State Prosecutors vs Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (19 September 1994) evidence.
evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not
the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of
the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the
courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in the
negative
Facts: The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of
Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the
ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the
provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves
the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation
of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central
Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases
solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers,
which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation,
that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange
restrictions. The respondents decision was founded on his belief that
the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the
newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the
court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu
propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the
announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has
made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to
take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking
judicial notice on matters he purported to be a public knowledge
based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the
Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of
inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the
prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting evidence
thereby depriving the government the right to be heard. The judge
also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on
the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a
matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of the president
lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as
basis for dismissing the case?
Ruling:The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross
ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is
no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is
the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper,
believing that the public announcement is absolute and without
qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes a
public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his
discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be
published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before its
effectivity. When the Presidents statement was published in the
newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official
text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial
notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal
knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law
requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should
be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such
notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does
not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common
knowledge contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial
notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course
of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that
involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the
information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay
yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the
prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court
ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the
case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take
judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a
reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the
courts with caution at all times.
ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ
FACTS: Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in
a criminal case or arson pending before the RTC. The accused was
petitioner Maximo Alvarez, stranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez,
sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was
called to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her
husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court on marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of
the motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the
presentation of the other witnesses. On September 2, 1999, the trial
court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez
from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in
the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This prompted
respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision
nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial
court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the objection of
her estranged husband on the ground of marital privilege.
HELD: Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her
husband. The disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage
under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court has its
exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that there is
no more harmony to be preserved. The acts of the petitioner stamp
out all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the State has
an interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, and
must have the right to offer the testimony of Esperanza over the
objection of her husband.
PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS. COURT
OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION
[G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998]
Facts: This is a civil case for damages arising from a sea collision
incident when plaintiff's tanker hit respondent's fishing boat, causing
the boat to sink.
The lower court and CA ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of
documentary exhibits presented, mainly the price quotations. These
price quotations were issued personally to Del Rosario who
requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost
at the collision of the two vessels. However, these are not published
in any list, register, periodical or other compilation nor containing
data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation.T
Issue: Are price quotations considered commercial list, thus can be
admissible in evidence?
Held: NO. Price quotations are not within the purview of commercial
lists as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals, containing
data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation.These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del
Rosario.
The price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the
Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered along with the
testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified
on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the
seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who
issued the price quotations.
A document is a commercial list if:
(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation;
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other
published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of
persons engaged in that occupation, and
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same
occupation.
Fortun v. Quinsayas, et.al.
(Confidentiality Rule in Disbarment Proceedings; Exception)
Facts: Petitioner Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun, the lead defense counsel
of Ampatuan, Jr. in the prominent "Maguindanao Massacre Case,"
filed this present petition for contempt against Atty. Prima Jesusa
Quinsayas, et.al., including media men and broadcasting companies.
Quinsayas, et.al. filed a disbarment case against Fortun for
dishonest and deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. They alleged that Fortun is "engaging in activities
misleading the prosecution and the trial court." Pending the
disbarment case, Quinsayas was invited to a show "ANC Presents:
Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre," where he discussed
the disbarment case against Fortun, including its principal points.
This tempted Fortun to file this present petition against him and
various media men and companies.
Fortun alleged that Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated
the details of the disbarment complaint against him in violation of
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that respondent
media groups and personalities conspired with Quinsayas, et al. by
publishing the confidential materials on their respective media
platforms. He said that the public circulation of the disbarment
complaint against him exposed this Court and its investigators to
outside influence and public interference.
In their comments, respondents, among others, contended
that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner was
already the subject of widespread news and already of public
knowledge, and that petitioner is a public figure and the public has a
legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, and character.
Issue: Whether or not respondents violated the confidentiality rule in
disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect
contempt of court.
Held: Quinsayas violated the confidentiality rule, but the media men
and companies are not liable thereto.
The Court recognizes that publications which are privileged
for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech. As a general rule, disbarment
proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and
the final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a
disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public
concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre
case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but
primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in
the case. Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint relate
to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao Massacre
case. Since petitioner is a public figure or has become a public
figure because he is representing a matter of public concern,
and because the event itself that led to the filing of the
disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public concern,
the media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment
case as legitimate news. It would have been different if the
disbarment case against petitioner was about a private matter as the
media would then be bound to respect the confidentiality provision of
disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.
Said provision of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on
the freedom of the press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media
is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of
a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest
in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
As to Quinsayas, he is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B
both as a complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and
as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Quinsayas is
familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.
However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, he disseminated
copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of
the media which act constitutes contempt of court. The premature
disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of
disbarment proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule.
The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to
make its investigations free from any extraneous influence or
interference, but also to protect the personal and professional
reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants. It is also
to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions
thereto without authority.
In view thereof, the court found Quinsayas liable for indirect
contempt of court, with a fine of P20,000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS: On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the
Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and
Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la
Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua
to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay
Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was
to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any
pusher to approach. The other members of the team strategically
positioned themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One
of them was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble:
"Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange
was made then and there two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one
P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics
Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and
Candolesas made a body search of the accused-appellant and took
from him the marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of
marijuana and crushed leaves.: nad
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-
Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for investigation by Detective
Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after
having been informed of his constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and
Pajilan. Microscopic, chemical and chromotographic examination
was performed on the confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles,
forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later
testified that the findings were positive. The marijuana was offered as
an exhibit.
ISSUES:
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged despite lack of evidence to prove that he
sold marijuana to the poseur-buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the
accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the P10.00 bill
allegedly used as buy-bust money.
RULING:
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses and to listen to their respective testimonies, gave more
credence to the statements of the arresting officers. Applying the
presumption that they had performed their duties in a regular
manner, it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation that he had
been manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted sufficient
evidence of his charges, let alone his admission that he had no
quarrel with the peace officers whom he had met only on the day of
his arrest.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution
has overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused-appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his
guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those
who would visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant invokes the
best evidence rule and questions the admission by the trial court of
the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.:This assigned error
centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked
money (Exh. E-2-A) which, according to the appellant, is excluded
under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy.
Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is
an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary
evidence except in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in
the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution
solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its
contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is
therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT
OF APPEALS, Complainant, vs. CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV,
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
Facts:Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on
inefficiency and incompetence of official duty; conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and directly and
indirectly having financial and material interest in an official
transaction considering his undue interest in the service of the order
of release and actual release of Melchor Lagua.
Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the
Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City. Laguas
petition for bond was approved in a Resolution where the appellate
court directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua.
The resolution was brought to the office of Atty. Madarang, Division
Clerk of Court, for promulgation.
Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at
the National Penitentiary, where Lagua was detained for homicide.
Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain Melissa
Melchor, who introduced herself as Laguas relative, asking how
much more they had to give to facilitate Laguas provisional liberty,
and that they sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of RTC
Pasig, but was told that they still had a balance. When Atty.
Madarang was able to get the mobile number of respondent, he
represented himself as Laguas relative and exchanged text
messages with said respondent for a possible pay-off for the Laguas
provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later discovered that the
respondent did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and
Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel. but
gave them to a certain Art Baluran, allegedly Laguas relative.
Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When
confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for
Laguas release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted serving
the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and
his counsel to Art Baluran. Complainant then lodged the complaint
against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence
constitutes a violation of right to privacy of the accused?
Held: No. The respondents claim that the admission of the text
messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right
to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
ephemeral electronic communication under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such
messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as
well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the
first three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez
v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent
therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text
messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in
exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA.
The Court had the occasion to state:
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee
since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone
conversations, text messages and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.ROGELIO DE JESUS y QUIZON, alias "ELIONG," accused-
appellant.
The accused, Rogelio de Jesus y Quizon appeals from the decision
of the Circuit Criminal Court, First Judicial District in its Criminal Case
No. CCC-1-80, Isabela (II-329) finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article
335, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing him,
after appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to indemnify the
offended party Clara Mina y Simon in the amount of P10,000.00 plus
another P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The facts are as follows: t.hqw
Clara Mina, an unmarried woman of 28, lived with her parents in
barrio Amistad, Alicia, Isabela (p. 7, tsn., March 21, 1974).
Clara Mina, however, is feeble-minded. She is unable to comb her
hair, bathe herself and wash her clothes (pp. 21, 31, 32, tsn., March
21, 1974). Because of her mental condition, she just stayed in the
house, doing no household chores (p. 31, tsn., Id.).
The accused, Rogelio de Jesus, a 19-year old farmer, who lived in
the house of his sister some 15 meters away from the victim's house,
knew of Clara's mental infirmity, and has often seen her left alone in
the house (p. 20, tsn., March 21, 1974; pp. 38, 47, 49, tsn., April 25,
1974).
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Jan. 3, 1974, Pastora Simon
went out to the field in order to plant palay, leaving her daughter
Clara Mina alone in the house. Her husband (Clara's father), had
gone to a place called Soliven four days before, while the other
members of the household had also left for the field (pp. 17, 18, 19,
tsn., March 21, 1974).
That afternoon, Clara Mina was seated on top of a trunk when
Rogelio de Jesus suddenly entered the house, carried her in his
arms and laid her on the floor (pp. 8, 13, tsn., March 21, 1974).
Objecting to what was being done to her, Clara gave an outcry "Madi!
Madi!" (which translated means "I don't like! I don't like!") Rogelio,
ignoring her cries, removed her panties as well as his own trousers.
He lay on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and performed
the sexual act (pp. 7, 8, 9, 13,14, 15, tsn., Id.).
Meanwhile, Pastora Simon, who had already walked some 150
meters away from their house, when sensing it was about to rain,
hurried back to the house to get cellophane with which to shield her
from the rain (p. 17, tsn., March 21, 1974). Upon her return to the
house, she found Rogelio de Jesus naked lying on top of Clara Mina
whose legs were spread apart (p. 19, tsn., Id.). Seeing them in that
position, she rushed to the kitchen to get a club but Rogelio spotted
her and ran away. (p. 20, tsn., Id.).
The barrio captain, Glicerio Guzman, to whom Pastora Simon had
immediately reported the incident, looked for Rogelio but failed to
locate him (p. 20, tsn., March 21, 1974; pp. 10, 20, tsn., March 22,
1974).
Returning from the barrio captain's house, Pastora Simon
investigated Clara, who revealed to her that she was carried away
from the trunk where she was seated, then forcibly laid on the floor to
have sexual intercourse with Rogelio (pp. 20, 21, tsn., March 21,
1974).
The next day January 4, 1974 Clara Mina, accompanied by her
parents, denounced Rogelio de Jesus to the police authorities (p. 20,
tsn., March 22, 1974). Clara Mina was examined by Fernando
Babaran, Municipal Health Officer of Echague, lsabela at the
Southern Isabela Emergency Hospital, the municipal health officer of
Alicia being then on leave (p. 6, tsn., March 22, 1974). The medical
certificate, Exhibit "C", issued by Dr. Babaran, shows the following
findings:
(1) hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock, 8 o'clock and 11 o'clock.
(2) vagina admits one finger with ease. Two fingers with difficulty.
(3) fresh perineal abrasion.
(4) smear, not done due to lack of microscope.
(5) contusion left temporal area. Lesions to heal within one week.
(p. 3, Record).
According to Dr. Babaran, the abrasions were possibly inflicted the
day prior to the examination and that the contusion on the left
temporal area of the girl's head could have been caused when her
head was pushed against a hard object (pp. 11, 12, tsn., March 22,
1974).
Subsequently, Rogelio de Jesus was surrendered by his brother-in-
law, a councilor to the Alicia Police Department. He executed an
affidavit, Exhibit "D" subscribed before Alicia Municipal Judge Flor
Egipto on January 5, 1974, admitting that he had sexual intercourse
once with Clara Mina, but denying that he raped her (p. 7, record).
The accused denied that he had forced the complainant to have
sexual intercourse with him and that he only inserted his forefinger
inside the complainant's private parts. He testified that he admitted
having sexual intercourse once with complainant in his
affidavit 1 because of maltreatment employed upon him by the jail
guards.
While the affidavit executed by the accused is not admissible in
evidence for lack of evidence showing that the accused during the
custodial investigation was apprised of his constitutional rights under
Art. IV, Sec. 20, of the New Constitution, 2 still there is sufficient
evidence on record that the accused had performed the sexual act to
wit: t.hqw
1. The accused testified that he merely inserted his forefinger into the
complainant's vagina to cure her of her mental malady. The records,
however show, from the testimony of both the prosecution and the
defense, that the accused laid on top of complainant. If appellant's
purpose was merely to insert his forefinger into the complainant's
vagina, then there is no necessity of lying on top of complainant.
2. Complainant testified, contrary to the testimony of the accused,
that the latter brought out his penis and inserted it into her vagina
which pained her a lot.
3. The hymenal lacerations and the fresh perineal abrasions in
complainant's vagina corroborated her testimony that the accused
had sexual intercourse with her.
The accused assailed the competence of the complainant as a
witness on the ground that being feeble minded she is not a
competent witness in contemplation of the rules and therefore her
testimony should have been rejected by the lower court. That the
complainant was feeble-minded and had displayed difficulty in
comprehending the questions propounded on her is an undisputed
fact. However, there is no showing that she could not convey her
Ideas by words or signs. It appears in the records that complainant
gave sufficiently intelligent answers to the questions propounded by
the court and the counsels. The court is satisfied that the
complainant can perceive and transmit in her own way her own
perceptions to others. She is a competent witness.
Having sexual intercourse with a feeble-minded woman is rape. The
offense is described under paragraph 2 of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, that is, the offender having carnal knowledge of a
woman deprived of reason. The Court, in the case of People vs.
Daing, 3 said:
The offense committed by appellant is rape described under
paragraph 2 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, that is, the
offender having carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason.
The deprivation of reason contemplated by law does not need to be
complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough. So it was held
by the Supreme Court of Spain that a man having carnal knowledge
of a woman whose mental faculties are not normally developed or
who is suffering from hemiplegia and mentally backward or who is an
Idiot commits the crime of rape. ...
Being feeble-minded, complainant is incapable of thinking and
reasoning like any normal human being and not being able to think
and reason from birth as aforesaid, and undoubtedly devoid or
deficient in those instincts and other mental faculties that
characterize the average and normal mortal, she really has no will
that is free and voluntary of her own; hers is a defective will, which is
incapable of freely and voluntarily giving such consent so necessary
and essential in lifting coitus from the place of criminality. 4 In this
connection, the Solicitor General properly stated: t.hqw
That complainant possesses such a low mental capacity, to the
extent of being incapable of giving consent, could be gleaned from
the fact, as testified to by her mother, that she is unable to do the
simple tasks of combing her hair and bathing herself. Thus, even
granting it to be true, as counsel has insinuated, that complainant
had submitted to the sexual act without resistance (p. 9 Appellant's
Brief) such cannot be construed as consent on her part, so as to
preclude it from being rape. Incapable of giving consent, she could
not thus consent in intelligently. 5
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro
and Escolin, JJ., concur.