POINTERS FOR AGRARIAN REFORM | MIDTERMS
REVOLUTIONARY KIND OF EXPROPRIATION With respect to "public use," the Court in Association of Small
All private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as
long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners.
TN: This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property
of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner
for a specific and perhaps local purpose.
Purpose of this kind of expropriation
It is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a
small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all
levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted
owner.
Confed vs. DAR
Petitioners claim that they own private agricultural lands devoted to
sugarcane. They and their predecessors-in-interest have been planting
sugarcane on their lands allegedly since time immemorial. They contend
that in the exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain, which
in the case of RA 6657 is the acquisition of private lands for distribution
to farmer-beneficiaries, expropriation proceedings, as prescribed in Rule
67 of the RoC, must be strictly complied with.
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is not entirely disregarded in the
implementation of RA 6657. The petitioners' main objection to
paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of Section 16 of RA 6657 is that they are
allegedly in complete disregard of the expropriation proceedings
prescribed under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners'
argument does not persuade. As declared by the Court in Association
of Small Landowners, we are not dealing here with the traditional
exercise of the power of eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of
expropriation:
. . . However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise
of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner
for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with
here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural
lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they
are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit
not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the
population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of
our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted
owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of
this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future,
which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations
yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today,
although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more
fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our
thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it
is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this
revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among
the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of
their dreams and deliverance.
Despite the revolutionary or non-traditional character of RA 6657,
however, the chief limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely: (1) public use; and (2) payment of just compensation,
is embodied therein as well as in the Constitution.
Landowners declared that the requirement of public use had already
been settled by the Constitution itself as it "calls for agrarian reform,
which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from
their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The
purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, 47 Proc. No. 131 48 and RA No. 6657
are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State
adopt the necessary measures 'to encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless
to own directly or collectively the lands they till.' That public use, as
pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us."
RA 3844
Abolition of Share Tenancy
Section 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy - Agricultural share
tenancy, as herein defined, is hereby declared to be contrary to public
policy and shall be abolished: Provided, That existing share tenancy
contracts may continue in force and effect in any region or locality, to be
governed in the meantime by the pertinent provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, until the end
of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council
proclaims that all the government machineries and agencies in that
region or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in this Code are
operating, unless such contracts provide for a shorter period or the
tenant sooner exercise his option to elect the leasehold system:
Provided, further, That in order not to jeopardize international
commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by marketing allotments
shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation that adequate
provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives, marketing
agreements, or other similar workable arrangements, have been made
to insure efficient management on all matters requiring synchronization
of the agricultural with the processing phases of such crops: Provided,
furthermore, That where the agricultural share tenancy contract has
ceased to be operative by virtue of this Code, or where such a tenancy
contract has been entered into in violation of the provisions of this Code
and is, therefore, null and void, and the tenant continues in possession
of the land for cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a leasehold
relationship under the provisions of this Code, without prejudice to the
right of the landowner and the former tenant to enter into any other lawful
contract in relation to the land formerly under tenancy contract, as long
as in the interim the security of tenure of the former tenant under
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended,
and as provided in this Code, is not impaired: Provided, finally, That if a
lawful leasehold tenancy contract was entered into prior to the effectivity
of this Code, the rights and obligations arising therefrom shall continue
to subsist until modified by the parties in accordance with the provisions
of this Code.
Shared tenancy the relationship which exists whenever two persons
agree on a joint undertaking for cultural production wherein one party
furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing
any one of the several items of production, the tenant cultivating the land
personally with aid of labor available from members of his immediate
farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided by the landowner
and the tenant.
Security of Tenure
Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural
leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural
lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
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IOW, the landowner cannot just dispossess, remove or eject a tenant
or lessee from the land without authorized cause.
Liabilities of lessor if he ejects tenant without authorization:
1. Fine or imprisonment
2. Damages suffered
3. Attorneys fees
4. Remuneration of last income
Grounds to extinguish
Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The
agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be
extinguished by:
a. Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor;
b. Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural
lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months
in advance; or
c. Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the
lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the
lessee.
Coderias v Chioco
The late Juan, a former governor, owned a 4-hectare farm in Nueva
Ecija, tilled by Raymundo. As tiller, he was issued a Certificate of Land
Transfer. In 1980, henchmen of Juan evicted Raymundo from the farm,
threatening to kill them if they did not leave. Thus, Raymundo was left
with no recourse but to leave with his family.
Upon learning of Juans death in 1993, Raymundo and his family
returned to the farm. He then filed with the Department of Agrariam
Reform Adjudication Board a complaint that his possession and
cultivation of the farm be respected, against the estate of Juan, as well
as payment of harvest from 1980 to 1993. The estate filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that Raymundos cause of action has prescribed under
the provisions of Republic Act 3844 since the dispossession took place
in 1980 but the petition was filed only in 1995, way beyond the three-
year period for filing such claims. On the other hand, Raymundo argues
that his possession should be deemed uninterrupted since his departure
was made due to threats to his life.
Expectedly, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ruled in
favour of the estate. Raymundo was guilty of laches since he did not
assert his claim within a period of 14 years, according to the PARAB.
When the case was appealed to the DARAB, the latter reversed the
PARAD decision. However, was reinstated by the Court of Appeals,
affirming the PARAD decision. Raymundo thus filed his petition for
review on certiorari. He posits that prescription should have started
when the intimidation ceased upon Juans death, not from 1980, when
he was forcibly evicted from the land. Further, the CA decision
disregards the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Ruling: Petition granted
It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been placed under
the coverage of RA 3844. It is also undisputed that a tenancy relation
existed between Chioco and petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been issued
in favor of the petitioner; thus, petitioner already had an expectant right
to the farm. A CLT serves as a provisional title of ownership over the
landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just
compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an amortizing
owner. This certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land
primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the
tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was tilling.
Since the farm is considered expropriated and placed under the
coverage of the land reform law, Chioco had no right to evict petitioner
and enter the property. More significantly, Chioco had no right to claim
that petitioners cause of action had prescribed.
x x x [T]he Land Reform Code forges by operation of law, between the
landowner and the farmer be [he] a leasehold tenant or temporarily a
share tenant a vinculum juris with certain vital consequences, such
as security of tenure of the tenant and the tenants right to continue in
possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or
the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and now, more basically,
the farmers pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates under Section
11 of the Code, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third
person without his knowledge, under Section 12 of this Code.
To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants, Section 10 of R.A. No.
3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold relation shall not be
extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession
of the landholding. With unyielding consistency, we have held that
transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural
leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership, such as the sale or
transfer of legal possession, will not terminate the rights of the
agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such
rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowners successor
in interest.
In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of
tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that the relationship of
landholder and tenant can only be terminated for causes provided by
law. x x x [S]ecurity of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural
lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their
[landholdings] is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the leasehold relationship can
take place only for causes provided by law
The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris, this juridical tie, that
exists between the petitioner and Chioco, which the latter is bound to
respect.
Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold relation shall be
extinguished only under any of the following three circumstances, to wit:
(1) abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months
in advance; or (3) absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed
the lessee x x x.
None of these is obtaining in this case. In particular, petitioner cannot
be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled that
Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property through threats and
intimidation. His house was bulldozed and his crops were
destroyed. Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and returned only in 1993
upon learning of Chiocos death. Two years after, or in 1995, he filed
the instant Petition.
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that [a]n action to
enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not
commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued. In
this case, we deem it proper to reckon petitioners cause of action to
have accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993,
and not at the time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in
1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to petitioners life and
limb existed, petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce
the recognition of this juridical tie. Since the threats and intimidation
ended with Chiocos death, petitioners obligation to file a case to assert
his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the
prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as enumerated above,
include the right to security of tenure, to continue in possession of the
land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer
of the land to third persons, the pre-emptive right to buy the land, as well
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as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his
knowledge.
Petitioner may not be faulted for acting only after Chioco passed away
for his life and the lives of members of his family are not worth gambling
for a piece of land. The bulldozing of his house his castle is only an
example of the fate that could befall them. Under the circumstances, it
is therefore understandable that instead of fighting for the farm,
petitioner opted to leave and keep his family safe. Any man who
cherishes his family more than the most valuable material thing in his
life would have done the same.
Force and intimidation restrict or hinder the exercise of the will, and so
long as they exist, petitioner is deprived of his free will. He could not
occupy his farm, plant his crops, tend to them, and harvest them. He
could not file an agrarian case against Chioco, for that meant having to
return to Nueva Ecija. He could not file the case anywhere else; any
other agrarian tribunal or agency would have declined to exercise
jurisdiction.
Respondent Court should have taken this fact into consideration for
tenants are guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the continued
enjoyment and possession of their landholding except when their
dispossession had been authorized by virtue of a final and executory
judgment, which is not so in the case at bar.
At any rate, respondent cannot legally invoke the strict application of the
rules on prescription because the failure of petitioner to immediately file
the Petition was due to its own maneuvers. This Court should not allow
respondent to profit from its threats and intimidation. Besides, if we
subscribe to respondents ratiocination that petitioners cause of action
had already prescribed, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein a
tenant who was unlawfully deprived of his landholding would be barred
from pursuing his rightful claim against the transgressor.
Petitioners tenure on the farm should be deemed uninterrupted since
he could not set foot thereon. And if he could not make the required
payments to Chioco or the Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner
should not be faulted. And, since his tenure is deemed uninterrupted,
any benefit or advantage from the land should accrue to him as well.
Does death or incapacity extinguish agricultural leasehold?
Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death
or Incapacity of the Parties - In case of death or permanent incapacity
of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall
continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can
cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor
within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among
the following:
a. the surviving spouse;
b. the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or
c. the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of
their age:
Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall
be exercised at the end of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That
in the event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the
periods herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order
herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the
leasehold shall bind his legal heirs.
Velasquez v Sps Cruz
According to the Court of Appeals, petitioners claim that he succeeded
Navarro as tenant is questionable. Section 9 of RA 3844 provides and
exclusive enumeration of those who are qualified to succeed to the
leasehold rights of a deceased or incapacitated tenant. Being a relative
only by affinity (Velasquez was a son-in-law of Navarro), petitioner
cannot lay claim as his successor.
Grounds to dispossess
The following are the grounds to dispossess an agricultural lessee:
1. Failure to comply with terms and conditions of agreement
2. Planting of crops or the use of land for other purpose than
that agreed upon
3. Failure to adopt proven farm practices to conserve land
4. Fault or negligence resulting in substantial damage
5. Non-payment of rental when due
6. Employed a sublessee
One of the important grounds is this non-payment of the rental when
due. Going back to the relationship, landowner provides the land, and
the lessee provides the labor and when there is production they are
supposed to divide the produce. The produce there to be given by the
lessee to the landowner is the rental. The rental is FIXED by law. The
rental shall not exceed 25% of the average normal harvest.
Rental should not be more than the equivalent of 25% of the average
normal harvest during the 3 agricultural years immediately preceding the
date of leasehold after deducting amount used for the seeds and costs
of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing.
Non-payment of rental as ground to dispossess
Sta. Ana vs. Carpo
Landowner has burden of proof that a ground to dispossess exists.
Respondents failed to discharge such burden. The agricultural tenants
failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to
warrant his dispossession of the land that he tills. In this case, there was
an intention to pay on the part of Sta. Ana.
The term deliberate is characterized by or results from slow, careful,
thorough calculation and consideration of effects and consequences.
The term willful is defined as one governed by will without yielding to
reason.
Natividad vs. Mariano
In this case, respondents were paying, but to previous owners. Further,
the respondents alleged non-payment did not last for the required two-
year period. The rental payments were not yet due and the respondents
were not in default at the time Ernesto filed the petition for ejectment as
Ernesto failed to prove his alleged prior verbal demands. Additionally,
assuming arguendo that the respondents failed to pay the lease rentals,
we do not consider the failure to be deliberate or willful. The receipts on
record show that the respondents had paid the lease rentals for the
years 1988-1998.
Non-payment of the lease rentals whenever they fall due is a ground for
the ejectment of an agricultural lessee under paragraph 6, Section 36 of
R.A. No. 3844. In relation to Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
816, deliberate refusal or continued refusal to pay the lease rentals by
the agricultural lessee for a period of two (2) years shall, upon hearing
and final judgment, result in the cancellation of the CLT issued in the
agricultural lessee's favor.
The agricultural lessee's failure to pay the lease rentals, in order to
warrant his dispossession of the landholding, must be willful and
deliberate and must have lasted for at least two (2) years. The term
"deliberate" is characterized by or results from slow, careful, thorough
calculation and consideration of effects and consequences, while the
term "willful" is defined, as one governed by will without yielding to
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reason or without regard to reason. Mere failure of an agricultural lessee
to pay the agricultural lessor's share does not necessarily give the latter
the right to eject the former absent a deliberate intent on the part of the
agricultural lessee to pay.
GCCs comments on Natividad:
- PD 816 covers rice and corn
- RA 3844 is silent on the period for non-payment of rentals
- There is no fact established in case whether the subject
property is rice or corn (although it can be assumed to be
because of the words crop year)
Period of redemption
Section 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. In case the landholding
is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee,
the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price
and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption
only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of the
redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred
eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee
on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the
registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of
legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of
the land at the time of the sale.
"Upon the filing of the corresponding petition or request with the
department or corresponding case in court by the agricultural lessee or
lessees, the said period of one hundred and eighty days shall cease to
run.
"Any petition or request for redemption shall be resolved within sixty
days from the filing thereof; otherwise, the said period shall start to run
again.
"The Department of Agrarian Reform shall initiate, while the Land Bank
shall finance, said redemption as in the case of pre-emption."
Po vs. Dampal
Concerns farm lots in Bukidnon, foreclosed by the bank for non-
payment of loan with petitioner as highest bidder. Previous owner and
tenant filed a civil case against the bank for annulment of mortgage.
Meanwhile, tenant-respondent filed a complaint for legal redemption
with DARAB.
Regional Adjudicator disallowed redemption because of prescription
and that the requirement of notice was complied with since the tenant
was considered to have knowledge due to the civil case. DARAB
Central Office reversed on the lack of notice of sale to tenant to DAR.
The admitted lack of notice on Dampal and DAR tolled the running of
the prescriptive period.
Reclassification of land as ground to extinguish leasehold
Davao New Town vs. Sps. Saliga
whether the leasehold relationship has between the respondents and
Eugenio has been established by virtue of the provisions of RA No. 3844
or of the five-year lease contract executed in 1981, this leasehold
relationship had been terminated with the reclassification of the property
as non-agricultural land in 1982. The expiration of the five-year lease
contract in 1986 could not have done more than simply finally terminated
any leasehold relationship that may have prevailed under the terms of
the contract.
But, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically
allow a landowner to change its use and this cause the ejectment of the
tenants. He must undergo the process of conversion before he is
permitted to use the land for other purposes.
Conversion the act of changing the current use of a piece of
agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR.
Reclassification the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the
requirements and procedure for land use conversion.
Crisostomo vs. Victoria
There was a lease contract entered into by Crisostomo and Hipolito that
would expire on Hipolitos death. When Hipolito died, Crisostomo
wanted to reclaim possession over the property but found Victoria there
who alleged that Hipolito was his uncle.
Court held that Hipolitos status as the acknowledged tenant did not
clothe him with capacity to designate respondent as tenant. The right to
hire a tenant is basically a personal right of the landowner except as may
be provided by law. But certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a
civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically authorized to install a
tenant thereon.
Still, there is no consent from Crisostomo which is an essential element
of tenancy. While there are receipts, Crisostomo never failed to write
down in the receipts that it was Hipolito who was the valid lessee.
P.D. 27: TENANTS EMANCIPATION DEGREE
Suppletory application on just compensation
The determination of just compensation should be based on RA 6657
for lands covered under PD 27. PD 27 applies suppletorily.
According to GCC: Another reason should be the reasonableness of
the factors in determining just compensation under RA 6657 compared
to PD 27.
CARL, as amended
Agricultural activity vis--vis raising of livestock
Section 3 (b). Agriculture or Agricultural Activity Means the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing fruit trees, raising of
livestock, poultry or fish including the harvesting of such farm
products and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer
in conjunction with such farming operations done by person whether
natural or juridical.
Luz Farms vs DAR
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section 11 of R.A. 6657
which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial
farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities
are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.
There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the
coverage of agrarian reform. The use of land in raising of livestock is
merely incidental and not the principal factor.
The intention of the committee is to limit the application of the word
agriculture. Raising of livestock, etc. is an industrial, not agricultural
activity. Great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form
of industrial fixed assets such as: animal housing structures and
facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers feedmill with grinders, etc.
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RA 7881: amended Section 3 (b) and removed the raising of livestock,
poultry or fish.
Holy Trinity vs Dela Cruz
Land on which no agricultural activity is being conducted is not subject
to coverage of either PD 27 or RA 6657.
Here, no evidence was submitted to show that any agricultural activity
like cultivation of the land, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising
of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities and practices were being peformed
in the Dakila property in order to subject it to the coverage of RA 6657.
We tale particular note that the previous tenants had themselves
declared that they were voluntarily surrendering their tenancy rights
because the land was no conducive to farming by reason of its elevation.
Also, the Whereas clause of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 which
mentioned that the Dakila property was not fit for agricultural use due to
lack of sufficient irrigation and that is was more suitable for residential
use.
Definition of agricultural land
Section 3 (c). Refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined
in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial land.
Natalia Realty vs. DAR
The undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as agricultural lands. These lots were
intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon
approval of the reservation. Lands previously converted by government
agencies, other than DAR, to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity
of the CARL, were outside the coverage of the law.
Alangilan vs. OP
Petitioner insists on exemption of the Alangilan landholding from CARO
coverage. It argues that the subject landholding had already been
converted into non-agricultural use long before the advent of the CARP.
The passage of the 1982 Ordinance, classifying the property as
reserved for residential, effectively transformed the land into non-
agricultural use and thus, outside the ambit of the CARL.
The term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use.
It does not denoted that the property has already been reclassified as
residential.
At the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding
was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994 reclassifying the
landholding to residential-1. If indeed, the landholding had already been
earmarked for residential use, then there would be no need for an
Ordinance in 1994.
LBP v Estate of Araneta
This involves a large tract of land in Rizal. On June 21 1974, Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1283 carving out a wide expanse from the
Watershed Reservation in Rizal and reserving the segregated area for
townsite purposes, subject to any rights, if there any be. Proclamation
1637 increased the size of the reservation and designated it as Lingdos
Silangan Townsite to include other lands. However, upon the issuance
of Proc. 1637, all activities related to the OLT were stopped. The
discontinuance of the OLT processing was obviously DARs way of
acknowledging the implication of the townsite proclamation on the
agricultural classification of the Doronilla property. It ought to be
emphasized, as a general proposition, that the former agricultural lands
of Doronilla were converted for residential use.
Agrarian Dispute
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby
vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
Agrarian Dispute: Any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements
over land devoted to agriculture
Any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
CARL and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership.
Essential Requisites of leasehold relationship:
1. parties (landowner and tenants)
2. Subject matter is agri land
3. Consent of parties
4. Purpose is agricultural production
5. Personal cultivation by the tenant
6. Sharing of harvest between parties.
Isidro v. CA
Facts: Private respondent is owner of land. Sister of private respondent
allowed Isidro to occupy swampy portion subject to condition to vacate
upon demand. Failure to vacate, unlawful detainer was filed against
Isidro. RTC dismissed because land is agricultural and so agrarian.
Ruling: Jurisdiction over subject matter is determined from the
allegations in the complaint. Court does not lose jurisdiction by defense
of tenancy relationship and only after hearing that, if tenancy is shown,
the court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Case involving
agricultural land does not automatically make such case agrarian. Six
requisites were not present. There was no contract to cultivate &
petitioner failed to substantiate claim that he was paying rent for use of
land.
Bejasa v. CA
Facts: Candelaria owned two parcels of land, which she leased to
Malabanan. Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and clear
it, with all the expenses shouldered by Malabanan. Bejasas continued
to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in
the form of rent or a shared harvest
Issue: Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the
Bejasas.
Ruling: Court found that there was no tenancy relationship between the
parties. There was no proof that Malabanan and the Bejasas shared the
harvests. Candelaria never gave her consent to the Bejasas stay on the
land.
There was no proof that the Dinglasans gave authority to the Bejasas to
be the tenant of the land in question. Not all the elements of tenancy
were met in this case. There was no proof of sharing in harvest.
Almuete v. Andres
Facts: Almuete was in exclusive possession of subject land. Unknown
to Almuete, Andres was awarded homestead patent due to investigation
report that Almuete was unknown and waived his rights. Andres also
represented that Almuete sold the property to Masiglat for radiophone
set and that Masiglat sold to him for a carabao and P600. Almuete filed
an action for recovery of possession and reconveyance before trial
court. Issue is who between 2 awardees of lot has better right to
property.
Issue: Whether there is agrarian dispute
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Ruling: NO. This is controversy relating to ownership of farmland so it is
beyond the ambit of agrarian dispute. No juridical tie of landowner and
tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent. RTC was
competent to try the case.
Nicorp Devt v. De Leon
Facts: Respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) praying that petitioners be
ordered to respect her tenancy rights over a parcel of land in the name
of the De Leon sisters.
Respondent alleged that she was the actual tiller and cultivator of the
land since time immemorial with full knowledge and consent of the
owners, who were her sisters-in-law and that petitioners entered the land
and uprooted and destroyed the rice planted on the land and graded
portions of the land with the use of heavy equipment; that the incident
was reported to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) which
issued a Cease and Desist Order 5 but to no avail.
Respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to respect her
tenancy rights over the land; restore the land to its original condition and
not to convert the same to non -agricultural use; that any act of
disposition of the land to any other person be declared null and void
because as a tenant, she allegedly had a right of pre-emption or
redemption over the land.
Petitioner Lim denied that respondent was a tenant of the subject
property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
He alleged that respondent is no longer physically capable of tilling the
land; that the MARO issued a certification that the land had no registered
tenant; that respondent could not be regarded as a landless tiller under
the CARP because she owns and resides in the property adjacent to the
subject land which she acquired through inheritance; that an Affidavit of
Non-Tenancy was executed by the De Leon sisters when they sold the
property to him.
Moreover, Lim claimed that respondent and her family surreptitiously
entered the subject land and planted a few crops to pass themselves off
as cultivators thereof; that respondent tried to negotiate with petitioner
Lim for the sale of the land to her, as the latter was interested in entering
into a joint venture with another residential developer, which shows that
respondent has sufficient resources and cannot be a beneficiary under
the CARP; that the land is no longer classified as agricultural and could
not thus be covered by the CARP. Per certification issued by the Office
of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor,
Cavite, the land is classified as residential pursuant to a Comprehensive
Land Use Plan approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Issue: Whether there is agrarian dispute.
Held: No. There is no substantial evidence to support that respondent is
a bona fide tenant on the subject property. Respondent failed to prove
the third and sixth elements cited above. It was not shown that the De
Leon sisters consented to a tenancy relationship or that the De Leon
sisters received any share in the harvests of the land from respondent
or that the latter delivered a proportionate share of the harvest to the
landowners pursuant to a tenancy relationship.
The affidavits merely stated that the De Leon sisters have known
respondent to be the cultivator of the land since time immemorial. It
cannot therefore be deemed as evidence of harvest sharing. That
respondent was allowed to cultivate the property without opposition,
does not mean that the De Leon sisters impliedly recognized the
existence of a leasehold relation with respondent. Occupancy and
continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure
tenant.
Sps. Fajardo vs. Flores
Facts: Parties executed a Kasunduan where it was admitted that Jesus
Fajardo was the tiller of the land. In another agreement, an area of
10,923 sq. m. was given to petitioners. The portion of the land where
petitoners home is erected is the subject of the instant case for unlawful
detainer.
Issue: whether it is MTC or DARAB which has jurisdiction over the
case.
Ruling: SC agreed with RTC which pointed out that the resolution of this
case hinges on the correct interpretation of the contracts executed by
the parties. The issue of who has a better right of possession over the
subject and cannot be determined without resolving first the matter as
to whom the subject property was allotted. Thus, it not a case for
unlawful detainer because it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
There exists an agrarian dispute because the controversy involves the
home lot of petitioners. An incident arising from the landlord-tenant
relationship/ Petitioners claim that the tenancy relationship has been
terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject
matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship,
or if the dispute originates from such the relationship, the case is
cognizable by the DARAB.
Estate of Pastor Samson vs. Susano
Ruling: The existence of a tenancy relationship is a question of fact.
There was no specific evidence cited to support such conclusion other
than their observation that Pastor failed to protest Macarios possession
and cultivation over the subject land for more than 30 years. Contrary to
what is required by law, no independent and concrete evidence were
adduced.
It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and cultivation of an
agricultural land will not ipso facto make one a de
jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove
personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the landowner.
Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot
be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete
evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove
sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be
presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate. Tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are
explicit in law and cannot be done away with by conjectures. Leasehold
relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence of facts but,
being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that
relationship should be primordial. For implied tenancy to arise it is
necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be present.
The affidavits executed by three of respondents' neighbors are
insufficient to establish a finding of tenancy relationship between Pastor
and Macario. As correctly observed by the estate of Pastor Samson, the
affiants did not provide details based on their personal knowledge as to
how the crop-sharing agreement was implemented, how much was
given by Macario to Pastor, when and where the payments were made,
or whether they have at any instance witnessed Pastor receive his share
of the harvest from Macario. Such failure is fatal to respondents' claim
particularly since the respondents have the burden of proving their
affirmative allegation of tenancy. In fine, the conclusions of the RARAD,
DARAB and the CA respecting the existence of tenancy relationship
between Pastor and Macario are not supported by substantial evidence
on record.
Heirs of Quilo v. DBP
Ruling: Notice of conference and the affidavits only showed that Quinto
filed a complaint against the spouses Oliveros regarding the land he was
cultivating. The affidavits confirmed merely that Quinto had been
planting on the land. Documents no way confirmed that his presence on
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the land was based on a tenancy relationship that the spouses Oliveros
had agreed to.
Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not
automatically establish a leasehold relation or make one a tenant. The
affidavit only stated that Quilo had given his share of the harvest to the
spouses (the details fell short)
Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence to
show that there were sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed
system of sharing between them. Deposit cannot prove the existence of
a sharing agreement. It must be showed that the deposit is made in
relation to tenancy.
Reyes v. Heirs of Floro
Ruling: Certification from Bautista has little evidentiary value, without
any corroborative evidence. The certification was not even presented as
a witness. Similarly, Reyes was not included as a legitimate and properly
registered agricultural tenant in the supposed Deed of Absolute sale with
Agricultural Tenants Conformity which Bautista executed in favor of
Zenaida. Zenaida was convicted of falsification of public document.
What is the value of a notarized document?
Before a document is received by the court, they will look into the
question of admissibility. If notarized, there is no need to present a
witness, since there is a presumption. If not notarized, you need a
witness to testify on the document.
Davao New Town v. Spouses Saliga
Issue: At the core of the controversy is the questioned reclassification of
the property to non-agricultural uses. This issue is intertwined with and
on which depends the resolution of the issue concerning the claimed
agricultural leasehold relationship.
Ruling: No tenancy relationship exists between DNTDC and the
respondents for the tenancy relationship between the ceased when the
property was reclassified.
Court outlined the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship, all of
which must concur for the relationship to exist.
- The parties are the landowner and the tenant
- The subject is agricultural land
- There is consent
- The purpose is agricultural production
- There is personal cultivation
- There is sharing of harvests
The absence of any of these requisites does not make an occupant a
cultivator, or a planter, a de jure tenant. Consequently, a person who is
not a de jure tenant is not entitled to security of tenure nor covered by
the land reform program of the government under any existing tenancy
laws.
In this case, we hold that no tenancy relationship exists between
DNTDC, as the owner of the property, and the respondents, as the
purported tenants; the second essential requisite as outlined above
the subject is agricultural land is lacking. To recall, the property had
already been reclassified as non-agricultural land. Accordingly, the
respondents are not de jure tenants and are, therefore, not entitled to
the benefits granted to agricultural lessees under the provisions of P.D.
No. 27, in relation to R.A. No. 6657.
Automat v Cruz
This court has held that a MARO certification "concerning the presence
or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties,
is considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification
does not bind the judiciary."
The amended certification does not bind this court. Several elements
must be present before the courts can conclude that a tenancy
relationship exists. MARO certifications are limited to factual
determinations such as the presence of actual tillers. It cannot make
legal conclusions on the existence of a tenancy agreement.
DAR vs. Woodland
Facts: NOC dated 11 Dec. 2003 and NOA dated 3 October 2004 were
issued over the portion of respondents land.
Issue: Can petitioner still issue NOC and NOA after June 15, 1998?
Ruling: For us to sustain Woodland's theory that the DAR can no longer
issue those notices after 15 June 1998 despite the enactment of R.A.
8532 would thwart the CARP's purpose. Clearly, Section 63 refers to the
implementation of the CARL in its entirety, not just the funding source.
Indeed, R.A. 8532 specifically amended Section 63 of R.A. 6657, but it
does not follow that only Section 63 had been affected by the
amendment. The fact that Section 63 falls under the chapter on
"Financing" only emphasizes its general applicability. Hence, the phrase
"until the year 2008" used in R.A. 8532 unmistakably extends the DAR's
authority to issue NOCs for purposes of acquiring and distributing private
agricultural lands. Finally, R.A. 9700 extended the acquisition and
distribution of all agricultural lands until 30 June 2014.The title alone
of R.A. 9700 An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of
All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary Reforms, Amending for the
Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Otherwise Known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, As Amended, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor reveals that the CARP was indeed
extended from 1998 to 2008 via R.A. 8532. Had there been no prior
extension from 1998 to 2008, how else could the CARP have been
extended by R.A. 9700 until 30 June 2014? There could have been an
extension only if the program sought to be extended had not expired.
Homestead Patent
Section 6: Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time
of the approval of this act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate the homestead.
Homestead Patent: A mode of acquiring alienable and disposable lands
of public domain for agricultural purposes conditioned upon actual
cultivation and residence.
Where do you file the application?
Before the CENRO where the land being applied is located.
Who are qualified?
Citizens of Philippines over 18 years old and not an owner of more than
12 hectares of land (Art XII, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution)
Who can claim exemption
Section 6. Retention Limits. In no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed 5 hectares. 3 hectares may be awarded to each child
of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at
least 15 years of age and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm. Provided, that original homestead grantees or their
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time
of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.
Qualifications under Sec 6 in order to retain the homestead:
- Original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs
- Who still own the homestead
- As long as they continue to cultivate (most important)
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Retention limit of landowner
What is not covered?
Section 6. Retention Limits Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
no person may own or retain any public or private agricultural land, the
size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family -
size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil
fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC), but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed 5
hectares. 3 hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner,
subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least 15 years of
age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally
retained by them thereunder.
How may hectares are not covered?
Section 6-A. Exception to Retention Limits Provincial, city and
municipal government, units acquiring private agricultural lands by
expropriation or other modes of acquisition to be used for actual, direct
and exclusive public purposes, such as roads and bridges, public
markets, school sites, resettlement sites, local government facilities,
public parks and barangay plazas or squares, consistent with the
approved local comprehensive land use plan, shall not be subject to the
five (5)-hectare retention limit under this Section.
Award to child of landowner
Three hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner,
subject to the following qualifications:
- That he is at least fifteen (15) years of age
- That he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm
Remember: The word used by law with respect to the children or child
of the landowner is NOT retention but AWARD.
Meaning: For a child to be awarded by the government with 3 hectares,
he has to comply with these qualifications
Who normally examines the qualifications?
MARO. And with due respect with MAROs, it is also possible that it is
in the appreciation of these qualifications that corruption can come in,
with or without consideration.
Exemption from coverage
Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly
and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds, and mangroves, national defense, school sites and
campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research
and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant
thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto,
communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal
farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research
and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope
and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the
coverage of the Act.
Note: Lands with 18% slope or over is exempt because of possible soil
erosion
Central Mindanao v. DARAB
Ruling: The subject lands are exempted because they are actually,
directly & exclusively used and found necessary for school site and
campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes
and for establishing seed and seeding research
The construction of DARAB in Section 10 restricting the land area of
CMU to its present needs overlooked the significant factor it growth of a
university in years to come. By the nature of CMU, which is a school
established to promote agriculture & industry, the need for vast tract of
agriculture land for future programs of expansion is obvious.
While portion of CMU land was leased by Phil. Packing Corp.(now Del
Monte), the agreement was prior to CARL & was directly connected to
the purpose & objectives of CMU as educational institution
As to determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary
for use of CMU, school is in best position to resolve & answer the
question. DARAB & CA have no right to substitute unless it is manifest
that CMU has no real need for land.
Things to take note in this case:
- One part used for school and campus site
- Another part not used, part is leased to Del Monte Phil.
Packing Co.
- Central Mindanao is an agricultural school
Supreme Court did not use the phrase found to be necessary, but
impliedly it was referring to it. Because even if that portion of land was
not used, if it was found to be necessary for future expansion, it is to be
exempted from coverage.
Concha vs. Rubio
The controversy involves the determination of who between petitioners
are qualified to become beneficiaries over a portion of land.
In Lercana v. Jalandoni, this Court was categorical in ruling that the
identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
In Sta. Rosa vs. Amante, SC held that Section 15 of RA 6657, the
identification of the beneficiaries is a matter strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP, a matter which is exclusively vested in
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, through its authorized officers.
Thus, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer's (MARO) decision not to
include respondents as farmer-beneficiaries must be accorded respect
in the absence of abuse of discretion. It bears stressing that it is the
MARO or the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who, together
with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, screens and selects the
possible agrarian beneficiaries. If there are farmers who claim they have
priority over those who have been identified by the MARO as
beneficiaries of the land, said farmers can file a protest with the MARO
or the PARO who is currently processing the Land Distribution Folder.
Afterwards, the proper recourse of any individual who seeks to contest
the selection of beneficiaries is to avail himself of the administrative
remedies under the DAR and not under the DARAB, which is bereft of
jurisdiction over this matter. In any case, it appears to this Court that the
decision of the MARO was arrived at after due consideration of the
circumstances of the case.
Ways in distributing lands to qualified beneficiaries under CARL
Compulsory acquisition (sec 16)
Voluntary offer to sell or voluntary land transfer (sec 20)
Non-land transfer schemes
Stock distribution option (SDO)
Production and profit sharing (PPS)
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Leasehold operation (sec 12)
What are the two aspects of land transfer schemes?
Voluntary The landowner will volunteer to convey the land
to the government, agree on the price and then execute the
deed of conveyance
Compulsory If the landowner refuses the notice of
acquisition and notice of coverage. Gov. will have to
expropriate. This time is a different expropriation.
Jurisdiction in identification and selection of beneficiaries
It is DAR who is mandated to select CARP beneficiaries. Jurisdiction lies
with the Office of the DAR Secretary to resolve the issues of
classification of landholdings for coverage (whether the subject property
is a private or government owned land), and identification of qualified
beneficiaries.
Jurisdiction to cancel a leasehold contract
DARAB. (Department of Agrarian Adjudication Board). It exercises
quasi-judicial powers. With respect to quasi-judicial powers, leasehold
contract involves rights, obligations and others terms of the contract
Who executes a leasehold contract?
The agricultural lessor and lessee.
Take note: Agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by
mere expiration of the term of period in a leasehold contract nor by the
sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the land. In case
the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession
of the landholding, purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated
to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Certificate of Land Ownership Award
CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or
awarded to the beneficiary by DAR
Who has jurisdiction to issue, correct or cancel CLOAs?
The DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative
implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties
who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of
the DAR and not the DARAB.
Compulsory Acquisition
The mandatory acquisition of agricultural lands including facilities and
improvements necessary for agricultural production, as may be
appropriate, for distribution to qualified beneficiaries upon payment of
just compensation.
Landlessness is acknowledged as the core problem in the rural areas
and the root cause of peasant unrest. In order to hasten the
implementation of the program, the DAR has made compulsory
acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition. To the same end, the
law provides for the steps in acquiring private lands through
administrative instead of judicial proceedings. This procedure is allowed
provided the requirements of due process as to notice and hearing are
complied with.
Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For
purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall
be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land
to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail,
and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal
building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay
a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set
forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written
notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner,
his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) shall pay the landowner the
purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other
muniments of title.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall
conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine
the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the
LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the
just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from
the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above
period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR
shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted
for decision.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries.
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination
of just compensation.
Who shall be notified?
The landowner is sent a notice of acquisition which shall contain the
offer/valuation by the DAR. Notice is done either through personal
delivery or registered mail, and posting in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building or barangay hall.
For FYI:
Notice of Coverage:
Notifies landowner that his property shall be placed under CARP and
that he is entitled to exercise his retention right;
Notifies him that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and
representatives of the concerned sectors of society may attend to
discuss the results of the field investigation, the land valuation and
other pertinent matters.
Also informs the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding
shall be conducted where he and the other representatives may be
present.
Notice of Acquisition
The Notice shall include, among others, the area subject of compulsory
acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or
upon deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or
non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent
Register of Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property
is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the
land for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries.
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LBP v. Heirs of Trinidad
Facts: Private respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of
agricultural land which was covered by RA No. 6657 through the
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the CARP. He offered to the
DAR the price of P2M per hectare for said portion of the land covered
by CARP. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued and
offered as just compensation the amount of P1,145,806.06 or
P76,387.57 per hectare. The offer was rejected by private respondent.
LBP deposited for the account of private respondent P1,145,806.06 in
cash and in bonds as provisional compensation for the acquisition of the
property.
Thereafter, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through the Regional
Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region XI conducted summary administrative
proceedings under DARAB to fix the just compensation, where they
rendered a decision fixing the compensation of the property at
P10,294,721.00 or P686,319.36 per hectare.
Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for judicial
determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court.
Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against
DAR before the same Special Agrarian Court and filed a Motion for
Delivery of the Initial Valuation praying that petitioner LBP be ordered to
deposit the DARAB determined amount of P10,294,721.
Petitioner LBP filed a Manifestation praying that the amount of the
deposit should only be the initial valuation of the DAR/LBP in the amount
of P1,145,806M and not P10,294,721.00 as determined by the DARAB.
Consequently, a decision was issued ordering petitioner LBP to deposit
for release to the private respondent the DARAB determined just
compensation of P10,294,721M Petitioner LBP filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order to deposit.
Issue: The lone issue in this controversy is the correct amount of
provisional compensation which the LBP is required to deposit in the
name of the landowner if the latter rejects the DAR/LBP's offer.
Petitioner maintains it should be its initial valuation of the land subject of
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) while respondent claims it pertains to the
sum awarded by the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB in a summary
administrative proceeding pending final determination by the courts.
Question was on the correct amount of provisional compensation which
LBP was required to deposit.
- Is it the amount stated in par (a) which is supposed to be
contained in the notice of acquisition? Or
- Is it the amount based on par (d) after the conduct of
summary proceedings?
Held: Supreme Court held that par (e) should be related to pars (a), (b)
and (c), considering that the taking of possession by the State is the next
step after DAR and LBP supplied with the notice requirements.
In effect, SC is saying that it is the offer of the LBP that will determine
what the correct amount to be deposited is and not the amount after the
determination of just compensation in a summary administrative
proceeding.
Reason: If the DAR will wait for the summary administrative
proceedings, this will hamper land redistribution process.
Heirs of Deleste vs. LBP
The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the
agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with
it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due
process of law.
But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the
landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of
sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2,
1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole
world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue
of the said deed of sale.
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not
to the Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that the tax declaration in
the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in
the name of Deleste. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments
of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are
nonetheless "good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession." Petitioners'
right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed
to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the
coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Just compensation
What is meant by just compensation?
The full & fair equivalent of property taken from owner by expropriation
(Assoc. of Small Landowners). The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value
of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made
by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall
be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Factors to be considered in determining just compensation:
- The cost of acquisition of the land
- The value of the standing crop
- The current value of like properties, its nature, actual use
and income
- The sworn valuation by the owner
- Tax declarations
- Assessment made by government assessors
70% of the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
translated into a basic formula by the DAR
Take note: Subject to the final decision of the proper court. The social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of
taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
Preliminary determination
The determination of just compensation by the DAR during the
compulsory acquisition proceedings of Section 16 of RA 6657 is
preliminary only. Hence, the court can review. Any party who disagrees
with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction
for final determination of just compensation.
On just compensation, judicial determination is expressly prescribed in
Section 57 of RA 6657 as it vests on the Special Agrarian Courts original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners.
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Association of Small Landowners v. Sec of DAR
Ruling: We do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a
specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the
State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we
deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The expropriation
before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention
limits allowed their owners. Such a program will involve not mere millions
of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares
of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other
things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Upheld validity of Sec. 16 RA 6657 (manner of acquisition of private
agricultural lands and ascertainment of just compensation). Section
16(e) of the CARP Law provides that: Upon receipt by the landowner of
the corresponding payment, or in case of rejection or no response from
the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR
shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified
beneficiaries.
Therefore, payment of the just compensation is not always required to
be made fully in money.
LBP v. Dumlao
Facts: Respondents are owners of agricultural lands covered under PD
27. Determination of just compensation remained pending with DAR, so
they filed complaint with RTC for determination.
Ruling: If just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA
No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law, although
property was acquired under PD No. 27.
The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just
compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the
emancipation patents because EP constitutes the conclusive authority
for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the
grantee. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the
grantee can acquire the vested right of ownership in the landholding,
subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner.
Petitioners argument that respondents should not be paid yet pending
determination by DAR is specious.
To wait for the DAR valuation despite its unreasonable neglect and delay
in processing is to violate the elementary rule that payment of just
compensation must be within a reasonable period from the taking of
property;
Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the
land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss
Principle: If an agricultural land is acquired under PD 27 but just
compensation has not been paid until RA 6657 took effect, just
compensation will be computed on the basis of the present law, NOT
under PD 27.
Reason: It is inequitable that just compensation should be determined
under PD 27 because just compensation is defined as the full and ample
value of the land to be given to the LO. Under PD 27, there is only one
factor in determining just compensation (average crop harvest), while in
RA6657, there are a lot.
DAR v. Heirs of Domingo
Facts: The late Angel T. Domingo is the registered owner of a rice land.
PD 27 was subsequently issued and pursuant to which actual tenant
farmers of private agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn were
deemed as full owners of the land they till. The land transfer program
under P.D. No. 27 was subsequently implemented by Executive Order
No. 228.
On April 26, 2000, Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija a complaint for determination and payment of just
compensation against the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and DAR.
Domingo opposed the said valuation and claimed that the just
compensation for the subject land should be computed using the
parameters set forth under RA 6657. The LBP and DAR disputed
Domingo's valuation and claimed that the determination of just
compensation should be governed by the provisions of P.D. No. 27 in
relation to E.O. No. 228.
Issue: Whether the method set forth under R.A. No. 6657 in the
computation of just compensation may be applied to private agricultural
lands taken by the government under the auspices of P.D. No. 27 in
relation to E.O. No. 228.
Ruling: Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform
process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private
respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic
Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO
228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v.
Alfeche.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based
on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's
failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with
RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering
that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being
real, substantial, full and ample.
LBP v. Livioco
Facts: Respondent Livioco was the owner of 3 sugar land. He offered
his sugar land to the DAR for acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per
square meter. The voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) form he submitted to the
DAR indicated that his property is adjacent to residential subdivisions
and to an international paper mill.
The DAR referred Livioco's offer to the LBP for valuation. LBP set the
price at P3.21 per square meter for 26 hectares. Livioco was then
promptly informed of the valuation. However,Livioco did not act upon the
notice given to him by both government agencies. Subsequently, LBP
issued a certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga that it has
earmarked the amount of P827,943.48 as compensation for Livioco's 26
hectares.
It was only two years later that Livioco requested for a reevaluation of
the compensation on the ground that its value had already appreciated
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from the time it was first offered for sale. The request was denied by the
Regional Director on the ground that there was already a perfected sale.
Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes
was an outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco finally filed a
petition for judicial determination of just compensation against DAR,
LBP, and the CLOA holders.
In this Petition before us, LBP assails the CA's assent to the valuation
of Livioco's property as a residential land. It maintains that it is not the
State's policy to purchase residential land. Since the property was
acquired under the CARP, it had to be valued as an agricultural land.
Issue: Was the compensation for respondent's properly determined?
Held: For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the
time of taking. There are three important concepts in this definition
the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual taking.
The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property
has changed from agricultural to residential, because there is no
allegation or proof that the property was approved for conversion to
other uses by DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate
and to approve land use conversions so as to prevent fraudulent
evasions from agrarian reform coverage.
Even reclassification and plans for expropriation by LGUs will not ipso
facto convert an agricultural property to residential, industrial or
commercial. Thus, in the absence of any DAR approval for the
conversion of respondent's property or an actual expropriation by an
LGU, it cannot be said that the character or use of said property changed
from agricultural to residential. Respondent's property remains
agricultural and should be valued as such. Hence, the CA and the trial
court had no legal basis for considering the subject property's value as
residential.
Respondent's evidence of the value of his land as residential property
could, at most, refer to the potential use of the property. While the
potential use of an expropriated property is sometimes considered in
cases where there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of the
expropriated property, it should never control the determination of just
compensation.
The potential use of a property should not be the principal criterion for
determining just compensation for this will be contrary to the well-settled
doctrine that the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, not its
potential uses. If at all, the potential use of the property or its
"adaptability for conversion in the future is a factor, not the ultimate in
determining just compensation."
It would also be contrary to the social policy of agrarian reform, which is
to free the tillers of the land from the bondage of the soil without
delivering them to the new oppression of exorbitant land valuations.
Note that in lands acquired under RA 6657, it is the farmer-beneficiaries
who will ultimately pay the valuations paid to the former land owners
(LBP merely advances the payment). If the farmer-beneficiaries are
made to pay for lands valued as residential lands (the valuation for which
is substantially higher than the valuation for agricultural lands), it is not
unlikely that such farmers, unable to keep up with payment
amortizations, will be forced to give up their landholdings in favor of the
State or be driven to sell the property to other parties. This may just bring
the State right back to the starting line where the landless remain
landless and the rich acquire more landholdings from desperate
farmers.
LBP v. Nable
Ruling: The Congress has thereby required that any determination of
just compensation should consider the following factors, namely: (a) the
cost of the acquisition of the land; (b) the current value of like properties;
(c) the nature, actual use and income of the land; (d) the sworn valuation
by the owner; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by
government assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed
to the property by the farmers and farmworkers and by the Government;
and (h) the fact of the non- payment of any taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the land.
Although Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 has not explicitly
mentioned the farming experience and the thumb method of conversion
as methods in the determination of just compensation, LBP cannot deny
that such methods were directly relevant to the factors listed in Section
17, particularly those on the nature, actual use and income of the
landholding.
LBP v. DAR
Facts: The valuation made by PARAB was rejected by the landowners.
After re-computation upon order of PARAD, a revaluated amount was
made but LOs still found it low. LOs appealed to DARAB. Pending
resolution of their appeal, Los interposed a Motion to Withdraw
Amended Valuation seeking the release to them of the amount
representing the difference between the initial value.
Ruling: There is a need to allow the landowners to withdraw immediately
the amount deposited in their behalf, pending final determination of what
is just compensation for their land.
It is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain if you do not allow
withdrawal. Also, it is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16 (e) and final compensation under
Section 18 for the purposes of exercising the landowners right to
appropriate the same. The immediate effect in other situations in the
same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his
property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
SC invalidated LBPs practice of opening trust accounts in favor of the
landowner.
In case the amount has already been deposited, even if the landowner
questions the accuracy or the validity of the amount deposited and will
thereafter file with the RTC for determination of just compensation, the
LO can withdraw the amount deposited. Part of his right to just
compensation
It should be deposited in the name of the landowner, not trust accounts
(trust accounts not expressly stated in Sec. 18)
Payment of Interest
Apo Fruits v. CA
Facts: RT rendered judgment ordering DAR/LBP to pay interest at the
rate of 12% per annum on the above-fixed amount of fair, reasonable
and just compensation computed from the time the complaint was filed
until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and
executory, the rate of 12% shall be additionally imposed on the total
obligation until payment thereof is satisfied.
Issue: Whether or not the interest was validly imposed.
Held: NO. It is true that Land Bank sought to appeal the RTC's decision
to the CA, by filing a notice of appeal; and that Land Bank filed in March
2003 its petition for certiorari in the CA only because the RTC did not
give due course to its appeal. Any intervening delay thereby entailed
could not be attributed to Land Bank, however, considering that assailing
an erroneous order before a higher court is a remedy afforded by law to
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every losing party, who cannot thus be considered to act in bad faith or
in an unreasonable manner as to make such party guilty of unjustified
delay.
The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the RTC and the Court
of Appeals does not mean that it deliberately delayed the payment of
just compensation. It may disagree with DAR and the landowner as to
the amount of just compensation to be paid to the latter and may also
disagree with them and bring the matter to court for judicial
determination. This makes LBP an indispensable party in cases
involving just compensation for lands taken under the Agrarian Reform
Program, with a right to appeal decisions in such cases that are
unfavorable to it. Having only exercised its right to appeal in this case,
LBP cannot be penalized by making it pay for interest.
Interest on the just compensation is imposed only in case of delay in the
payment thereof which must be sufficiently established. Given the
foregoing, we find that the imposition of interest on the award of just
compensation is not justified and should therefore be deleted.
LBP v. Rivera
Facts: The respondents are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land
that was placed under the coverage of PD 27. After DAR directed
payment, LBP approved the payment of P265,494 inclusive of 6%
increment.
The trial court adopted the formula prescribed in PD27 in arriving at the
amount of just compensation. Also, trial court also imposed "interest in
kind" payable from 1972 to 2002 by multiplying by 1.8 the Average Gross
Production of palay of 121.6 cavans per hectare multiplied by 2.5.
Ruling: In the determination of the interest, if it is payable in kind, its
value shall be appraised at the current price of the products or goods at
the time and place of payment.
PD 27 compared to RA 6657
1. PD 27 uses average crop harvest as a consideration. RA
6657 does not.
2. RA 657 for lands covered by PD 27 and just compensation
has not been determined at the time of passage of RA 6657
applies because PD 27 and EO 228 have suppletory effect.
Is prior recourse to DARAB necessary?
To wait for the DAR valuation despite its unreasonable neglect and delay
in processing is to violate the elementary rule that payment of just
compensation must be within a reasonable period from the taking of
property;

Consequently, the respondents instituted a civil case for determination

and payment of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court.

LBP filed its answer, stating that rice and corn lands placed under the
coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27 were governed and valued in
accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 228 and that the
administrative valuation of lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
and Executive Order No. 228 rested solely in DAR and LBP was the only
financing arm.

Ruling: The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered

to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual
and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of
the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell,
if fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if
property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with
the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interest on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and
the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in
a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before
the taking occurred.

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interest on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time
petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property
in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to
be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being
an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the
issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency
over time.

LBP v. Gallego
Facts: Respondents are co-owners of parcels of agricultural land. DAR
placed a portion of the property under the coverage of PD27. However,
teh parties failed to agree on the amount of just compensation which
prompted respondents to file a petition before the RTC for the
determination of just compensation.

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