and social or human sciences
justify themselves and their specific claims. Kuhn's legacy is well cap-
tured by Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey in the opening essay of The Rheto-
ric of the Human Sciences (1987) where they link him to Stephen Toulmin
and Cham Perelman as instigators of the study of the Rhetoric of Inquiry.
In their words, Kuhn's landmark classic "challenges philosophy to account
for the actual operation of scientific communities - their professional de-
vices of communication and socialization, their political structures, their
reliance on aesthetics, and their rhetorical dependence on persuasion"
(Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey 1987, 12). Despite this reaction, how-
ever, Kuhn's project was in many ways modest. He was not seeking to
develop a sociology of science or a rhetoric of inquiry. He sought only to
account for the form of modern science's history, which is not marked by
linear progress, but by a succession of dominant frameworks, or what he
termed paradigms.
As I will argue in this essay, Kuhn's conception of paradigms is in-
compatible with rhetoric, except during scientific revolutions or under con-
ditions of incommensurability. Incommensurability is a problematic
category, however, for the opening it affords rhetoric ultimately undermines
the very idea of paradigms. Consequently, locating rhetoric within normal
science either undermines the very category distinctions that provide sci-
ence with its specificity, or reduces rhetoric from a particular genre of dis-
course directed toward human agency to "rhetoricality," an aspect of all
discourse. As we shall see, such blurring of genre distinctions is itself fun-
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2003.

Copyright 2003 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.
248
THE INCOMMENSURABILITY THESIS 249
damentally problematic, for science and rhetoric as discursi

practices are themselves incommensurable, even if not in K
Rhetoric and revolution
Kuhn observed that modern science is characterized by the bracketing of

major disagreements regarding basic assumptions except during periods of
"crisis." While pre-modern inquiry saw the contemporaneous co-existence
of fundamentally incompatible frameworks, each competing for adherents,
modern science normally excludes such divisions. Instead, modern science
is characterized by a succession of frameworks. Only at periods of transi-
tion that are temporally bounded, for which Kuhn coined the term "scien-
tific revolutions," does more than one framework have currency within a
given sub-specialty (1962, 10-22).
Kuhn accounts for this curious historical phenomenon by arguing
that modern science is precisely constituted through an enforced bracket-
ing of debates over first principles. The first principles, or paradigm, of
any field are more than a set of epistemological or ontological assump-
tions. They are the set of rules constitutive of science as an activity. They
orient scientists in their work, providing background assumptions, meth-
odological principles, criteria of validity, a research agenda, and so on.
The hegemony of a paradigm frees scientists from having to justify their
work philosophically, socially, or politically. As Kuhn observes, normally
science has the form of puzzle solving (35-42). He even likens it to a game,
and like any game the participants need not concern themselves with the
extrinsic validity of its rules or of the game itself. As Kuhn notes:
Though many scientists talk easily and well about particular individual hy-
potheses that underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are little bet-
ter than laymen at characterizing the established bases of their field, its
legitimate problems and methods. If they have learned such abstractions at
all, they show it mainly through their ability to do research. That ability can,
however, be understood without recourse to hypothetical rules of the game. (47)
Paradigms render modern science possible by producing practitioners and

practices rather than by providing explicit knowledge of the principles such
practices instantiate. In Foucault's language, we could say that practices
are discursive formations (see Foucault 1972, 31-39). They are produc-
250 MAURICE CHARLAND
tive: they give to knowledge and a form of lif

relations of power: scientific activity is const
self-surveillance and self-disciplining of the s
its graduate schools, peer review processes, an
tion of findings. These institutions secure the
each sub-specialty. Furthermore, because each
the institution and practices of some science,
visible or available for scrutiny and critique. F
is a necessary a priori.
Paradigms also constitute meaning. In Ku
like political constitutions. They are necessary
collective life. They do so by establishing bo
ence. The extra-paradigmatic is not only exclu
meaningless. At certain moments, however,
pable of sustaining sense within their boun
history of science as consisting of periods of
terrupted by moments of crisis and radical ch
change is akin to revolutionary constitutional
erence to the historical record, Kuhn demonst
from within. Paradigms lose their power w
doxes, cannot account for anomalous finding
observed phenomena. Under such circumsta
impossible. This leads to a revolutionary situ
Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growin

segment of the political community, that existi
equately to meet the problems posed by an enviro
created. In much the same way, scientific rev
growing sense, again often restricted to a narro
community, that an existing paradigm has cea
the exploration of an aspect of nature to which
ously led the way. (1962, 91)
The scientific enterprise requires a work

just as civil society requires a functional consti
be replaced. But how? For Kuhn, the answer is
suasive discourse that seeks assent in the absence of secure foundations.
Paradigms themselves cannot help in this matter, for they are based upon
the bracketing of a priori questions, and as such criteria for new paradigm
development and selection are beyond their scope. Kuhn also notes a sec-
ond parallel between political and scientific revolutions. He observes that:
"Political revolutions aim to change political institutions in ways these in-
THE INCOMMENSURABILITY THESIS 25 1
stitutions themselves prohibit" (92). For Kuhn, scientific r

similar in that they involve changes that violate the reign
Scientific revolutions are extra-paradigmatic just as politi
are extra-constitutional. Indeed, it takes little effort to exten
claim that scientific revolutions are political revolutions with
community. "Normal science" then ceases to exist and the
of a new paradigm, of a new hegemony, occurs through a cla
and a battle for the "hearts and minds" of scientists who have become
deterritorialized in spite of themselves. Thus, in a very strong sense, scien-
tific revolutions are not science at all. That is to say, the discourse of these
revolutions is not guided by the same rules, procedures, and imminent prin-
ciples that constitute normal science as an epistemic genre. Revolutions
are outside science. Central to Kuhn's political vision of scientific revolu-
tions is his epistemological a priori, supported by his reading of the his-
tory of science, that defines paradigms as incommensurable with each other.
Kuhn thus offers an anti-realist epistemology of representation. Science
cannot directly grasp nature. The real is figured in scientific discourse.
Those holding different paradigms have different apprehensions of the
world. Where one would "see" oxygen, the other would "see"
dephlogisticated air (55).
What marks paradigms as distinct is that they offer incompatible figu-
rations of nature. Because nature can never be apprehended directly, there
is no neutral descriptive language or transcendent ground to resolve para-
digm conflict. In the language of rhetorical theory, such conflict cannot be
settled by inartificial proof. Thus Kuhn observes that "[l]ike the choice
between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms
proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life" (93).
Consequently, for Kuhn, the choice of community life depends upon po-
litical discourse, described as "persuasive" discourse, which is to say dis-
course that gains assent in the absence of sure foundations and gives rise to
social institutions and practices. Because a paradigm's first principles can-
not be discovered in an empirical sense, nor demonstrated inartistically, it
must depend upon rhetorical invention and artful language to render them
in compelling fashion. Until a paradigm is consolidated and gains the sta-
tus of normal science, it cannot yield "knowledge" and so demonstrate its
efficacy or epistemological validity. That, even under the best circum-
stances, can only be done post hoc. Thus, the reigning paradigm must be
indicted and put on trial, while compelling metaphors offer a new vision of
what science could be. Furthermore, and as importantly, the success of
new paradigms, like that of political orders, depends upon enlisting fol-
lowers. This not only opens the way for a wid

violate the strict decorum of normal science,
of science as continuously advancing. Succe
and consolidate their hegemony by successf
cessors in a narrative of progress. In order to
resent nature, the successful paradigm has ever
previously counted as knowledge as a special
the present (100-102). Science benefits from it
fallacy.
Epistemology or hermeneutics
Scientific revolutions are clearly rhetorical. However, Kuhn's role for rheto-
ric in scientific revolutions does not in itself inaugurate the Rhetoric of
Science project. That project is concerned in large measure with "normal
science," where there is no great struggle. Kuhn offers a vision of normal
science as proceeding under what Richard Rorty terms "epistemology." In
Rorty's words: "For epistemology, to be rational is to find the proper set of
terms into which all the contributions should be translated if agreement is
to become possible" (1979, 318). Normal science produces knowledge in a
highly normalized context where paradigms regulate what count as valid
objects and inferences. The formal incompleteness of verification proce-
dures is not at issue because paradigms delimit an area of sense over against
radical skepticism. As such, all valid statements in a normal science are
commensurable with each other and with that science's organizing prin-
ciples. There is internal coherence, but not only by fiat. That is to say, we
have both rules and sense, where the former create a space for the latter.
Consequently, while we will of course find persuasion among the social
practices of scientists, their students, and their benefactors, science's knowl-
edge discourse in itself is only weakly rhetorical. Although there is argu-
ment, persuasion has only a minor, facilitative, or pedagogical role, because
outcomes are determined largely by the paradigm itself. At most, one can
make the banal claim that "rhetorical" elements, which are of course fun-
damental properties of discourse, make scientific communication possible.
Thus, for example, while Philip. J. Davis and Reuben Hersh demonstrate
that even proofs in deductive logic are necessarily incomplete and that their
evaluation is based in a reader's intuitive grasp of what steps are key or
significant, they do not admit that conclusions could go either way (1987,
65). The Rhetoric of Science project has greater ambitions, h

focuses upon discourses as persuasion over against bound
tion. Bounded demonstration may rely on "rhetorical" el
non-analytic arguments, tropes, and figures, but it is not d
recruiting adherents to a controversial position. Instead, it
accepted and bounded concepts and principles. In such demo
torical elements serve two specific functions: economy a
Economy consists in the simplification of arguments and pr
the clarification of concepts. Stabilization consists in pa
nance, holding together concepts that might otherwise be s
ally their self-) deconstruction.
Can Kuhn's model accommodate a stronger role for r
discourse of normal science? The answer lies with what is done with his
concept of incommensurability. Kuhn holds that paradigms are incommen-

surable with each other. There is a prior incommensurability between na-
ture-in-itself and discourse. Science offers representations of something
that always remains ungraspable. Thus, normal science depends upon a
founding rhetoric of constitution in the wake of a revolutionary act, in or-
der to erect a structure of sense. Also, while incommensurability marks the
boundary that revolutions cross, not all incommensurabilities are precur-
sors to revolution. Rather, incommensurability signals the epistemological
limit to knowledge and of a tamed epistemic rhetoric. When representa-
tions claim the same territory, Kuhn's logic of hegemony leads to revolu-
tion, but Kuhn also recognizes the coexistence of incommensurable
paradigms with distinct object domains. These are not in conflict - there is
no civil war. They stand as neighboring worlds that do not communicate
with each other (Kuhn 1962, 59). They share few if any common meanings
or concerns. Indeed, Kuhn defines incommensurability as the impossibil-
ity of translation between paradigms. As such, even in the absence of revo-
lution, incommensurability raises the problem of understanding, and opens
a space for a rhetoric that is neither epistemic nor political, but hermeneu-
tic. Rhetoric is hermeneutic, not by providing for shared meaning accord-
ing to an ideal of perfect translatability, but by providing for a feeling of
commonality and the coordination of action. As such, rhetoric can sustain
the idea of science as a common enterprise over against paradigmatic dif-
ference. So conceived, rhetoric is an ally of normal science, but remains a
metadiscourse, operating extra-paradigmatically. Scientific discourse must
create and sustain islands of meaning in the face of the abyss of the incom-
mensurable, which is the risk of meaninglessness itself. "Science" in the
broad sense depends upon such rhetoric to bridge paradigms, to provide
(false) unity. In this, rhetoric has a place, as

bridges them together into the larger inst
this role, however, rhetoric must be underst
erations that produce and consolidate mean
ing, rather than as tools for combat.
A more radical extension of Kuhn's incom
discourse provides a further place for a stron
ence. The postmodern insight that meaning
always at risk, gives rhetoric additional im
only arise through an agon, the language o
burden of figuring a recalcitrant real that ex
of meaning suffer constant erosion and are a
requires rhetorical policing to keep paradigm
Gross's The Rhetoric of Science is not a decon
theless subscribes in part to this postmod
Aristotle's designation of rhetoric as a civic a
phistic, which relativized knowledge as it
maxim that "man is the measure of all things
conceives of rhetoric as hermeneutic and constitutive rather than as
epistemic. He asserts that science "invents" rather than "discovers": "The

term invention, on the other hand, captures the historically contingent and
radically uncertain character of all scientific claims, even the most suc-
cessful" (Gross 1990, 7). Gross's use of the phrase "radically uncertain"
dissolves science. "Radical uncertainty" implies that the incommensura-
bility or "gap" is not a semantic one between paradigms, but an inferential
one between utterances. Furthermore, that gap must be negated to estab-
lish any claim. If the answers to scientific questions are undetermined, ei-
ther by nature or by a paradigmatic frame, normal science as conceived by
Kuhn no longer exists. Science would no longer be a process of solving
puzzles, but the ongoing process of world constitution. A consequence of
conceiving of rhetoric and science hermeneutically rather than epistemically
is that knowledge is subordinated to power. Power would impose the sem-
blance of coherence by regulating practices. Meaning would be
epiphenomenal and semantic entailment would be illusory. Gross does not
whole-heartedly advocate a nihilist or Nietzschean view of discourse. He
does after all attribute science's success to its ability to offer a "coherent
network of utterances" (Gross 1990, 203). Nevertheless, his coherence is
not Kuhn's. In Kuhn, paradigms insure a coherence of sense, of entail-
ment; incoherence is between paradigms. Gross however minimizes the
distinction between revolutionary and normal science (127). Both are en-
gaged in redescription (205). These redescription

coherent, but they do not assure the coherence of f
science must constantly depend upon reconstitutio
For Gross, "science is less a matter of truth th
worlds" (205). In Gross's terms, science is rheto
though persuasion in the face of meaninglessness.
herself and then her colleagues that her propositio
others in the Rhetoric of Science project, rely on a
incommensurability thesis and eschew realist ep
consensus view of knowledge. As Gross puts it:
When scientific truth is seen as a consensus conce

range of utterances, rather than the fit between the
tual change need no longer be justified on the basis
tion of that reality. It is instead the natural result
that is science, a persistent effort to renew consensus
of potentially disruptive utterances. (204)
Observe here, though, that the very structure that

This "persistent effort to renew consensus" appears
revolution, but nevertheless is driven by paradi
becomes the paradigm's supplement. It has becom
tics, assisting understanding within paradigms, wh
idea of paradigm is no longer tenable. In other wor
based in paradigms, for they are not generative of
such, coherence is not a property of argument fie
procedure; and thus an effect of power. Specific
ence to be produced by the displacement of disagr
ized procedures of verification (32). Epistemology o
effect. The implication is that incommensurabi
Strictly speaking, each phrase becomes potentially
the next. There are no normal utterances, only no
disciplinary in Foucault's sense, insuring the non-a
Franois Lyotard terms a diffrend, that which m
Paradoxically, this radical extension of Kuhn
thesis, as undertaken by the Rhetoric of Science p
Gross, radically alters the nature of incommens
ence claims to be representational. It seeks to offe
use Rorty's phrase. New paradigms present themse
proved mirrors that permit a better view. Once the
mal and revolutionary science is abandoned, howev
coherent fields of representation, and so sc

itself producing fully rendered worlds. Science
the manner that the interstate highway system
on-ramps and off-ramps, rest stops, and inter
Only certain points are accessible. There is a hi
struction happens occasionally and unpredictab
be obsolete. Science, like the highway system,
full and fixed panorama. It moves us along fro
next. In its most extreme formulation, even E
be considered a coherent and continuous visu
ances would not just follow according to some
institutionally supported, and informal logic. E
would now depend upon extrinsic appeals - or
tic means. Thus, while science might, as G
coherent set of utterances, that coherence alw
stable.
For an incommensurability of genres
Normal science is no longer a nice safe place. Incommensurability has

moved inward. It is not between paradigms but potentially between utter-
ances. Not only does science lose its particularity as a genre of knowledge
discourse, but rhetoric's place has shifted. As the "patch" that bridges in-
commensurability, rhetoric would no longer a localized phenomenon, but
would be intrinsic to all ostensive phrases. "Rhetoric" becomes the term
that signals an anti-realist ontological a priori rather than a particular techne
or dunamis. That is to say, incommensurability itself vanishes from be-
tween discourses precisely because it is the a priori of discourse, it is the
condition from which discourse emerges. Consequently, science is inven-
tion in a radical sense, the fashioning of coherence out of nothingness.
Science conceived rhetorically is an instance of the will to power speaking
itself.
The Rhetoric of Science project thus presents us with an irony: By

extending incommensurability to within paradigms, the latter dissolve and
rhetoric is everywhere, but not as persuasion in the usual sense treated by
Aristotle, but as "rhetoricality" as the "groundless, infinitely ramifying
character of discourse in the modern world" (Bender and Wellbery 1990,
25). Consequently, rhetoric itself is "no longer the title of a doctrine or
practice. . . . [I]t becomes instead something like the conditi

istence" (25). All is rhetoric when one is speaking over the abyss.
Untranslatability no longer is a valid concept, for there are no secure places
to translate from or to. Furthermore, there is no hermeneutic understand-
ing, because science's procedures are only validated institutionally. Thus,
rhetoric is creation: It is architectonic and as such becomes the common
denominator or measure of all discourses of knowledge. Indeed, with little

effort we could extend this argument to all discourses. We then would have
that "all discourse is rhetorical," and hence subsumable under rhetoric as
the new, universal common measure of measurelessness, but where rheto-
ric is in the agon of utterance, of struggling to sustain meaning, not in a
practical art dedicated to the organization of a program of action. This
clearly is not what Kuhn had in mind. Kuhn's vision was of normal science
being interrupted by revolutions, of normalized procedures of inquiry be-
ing thrown off in favor of a new regime, or in Rorty's rendering, episte-
mology being interrupted by hermeneutics (1979, 317-33). The Rhetoric
of Science project, however, ultimately does not support this Kuhnian in-
terpretation. Rhetoric penetrates all science, and thus epistemology, the
production of knowledge through normalized discursive procedures, is in-
distinguishable from a non-foundational constitutive hermeneutics, in the
sense of a quest for meaning through an encounter with language. This,
however, contradicts the foundational distinction that generates Kuhn's
analysis and consequently places the Rhetoric of Science project in an
awkward position, for the productive distinctions between science and rheto-
ric risk being lost.
The oxymoronic character of the phrase "Rhetoric of Science" be-
comes apparent if we consider Rorty's discussion of hermeneutics and in-
quiry. Rorty, as is well known, considers the epistemological impulse within
philosophy to be unproductive. He advocates that philosophy be herme-
neutic in character, and as such not produce knowledge but promote some-
thing akin to understanding. He terms such philosophy edifying (Rorty 1979,
360). Its role is to contribute to interesting conversations. This is all well
and good within philosophy, but how can we speak of science as edifying
or "hermeneutic" in Rorty's sense? Is science but a conversation about
nature? Hardly, for conversations have a fluid structure, a different dure,
and could not proceed with institutionalized referees. Not surprisingly, Rorty
considers hermeneutics and inquiry to be antithetical. Inquiry is rule-gov-
erned or paradigmatic in a way that hermeneutics or conversation is not.
Science is more than a conversation. The mark of science, as even Gross
admits, is to lay claim to represent the real and to strongly regulate the
nature of debates: it displaces controversy

displacement relegates rhetoric to a second
handmaiden to normal science.
Kuhn's famous text and the Rhetoric of Science project arise from
what Rorty dubs the "loss of the real." This "loss" favors rhetoric's status
precisely because rhetoric developed as an art to elicit human action in
domains where secure knowledge was unavailable. What is often forgot-
ten, however, is that even within its own traditions rhetoric is not usually
considered productive of all forms of knowledge. This is clear in Aristotle,
whose tripartite homology of rhetoric's temporalities, knowledge domains,
and forums is well known. Rhetoric is concerned with the good, the just,
and the expedient as applied to particular cases. Aristotle's sophistic pre-
decessors granted rhetoric a larger domain, but also focused primarily upon
action and particularity. Gorgias, for example, asserted that oratory could
be more productive than good health and medicine, but his point of refer-
ence was the individual patient who must be persuaded to follow an appro-
priate treatment. Rhetoric's focus upon the particular is stressed by McKeon,
who even as he argues that rhetoric is architectonic, reminds us that it is
concerned with cases and has as its end not knowledge but action (McKeon
and Backman 1987, 23). I grant to Kuhn, Rorty, and others such as Gross
that no possible meta-epistemology can provide an incontrovertible vali-
dation of paradigms. As such, rhetoric in a strong sense is involved in para-
digm legitimation considered politically. Rhetoric can address the practical
question "what paradigm should we adopt at this junctureV The further
claim implicit in the strong version of the Rhetoric of Science project that
science is rhetorical all the way down remains highly problematic, how-
ever. Consider for a moment that political advocates can and do recognize
the rhetorical character of their discourse, while scientists within their prac-
tice cannot if they are to remain in good faith. To so admit would contra-
dict the very principles that Gross credits with science's success. Science
claims to produce universally valid knowledge, and as such cannot admit
the dissoi logoi, the idea of situated knowledge, or a faculty of judgment
over against the rule of reason. Science respects the idea of the better argu-
ment, but does not equate consensual validation with something akin to
electoral or parliamentary victory. Its horizon remains "truth."
It should be apparent by now that my preoccupation here is not the
"loss of the real" but the loss of distinctions between discursive genres,
and their particular capacities. With respect to the delimited domain of
inquiry or science, Kuhn's incommensurability thesis has ultimately con-
tributed to this loss. While Kuhn presents paradigms as practices, his em-
phasis upon semantic incommensurability tightly ties scienc

mological problematic of representation: Incommensura
present different "worlds." From there it is easy to claim th
rhetoric and science are forms of world-making, they are f
the same. This line of reasoning forgets that there is more to
world-making. Different kinds of discourse do differen
Franois Lyotard reminds us of this important point in T
Condition (1984). He borrows the concept of "language
Wittgenstein in order to discuss the pragmatics of scienc
serves to discriminate between the "various categories of utt
can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties
which they can be put" (Lyotard 1984, 10). In this formulati
as presented in Kuhn are language games. One must then
tween language games, for they give rise to different types
and have different effects. As Lyotard puts it, "messages ha
ent forms and effects depending on whether they are,
denotatives, prescriptives, evaluatives, performatives, etc. It
what is important is not simply the fact that they commun
tion" (16).
Lyotard's pragmatic orientation moves us away from sem
representation. Science is not analogous to representation
photography, nor does it simply produce a coherent field of m
ness or gaps need not be overcome precisely because scie
perspective is not about creating worlds at all. Scientific
performance of "moves" where each utterance is placed in
predecessors. Lyotard then identifies what is specific to the
search game:
First, the sender should speak the truth about the referent
be possible for the addressee validly to give (refuse)

ment he hears. This implies that he is himself a pote
[the sender's] equal. . . . Third, the referent ... is su
by [the sender's] statement in conformity with what
Furthermore, he identifies two rules that secure tr

that which is susceptible to proof and can be used a
and "the same referent cannot supply a plurality of
sistent proofs." This leads to the following fundame
science: "Not every consensus is a sign of truth; but
truth of a statement necessarily draws consensus" (
sion of the pragmatics of science is consistent in
principles in the Rhetoric of Science project

sively. The procedures by which it posits
fied. Argument and at least the idea of
Lyotard's approach, however, also highlights
is well known, in the rhetoric of the agora
ally does "supply a plurality of contradictor
thermore, Lyotard observes that scientif
"narrative knowledge," the knowledge of
telling, in that the former is an exclusive
itself as distinct from the social bond; there
between the competence of senders and r
terms of "a diachronic temporality, that is
which is in respect to the idea of progress.
to the idea of modern democracy, and wh
equality and progress, political rhetoric i
with the "rhetoric" of science. Political rhet
narrative; the social bond is fundamental
litical oratory addresses audiences in t
"audienceness," in other words, the relation
metrical. Lyotard's focus upon pragmatics
different order than those of Gross, who, e
ence, philosophy, and politics employ dist
asserts that "Aristotle notwithstanding, rhe
differ not in kind but only in degree" (G
common denominator is that in all cases, ar
cal organization, enthymematic (that is, inc
of arrangement and appropriate style. Gross
precisely because he defines rhetoric as th
duces agreement, whether it be with respec
For Lyotard, science and other domains su
distinct because they are based in language g
tinct pragmatics, over and above their havin
rensics.
Unlike the Rhetoric of Science project, Lyotard does not seek to blur
distinctions. Lyotard is far more concerned with maintaining the integrity
of incommensurable domains even while exploring their encounter. For
Lyotard, language games or what in The Diffrend he comes to call "genres"
are more than the morphological features of phrase types (1988, 136-37).
On the contrary, their pragmatics are constitutive of what we could call
distinct "forms of life," the autonomy of which should be respected. Lyotard
THE INCOMMENSURABILITY THESIS 26 1
argues for the autonomy of language games through a revised

(Lyotard and Thbaud 1985, 94). He observes that language
leological. Immanent to each game is a finality that is "tr
That is to say, each game is guided by a regulative idea in
sense. A Kantian regulative idea is not a concept in the strict
it cannot be explicitly specified. Furthermore, it can never fu
ized. "Truth," "beauty," and "justice," as examples of regula
never be fully or properly rendered, even as they organize la
(44-52). Science is guided by the idea of the true representatio
ral universe that can be described in terms of universal causal or stochastic
relations. Because this idea is regulative, it structures the pragmatics of

scientific discourse. Over and above semantic incommensurabilities, or the
acceptability of certain technical terms in particular scientific language
games, the various modern sciences axe pragmatically commensurable with
each other because of their common finality. Furthermore, even though
they depend upon argument and proof, they remain incommensurable with
other phrase regimens, and in particular with strong rhetoric, sometimes
mislabeled "little rhetoric," marked by particularity, contingency, and the
idea of human agency. Strong conceptions of rhetoric, be they Sophistic,
Aristotlean, or Platonic, view rhetoric as situated normative practices that
valorize doxa. The sciences are descriptive; they are directed toward "the
true." Aristotle's traditional genres of forensic, deliberative, and epideictic
discourse, forms of strong rhetoric, are not and so remain incommensu-
rable with science. The finalities are different. Specifically, these genres
are concerned with contingent prescriptive questions: How do we render
justice in this case? What measures must this community now undertake?
What values must we prize? Without appealing to a theory of faculty psy-
chology, Lyotard reasserts distinctions articulated in antiquity by Aristotle
and the Sophists and in modernity by Kant. With Aristotle, he asserts that a
distinction exists between episteme and phronesis. This is what marks the
boundary between politics and science (21-29), and these are instantiated
in different language games. To follow one regimen, to "play" a language
game, is to enact a form of life. Each domain calls upon us to speak and
listen in a particular way.
I should emphasize again that the distinction identified by Lyotard
between inquiry and politics is not simply a matter of form. Admittedly, in
the terms he develops in The Diffrend, we could say that inquiry is "rhe-
torical," but only in the banal sense that discourses of inquiry also rely on
tropes and argumentative forms or that discourse is marked by rhetoricality.
But science and rhetoric are distinct genres because of their finality, which
implies different addressor- addressee re

Obrechts-Tyteca observe, philosophy and i
dressed to a "universal" audience. That is t
are presented as if addressed only to the f
"disappears" in philosophy in the sense tha
pected to assent to true claims (Perelman a
Civic rhetoric, in contrast, is directed towar
For this reason, it is addressed to "particular
contingent and interested beings. As a coroll
by transcendental reason but must be won. R
lishes an asymmetry between sender and r
science. Rhetors are advocates. They provide
contrary arguments and evidence. A rhetor is
logoi. Audiences, while not disinterested,
that capacity, they are not advocates, but ar
ment. As pointed out above, science presume
and receiver; scientists, whether addresso
disinterested position. Arguments should be
the community, including the addressor. Wh
points out, is not whether scientific or philo
ally realizes this idea. Rather, what is fundam
nizes scientific and philosophical discou
resemblances and differences between inquir
lative idea and addressor-addressee relation
The genre distinction that I have elaborat
Leff 's observation that proponents of the R
dered the concept "rhetoric" unrecognizable f
1987, 21-23). In Aristotle and the civic tradit
by an idea, not simply a set of surface featur
tical knowledge and action within a domai
gent. Rhetoric is distinguished by its telos. R
of phrases, including argument, narrative, a
organized toward different ends. For rhetor
simply a sign of non-analytic reason. Clearly
Science" has rhetorical (that is, political) v
contradiction, it is the battle cry of a quiet
More than "Discourse of Science" or even
lists the imagination in its anti-realist vis
termed displaced by this slogan, however. Rh
art, nor even a taxonomic theory of textual
perspective. More precisely, the presence of the term "rheto

ontological privileging of signs over things. Thus, "rhet
rubric under which Gross can join such philosophically diver
Aristotle, Propp, Freud, Habermas, Perelman, Barthes, and o
less of their opinion of rhetoric, because of a common
discursivity (Gross 1990, 9-10). The unity (and difference
easily lost, as Leff cogently notes (1987, 35).
More is at stake here than the epistemological status
project into science or the disciplinary boundary of a langua
the Rhetoric of Inquiry, what is at stake is maintaining the
distinct pragmatic genres of speech and realms of human lif
be wary of a simple relativism that results from an unrefle
ward theories predicated upon the dismantling of modernity
be rendered unto Caesar.
Department of Communication Studies

Concordia University
Thanks to Dilip Gaonkar and James Jasinski for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this essay.
Works Cited
Bender, John B., and David E. Wellbery. 1990. "Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of
Rhetoric." In The Ends of Rhetoric: History, Theory, Practice, ed. John B. Bender and
David E. Wellerby, 3-39. Stanford: Stanford UP.
Davis, Philip J., and Reuben Hersh. 1987. "Rhetoric and Mathematics." In The Rhetoric of
the Human Sciences, ed. John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey, 53-
68 Madison: U of Wisconsin P.
Foucault, Michel. 1972. The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books.
Gross, Alan G. 1990. The Rhetoric of Science. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: U of Chicago P.
Leff, Michael C. 1987. "Modern Sophistic and the Unity of Rhetoric." In The Rhetoric of
the Human Sciences, ed. John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey, 19-
37. Madison: U of Wisconsin P.
Lyotard, Jean-Franois. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minne-
apolis: U of Minnesota P.
Lyotard, Jean Francois, and Jean-Loup Thbaud. 19

Minnesota P.
McKeon, Richard Peter, and Mark Backman. 1987. Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Dis-
covery. Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow P.
Nelson, John S., Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey. 1987. "Rhetoric of Inquiry." In
Rhetoric of the Human Sciences, ed. John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N.
McCloskey, 3-18. Madison: U of Wisconsin P.
Perelman, Cham, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1969. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Ar-
gumentation. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P.
Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Charland - Incommensurability Thesis and The Status of Knowledge

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The Incommensurability Thesis and the Status of Knowledge

Author(s): Maurice Charland

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2003.

damentally problematic, for science and rhetoric as discursi

Rhetoric and revolution

Kuhn observed that modern science is characterized by the bracketing of

Paradigms render modern science possible by producing practitioners and

tive: they give to knowledge and a form of lif

Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growin

The scientific enterprise requires a work

stitutions themselves prohibit" (92). For Kuhn, scientific r

lowers. This not only opens the way for a wid

65). The Rhetoric of Science project has greater ambitions, h

concept of incommensurability. Kuhn holds that paradigms are incommen-

(false) unity. In this, rhetoric has a place, as

epistemic. He asserts that science "invents" rather than "discovers": "The

gaged in redescription (205). These redescription

When scientific truth is seen as a consensus conce

Observe here, though, that the very structure that

coherent fields of representation, and so sc

For an incommensurability of genres

Normal science is no longer a nice safe place. Incommensurability has

The Rhetoric of Science project thus presents us with an irony: By

practice. . . . [I]t becomes instead something like the conditi

denominator or measure of all discourses of knowledge. Indeed, with little

nature of debates: it displaces controversy

phasis upon semantic incommensurability tightly ties scienc

be possible for the addressee validly to give (refuse)

Furthermore, he identifies two rules that secure tr

principles in the Rhetoric of Science project

argues for the autonomy of language games through a revised

relations. Because this idea is regulative, it structures the pragmatics of

implies different addressor- addressee re

perspective. More precisely, the presence of the term "rheto

Department of Communication Studies

Lyotard, Jean Francois, and Jean-Loup Thbaud. 19

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