G.R. No.
L-48796 June 11, 1981 together with some funeral parlor men arrived at the scene, and they saw a small baby
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIEGO OPERO Y COSIPAG et al., accused; DIEGO OPERA Y COSIPAG, defendant-
appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Automatic review of the death sentence imposed on Diego Opero for robbery with
homicide with which he was charged in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, together
with Reynaldo Lacsinto and Milagros Villegas, who, however, did not appeal their
conviction with much lesser penalty, the last-named, as a mere accessory after the fact.
Another accused, Asteria Avila was acquitted.
In his brief, appellant raised only the question of the propriety of the imposition of the
death penalty on him, with the following assignments of error:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING ARTICLE 4, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN DETERMINING THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING ARTICLE 49, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED
For the facts of the case, the narration of which in both the People's brief and that of
appellant does not vary as to the essential ones, We could very well quote from the
Appellee's brief, being the more comprehensive and complete, the following:
At about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of April 27, 1978, Salvador Oliver, a GSIS security
guard assigned to the House International Hotel at Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila, was
informed by Demetrio Barcing another security guard, that the latter picked up a little
girl about three years old loitering at the second floor of the building. Rafael Ordona a
janitor of the House International Hotel, told Oliver that the little girl is residing at
Room 314 of the hotel. Oliver called up Room 314 by telephone and when nobody
answered, he and Barcing brought the little girl to said Room 314 (pp- 6, 7, & 8, t.s.n.,
June 15, 1978). Upon reaching Room 314, Oliver knocked at the door, and when
nobody answered, he pushed the door open but he smelled foul odor emanating from
the room. Oliver covered his nose with a handkerchief and together with Barcing and
the little girl, they entered the room where they saw prostrate on a bed a dead person
with the face down and both feet tied. Oliver called up the homicide division of the
Manila Police. Patrolman Fajardo who was assigned to investigate the report of Oliver,
crying and trying to get out of a crib near the bed of the dead person. (pp. 9, 10 & 11,
t.s.n., Id).
The dead body at Room 314 of the House International Hotel was that of Liew Soon
Ping, Room 314 had been ransacked and personal belongings thrown all around. The
hands and feet of the dead person were tied and the body was bloated. A towel was
tied around the mouth of the victim. Photographs of the dead person and the condition
of the room were taken under Patrolman Fajardos supervision (pp. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 &
24, t.s.n., June 15, 1978).
Patrolman Fajardo came to know that the occupants of Room 314 were Dr. Hong, his
wife Liew Soon Ping who is the victim in this case, their three children and two maids,
namely, Mila and Ester (pp. 26 & 27, t.s.n., Id). After conducting a preliminary inquiry
around the vicinity of the incident, Patrolman Fajardo made an advance report (Exh.
"O"; pp. 32, 33 & 34, rec.) naming therein three suspects, namely, Diego Opero,
Milagros Villegas, Asteria Avila and a fourth unidentified suspect. The names of these
suspects were furnished by neighbors of the victim to Patrolman Fajardo (pp- 28 & 29,
t.s.n., Id.).
After establishing the Identity of the suspects, a follow up team of Manila Policemen
composed of Patrolmen Luis Lim and Servande Malabute was formed to further
investigate the case. A separate police team composed of Sgt. Yanguiling and several
policemen were sent to Leyte and Samar to track down the suspects (pp. 30 & 31,
t.s.n., Id.). "Dr. Hong, the victim's husband who was in Cebu when the incident in his
residence was committed was contacted by the police and informed about the death of
his wife.
Dr. Hong came back immediately from Cebu and reported to the police. He (Dr. Hong)
made an inventory of the personal effects found missing in his residence. valued at
P30,221.00 (pp. 31, 32 & 33, t.s.n Id; Exhs. 'R' and 'R-l').
While the case was under investigation, the homicide division of the Manila Police,
received a radio message (Exh. "T-l", p. 40, rec.) relayed thru Col. Narciso Cabrera, Chief
of the Detective Bureau of the Manila Police, that Reynaldo Lacsinto one of the
suspects could be found in a school house in Moriones, Tondo, Manila. Another radio
message (Exh. "T", p. 41, rec.) was received by the police that two other suspects in the
case, namely, Diego Opero and Asteria Avila were picked up by the Samar P.C. and
some of the missing articles, namely, one (1) camera, flashlight, bill fold, and other
personal belongings were recovered from them (pp. 35 & 36, t.s.n., Id).
Reynaldo Lacsinto was taken to police headquarters and after appraising him of his
rights under the constitution, his statement was taken in the presence of his father (pp.
37, 38 & 39, t.s.n., Id; Exhs. "U" & "U-l", pp. 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 & 48, rec,). In his said
statement to the police, Lasinto admitted his participation and narrated in detail the
commission of the robbery in Room 314 of the House International Hotel.
The Samar P.C. turned over three other suspects, namely Diego Opero, Milagros
Villegas and Asteria Avila to Sgt. Yanguiling who brought said suspects to Manila and
turned them over to the homicide division of the Manila Police, together with some of
the stolen articles (pp. 31 & 32, t.s.n., June 16, 1978). Statements of these three
suspects (Exhibits "B", "C", and "D", respectively) taken by the Samar P.C. were also
turned over by Sgt. Yanguiling to the homicide division (pp. 34 & 35, t.s.n. Id). Opero
was investigated further at the Manila Police Headquarters and he gave a supplemental
statement (Exh. "FF", pp. 70-74, rec.; p. 36, t. s.n. Id) admitting that he had robbed the
victim and Identified some of the missing articles recovered from his possession (pp. 41
& 42, t.s.n. Id). He described in detail how he planned the robbery and named the rest
of his coaccused as willing participants. He also narrated in his said supplemental
statement that he and his co-accused Lacsinto subdued the victim by assaulting her,
tying up her hands and feet stabbing her and stuffing her mouth with a piece of
pandesal (pp. 70- 74, rec.).
In her statement to the Manila police (Exh. 'GG', pp. 74 & 75, rec.) Milagros Villegas
Identified the stolen clothes which were given to her by Opero. (pp. 44, 45 & 46, t. s.
n. Id)
The third suspect, Asteria Avila told the Manila police that she was not a party to the
crime and upon advice of her lawyer she did not give any further statement. (p. 47, t. S.
n. Id)
A reenactment of the crime at the crime scene was held under the direction of Opero
portraying - his role, with Lacsinto depicting his part, and pictures of the reenactment
were taken (pp. 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 & 60, t. s.n. Id; pp. 79-99, incl., rec.).
The body of the victim Liew Soon Ping was autopsied by Dr. Angelo Singian, then Chief
of the Medico Legal Division of the Western Police District. The body was Identified by
the victim's husband. Dr. Singian examined the body of the victim and issued a death
certificate (Exh. "AA"), and the necropsy report (Exh. 'BB'), with the following findings:
1) a pale yellowish band across the eyes of the victim caused by the application of a
towel, or broad piece of cloth across the eyes; 2) a pale yellowish band across the
mouth caused by a similar material as the one applied across the victim's eyes, which
was tied across the mouth; 3) contusion and hematoma on the upper and lower lips
caused by a blunt instrument; 4) abrasions on the right side of the chin; 5) broad linear
mark of clothing material on the neck; 6) cord or ligature marks on the left and right
arm, indicating that both arms were tied; 7) abdomen distended with gas, due to
decomposition; 8) epiglotis, hematoma and contusion on the right side of the tongue;
9) contusions and hematoma on the right cheek; 10) superficial stab wound measuring
0.8 c.m. on the right side of the chin caused by a sharp bladed instrument; 1 1)
superficial stab wound on the mid-axilliary line caused by a sharp bladed instrument:
12) stab wound on the left forearm: 13) cord markings on both feet.
Internal findings reveal an impacted bolus of white bread measuring 3 x 2.5 cm in the
oropharynx. The tongue has contusion on the right lateral side and an abrasion across
the middle portion. The larynx and trachea are markedly congested. The cause of death
was due to asphyxiation by suffocation with an impacted bolus into the oropharynx and
compression of the neck with a broad clothing around the neck (pp. 6-18, incl., t. s. n.
June 16,1978; Exh. "BB" pp. 62 & 63, rec.).
In his first assignment of error, appellant advances the theory that he never intended
to kill the deceased, his intention being merely to rob her, for if indeed he had the
intention to kill her, he could have easily done so with the knife, and therefore, his
liability should be only for robbery.
Appellant's theory finds no basis in the law or in jurisprudence. It was been repeatedly
held that when direct and intimate connection exists between the robbery and the
killing, regardless of which of the two precedes the other, or whether they are
committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.1 If the circumstances would indicate no intention to kill, as in
the instant case were evidently, the intention is to prevent the deceased from making
an outcry, and so a "pandesal" was stuffed into her mouth, the mitigating circumstance
of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated. 2 The stuffing
of the "pandesal" in the mouth would not have produced asphyxiation had it not slid
into the neckline, "caused by the victim's own movements, " according to Dr. Singian.
The movements of the victim that caused the "pandesal" to slide into the neckline
were, however, attributable to what appellant and his co-accused did to the victim, for
if they did not hogtie her, she could have easily removed the "pandesal" from her
mouth and avoided death by asphyxiation.
It may not avail appellant to contend that the death was by mere accident for even if it
were so, which is not even beyond doubt for the sliding of the pandesal into the
neckline to produce asphyxiation could reasonably have been anticipated, it is a settled
doctrine that when death supervenes by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is
immaterial that the occurrence of death was by mere accident. 3 What is important and
decisive is that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.4 These
Spanish doctrines were cited by this Court in People vs. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil.
992.
Appellant would also have Article 49, paragraph I of the Revised Penal Code apply to
him, and faults the court a quo for having failed to do so. The provision cited reads:
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is
different from that intended In cases in which the felony committed is different from
that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding
to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the
latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
xxx xxx xxx.
The foregoing provision has been applied only to cases when the crime committed
befalls a different person from the one intended to be the victim. This was the explicit
ruling in the case of People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150-153, citing decisions of he
Supreme Court of Spain." 5
In the instant case, the intended victim, not any other person, was the one killed, as a
result of an intention to rob, as in fact appellant and his co-accused, did rob the
deceased. As stated earlier, what may be appreciated in appellant's favor is only the
mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, an entirely
different situation from that contemplated under paragraph 1, Article 49 of the same
Code, where as already explained, the different felony from that intended, befalls
someone different from the intended victim, as when the person intended to be killed
is a stranger to the offender, but the person actually killed is the offender's father,
thereby making the intended felony which is homicide different from the crime actually
committed which is parricide.
Notwithstanding the presence of the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to
commit so grave a wrong as that comitted, there still remains one aggravating
circumstance to consider, after either one of the two aggravating circumstances
present, that of superior strength and dwelling, is offset by the mitigating circumstance
aforesaid. The higher of the imposable penalty for the crime committed, which
is reclusion perpetua to death, should therefore be the proper penalty to be imposed
on appellant. 'This is the penalty of death as imposed by the lower court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law and the
evidence, except as to the nonappreciation of the mitigating circumstance of having no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, which nevertheless does not
call for the modification of the penalty of death as imposed by the lower court, is
hereby affirmed. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151978 July 14, 2004
ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. CR. No. 23753, affirming the August 16, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, in Criminal Case No. 98-1089. The RTC
convicted petitioner Arturo Romera of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. He was also ordered to pay private offended party P19,361.15 as actual
damages and P10,000 as attorneys fee.
The Information against petitioner reads:
On October 4, 1998, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, at Sitio Puntod, Barangay
Balagnan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Roy Mangaya-ay with the use of a bolo,
thus, inflicting a mortal wound on the abdomen of the latter; accused thereby
performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony of Homicide
which was not produced because of the timely and effective medical attendance
administered on the said victim.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249, in relation with Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code.3
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued.
The facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the records, are as
follows:
In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera was with the victim, Roy
Mangaya-ay, and five other men namely, Eligario "Beboy" Acenas, Dennis "Bobong"
Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay, Bebing Zulueta and Franklin Generol. They were all
headed for Biasong to play volleyball. When they reached Biasong, it was raining, so
they decided to while away time at the house of Ciriaca Capil. Franklin Generol hung a
string made of cigarette foil on Bebing Zuluetas pants and said, "Theres a monkey
among us." Everybody laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay, who got angry and chided
Franklin Generol to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing Zulueta also got angry and
pointed a finger at Franklin Generol and said, "Even if you are stronger and older, if you
will be hit by my fist, you will crawl." Petitioner then stood up and warned everyone,
"You all watch out in Balaguan." He pulled Franklin Generol to join him and said, "Lets
go, there are many boastful people here." Thereafter, petitioner and Franklin left the
group.
At six oclock in the evening, Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On their way
home, they passed by the house of one Antonio Mangaya-ay. In said house, which is
about one kilometer away from petitioners own, they saw petitioner already carrying a
bolo waiting for them.
Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, petitioner uttered, "Here are the brave
ones." Roy and his companions ran away but Roy slipped on the muddy ground.
Petitioner approached Roy and said, "Come here, brave one." He held Roy up by the
collar and stabbed him in the stomach. Roy fell unconscious. When he woke up, he
found himself at the provincial hospital where he underwent surgery and stayed for
more than three weeks.
After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a certain Tibo Ramoso
of the Citizens Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU). Ramoso accompanied
petitioner to the Balingasay police station.
For his part, petitioner testified on what happened as follows:
Petitioner and his family were having dinner in their house at around seven oclock in
the evening. Thereafter, they went to bed. While lying in bed, they heard Roy call
petitioner and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not answer
Roy because he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for petitioner but when
the latters wife told him that petitioner was already asleep, he told her to wake her
husband up. Petitioner went down the house and asked who was at the door. Just as
he opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo
and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he would kill petitioner. Petitioner
tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at
the wall, petitioners wife held the door to allow petitioner to exit in another door to
face Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him,
but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the
stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. According to petitioner, he
ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
The trial court discounted petitioners story of self-defense. It found that when
petitioner got hold of the bolo, there was no more danger to his life. Petitioner was
convicted of frustrated homicide. The dispositive part of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused
ARTURO ROMERA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense charged.
Consequently, taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and the provisions of the [I]ndeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to a penalty ranging from One (1) year Eight (8) months and Twenty (20)
days of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as maximum and to pay the private offended party as actual
damages, P19,361.15 and another sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fee without,
however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning to the trial court the following
assignments of error:
1. FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE THEORY OF SELF DEFENSE.
2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPRECIATE SPECIAL PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE, ARTICLE 69, REVISED PENAL CODE
WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES.
3. FURTHER ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPLY ARTICLE 62 (5) REVISED PENAL CODE,
WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY ONE DEGREE LOWER WITH THE PRESENCE OF TWO OR
MORE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.5
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. It pointed out that
assuming arguendo that it was the victim who was the aggressor at the start, the
unlawful aggression ceased to exist when petitioner took possession of the bolo from
the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense
becomes unavailing.
The appellate court also ruled that Article 696 of the Revised Penal Code finds no
application in this case. It explained that there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself. It held, however, that petitioner is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender as it was established during trial that after the
incident he surrendered himself to the CAFGU and later on to the police authorities.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals erroneously failed to apply Article 64 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code, which lowers the imposable penalty by one degree when two or
more mitigating circumstances are present.
Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when the latter woke
him up and thrust a bolo at him without warning as petitioner opened the door.
Moreover, by hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his house, and endangering
the lives of his children, the victim also obfuscated his thinking and reasoning
processes, says the petitioner.
For public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the
mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation are unavailing to
petitioner since it was he who initiated the attack. The OSG insists that it was not the
victim who went to petitioners house, but petitioner who went to where the victim
was resting.
We note that while both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not categorically state
who started the attack, it can be reasonably gleaned from their decisions that it was
the victim who initiated the aggressive encounter. This finding of fact is amply
supported by the evidence on record.
Are the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in
this case?
Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls
of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage
and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in
danger. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while
petitioner was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the
circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate
mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are
based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating
circumstance.7 From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both
circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should
not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.
Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is
also present, Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code should be applied, to wit:
ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
...
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number
and nature of such circumstances.
...
The penalty for frustrated homicide, pursuant to Article 50 8 of the Revised Penal Code,
is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for consummated
homicide. The penalty for consummated homicide is reclusion temporal, hence the
penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor. There being two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 64 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code, the next lower penalty, prision correccional, is the next statutory
penalty. But following the Indeterminate Sentence Law herein applicable, the minimum
term of the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner for frustrated homicide
should be within the range of arresto mayor in any of its periods or from one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months, while the maximum term should be within the range
of prision correccional in its medium period or two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, is MODIFIED as far
as the penalty imposed is concerned. Petitioner ARTURO ROMERA is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. He is also
ORDERED to pay the private offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages,
and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211062
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Violence between husband and wife is nothing new. Marital violence that leads to
spousal killing is parricide. Perceived as a horrific kind of killing, penal laws impose a
harsher penalty on persons found guilty of parricide compared to those who commit
the felony of homicide.
For review is the June 28, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR
H.C. No. 01209 which affirmed with modification the August 18, 2009 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 6, convicting Manuel
Macal y Bolasco (accused-appellant) of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
For allegedly killing his spouse, Auria Ytac Macal (Auria), the accused-appellant was
charged with the crime of parricide in a February 13, 2003 Information3 that reads:
"That on or about the 12th day of February, 2003, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
MANUEL MACAL y BOLASO, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his wife,
AURIA MACAL y YTAC, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, armed with an
improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle) and a kitchen knife, stab said Auria Macal on
the front portion of her body inflicting a fatal wound which caused her death, which
incident happened inside the bedroom of the house they are residing.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On July 7, 2003, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of parricide.4 During the pre-trial conference, the
parties agreed to stipulate that Auria was the wife of the accused-
appellant.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
To prove the accusation, the prosecution presented Angeles Ytac (Angeles) and Erwin
Silvano (Erwin) as witnesses.
Angeles, the mother of Auria, narrated that Auria and the accused-appellant got
married in March 2000 and that out of their union, they begot two (2) children. Angeles
claimed that, at the time of the incident, they were all living together in a house
located in V & G Subdivision, Tacloban City. The said house was entrusted to Angeles by
her brother, Quirino Ragub, who was then residing in Canada.
Angeles testified that at around 1:20 in the morning of February 12, 2003, she, her
children Catherine, Jessica, Auria and Arvin were walking home after playing bingo at a
local peryahan. Some friends tagged along with them so that they could all feast on the
leftover food prepared for the fiesta that was celebrated the previous day. Along the
way, Angeles and her group met Auria's husband, the accused appellant. The latter
joined them in walking back to their house.
When they arrived at the house, the group proceeded to the living room except for
Auria and the accused-appellant who went straight to their bedroom, about four (4)
meters away from the living room. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her daughter
Auria shouting, "mother help me I am going to be killed."6 Upon hearing Auria's plea for
help, Angeles and the rest of her companions raced towards the bedroom but they
found the door of the room locked. Arvin kicked open the door of the bedroom and
there they all saw a bloodied Auria on one side of the room. Next to Auria was the
accused-appellant who was then trying to stab himself with the use of an improvised
bladed weapon (belt buckle). Auria was immediately taken to a hospital, on board a
vehicle owned by a neighbor, but was pronounced dead on arrival. Angeles declared
that the accused-appellant jumped over the fence and managed to escape before the
policemen could reach the crime scene.
Erwin corroborated Angeles' testimony that Auria was killed by the accused-appellant.
Erwin claimed that he was part of the group that went to Angeles' residence on that
fateful morning. From where he was seated in the living room, Erwin recounted that he
heard Auria's screaming for her mother's help. The cry for help prompted him to ran
towards the bedroom. Once the door was forcibly opened, Erwin became aware that
the accused-appellant stabbed Auria on the upper left portion of her chest with a
stainless knife. Erwin testified that the accused-appellant stabbed himself on the chest
with a knife-like belt buckle and that soon after, the accused-appellant hurriedly left
the house.
The prosecution formally offered in evidence the Certificate of Death wherein it is
indicated that Auria died of hemorrhagic shock secondary to stab wound. 7
Version of the Defense
To substantiate its version of the fact, the defense called to the witness stand the
accused-appellant, Benito Billota (Benito) and Nerissa Alcantara (Nerissa).1wphi1
The accused-appellant did not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he
stabbed his wife, resulting in the latter's death, but seeks exoneration from criminal
liability by interposing the defense that the stabbing was accidental and not
intentional.
The accused-appellant admitted that he was married to Auria in March 2000 and the
wedding was held in Manila. The couple had two children but one of them died.
According to the accused-appellant, he was employed as a security guard by Fighter
Wing Security Agency which was based in Manila. While the accused-appellant was
working in Manila, his family lived with Angeles in Tacloban City. The accused-appellant
came home only once a year to his family in Tacloban City.
On February 12, 2003, the accused-appellant arrived home in V & G Subdivision,
Tacloban City from Manila. Before the accused-appellant could reach the bedroom, he
was warned by Arvin, his brother-in-law, not to go inside the bedroom where his wife
was with a man for he might be killed. Ignoring Arvin's admonition, the accused-
appellant kicked the door but it was opened from the inside. After the bedroom door
was opened, the accused-appellant saw his wife and a man seated beside each other
conversing. Furious by what he had seen, the accused-appellant went out of the room,
got a knife and delivered a stab blow towards the man but the latter was shielded by
Auria. In the process, the stab blow landed on Auria. After Auria was accidentally
stabbed, the man ran outside and fled. The accused-appellant testified that out of
frustration for not killing the man, he wounded himself on the chest. He then left the
house and went to Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC) for medical
treatment.
Benito attested that he came to know the accused-appellant while they were seated
next to each other on board a Christopher Bus bound for Tacloban City. The bus they
were riding reached Tacloban City past midnight of February 12, 2003. Considering the
lateness of the hour and there was no bus available that would take Benito to his final
destination, the accused-appellant convinced Benito to simply go home with him. Once
they got home, the accused-appellant went inside the house while Benito opted to stay
by the main door. The accused-appellant asked someone from the living room the
whereabouts of his wife, Auria. Benito testified that a female informed the accused-
appellant that Auria was inside the bedroom but advised him not to go in as Auria was
not alone in the room. Undettered, the accused-appellant proceeded to the bedroom
and was able to get inside the room. Moments later, Benito heard a thudding sound
coming from the bedroom. Then, Benito saw a man running out of the house. Sensing
trouble, Benito immediately proceeded to the bus terminal.
To support the accused-appellant's claim that he brought himself to a hospital on
February 12, 2003, Nerissa, the Administrative Officer/OIC Records Officer of EVRMC,
was presented as witness for the defense. Her testimony focused on the existence of
the medical record concerning the examination conducted on the accused-appellant by
a physician at EVRMC. Per hospital record, Nerissa confirmed that the accused-
appellant sustained a three-centimeter wound located at the left parastemal, level of
the 5th ICS non-penetrating and another lacerated wound in the left anterior chest. 8
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime of parricide and the dispositive
portion of its judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds accused MANUEL
MACAL y BOLASCOguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay
the heirs of the victim, Aurea Ytac Macal, P.50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P.50,000.00 for moral damages. And, to pay the Costs.
SO ORDERED.9
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In contrast,
the RTC found accused-appellant's declarations doubtful and contrary to human
experience and reason. The RTC was not persuaded by the accused-appellant's
argument that the stabbing incident was purely accidental after it took into account
Auria's terrifying wail that she was going to be killed. The RTC also refused to believe
accused-appellant's claim that there was a man with Auria inside the bedroom. Logic
dictates that a man in that situation would normally run away the first opportunity he
had specifically when the accused-appellant stepped out of the bedroom to obtain a
knife. The RTC even went further by saying that the accused-appellant injured himself
so that he can later on invoke self-defense which he failed to do as there are witnesses
who can easily disprove his theory of self-defense.
The CA 's Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The fallo of the CA
decision states:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the
assailed Decision dated August 18, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban
City in Criminal Case No. 2003-02-92. Accused-Appellant MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO is
found GUILTY of parricide committed against his legal wife, Auria Ytac Macal, on
February 12, 2003 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
further ordered to pay the heirs of Auria Ytac Macal the amounts of Php 50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, Php 25,000.00 as temperate damages
and Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.10
The appellate court ruled that all the elements of parricide are present in this case.
Moreover, the CA reasoned out that while Angeles did not actually see the accused-
appellant stab Auria, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to
sustain his conviction. From the viewpoint of the CA, the prosecution's case against the
accused-appellant was strengthened by the latter's own testimony and admission that
he stabbed his wife. The CA further held that neither can the act of the accused-
appellant be covered under the exempting circumstance of accident under Article
12(4)11 of the Revised Penal Code nor under absolutory cause found in Article 2412 of
the same Code.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
The principal issue before the Court is whether the court a quo erred in finding the
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
In the resolution of March 10, 2014, the Court required the parties to submit their
respective supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice. However, both
parties manifested that they will no longer file the required briefs as they had already
exhaustively and extensively discussed all the matters and issues of this case in the
briefs earlier submitted with the CA.
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the conviction of the accused-appellant with modifications.
All the Essential Elements of Parricide Duly Established and Proven by the Prosecution
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.13
Among the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and the victim is
the most crucial.14 This relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of parricide
from homicide.15 In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship
between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate.16 Oral evidence may also
be considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not
contested.17
In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant is
beyond dispute. As previously stated, the defense already admitted that Auria was the
legitimate wife of the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference. Such
admission was even reiterated by the accused-appellant in the course of trial of the
case. Nevertheless, the prosecution produced a copy of the couple's marriage
certificate which the defense admitted to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the
original.18 Hence, the key element that qualifies the killing to parricide was
satisfactorily demonstrated in this case.
Just like the marital relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant, the fact of
Auria's death is incontestable. Witnesses, from both the prosecution and defense, were
in agreement that Auria expired on February 12, 2003. As additional proof of her
demise, the prosecution presented Auria's Certificate of Death which was admitted by
the RTC and the defense did not object to its admissibility.
Anent the remaining element, there is no doubt that Auria was killed by the accused-
appellant. The stabbing incident was acknowledged by the accused-appellant himself
during his direct examination by defense counsel Emelinda Maquilan, to wit:
xxxx
Q: What is the name of your wife?
A: Aurea Ytac.
Q: You said you saw your wife in your room with a man. Now, what was the man doing
when you saw this man together with your wife?
A: They were conversing.
Q: They were conversing in what part of your room?
A: At one side of the room.
Q: So, what did you do upon seeing the man, if there was any?
A: Because of my anger, I stabbed the man.
Q: Were you able to hit the man?
A: No, because my wife shielded him.
Q: Since your wife shielded the man, what happened to your wife?
A: My wife got hit.
Q: Now, in what of the body of his wife was hit?
A: I cannot exactly tell where she was hit but he delivered a stabbing blow at the man.
Q: So, after your wife was hit by the stabbing blow to be directed to the man, what
happened next?
A: Out of desperation because I was not able to kill the man, I wounded myself.
Q: How about the man whom you wanted to stab, what happened to him?
A: He ran.
Q: Since you said your wife was hit by that stabbing blow, what happen to your wife
then?
A: She died.
Q: How about you, what happened to you after you yourself?
A: I left the place.19
The outright admission of the accused-appellant in open court that he delivered the
fatal stabbing blow that ended Auria's life established his culpability.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide as defined in Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code are present in this case.
Affirmative Defense of Accident as an Exempting Circumstance Must Fail
The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code to release the
accused-appellant from criminal liability. Pursuant to said provision, the essential
requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person is performing a
lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and
(4) without fault or intention of causing it.20
A close scrutiny of the transcripts of stenographic notes would reveal that the accused-
appellant was not performing a lawful act at the time Auria was stabbed. This can be
gathered from the narration of the accused-appellant during cross-examination
conducted by Prosecutor Percival Dolina:
xxxx
Q: Now, of course, when you saw the man and your wife, according to you, they were
just conversing with each other, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far where they to each other?
A: They were beside each other.
Q: They were sitting?
A: Yes, sir, both were sitting.
Q: Of course, when you saw them, you got angry?
A: I became angry.
Q: That is why you got a knife and stabbed the man?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when you stabbed the man, you had the intention to kill him?
A: Yes, my intention was to kill him.
Q: But it was your wife who was hit?
A: My wife was the one hit.21
The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill. 22 This certainly does not
hold true in the instant case based on the aforequoted testimony of the accused-
appellant. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who were then within hearing
distance from the bedroom, testified that they distinctly heard Auria screaming that
she was going to be killed by the accused-appellant.
Given these testimonies, the accused-appellant's defense of accident is negated as he
was carrying out an unlawful act at the time of the incident.
It also bears stressing that in raising the defense of accident, the accused-appellant had
the inescapable burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, of accidental
infliction of injuries on the victim.23 In so doing, the accused-appellant had to rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's
evidence.24 As aptly pointed out by the CA, the defense failed to discharge the burden
of proving the elements of the exempting circumstance of accident that would
otherwise free the accused-appellant from culpability. Aside from the accused-
appellant's self-serving statement, no other proof was adduced that will substantiate
his defense of accidental stabbing.
Further, contrary to what the accused-appellant wants the Court to believe, his
actuations closely after Auria was stabbed tell a different story.1avvphi1 If Auria was
really accidentally stabbed by him, the accused-appellant's natural reaction would have
been to take the lead in bringing his wife to a hospital. Instead, his priority was to come
up with an improvised bladed weapon that he could use to hurt himself. Additionally,
the fact that the accused-appellant ran away from the crime scene leaving Auria's
relatives and neighbors to tend to his dying wife is indicative of his guilt.
The CA took one step further when it examined the applicability of Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code in this case. For this purpose, the CA assumed arguendo that there
is another man inside the bedroom with Auria.
Article 247 is an absolutory cause that recognizes the commission of a crime but for
reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. 25 The defense must
prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person;
(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
(3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or
that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. 26 Among the
three elements, the most vital is that the accused-appellant must prove to the court
that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately
thereafter.27
Having admitted the stabbing, the burden of proof is shifted to the defense to show the
applicability of Article 247.28As disclosed by the accused-appellant, when he saw Auria
with a man, the two were just seated beside each other and were simply talking.
Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is not applicable in the present
case.
In sum, the Court agrees with the trial and appellate courts that the evidence of the
prosecution has established the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.
Penalty and Pecuniary Liability
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for parricide
is reclusion perpetua to death.1wphi1 With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346
(RA 9346), the imposition of the penalty of death is prohibited. Likewise significant is
the provision found in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code stating that in the absence
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser
penalty shall be imposed. Applying these to the case at bar and considering that there
are no mitigating and aggravating circumstances present, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was correctly imposed by the RTC and CA.
Civil indemnity is automatically awarded upon proof of the fact of death of the victim
and the commission by the accused-appellant of the crime of parricide.29 Current
jurisprudence sets civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00. As such, the Court finds
it necessary to increase the civil indemnity awarded by the trial and appellate courts
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
There is no question that Auria's heirs suffered mental anguish by reason of her violent
death. Consequently, the award of moral damages is in order. Similar to civil indemnity,
prevailing jurisprudence pegs moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00. On that
account, the Court must also adjust the moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
Given that this is a case of a husband killing his wife where relationship a qualifying
circumstance, the award of exemplary damages is justified. The exemplary damages of
P30,000.00 awarded by the CA is maintained as it is consistent with the latest rulings of
the Court.
Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but definite proof of its amount was not presented in court. 30 In People v. De
Leon,31 the Court awarded P25,000.00 as temperate damages where the expenses for
the funeral cannot be determined with certainty because of the absence of receipts to
prove them. In keeping with the said ruling, the Court affirms the CA's award of
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
On a final note, the Court upholds the imposition of interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum on all the monetary awards for damages reckoned from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.32 This is in accordance with the Court's discretionary
authority to levy interest as part of the damages and in conformity with the latest
Court policy on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the CA's decision dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 01209,
finding accused-appellant, Manuel Macal y Bolasco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim,
Auria Ytac Macal, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
In addition, all the monetary awards shall earn an interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina
Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno
that she had thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her
to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's
neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house,
apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the
place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from
the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering
and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and,
having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to
her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her
to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very
dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin
Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested
him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the
appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a
newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body
to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been
shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to
the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her
house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion
upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her
house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to
kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom
she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another
man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his
conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her
child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr.
Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was
contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as will be
stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the
appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both.
On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a
minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment
having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in
question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of
the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that
usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully
or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or
omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence,
the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full
enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he
may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in
one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her
affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took
place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol she considers him
her husband as he considers her his wife began a year ago; as he so testified at the
trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning,
affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the
appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly
waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed
of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and
Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to
the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without
strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact
she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far
from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all
these the fact that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician
and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness
and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the
hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she
is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to
childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and
the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol a mere laborer earning only twenty-five
centavos a day is uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned
from books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why
she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was
unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or
insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal
Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave
it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the
thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she
had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as
that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because
of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and
extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere
accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances
(art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting
that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she
later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes
entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to
the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such
circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in
her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and
convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with
this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
G.R. No. 199875 November 21, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the December 17, 2010 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 28761, which affirmed the April 26, 2004 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 98, Quezon City (RTC), finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Rape and Frustrated Murder.
On July 25, 1997, two separate Informations for Frustrated Murder and Rape were filed
before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-72078 and Q-97-72079,
respectively. These informations read:
Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078
The undersigned accuses EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL of the crime of Frustrated Murder,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and with evident premeditation, with abuse
of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of AAA3 by then and there
stabbing her with a kitchen knife, hitting her twice below the chest, thereby inflicting
upon said AAA serious and mortal wounds, the offender thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce death, which, however, was not produced by reason of
cause independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, the timely medical
intervention, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079
The undersigned accuses EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL, of the crime of Rape, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously undress her and put himself on top of her, and thereafter
have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and without
her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Evidence for the Prosecution
During the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses; namely: complainant
AAA; Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra (Dr. Freyra), the chief of the medico-legal division of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; and Dr. Reynaldo Perez (Dr. Perez)
of the East Avenue Medical Center, AAAs attending physician.
According to AAAs account, on July 21, 1997, at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon,
she was inside her rented house together with her two (2) children, aged 1 years old
and 9 months old, respectively. She then noticed that accused Edwin Isla (Isla) was
standing by the door of her kitchen. He asked her what time her landlady would be
arriving and she answered that she had no idea. Thereafter, she opened the door of the
kitchen, hoping that passersby would see him inside the house. After fifteen (15)
minutes, she was startled when he suddenly poked a knife on her neck and pulled her
inside the bedroom. By this time, she noticed that she had already closed the window
and the door of the living room. She pleaded and begged for mercy but to no avail. She
was warned not to shout or resist otherwise she would be stabbed.
Inside the bedroom, she was made to lie down on the floor because there was no bed.
Isla placed himself on top of her and then he removed her upper clothing. He raised her
bra, exposing her breasts and then kissed them. Eventually, he made her spread her
legs and had carnal knowledge with her. While he was committing the dastardly act,
she noticed a knife pointed at her. She also informed the trial court that during the
whole ordeal, her children were present and witnessed everything.
When Isla stood up after raping her, she noticed that the knife he was holding was
already bloodstained. At this point, she found out that she was stabbed with the knife.
She tried to take hold of the knife while shouting for help. In response, Isla struck her
the second time, this time, under her lower left breast. She also sustained a wound on
her palm while trying to disarm him. Then the knife fell to the floor. It was at this
moment that she was able to get hold of it and she threw it outside through a broken
window in the room. Thereafter, Isla scampered out of the house through the
backdoor.
In a little while, a neighbor came knocking at the door and was able to see AAAs
condition. She was taken to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) for medical
attention and was confined there for five (5) days.
At the hospital, Dr. Freyra conducted an examination on AAA upon the request of the
station commander of the PNP Lagro Police Station. Based on her findings, AAA
sustained eleven (11) body injuries, two (2) of which were stab wounds, six (6) incised
wounds and two (2) contusions. The stab wounds required medical attendance of not
less than 30 days. An examination of AAAs sexual organ showed congestions and
abrasion in the labia minora and yielded negative result on the presence of
spermatozoa.
AAAs attending physician, Dr. Perez, on the other hand, testified that she had multiple
stab wounds on the left side of the chest. Her chest x-ray result disclosed an
accumulation of blood in the thorax which required him to conduct a procedure to
drain the blood. He concluded that the stab wounds were severe and fatal which could
have led to AAAs death had it not been for the timely medical attendance.
Evidence for the Defense
For the defense, accused Edwin Isla was presented together with two (2) psychiatric
doctors who examined him.
Isla never denied that he raped AAA on July 21, 1997. Invoking the defense of insanity,
he testified that before the incident, he and AAA had an illicit relationship for about
two months until they broke up. He had to use a knife to be able to have sexual
intercourse with her. It was the first time that he and AAA had sex. After raping her, he
admitted stabbing AAA twice, first on her left breast and then on her lower right breast
"for reason he cannot understand."6 He also punched her several times when she
attempted to grab the knife from him.
As to Islas claim of insanity, Dr. Juan Villacorta (Dr. Villacorta) and Dr. Mary Gomez (Dr.
Gomez) of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) were presented as qualified
expert witnesses.
Dr. Villacorta testified that Isla was suffering from a major depressive disorder with
psychotic features; that he manifested psychosis on account of his hallucinations, poor
impulse control, poor judgment, and low frustration tolerance; and that he exhibited
such behavioral pattern immediately prior to being jailed. Dr. Villacorta, however,
could not say with definite certainty or not Isla was suffering from such mental disorder
on July 21, 1997 as there was no examination conducted on Isla on the said date. 7
To corroborate Dr. Villacortas findings, Dr. Gomez was presented. After a thorough
interview and psychiatric testing on Isla, she likewise observed that Isla was suffering
from a major depressive disorder which impaired his mental faculties. She said that his
psychosis could have been existing prior to or about July 21, 1997 but again, like Dr.
Villacorta, she opined that such finding could not be conclusive because of lack of
information from other informants during that time.8
Ruling of the RTC
On April 26, 2004, the RTC convicted Isla of the crimes of rape and frustrated murder. It
did not give credence to his defense of insanity because it noted that Isla committed
the crimes charged during a lucid interval. He knew that what he was doing was
unlawful. There was no indication that he was deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will when he committed all the acts attending the commission of the crime.
The RTC gave no weight to the assertion of the defense that, based on the evaluations
made by the doctors from NCMH, Isla was suffering from psychosis since 1992. It was
of the impression that there was nothing in the testimony of these expert witnesses
that Isla was suffering from psychosis long before the incident. 9 On this note, his
condition could not be equated with imbecility; hence, he could not be exempt from
criminal liability. Thus, the RTC ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment in these cases is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079, the Court finds accused Edwin Isla y Rosell GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized under Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby SENTENCES him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify complainant AAA the amount of Php50,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto, the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay
the cause of suit.
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078, the Court finds accused Edwin Isla y Rosell GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby SENTENCES
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal
as maximum, and to indemnify complainant the sum of P10,000.00 for actual damages,
and to pay the cause of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, Isla interposed an appeal with the CA. On December 17, 2010, the CA
denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision which found Isla to have acted with
discernment when he committed the crimes.According to the CA, Isla exactly knew that
what he was doing was evil so much so that he had to employ cunning means, by
discreetly closing the windows and the door of the house and by resorting to threats
and violence, to ensure the consummation of his dastardly deed. The fact that he
scampered away after AAA was able to take the knife from him, would only show that
he fully understood that he committed a crime for which he could be held liable.
The CA did not give weight to the expert testimonies given by the two psychiatric
doctors either. Since the mental examination on Isla was taken four to six years after
the commission of the crimes, the doctors could not say with definite certainty that he
was suffering from psychosis immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of
the crimes which was very vital for said defense to prosper. Thus, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision.11
Hence, the present appeal.
Both the prosecution and the defense opted not to file any supplemental briefs and
manifested that they were adopting their arguments in their respective briefs filed
before the CA. In his Appellants Brief, the defense presented the following:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WAS INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
At the outset, this Court notes that there is no more question as to whether or not AAA
was raped by Isla. The latter never denied this fact which can be gleaned from his direct
testimony, to wit:
Atty. Erasmo (defense counsel)
Q: So when you left at 4:00, where did you proceed?
A: To my aunt at Balintawak.
Q: How about AAA, what happened to her if you know?
A: she was raped and stabbed, sir.
Q: Who raped and stabbed AAA, if you know?
A: Me, sir.
Q: What time did this happen?
A: 3:00 oclock, sir.
Q: Now, how did you rape AAA?
A: I went inside their house.12
(Emphases supplied)
That being so, what is left for this jurisdiction to resolve is whether or not Islas claim of
insanity is creditable so as to exculpate him of the crimes he admittedly committed.
This Court is not convinced with Islas defense.
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for one of the circumstances which
will exempt one from criminal liability which is when the perpetrator of the act was an
imbecile or insane, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. This circumstance,
however, is not easily available to an accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the
exception rather than the rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil
Code, the presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity
admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of
insanity. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the
time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with
which he is charged.13
In the case at bench, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The
respective testimonies of Dr. Villacorta and Dr. Gomez of the NCMH, as qualified expert
witnesses, failed to support its claim of insanity. As observed by the CA, the mental
examination on Isla taken four to six years after the incident happened in July 1997, in
effect, showed that it could not be concluded with certainty that he was suffering from
such psychosis immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crimes.
The expert witnesses themselves opined that their findings were not conclusive as to
whether Isla was insane on that fateful day of July 21, 1997, as no examination was
made on said day or for lack of information from other informants during that time. 14
This Court also agrees with the observation of the RTC as affirmed by the CA that Isla
acted with discernment as can be deduced from his acts before, during and after the
commission of the crimes with which he was charged. The RTC wrote:
The overt acts committed by the accused are attributed to a criminal mind, not a
lunatic. There is no indication whatsoever that he was completely deprived of reason
or discernment and freedom of will when he stood for a while by the door of
complainants house, then entered it, toyed with a disconnected telephone set, and
cunningly poked a knife at complainants neck and dragged her inside the room where
he raped her. The fact that he first discreetly closed the door and the window before
he approached and poked a knife at complainant, then, as he laid on top of her,
ordered her to undress, kissed her breast, separated apart her legs with his own legs,
and satisfied his lust, all the while holding a knife with his right hand poked at
complainants body, are calculated means to ensure consummation of his lewd design.
These are by no means the workings of an imbecile, but by one engulfed by lust. 15
In the case of People vs. Rafanan, Jr., this Court has held that the defense of insanity
may be accepted as an exempting circumstance on the test of cognition, which requires
a complete deprivation of intelligence, not only of the will, in committing the criminal
act. Thus, when the accused in said case, threatened the victim with death in case she
reported her ravishment indicated that he was aware of the reprehensible moral
depravity of that assault and that he was not deprived of intelligence. 16
If Isla had become insane after the commission of the crime, such fact does not alter
the situation and the Courts ruling is the same. His defense still fails considering that
he was not insane during the commission of the acts charged. Any problem regarding
his present mental condition should be dealt with administratively.
With respect to the stabbings, it appears that Isla committed two acts. The first was
while he was ravishing AAA. The Court considers this and the rape as one continuous
act, the stabbing being necessary, as far as he was concerned, for the successful
perpetration of the crime. When he testified, Isla claimed that he had to use the knife
so he could have sexual intercourse with her.
The second stabbing took place after consummation of the rape act. According to AAA,
after her defilement, she noticed the knife bloodied and she tried to wrest it from him.
In their struggle, she was stabbed under her lower left breast but she was able to force
Isla to drop the knife. At this point, Isla was able to escape through the backdoor. This
second stabbing is a separate and distinct offense as it was not a necessary means to
commit the rape. It was intended to do away with her life. Thus, it has been written,
"Where a girl was raped and then strangled to death, the crimes are the separate
crimes of rape and homicide, not complex." 17 This was also the ruling in People v.
Dawandawan,18 where it was written:
The physical injuries which could have caused the victim's death were not the result of
the rape committed; neither was the slashing a necessary means for committing the
rape. Independently of the slashing of the victim's neck and the stabbing, the accused
was able to consummate the rape. The physical injuries were inflicted after the rape
and were not a necessary means to commit the same. Hence, the crimes committed
are the two separate crimes of Rape and Frustrated Homicide.
The Court, however, finds itself unable to agree that the second crime committed was
frustrated murder. In the information, it was alleged that the stabbing was committed
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. There is,
however, nothing in the records of the case that would show the presence of the said
qualifying circumstances.
Evidently, there was no treachery. For treachery to exist "the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make." It is important in
ascertaining the existence of treachery that it be proven that the attack was made
swiftly, deliberately, unexpectedly, and without a warning, thus affording the
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the attack. 19 In the case at bench,
Islas attack was not sudden, swift, deliberate and without warning. He stabbed AAA
during the course of the struggle. Thus, the prosecution failed to show that the
stabbing was so calculated as not to afford AAA the chance to evade the attack.
Moreover, the attack was not with evident premeditation. The elements of evident
premeditation are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2)
overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3)
a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution
sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. These
circumstances were not obtaining in the case at bench. An examination of the facts
would reveal that there was no sufficient time that elapsed for Isla to decide to commit
the crime and reflect on its consequences. Moreover, there was no showing that he
performed other overt acts to show that he was determined to commit murder. The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 20 When Isla
stabbed AAA the second time, it was more of a reaction to the possibility of his being
disarmed by his victim rather than a well-planned attack to kill her.
Neither was there an abuse of superior strength. There was no showing that Isla took
advantage of his superior strength to consummate the crime.
For said reasons, the crime charged should have been frustrated homicide only.
Consequently the penalty should be changed.
Under Article 249 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for one found guilty of Homicide is
reclusion temporal, whose duration is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years. Considering that the crime is frustrated, Article 250 in relation to Article 50
of the RPC provides that the penalty next lower in degree of the penalty prescribed by
law for the consummated felony should be imposed. Thus, the penalty should only be
prision mayor, the duration of which is from six (6) years to twelve (12) years.
Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, Article 64
of the RPC provides that the penalty should be in its medium period which is eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should be within the
range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower in degree. Hence, for the crime of
frustrated homicide, Isla should suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
With respect to the civil aspect, he should also be made to pay AAA the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the civil indemnity ex delicto and
moral damages awarded. Said award is in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on
simple rape wherein exemplary damages are awarded in order to set a public example
and to protect hapless individuals from sexual molestation.21

In lieu of the award of P10,000.00 as actual damages, an award of temperate damages

should be given instead. The Court has consistently held that in order for one to be
entitled to actual damages, the claim must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages
but there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be
given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. 22

In this case, AAA failed to provide receipts to substantiate her claim. This Court,
however, is not unmindful of the fact that AAA was hospitalized for about five (5) days.
Considering that the expenses she incurred cannot be proved with certainty, an award
of temperate damages is but proper. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases
where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced,
although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary
loss.23 An award of P8,000.00 as temperate damages is, to the Court's mind,
just.1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with ,MODIFICATION the December 17, 2010 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28761 as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079, finding the accused Edwin Isla y Rossell guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, and P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to
pay the cost of suit.

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078, finding the accused Edwin Isla y Rossell guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four
(4) years prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P8,000.00 as temperate damages; and to
pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.