CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III.
The Philippine as a state)
1.) People of the Philippines vs Loreta Gozo
53 SCRA 476 Political Law Sovereignty
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval
Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the
advice of an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished
the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later
on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineers Office for
violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition
and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the
lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no
administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a
foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but
also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of
their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise
of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative
jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.
2.) Manila International Airport Authority vs CAGR No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495
SCRA 591
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy
International Airport located at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent
notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the
amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of Paranaque
city threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which
they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed to
do so within the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA
then sought for the TRO with the Supreme Court a day before the public auction,
MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately the TRO was received by
the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction .MIAA claims that
although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are with MIAA
still the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that
it is an instrumentality of the government and as such exempted from real estate
tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be
subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque
City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporation therefore
not exempted to real estate tax.
Issues: Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a
government owned and controlled corporation and as such exempted from tax.
Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and
thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.
Ruling:
Under the Localgovernment code, government owned and controlled corporations
are notexempted from real estate tax. MIAA is not a government owned and
controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a stock or non
stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided into
shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no members. MIAA is an
instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and government
functions.
Under the civil code, property may either be under public dominion or private
ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State and are utilized
for public use, public service and for the development of national wealth. The ports
included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports. When
1
CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form
part of the patrimonial property of the State.
The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion.
Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international travel
and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and
for regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of
MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of the public dominion the land and
buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them to levy and
public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a
proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings from public use, these
properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land
and buildings are for public use the ownership is with the Republic of the
Philippines.
3.) Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts:. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his
sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor,
the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when
the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of Florentinos
benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself
to be the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and
contended that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only
to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the
terms of the insurance policy?
YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social
unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been
filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows
more care towards the child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of
the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may
happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in
consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the
country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict
were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting
priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role
of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
2
CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
4.) In RE Habeas Corpus of Harvey, et. al. Harvey vs. Commissioner Defensor
Santiago[GR 82544, 28 June 1988] Issue: Whether the Philippine Government has the power to deport foreigners from
Second Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur its territory.

Facts: Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, (both Americans), and Adriaa Van Den Held: Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its
Elshout (Dutch) were apprehended on 27 February 1988 from their respective territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or
residences at Pagsanjan, Laguna by agents of the Commission on Immigration and public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or
Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by Commissioner Miriam under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
Defensor Santiago of the CID. They were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious
who were apprehended after 3 months of close surveillance by CID agents in to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this
Pagsanjan, Laguna. 2 days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988, 17 of the 22 case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children
arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The
working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original 22, only Harvey, et. al. Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation
have chosen to face deportation. Seized during their apprehension were rolls of proceedings against Harvey, et. al., acted in the interests of the State.
photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious
poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and
other literature advertising the child prostitutes. They are presently detained at the
CID Detention Center. On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted
against Harvey, et. al. for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code (Deportation Case 88-13). On 14 March 1988, Harvey, et. al.
filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being
seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the
Board of Commissioners for their provisional release, the Commissioner ordered
the CID doctor to examine Harvey, et. al., who certified that the latter were healthy.
On 22 March 1988, Harvey, et. al. filed a Petition for Bail which, however, the
COmmissioner denied considering the certification by the CID physician that the
accused were healthy. To avoid congestion, the Commissioner ordered Harvey, et.
al.'s transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was
deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting then to and from the CID
where trial was on-going. On 4 April 1988, Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion
stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be
"provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty.
Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of
Special Inquiry III allowed provisional release of 5 days only under certain
conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the
Manifestation/Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the
present petition for a writ of haeas corpus.

3
CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
5.) REPUBLIC vs. CHULE Y. LIM
G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004
FACTS:
Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. She claimed that she was
born on 29 October 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan
transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. the Court finding the petition sufficient
in form and substance ordered the publication of the hearing of the petition.
During the hearing, Lim testifies that:
1. Her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her
school records and in her marriage certificate.She presented a clearancefrom the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to further show the consistency in her use of
the surname "Yu".
2. She claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To
(Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
3. Her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have
been Filipinoconsidering that her father and mother never got married. Only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being
a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
4. It was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child
when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents
were never married. She also presented a certification attested by officials of the
local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no
record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The RTC granted the petition and directed the civil register of Iligan City to make the
following corrections in the birth records of Lim:
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her fathers name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in
answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
Petitioner Republic appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial courts decision. Petitioner claims that Lim never complied with the legal
requirement in electing her citizenship. Petitioner also assails the Court of Appeals
decision in allowing respondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding that
she is illegitimate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lim complied with the legal requirement in electing her
citizenship
2. Whether the CA erred in allowing Lim to to use her fathers surname despite its
finding that she is illegitimate.
HELD:
1. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional
requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the
child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born
of Filipinomothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in
a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of
electing Filipinocitizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in
the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that
her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not
required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become
a Filipinocitizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondentautomatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is
a Filipinosince birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached
the age of majority.
4
CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis
Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents case, the change in
the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to
her community in general.
CA decision is affirmed.

2. The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow
respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of
her fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can
remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for
her to use her fathers surname.

Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using
her fathers surname which she has used for four decades without any known
objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the
reasons allowed for changing ones name or surname is to avoid confusion.

Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of
aliases, a person is allowed to use a name by which he has been known since
childhood.

Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v.
Rep. of the Phils., we held: Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which
regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use a name by which he has been
known since childhood (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui
Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Taada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot enjoin
the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v.
Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).

While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, there is no

such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already
been using since childhood.

The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression
of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change
of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family
whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In this case,
the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be

5
CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
6.) Republic v. Sagun (G.R. No. 187567; February 15, 2012)
FACTS: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national,
and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio
City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In
1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized
by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter of
Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in
local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted that by
virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such
fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance
of a Philippine passport.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3,
2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby
directed to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino
citizenship of said petitioner.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for
review on certiorari before us. Petitioner points out that while respondent executed
an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of
Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered
with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old
or 12 years after she reached the age of majority.
ISSUES:
Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship
procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible?
Is an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the
age of majority, considered to have been made within a reasonable time as
interpreted by jurisprudence?
HELD: Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement
of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of
the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is
beyond judicial power.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of
respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the court's
competence.
As to the propriety of respondent's petition seeking a judicial declaration of election
of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is
required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied
with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the
1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship
6
CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five
are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution
was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose born before
January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the
1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not
been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship
by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot
take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now
be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine
citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we
held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly
not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied. (Re:
Application For Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No.
914, October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 1, 7-8.)

GRANTED

7
CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
7.) ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF born in 1948.Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSEONG, JR., respondents. En Banc Doctrine: citizenship up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar
Date: July 30, 1991Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts: The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of
a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).The HRET
declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11, 1987,
the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Six to Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent
premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of
the Philippines; and2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar. The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent .A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated
February 22, 1989.Hence, these petitions for certiorari

Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed

Ratio: The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather),
arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from
the then Spanish colonial administration. The father of the private respondent, Jose
Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by OngTe to Samar in
the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. As
Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As
the years passed, Jose Ong Chuanmet a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two
fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932according to Catholic faith and
practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was

8
CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
8.) Frivaldo vs COMELEC [174 SCRA 245]
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification for Public Office)
Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of petitioners election and proclamation on the ground
that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine
citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualified to run for and be elected governor.
Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization
as an American citizen was not impressed with voluntariness. His oath in his COC
that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation.
Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had
divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his
Philippine citizenship.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines
and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As
an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines. His election did not
cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the
Local Government Code and the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.
Held: No. First, petitioners loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and
could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship.
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born
Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation.
Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office
but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged
9.) JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmea
G.R. No. 83820 25 May 1990 Political Law-Citizenship
FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed
with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Osmea on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen.
In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a
certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commission that
Osmea is an American Citizen. According to the evidence presented, Osmea
maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio Osmea,
a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmea Sr., that he is a holder of a
valid and subsisting Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines.
COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been
timingly filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not s Filipino
citizen and Osmea was proclaim of winning candidates for obtaining the highest
number of votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmea remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine
Citizenship cannot be presumed.
HELD: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmea had lost his Filipino
Citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;
2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the
foreign country.
The evidence clearly shows that Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship
by any of the three (3) mentioned hereinaboved or any other modes of losing
Philippine citizenship.
The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states Dual allegiance of citizens is
iniminical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law has no retroactive
effect.
The petition for certiorari DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby
AFFIRMED.
9
CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
10.) Poe v Comelec GR 221697 (2016) for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures
would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Facts: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her
day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May COC.
2005. Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read
Dissent)
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the
Held:
PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she
fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in
satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may
Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
run for presidency.
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical
petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225.
features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she
is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That
stopped using her American passport.
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128,
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-
were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
material misrepresentations in her COC.
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
the natural-born citizenship issue.
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is
candidates (Read Dissent)
supported by treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the
Held:
Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of
rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is
found.
not one among them.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have
Held:
sole jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus
respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en
revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.
banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions,
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July
the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining
18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs
the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be
reliance on cases which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be
supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds
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CONSTI 1 DIGEST (III. The Philippine as a state)
counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino
citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this
case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay
and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe
returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for
committing material misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented
facts as to her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for
ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when
there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or
cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her
qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced
qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false
representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency. ##
Carpio Dissent (Highlights): Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens
Brion Dissent (Highlights): COMELECs Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the
Determination of a Candidates Eligibility

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