EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 138874-75. July 21, 2005.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO

JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL BALANSAG,
DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG"; JAMES ANTHONY UY alias
"WANGWANG"; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM", accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Arroyo Chua Caedo & Coronel Law Offices for F.J. Larraaga.
Chavez Miranda Aseoche Law Offices for J. Aznar.
Eric S. Carin for James Andrew S. Uy and James Anthony S. Uy.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; FILING THEREOF DOES NOT IMPOSE AN
OBLIGATION TO DISCUSS AND RULE AGAIN ON THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE MOVANT
WHICH ARE MERE REITERATION OF THE ISSUES PREVIOUSLY RAISED AND THOROUGHLY
DETERMINED AND EVALUATED IN THE DECISION BEING QUESTIONED. At the inception, let it be
emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule
again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and
thoroughly determined and evaluated in our Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership
vs. Velasco, we ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the
reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant." The
foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and
Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric matters demanding new judicial
determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in their respective briefs which we already
considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
2.ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; OPENS THE ENTIRE RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR
REVIEW. In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the case in its entirety. The
totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, averting general
conclusions from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire records
for review.
3.ID.; EVIDENCE; PHYSICAL EVIDENCE; ONE OF THE HIGHEST DEGREES OF PROOF AND SPEAKS
MORE ELOQUENTLY THAN ALL WITNESSES PUT TOGETHER; CASE AT BAR. Appellants vigorously
contend that we should not have sustained Rusia's testimony hook, line and sinker, owing to his tainted record and
reputation. However, it must be stressed that Rusia's testimony was not viewed in isolation. In giving credence to
Rusia's testimony, the trial court took into consideration the physical evidence and the corroborative testimonies of
other witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial court's findings. We reiterate our
pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusia's testimony worthy of belief is its striking compatibility with
the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all
witnesses put together. The presence of Marijoy's ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on
her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia's testimony on what actually took place from Ayala
Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a
witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration
by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed
Jacqueline's two failed attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara
recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire on the evening of
July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene's Store while the white
van, driven by Cao, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of "quarreling male and female"
emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larraaga and
Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia's
narration. Now, with such strong anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses,
why should we not accord credence to Rusia's testimony? Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might
indeed be unworthy of belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence presented
by the prosecution.
4.ID.; ID.; ALIBI; LESS PLAUSIBLE WHEN IT IS CORROBORATED ONLY BY RELATIVES OR CLOSE
FRIENDS OF THE ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained
the trial court's rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in
the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Being evidence that is
negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
who testify on clear and positive evidence. On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense
when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused. This case presents to us a balance scale
whereby perched on one end is appellants' alibi supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or
classmates, while on the other end is the positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses
who were not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the
balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; TO PROSPER, THE REQUIREMENTS OF TIME AND PLACE MUST BE MET; CASE AT BAR.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants failed to meet the
requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place. They failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters
were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James
Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997. Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in
Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only
one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route.
One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon
and evening. Indeed, Larraaga's presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but
a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larraaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the
night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she
saw Larraaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of
Jacqueline's prior story that he was Marijoy's admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows Larraaga since she had seen
him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00
o'clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized
the two (2) men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her
office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center,
corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon,
Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was
leaning against the hood of a white van. And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified Larraaga as one of
the participes criminis. Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of Rusia, we are
convinced that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the
principal perpetrators thereof.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants (1) Francisco
Juan Larraaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James Anthony
Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them of the crimes
of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious
illegal detention, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1)In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias
'PACO;' JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias 'WESLEY;'ALBERTO CAO alias
'ALLAN PAHAK;' ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias 'MM,' are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal
injection;
(2)In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias
'PACO;' JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias 'WESLEY;'ALBERTO CAO alias
'ALLAN PAHAK;' ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias 'MM,' are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3)In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the
time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304,
he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;
(4)Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each
case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar. EcHaAC
 In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No.
7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellency's pardoning power.
SO ORDERED."
Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:
A. LARRAAGA
"I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAAGA AND THE NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM
TESTIFYING;
II
THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;
III
LARRAAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE;
V
THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY; AND
VI
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS." 1
B. AZNAR
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID RUSSIA AS STATE
WITNESS; AND (B) CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF RUSIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT
AZNAR.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE
APPELLANTS." 2
C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAO
 "I
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE WITNESS UNDER
PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E), SECTION 17 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
II
RUSIA'S TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE
INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.
III
BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY DISPLAYED BY
THE COURT A QUO WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
IV
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS NOT
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT." 3
D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY
"I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES
ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY
HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN,
CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED
THUS THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;" 4
In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004, Larraaga submitted a separate study of Dr.
Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun, Forensic Pathologist, to show that the examination conducted by the prosecution expert
witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. DcAaSI
In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration 5 , Aznar submitted to this Court the Affidavit dated February
27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas, to
show that: (1) the police investigation of this case was flawed; (2) he (Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his
involvement in this case but because he had in his possession a pack of shabu and firearms; and (3)David Rusia is
not a credible witness.
On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment 6 praying that the four (4) motions for
reconsideration be denied with finality, there being no new argument raised. He responded to appellants' assignments
of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our challenged Decision.
In his consolidated comment 7 to Aznar's supplemental motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General enumerated
the grounds why Atty. Villarin's Affidavit should not be given consideration. On February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a
reply alleging that the Solicitor General "read out of context" certain portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the
Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of his arrest, there was no
evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a rejoinder stating that Aznar's reply "actually
supports the undersigned counsel's (Solicitor General's) position that Atty. Villarin's Affidavit is utterly inadequate to
prove his innocence or at least even acquit them on reasonable doubt," thus, "it would be useless to call for new trial
on the basis of such Affidavit." On March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should be
given due consideration.
Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James Andrew's alleged minority, we find all
the motions bereft of merit.
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not impose on us the
obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration of the
issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and
Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, 8 we ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual invariably
involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the
arguments advanced by the movant."
The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and
Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric matters demanding new judicial
determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in their respective briefs which we already
considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we deem it necessary to stress once more
our basis in convicting appellants.
The following is a prcis of the issues submitted by appellants in their motions:
This Court erred
first, in according credence to Rusia's testimony;
second, in rejecting appellants' alibi;
third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process when it excluded the testimony of other
defense witnesses; and
fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy.
In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the case in its entirety. The totality of the
evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, averting general conclusions from
isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire records for review. 9
I
Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusia's testimony hook, line and sinker, owing to
his tainted record and reputation.However, it must be stressed that Rusia's testimony was not viewed in
isolation. In giving credence to Rusia's testimony, the trial court took into consideration the physical evidence and
the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial court's
findings. cCAIaD
We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusia's testimony worthy of belief is its striking
compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof. It speaks more
eloquently than all witnesses put together. 10 The presence of Marijoy's ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-
awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia's testimony on
what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of
such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish.
Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he
narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed Jacqueline's two failed attempts to escape from appellants
near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from
them where he could find a vehicle for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he
bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene's Store while the white van, driven by Cao, was waiting on the side of the
road and he heard voices of "quarreling male and female" emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao
and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larraaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997.
All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia's narration. Now, with such strong anchorage on the physical
evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusia's testimony?
Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy of belief in view of his character, it is
not so when considered with the other evidence presented by the prosecution.

II
Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial court's rejection of their alibi. Settled is the
rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 11 Being evidence that is negative in nature and self-serving, it
cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
evidence. 12 On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only
by relatives or close friends of the accused. 13
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants' alibi supported by witnesses who
were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end is the positive identification of the herein
appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above
jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter. TacADE
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants failed to meet the
requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place. 14 They failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters
were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James
Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical impossibility. During
the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are
four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from
Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraaga's presence in Cebu City on July 16,
1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larraaga as one of the
two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16,
1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she sawLarraaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of
Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of Jacqueline's prior story that he was Marijoy's admirer. Shiela confirmed
that she knows Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the
same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at
the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them
several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles,
the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In
addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about
3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van. 15 And over and above
all, Rusia categorically identified Larraaga as one of theparticipes criminis.
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of Rusia, we are convinced
that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the principal
perpetrators thereof.
At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that Larraaga was charged with or complained
of pruriently assaulting young female students in Cebu. Months before the abduction of Marijoy and Jackie, the
parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about Larraaga's attempt to snatch their young daughter and drag
her in a black, stylish Honda Civic. It happened just near the gate of Rochelle's school, thus, showing his impudence.
We quote a portion of the transcript of stenographic notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:
"ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a . . . Inspector Era handed to this representation a copy of a Letter
dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of San Carlos, P. del
Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan and Alexander Virtucio and noted
by Mrs. Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls High School, and for the
record, I will read the content:
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high school student of
your University of San Carlos-Girls High School, are writing your good office about an
untoward incident involving our daughter and another student of your school.
xxx xxx xxx
That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates, Michelle Amadar
and Keizaneth Mondejar, while on their way to get a ride home near the school
campus, a black Honda Civic with five young male teenagers including the driver,
suddenly stopped beside them, and simultaneously one of them, which was later
identified as FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school,
grabbed Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle to their vehicle. She resisted and
got away from him. Sensing some people were watching what they were doing, they
hurriedly sped away.
We are very concerned about Rochelle's safety. Still now, she is suffering the shock and
tension that she is not supposed to experience in her young life. It is very hard for us
parents to think about what she'd been through." 16
The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not enhance Larraaga's chance of securing
an acquittal.
III
Larraaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial court's exclusion of Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty.
Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses. Professor Bailen was properly excluded. First, he
is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And second, his report consists merely of the results of his visual
inspection of the exhibits already several months old. Anent Atty. Villarin's failure to testify before the trial court,
suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration
dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is a
man trying to impress people that he was the one responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a
promotion. The trial court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his intended testimony. Indeed, we
agree with the Solicitor General's observation that such Affidavit "is neither helpful nor encouraging to Aznar's
cause." We quote his keen reflection on the matter:
"xxx xxx xxx
Third. Atty. Villarin's affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof, acknowledged that the body found
in the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy. This assertion immediately conflicts with accused-
appellant Aznar's claim in his Motion for Reconsideration that the corpse was not Marijoy's. Surely,
something is amiss in accused-appellant Aznar's recollection of his defense.
 Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit that accused-appellant Francisco
Larranaga was a suspect in the subject crimes. Evidently, this statement completely supports this
Honorable Court's findings in its Decision dated February 3, 2004.
Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarin's affidavit, he stated that: 'The arrest of Juzman Aznar
was the major breakthrough in the investigation of the case because witnesses came out and
identified Juzman Aznar as one of those allegedly seen talking to the victims on the night they
disappeared.' Hence, accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a first-grade suspect in
the Chiong sisters' celebrated abduction and killing.
Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: '. . . I did not take this against
[Supt. Labra] for preempting our next move to get Juzman Aznar as we were already placing
him under surveillance because I knew [Supt. Labra] did it in his honest desire to help solve
the crime . . . .' Clearly, this statement is not an indictment of the investigation that the police
undertook in the subject crimes.
Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades against alleged influence peddling by
Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers
and police officers who unearthed the evidence against accused-appellants and successfully
prosecuted the latter. In executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin would want to
impress that he, rather than those promoted, deserved the promotion.
Eighth. Atty. Villarin's inability to testify in the criminal cases was not due solely to the
prosecution's action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an argument openly discussed in court.
Hence, for the resulting inability, Atty. Villarin has no one to blame but the defense lawyers who
did everything to make a mockery of the criminal proceedings.
And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarin's affidavit of the quality of a "smoking gun" that would
acquit accused-appellants of the crimes they have been convicted. For he did not finish the police
investigation of the subject crimes; this is the long and short of his miniscule role in the instant
case.Indeed, judging by the substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a new
trial is held on anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his own
unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his self-
congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing to get a promotion when
almost everyone else did." 17

Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortun's separate study to show that the examination conducted on the
body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence
warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larraaga could have produced it during trial had he wished to.
IV
Knowing that the prosecution's theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia' testimony, appellants endeavor to destroy it
by claiming that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We must
reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to such argument. First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, 18 a
fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse match those of Marijoy. 19 Second, the packaging tape
and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were
being detained. 20Third, the body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was
abducted. 21 And fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of
Marijoy 22 which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every
place which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment, appellants still fail to bring to the
attention of this Court any person laying a claim on the said body. Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other
families who had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would have surfaced and claimed the body. The
above circumstances only bolster Rusia's narration that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine,
following Josman's instruction "to get rid" of her.
On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years and two hundred
sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed, the records bear that on March 1, 1999, James
Andrew's birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part of theFormal Offer of Additional
Evidence, 23 with the statement that he was eighteen (18) years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants filed
a Manifestation of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence by alleging that James
Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old. 24
Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of
Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. He prays that his penalty be
reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.
The entry of James Andrew's birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is extremely difficult for us to
determine the veracity of his claim. However, considering that minority is a significant factor in the imposition of
penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato
City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrew's Birth Certificate, and
thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James
Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews' claim of minority.
Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and penalty, there being nothing in his motion
which warrants a reconsideration of our Decision. STIcaE
In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of evaluating every piece and specie of
evidence presented before the trial court in response to appellants' plea for the reversal of their conviction. But, even
the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent
ratiocination of their submissions. Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our affirmance of the verdict of the trial
court, in light of appellants' clear culpability which demands retribution.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen
Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED (a) to secure
from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of
James Andrew's Birth Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file an extensive comment on the
motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews' claim of
minority. The motion is likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned. IScaAE
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Nazarioand Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., took no part. Victims related to Mrs. Davide.
Azcuna, took no part. Former partner of counsel.
||| (People v. Larraaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, [July 21, 2005], 502 PHIL 231-249)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125688. April 3, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IGNACIO CUPINO, 1 VINCENT

DEJORAS and RAMON GALOS a.k.a. Jun, accused, IGNACIO CUPINO and VINCENT
DEJORAS, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Cesilo A. Adaza for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Gromyko Valiente had an altercation with accused Galos and a fistfight ensued when appellant Cupino and Dejoras
arrived. Outnumbered, Valiente ran and was pursued. The deceased was stabbed twice by Galos when his attention
was diverted. The bolo left embedded in Valiente's stomach was pulled out by Cupino. Appellant Dejoras tried to
grab the bolo but unfortunately took hold of the blade cutting his hand. He then let go and run. Thereafter, Cupino
stabbed the wounded victim. No witness for the prosecution testified as to the participation of Dejoras in the assault
except that Dejoras joined Galos and Cupino when they approached the victim and he later tried to prevent Cupino
from stabbing the victim. Nonetheless, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused, who acted in
conspiracy, guilty of murder. Hence, this appeal.
The trial court's finding on the presence of conspiracy and guilt of the two accused are binding on appeal in the
absence of material inconsistency in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses identifying Galos and Cupino as the
assailants of the deceased. However, the act of Dejoras in trying to prevent Cupino from stabbing the victim clearly
showed that he did not support the criminal intent and conspiracy of the other two accused. TECIaH
Treachery is not necessarily precluded by either the occurrence of a tussle before the victim was killed or by the
frontal nature of the attack. Appellant Cupino was found guilty of murder but appellant Dejoras was acquitted.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TRIAL COURT'S ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES,

BINDING ON THIS COURT. As we have repeatedly said, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is generally binding upon us. After a thorough review of the records before us, we find no reason to
disagree with the trial court in finding no material inconsistency in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; MANIFEST IN COMMON INTENT TO KILL VICTIM; CASE AT BAR.
The above testimony clearly demonstrates the conspiracy between Ramon Galos and Appellant Ignacio Cupino.
Both of them showed their common intent to kill Valliente. On the part of Galos, conspiracy was shown by his act of
grabbing the fleeing victim, simultaneously drawing his small bolo or pisaw, and stabbing the latter twice. By
running after the wounded victim, Cupino showed unity of purpose with Galos. When he eventually caught up with
the victim, Cupino pulled out the bolo that was embedded in the body of the latter and used it to stab him again.
Clearly, by the consonance of their deeds, both assailants conspired to kill Valliente.
3. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; MANIFEST IN DIVERTING ATTENTION OF
VICTIM TO MAKE SURE HE COULD NOT DEFEND HIMSELF. We agree with the court a quo that
treachery qualified the slaying to murder. By diverting the attention of Valliente to the approaching Dejoras and
Cupino, Galos was obviously making sure that the victim could not defend himself. When Valliente turned his back,
Galos began his attack, which eventually led to the stabbing of the former. Treachery was not necessarily precluded
by either the occurrence of a tussle before the victim was killed or by the frontal nature of the attack.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSORBS SUPERIOR STRENGTH IN CASE AT BAR. We also agree with the lower court
that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed by alevosia.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; MUST BE ESTABLISHED AS CLEARLY AS ANY ELEMENT OF THE
CRIME. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is
not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability
under specific circumstances. As such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of
evidence to be satisfied is, we repeat, beyond reasonable doubt.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPRECIATED WHERE APPELLANT TRIED TO PREVENT CO-ACCUSED FROM
STABBING VICTIM. The prosecution failed, however, to show what Dejoras specifically did that proved his
participation in the conspiracy. Rather, what the said eyewitness said was that Dejoras tried to prevent Cupino from
stabbing the victim, clearly showing that he did not support the criminal intent and conspiracy of the other two
accused. These incontrovertible data lead to one conclusion: there is reasonable doubt on whether Dejoras conspired
with Galos and Cupino in killing Valliente. We are therefore constrained to exonerate him. Indeed, guilt must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, there is reasonable doubt on the culpability of Appellant Dejoras as a
principal.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; LIABILITY AS ACCOMPLICE NEGATED BY ABSENCE OF COMMUNITY
OF DESIGN. The acts of Appellant Dejoras showed that he was not aware of his companions' intent to kill
Valliente; at the very least, there is reasonable doubt as to his knowledge thereof. In any event, community of design,
the first of the requisite elements that must be present before a person may be held liable as an accomplice, is
lacking.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

Conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present appeal, the prosecution eyewitness
testified that one of the appellants had joined the other accused in approaching the victim, but subsequently tried to
prevent them from stabbing this same victim. Such dubious participation is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the said appellant conspired with the others in committing the offense. Accordingly, the constitutional
presumption of innocence must be upheld. He must be acquitted. LLphil
The Case
Vincent Dejoras and Ignacio Cupino 2 appeal the March 6, 1995 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City (Branch 25). Dejoras and Cupino, together with one Ramon Galos, 4 were convicted of
robbery with murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
On October 19, 1989, an Information 5 was filed by Fourth Assistant City Fiscal Petronio P. Pilien, charging the
three as follows:
 "That on or about August 16, 1989, at more or less 9:45 in the evening . . ., at Patag Crossing,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill[;] armed with a knife [with] which one of them was then conveniently provided[;] with
treachery, evident premeditation, superior strength, did then and ther[e] wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously [through] accused (Ramon Galos alias Jun), [stab] one Gromyco 6 Valliente 7 [hitting
him] at the left/right portion of his arm and abdomen, thus inflicting mortal wounds upon [the]
offended party's person which directly caused his instantaneous death.
"Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code."
Arraigned on January 22, 1990, 8 both appellants entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. Thereafter, the lower
court rendered its assailed Decision, 9the dispositive part of which we quote thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds all the three accused in conspiracy with each
other, GUILTY beyon[d] reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery as
principal by direct participation as punished under the Revised Penal Code. This Court hereby
sentences the two accused, Vincent Dejoras and Ignacio Copino, the third accused being at large, to
individually suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUAwithout the attendance of any mitigating
circumstance and to jointly and severally pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00 for the death of Gromyko Valliente, P40,000.00 as actual damages and burial expenses,
P20,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs." 10
In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal was filed directly with this Court. 11
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, 12 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
"At around 9:45 in the evening of August 16, 1989, during the celebration of the town fiesta of
Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, accused Ramon Galos and Gromyko Valiente (herein victim) were
having a heated argument in front of Dod's Store, which was owned by a certain Piloton, located at
the crossing of Patag (testimony of Silverio Bahian, TSN, September 6, 1990, pp. 4-5; Testimony of
Ferdinand Bangayan, TSN, July 2, 1990, pp. 5-6).
"Then, appellants Ignacio Cupino and Vincent Dejoras arrived, and a fistfight erupted. Cupino,
Dejoras and Galos ganged up on Valiente who also fought back (Testimony of Silverio Bahian at
pp. 6-7, supra; Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan at p. 7, supra.). Beaten and outnumbered,
Valiente ran away towards the direction of a small pathway leading to the store of a certain Major
Grio, which was beside Dod's Store. The trio chased . . . him (Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan at
p. 10, id.). Galos caught up with Valiente and then stabbed him twice in the stomach with a small
bolo (Testimony of Silverio Bahian at pp. 9-10, supra.).
"With the bolo still embedded on his stomach, Valiente crawled along the pathway. Cupino also
caught up with Valiente (pp. 11-12, id.). Then Cupino pulled the bolo from the victim's body and
was about to stab the victim again when Dejoras tried to grab Cupino's hands, but instead Dejoras
got hold of the blade of the bolo and was injured in the process. Dejoras left, coming out of the
pathway with his wounded right hand (pp. 12-13, id.).

"Meanwhile, Cupino proceeded to stab the victim twice in the stomach. Afterward, Cupino and
Galos fled from the scene of the crime (p. 14, id.). Valiente, who was seriously wounded and soaked
 in his own blood, cried for help. He was brought to a hospital but later died (p. 19, id.; Testimony of
Ferdinand Bangayan at pp. 12-13, supra.). cdtai
"The autopsy conducted on the victim's body revealed that he sustained four (4) stab wounds: one
on the left subpostal margin, another wound on the right subpostal margin, and two (2) sutured
wounds on the left cocital area. The wound that was inflicted on the pancreas of the victim was
considered fatal since it caused the massive hemorrhage. The cause of death was attributed to
massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds (Testimony of Dr. Apolinar
Vacalares, TSN, February 13, 1991, pp. 6-7)." 13
Version of the Defense
For their part, appellants submit the following as the facts of the case:
"On August 16, 1999, Ignacio Copino celebrated the town fiesta of Patag, Cagayan de Oro City at
home with his family and friends, one of whom was Vincent Dejoras. After eating dinner at around
7:00 p.m., Dejoras, together with his co-workers, headed for home. Copino decided to accompany
the group and at the Patag crossing, he was able to convince Dejoras to go to the 'perya' and gamble,
as he had P30 with him.
"The pair lost all of the P30 in the 'pula-puti' game and decided to call it quits. On their way home,
they saw Ramon Galos 'alias Panit' and Grom[yk]o Valiente 'alyas Bobong', two of their
acquaintances, apparently having an altercation.
"They were about two meters from Galos and Valiente when Galos suddenly said: 'Nasi is here
(referring to Copino), you hit him.' (Transcript of Stenographic Notes, VINCENT DEJORAS,
Hearing April 4, 1991, page 7). Galos then kicked Valiente and the latter fell down. Valiente was
able to get up and run towards an alley at the back of Dod's store with Galos in close pursuit.
Copino and Dejoras ran after the two with the intention to pacify the fighters. Galos was able to
corner Valiente and once again, the two traded blows. When Copino and Dejoras were finally able
to catch up with the two, they noticed that Valiente was already bleeding. Eyewitness Silverio
Bahian later recounted that he saw Panit pull out a bolo and stab Bobong.
"Dejoras, on his part, tried to stop Galos from inflicting more wounds and he too was wounded in
the process. What happened was that instead of holding Galos' hand, he was able to hold the blade
of the knife, thereby injuring himself. Galos then ran away. Upon the realization that his right hand
was bloodied, and fearing that more harm would fall upon them, Copino and Dejoras too ran away.
"Dejoras went to City Hospital to have his wound treated and then they went home. At midnight of
the same day, a policeman went to his house and brought him to the OKK Police Station where he
was booked into the police blotter. The following day, Copino and Dejoras learned that Gromyko
Valiente had died. Together with their parents the[y] went to the Tourism Hall to have their
statements taken by the police." 14
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that (1) appellants were guilty of murder, as the killing was qualified by treachery; (2)
conspiracy was proven by the chain of circumstantial evidence submitted; and (3) the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength was absorbed by treachery and may no longer be used to increase the penalty to its maximum
period.
The Issues
Appellants aver that the court a quo committed the following errors:
 "I. In failing to appreciate the testimony of accused-appellants and in giving full weight and credit
to the version of prosecution witnesses.
II. In holding that there was conspiracy between accused-appellants.
III. In holding that accused-appellants herein [were] guilty as charged." 15
We shall discuss the foregoing issues in the following sequence: (1) credibility of the prosecution evidence, (2)
conspiracy and (3) proper penalty.
The Court's Ruling
This appeal is partly meritorious. We affirm the challenged Decision in regard to Ignacio Cupino, but reverse it in
regard to Vincent Dejoras.
First Issue
Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellants challenge the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. They argue that there
are contradictions patent in their testimonies. We disagree. As we have repeatedly said, the trial court's assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is generally binding upon us. 16After a thorough review of the records before us, we find
no reason to disagree with the trial court in finding no material inconsistency in the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies.
Neither are we impressed with appellants' assertion that the evidence for the prosecution is weak. The claims of the
defense are belied by the clear, credible and straightforward testimony of Prosecution Eyewitness Silverio Bahian,
which we quote:
"Q At this time, August 16, 1989, at more or less 9:45 p.m., what particular place in the store of
Piloton?
A [In front] of the store.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What where you doing there?
A I was reading komiks.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were there at Piloton store, reading komiks, what happened if any?
A There was an argument between Bobong Valiente 17 and Panit. 18
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said that there was an argument, where did this altercation [take] place?
A [In front] of me.
Q How far away from you? From where you are sitting, point to any object within the court room to
indicate what you [meant by "in front"] of you?
A Less than a meter.
Q From where you are sitting, point to any object[.]
A This chair. This table or this chair I am sitting on. [In front] of me. Just very near me.
Q From what direction was this Bobong coming . . .?
A Going to the checkpoint.
Q What about the other person [with] whom he had an altercation?
A Going to the crossing.
Q What happened after they had an altercation?
A After their altercation, this Nasi 19 and Beni 20 were walking from the road.
Q Who is this Nasi?
A Nasi Copino.
Q Who is this Beni?
A Dejoras.
Q When these two came, Beni and Nasi, where were the two who were having an argument?
A Mr. Bahian approached the two who were having an altercation.
Q What about the person [with] whom he had an altercation? Where was he at that time?
A He followed him.
Q So, what happened after Bobong went to Nasi and Beni and the other person Panit?
A They ganged up [on] Bobong.
Q When you said they ganged up on Bobong, to whom are you referring . . .?
A Panit, Nasi and Beni.
Q From your place in relation to the place where they ganged up on Bobong, how far away was
that?
A About three meters. LLpr
xxx xxx xxx
Q Where [was] this place in relation to you whe[n] they ganged up on Bobong?
A In the middle of the road.
Q And what was the condition of the road on that night of August 16, 1989 at 9:45 p.m.?
A It was bright.
Q Why do you say that it [was] 'hayag'?
A Because there was a lamppost.
Q Where [was] this lamppost located in relation to you?
A [In front] of me.
Q So, what happened after they ganged up . . . this Nasi, Beni and Panit, as you said, they ganged up
on Bobong? What happened?
A Since Bobong [could] not keep up a fight with the three, Bobong ran towards me.
Q What happened after Bobong ran towards you as you said?
A He was being held by Panit.
Q Will you demonstrate how he was h[e]ld by Panit?
A (Witness demonstrating by stretching his left arm and closing hi[s] fist and twisting it to his left
side)
Q So, what happened after that? After he was held up and as you said twisted?
A Panit stabbed Bobong.
Q Will you please demonstrate again how Panit stabbed Bobong after he held him and[,] pulling
him[,] he thrust the knife forward?
A (Witness demonstrating his right arm forward)
Q How many times was he stabbed by Panit? This Bobong?
A I think twice.
Q And where was this Bobong hit if he was hit?
A In the stomach.
Q What was used in the stabbing of Bobong by Panit?
A A small bolo.
Q Will you please describe the small bolo or what appears to be a bolo to you? How long was this?
A About 12 inches including the handle.
Q What about the blade? Was this double bladed or not?
A Single bladed.
xxx xxx xxx
ACP CABALLERO, JR.: (resuming)
Q Now, what happened after Bobong was held up by this Panit and stabbed twice as you said? What
happened to Bobong?
A Bobong crawled going to a small alley.
Q You mentioned this alley. Now, from where you are situated then while reading komiks [on] this
alley, how far was this from you?
A Just here.
(Witness stretching his left arm going to his left side)
Q What happened to the small bolo which was used in the stabbing? Do you know where was it at
the time Bobong crawled?
A The small bolo was still embedded on the left portion just below the breast, solar plexus.
Q So, what happened after Bobong crawled[;] who was going to the area which you testified was
just near you?
A Nasi caught up with him.
Q You mentioned, of course, . . . Nasi. Nasi who?
A Copino.
Q What happened after he was overtaken by Nasi Copino?
A Nasi pulled the small bolo.
Q What happened next after Nasi pulled the small bolo?
A When he was about to thrust the small bolo to the body of Bobong, his friend held his hand.
Q Who [was] this companion of Nasi that you are referring to who held up his hand?
A Beni.
Q Do you know the real name of Beni?
A It is only his nickname that I know
Q Beni what?
A Dejoras.
Q What happened after the hand of Nasi was held up by Beni?
A It was the small bolo which was held by Beni.
Q Which part of the knife was held by Beni Dejoras?
A The blade.
Q So, what happened after he held the blade?
A Nasi pulled the small bolo, and that [was] why Beni was wounded.

Q What happened after Beni was injured?

A Beni went out.
Q And where was Nasi then at this time when Beni, as you said, went out?
A Nasi was still [in front] of Bobong.
Q Was he motionless [in front] of Bobong or what?
A He continued to stab Bobong.
Q Where was Bobong hit when he was stabbed by Nasi?
A At first, he was able to parry the thrust of Nasi.
Q So, what happened to Bobong after he parried the stab of Nasi?
A Bobong fell down.
Q What happened after that?
A Nasi again stabbed Bobong.
Q And where was Bobong hit at this particular time?
 A In the stomach.
Q So, what happened after that?
A Nasi ran away." 21
The above testimony clearly demonstrates the conspiracy between Ramon Galos and Appellant Ignacio Cupino.
Both of them showed their common intent to kill Valliente. On the part of Galos, conspiracy was shown by his act of
grabbing the fleeing victim, simultaneously drawing his small bolo orpisaw, and stabbing the latter twice. By
running after the wounded victim, Cupino showed unity of purpose with Galos. When he eventually caught up with
the victim, Cupino pulled out the bolo that was embedded in the body of the latter and used it to stab him again.
Clearly, by the consonance of their deeds, both assailants conspired to kill Valliente. 22
We agree with the court a quo that treachery qualified the slaying to murder. By diverting the attention of Valliente
to the approaching Dejoras and Cupino, Galos was obviously making sure that the victim could not defend himself.
When Valliente turned his back, Galos began his attack, which eventually led to the stabbing of the former.
Treachery was not necessarily precluded by either the occurrence of a tussle before the victim was killed23 or by the
frontal nature of the attack. 24 We also agree with the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength was absorbed by alevosia. 25
Second Issue
Conspiracy; Dejora's Liability
Though we uphold the findings of the trial court with regard to Appellant Cupino, we differ with its conclusion that
Appellant Dejoras was guilty.
It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. 26 Conspiracy is not a
harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under
specific circumstances. 27 As such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of
evidence to be satisfied is, we repeat, beyond reasonable doubt. 28
In People v. Elijorde, 29 a case with similar facts, we said:
"Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty
that he is guilty of murder. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through
clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the
malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among
them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases,
complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e.,acts which yielded the reasonable
inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in
every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof
do reasonably yield that inference." (Footnotes omitted)
Thus, in Elijorde we found one of the accused, a certain Punzalan, innocent under the circumstances. 30 Similarly, in
the present case, we find Appellant Vincent Dejoras not guilty.
Unlike the trial court, we are quite mindful of the testimony of Prosecution Eyewitness Bahian regarding Appellant
Dejoras' participation in that bloody incident on the eve of the fiesta. His answers to the propounded questions
merely established that Dejoras joined Galos and Cupino when they approached the victim. The prosecution failed,
however, to show what Dejoras specifically did that proved his participation in the conspiracy. Rather, what the said
eyewitness said was that Dejoras tried to prevent Cupino from stabbing the victim, clearly showing that he did not
support the criminal intent and conspiracy of the other two accused. 31 These incontrovertible data lead to one
conclusion: there is reasonable doubt on whether Dejoras conspired with Galos and Cupino in killing Valliente. We
are therefore constrained to exonerate him. Indeed, guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, there
is reasonable doubt on the culpability of Appellant Dejoras as a principal.
Dejoras cannot be held liable as an accomplice, either. 32 In Elijorde, 33 we said:
"The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which
cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore
required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice
that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation."
The acts of Appellant Dejoras showed that he was not aware of his companions' intent to kill Valliente; at the very
least, there is reasonable doubt as to his knowledge thereof. In any event, community of design, the first of the
requisite elements that must be present before a person may be held liable as an accomplice, is lacking. 34
On the prosecution's theory that Dejoras may have inflicted injury on the victim when he joined in the fray, we have
combed the records and found no basis for this speculation. We note that the eyewitness could not recount the details
of the brawl, but merely provided a general picture, saying that everything happened so fast. 35 Hence, we find no
basis for Appellant Dejoras' liability even for physical injuries. 36
Additional Questions
Penalty and Damages
When the crime was committed, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal (maximum) to death. 37 Since no
generic modifying circumstance was proven, the trial court correctly sentenced Cupino to reclusion perpetua. 38
We increase to P50,000 the award for moral damages, in consonance with current jurisprudence. 39 The facts
showing moral damages were proven during the trial. However, the established actual damages amount to only
P30,000, not P40,000 as found by the lower court. 40 The award of P50,000 civil indemnity for the death of
Gromyko Valliente is affirmed. 41
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Decision insofar as it found Appellant Ignacio Cupino GUILTY of
MURDER and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Appellant Cupino is solely responsible for paying the heirs of
the victim, Gromyko Valliente, the amounts of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, P30,000 as actual damages and
P50,000 as moral damages. Appellant Vincent Dejoras is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from custody
IMMEDIATELY, unless he is being legally held for another cause. In this regard, the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report his compliance, within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Costs against Appellant
Cupino. LibLex
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Cupino, G.R. No. 125688, [April 3, 2000], 386 PHIL 23-40)
 EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 148145-46. July 5, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and

ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA, appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

On automatic appeal 1 before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch
50, finding appellants Felix Ventura(Ventura) and Arante Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 and Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693.
The accusatory portion of the Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and acting in
concert, without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber Home-made Revolver
and Arante V. Flores armed with a bladed weapon, and by taking advantage of their superior
strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with
bladed weapon one Aileen Bocateja y Peruelo, thereby inflicting upon the person of the latter the
following wounds, to wit:
- Cardio respiratory arrest
- Hemothorax
- stab wounds
which wounds were the direct and immediate cause of the death of said victim, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the latter.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time and with
the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
The accusatory portion of the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping each other, without any justifiable cause or motive, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a
.38 Caliber Homemade Revolver and Arante Flores y Ventura armed with a bladed weapon, with
intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with said bladed
weapon one Jaime Bocateja, thereby causing upon of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
 - multiple stab wounds
- #1 Posterior axillary area right
- #2 Posterior axillary area left with minimal hemothorax
- lacerated wound right parietal area
OPERATION PERFORMED:
- Exploration of wound right parietal for removal of foreign body
thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or accident
independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance,
which saved the life of the victim and the victim was able to escape.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time, and with
the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
When arraigned, appellants pleaded not guilty to both charges. 4 The two criminal cases were consolidated following
which they were jointly tried. 5
The spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were, in the early hours of February 23, 2000, fast asleep in their room on
the ground floor of their two-storey house at Alunan-Yulo in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. The room had a glass
wall with a glass sliding door which was closed but not locked. The kitchen light was open, as was the light in the
adjoining room where the couple's young children, Jummylin and Janine, were sleeping. Their niece, Aireen
Bocateja, and Jaime's elder daughter, Rizza Mae, were asleep in their rooms on the second floor. 6
At around 2:00 a.m., 7 Jaime was roused from his sleep by appellant Ventura who, together with his nephew
appellant Flores, had stealthily entered the couple's room after they gained entry into the house by cutting a hole in
the kitchen door.
As established by the testimonial and object evidence for the prosecution, the following transpired thereafter:
Appellant Ventura pointed a revolver at Jaime's face, announced a hold-up, hit Jaime on the head with the gun and
asked him for his keys. 8
When appellant Ventura struck him again, Jaime called out for help and tried to grab the revolver. The two men then
struggled for possession of the gun. As Jaime almost succeeded in wresting possession of the gun from him,
appellant Flores shouted to appellant Ventura to stab Jaime. Using the knife he was carrying, appellant Flores
stabbed Jaime three times. Jaime thereupon released the gun, threw a nearby plastic stool at the jalousy glass window
causing it to break and cried out for help. 9
In the meantime, Aileen who had been awakened, began shouting for help as she saw her husband in mortal danger.
Appellant Flores stabbed her, however, with his knife, and although Aileen tried to defend herself with an electric
cord, appellant Flores continued stabbing her. 10
Awakened by the commotion, Aireen descended the stairs and saw the knife wielding appellant Flores whom she
recognized as a former employee of the butcher shop of the Bocataje spouses. Pleading with appellant Flores not to
harm her, Aireen ran back upstairs into Rizza Mae's room, and the two called to their neighbors for help. 11
Appellants Ventura and Flores thereupon fled the Bocateja house, 12 bringing nothing with them. 13
Soon members of the Central Investigation Unit (CIU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) arrived in response to
a flash report. 14 Some of the police officers took the spouses to the Western Visayas Regional Hospital, 15 while
other elements of the CIU team intercepted appellants Ventura and Flores who were being pursued by neighbors of
the spouses at the corner of Araneta-Yulo. Recovered from appellant Ventura was a .38 caliber revolver with five (5)
live bullets, and from appellant Flores a blood stained knife 16 measuring 14 inches from tip to handle with a 10-
inch blade. 17
Shortly after their arrest, appellants were interviewed by reporters from Bombo Radio to whom they admitted
responsibility for stabbing Jaime and Aileen. In response to questions from the reporters,
appellant Ventura explained that he suspected his wife was carrying on an affair with Jaime. 18
In the ocular inspection of the Bocateja residence, the CIU team found the spouses' room in disarray, with some
cabinets opened and blood splattered all over the floor, the bed and the ceiling. 19
Aileen eventually died in the hospital on the same day of the commission of the crime. 20 Dr. Luis Gamboa, City
Health Officer of Bacolod City who conducted the autopsy of her body, found that she suffered a hack wound on her
face and four stab wounds on her body, three at the chest and one at the back of the right shoulder, all caused by a
sharp bladed instrument, such as the knife recovered from appellant Flores. One of the stab wounds penetrated
Aileen's chest near the left nipple, the intercoastal space and the middle of her right lung causing internal hemorrhage
and ultimately resulting in her death. 21
Jaime who was hospitalized for a total of six days, was treated by Dr. Jose Jocson, 22 who certified that he sustained
the following non-lethal injuries: 23
MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS
#1 POSTERIOR AXILLARY AREA RIGHT
#2 POSTERIOR AXILLARY AREA LEFT WITH MINIMAL HEMOTHORAX
LACERATED WOUND RIGHT PARIETAL AREA 24
From the evidence for the defense consisting of the testimonies of appellants Ventura and Flores and Primitiva
Empirado, the following version is culled:
Four days after February 13, 2000 when appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental from Manila where he had
been working as a security guard,25 he noticed that his wife, Johanna, who had previously been employed as a house
helper of the Bocateja spouses, was wearing a new ring. When he confronted her, she said that it came from Jaime
who was courting her, and that it was because Jaime's wife, Aileen, had discovered their illicit relationship that she
had been dismissed from the Bocateja household. Incensed at the revelation, he slapped his wife whereupon she left
the conjugal home. 26
On February 22, 2000, Johanna returned to the conjugal home in Barangay Alegria, Municipality of Murcia, Negros
Occidental to get her things. After a verbal confrontation with her husband, she left to find work in Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental. This was the last time that Johanna and appellantVentura saw each other. 27
That same day, appellant Flores visited his uncle-appellant Ventura. The two spoke at length and appellant Flores,
who had previously worked for a day at the meat shop of the Bocateja spouses, confirmed that Johanna and Jaime
were having an affair. 28
Since appellant Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant Ventura asked him to go with him to their
residence so he could confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna. 29
Appellants, armed with an unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the Bocateja residence still on the same
day, February 22, 2000, arriving there at around 11:00 p.m. They were not able to immediately enter the premises,
however. After boring a hole through the kitchen door with the knife, appellants entered the Bocateja residence at
2:00 a.m. of the next day, February 23, 2000. 30
Once inside, appellants entered the room of the Bocateja spouses through the unlocked sliding door.
Appellant Ventura woke Jaime up, confronted him and told him to stop his relationship with Johanna. Jaime fought
back, and he and appellant Ventura grappled for possession of the latter's gun. 31

Soon after, Aileen woke up, screamed for help, and began throwing things at appellant Flores whom she attempted to
strangle with an electrical extension cord. Unable to breathe, appellant Ventura stabbed Aileen twice with his knife.
And seeing that Jaime had wrested control of the gun from appellant Ventura, appellant Flores also stabbed
Jaime. 32
Since appellants had not intended to kill Aileen or stab Jaime, they fled in the course of which Jaime began shooting
at them with a 9 mm pistol. Appellants were eventually intercepted by policemen who placed them under arrest. 33
Interviewed by the media after his arrest, appellant Ventura stressed that he just wanted to confront Jaime about the
latter's relationship with appellant's wife, Johanna. 34
By the appealed Decision of December 15, 2000, the trial court disposed as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and
ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principals by Direct
Participation of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-
20693 with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling, nighttime and the
breaking of door to gain entrance to the house and with no mitigating circumstance. Accordingly,
they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, they shall serve a prison term of from Eight (8) years of Prision
Mayor as Minimum to Eighteen (18) years of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum.
The Court also finds the two (2) above-named accused GUILTY as Principal[s] by Direct
participation for the crime of Murder as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-20692 qualified by
abuse of superior strength. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and by the
breaking of a door are present in the commission of the crime. There is no mitigating circumstance.
The accused, therefore, are meted the Supreme penalty of DEATH.
By way of civil liability, the accused are solidarily ordered to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocoteja the
sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The accused are likewise held solidarily liable to pay Jaime
Bocateja the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
In their Brief, 36 appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) in convicting them despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) in considering abuse of superior strength as a
qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20892; (3) in considering evident premeditation as a qualifying
circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20893; and (4) in considering the aggravating circumstances of breaking of
door and nocturnity in both cases. 37
Appellants argue that, at most, they can only be convicted of attempted homicide for the stabbing of Jaime and
homicide for the fatal stabbing of Aileen. 38
From a considered review of the records and applicable jurisprudence, the instant appeal fails.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment. 39 For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination;
and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
circumstances of his act. 40
By appellants' argument, even if appellant Ventura became jealous when he learned of the illicit affair between his
wife and Jaime, it is not, by itself, sufficient proof that he determined to kill the latter; that with Jaime's testimony
that appellant had announced a "hold-up," they, at most, intended to rob, but not kill the spouses; that their only
purpose was to confront Jaime regarding his supposed affair with appellant Ventura's wife, Johanna; and that if they
had truly intended to kill Jaime, then appellant Ventura would not have bothered to awaken him, but would just have
shot him in his sleep.
These assertions run counter to the established facts and are debunked by appellants' own admissions.
Appellants admittedly arrived at the Bocateja residence at 11:00 p.m. and surreptitiously entered therein at 2:00 a.m.
At that time, the surrounding premises were decidedly dark, and all the members of the household were fast asleep.
Armed with a gun and a knife, they proceeded directly to the bedroom of the spouses, where appellant Ventura woke
up Jaime. These actuations are not of those seeking parley, but instead betray an unmistakable intention to kill, not
merely confront, Jaime.
Indeed, when pressed during cross-examination to explain why he chose to "confront" Jaime under the foregoing
circumstances, appellant Venturabecame evasive and did not give a clear answer:
Q Mr. Witness, you said that your purpose in going to the house of Jaime was only to confront him.
My question is, why is it that you went there at 11:00 o'clock in the evening and not in the
morning so that you will have all the opportunity to confront him?
A Because at that time, I was not on my proper frame of mind.
Q Why, is it not a fact that as early as February 17, 2000, you were already told by your wife that
there was that relationship with Jaime Bocateja and your wife?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did you not immediately confront Mr. Bocateja after that day or February 17?
WITNESS:
A On that day, I don't know Jaime Bocateja.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q On February 22. So that you did not ask your wife where the place of Jaime Bocateja was at that
time you were by him on February 22, 2000?
A Johanna did not tell me the place of Jaime Bocateja.
Q Why did you not ask her where the house is, at that time?
A What she told me was that, she is working in Bacolod City.
Q Mr. Witness, you had from February 17 to 22, a number of days to confront Mr. Jaime
Bocateja. Did you not confront your wife or perhaps ask her about the place or where this
Jaime Bocateja was at that time and have the intention to confront him, if that was really
your intention to confront him?
 WITNESS:
A No, I did not ask her because we had a confrontation and the next day, February 17, she left.
Q Of course, when you arrived at the house of the Bocateja [spouses] at 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, you were armed at that time, is that right, you and your companion, Arante Flores?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that weapon at that time?
A .38 caliber revolver.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Mr. Witness, if your intention was only to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja, why is it that you did not
wait or you did not come to that place earlier so that at that time, Jaime Bocateja was still
awake or perhaps waited until the next day?
COURT:
Already answered. He said that he was not at the proper frame of his mind. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
Cross-examined on the same point, appellant Flores was equally evasive, but eventually revealed that the timing and
method of entry were purposely chosen to avoid detection by either the Bocateja family or their neighbors:
Q You arrived in the house of Bocateja at about 11:00 o'clock is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And your purpose in going to the house of Bocateja was only to confront Jaime Bocateja about
his relationship with Johanna is that right?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Why did you wait Mr. Witness why did you and the other accused Felix Ventura wait for three
(3) hours for you to confront him in his house?
WITNESS:
A Because we were not able to enter the door right away because the door could not be
opened. ATHCac
Q My question Mr. Witness, is this you ate your supper at Libertad market at about 8:00 o'clock
why did you not go to the house of Jaime Bocateja at 9:00 o'clock immediately after supper?
At that time when the members of the family were yet awake?
A We stayed at Burgos market and then from Burgos to Libertad we only walk and from Libertad to
the house of Bocateja.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q You will admit Mr. Witness at the time you left your place at Brgy. Alegria you were already
armed, is that right?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Your uncle Felix Ventura was armed with [a] .38 caliber revolver, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were also armed with a bladed weapon is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you have to bring this weapon Mr. Witness?
A We brought this weapon just to frighten Jaime Bocateja during [the] confrontation.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Are you saying Mr. Witness if your purpose was only to confront him you have to bring this [sic]
weapons?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime Bocateja about 11:00 o'clock . . . by the way when did
you arrive at the house of Jaime Bocateja?
A 11:00 in the evening.
Q Of course you did not anymore knock at the door Mr. Witness?
A No, sir.
Q Or you did not also call any member of the family to open [the door for] you, is that right?
WITNESS:
A No, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q As a matter of fact you only broke the gate Mr. Witness in order to enter the compound of the
Bocateja family?
A We scaled over the gate.
Q And why do you have Mr. Witness to go over the fence and open a hole at the kitchen for you to
confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja if that was your purpose?
A The purpose of my uncle was just to confront Jaime.
Q And when you confront, are you saying that you cannot any more knock at the door, perhaps call
any member of the family inside the house?
WITNESS:
A No, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Why Mr. Witness, Why?
 A We did not call or knock at the person inside the house because it will make noise or calls and
alarm to the neighbors. 42 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
To be sure, all the elements of evident premeditation were clearly established from the lips of appellants themselves.
Thus, on clarificatory questioning by the trial court, appellant Ventura testified:

COURT:
Q I recall that you left Murcia [at] 4:00 o'clock. Is that morning or afternoon?
A I left Murcia at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Q 4 :00 o'clock from Alegria then to Alangilan, then to Bacolod, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From Alangilan to Bacolod, what mode of transportation did you make?
A From Alegria to Alangilan, we only hiked and then from Alangilan to Bacolod we took the
passenger jeepney.
Q From Alegria to Alangilan, how long did it take you to walk? How many kilometers?
A Four (4) kilometers.
Q And, I assume that while you were walking, you were talking with Arante Flores, your nephew,
about the plans to go to the house of Jaime Bocateja?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q By the way, what did you do at Alangilan?
A I went there because my clothes were at my sister's house.
Q So, what time did you arrive in [Bacolod]?
A We arrived here in [Bacolod] late in the evening.
Q I assume that you disembarked at Burgos Market?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you just walked from Burgos Market to Libertad Baybay to the house of Jaime Bocateja?
A Yes, sir.
Q It took you about thirty (30) [minutes] to one (1) hour, more or less?
A More than one (1) hour.
Q And during this time, you were talking again with Arante Flores [about] the course of action that
you will take once a confrontation takes place with Jaime Bocateja?
WITNESS:
A Yes, I asked him the location of 3rd Road since I do not know the house of Jaime Bocateja.
COURT:
 Q I assume that the front main door of the house was close[d] at that time, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You scaled that door, the front main door of the gate?
A Yes, sir, we scaled the gate.
Q You were not able to open it but you simply scaled, you went over?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said yet, you destroyed the main door of the house. Can you tell the Court, how did you
destroy the main door of the house?
A No, the kitchen door, sir.
COURT:
Q How were you able to destroy it?
WITNESS:
A We used the knife in unlocking the door. We made a hole.
Q You made a hole and with the use of your hand, you were able to unlock the inside lock because
of the hole?
A Yes, sir.
Q And I assume that it took you twenty (20) thirty (30) minutes to make that hole?
A Yes, sir. 43 (Emphasis supplied)
The immediately foregoing narration was echoed by appellant Flores who gave the following testimony on direct
examination:
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q So from Brgy. Alegria where did you proceed?
WITNESS:
A We proceeded to Brgy. Alangilan.
Q This Brgy. Alegria how far is it from Brgy. Alangilan?
A The distance between Brgy. Alegria to Brgy. Alangilan is about three (3) kilometers.
Q So, what means of transportation did you used in going to Alangilan?
A We walked in going to Alangilan.
Q When you arrived at Brgy. Alangilan what did you do?
WITNESS:
A We went to our aunt's house.
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q From Alangilan where did you proceed?
 A In Alangilan, we stayed at the house of my aunt and then we proceeded to Bacolod.
Q So what time did you arrived [sic] in Bacolod?
A 8 :00 o'clock in the evening.
Q When you arrived in Bacolod, what did you do?
A We ate our supper at Libertad Market.
Q After eating your dinner at Libertad, what did you do?
A After eating our supper, we proceeded to the house of Jaime Bocateja.
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q What time did you arrived [sic] at the house of Jaime?
WITNESS:
A 11:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime, what did you do?
A We enter[ed] the gate of their house.
Q Please continue?
A Then, we opened the door.
Q And then?
A We reach[ed] [the Bocateja residence] at around 11:00 o'clock and we tried to open the door but
we could not open the door immediately. We made a hole so that we can get in the
house. We entered the house at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning the following
day. 44 (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, the accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve to kill Jaime, but the calm and methodical
manner by which they sought to carry out his murder. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, unless shown to be
customary, 45 appellants' act of arming themselves with a gun and a knife constitutes direct evidence of a careful and
deliberate plan to carry out a killing. Consider the following ruling of this Court in People v. Samolde: 46
As stated earlier, accused-appellant and Armando Andres tried to borrow Cabalin's tear gas
gun. This attempt by the accused-appellant and his co-accused to arm themselves prior to the
commission of the crime constitutes direct evidence that the killing of Feliciano Nepomuceno had
been planned with care and executed with utmost deliberation. From the time the two agreed to
commit the crime to the time of the killing itself, sufficient time had lapsed for them to desist from
their criminal plan had they wanted to. Instead, they clung to their determination and went ahead
with their nefarious plan . . . 47 (Emphasis supplied)
From the time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, after they had resolved to go to confront Jaime, to the time
they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City, ten hours had elapsed sufficient for appellants to
dispassionately reflect on the consequences of their actions and allow for their conscience and better judgment to
overcome the resolution of their will and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if only they had desired to
hearken to such warnings. In spite of this, appellants evidently clung to their determination to kill Jaime.
That evident premeditation was established through the testimonies of appellants and not by those of the prosecution
witnesses is of no moment. While appellants could not have been compelled to be witnesses against
themselves, 48 they waived this right by voluntarily taking the witness stand. Consequently, they were subject to
cross-examination on matters covered by their direct examination. 49 Their admissions before the trial court
constitute relevant and competent evidence which the trial court correctly appreciated against them. 50
Although he admitted stabbing Jaime, appellant Flores sought to justify his actions by claiming that he was impelled
by the need to prevent Jaime from shooting his uncle, appellant Ventura. This pretense does not impress.
To successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in
provoking the assailant, should any provocation have been given by the relative attacked. 51Of these, the requisite of
"unlawful aggression" is primary and indispensable without which defense of relative, whether complete or
otherwise, cannot be validly invoked. 52
Not one of the foregoing requisites of defense of a relative is present. From all accounts, it was appellants who
initiated the unlawful aggression, and it was the victim Jaime who acted in self defense. Hence, neither the justifying
circumstance of defense of a relative 53 nor the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a
relative 54 may be appreciated in appellant Flores' favor.
While appellant Ventura did not directly participate in the stabbing of Jaime, the trial court correctly held both
appellants collectively liable for the attempt on the latter's life since they were shown to have acted in conspiracy
with each other.
There is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. 55 Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in these cases, all the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because, in contemplation of law,
the act of one is the act of all. 56
By stabbing Jaime Bocateja pursuant to their pre-conceived plot, appellants commenced the commission of murder
directly by overt acts. Despite their efforts, however, they failed to inflict a mortal wound on Jaime, hence, their
liability only for attempted murder. 57
With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both appellants guilty of murder qualified not by evident
premeditation but by taking advantage of superior strength, 58 to wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. The accused Arante Flores who delivered the stabbing blow is big and strong, standing
about five feet and six (5'6") inches tall. His weapon was a 14 inch dagger. Aileen Bocateja [stood]
only about five (5'0") feet tall. The disparity of their strength is enormous. 59 (Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked. 60 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age,
size and strength of the parties, and is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous to the aggressor, which is
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant Arante Flores is taller, and probably stronger than the
victim Aileen Bocateja because of their difference in sex as well as the fact that the accused appellant Flores was
armed at that time . . ." 62 Nevertheless, they argue that Aileen's death was not attended by abuse of superior
strength since: (1) though ultimately unsuccessful, she was able to put up a defense against appellant Flores; and (2)
the prosecution failed to show that appellant Flores deliberately took advantage of the disparity in their size and sex
in order to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the
aggression, 63 taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless.
Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not
annulling it. 64Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on her and her husband by throwing
nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant Flores does not automatically negate the possibility that the
latter was able to take advantage of his superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself. 65 Thus, in People v. Molas, 66 where the accused was convicted of murder for stabbing to death two
women and an eight year old boy, this Court discoursed:
While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing of the
three victims was raised to murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. There was abuse of superior strength when Molas inflicted several mortal wounds
upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and stronger, was armed with a weapon which he used
in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was also present when he hacked eight-year old
Abelaro and also Dulcesima who, besides being a woman of lesser strength was
unarmed. 67 (Emphasis supplied)
And in the more recent case of People v. Loreto, 68 this Court opined:
The contention of accused-appellant is barren of merit. Article 14, paragraph 15 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that a crime against persons is aggravated by the accused taking advantage of
superior strength. There are no fixed and invariable rules regarding abuse of superior strength or
employing means to weaken the defense of the victim. Superiority does not always mean numerical
superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis--vis the
victim. There is abuse of superior strength even if there is only one malefactor and one victim.
Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the
victim, considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense,
although not annulling it. The aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to insure the
commission of the crime. In this case, accused-appellant was armed with a knife and used the same
in repeatedly stabbing Leah, a young wisp of a girl, no less than eighteen times after overtaking her
in the sala of Dan's house. Irrefragably, then, accused-appellant abused his superior strength in
stabbing Leah. In a case of early vintage [People v. Guzman, supra. at 1127], the Court held that:
There is nothing to the argument that the accused was erroneously convicted of murder. An
attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used
in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself (U.S.
vs. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612;People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was, therefore, correctly appreciated by the
trial court, as qualifying the offense as murder. 69 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took advantage of the
superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.
As for appellant Flores' claim of self-defense, it cannot be sustained. As in defense of a relative, one claiming self
defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence 70 both unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or
injured and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. As a third
requisite, he must also prove lack of sufficient provocation on his part. 71 None of these requisites was shown to be
present. As expounded by the trial court:
Arante declared that Aileen panicked and screamed and was hitting him with an extension cord so
he stabbed her. Arante was suggesting that had Ai[l]een remained cool, composed and friendly, she
would not have died.
This perverted reasoning need not detain the Court. There was an on-going aggression being
committed inside her house and within the confines of her room, hence, Aileen's actuations were
perfectly just and legitimate. 72
As adverted to earlier, the trial court, citing People v. Dueno, 73 did not consider evident premeditation as having
aggravated the killing of Aileen since she was not the intended victim of appellants' conspiracy. Upon further
scrutiny, however, this Court finds that this aggravating circumstance should have been appreciated in connection
with Aileen's murder. Jurisprudence is to the effect that evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if
a person other than the intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not
only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance. 74
Here, it was established that upon seeing her husband being attacked by appellants, Aileen immediately called for
help and hurled objects at appellant Flores. And it was because of this passionate defense of her husband that
appellant Flores hacked at her face and stabbed her four times. These factual circumstances are analogous to those
in People v. Belga, 75 where this Court had occasion to state that:
While it would seem that the main target of the malefactors were Alberto and Arlene Rose, this does
not negative the presence of evident premeditation on the physical assault on the person of
Raymundo Roque. We have established jurisprudence to the effect that evident premeditation may
be considered as present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed (or wounded, as
in this case), if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim
but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance. Here, Raymundo Roque provided such
violent resistance against the conspirators, giving the latter no choice but to eliminate him from
their path. 76(Emphasis and italics supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, while appellants' original objective may have only been the killing of Jaime, the trial court correctly held both
of them responsible for the murder of Aileen. Co-conspirators are liable for such other crimes which could be
foreseen and are the natural and logical consequences of the conspiracy. 77In Pring, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, 78 this Court held:
While the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused, there is no
question that they were all prompted and linked by a common desire to assault and retaliate against
the group of Loreto Navarro. Thus, they must share equal liability for all the acts done by the
participants in such a felonious undertaking. While petitioners herein, Rogelio Pring and Alberto
(Roberto) Roxas, on their part, had ganged up Jesus Yumol who belonged to the group of their
adversaries by hitting the latter with a bench and a piece of wood, and that it was a certain David
Ravago who stabbed the deceased Loreto Navarro, nevertheless, it is a rule that conspirators would
necessarily be liable also for the acts of the other conspirators unless such acts differ radically or
substantially from that which they intended to commit (People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil.
536; People vs.Rosario, 68 Phil. 720).
The pronouncements made by this Court in the aforecited case of People vs. Enriquez, still serve as
the governing rule that should be applied to the case at bar. In the said case, this Court stated:
"xxx xxx xxx
 'We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused had undoubtedly
conspired to do grave personal injury to the deceased, and now that the injuries actually
inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot escape from the legal effect of their acts on the
ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a different way from that which had been
intended . . .
'As has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'If a number of persons agree
to commit, and enter upon the commission of the crime which will probably endanger
human life such as robbery, all of them are responsible for the death of a person that ensues
as a consequence.' (Boyd vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 450; 35 Law. ed. 1077). In United States
vs. Patten, the court said: 'Conspirators who join in a criminal attack on a defenseless man
with dangerous weapons, knock him down, and when he tries to escape, pursue him with
increased numbers, and continue the assault, are liable for manslaughter when the victim is
killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of them during the beating, although in the
beginning they did not contemplate the use of a knife.' (42 Appeals, D.C., 239)"
Although during the incident in question the aggression committed by the petitioners herein was
directed against the other members of the group of Loreto Navarro and not on the deceased, this
would not relieve them from the consequence of the acts jointly done by another member of the
petitioners' group who stabbed the deceased Loreto Navarro. 79 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
And in the more recent case of People v. Bisda, et al., 80 this Court held:

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally
in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it
was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses
incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly
produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that
result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs
radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it
in United States v. Andolscheck, "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite
outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the
common purposes as he understands them." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, since they deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom where his wife Aileen was also
sleeping, appellants cannot now claim that the latter's violent resistance was an unforeseen circumstance. Hence,
neither of them can escape accountability for the tragic consequences of their actions.
In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, 81 nighttime 82 and breaking of door 83 in connection with both crimes.
Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human abode. 84 Thus,
it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and
produces greater alarm. 85 Here, dwelling was correctly appreciated since the crimes were committed in the place of
abode of the victims who had not given immediate provocation. 86
Upon the other hand, as pointed out by both appellants and the Solicitor General, the breaking of a door was not
alleged in either of the two informations. Thus, the same cannot be appreciated against appellants. On this point, this
Court's discussion in People v. Legaspi, 87 quoted in the Solicitor General's Brief, is instructive:
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information,
resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of death upon accused-appellant.
In People v. Gallego (G.R. No. 130603, 338 SCRA 21, August 15, 2000), We had occasion to rule
thus:
"In People v. Albert (251 SCRA 136, 1995), we admonished courts to proceed with more
care where the possible punishment is in its severest form death because the execution
of such a sentence is irrevocable. Any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as
error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden duty of the Court to exercise extreme caution
in reviewing the parties' evidence. Safeguards designed to reduce to a minimum, if not
eliminate the grain of human fault ought not to be ignored in a case involving the imposition
of capital punishment for an erroneous conviction 'will leave a lasting stain in our
escutcheon of justice.' The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his
defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life and
death in order for the Court to properly 'exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties'
evidence.' This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance
raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be
alleged in the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence
being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the
inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be
appreciated against him.
xxx xxx xxx
The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that due to
their non-allegation in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be considered in raising the penalty imposable
upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx xxx xxx
It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has now been
formalized in the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000.
Section 8 of Rule 110 now provides that:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.
Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omission complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficientto enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstancesand for the court to
pronounce judgment. 88 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants and the Solicitor General also argue that nocturnity should not have been considered since Jaime himself
testified that their bedroom was well-lit and there was light coming from the kitchen and the adjoining bedroom of
their children. 89
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test, under which nighttime is
aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of the offense; and (2) the subjective test, under which
nighttime is aggravating because the darkness was purposely sought by the offender. 90 Applying these tests to the
established factual circumstances, this Court concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with
both crimes.
While the bedroom where the crimes occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in furtherance of their
murderous intent, appellants deliberately took advantage of nighttime, as well as the fact that the household members
were asleep, in order to gain entry into the Bocateja residence. Indeed, their own testimony indicates that while they
were already outside the Bocateja house at around 11:00 p.m., they purposely waited until 2:00 a.m. before breaking
into the residence so as not to call the attention of the Bocatejas and/or their neighbors. It is thus clear that appellants
deliberately took advantage of the darkness of the night, not to mention the fact that the Bocatejas were fast asleep,
to conceal their actions and to facilitate and insure that their entry into the victims' home would be undetected.
No mitigating circumstances are present to offset the foregoing aggravating circumstances. While the trial Court
noted that appellants were apparently motivated by their belief that Johanna and Jaime were carrying on an illicit
relationship, to wit:
The accused presented evidence to prove that Jaime Bocateja and Johanna Ventura, wife of the
accused Felix Ventura, were maintaining an illicit relationship. The evidence on this point is
principally hearsay the alleged admissions made by Johanna of the relationship. There is no
doubt, however, that the accused Ventura believes that [his] wife and Jaime Bocateja are clandestine
lovers. It is fairly reasonable, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is Ventura's
belief of this illicit relationship which prompted him to confront Jaime Bocateja, 91
it nevertheless ruled out passion or obfuscation 92 or immediate vindication of a grave offense 93 as mitigating
circumstances.
While jealousy may give rise to passion or obfuscation, 94 for the appreciation of this mitigating circumstance it is
necessary that the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. 95 In the same vein,
while "immediate" vindication should be construed as "proximate" vindication in accordance with the controlling
Spanish text 96 of the Revised Penal Code, still this mitigating circumstance cannot be considered where sufficient
time elapsed for the accused to regain his composure. 97
In these cases, appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as February 17, almost a week before the
stabbing incidents on February 23, when he first confronted his wife about her ring. Moreover, as previously noted,
ten hours had elapsed from the time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, weapons in hand, to the time they
entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City. Within that period appellant Ventura had opportunity to change his
clothes at a relatives' house in a neighboring barangay and both appellants were able to take their dinner at the
Burgos Market in Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside the Bocateja residence before carrying out
their plan. Without question, sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to cool and for them to recover their
equanimity.
In fine, for stabbing Jaime, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder qualified by evident
premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. However, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the trial court erred in imposing the sentence of Eight (8) Years of prision mayor as minimum to
Eighteen (18) Years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed for the
consummated penalty shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempted felony. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The
penalty two degrees lower is prision mayor. 98 Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103, 99 as amended, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering the presence of two aggravating circumstances, the
proper imposable penalty falls within the range of prision mayor in its maximum period (from Ten (10) Years and
One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years) as maximum and prision correccional (from Six (6) Months and One (1) Day to
Six (6) Years) as minimum. Accordingly, this Court hereby sentences appellants to an indeterminate penalty of Six
(6) Years of prision correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of prision mayor as maximum.
For fatally stabbing Aileen, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and nighttime. As already noted, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law
prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be imposed when, in the commission of the deed, one
aggravating circumstance is present. Consequently, the trial court's imposition of the supreme penalty of death must
be sustained.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to the separate opinions expressed
in People vs. Echegaray 100 that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the
death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
As regards the civil liability of the appellants, the award of the trial court is hereby modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Aileen as civil indemnity for her death is
sustained, the commission of the crime by appellants having been duly proven. 101 The award of moral damages to
her heirs is likewise proper considering that the prosecution presented adequate proof that they suffered mental
anguish and wounded feelings. 102 However, the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court is hereby
reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence. 103 It should be borne in mind that the
purpose for such award is to compensate the heirs of the victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich
them. 104
The award of exemplary damages should be increased from P20,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such award is proper in view
of the presence of aggravating circumstances. 105 Furthermore, considering that counsel for appellants admitted that
the heirs of Aileen incurred funeral expenses of P100,000.00 106and such admission has not been shown to have
been made through palpable mistake, the same should be awarded as actual damages. 107
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the trial court did not grant Jaime's claim for P20,000.00 in actual damages for
hospitalization expenses since he failed to present any receipts to substantiate the same. Nonetheless, in light of the
fact that Jaime was actually hospitalized and operated upon, this Court deems it prudent to award P20,000.00 as
temperate damages. 108 Moreover, Jaime is also entitled to moral damages in accordance with Article 2219,
paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, which this Court hereby awards in the amount of P25,000.00. 109 Finally, exemplary
damages of P25,000.00 are also in order considering that the crime was attended by two aggravating
circumstances. 110
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted
murder qualified by evident premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime and are
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of Prision Correccional as minimum to Twelve (12)
Years of Prision Mayor as maximum.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the victim, Jaime Bocateja, the amounts of: (a) Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) as temperate damages; (b) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as moral damages; and (c)
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 is likewise AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants
Felix Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and nighttime and are
SENTENCED to the supreme penalty of DEATH.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocateja the amounts of: (a) Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; (b) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; (c) Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and (d) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
Upon the finality of this Decision, and pursuant to Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of R.A.
No. 7659, let the records of the cases be immediately forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the exercise,
at her discretion, of her power to pardon appellants Felix Venturaand Arante Flores.
SO ORDERED. IDAESH
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Ventura y Quindoy, G.R. Nos. 148145-46, [July 5, 2004], 477 PHIL 458-499)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125966. January 13, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JUAN FACTAO alias "BOYET," ALBERT
FRANCIS LABRODA Alias "ABET," and TIRSO SERVIDAD, appellants.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:

The defense of alibi is by nature weak but it assumes significance and strength where the evidence for the
prosecution is also intrinsically weak. 1 The contrasting weight of the prosecution evidence against appellants Juan
Factao and Albert Francis Labroda, on the one hand, and appellant Tirso Servidad, on the other, accounts for the
difference that the Court accords their respective alibis.
In the evening of August 23, 1991, Vicente Manolos was in a kamalig near the seashore in Barangay Sirawagan, San
Joaquin, Iloilo with Eduardo Sardoma, Rolando Nierves, Noel Serrano and the hut's owner, Fernando
Sardoma. 2 Sometime past 8:00 p.m., Vicente felt the urge to defecate so he went beside a boat about four or five
meters from the hut. 3 As Vicente relieved himself, he saw Juan Factao and Albert Francis Labroda approach the
hut. 4 Factao was armed with a garand rifle. 5
As the two men neared the kamalig, Labroda looked around as if to see if there was anyone else about. 6 Factao
peeped into the hut, which was illuminated by an electric light bulb, aimed his gun at a hole in the hut's bamboo wall
and fired. 7
Factao and Labroda then sped towards the Sirawagan River. 8 In his haste, Factao tripped on the outrigger of the
boat beside which Vicente was defecating. 9 Fortunately, Factao did not notice Vicente, who tried to hide
himself. 10 Vicente quickly pulled up his pants and ran towards the hut. 11
From about five arms' length away, 12 Jose Manuel Sermona also witnessed the shooting. Jose Manuel saw Juan
Factao, Albert Francis Labroda and Tirso Servidad pass the hut where he was staying as they walked towards
the kamalig of Fernando Sardoma. 13 Factao was carrying a garand, although the other two were
unarmed. 14 Labroda looked on as Factao peeped into the kamalig, aimed and fired. 15 Factao and Labroda then ran
towards the river while Servidad separated from the two. 16
Inside the kamalig, Eduardo Sardoma was conversing with Rolando Nierves, Noel Serrano and Fernando
Sardoma. 17 The latter was on the floor lying on his side. 18 Suddenly, Eduardo heard an
explosion. 19 Immediately, he went outside and saw Tirso Servidad bending his body forward and moving his head
sideways. 20 Eduardo quickly wrapped his arms around Tirso. Eduardo also espied Juan Factao, who was carrying a
garand, and Albert Francis Labroda running from the scene. 21
Eduardo then heard Fernando Sardoma pleading for help. 22 Fernando said he had been shot and asked to be brought
to the hospital. 23 Eduardo went back inside the hut, where he found Fernando bathing in his own blood. 24
The same bloody sight greeted Vicente Manolos when he reached the hut. 25 He cuddled Fernando and pushed
inside the victim's protruding intestines. 26 Vicente, Eduardo, Jose Manuel and Rolando Nierves loaded Fernando
into a jeep and rushed him to the hospital. 27 Their efforts were for naught, however, as Fernando was already dead
upon arrival at the Pedro Trono Memorial Hospital in Guimbal, Iloilo. 28
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Irene Escanlar, Medical Officer III of said hospital, revealed that the victim sustained
a gunshot wound at the eleventh left intercostal space with exit at the right hypochondriac area. 29 The bullet
perforated the left lower lobe of the lung, the pancreas, the whole lobe of the liver and the right diaphragm. 30 The
bullet also caused a fracture on the right tenth and eleventh ribs. 31 Hypovolemic shock or massive blood loss,
secondary to the rupture of the liver, was the victim's immediate cause of death. 32 According to Dr. Escanlar,
Fernando probably had his side towards the assailant when he was shot. 33 Dr. Escanlar reduced her findings in a
Post Mortem Report. 34
The police investigation resulted in the apprehension of Juan Factao, Albert Francis Labroda and Tirso Servidad.
The three were subsequently charged with Murder in an Information reading:
That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1991, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed with Garand, US Rifle Caliber .30 Ml, with
treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one FERNANDO SARDOMA with
the weapon they were then provided, inflicting upon their said victim gunshot wound on the vital
part of his body which caused the immediately (sic) and instantaneous death of said Fernando
Sardoma.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 35
When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty. 36 Trial ensued, during which the prosecution offered the
testimonies of Jose Manuel Sermona, Eduardo Sardoma, Vicente Manolos and Dr. Irene Escanlar. The prosecution
witnesses testified to the foregoing narration.
The accused denied any participation in the killing of Fernando Sardoma. They invoked alibi as their defense.
Factao and Labroda, both members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), claimed that at the
time of the incident they, along with Noel Lupase and Carlos Garcia, were celebrating the birthday of Labroda in the
latter's house. 37 The party ended at around 10:00 p.m. 38 Thereafter, Carlos Garcia repaired to his home while Juan
Factao returned to camp. 39 Noel Lupase, who corroborated Labroda and Factao's presence at the party,40 spent the
night at Labroda's house. 41 They learned about the tragedy only the following day. 42
Factao and Labroda, suspected that the victim's companions, the principal prosecution witnesses, were sympathizers
of the New People's Army (NPA).43 Factao also imputed ill motive on prosecution witness Vicente Manolos with
whom he had a quarrel during a basketball game five days before the killing of Fernando Sardoma. 44
Accused Servidad, also a CAFGU member, 45 presented a different account of his whereabouts. Servidad was on his
way home when he met Sirawagan Barangay Captain Faustino Nierves at about 8:30 in the evening of 23 August
1991. 46 The two then heard an explosion from the direction of the seashore. 47 Barangay Captain Nierves
instructed Servidad to investigate the explosion. 48
Some ten meters from Fernando's hut, Servidad came upon Rolando Nierves and Vicente Manalos, 49 and inquired
about the explosion. 50 Rolando and Vicente replied that Fernando had been shot. 51 Servidad asked them to call for
other people to help bring Fernando to the hospital. 52 Servidad then proceeded to the kamalig and peeped through
the door. 53 Inside, he saw a bleeding Fernando. 54 Servidad asked people to help him lift Fernando to the
jeep. 55 Thereafter, he headed back home. 56
Servidad denied being with Factao and Labroda on that fateful evening or that Eduardo Sardoma grabbed him right
after the explosion. 57 Servidad said he was not in good terms with prosecution witnesses Eduardo Sardoma and
Jose Manuel Sermona, whom he suspected were NPA sympathizers.58 He denied harboring a grudge against the
victim, who he claimed was a good friend. 59
Servidad's alibi was corroborated by Barangay Captain Nierves, who testified having met Servidad right before the
explosion, and instructing the latter to investigate the incident. 60 Later that evening, Servidad informed him that
Fernando Sardoma had been shot. 61
The defense also presented Juan Roweno Secuban, likewise a CAFGU member, whose testimony was offered to
disprove that the killing of Fernando Sardoma was in retaliation for Secuban's hacking. 62 According to Secuban, he
was hacked by a certain Ronaldo San Miguel over a girl they were both courting. 63 Fernando, allegedly a witness to
the incident, even executed an affidavit in favor of Secuban. 64
On July 14, 1995, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 25, rendered judgment finding all three
accused guilty of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads as follows: acHETI
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused, Juan Factao alias "Boyet," Albert
Francis Labroda alias "Abet" and Tirso Servidad, guilty of murder as charged beyond the shadow of
doubt, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the invisible (sic) penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, plus the
accessory penalties as provided under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, and moreover, they are
ordered to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 to reimburse the family the
amount of P10,000.00 for the coffin and another P10,000.00 as expenses for the funeral and wake,
and to pay the attorney's fee of P9,000.00 and the cost. At the time the crime was committed the
death penalty was not yet restored, hence it cannot be imposed in this case.
SO ORDERED. 65
From this Decision, the accused have appealed.
The Court entertains no doubt that appellants Juan Factao and Albert Francis Labroda are guilty of the slaying of
Fernando Sardoma. Prosecution witness Vicente Manolos unerringly pointed to the two as the perpetrators of the
crime:
Q: At around that time while you were defecating beside the boat can you tell the Court if there was
any unusual incident that happened?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what was the incident about?
A: I saw two men approaching the hut of Fernando Sardoma.
Q: Now, can you identify these two persons which you said were approaching the hut of Fernando
Sardoma?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Please tell the court the names.
A: Juan Factao alias Boyet and Albert Francis Labroda.
xxx xxx xxx
 Q: At that time that you saw Juan Factao was he carrying something?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you please tell the court was he was carrying?
A: A long firearm.
Q: Can you identify that firearm?
A: Yes, it was a garan (sic).
Q: Now, thereafter, what did Juan Factao and Albert Labroda do?
A: They went nearer the hut of Fernando Sardoma. When they were near already I saw Albert
Francis Labroda looking around seemingly trying to find out if there are people around.
Q: What about Juan Factao, what did he do?
A: Looking stilthelly (sic), towards the hut of Fernando Sardoma.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Was Juan Factao able to reach the hut of Fernando Sardoma?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When he arrived to the hut of Fernando Sardoma do you know what he did?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell the court.
A; He first peep (sic) or took a look inside and afterwards aimed the firearm at a hole because the
hut is filled with holes, and then fired the shot.
Q: After firing the shot, what did Jun Factao do, if any?
A: They ran away.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What about Albert Francis Labroda did (sic) know where he went?
A: They escaped together. 66
Vicente's foregoing testimony was corroborated by Jose Manuel Sermona.
Conspiracy between appellants Factao and Labroda was adequately established. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 67 It is not necessary,
however, that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
which show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted action and a community of interest among the
accused. 68
While there is no direct evidence to show that Factao and Labroda agreed to commit the crime, the acts of Factao and
Labroda immediately before and after the shooting evince a commonality in design sufficient to make them co-
principals to the killing. Vicente Manolos testified that as Factao prepared to shoot Fernando, Labroda was looking
around to see if anyone else was about. 69 Thereafter, the two fled together, running in the same direction, a fact to
which Jose Manuel Sermona 70 and Eduardo Sardoma 71 also testified.
The alibi of appellants Factao and Labroda cannot prosper in the face of the positive identification by prosecution
witnesses Vicente Manolos and Jose Manuel Sermona, who were both familiar with the two appellants. Alibi, which
is easy to concoct, cannot prevail over positive identification. 72
Moreover, for their alibi to prosper, the accused must not only prove that they were somewhere else when the
offense was committed, but also that they were so far away that they could not have been physically present at the
scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 73 Appellants Factao and Labroda utterly
failed to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Factao and Labroda themselves testified that they were at the house of Labroda to celebrate the latter's
birthday on 23 August 1991 at approximately the same time that Fernando Sardoma was killed. 74 Labroda's house
was just more than a kilometer away from the place where the crime was committed, or approximately thirty (30)
minutes on foot. 75 Evidently, the accused-appellants were in a place near the crime scene.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to establish appellant Tirso Servidad's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Vicente Manolos testified that he saw only Juan Factao and Albert Labroda at the scene of the crime. On direct
examination, he did not mention appellant Servidad at all.
Q Now, can you identify these two person[s] which you said were approaching the hut of Fernando
Sardoma?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please tell the Court their names?
A Juan Factao alias Boyet and Albert Francis Labroda. 76
On cross-examination, the witness adverted to appellant Tirso Servidad but only because the private prosecutor
mentioned his name. Moreover, he confirmed the fact that he did not see the appellant Servidad at the same time that
he saw the other two appellants.
Q You mean to say that you have not seen or meet (sic) this Tirso Servidad in the evening of August
23, 1991?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A Outside the hut, I heard his voice.
Q You mean to say that you only heard the voice of this Tirso Servidad, is that what you mean?
A Yes, sir. But when we were carrying Fernando Sardoma, I noticed him. Later, I lost sight of him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q But at the time you were then relieving yourself at the seashore near the fishing boat you have not
seen Tirso Servidad with, Juan Factao and Francis Albert Labroda, is that correct?
A No, I saw only both of them. 77 (Emphasis supplied)
Vicente's testimony contradicts that of Jose Manuel Sermona, who allegedly saw Servidad with Factao and Labroda
going to Fernando's hut. Jose Manuel claimed that Servidad allegedly separated from the other two and went to the
front door, which was facing the seashore:
Q: Have you gone to the hut of Fernando Sardoma before 23 August 1991?
A: Yes, sir.
 xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court, if you were familiar of (sic) that hut of Hernando (sic)
Sardoma where you went inside on August 23, 1991?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Court how many doors this "kamalig" of Hernando (sic) Sardoma
has?
A: Only one door.
Q: And this door of the "kamalig" of Hernando (sic) Sardoma, is it facing the seashore or not?
A: Facing the seashore. 78
The front of the door where Jose Manuel allegedly saw Servidad, however, was only about four to five meters away
from where Vicente Manolos was defecating. Yet Vicente categorically stated that he did not see Servidad as Factao
fired the fatal shot. 79
These irreconcilable discrepancies in the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the culpability
of appellant Servidad.
Eduardo Sardoma's claim that he caught Servidad peeping into the hut as Factao and Labroda were fleeing defies
human nature. If Servidad were at all present at the time of the shooting and conspired with his co-appellants to kill
Fernando Sardoma, he would have immediately fled from the scene with his cohorts once the criminal deed was
done. But as the defense would have it, Servidad separated from the other appellants and worst, even linger at the
crime scene and risked arrest. ScAIaT
Senior Inspector Bonifacio Servano also said that he saw Tirso sometime after the killing, some distance from the
crime scene:
Q When you arrived at the place of the incident at around 9:25 in the evening on August 23, 1991
together with two (2) policemen, you saw Tirso Servidad in the place of the incident?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness: Correction please, your honor, I saw or met him but outside the place of the incident about
200 meters from the national highway of Brgy. Siwaragan.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Was he running or walking?
A He was walking and he stop (sic) when he saw me and saluted me. 80
Servidad's behavior in nonchalantly greeting no less than the Chief of Police is unusual for one who had just killed a
fellow human being. Again, as correctly pointed out by the defense, it is contrary to human experience for a guilty
person, right after the commission of a crime, to roam the streets within the vicinity of the crime scene where police
authorities could easily apprehend him. 81
Even if Servidad were indeed present at the scene during the shooting, such fact by itself would not render him
criminally liable. The mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a co-
conspirator. 82 The prosecution did not offer any evidence that Servidad performed any act from which his
conspiracy to the crime may be deduced.
In the face of the contradicting and unbelievable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the alibi of appellant
Servidad assumes strength and significance. According to appellant, he was on his way home when he met
Sirawagan Barangay Captain Faustino Nierves at the precise time of the explosion, 83 a fact corroborated by the
Barangay Captain himself. 84 No ill motive has been attributed for this witness, a public officer, to testify falsely.
The crime committed by appellants Factao and Labroda is Murder, the killing being qualified by treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. 85 Treachery attended the killing of the victim Fernando Sardoma,
where his assailant Factao first peeped into the bamboo wall, inserted the rifle through the bamboo wall and shot
Fernando, who was then lying on his side in the relative security of his hut, utterly defenseless and completely
unaware of the impending attack.
Evident premeditation, although alleged in the information, was not adequately proven. The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution
to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 86 The elements of
evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his resolve; and (3) a sufficient interval, of time between the determination or
conception and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act and to allow his
conscience to overcome the resolution of his will if he desired to hearken to its warning. 87 Where, as in this case,
there is no evidence as to how and when the plan to kill was decided and what time had elapsed before it was carried
out, evident premeditation cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance. 88

The trial court ruled that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling attended the killing. Nighttime, as
a rule, is absorbed in treachery, and should not have been appreciated. 89 The killing, however, was committed in
the dwelling of the victim, who did not give any provocation therefor.90 This aggravating circumstance was,
therefore, correctly appreciated.
At the time of the commission of the offense, Murder was punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to
death. 91 As there is no mitigating circumstance and one aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty
should be imposed, 92 but as the death penalty was then suspended. At the time of the commission of the offense,
only the penalty of reclusion perpetua may be meted upon appellants. 93
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, 94 appellants Factao and Labroda are each liable to pay the heirs of the
victim Fernando Sardoma P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should
also be awarded to said heirs because of the presence of aggravating circumstances. 95
While Fernando Sardoma's widow Virgilia testified that she incurred P30,000.00 in expenses for her late husband's
two-week wake, 96 apart from the coffin, which cost P10,000.00, including the service, 97 such testimony was not
supported by a single receipt. Accordingly, the award of P10,000.00 for the coffin and another P10,000.00 for the
wake and funeral expenses by the RTC is deleted. 98 However, they may be awarded temperate damage of
P25,000.00 from each guilty appellant. 99
The widow Virgilia also said she spent P9,500.00 for a private prosecutor, to whom she still owes another
P1,500.00. 100 Again, this amount is not borne by any receipt or agreement in evidence. Nevertheless, the Court, in
light of the award of exemplary damages, sustains the grant by the RTC of P9,000.00 as attorney's fees. 101
WHEREFORE, appellants Juan Factao and Albert Francis Labroda are found GUILTY of the crime of Murder and
are sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua. They are each ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
Fernando Sardoma the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages and P9,000.00 as attorney's fees. DCcHIS
For failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant Tirso Servidad is
ACQUITTED. The Director of Prisons is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being held for some
other lawful cause, and to inform this Court of such action within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Factao, G.R. No. 125966, [January 13, 2004], 464 PHIL 47-66)
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 153875. August 16, 2006.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO DAGANI y REYES and

OTELLO SANTIANO Y LEONIDA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

For review before the Court is the Decision dated June 20, 2002 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, Branch 12 (RTC), dated February 18, 1993, in Criminal
Case No. 89-77467, finding the accused-appellants Otello Santiano y Leonida (Santiano) and Rolando Dagani y
Reyes (Dagani) guilty of the crime of Murder.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about September 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault
and use of personal violence upon one ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX by then and there shooting
him with a .38 caliber revolver, thereby inflicting upon the said ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX
mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued where the prosecution adduced evidence to
establish the following:
At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group composed of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln Miran
(Miran), and two other individuals had been drinking at the canteen located inside the compound of the Philippine
National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All of a sudden, appellants, who were security
officers of the PNR and covered by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered the canteen and approached the
group. Appellant Dagani shoved Miran, causing the latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then held Javier while
Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.
The defense proceeded to prove their version of the facts:
Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk officer to investigate a commotion at the canteen. Upon
reaching the place, Santiano ordered his co-accused, Dagani, to enter, while the former waited outside.
Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22 caliber
revolver and attempted to fire at Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. Then suddenly, while outside the canteen,
Santiano heard gunfire and, from his vantage point, he saw Javier and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber gun which
belonged to Javier. During the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire a warning shot. He
heard Javier's gun fire again, so he decided to rush into the canteen. Santiano then shot Javier from a distance of less
than four meters.
Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of official duty as PNR
security officers. They also argued that the prosecution failed to establish treachery and conspiracy. CDESIA
The RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding both accused Otello Santiano y Leonida and Rolando Dagani y Reyes guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Art. 248, RPC, with
the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and granting them the benefit of
[the] Indeterminate Sentence Law, both accused are hereby sentenced to each suffer an
Indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum,
to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal . . . .
Both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity, the sum of P31,845.00 as funeral and burial expenses, the sum of P30,000.00 as
and for [sic] attorney's fees and the further sum of P1,000.00 per appearance of counsel.
Both accused shall be credited with the full extent of their preventive imprisonment. Both accused
are hereby committed to the Director, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila for service
of Sentence.
SO ORDERED. 3
In brief, the RTC held that appellants failed to prove that Javier attempted to squeeze the trigger of the .22 caliber
gun when he pointed it at Dagani; that during the course of the struggle for the possession of the .22 caliber gun, the
danger to the life of the accused ceased to be imminent; that in grappling for the weapon, Dagani "controlled" the
hands of Javier and pushed them away from his body; that the appellants failed to produce the two empty shells as
physical evidence of the gunfire allegedly caused by Javier; that no points of entry or bullet markings on the walls of
the canteen were shown; that, in light of these findings, no unlawful aggression was present on the part of the victim;
that the appellants failed to prove that they were on official duty at the time of the incidence; that, since it was not
established that Javier actually fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as a necessary
consequence of the due performance of an official duty; that the appellants were acting in conspiracy; that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing, considering that Javier had been shot while his hands were
being held by Dagani and as his body was out of balance and about to fall; and that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of the appellants.
The appellants appealed to the CA and assigned the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING SELF DEFENSE ON THE
PART OF THE ACCUSED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE IN LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF AN OFFICIAL DUTY.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE
WAS CONSPIRACY.
IV
 THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS
ABLE TO ESTABLISH BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED ARE
GUILTY OF MURDER. 4
The CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is MODIFIED. Appellants are hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The award for attorney's fees and appearance fees for counsel are
hereby deleted. In all the other aspects, the appealed decision is maintained.
Let the entire records of the case be elevated to the Supreme Court for the mandated review.
SO ORDERED. 5
The C A affirmed the findings of fact as well as the salient portions of the RTC Decision, but deleted the award of
attorney's fees and the per appearance fees of counsel since, the CA reasoned, the instant case is criminal in nature
which is under the control of the public prosecutor, and, additionally, the RTC failed to justify this award in the body
of its Decision. And last, the CA found that the RTC erroneously applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law since the
penalty for Murder, at the time of the incident, was reclusion perpetua which is an indivisible penalty to be imposed
in its entirety, regardless of the attending mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Appellants are now before this Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the CA. Through their
Manifestation dated February 11, 2003, 6 appellants prayed to dispense with the filing of additional briefs.
As of date, the records show that despite the efforts exerted by the surety and the responsible law officers to locate
the appellants, the latter could not be found and have jumped bail. 7
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Appellants argue that the courts a quo misappreciated the facts and erred in finding that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. They insist that the victim, Javier, had been armed with a revolver at the time he
was struggling with appellant Dagani; that the former "could have easily killed the latter;" that, given the fact that
Javier had been drinking, "it is quite probable for Javier to act harshly and aggressively towards peace officers such
as the accused;" 8 and that Javier actually fired three shots from his .22 caliber gun. 9
We are not convinced. HEIcDT
When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally
justified. Having owned the killing of the victim, the accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court
the elements of self-defense in order to avail of this extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this burden by
clear and convincing evidence. When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated
on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the
person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that
unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. All these
conditions must concur. 10
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude 11
but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. 12 To invoke self-defense
successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who
was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. 13
In the instant case, the assertions that it was "quite probable" that Javier, during the course of the struggle for the
firearm, "could have easily killed" the appellants are uncertain and speculative. There is aggression in contemplation
of the law only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life. The peril sought to be avoided
must be imminent and actual, not just speculative. 14

To sum up the matter, we quote the findings of the CA:

The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They
were unable to present evidence that the victim actually fired his gun. No spent shells from the .22
caliber pistol were found and no bullets were recovered from the scene of the incident. Javier also
tested negative for gunpowder residue. Moreover, the trial court found appellant Dagani's account
of the incident to be incredible and self-serving. In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-
defense without any proof of the existence of its requisites. 15
Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of the danger to their
lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and grappled for the gun with the latter. After the
victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no longer any unlawful aggression that would have necessitated the
act of killing. 16 When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense
has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. 17 When Javier had been caught in the struggle for the
possession of the gun with appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged by appellant Santiano, which impelled him to
fire at the victim, had then ceased to a reasonable extent, 18 and undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-
preservation when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful
aggression had already ceased. 19
The second element of self-defense demands that the means employed to neutralize the unlawful aggression are
reasonable and necessary. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence. 20 The
circumstances in their entirety which surround the grappling of the firearm by Dagani and Javier, such as the nature
and number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim 21 which amounted to two fatal wounds, 22 that Dagani was
able to restrain the hands of Javier and push them away from his body, 23 that Dagani was larger than Javier and had
finished Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) hand-to-hand combat training, 24 and Javier, as admitted by the
appellants, was inebriated at the time of the incident, 25 do not justify appellant Santiano's act of fatally shooting the
victim twice. 26
All things considered, the appellants' plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of
self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence
but is in itself extremely doubtful. 27 Whether the accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact. Like alibi, the
affirmative defense of self-defense is inherently weak because, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate
and difficult to disprove. 28 This Court, therefore, finds no reversible error on the part of the courts a quo in
rejecting the claim of self-defense.
Appellants set up the defense that they were in the lawful performance of their official duties. They specifically aver
that they had been ordered by their desk officer to proceed to the canteen in response to a telephone call stating that
there was a group "creating trouble;" that they were in the call of duty and exercising their functions and
responsibilities as members of the PNR Civil Security Office to preserve peace and order and protect the lives and
property in the PNR Compound; 29 and that, invoking jurisprudence, as security officers in the performance of duty,
like the police, they must stand their ground and overcome the opponent, and the force that may be exerted must
differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self defense. 30
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before this defense can
prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary consequence of such lawful
exercise. 31 These requisites are absent in the instant case.
As found by the CA:
The defense failed to prove that the security officers were in fact on duty at the time they were at the
canteen. The trial court gave weight to the fact that the appellants were unable to submit their daily
time records to show that they were on duty at the time. Appellants' assertion that they were ordered
to go on 24-hour duty was belied by PNR Security Investigator Rolando Marinay's testimony that
PNR security officers work in two 12-hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to
7:00 a.m.
Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot
be regarded as a necessary consequence of appellants' due performance of an official duty. 32
As stated, considering that the imminent or actual danger to the life of the appellants had been neutralized when
Dagani grappled with Javier and restrained his hands; that Javier had been thrown off-balance; that Dagani had been
specially trained for these purposes; and that Javier had been drinking immediately prior to the scuffle, this Court
holds that the fatal injuries that appellant Santiano inflicted on the victim cannot be deemed to be necessary
consequences of the performance of his duty as a PNR security officer. 33 While it is recognized that police officers
if indeed the appellants can be likened to them must stand their ground and overwhelm their opponents,
in People v. Ulep, 34 this Court counseled:
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under
circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law
does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true
that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an
immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment
and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither
capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal
provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and
within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement
officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending.
They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom
society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights. 35
But this Court cannot agree with the findings of the courts a quo that the appellants were in conspiracy. SCHTac
The RTC simply held:
The Information cited conspiracy of the accused. Since it can also be committed thru
simultaneous/concerted action and considering that Javier was shot by Santiano while being held by
Dagani, under jurisprudence, conspiracy is present. 36
The tenor of the factual findings of the CA is equally unsatisfactory:
Moreover, the facts show that Javier was shot by appellant Santiano as he was being subdued by
appellant Dagani. The trial court held that the manner of the attack was indicative of a joint purpose
and design by the appellants. 37
Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or
suspicions. 38 Other than the plain fact that the victim had been shot by one of the accused while being held by a co-
accused, there is no other evidence that the appellants were animated by the same purpose or were moved by a
previous common accord. It follows that the liability of the accused must be determined on an individual basis.
While no formal agreement is necessary to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, yet, conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. 39
This Court has held that even if all the malefactors joined in the killing, such circumstance alone does not satisfy the
requirement of conspiracy because the rule is that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself. 40 Thus, even assuming that Javier was simultaneously attacked, this does not prove conspiracy. No evidence
was presented to show that the appellants planned to kill Javier or that Dagani's overt acts facilitated that alleged
plan. The prosecution did not establish that the act of Dagani in trying to wrestle the gun from Javier and in the
process, held the latter' s hands, was for the purpose of enabling Santiano to shoot at Javier. The prosecution had the
burden to show Dagani's intentional participation to the furtherance of a common design and purpose 41 or that his
action was all part of a scheme to kill Javier. That Dagani did not expect Santiano to shoot the victim is established
when Santiano testified that Dagani "seem[ed] to be shocked, he was standing and looking at the victim" as Javier
gradually fell to the ground. 42 And since Dagani's conviction can only be sustained if the crime had been carried out
through a conspiracy duly proven, in view of the failure of the prosecution to discharge that burden, this Court is
constrained to acquit him.

And this Court cannot say that treachery attended the attack. The RTC declared:
[T]he Court believes that Javier was shot while his body was out-balanced and about to fall to the
right side and while his hands were being held by Dagani. Javier, therefore, was shot at when he has
no means to defend himself, hence, the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. 43
which the CA affirmed as follows:
The findings of the court a quo clearly showed that Javier was being held down and could not
effectively use his weapon. As such, the trial court held that Javier could not be considered to be an
armed man as he was being held down and was virtually helpless.
It has been held that when an assault is made with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and
unsuspecting victim who [was] given no immediate provocation for the attack and under conditions
which made it impossible for him to evade the attack, flee or make [a] defense, the act is properly
qualified as treachery, and the homicide resulting therefrom is classified as murder. 44 . . .
Treachery under par. 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment of means,
methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. Treachery is
present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. 45
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the victim, the
vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by
themselves render the attack as treacherous. 46 This is of particular significance in a case of an instantaneous attack
made by the accused whereby he gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell
and was rendered defenseless. 47 The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must
be shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the crime
and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim. 48 For the rules on
treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim, and
without provocation on the part of the latter. 49 Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is
required that the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime
itself. 50
The prosecution failed to convincingly prove that the assault by the appellants had been deliberately adopted as a
mode of attack intended to insure the killing of Javier and without the latter having the opportunity to defend
himself. Other than the bare fact that Santiano shot Javier while the latter had been struggling with Dagani over the
possession of the .22 caliber gun, no other fact had been adduced to show that the appellants consciously planned or
predetermined the methods to insure the commission of the crime, nor had the risk of the victim to retaliate been
eliminated during the course of the struggle over the weapon, as the latter, though struggling, had not been
completely subdued. As already stated, this Court must emphasize that the mere suddenness of the attack, or the
vulnerable position of the victim at the time of the attack, or yet even the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by
themselves make the attack treacherous. 51 It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the means employed
gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and that such means had been deliberately or
consciously adopted without danger to the life of the accused. 52
For these reasons, the Court is inclined to look upon the helpless position of Javier as merely incidental to the attack,
and that the decision to shoot Javier was made in an instant. 53
Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and convincingly as the crime
itself, any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of Santiano. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution
to prove treachery to qualify the killing to Murder, appellant Santiano may only be convicted of Homicide. 54 The
penalty, therefore, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is reclusion temporal.
The Office of the Solicitor General is correct in that the courts a quo failed to consider the aggravating circumstance
of taking advantage of official position under Article 14 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, since the accused, a PNR
security officer covered by the Civil Service, committed the crime with the aid of a gun he had been authorized to
carry as such. 55 Considering that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as duly appreciated by the
courts a quo, shall be offset against the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period, pursuant to Article 64 (4) of the aforesaid Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence of appellant Santiano will consist of a minimum that is
anywhere within the full range ofprision mayor, and a maximum which is anywhere within reclusion temporal in its
medium period. This Court hereby fixes it to be from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to the award of damages, prevailing jurisprudence entitles the heirs of the deceased to the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages. 56
The CA erred in deleting the attorney's fees and per appearance fees for lack of factual basis. Although the CA is
correct in noting that the RTC failed to justify these awards in the body of its Decision, this appeal opens the entire
case for review and, accordingly, the records show that the foregoing amounts had been stipulated by the
parties, 57 thereby dispensing with the need to prove the same. 58
As to moral damages, however, the widow of the victim, Erlinda Javier, is not entitled to the same. She did not
testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress which she suffered as a result of her husband's death. No other
heirs of Javier testified in the same manner. 59
Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position attended the killing, the Court
awards exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in accordance with Articles 2230 and 2234 of the Civil
Code and prevailing jurisprudence. 60
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15304 dated June 20, 2002 is MODIFIED.
Appellant Otello Santiano y Leonida is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of an indeterminate sentence from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant Santiano is
further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P31,845.00 as funeral
and burial expenses, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees and P1,000.00 per appearance
of counsel. Appellant Santiano shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment.
Appellant Rolando Dagani y Reyes is hereby ACQUITTED. TIAEac
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Dagani y Reyes, G.R. No. 153875, [August 16, 2006], 530 PHIL 501-524)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127962. April 14, 2004.]

KINGSTON(E) LI Y NUNEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:

On 19 April 1993, the relative early morning calm in General Luna Street, Barangay Bangkal, Makati, was shattered
when a petty argument evolved into a street brawl. After the dust had settled, eighteen (18) -year old Christopher
Arugay (Arugay) lay dying from multiple stab wounds, while his neighbor, twenty-four (24)-year old
Kingstone 1 Li (Li), staggered injured, with hack wounds on his head.
Li was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 148, 2 with the crime of Homicide. 3 On 5
January 1994, after trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal. His conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals Fifteenth Division in a Decision 4 dated 6 September 1996.
The version presented by the prosecution as to the antecedent facts leading to Arugays death differs sharply from
the version offered by Li. The accused claims that the dispute stemmed from a spurned offer to drink, while the
prosecution traces the root of the fight to an indecorous bath in public.
The story of the prosecution was told by the witnesses Aubrey dela Camara (dela Camara) and Ronaldo Tan
(Tan). 5
Shortly before his death, Arugay was watching television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his
girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Janes boyfriend, Tan. At around 1:15 in the early morning, dela Camara and Tan
suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo Eddie Boy
Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were facing the house of the Arugays. 6
Enraged, Arugay yelled, Pare bastos kayo, bat kayo nakahubad? 7
Li shouted back, Putang Ina! and threw something at the Arugays house. Sangalang also yelled, Putang Ina mo,
lumabas ka, papatayin kita! 8
An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by Li, now wearing briefs and carrying a baseball bat. Li
struck Arugay on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house. Tan and dela Camara
assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then
stabbed Arugay once. 9
Immediately thereafter, dela Camara was confronted by Lis sister, Kristine, who proceeded to pull her hair and slap
her around. Kristine also wielded a bolo, with which she hacked dela Camara in the arm. Although preoccupied
under the circumstances, dela Camara was able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once, so she claimed. 10
Tan saw Arugay run towards the street after he was stabbed, with Li and Sangalang chasing him. He saw nothing
further of the incident, according to him. 11
In their respective testimonies, dela Camara and Tan are unable to account for the fact that before the fight ended, Li
also lay wounded with multiple hack wounds on his head and body. This fact lies at the crux of the petitioners
defense.
On the other hand, Li presents a different version.
Li encountered Arugay out on the street on the night of 18 April 1993, a few hours before the brawl. Arugay was
carrying a bayong containing various liquors. He invited Li to a drinking session which the latter refused as he had
work the following day. 12
Early the next morning, around one oclock a.m., Li was watching television at his home with his friend Ricky
Amerol when they heard objects being thrown at the house. Peeping through the window, they saw Arugay and dela
Camara in front of the gate throwing stones and bottles at the direction of Lis house. The stones broke window
jalousies and also struck Amerol. At the same time, Arugay was also hurling invectives at Li. 13
Annoyed, Li opened the door asking, Pare, ano ba problema mo? Wala naman kaming kasalanan sa yo. Arugay
and his girlfriend just kept on stoning the house and hurling invectives at petitioner. Arugay kicked the gate but Li
prevented him from opening it. Arugay then ran towards his house across the street. 14
Li tried to fix the gate, which had become misaligned and its lock destroyed as a result of the kicking. Reacting, he
saw Arugay coming out of the house armed with two kitchen knives. In response, Li went inside his house and got a
baseball bat. When he returned to the street, Arugay attacked him with a knife. Li managed to avoid Arugays thrusts
and hit Arugay with the baseball bat on the right shoulder. Arugay ran back to his house shouting, The long one!
The long one! Li also dashed back to his house but before he was able to enter the door, he saw Arugay carrying a
two-foot long bolo, running towards him. On Arugays heels were Ronaldo Tan and Aubrey dela Camara. 15
Arugay tried to hit Li with the bolo. Li raised his right hand to protect himself but Arugay was able to hit him on his
right temple and right wrist. Not content, Arugay hit Li on the right shoulder. Li passed out. 16
Upon regaining consciousness, Li tried to crawl back to his house but Ronald Tan hit him at the back of his left ear
with a baseball bat. Eventually, Li managed to get back to the house and was brought to the Makati Medical Center
by Amerol and Barangay Tanod Eduardo Reyes. 17
On cross-examination, Li admitted that Eduardo Sangalang was also in his house at the time the incident started.
Sangalang was the boyfriend of Lis half-sister, Cristy. 18
Dr. Alberto Reyes of the Medico Legal Section of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted the post-mortem
examination on the body of Arugay. He noted the following injuries:
Pallor, lips and nailbeds.
Contusion, arm, right, poster-lateral, 5.0 x 3.0 cm.
Wounds, incised, scalp, parieto-occipital, right, 6.0 cm.; anterior sheet, left side, supramammary 6.0
cm., inframmary 4.0 cm.
Wounds stab:
1. 3.0 cm., long, spindle[-]shaped edges, irregular, oriented, horizontally, with a sharp, medial and a
blunt lateral extremities, located at the anterior chest wall, left side, 15.0 cm. from the
anterior median line, directed upwards, backwards and medially, involving the skin and soft
tissues only with an approximate depth of 4.0 cm.
 2. 4.0 cm., long, spindle shaped edges irregular, with a sharp inferolateral and blunt supero-medial
extremities, located at the anterior abdominal wall, right side, 0.5 cm. from the anterior
median line, directed upwards , backwards and medially involving the skin and soft tissues,
laceration of the diaphragm and the right lobe of the liver, with an approximate depth of 10.0
cm.
3. 1.5 cm. long, spindle shape[d] edges irregular oriented almost horizontally with a sharp lateral
and blunt medial extremities, located at the anterior abdominal wall, left side, 9.0 cm. from
the anterior median line, directed backwards, upwards and medially involving the skin and
soft tissues, penetrating the transverse colon with an approximate depth of 12.0 cm.
4. 1.5 cm. long, spindle, edges irregular oriented almost horizontally with a sharp poster-lateral a
blunt antero medial extremities located at the anterior chest wall right side, 21.0 cm. from
the anterior median line, directed backward, upwards and medially involving the skin and
soft tissues penetrating the 8th intercostals space, into the diaphragm and right lobe of the
liver, with an approximate depth of 12.0 cm.
Hemoperitoneum 1,500 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach, half-full with rice and brownish fluid.
Cause of death stab wounds of the chest and abdomen. 19
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Li guilty as charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding accused KINGSTONE LI guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) years, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessories of the law.
The accused is further ordered to pay to the heirs of the late Christopher Arugay the sum of
P50,000.00 for and as indemnity for causing the death of said victim.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 20
Li appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. 21
Li filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of homicide.
Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that the RTC erred in holding that he was the instigator of the events leading
to Arugays death; in not basing itsDecision on the evidence on record; in holding that he was guilty of homicide by
reason of conspiracy; and in not ruling that the evidence of the prosecution does not prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 22
There is a difference in the factual findings of the RTC and those of the Court of Appeals. The variance warrants the
close review of the findings of the two courts. While both courts argue that Li was guilty of homicide, their
respective rationales are different.
Neither court disputes that the proximate cause of the death of Arugay was the stab wounds he received. The RTC
concluded though that it was Sangalang, and not Li, who stabbed Arugay:
 From all these conflicting versions, this court after piecing out the evidence presented and from
what can be deduced in the circumstances obtaining finds that because of the altercation between
Christopher Arugay and Kingstone Li, Christopher Arugay armed himself with a bolo and
Kingstone Li armed himself with a baseball bat.

From the evidence presented, it became clear to the court that it was Kingstone Li who hit first with
a baseball bat Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right arm which is near
the shoulder. 23
xxx xxx xxx
Now, after Kingstone Li has hit the deceased with a baseball bat, the deceased who is armed with a
bolo, retaliated by hacking Kingstone Li on the head and indeed he was hit on the head and right
wrist causing Kingstone Li to lose his hold on the baseball bat and fell (sic) seem-unconscious or
unconscious.
At this point in time, Eduardo Sangalang, who was then also present stabbed the deceased several
times at least six times.
This is explained by the findings of Dr. Alberto Reyes that Christopher Arugay sustained an
incise[d] wound on scalp, on the left chest, and four stab wounds that are fatal.
When Christopher Arugay sustained the fatal wounds, two (2) of them piercing his liver . . . 24
While the RTC concluded that Li had not stabbed Arugay, it nevertheless held him guilty, predicated on a
finding of conspiracy with Sangalang. This issue shall be explored in greater detail later.
In contrast, the Court of Appeals did not rule out the possibility that Li had stabbed Arugay, and rendered
unnecessary a finding of conspiracy to attach guilt to the accused. It held:
The deceased suffered four fatal wounds, then (sic) the accused might have inflicted at least one
fatal stab wound and so with his friend Eddie Boy, who remains at large. Since it has not been
established which wound was inflicted by either one of them, they should both be held liable and
each one is guilty of homicide, whether or not a conspiracy exists. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate courts formulation is wrong as the converse is the correct rule: with the existence of conspiracy, it is
no longer necessary to determine who among the malefactors rendered the fatal blow; 26 whereas in the absence of
conspiracy, each of the accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. 27 Thus, it is necessary to
determine whether a conspiracy existed between Li and Sangalang, and if there was none, to ascertain the particular
acts performed by Li. TcSICH
The Court of Appeals also cited the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Tan and dela Camara, to the effect that
they saw Li stab Arugay at the left portion of the body. 28 These testimonies are vital as they constitute the only
evidence that Li actually stabbed Arugay. A careful examination of the case however cautions us from giving full
faith and credence to the supposed eyewitnesses for the prosecution. The RTC itself cast doubt on the veracity of all
the eyewitness testimony, whether for the prosecution or for the accused. The RTC noted, thus:
At the outset, the court has to state that it has noted that the witnesses for the prosecution and that of
the defense either held back on material facts or have deliberately withheld some facts or added
some matters to the real facts for these are not only gaps but holes in the versions of the witnesses
for the prosecution and the defense. What this court can do is to cull from the evidence presented
what could be the approximate or near the truth. The prosecution did not help this court any to have
a good view of the facts and neither the defense. 29
The relationships of the witnesses dela Camara and Tan to Arugay or the latters family cannot be easily discounted.
Dela Camara was the boyfriend of Arugay, while Tan was the boyfriend of Arugays sister, Baby Jane. As such, they
are not wholly neutral or disinterested witnesses. Both of them actually asserted in open court that they were not
willing to say anything derogatory against Arugay. Tan testified as follows:
Q: Since Jane Arugay is your girlfriend, and Christopher Arugay was your friend, you did not like
to say anything derogatory against Christopher Arugay, did you?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Neither did you want to say anything also derogatory against the family of Christopher Arugay,
did you?
A: Yes, maam. 30
Similarly, dela Camara testified as follows:
Q: As the girlfriend of Christopher Arugay, you did not say anything derogatory [about] the said
Christopher Arugay, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: You do not like to besmirch his memory, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: So that if Christopher Arugay assaulted Kingstone Li on April 19, 1993, you did not like this, do
you know that, did you Ms. Dela Camara.
A: Yes, maam. 31
The revelations serve caution against accepting the testimonies of Tan and dela Camara as gospel truth. They cast
doubt as to whether these witnesses would be capable to attest to an unbiased narration of facts, especially if by
doing so, they would be forced to impute culpability on Arugay, thereby staining the sainted memory of their
deceased friend.
Moreover, the respective testimonies of dela Camara and Tan are inconsistent with each other with respect to
material points. Dela Camara claimed that she and Tan together assisted Arugay after the latter had been struck down
with the baseball bat. 32 Yet while Tan admitted that he had pulled Arugay away from the scene of the melee, he
made no mention of the assistance of dela Camara. 33 In fact, Tan stated that dela Camara remained inside the
house. 34 This assertion contradicts dela Camaras claim that she was outside the house during the whole time the
incident transpired. 35Nor did Tan advert to the scene painted by dela Camara of Kristine Li wielding a bolo while
pulling on the hair of Arugays girlfriend. That is an unusual enough occurrence that would stick to the mind of
anybody who would witness such.
Indeed, the tale weaved by Tan arouses more curiosity upon examination of his sworn statement, executed the night
after the incident. Therein, Tan referred to some existing bad blood between Arugay and Li over a borrowed tape, a
fact which subsequently none of the parties would call attention to. 36 Curioser, Tan never mentioned any baseball
bat having been used by Li during the incident. Nor did he mention any participation of Sangalang in the actual
brawl. On the other hand, dela Camara in her own sworn statement, asserted that both Li and Sangalang had stabbed
Arugay and that she herself was hacked on the arm by Kristine Li. 37
Both Tan and dela Camara testified that Li stabbed Arugay on the left side of the body as the latter was being pulled
towards his house after having been struck with the baseball bat. 38 However, Tan testified that Li came from behind
Arugay to inflict the stab wound, 39 while dela Camara stated that Arugay was facing Li when he was stabbed. 40
Most importantly, the testimonies of dela Camara and Tan both contradict the physical evidence. As consistently
held:
Time and again, we have upheld the primacy of physical evidence over biased and uncorroborated
testimony of witnesses. We have held:
. . . Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the
accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied
principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth . . . [W]here the physical
evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we
ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. 41
It is undisputed that Li had armed himself with a baseball bat as he prepared to face Arugay. It also appears that the
baseball bat remained at the scene of the fight, as the same weapon was used to strike Li on the head after he lay
injured. 42 In order to sustain the claim of Tan and dela Camara that Li had stabbed Arugay, we would have to
postulate that Li was armed with both a knife and a baseball bat. This scenario is severely flawed.
First. Tan and dela Camara would have us believe that Li faced off Arugay with a baseball bat, then after having
struck Arugay, he ran off to his home to get a knife, returned to the melee, then stabbed Arugay. 43 This projected
sequence is simply incredulous. Li was already armed with a weapon that could incapacitate or kill. He had already
struck a blow that apparently forced the victim down. There is no logical reason for Li to suddenly run off to get a
knife, considering he already had a weapon capable of inflicting damage and was at an advantageous position vis--
vis the prostrate Arugay.
There is of course the possibility that Li was already carrying the knife when he emerged with the baseball bat, but
that was not established by the prosecution. Moreover, the scenario of Li brandishing a knife with one hand and
wielding a bat with the other is highly improbable. It would require unusual physical dexterity for a person to wield
both weapons simultaneously and still utilize them with adequate proficiency. Nor is it likely that Li concealed the
knife in his clothing. According to Tan, Li was only wearing briefs when he attacked Arugay with the baseball
bat. 44
Second. The pathological findings likewise cast severe doubt on the possibility that Li had stabbed Arugay. The trial
court concluded that only one knife was used in killing Arugay, and probably only one wielder thereof. The RTC
decision said:
The court noted also with particular interest the description of the four wounds as found by Dr.
Reyes. The first wound has been described by Dr. Reyes as 3.0 cm. long, spindle[-]shaped edges,
irregular, etc; the No. 2 wound has also been described as 4.0 cm. long, spindle[-] shaped, edges
irregular, etc.; No. 3 wound is 1.5 cm. long, spindle-shaped, edges, irregular, etc.; and the fourth
wound is 1.5 cm. long, spindle shaped edges irregular;
Thus there are two (2) outstanding characteristics of the four (4) stab wounds sustained by
Christopher Arugay. All of them are spindle[-]shaped and irregular in their edges. This is significant
because it would appear to the court that only one weapon was used because all the characteristics
of the four wounds were the same. Thus, to the mind of the court there is only one person who
inflicted these wounds, not two (2) or three (3). It could be possible that there were two who
inflicted the stab wound[s] if the weapon used was given to another after using the same and the
other one to whom it was transferred used it also. But in this case there is no showing that such
incident did happen. 45
It must be qualified that Dr. Reyes, the NBI Medico-Legal, refused to definitively conclude that only one knife was
used in stabbing Arugay though he conceded that such was possible. 46 Nevertheless, the fact that Arugay sustained
the same kind of stab wounds tends to support the conclusion that only one knife was used on him.
Third. Dela Camara testified that she saw both Li and Sangalang stab Arugay. Considering that there was only one
knife used, her version would hold water only if we were to assume that the same knife passed from the hands of Li
to Sangalang or that they held identical or similar knives. As the RTC ruled, nothing of the sort was established. The
more logical assumption would be that there was only one stabber using one knife. The question now arises, was it
Li or Sangalang who stabbed Arugay?
There is the dubious claim of Tan and dela Camara that they did see Li stab Arugay once. Assuming this were true,
this blow would not have been the fatal stab wound, as it did not prevent Arugay from further participating in the
rumble and, as subsequently established, inflicting damaging blows on Li. However, the physical evidence belies any
conclusion that Li inflicted any of the several fatal wounds on Arugay.
Dr. Pedro P. Solis, the medico-legal consultant of Makati Medical Center who also happens to be one of the
countrys leading experts in Legal Medicine47 , examined Lis injuries on the same day of the incident, and
subsequently testified on his findings. He concluded that Li suffered three types of wounds on his body. The first
type consisted of abrasions, consistent with forcible contact accompanied by a hard object. The two other types of
injuries were considerably more serious: incised wounds and a contusion. As found by the RTC:
According to (sic) Dr. Pedro Solis, who examined the accused at the Makati Medical Center on the
very night after the incident and (sic) found the following injuries on Kingstone Li, to wit:
1. . . .
2. Wound, incised, 12 cm., scalp, fronto-parietal area, right, 9 cm., right; 9 cm. posterior
aspect, shoulder, right; 1.5 cm., postero-medial aspect, distal third, forearm, right.
3. Contusion, 4 x 5 cm., scalp, parieto-occipital area (post suricular) left.
From the expert testimony and opinion of Dr. Pedro Solis, the injuries suffered by Kingstone Li
were defense wounds, and that there were two (2) weapons used in inflicting injuries on Kingstone
Li. One is a sharp edge[d] instrument such as a bolo and the other one is [a] blunt instrument. 48
The physical evidence of Lis injuries are consistent with his version that Arugay had hacked him, and as he
struggled to recover from the blow, he was struck with his own baseball bat by Tan, thus explaining the contusion on
his head. More importantly though, the injuries were serious enough to incapacitate Li at the scene, calling into
question his ability to inflict the fatal blows on Arugay. As Dr. Solis testified:
A: [I] noticed in this particular case that there are incise[d] wound[s] on the right hand and right
shoulder. These are injuries brought about, as I said, brought about by [a] sharp edged
instrument. This I presumed to have been brought about by the inherent self defensive (sic)
mechanism of the victim. In so far as the injury on the head is concerned, it must be a hit,
now, I am referring to the incise wound on the head, incise[d] wound on the head will also
cause pressure on the skull thereby producing some effect on the brain, this has been
aggravated by a blunt instrument applied on the left side of his neck and joining as together
the two injuries the incise[d] wounds and that of contusion which is brought about by blunt
instrument it might have cause[d] him some degree of loss of consciousness.
Q: Would that person have been able to stab somebody one time, two times, three times or four
times after sustaining those injuries?
A: In that condition he has no complete power to perform volitional acts because he must have lost
partially or totally his consciousness primarily the hit on the left side of the head because the
 brain is a vital organ and slight jarring will cause los[s] of consciousness and what we call in
ordinary parlance, you saw shooting stars as a consequence.
Q: Aside from los[s] of consciousness, would that person who sustained that injury have been able
to walk without the assistance of anybody?
A: In all [likelihood], he might have lost I said of his volitional movement, he [may be] able to walk
but as I have observe[d] it must be with assistance more particularly in this case whereby the
incise wound on the head is measured 12 cm., the head is a bloody organ in a way that if a
person is erect, blood will flow on that area and it might cause even modification of his
visual perception. 49
Li was slashed on the head with a bolo, causing a twelve centimeter (12 cm.)-wound, among other wounds. In such a
condition, it is highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay. Moreover, it
could not be established that Li was ever armed with a knife. Difficult as it is already to believe that the wounded Li
could have stabbed Arugay several times, the incredulity is compounded by imagining that Li would have also
groped around for a knife, dazed and severely wounded as he was. Simply put, Li could not have stabbed Arugay.
The assertions to the contrary of Tan and dela Camara are inherently flawed.
Fourth. In all, the factual determination made by the RTC is wholly believable up to a point. There were four
participants in the brawl, namely Li, Sangalang, Arugay and Tan. The first blow was struck by Li, who had armed
himself with a baseball bat and used the same to hit Arugay on the left upper arm. This unprovoked assault by Li
establishes at least some degree of criminal culpability on his part. Arugay then armed himself with a bolo which he
used to inflict an incised wound on the head of Li. After Li had fallen, Sangalang, himself armed with a knife, fatally
stabbed Arugay at least four times. Tan had picked up the baseball bat dropped by the wounded Li and struck Li on
the head with the bat. These findings are consistent with the physical evidence, reliance on which should be given
greater primacy over the unreliable eyewitness testimony of Tan and dela Camara.
Thus, Sangalang alone had stabbed Christopher Arugay. Yet the RTC still found Li guilty on the tenuous
determination that a conspiracy between Li and Sangalang existed. The RTC held:
From the evidence presented, the court believes and it so holds that there was conspiracy.
It must be pointed out that Kingstone Li and Eduardo Sangalang were then in the same house at the
same time. Eduardo Sangalang is the boyfriend of the half-sister of Kingstone Li.
The act of Kingstone Li [in] getting a baseball bat and using it as a weapon and the act of Eduardo
Sangalang alias Eddie Boy in arming himself with a sharp pointed weapon and both going out to
meet Christopher Arugay whose only sin is to point to the accused his scandalous and indecent act
in bathing nude not in the bathroom but in a place which is crowded by people who can see him
especially the ladies and is provocative to others are patent and conclusive presumption of
conspiracy for their acts were concerted and so close to each other that there is no way but to
conclude a conspiracy. 50 (Emphasis not ours)
Proving conspiracy is a dicey matter, especially difficult in cases such as the present wherein the criminal acts arose
spontaneously, as opposed to instances wherein the participants would have the opportunity to orchestrate a more
deliberate plan. Spontaneity alone does not preclude the establishment of conspiracy, which after all, can be
consummated in a moments notice through a single word of assent to a proposal or an unambiguous handshake.
Yet it is more difficult to presume conspiracy in extemporaneous outbursts of violence; hence, the demand that it be
established by positive evidence. A conviction premised on a finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on
mere inferences and presumption. 51
It is worth noting that while conspiracy was alleged in the Information against Li, the prosecution devoted its efforts
to prove that Li had actually inflicted the stab wounds on Sangalang, tagging him as a direct participant in the crime.
Thus, there seems to be no evidence that would directly establish the fact that Li and Sangalang had come into an
agreement to commit a common felony. Any conclusion that there was a conspiracy will have to be drawn
inferentially, as the RTC did.
It is not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit a crime if there is proof that the malefactors have acted
in concert and in pursuance of the common objectives. Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy since it is by
its nature often planned in utmost secrecy and it can seldom be proved by direct evidence. 52 Conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design. 53Complicity may
be determined by concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the form and manner in which
assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal wound. 54
However, caution dictates a careful examination of the established facts before concluding, as the RTC did, that an
implied conspiracy had been established. An implied conspiracy must still be based on facts established by positive
and conclusive evidence. 55 Even if conspiracy per se is not criminal, as it rarely is in this jurisdiction, 56 the weight
of factual evidence necessary to prove conspiracy is the same as required to establish criminal liability proof
beyond reasonable doubt. 57 Suppositions based on mere presumptions and not on solid facts do not constitute proof
beyond reasonable doubt. 58
The RTCs conclusion that there was a conspiracy was drawn from these circumstances, namely: that Li and
Sangalang were in the same house at the same time; and that they both armed themselves before going out to meet
Arugay. The fact that they were in the same house at the same time is not in itself sufficient to establish conspiracy.
Conspiracy transcends companionship, 59 and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. 60

The other circumstance that Li and Sangalang had emerged from Lis house, both armed, to face Arugay has to be
weighed against other facts also relied upon by the RTC. As the RTC held, Sangalang stabbed Arugay only after
petitioner had become unconscious. Before that point, even as Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat, it was not
proven that Li had asked for, or received, any assistance from Sangalang. Based on these circumstances, the Court is
hard put to conclude that Sangalang and Li had acted in concert to commit the offense. In fact, the stabbing of
Arugay could very well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li
was struck on the head by Arugay. From such a spontaneous reaction, a finding of conspiracy cannot arise. 61
Moreover, it appears that the fight involved two distinct phases. The first phase commenced when Li, without
sufficient provocation, assaulted Arugay with the baseball bat. Lis participation in this phase, albeit as a solitary
actor, was indubitably established. Sangalangs participation, much less his physical presence during this phase, was
not established at all. In the second phase, Sangalang was the main actor. Li was incapacitated by then. Clearly, the
existence of conspiracy should be ruled out.
After Arugay had been struck down, it appears that there would have been a lapse of at least a few minutes, affording
him time to procure the bolo. The second phase in the brawl then commenced. No further blows appear to have been
inflicted by Li. On the other hand, Li himself became the victim of the hack wounds on the head inflicted by Arugay.
As Li lay incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained highly doubtful whether he had any further participation
in the brawl. At that point, Sangalang, whose previous participation was not conclusively established, emerged into
the fray. Sangalang stabbed Arugay to death. Verily, it cannot be assumed that Sangalang did what he did with the
knowledge or assent of Li, much more in coordination with each other.
The scenario as established by the RTC still leaves many open-ended questions and admits to a myriad of
possibilities. This very uncertainty indicates that Lis liability as a conspirator was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. The general principle in criminal law is that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.
Consequently, when confronted with variant though equally plausible versions of events, the version that is in accord
with the acquittal or the least liability of the accused should be favored.
The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay
with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond
reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of
speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical
attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries, penalized as follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the offender has caused
physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor
require medical attendance; 62
The duration of the penalty of arresto menor is from one day to thirty days. 63 The felony of slight physical injuries
is necessarily included in the homicide charge. Since the Information against Li states that among the means
employed to commit the felonious act was the use of the baseball bat, conviction on the lesser offense of slight
physical injuries is proper. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances established, the imposition of the
penalty in its medium period is warranted. 64 Li was convicted by the RTC on January 5, 1994. Having long served
more than the imposable penalty, Li is entitled to immediate release unless, of course, he is being lawfully detained
for another cause.
What transpired during the dawn hours of 19 April 1993 was an artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of any
methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of
honor, but because the actors were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this lethal
imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful
scrutiny of the evidence reveals that the criminal culpability of Kingstone Li in the death of Christopher Arugay was
not established beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death apparently
remains at large. Yet absent any clear showing of conspiracy, as in this case, Kingstone Li cannot answer for the
crime of Eduardo Sangalang. HCSAIa
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of the
charge of Homicide for lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, he is found GUILTY of the crime of
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto menor in the medium period of ten (10) to twenty (20) days.
Considering that petitioner has been incarcerated well-beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause petitioners IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless petitioner is being lawfully
held for another cause, and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the
compliance with such order.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ ., concur.
||| (Li y Nunez v. People, G.R. No. 127962, [April 14, 2004], 471 PHIL 128-152)
 EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 134823-25. January 14, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO HAMTON a.k.a. "BOY

NEGRO," ANTONIO RAMIREZ alias "TONG" or "CHITO,"accused,

ARTHUR PANGILINAN y DE GUZMAN a.k.a. "TORING," ARNOLD LOPEZ y

SERRANO a.k.a. "ADAN MANALO," REYNALDO YAMBOT y MASAGAYA, and JUN
NOTARTE (at large), accused,

ARTHUR PANGILINAN y DE GUZMAN a.k.a. "TORING," ARNOLD LOPEZ y

SERRANO a.k.a. "ADAN MANALO" and REYNALDO YAMBOT y
MASAGAYA, appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Edilberto Barot, Jr. for A. Hamton.
Public Attorney's Office for A. Lopez & R. Yambot.
Free Legal Counsel for A. Pangilinan.

SYNOPSIS

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City convicting appellants of the
crimes of kidnapping for ransom and illegal possession of firearms and imposing upon each of them the death
penalty and a prison term. Appellants assailed the decision of the trial court finding all of them in conspiracy to
commit the crime. They further questioned the credibility of and competence of the prosecution's witnesses.
In affirming the conviction of the three appellants for the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the Court found that their
identities were adequately established by the clear and convincing testimonies of the victim Teofilo Garcia and his
wife, Leonida Garcia. Teofilo recounted his ordeal, replete with details that he could not have simply concocted. He
narrated the events that led to his abduction, his captivity, the ransom payment and his eventual release and rescue.
His wife, who was also present during the abduction, corroborated Teofilo's testimony. Their testimonies constitute
persuasive and unassailable proof that all the appellants committed the crime of kidnapping for ransom. ASIDTa
The Court further agreed that in perpetrating the crime of kidnapping for ransom, conspiracy existed among the three
appellants. Viewed in its totality, the individual participation of each of them pointed to a joint purpose and criminal
design.
However, the Court set aside appellants' conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms holding that they
cannot be held liable for such offense, since there was another crime kidnapping for ransom which they were
committing at the same time.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ASSAILANTS; IT IS NATURAL FOR VICTIMS TO STRIVE TO REMEMBER THE FACES OF THEIR
ASSAILANTS AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. At the
outset, we emphasize that the identities of all the accused were adequately established by the clear and convincing
testimonies of the victim and his wife. Particularly persuasive was the narration by Garcia of the events that led to
his abduction, his captivity, the ransom payment and his eventual release and rescue. He never wavered in his story,
even when he was subjected to an exhausting cross-examination by the defense counsels. . . . Thereafter, Garcia
further recounted his ordeal, replete with details that he could not have simply concocted. He narrated how he had
been brought to a house where he was chained to an iron grill and detained for ten days. His testimony included
details of how he had been fed, how he had relieved himself during his detention, and how he had been asked by
appellant Lopez to write a letter to his family to assure them that he was still alive. The testimony of the victim
regarding the ransom payment was likewise credible and convincing. He detailed the events leading to the pay-off,
from the time he was awakened to the time of the actual shoot-out that eventually led to the arrest of appellants. . . .
These testimonies constitute persuasive and unassailable proof that all the appellants committed the crime of
kidnapping. Certainly, the positive identification of them by the victim and his wife, who had ample opportunity to
see and remember their faces, more than satisfies the judicial mind and conscience. It is natural for victims of crimes
to strive to remember the faces of their assailants and the manner in which they committed the crime. Hence, there is
usually no reason for us to doubt their testimonies or to suspect their motives. The present witnesses had close
contact with the kidnappers when the victim was abducted and his wife was hit with a gun. Further, the victim was
held for ten (10) days, which was more than ample time for him to be familiar with them. His wife, on the other
hand, was in constant communication with one of the appellants during the ransom payment negotiations. She again
saw them during the actual ransom payment. Moreover, the appellants did not even deny their presence during the
abduction or the ransom payment. This fact bolsters the credibility of the spouses and confirms that they did not
simply make up their narration of the kidnapping.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES ARE WORTHY OF FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE ABSENT
ANY IMPROPER MOTIVE TO TESTIFY FALSELY AGAINST ACCUSED. In the instant case, there is no
showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim or his wife to testify falsely against the accused or to
implicate them falsely in the commission of so heinous a crime. The logical conclusion, then, is that no such
improper motive exists and that the testimonies are worthy of full faith and credence.
3. ID.; ID.; DENIAL; MERE DENIAL OF INVOLVEMENT IN A CRIME CANNOT TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER THE POSITIVE TESTIMONY OF THE OFFENDED PARTY. As a defense, denial is indeed insipid and
weak, being easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. Mere denial of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence
over the positive testimony of the offended party.
4. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; FOR THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI TO PROSPER, ACCUSED MUST DEMONSTRATE
PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AT THE TIME OF ITS COMMISSION.
Strangely, considering their proven participation in the crime, appellants Lopez and Yambot also proffer the
defense of alibi. For it to prosper, however, it is not enough for them to prove that they were somewhere else when
the crime was committed; they must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time. This, appellants miserably failed to show.
5. ID.; ID.; SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS
ASSERTED. Moreover, other than giving self-serving testimonies, they did not present any evidence to
corroborate their denial and alibi. It cannot be gainsaid that self-serving declarations are inadmissible as evidence of
the facts asserted. As a general rule, the reason for the exclusion of such evidence is not that it might never
contribute to the ascertainment of the truth. Rather, the reason is that, if received, it would most likely consist of
falsehoods fabricated for the occasion and mislead more than enlighten.
6. ID.; ID.; DENIAL AND ALIBI; THE DEFENSES OF DENIAL AND ALIBI ARE NEGATIVE, SELF-
SERVING AND UNDESERVING OF ANY WEIGHT IN LAW UNLESS SUBSTANTIATED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING PROOF. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all
defenses, because they are easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, they cannot prevail over the
positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party. Absent any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, a categorical, consistent and positive identification of the accused
prevails over denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, denial and alibi are negative, self-
serving and undeserving of any weight in law.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; CONSPIRACY MAY BE DEDUCED FROM THE MODE AND MANNER
IN WHICH THE OFFENSE WAS PERPETRATED. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement need not be proven by
direct evidence; it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during and after the commission of the
offense, pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Indeed, jurisprudence
consistently tells us that conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated.
8. ID.; ID.; WHEN CONSPIRACY IS PROVEN, THE CONSPIRATORS SHALL BE EQUALLY LIABLE FOR
THE CRIME. In the case at bar, as the trial court correctly held, conspiracy may be deduced from the appellants'
acts that show concerted action and community of interest. If it can be proven that two (2) or more persons aimed
their acts toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and concurrence of
sentiment then conspiracy may be inferred, even though no actual meeting among them to concert means can be
shown. Consequently, the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime, because in a conspiracy the act of
one is the act of all. DHITSc
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Undoubtedly, in perpetrating the kidnapping for ransom, conspiracy existed
among herein accused-appellants. Viewed in its totality, the individual participation of each of them pointed to a
joint purpose and criminal design. Notarte and Yambot snatched the victim from his office in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. Pangilinan and Yambot sandwiched him in the car and transported him, together with the others, to a house
where he was detained for ten days. Lopez negotiated with the victim's wife for the ransom payment. Further, all
three appellants set out to the designated place of ransom payment. These acts were complementary to one another
and were geared toward the attainment of a common ultimate objective. That objective was to extort a ransom of P10
million (which was later reduced to P1.2 million through bargaining by the victim's wife) in exchange for the
victim's freedom.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT A KIDNAPPING SYNDICATE WOULD ENTRUST THE
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR WELL-PLANNED CRIMINAL SCHEME TO PEOPLE WHO HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER OF THE DETAILS OF THEIR NEFARIOUS PLAN. Moreover, it is difficult
to accept the excuse of appellants that they had nothing to do with the kidnapping. We agree with the following
observation of the trial court: . . . . Verily, it is "inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust
the performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their well-planned criminal scheme to people not in cahoots
with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the details of their nefarious plan."
11. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; THE FACT THAT THE JUDGE WHO
PENNED THE DECISION WAS NOT THE ONE WHO HEARD THE TESTIMONIES DOES NOT IPSO FACTO
RENDER THE JUDGMENT ERRONEOUS. Likewise, the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not
the same one who had heard the testimonies of all the witnesses is not a compelling reason to jettison the findings of
the court a quo. This circumstance does not ipso facto render the judgment erroneous, more so when it appears to be
fully supported by the evidence on record. While a judge in such a situation has no way to test the credibility of all
the witnesses, since he did not have the unique opportunity of observing their demeanor and behavior under oath, the
trial court's factual findings are nonetheless binding on this Court when these are ably supported by the evidence on
record. Unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the validity of a decision is not necessarily
impaired by the fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.
12. CRIMINAL LAW; KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION; ELEMENTS; WHEN
IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY MANDATORY. The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another,
or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned [in Art. 267, Revised Penal Code] is present.
Moreover, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom. In the instant case, appellants cannot escape the penalty of death, inasmuch as it was sufficiently
alleged and indubitably proven that the kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
13. ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; NO SEPARATE OFFENSE OF SIMPLE ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IF AN UNLICENSED FIREARM IS USED IN THE COMMISSION OF ANY
OTHER CRIME. As to the conviction of the appellants for illegal possession of firearms, we are constrained to
dismiss and set aside this portion of the judgment. They cannot be held liable for such offense, since there was
another crime kidnapping for ransom which they were committing at the same time. . . . [T]his Court has
consistently ruled that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any other crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Explained the Court: "Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally
in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession
of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and
not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance . . . . The law
is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was
committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide
and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we."
14. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES, AWARDED TO THE VICTIM WHO SUFFERED
TRAUMA; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AWARDED WHERE THERE IS AN AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE. As regards the articles allegedly taken from the victim during the kidnapping, we find that
the prosecution failed to prove with certainty the amount of money or the value of the jewelry taken from him. These
cannot be presumed. Moreover, we reduce the award of moral damages to three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) to be paid by the appellants solidarily. The fact that the victim suffered the trauma of mental, physical
and psychological ordeal constitutes sufficient basis for an award of moral damages. Meanwhile, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages within the meaning
of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. There being a demand for ransom in this case, and by way of example or
correction, the offended party shall receive exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00).

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:
Before this Court for automatic review is the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 70,
penned by Judge Pablito M. Rojas in Criminal Cases Nos. 105326, 106115 and 106116, finding Arthur Pangilinan,
Arnold Lopez and Reynaldo Yambot guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of kidnapping for ransom and
illegal possession of firearms and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death and a prison term of six
(6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. HIAEcT
Antonio Hamton, who was found guilty of robbery and sentenced to an "indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years
of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor" in Criminal Case No. 105326, filed an appeal with this
Court, but later withdrew the same. 1
The Solicitor General narrates the antecedent facts of the case as follows:
"Teofilo Garcia, and his wife, Leonida, were the sole distributors of the Singer Sewing Machines
under the business name 'Garmer Industrial Sewing Machines'. On March 8, 1994, around eleven
o'clock in the morning, two armed men, later identified as Jun Notarte and Reynaldo Yambot,
entered the Garcias' office and showroom at 322 Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City and
announced a hold-up. After emptying Teofilo's drawer of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) in cash,
they took him with them outside to a waiting light gray Mitsubishi Lancer. Inside the car were two
other men, later identified as herein appellant Arnold Lopez and Arthur Pangilinan. Teofilo was
shoved into the backseat of the car and blindfolded with black sunglasses covered with adhesive
tapes. One of the men told him, 'Pera lang ang kailangan namin sa iyo'. His abductors then divested
him of his gold ring worth Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), his gold bracelet worth
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), his gold necklace worth Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00),
and his wallet containing, among others, Two Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P2,300.00) in cash.
"About the time Teofilo was being led out of the office, Leonida arrived. Seeing her husband's
plight, she immediately approached the Mitsubishi Lancer and asked the men inside why they were
taking her husband. In response, appellant hit her on the nose with a gun and pushed her away. The
Mitsubishi Lancer then sped away.
"After traveling for about two hours, the Mitsubishi Lancer stopped. Teofilo's abductors transferred
him to a trimobile where, accompanied by appellant, he traveled for thirty minutes more before
finally stopping. Teofilo was brought to a house where he was confined in a room with no windows.
To prevent him from escaping, his left wrist was chained to an iron grill. Three or four persons
guarded him.
"On March 10, 1994, around eleven o'clock in the morning, appellant, who identified himself as
'Adan Manalo,' called up Leonida, telling her to prepare the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) as ransom money for her husband's release. When Leonida pleaded for the
amount to be lowered since she could not afford it, appellant put the phone down.
"On March 12, 1994, appellant called up Leonida to inquire if she had already raised the ransom
amount. Leonida replied that she had raised only Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) and
would be needing more time to raise the rest of the amount.
"Appellant called again around twelve noon of March 14, 1994. Asked how much money she had
already raised, Leonida answered that she was still trying to raise the needed amount. She also
requested appellant to get for her the key to their office vault from her husband, so that she could
get the money inside and add it to the money to be paid as ransom.
"Accordingly, appellant, on March 15, 1994, told Teofilo to give him the key to their office vault
and to write a note for his family so that they would know that he was still alive. Teofilo did as he
was instructed.
"Around eight o'clock in the morning of March 16, 1994, appellant called up Leonida to inform her
that the key to their office vault as well as a note from her husband was ready for her pick-up at
Andok's Litson located at EDSA corner Estrella Street. By ten o'clock of the same morning,
Leonida was in possession of the key and the note. She was able to confirm that the note was in her
husband's handwriting. When appellant called her again later that day, Leonida informed him that
she had gotten the key and the note, and that she had raised One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
already. Unimpressed, appellant told her that this was not enough and that he would call her again
the next day.
"True to his word, appellant called around noontime the following day. Informed by Leonida that
she now had One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00), appellant seemed finally
satisfied. He then gave Leonida instructions for the pay-off. At a little before four o'clock that
afternoon, she should be at the Magallanes flyover and open the hood of her car to make it appear
that it developed engine trouble. Appellant would then drive by and stop his car beside hers. After
he identifies himself as 'Adan,' Leonida should immediately hand over the ransom money to him.

"All this time, Leonida had been coordinating with the Task Force Habagat of the Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission (PACC). Alerted of these latest developments, Col. Michael Ray Aquino, Chief
of Special Operations, PACC, planned for the delivery of the ransom money and Teofilo's rescue.
Eight teams were formed to monitor the pay-off and conduct rescue operations. The ransom money
was placed in a light blue Dunlop bag (Exhibit G) and Leonida was instructed to wear a green dress
for easy identification at the pay-off site.
"About 3:45 in the afternoon of the same day, Leonida, accompanied by her driver, arrived at the
pay-off site on board her Pajero. Pursuant to appellant's instructions, Leonida's driver opened the
hood of the Pajero. A red Toyota Corolla with Plate No. PFW 688 then approached and stopped just
beside the Pajero. Leonida saw her husband seated between two men at the back of the red car.
Meanwhile, appellant, who was seated in front at the passenger side, got down from the car. After
identifying himself as 'Adan,' Leonida gave the Dunlop bag containing the ransom money to him.
The Toyota Corolla then sped away.
"Inside the Toyota Corolla, appellant gave Teofilo Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) for taxi, assuring
him that they would drop him off a short distance away. Before they could do so, however, they
noticed a speeding white Nissan Sentra behind them. Appellant warned his companions,'Puwesto
kayo, delikado tayo mga kasama, alert kayo, puwesto kayo'. Without stopping to release Teofilo
anymore, the Toyota Corolla raced along EDSA towards Cubao, with the Nissan Sentra in hot
pursuit. The chase continued until the Toyota Corolla stopped near the intersection of Guadix Drive
and ADB Avenue. Using an armalite, Jun Notarte, the driver of the Toyota Corolla, opened fire at
the Nissan Sentra, shattering its windshield. Col. Raymundo Padua and his team members, the
occupants of the Nissan Sentra, returned fire. During the exchange of gunfire, Jun Notarte managed
to escape. However, his companions, namely appellant, Arthur Pangilinan, and Reynaldo Yambot,
were not as lucky. After about ten minutes of intermittent firing, they were finally subdued and
taken into custody. Teofilo was successfully rescued, shaken but unharmed.
"Among the items recovered from Teofilo's kidnappers were the following: the Dunlop bag
containing the ransom money in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,200,000.00); additional cash in the amount of Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred Forty Seven
Pesos (P32,647.00); an M-16 armalite rifle with Serial No. 164881 (Exhibit CC); and a .45-caliber
pistol with Serial No. 1163568 (Exhibit A). Subsequent verification revealed that the M-16 armalite
rifle and the .45-caliber pistol were not registered with the Firearms and Explosives Office, Camp
 Crame, Quezon City, and that no license to possess these firearms had ever been issued in the
names of any of Teofilo's kidnappers.
"Separately apprehended in connection with his kidnapping incident was Antonio Hamton. Having
somehow learned about Teofilo's abduction, Antonio, at the same time that appellant was
negotiating with [Leonida] for the ransom money, was also calling up Leonida, pretending to be her
husband's kidnapper. Antonio's ruse was eventually discovered, but not before he was already able
to extort Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) from Leonida." 2
An Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 106114, was filed on April 14, 1994. It charged appellants in this
manner:
"That [on] or about March 8, 1994 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning at Shaw Boulevard, corner
Aquino Lane in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being all private persons conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping/aiding each other and by means of force, threats or intimidation and with the use
of arms and vehicles, for the purpose of demanding money or ransom, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully. and feloniously abduct and kidnap TEOFILO M. GARCIA while at his office; and that
once in their physical custody and control detain and deprive him of his liberty against his will, and
demand TEN (P10,000,000) Million from his wife Leonida Garcia, in exchange for her husband's
life, safety and freedom, but which amount through sheer patient appeals/negotiation was later
reduced to P1.2 Million, which accused finally agreed and accepted which said Mrs. Leonida
Garcia, did in fact give, pay and deliver the said amount or ransom money to accused to her loss,
damage and prejudice." 3
A second Information, docketed. as Criminal Case No. 106116, was filed against appellants thus:
"That, on or about March 8 & 17, 1994 in the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control, a Caliber 45
Pistol, bearing Serial No. SN-1163568, and one (1) M-16 Rifle with Serial No. RP 164881, without
first having secured the necessary license and/or permit, from the corresponding office/agency of
government." 4
During their arraignment on May 2, 1994, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, pleaded not guilty to the
twin charges of kidnapping for ransom and illegal possession of firearms. 5 After a joint trial, they were found guilty
via the automatically appealed Decision, which reads in part:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Arthur Pangilinan y de Guzman, a.k.a. 'Toring';
Arnold Lopez y Serrano, a.k.a. 'Adan Manalo'; and Reynaldo Yambot y Masagaya, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of Kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in Criminal Case No. 106115 and of the
offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms as charged in Criminal Case No. 106116. For the offense
of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, said accused are hereby meted out the death
penalty. For the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms, said accused are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years and to pay a fine of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 30,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
"Accused Pangilinan, Lopez and Yambot are further ordered to return to the private complainant,
Teofilo Garcia, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (PHP 4,300.00)
representing the total amount of cash taken from the latter's office and his person during the
abduction, as well as to return or restore to said private complainant the gold bracelet and the gold
necklace or if the same is no longer possible, to pay the value of the same which is PHP 50,000.00
 each. In addition, said accused are hereby ordered to indemnify, in solidum, the private
complainant, Teofilo Garcia, the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS (PHP 2,000,000.00) and to the
wife of the complainant, Leonida Garcia, the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (PHP
1,000,000.00), by way of moral damages." 6
Appellants submitted individual appeal briefs assailing the RTC Decision. They aver that the trial court failed to
establish clearly that they had all committed conspiracy to commit kidnapping for ransom. The lower court should
have imposed individual penalties upon them depending on their degree of participation in the crime.
Appellants also question their conviction for illegal possession of firearms, arguing that the prosecution failed to
produce sufficient evidence showing their physical or constructive possession of the subject firearms. Further, they
contend that their conviction for the said offense cannot be made on the basis of the testimony of a prosecution
witness of questionable credibility and competence. EaICAD
Specifically, appellant Reynaldo Yambot assigns the following errors:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT REYNALDO
YAMBOT AS CO-CONSPIRATOR IN COMMITTING THE OFFENSE OF KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM.
"II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED REYNALDO YAMBOT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT CREDIBLE ENOUGH TO
TESTIFY." 7
This assignment of errors has been adopted by appellant Arnold Lopez with the following addition:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED ARNOLD LOPEZ GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT
THAT HE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY REPRESENTED DURING THE PRESENTATION OF
CO-ACCUSED ARTHUR PANGILINAN AS HOSTILE WITNESS." 8
On the other hand, appellant Arthur Pangilinan ascribes the following errors to the trial court:
"3.1 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT AS A
CONSPIRATOR IN THE OFFENSE OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION.
"3.2 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS IN PHYSICAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE
POSSESSION OF ANY OF THE SUBJECT FIREARMS AND THAT HE HAD ANIMUS
POSSIDENDI AS REGARDS THESE FIREARMS." 9
After a careful review of the records and the arguments of both the prosecution and the defense, this Court agrees
with the trial court that all three appellants are guilty of kidnapping for ransom, but not of illegal possession of
firearm.
Appellants all rely on the defense of denial and alibi. They point to Jun Notarte, who is still at large, as the
mastermind of the kidnapping. They maintain that they merely accepted his offer of jobs with higher pay, and that
they were not privy to his plans to kidnap Garcia. Plainly, they want this Court to believe that they were simply in
the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong companion and for the wrong reason.
Appellant Arnold Lopez claims that Notarte offered him a job to train as a soldier, with better pay. 10 He says that
because of his meager earnings as a construction worker, he was easily enticed by Notarte's promise. 11 He alleges,
however, that he was not present during the abduction of the victim, because he was working in Paraaque, installing
doors and windows from March 8 to 15, 1994. 12 It was only because of the job offer that he was present during the
pay-off. He argues further that his participation in the kidnapping incident was very minimal, if any, so he could not
have been a co-conspirator in the crime. 13

On the other hand, Reynaldo Yambot alleges that Notarte promised to help him apply as a driver of the latter's
superior officer. 14 Yambot maintains that, because he was driving his jeepney in Caloocan from March 8 to 16,
1994, 15 he was not present during the abduction of the victim. The only reason he was present during the pay-off
was that Notarte had actually engaged him as a driver, but without his knowing anything about the abduction that
had already taken place. 16
Finally, Arthur Pangilinan claims that he was offered a job to watch Notarte's car at five hundred pesos a day. 17 He
maintains that there were no overt acts that would link him to the kidnapping other than his "being merely an ill-
fated passenger of the car used by his co-accused in two occasions, i.e., in kidnapping Mr. Garcia and in receiving
the ransom from the victim's wife." 18 Further, his wife was presented in court to corroborate his claim that he had
not taken part in the plan to commit the kidnapping.
At the outset, we emphasize that the identities of all the accused were adequately established by the clear and
convincing testimonies of the victim and his wife. Particularly persuasive was the narration by Garcia of the events
that led to his abduction, his captivity, the ransom payment and his eventual release and rescue. He never wavered in
his story, even when he was subjected to an exhausting cross-examination by the defense counsels. He testified thus:
"JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q On March 8, 1994 at about 11:00 in the morning do you remember where were you?
A Yes, sir. I was in my office at about 11:00 in the morning at Shaw Blvd.
Q Were you alone in your office?
A I was with my three employees, sir.
Q What are their names?
A They are Grace Munda, Aurora Mckinley and Dado Mercado, sir.
COURT:
Q How is he related to your wife?
A He is the cousin of my wife, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q On that occa[s]ion, do you recall having received a visitor in your office?
A Yes, sir. Two men arrived.
Q What questions, if any, did they ask you upon entering your showroom?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
No basis, Your Honor.
COURT:
He said he had two visitors. Witness may answer.
WITNESS
A When the two men entered in our office, one pretended to be a customer and the other one
approach[ed] my three employees, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Why do you say that one of them pretended to be a customer?
A Because he was the one who asked me about the price of the sewing machine, sir.
Q Was there anything unusual that happened afterwards?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We will object, Your Honor. The question is leading.
COURT:
How can it be leading? Objection overruled. Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A Yes, there was, sir.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q What is it?
A The one who pretended as a customer pulled out the gun and pointed it at me and said, 'hold-up',
sir.
Q What kind of firearm did you see?
A It's a 45 caliber, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
All right. You said that, there were two male visitors who entered your showroom that day, what
was the other one doing?
A The other one poked a gun on my three employees, sir.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Can you identify the man who pointed the gun at your three employees if you see him again?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around the courtroom and point to the man who pointed a gun at your three
employees?
COURT:
Why don't you ask him the guy who poked the gun at him.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
He was the one who got away, Your Honor. There were four kidnappers, one of them escape. He is
at large.
COURT:
All right. Let him identify.
Q Yung nagtutok sa iyo [ng] baril nandito ba?
A Wala po.
Q Yung nagtutok ng baril sa tatlo nandito ba?
A Opo. He is here, your Honor.
Q Yung nagtutok ng baril sa tatlong empleyado mo, ituro mo, bumababa ka at ituro mo.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a man whom when asked identify himself as Reynaldo Yambot.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q You stated that the man [who] pretended to be a customer poked a gun at you, what did he want?
COURT:
He already said, 'hold-up.'
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q What did he do afterwards, if he did anything?
A After he said, 'hold-up', he opened the drawer of my table and g[o]t some P2,000.00 cash, sir.
Q Having taken the money, what did he do afterwards?
A Then he told me, you go with us, sir. After taking the money he said, 'sama ka sa amin.'
Q What was your reaction?
A I went along with him, sir.
Q Why did you go with him?
A I went with him because it was a 'hold-up' and I was afraid so I went with him, sir.
Q At the time he made those statements, what was he doing to the gun?
A He tucked it in his waist, sir.
Q Did you go with him willingly?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A 'Baka patayin po ako kaya sumama ako.' Perhaps they would kill me so I went along with him,
sir.
Q Where did he take you?
A They b[r]ought me outside the door and outside was a car waiting, sir.
[A] I am showing you pictures of a car . . . (discontinued)
COURT:
Excuse me. Why don't you ask him first to describe the car.
Q Anong itsura ng kotse?
A It was a lancer with a color which looks like a silver green with tinted windows and partially
tinted front glass, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q How did you enter the vehicle that was waiting for you?
A The car was opened by accused Jun Notarte and I was pushed inside, sir.
FISCAL VILLA-IGNACIO:
Your Honor please, actually the witness said tinuhod meaning a person used his knee to shove him
inside the vehicle. It's more of a kick, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
A The car was opened by accused Ju[n] Notarte and he used his knee to shove me inside, sir.
ATTY. DE LEON:
We adopt the tagalog translation also, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
A Tinuhod niya ako papasok sa kotse.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Did you enter the front seat or the back seat?
A The back seat, sir.
Q Once you were inside the vehicle, will you tell the Court what happened?
A I was sand[w]iched by two men, sir.
COURT:
Q Who was the one to your right?
A Arthur Pangilinan was on my right, Your Honor.
Q And who was on your left?
A Yambot was on my left, Your Honor.
JUSTICE. CONCEPCION:
Q Is the man whom you mentioned, Arthur Pangilinan, can you identify him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is he in the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Bumaba ka at ituro nyo po.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a man inside the courtroom whom when asked identify himself as Arthur
Pangilinan.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q After you were seated sandwiched between two men, do you recall if there were any persons
seated on the front of the vehicle?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the driver's seat who was seated?
A Ju[n] Notarte was in the driver's seat, sir.
Q And on the seat beside the driver?
A Beside the driver was Arnold Lopez, sir.
Q Can you identify the man whom you said as Arnold Lopez?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to him.
FISCAL VILLA-IGNACIO:
For the record, Your Honor, witness is stepping down from the witness stand and appearing to
[point] to a man whom when asked answered by the name of Arnold Lopez.
ATTY. MACATANGAY:
For the record, Your Honor, Arnold Lopez is [the] man who is walking with c[r]utches.
COURT:
Make it of record that the man is using c[r]utches.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q After you were seated in the car, will you please state what transpired, if any?
A Yung sunglass na sinasabing piring, piniringan po ako rito.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you not ask these men what they wanted from you?
A I a[sk]ed them what they want from me, sir.
ATTY. MACATANGAY:
 Very leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
I will allow that.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q And what is the answer, if any?
A 'Pera lang ang kailangan namin sa iyo', that was what they told me, sir.
Q After you were already in the car, what did you try to do in the car?
A None, sir. We were on the road." 19
Thereafter, Garcia further recounted his ordeal, replete with details that he could not have simply concocted. He
narrated how he had been brought to a house where he was chained to an iron grill 20 and detained for ten
days. 21 His testimony included details of how he had been fed, how he had relieved himself during his detention,
and how he had been asked by appellant Lopez to write a letter to his family to assure them that he was still
alive. 22 The testimony of the victim regarding the ransom payment was likewise credible and convincing. He
detailed the events leading to the pay-off, from the time he was awakened to the time of the actual shoot-out that
eventually led to the arrest of appellants. 23
His wife, who was also present during the abduction; corroborated his testimony as follows:
"FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q Will you tell this Honorable Court, Mrs. Garcia, if on March 8, 1994 you reported for work in
your office?
A Yes, I reported for work about 11 o'clock.
Q Were you able to reach your office that morning of March 8, 1994?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall of any unusual incident that took place that morning?
A I saw my husband being led by the arm by a man and another man was just behind my husband
and closely following.
COURT:
Q Where were they going?
A I saw them going to board a blue grey vehicle.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q Would you know the model or make of the car?
A I did not notice but I know it was colored blue grey.
Q What else happened when you saw that your husband was being led inside the car?
A I saw that my husband as if he was shoved inside (tinuhod).
Q Who of the two, if you saw, 'tumuhod sa asawa mo'?
A He's a tall man with fair complexion.
Q The one who shoved, would you kindly look around if he is in the courtroom?
A He is not around.
Q What about the other one who closely followed your husband?
A He is here.
Q Will you kindly go down and identify him by lightly tapping his shoulder?
INTERPRETER:
The witness pointed to a man inside the courtroom who when asked identified himself as Reynaldo
Yambot.

[FISCAL DAOSOS:]
Q After your husband was shoved inside that grey car, what else happened, if you know?
A I alighted from my car and opened the front door of the blue grey vehicle. I saw my husband with
a blindfold and a gun pointed to him.
Q You said when you opened the car, you saw your husband already wearing a black blindfold
sunglass. If you are shown that sunglass or black blindfold would you be able to recognize
it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I'm showing to you a plastic sunglass which was previously marked, Your Honor, as exh. 'C'.
Will you kindly go over and tell this Honorable Court what is the relation of that black
sunglass to the blindfold you were referring to [a] while ago?
A Parang ganito po.
Q You also said that someone pointed a gun at your husband. What particular part of the head or the
face was the gun pointed?
A The gun was pointed to my husband's neck.
Q Would you be able to recognize the person who was pointing a gun at your husband?
A I would not know who was the person who pointed a gun to my husband.
Q What kind of gun was pointed, was it a long firearm or a short firearm?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We object to that question, Your Honor. He is suggesting to the witness her answer . . .
FISCAL DAOSOS:
If she knows.
COURT:
Q What kind of gun was that?
A It was a short gun.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q If you are shown a gun of that description, as you said 'short' [,w]ould you be able to recall
whether the gun that we are going to show you will be similar to that pointed to your
husband's neck?
COURT:
Excuse me. Before you show that particular gun to the witness, [d]o you know what sort of hand
gun was pointed to your husband?
A No, Your Honor. Basta baril. Para pong pagalingan lang yung baril na yan, eh. Ngunit kung
pakikitaan ako puwede k[o]ng ituro pero hind ko alam kung anong klaseng baril yon.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q I'm showing to you a [hand]gun. Will you be able to tell this Honorable Court if the gun pointed
to the neck of your husband would be similar to this?
A Para pong kamukha.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
This was already marked as Exh. 'A', Your Honor.
Q Now, where was your husband seated, madam witness?
A Nasa gitna po siya ng dalawang lalake.
Q Where? [In f]ront or at the rear?
A He was seated at the rear of the car sandwiched by two persons.
Q Now, you said that your husband was seated between two persons. Would you be able to tell this
Honorable Court which of the two pointed a gun at your husband. Was it the person sitting
at the left of your husband or the right side of your husband?
A I did not see clearly which of the two men was pointing a gun at my husband.
Q You said, Mrs. Garcia, that your husband was seated between two persons at the rear seat of the
car, [is] that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you be able to recognize any of the two that sandwiched your husband?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
Your Honor, the witness is incompetent to answer that.
COURT:
Let her answer if she knows.
A Yung pong isa sa kaliwa ng mister ko.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q Will you kindly look around this courtroom and point to the person identified, the person sitting
at the left of your husband?
A At my husband's left was Reynaldo Yambot.
Q We go back to that portion where you said you immediately opened the door of the front seat of
the car . . .
COURT:
You would not know or you would not recall the face of the man who was seated to your husband's
right?
A I cannot recall, Your Honor.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q You said that you opened the front seat of the car. Which side of the door of the car that you
opened?
A I opened the right side door of the vehicle.
Q Were you able to open the car?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do, if any, when you opened the car?
A I asked them why they are taking my husband. What wrong has he done.
Q What was their reply, if any?
A I did not hear any answer. . .
COURT:
Q Bakit wala kang narinig na sagot. Ano ang sinabi mo sa kanila?
A Ang sinabi ko po, 'ano ang kasalanan ng mister ko, bakit ninyo siya kinuha.' I did not hear any
answer but instead I was whipped with a gun.
Q Were you hit by this gun? Where were you hit?
A The gun hit my nose and my nose even bled on that day.
Q Will you tell this Honorable Court briefly what kind of gun was used to whip you?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
The witness already answered she does not know what kind of a gun was that.
[FISCAL DAOSOS:]
Q All right. The next question is, is it a long gun or a short gun?
A It was also a short gun.
Q Would you be able to say if the gun looks similar to the one that was pointed to the neck of your
husband?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We interpose objection to that question, Your Honor. For the reason that it is not only leading but
the witness is incompetent to testify on what kind of gun was she able to see.
FISCAL ASDALA:
The testimony refers to the husband not to the gun used in whipping her.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q Would it be similar?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
She's not in a position to testify. . .
COURT:
Just ask her to describe it.
A Parang pareho duon sa ipinakita sa akin. (it looks like the one I was shown earlier).
COURT:
Witness referring to a caliber 45 marked as exhibit 'A'.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q You said you asked them, 'why are you taking my husband, what wrong has he done'. Now, did
you notice if there were people in the front seat of the car?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would [you] be able to recognize the person who whipped you with the gun?
A Nakilala ko po.
Q If he is in this courtroom would [you] be able to identify him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please step down and identify this person by lightly tapping his shoulder?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man inside the courtroom who identified himself as Arnold Lopez.
[FISCAL DAOSOS:]
Q Where was this Arnold Lopez seated?
A He was seated in [f]ront beside the driver.
COURT:
Q Where was he at the time when he whipped you with the gun?
A He was seated beside the driver's seat.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q How about the driver's seat[,] was somebody there?
A Meron po.
Q Would you tell this Honorable Court if that man occupying the driver's seat is inside this
courtroom?
 A He is not present.
Q Now, after you were whipped and you received no reply, what happened, if any?
A Tinulak niya po ako palabas.
Q Who?
A Arnold Lopez pushed me out.
Q Now, after you were pushed out, what else happened?
A They sped away.
Q Were you able to observe to what direction they sped away?
A They were going towards the direction of Acacia Lane." 24
These testimonies constitute persuasive and unassailable proof that all the appellants committed the crime of
kidnapping. Certainly, the positive identification of them by the victim and his wife, who had ample opportunity to
see and remember their faces, more than satisfies the judicial mind and conscience. It is natural for victims of crimes
to strive to remember the faces of their assailants and the manner in which they committed the crime. 25 Hence,
there is usually no reason for us to doubt their testimonies or to suspect their motives. The present witnesses had
close contact with the kidnappers when the victim was abducted and his wife was hit with a gun. Further, the victim
was held for ten (10) days, which was more than ample time for him to be familiar with them. His wife, on the other
hand, was in constant communication with one of the appellants during the ransom payment negotiations. She again
saw them during the actual ransom payment. SIDEaA
Moreover, the appellants did not even deny their presence during the abduction or the ransom payment. This fact
bolsters the credibility of the spouses and confirms that they did not simply make up their narration of the
kidnapping.
As to the demand for and the actual payment of the ransom money, the victim's wife testified thus:
"JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q On March 17, 1994 you recall having received a telephone call?
A Opo.
Q At about what time did you receive the call?
A Banda pong mag-aalas dose ng umaga po.
Q And who was the one who called you?
A Si Adan po.
Q Was there any conversation?
A Ang sabi niya po sa akin 'nadagdagan na ba 'yong pera?' 'Opo, nadagdagan na ng dalawang
daan.'
COURT:
Dalawang daang piso? Dalawang daan? O two hundred thousand?
A Two hundred thousand (P200,000.00).
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
.Q And what did Adan say?
A . . . sabi niya 'ito na dahil ang sabi mo gusto mong makausap ang mister mo, ito na ang mister
mo, kausapin mo na siya.'
Q Were you able to talk to your husband?
A Opo, kinausap niya ako. Ang sabi niya po sa akin 'lumipat ka ng bahay.'
Q What else?
A Yon po ang sabi niya lumipat ako ng bahay. Pa[g]katapos ko daw pong makipagusap.
COURT:
Just quote what he said. You quote what he actually said to you.
PROS. DAOSOS:
Ano ang sinabi?
A Opo. Ang sabi niya lumipat ako ng bahay.
COURT:
Hindi lumipat. 'Yong mismong sinabi niya. I-quote mo 'yong sinabi niya mismo.
A Yon nga lumipat daw ako ng bahay.
COURT:
Hindi. Kung ano ang sinabi niya mismo.
A 'Lumipat ka ng bahay.''
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q To what house?
A 'Lumipat ka ng bahay. Pumunta ka doon kila nanay.'
COURT:
'Yon lang ba ang sinabi sa iyo sa telepono?
A Oho. Tapos ang sagot ko 'bakit?'
Q And what was the answer?
A Wala na po. Ang sumagot si Adan na po.
Q And what did Adan say?
A Ang sabi niya 'O, iready mo ang pera' tatawag uli ako bago mag-ala una.'
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q What else did he say? Is that all?
A Opo. Binaba na niya ang telepono.
Q Do you recall if on that day Adan Manalo called you up?
A Opo, tumawag po siya mga ala-una.
Q What was your conversation?
A Tinanong niya po sa akin kung magkano na ang pera. Ang sabi ko po 1.2 na.
Q 1.2 what?
A One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00) lang ang naiipon ko. Nagalit po siya sa
akin. Ang sabi niya 'bakit 1.2 lang?' Di ba sabi mo 2 million na. Akala ko two million na.'
Hindi sabi ko. 1.2. tang ang naipon ko sa ngayon. Baka puwede na iyon kapalit ng mister
ko.
Q And what did Adan say?
A Na cut na naman[. [T]atawag uli ako[,] sabi niya.
Q Did he in fact call up again?
A Opo.
Q At about what time.
A Mag-aalas dos na po iyon.

Q Ng hapon?
A Ng hapon po.
Q And what was your conversation with him?
A Pumayag na po siya sa 1.2 na ibibigay ko sa kanya kapalit ng mister ko.
Q When you said 1.2, what do you mean?
A Ransom money.
Q 1.2 what is that?
A One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00).
Q So you said he agreed already to the amount of one million two hundred thousand pesos
(P1,200,000.00)?
A Opo.
Q In exchange [for] your husband?
A Opo.
Q And what else did you talk about?
A Binigyan niya po ako ng instruction kung saan ko ibibigay 'yong 1.2 million.
Q Could you tell us what is the instruction?
A Ang sabi niya po sa akin magkikita kami ng bago mag-alas kuwatro ng hapon sa fly-over.
Q Fly-over where?
A Doon po sa Magallanes papuntang Alabang doon po sa ibabaw tapat po daw ng Mercedes Benz
Service. Doon po daw ako tatapat at buksan ko daw iyong hood para po daw sira . . . sira
'yong sasakyan ko at saka buksan ko po daw lahat ang bintana ng sasakyan ko.
Q Was there any other instructions?
A Ang sabi po niya ipaparada po daw niya sa tabi ng sasakyan ko at saka bubuksan niya sasabihin
niya 'ako si Adan.' Doon ko po daw ibibigay ang pera. Pag sinabi niyang siya si Adan doon
ko po daw ibibigay ang pera. At saka tinanong din po niya sa akin kung anong sasakyan ang
gagamitin ko.
Q Did you tell him?
A Opo, sinabi ko po Pajero ang gagamitin kong sasakyan. Ibinigay ko po lahat 'yung plate number.
Q What plate number did you give?
A 'T' as in Task, 'F' as in Force and 'H' as in Habagat. Number 808.
Q What else did you talk about?
A ['Y]on po. Sabi niya bago mag-alas kuwatro nandon na ako. Binaba na po niya.
Q Now what happened after your phone conversation?
A I called up PACC.
Q Whom did you call?
A Si Major Aquino po at saka si Tinyente Mendoza. Nagpunta po sila sa bahay.
Q Were you able to talk with them?
A Opo.
Q What was your conversation with them?
A Sinabi ko po sa kanila magbabayaran na kami dito sa lugar na ito bago mag-alas kuwatro
magkikita kami sa ibabaw ng fly-over.
Q Did you tell them what fly-over?
A Opo. 'Yon pong sa Magallanes papuntang Alabang doon po ako pupuwesto.
Q What time you should go there?
A Bago mag-alas kuwatro nandoon na ako sa ibabaw.
Q What did Major Aquino and his companion tell you?
A Wala na po. Umalis na po sila. Ako naman po papunta na sa luga[r] na ibibigay ko 'yong pera.
COURT:
Q Are you saying that Major Aquino did not give you any instruction?
A Wala na po. Basta ang sabi niya 'O sige pumunta ka na doon.' Hindi ko na po alam kung ano ang
gagawin nila.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Did you in fact go to the fly-over on the corner of Magallanes?
A Opo, pumunta po ako.
Q In what vehi[cl]e were you riding?
A 'Yon pong Pajero.
Q Who was driving?
COURT:
Q At what time did you leave your house?
A Siguro po mga alas 3:15 po.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Who was the driver?
A May driver po ako.
Q And where were you seated?
A Sa tabi po ng driver.
Q When you went to the place [w]here you bringing anything with you?
A Opo, meron po.
Q What were you bringing?
A 'Yon pong pera na nakalagay sa bag.'
COURT:
Q How much?
A One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00).
Q Place in?
A Nakalagay po sa bag na Dunlop na kulay asul.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Did you arrive at the fly-over in Magallanes?
COURT:
A Were you not going to ask her to identify the bag?
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Later on Your Honor because the money were xeroxed. We will ask her. Nakarating na ba kayo sa
Magallanes?
A Opo, nakarating po kami.
Q And what happened upon your arrival in Magallanes?
A 3:45 ng makarating po kami doon.
Q Did your driver comply with the instruction to open the hood?
A Opo. Bumaba po siya at saka binuksan 'yong hood na kunwari nasiraan 'yong sasakyan. Eh,
matagal po kami doon. May lumapit pa pongtraffic aide. Ang sabi ko sandali na lang,
inaayos pa 'yong sasakyan eh. Ang sabi ko aalis na rin kami dahil ho tumagal kami doon ng
mga ten minutes eh. Tinataboy na kami ng traffic aid. Ngayon ho sinara namin 'yong hood.
Lumakad ho kami unti-unti eh kasi nga hindi pa ho sila dumarating. Eh ngayon siguro mga
alas-kuwatro na ho sila dumating biglang meron pumaradang red toyota sa tabi namin.
COURT:
Q Where did they park their car?
A They parked their car parallel to my car.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q You mentioned a red toyota. I am showing you Exhibit 'I' on which attached Exhibits 'I-1' and '1-
2', can you identify them?
A Para pong kahawig na ganito. Ganitong kulay.
Q Ang ano?
A Ang sasakyan.
Q Kahawig na paano?
A Para pong ganyan.
Q After this toyota car stopped beside the Pajero, what transpired next?
A Bumukas po 'yong dalawang bintana. Bandang kanan nila. Dalawang bintana.
Q Nang ano? Nang anong kotse?
A Yong red toyota po.
Q And where were you at that time?
A Nandoon po ako sa tabi ng driver.
Q Nang?
A Nang sasakyan ko po, 'yong Pajero.
Q When those two (2) windows on the right side of the car, the toyota car open did you see
anything?
A Nakipag-usap po sa akin . . . Nakita ko po ang mister ko at saka 'yong katabi niya.
COURT:
Q Where was he seated? Right or left?
A Parang nasa gitna po. Parang nandito po siya sa tagiliran.
Q When you saw your husband where was he seated?
A Dito po sa tabi ng bintana.
Q Kaya nga, where was he seated?
A Sa likod po.
Q Yes, where was he seated, right, middle or left?
A Right.
Q Extreme right?
A Yes.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Was he alone in the back seat?
A Hindi ho. Nakita ko ho 'yong sa kaliwa niya.
Q Can you identify the man who was seated on his left?
A Opo. (Witness pointing to a man inside the court room, who, when asked, answered by the name
of Arthur Pangilinan.)
Q Do I understand from you that there were only two (2) persons seated at the back seat of the
toyota?
A Apat po sila. Pang lima ang mister ko. Kaya lang hindi ko nakita 'yong isa doon sa bandang
hulihan.
Q 'Yong upuan lang sa likod 'yong katabi ng asawa mo? Ilang tao ang nakita mong naroroon?
Isang tao lang o . . .?
A Dalawa lang sila. Kaya lang hindi ko mamukhaan 'yong isa pa dahil 'yong bintana eh, hindi ko
na siya makita.
Q What about in the front seat, was there anybody in the front seat?
A Meron po. 'Yon po si Adan.
Q Can you identify them?
A Opo, si Arnold Lopez.
COURT:
Q Saan nakaupo si Arnold Lopez?
A Doon po sa harapan na tabi ng driver.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Can you identify him?
A Opo. (Witness pointing to a man inside the court room, who, when asked, identified himself as
Arnold Lopez as the man seated beside the driver.)
Q Was there anyone seated at the driver's seat of the red toyota?
A Meron po 'yong driver. Kaya lang hindi ko po siya nakita. May tao doon dahil dalawang bukas
na bintana.
COURT:
Q Nakita mo 'yong driver?
A Hindi ko po nakita. 'Yong paa lang ang nakita ko.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Have you seen your husband in the car? What transpired next? What happened after you saw
your husband?
A After ho? Nakipag-usap po siya sa akin.
Q What did he say?
A Ang sabi niya uuwi na daw po ako magtataksi na lang siya. Magtataksi na lang po daw siya
pauwi sa amin. Tapos po sinarado na po 'yong bintana.
COURT:
Will you please quote it.
A 'Umuwi ka na, uuwi na lang ako. Magtataksi na lang ako.'
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q You said . . . You mentioned that you have with you on that day one million two hundred
thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00)?
A Opo.
Q Now, what did you do with that money?
A Bumaba po si Adan.
COURT:
Q Who is Adan?
A Si Arnold Lopez. Sabi niya 'ako si Adan, amin na ang pera.'
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Where was Adan Manalo at the time he uttered that words?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We object to the question of distinguished justice Your Honor.
COURT:
Why?
ATTY. LEONARDO.
Because he already stated that Adan went out.
COURT:
He went out of the car.
ATTY. LEONARDO:
 Yes, [he] went out Your Honor. The question is where was he seated?
COURT:
Q Where was he if you know in relation to where he was seated? Saan si Adan, ah,
si Arnold Lopez?
A Doon po sa unahan ng sasakyan. Binuksan niya bumaba siya pagkatapos kinuha niya ang pera
sa akin.
Q Katabi siya ng driver mo?
A Opo. Ito po 'yong driver ko dito niya pinadaan ang pera.
Q Kaya nga saan nakatayo si Adan?
A Doon po sa labas sa tabi ng driver ko. (He was standing beside my driver when I gave the money
to him).
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q I am showing you this kind of bag which bag has a word 'Dunlop' on it and previously marked as
Exhibit 'G', can you identify this bag?
A Opo, 'yan po ang pinaglagyan ko ng pera.
Q After you deliver the bag containing one million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00),
what happened next?
A Umalis na po kami. Bumalik na po ako sa bahay namin.
Q When you say 'kami', to whom do you refer? 'Umalis na kami'.
A 'Yong driver ko.
Q 'Yong driver mo at ikaw?
A Opo.
Q And what about the car what happened to it?
A Umalis na rin po siya. Magkaiba kami ng daan. (They left and we went into different directions).
Q You said you went in different directions, the Pajero and the toyota car. To what directions did
you go?
A Going to Manila.
Q And what about the toyota car, where was it [heading]?
A Hindi ko na po sila alam kung saan sila lumiko." 26
Clearly, the appellants' denial cannot overcome the positive identification by the complaining witness and his wife.
As a defense, denial is indeed insipid and weak, being easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. 27 Mere denial of
involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party. 28
Strangely, considering their proven participation in the crime, appellants Lopez and Yambot also proffer the defense
of alibi. For it to prosper, however, it is not enough for them to prove that they were somewhere else when the crime
was committed; they must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time. 29 This, appellants miserably failed to show.
Moreover, other than giving self-serving testimonies, they did not present any evidence to corroborate their denial
and alibi. It cannot be gainsaid that self-serving declarations are inadmissible as evidence of the facts asserted. 30 As
a general rule, the reason for the exclusion of such evidence is not that it might never contribute to the ascertainment
of the truth. Rather, the reason is that, if received, it would most likely consist of falsehoods fabricated for the
occasion and mislead more than enlighten. 31

Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy
to concoct and difficult to disprove. 32 Furthermore, they cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party. 33 Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, a categorical, consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails over denial and
alibi. 34 Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, denial and alibi are negative, self-serving and
undeserving of any weight in law. 35
In the instant case, there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim or his wife to testify falsely
against the accused or to implicate them falsely in the commission of so heinous a crime. The logical conclusion,
then, is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimonies are worthy of full faith and credence. 36
Likewise, the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the testimonies of all
the witnesses is not a compelling reason to jettison the findings of the court a quo. This circumstance does not ipso
facto render the judgment erroneous, more so when it appears to be fully supported by the evidence on
record. 37 While a judge in such a situation has no way to test the credibility of all the witnesses, since he did not
have the unique opportunity of observing their demeanor and behavior under oath, the trial court's factual findings
are nonetheless binding on this Court when these are ably supported by the evidence on record. 38 Unless there is a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that
its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. 39
Appellants also question the RTC decision finding all of them in conspiracy to commit kidnapping for ransom. They
submit that conspiracy was not established with positive and conclusive evidence. According to them, to be guilty of
conspiracy, they must be shown to have participated in the criminal design and, at the same time, to have committed
overt acts necessary or essential to the perpetration of the offense.
Such postulations are merely feeble attempts to escape liability. We do not subscribe to the tale of appellants that
they associated with Jun Notarte, the alleged mastermind, simply because he had offered them high-paying jobs.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. 40 The agreement need not be proven by direct evidence; 41 it may be inferred from the conduct
of the parties before, during and after the commission of the offense, 42 pointing to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of interests. 43 Indeed, jurisprudence consistently tells us that conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. 44
In the case at bar, as the trial court correctly held, conspiracy may be deduced from the appellants' acts that show
concerted action and community of interest. If it can be proven that two (2) or more persons aimed their acts toward
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment then
conspiracy may be inferred, even though no actual meeting among them to concert means can be
shown. 45 Consequently, the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime, because in a conspiracy the act
of one is the act of all. 46
Undoubtedly, in perpetrating the kidnapping for ransom, conspiracy existed among herein accused-appellants.
Viewed in its totality, the individual participation of each of them pointed to a joint purpose and criminal design.
Notarte and Yambot snatched the victim from his office in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Pangilinan and Yambot
sandwiched him in the car and transported him, together with the others, to a house where he was detained for ten
days. Lopez negotiated with the victim's wife for the ransom payment. Further, all three appellants set out to the
designated place of ransom payment. These acts were complementary to one another and were geared toward the
attainment of a common ultimate objective. That objective was to extort a ransom of P10 million (which was later
reduced to P1.2 million through bargaining by the victim's wife) in exchange for the victim's freedom.
Moreover, it is difficult to accept the excuse of appellants that they had nothing to do with the kidnapping. We agree
with the following observation of the trial court:
"Pangilinan's pretenses do not jibe well with reality. From his own version of the incident, there was
no need for Notarte to have hired him merely to watch the former[']s car on the day of the
abduction. For, it must be emphasized that when Notarte and Yambot left the car and entered the
building for the purpose of abducting Garcia, one of Notarte's companions, Arnold Lopez, was left
in the car. Evidently, Lopez could very well have assumed the role of watching the car without the
need of having to hire an extra hand for the purpose.
"Moreover, it is significant to note that as early as March 08, 1994 when Garcia was forcibly taken
from his office whom Pangilinan thought, as he was made to understand, was a drug pusher, he
already entertained some suspicion that it was not so and that Notarte and his group were into
something illegal when instead of going to Camp Crame to detain the drug-pushing suspect, they
bypassed Camp Crame and proceeded to Baliuag, Bulacan. He was even prompted, by reason of
said unexpected turn of events, to tell his wife right after he was given PHP 500.00 as his
compensation for the day and after he was sent home by Notarte that what he saw was not an arrest
of a suspect but a hold-up. Yet, when Notarte again passed by his house on March 17, 1994,
Pangilinan again went with Notarte, although Pangilinan claims that he was only forced to do so
because of alleged threat by Notarte that something would happen to him and his family if he
refuses to go with him. Such threat, assuming it was made, pales into significance in the light of the
fact that Pangilinan accepted from Notarte an additional amount of PHP 1,000.00 which, if
anything, clearly demonstrates, coupled with his earlier participation, his complicity or connivance
with Notarte in the abduction of Teofilo Garcia."
xxx xxx xxx
"The accused Pangilinan, Lopez and Yambot uniformly declared that their involvement with
Notarte was only on account of the latter's offer to them of better-paying jobs and not because of his
plan to kidnap a person of which they were not privy to. Only the naive would fall for such a ruse. If
their testimonies are to be believed, the jobs being offered to them were no better than their jobs at
the time the offers were made. Besides, all of them profess to barely know Notarte when he
approached them about the jobs and yet they appear to have readily accepted the offers. On the part
of Notarte, he could not have been stupid enough to have recruited men of dubious loyalty and
commitment to a risky and dangerous undertaking." 47
Verily, it is "inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the performance of an essential
and sensitive phase of their well-planned criminal scheme to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no
knowledge whatsoever of the details of their nefarious plan." 48
Appellant Lopez also argues that he cannot be convicted, because he was not sufficiently represented during the
presentation of co-appellant Pangilinan as hostile witness.
Such an argument would hold if Lopez's conviction were based on Pangilinan's testimony. But as we have held
above, Lopez was convicted because of the positive identification made not only by the victim, but also by the
victim's wife who also pointed to him as the person who had whipped her with a gun on the day her husband was
abducted. 49
When Arthur Pangilinan testified in the absence of Lopez's counsel, the court appointed Atty. Leonardo to represent
Lopez for that day. 50 However, we find that such an appointment did not provide the appellant with adequate
representation to safeguard his rights fully. It was irregular because Pangilinan, whom the lawyer was also
representing, gave incriminating statements against Lopez. As the counsel of Pangilinan, Atty. Leonardo could not
have objected either to his questions or to his answers to safeguard the rights of his other client, Lopez. However,
this notwithstanding, the incriminating evidence provided by the victim and his wife are more than sufficient to
convict Lopez even without Pangilinan's testimony.
Appellants were charged with and convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained,
or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private
individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act
of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances
mentioned above is present. 51 Moreover, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. 52 In the instant case, appellants cannot escape the penalty of death,
inasmuch as it was sufficiently alleged and indubitably proven that the kidnapping had been committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom.
As to the conviction of the appellants for illegal possession of firearms, we are constrained to dismiss and set aside
this portion of the judgment. They cannot be held liable for such offense, since there was another crime
kidnapping for ransom which they were committing at the same time.
The law governing illegal possession of firearms provides:
"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
 Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000)
shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with
bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also
lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire
magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attemptedcoup d' tat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d' tat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully
or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be
used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs
or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal
authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor." 53 (Italics supplied)
Interpreting this law, this Court has consistently ruled that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
other crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. 54 Explained the Court:
"Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain
meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to
favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal
possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime
committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be
deemed an aggravating circumstance . . . The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple
illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested."
If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it
should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we." 55
In sum, we affirm the conviction of the appellants as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention. However, we set aside the judgment convicting them of illegal possession of firearms.
As regards the articles allegedly taken from the victim during the kidnapping, we find that the prosecution failed to
prove with certainty the amount of money or the value of the jewelry taken from him. These cannot be presumed.
Moreover, we reduce the award of moral damages to three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to be paid by the
appellants solidarily. The fact that the victim suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological ordeal
constitutes sufficient basis for an award of moral damages. 56 Meanwhile, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages within the meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code. 57 There being a demand for ransom in this case, and by way of example or correction, the offended
party shall receive exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). 58
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC of Pasig City (Branch 70) in Criminal Case No. 106115 sentencing
appellants to death for kidnapping for ransom is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that they shall pay the
victim in solidum the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) as moral damages and an additional
amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages. Costs against appellants.
However, the Decision of the court a quo convicting them of illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Case No.
106116 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional, and that the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this decision, to the Office of the President for possible exercise of
the pardoning power. DHTECc
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Pangilinan, G.R. Nos. 134823-25, [January 14, 2003], 443 PHIL 198-246)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 135619. January 15, 2004.]

ADONIS ARADILLOS and ALBINO GALABO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

For review is the decision dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17316, 1 affirming
the conviction of petitioners Adonis Aradillos and Albino Galabo of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, with
modification as to the penalty and the award of actual and moral damages.
An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (Branch 10) of Davao City, charging petitioners Aradillos
and Galabo with the crime of Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about February 3, 1992, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with an ax and piece of wood,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage
of their superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and hacked with
said ax and struck with said piece of wood, one Gloria Alviola thereby inflicting upon the latter the
following injuries, to wit:
COMPOUND FRACTURE, (R) AND (L) FRONTAL AREA 2 TO HACKING WOUND
GCS 15 RLS 1
which injuries would cause the death of the said Gloria Alviola, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but, nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely arrival and
intervention of complainant's brother-in-laws and the able medical assistance rendered to the said
Gloria Alviola which prevented her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge 3 and thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution and the defense differ in their versions of the incident.
The gist of the prosecution evidence is as follows:
At around 5:45 in the afternoon of February 3, 1992, Gloria rebuked herein petitioners Aradillos and Galabo when
she saw them in the act of cutting the bamboo bridge located on the property of her husband. Thereupon, petitioners
chased her and they caught up with her near the house. Galabo then hit her several times with a piece of wood and
his carpentry bag causing her to fall down. While Gloria was staggering face down, Aradillos hacked her twice with
a carpentry ax, hitting her on the right side of the head and on the forehead. She asked for help from the Visto
family, her neighbors, who brought her to the clinic of Dr. Alvarez in Matina, Davao. After Dr. Alvarez gave her
first aid treatment, Gloria was advised to go to Davao Medical Center where she was confined in the ICU for four
days. 4
At the time Gloria reproached petitioners, she was within her bamboo-fenced yard, about ten meters away from
them. Her house is located five to six meters away from the place where she was standing. Her children,
Rosalito 5 and Rodilyn, and her sister-in-law, Rosa, were also within the premises. Petitioners cut their way through
her closed bamboo gate and they overtook her while she was running towards her house. After she was injured, her
children brought her to the Visto family's house which is located 200 meters away. Meanwhile, Rosa ran to the Alsa
Masa detachment to report the incident. Gloria's four brothers-in-law, namely: Roberto, Modesto, Efren and Nilo,
and her sister-in-law, Miguela were also within the premises but were not able to help her because they were
nervous. 6
On the other hand, petitioners invoke self-defense, contending that the victim's injuries on the head were the result of
the struggle for the possession of the ax between her and petitioner Aradillos. Petitioners, who are both carpenters,
recounted that on their way home from work in the afternoon of February 3, 1992, they stopped by the wooden
bridge where they usually pass because of an uprooted "idyok" tree that obstructed their passage. Petitioner Galabo
started cutting off the roots of the tree with his carpentry ax. But upon seeing them, Gloria who had been drinking
"tuba" with her brothers-in-law, shouted invectives at them and threw stones at Galabo. When Galabo was hit on his
left rib, he ran for cover at a nearby coconut tree. Petitioner Aradillos took over the cutting of the tree. Gloria
continued throwing stones. Then, she approached Aradillos and grabbed the ax from him. While the two grappled for
its possession, Gloria's brothers-in-law were throwing stones at Galabo. In the course of the struggle between
Aradillos and Gloria, the ax hit the latter. Seeing that Gloria was injured, Aradillos ran away, followed by Galabo.
Aradillos passed by his house, left the ax there, then, went directly to the purok leader, Benjamin Autida, to whom he
surrendered. 7
The trial court believed the prosecution's account, finding that the nature of the injuries sustained by Gloria could not
have been caused during the struggle between her and petitioner Aradillos. Thus, the trial court convicted petitioners
of the crime of Frustrated Homicide and sentenced them, as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the two (2) accused, Adonis Aradillos and Albino Galabo,
proven beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Homicide and finding in their favor the provisions of
Art. 250 of the Revised Penal Code, they are hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of ONE (1)
YEAR each and pay the costs.
For the civil liability, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00 for
medical expenses and moral damages, of the victim. HTaSEA
SO ORDERED. 8
On appeal, in sustaining the trial court's findings, the Court of Appeals noted that it is "unnatural and contrary to
ordinary human experience for a woman, alone and unarmed, to run towards the two male appellants and grapple for
the possession of an axe." 9 The appellate court modified the penalty imposed on petitioners and the damages
awarded in favor of the victim, 10 as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1) The accused appellants are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum; and
2) They are ordered to pay the victim jointly and severally, the sum of P1,664.00 for medical
expenses as actual damages, and P6,000.00 as moral damages.
 SO ORDERED. 11
In their petition for review on certiorari, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals' affirmance of their conviction
with modification is not in accordance with law, the applicable decisions of this Court and the evidence on record.
It is settled that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review 12 and it becomes the duty
of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are assigned as
errors or not. 13
At the outset, the Court notes that while the memoranda of the parties and their appeal briefs focused on petitioners'
claim of self-defense, their evidence is actually rooted on the testimony of petitioner Aradillos that the ax
accidentally hit Gloria during the struggle for its possession between them, thus:
Q Before the wounding incident happened, what were you doing?
A I was looking at Albino Galabo who was cutting the roots of the "idyok".
Q Where was that "idyok" located at that time while you were watching Albino Galabo cutting it?
A The "idyok" was along the bridge where it was fallen and which Albino cut.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And while Galabo was cutting the "idyok", what happened next?
A He was stoned by Gloria Alviola.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else transpired aside from the stoning incident?
A She shouted: "Mga baga mo ug nawong. Mga squatter mo. Mga gagmay ra ba mo ug lawas."
(You are shameless. You are squatters. you have small bodies.)
Q How did you come to know that Gloria Alviola threw stones at Albino Galabo?
A Because I saw her.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Let us go back to the stoning incident. You said Gloria threw stones at Galabo while Galabo was
cutting the "idyok" and Gloria at the same time uttered those words you just have quoted,
what happened to Galabo, if any, in result of the stoning of Gloria?
A Galabo was hit at his right rib cage.
Q And what happened to Galabo?
A He was in pain.
Q What else did he do, if any?
A I got the axe which Galabo used in cutting the "idyok" to continue cutting the said "idyok", but
Gloria continuously threw stones to us and then she grabbed the axe from my hands.
xxx xxx xxx
Q I will further clarify, Your Honor. How did it happen that Gloria, the one you said threw stones at
Galabo was able to wrestle with you for the possession of the axe?
A She rushed at me.
 Q After rushing at you, what did Gloria do?
A She grappled with me for the possession of the axe.
Q In relation to the wooden bridge, in what particular spot or area were you grappling for
possession of the axe? ITHADC
A At the edge of the bridge.
Q Can you demonstrate to the Honorable Court how the grappling for possession of the axe
happened between you and Gloria?
A (Witness demonstrated that he placed his right hand at the lower portion of the handle of the axe;
that Gloria's right hand was holding the middle portion; and that his left hand was holding
the upper portion; and that Gloria's other hand was on top of his hand.) 14 (Emphasis
supplied)
On cross-examination, Aradillos further demonstrated how Gloria sustained her injuries:
Q Now, with that kind of illustration, Mr. Aradillos, how did Gloria sustain the injuries because you
said that it was in the course of grappoing (sic)? Will you please demonstrate to the Court
how the injuries of Gloria Alviola was inflicted?

A (Witness makes a demonstration)

xxx xxx xxx
ASST. CITY PROS. CALIZO:
We would like to make of record that in his earlier demonstration Gloria was holding the middle
portion and the upper portion of the axe. Was that the position of the axe during that time?
A Yes. Sometimes it swung like this the blade sometimes faced me; sometimes it faced her.
Q How did she sustain the wound?
A She was accidentally injured because of the force of the grappling.
xxx xxx xxx
Q At that time you pushed the axe, was that the position of your hands?
A No ma'am. Because of the swinging, I was able to push it accidentally towards
Gloria. 15 (Emphasis Ours)
Accident and self-defense are two incompatible defenses. Accident presupposes lack of intention, while self-defense
assumes voluntariness, but induced only by necessity. 16
In view of the above-quoted assertions of petitioner Aradillos before the trial court, the Court adopts a more liberal
stance by disregarding the apparent conflict in the defense raised by petitioners in their pleadings. After all, court
litigations are primarily for the search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are
given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. 17
In People vs. Court of Appeals, 18 the Court ruled that when, during the trial of the case, an accused claims that the
crime was the result of an accident, the burden of proving self-defense will not come into play, to wit:
 . . . It is noteworthy that during the trial, petitioner Tangan did not invoke self-defense but claimed
that Generoso was accidentally shot. As such, the burden of proving self-defense, which normally
would have belonged to Tangan, did not come into play. Although Tangan must prove his defense of
accidental firing by clear and convincing evidence, the burden of proving the commission of the
crime remained in the prosecution. 19 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, petitioners need not discharge the burden of proving self-defense, although they must prove their
defense of accidental infliction of injuries on the victim, by clear and convincing evidence. On the prosecution
remains the burden of proving the commission of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not disputed that Gloria sustained hacking injuries. The prosecution maintains that these injuries were the result
of intentional blows, while petitioners stand by their claim that Gloria sustained the injuries while she and Aradillos
were grappling for the possession of the ax.
Generally, the rule is that an assessment made by the trial judge of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed
on appeal. Having heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their demeanor on the witness stand, the judge
is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility. 20But when it is shown that some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance which would affect the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied, the Court will not hesitate to make its own evaluation of the evidence. 21
Records show that aside from the testimony of the victim and petitioners, the evidence for both the prosecution and
the defense as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime is based substantially on the
corroborating testimonies of their respective relatives, who maintained the respective versions of the prosecution and
the defense. Each family has its own ax to grind against the other as they are embroiled in a land dispute. Thus, in
order to arrive at a judicious conclusion, these circumstances should have been taken into consideration by the lower
courts in the assessment of the respective probative weights of the evidence of the parties.
A review of the records discloses that the prosecution's evidence failed to support Gloria's account on how she
sustained the injuries on the head. In fact, her version together with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses is
replete with incredible details that necessarily cast serious doubts on the probative weight of the prosecution
evidence which the trial and appellate courts have overlooked.
Gloria testified on direct examination that she was inside her yard while petitioners were at the bridge when the latter
chased her, but they were able to catch up with her near her house. Her testimony was totally demolished by the
cross-examination conducted by the prosecution. Gloria stated that she was inside her yard while petitioners were at
the bridge, ten meters away from her. 22 She likewise asserted that her house is located five to six meters away from
where she was standing. 23 If her assertions were true, petitioners had to run ten meters towards her while she had
only five to six meters to reach her house. Given the disparity between the distances that petitioners and Gloria had
to run, evidently, she had a good head start for her to reach her house before petitioners could be near her. aEIcHA
In addition, Gloria testified that petitioners had to destroy the bamboo gate in order to get inside the yard, thus giving
her more time within which to reach her house. Yet, Gloria claims, petitioners were able to overtake her. Unless
Gloria leisurely walked towards her house or that she had no intention of taking refuge in her house, it would have
been physically impossible for petitioners to have caught up with her before she entered her house. As noted by the
trial court, "you will not wait for someone to catch you before [you] ran (sic) away." 24 If at all, Gloria should have
already been in the safety of her house by the time petitioners would have negotiated the distance of ten meters, not
to mention the time that petitioners would have spent in destroying the bamboo gate.
The prosecution also claims that petitioner Galabo hit Gloria several times on the nape with a carpentry bag and a
piece of wood measuring two feet in length and two inches in diameter 25 which caused her to fall face
down. 26 However, aside from the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, no other evidence was presented to support
such claim. If their testimonies were true, then Gloria should have suffered injuries, or bruises at the very least, as a
result of the blows on her nape with a carpentry bag and a piece of wood. But interestingly, no medical evidence was
presented to confirm that Gloria sustained even a scratch from said blows.
Such lack of evidence renders incredible the prosecution's accusation that Galabo inflicted blows on Gloria. Physical
evidence is mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates highly in the hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence. 27 It enjoys a far more superior probative weight than corroborative testimonies. 28 In this case, the
absence of physical injuries and medical findings negate Gloria's claim that she was hit by petitioner Galabo.
Gloria further testified on direct examination that after sustaining injuries, she sought help from her neighbors, the
Visto family, who brought her to the clinic of Dr. Generoso B. Alvarez. On cross-examination, Gloria stated that it
was her children, Glodilito and Rodilyn, 29 who managed to help her get to the Visto family's house, which is
located 200 meters away from her house. 30 It would have been easy to believe such testimony if at the time the
fracas occurred, there were no other people within the immediate vicinity who could have come to Gloria's aid. But,
the corroborating testimonies of the prosecution witnesses' all declare, that at that time, Gloria's four brothers-in-law
were in Rosa Alviola's house, which was merely ten meters away from the place where the alleged hacking occurred.
Roberto Alviola testified that he just watched and went inside his house after the incident while his other brothers ran
away when the incident took place. 31 It is claimed that they were not able to help Gloria because they were nervous.
The Court finds this utterly incredible and totally absurd. No amount of stretch of any one's imagination can it be
believed that four able-bodied men will be so unconcerned so as to just watch and let an injured woman, a relative at
that, and her two young children, walk 200 meters for help, when they were already close by and could have readily
given assistance. They did not even exert any effort to call for their neighbors for assistance or immediately report
the incident. In fact, it had to take two women, Rosa and Miguela Alviola, to run to the Alsa Masa detachment and
report the incident.
It is even highly improbable that petitioners would pursue Gloria into her yard to harm her. In the first place, the
prosecution failed to adduce any plausible reason why petitioners would suddenly run after Gloria. Also, at the time
of the alleged chase, Gloria was inside her yard, together with her children, Glodilito and Rodilyn, and her sister-in-
law, Rosa Alviola. 32 It is very unlikely that petitioners will have the audacity to attack Gloria inside her premises
and within the sight of her family members who could be witnesses to their alleged malevolent intent to kill Gloria.
Most telling of the incredibility of the version of the prosecution, is the testimony of Roberto Alviola, the victim's
brother-in-law. According to Roberto, he heard Gloria shouting for help. 33 He went out of his house and saw
petitioners ganging up on her. After seeing this, he went back inside his house, remained there and did
nothing. 34 Meanwhile, his brothers, Efren, Nilo and Modesto, who were with him earlier, had ran away. 35 Such
display of apathy or unconcern for a relative goes against ordinary human behavior, especially for Filipinos who are
noted for close-knit familial ties and readiness to help family members at the risk of their own lives.

Testimonial evidence to be credible should not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but should also be
credible, reasonable and in accord with human experience, failing in which, it should be rejected. 36
Moreover, the Court cannot concur with the appellate court's observation that it is "unnatural and contrary to
ordinary human experience for a woman, alone and unarmed, to run towards the two male appellants and grapple for
the possession of an axe." 37 Such observation cannot be accepted as absolute. The lower courts failed to consider
the established facts and the circumstances of the case. It need not be said that there are women who, when
provoked, throw caution to the wind and charge on to fight back. In this case, it is not "unnatural" for Gloria to show
aggression against petitioners. It is shown that the petitioners are smaller than Gloria. 38 Moreover, unrebutted
defense evidence disclose that on February 2, 1992, a day before the incident, Lydia Galabo, wife of petitioner
Albino Galabo and Aradillos' older sister, filed with their barangay a complaint for "harassment, stoning and slight
physical injuries" against Gloria. 39 Summons was served on Gloria through Purok Leader Benjamin Autida in the
morning of February 3, 1992. 40 Gloria manifestly harbors an animosity against petitioners and their family, and this
explains her frenzied reaction towards petitioners when the incident occurred.
All these facts and circumstances when taken into account engender the Court to suspect the truthfulness of the
prosecution's account. To accuse is one thing, to prove is another. In this case, the prosecution's accusations do not
jibe with their proofs. As such, the Court has no other recourse but to disbelieve the tale as presented by the
prosecution. IaDcTC
In contrast, the defense's account is credible as it is in accord with the natural course of things. As told by petitioner
Aradillos, it was Gloria who went near Aradillos who was then cutting the roots of the "idyok" tree, and grabbed the
ax, obviously with the intention of stopping Aradillos from cutting the tree. Not wanting to let go of the ax, Aradillos
held on to it and the two then struggled for its possession. With both of their hands on the handle, the ax went
swaying and swinging, which accidentally hit Gloria. 41 The injuries sustained by Gloria, in fact, confirm that it was
not intentional. For if it were so, petitioner Aradillos would have exerted such force that Gloria would have suffered
more than what she had sustained. Worse, she would not have survived at all.
That Gloria and her brothers-in-law were drinking tuba in the afternoon of February 3, 1992; that Gloria stoned
Galabo and that Aradillos grappled with Gloria for the gun as testified to by petitioners and other defense witnesses
are more credible than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. This is strengthened by the fact that it was not
refuted by the prosecution that her brothers-in-law did not come to her aid, and that after she was injured, she had to
seek her neighbor's assistance who were 200 meters away instead of her relatives who were just nearby. As
previously discussed, the Court cannot fathom why her brothers-in-law did not help Gloria, unless, as testified by
petitioners, Gloria's in-laws were drinking tuba prior to the incident and the former were already intoxicated and
therefore could not have been of any assistance to Gloria.
The Court likewise finds that conspiracy was not established. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 42 Like the offense itself, conspiracy
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 43 Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per
se sufficient proof of conspiracy. 44
In the present case, the defense sufficiently rebutted the accusation that Galabo and Aradillos acted in concert in
harming Alviola. As their evidence shows, it was only Aradillos who struggled with the victim, and Galabo was then
fending off the stones being thrown by the victim's brothers-in-law. Galabo had nothing to do with the injuries
sustained by Gloria. Galabo's only participation in the incident was his presence, but mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not imply conspiracy. 45
Even assuming that the prosecution's version is true, and Galabo hit Gloria with a carpentry bag and a piece of wood,
and thereafter, Aradillos hacked Gloria, still, the seemingly concerted and simultaneous acts of petitioners were more
of a spontaneous reaction to what they perceived to be an aggression by Gloria, rather than the result of a common
plan to kill the victim. Hence, their liability is individual and not collective. 46 More specifically, Aradillos is solely
liable for the injuries sustained by Gloria. There is no evidence that Gloria sustained injuries from the acts of Galabo.
Lastly, the Court cannot agree with the lower courts' finding that the nature of Gloria's injuries justifies the
conclusion that these were fatal and intentionally inflicted, and cannot be the result of a mere struggle such that
petitioners are guilty of Frustrated Homicide.
Intent to kill is the principal element of attempted or frustrated homicide, or murder. 47 Such intent must be proved
in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor. 48 The
testimonies of the doctors who treated Gloria did not establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth and severity of
the wounds sustained by her. Such medical evidence could have shed light as to the relative position of Aradillos and
Gloria at the time the blows were inflicted, whether the wounds sustained by the victim were a result of an
intentional infliction or accidental, or whether it was mortal or superficial. In People vs. Matyaong, 49 the Court
discussed the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained by a victim, viz.:
 In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to the function of the
various organs, and also the danger to life. A division into mortal and nonmortal wounds, if it could
be made, would be very desirable; but the unexpected complications and the various extraneous
causes which give gravity to the simplest cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination of
some injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification impracticable. The
general classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and mortal wounds may be used, but the
possibility of the slight wound terminating with the loss of the person's life, and the apparently
mortal ending with only a slight impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. . . .
The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the extent of the injury, the
form of the wound, the region of the body affected, the blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved,
the entrance of disease-producing bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and
constitution of the person injured, and the opportunities for administering proper surgical treatment.
. . . 50
Dr. Generoso B. Alvarez who initially attended to Gloria and gave her first aid treatment, opined that if the bleeding
was left untreated, the victim could die in six to twelve hours but at the same time, but also stated on the witness
stand that Gloria suffered two lacerations on the head which merely required suturing. Dr. Alvarez testified as
follows:
Q How would you describe the bleeding that you saw?
A Profuse, I would say.
Q In your medical studies and experience, what appears to be the most heavy bleeding in the part of
the body? DTESIA
A Generally, wounds on the head, usually profuse, even small wounds.
Q After a patient was on your examining table, and you saw blood on her head and on her body,
what did you do?
A I have to examine the patient on the vital signs, whether the pulse rate and state of consciousness
was stable, and because my clinic was very limited, when you feel that there are other
colleagues who can do it much better than you, but at that time I was at a loss knowing that
it was a medico-legal case, but at that time I had no other recourse because it was at that
time that there was a jeepney strike, so it took time for her to be transported for the moment,
so I had to control the bleeding and keep the patient stable until she could be transported to
the hospital.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Since you knew that the patient was stable, what did you do next?
A After cleaning up the face with blood, I have to inspect the extent of the wound, I put my finger
on the wound.
Q What did you find out on the head of the patient?
A There were 2 wounds, one on the forehead and there was another wound on the right side up on
the scalp, about 2.5 inches.
Q In that wound in the forehead, what did you do next?
A I inserted my finger to find out whether there is brain damage or fracture, because you do not
close a wound if you suspect there is a fracture inside because the blood will get inside the
 brain, and I found out there was a depressed fracture, I suppose it was a sharp injury based
on the history, there was a depressed fracture and the same on the other wound.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. PALABRICA:
Q Are these kind of wounds painful?
A Painful, for a while.
Q Could that have caused death on the patient?
A If she was unfortunate, she could have died. Fortunately for her, it was in the area of the brain
where it is not very important to us, in fact, you could remove that portion of the brain, and
still be alived (sic).
Q You said that the bleeding was profuse, were you able to stop the bleeding?
A Yes.
Q If that bleeding was not stop (sic), would the patient have died?
A Yes, it was at that time the jeepney was on strike, normally, you do not suture wound on the scalp
when you know there is bleeding inside, but under the situation, there was no way to
transport her to the hospital, the first thing I did was to stop the bleeding.

Q If that wound was left to bleed on its own, how many minutes would it have taken to live or die?
A It could depend, 6 to 12 hours.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Multiple laceration, what do you mean?
A More than one laceration.
Q When you say laceration, what does it mean?
A It is a wound.
Q Laceration could usually be caused by?
A It could be blunt, it could be sharp instrument.
Q What do you mean by 2 lacerations?
A Forehead and the scalp.
Q Scalp is also the laceration of the other wound?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q There is here exploration and repair done.
A As I said earlier, before you touch anything, you have to explore the head.
Q How about the repair?
 A Suture. 51 (Emphasis supplied) cHSIAC
Taken in its entirety, it appears that the wounds sustained by Gloria were not so grave so as to sustain the claim
of the prosecution that petitioners had the intention to kill Gloria when she was hit with the ax by Aradillos on
the head.
Moreover, another prosecution witness, Dr. Rene Elias Lopez, testified that the fractures on the right and left frontal
area of Gloria's skull were slight or minimal. 52 This weakened the claim of the prosecution that the injuries
sustained by Gloria could have been fatal or were inflicted by Aradillos with such force as to establish the intent to
kill.
On direct examination, Dr. Lopez testified that there was no fracture in the skull and that the fracture chip did not
present much of a problem. Further, he was not emphatic on the fatal nature of the injuries sustained by Gloria, thus:
Q "Frontal chip", what do you mean "chip"?
A It means a small fracture.
Q How small was that?
A It's quite small, maybe a finger nail.
Q What happened to the forehead or frontal bone which was chipped, what happened?
A This means that the frontal bone had a chip fracture on the bone, left and right areas. There was a
break in the continuity of the bone.
Q In other words, the left frontal area of the head was sort of cut and damaged, is that what you
want to tell us?
A The outer layer of the skull was indeed violated and resulted in the . . .
ATTY. DE VERA:
Objection, Your Honor, the witness is incompetent, and no basis.
Q Now, as a doctor, what would be the effect of the chip on the left and right frontal area of the
head?
COURT:
Lay the basis first.
Q Doctor, are you familiar with the effects of the chip on the frontal area of the head?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what would be the effect since you are familiar with the effects?
xxx xxx xxx
Q In this case you said there was a chip in the left forehead or right frontal bone, what would be the
effect doctor of that chip which you identified?
A The chip itself does not present much of a surgical problem, however there are several instances
wherein the chip fractured presented in the skull there might be other injuries which
necessitates further management.
Q In this case doctor what did you discover or find in this patient after you examined her?
A The patient, as I have said presented with a sutured wound. Further X-ray on the skull showed a
fracture on the frontal bone. So, we were entertaining the possibility of an intra-cranial
injury inside the skull, and therefore the patient must be admitted and observed for any
further consequence of the injury sustained.
Q In the same manner the wound on the right, what would have been the effect of that?
A The same, sir.
Q As far as you know the wound was depressed?
A There was no depression in the skull.
Q Doctor, what medication did you advise the patient after she arrived in the hospital?
A She was under IV, given anti-biotics, anti-tetanus, prophylactic immunization. She was placed in
the ICU.
Q What do you mean by IV?
A Intravenous fluid.
Q Why?
A We were entertaining the possibility of an intra-cranial injury. If there is no IV placed something
might develop as a result of the injury. We might lost time and will not be able to give her
medication on an emergency basis. DcIHSa
Q In other words, the patient might die?
ATTY. DE VERA:
Very leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
Reform your question.
Q What would have been the effect doctor if this has not been done?
A The purpose of the IV is more or a precautionary measure of any untowards incident as a result of
the injury. That's why she was admitted to the ICU.
Q Doctor, how about anti-tetanus, why do you give anti-tetanus?
A Any patient presented with a break in the skin must be administered with anti-tetanus.
Q Doctor, what were the others you said?
A Anti-biotics, penicillin and chloramphenicol.
Q Standard doses? Maximum doses?
A These are maximum doses.
Q Why?
A We have to safeguard the possibility of an intra-cranial injury, therefore maximum dosages are
what you call recommended on the patient.
 Q In other words, if you do not give the usual medication as you said and administration, what is the
danger to the patient, please tell us?
A The patient would develop skin infection.
Q And what would happen if there is skin infection?
A The wound will not heal.
Q And what else?
A If it does not heal, then the patient might develop fever later on. 53
On cross-examination, Dr. Lopez further testified:
Q So, as you testified a while ago, you were the one who interpreted the X-ray findings, and
according to you, you found compound fractures where?
A Both right and left frontal area of the skull.
Q Of the forehead?
A Yes, sir.
Q But the fracture was minimal or slight because you said earlier "something like the equivalent of
a chip", so it was minimal or slight?
A Yes, sir.
Q And there was no other surgical operation performed on the patient with respect to the said
fracture that you found?
A None, sir.
Q In other words, the fracture could heal by itself through natural process without any outside
medical intervention? I am referring to the fracture itself .
A The fracture could heal by itself, yes. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
Dr. Lopez likewise stated that Gloria was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) for further observation as a
matter of standard procedure because they cannot discount the possibility of intra-cranial injury. 55 The victim
was then taken out of the ICU after 24 hours of observation and discharged from the hospital on February 6,
1992, 56 three days after the alleged hacking incident. In his Medical Certificate, Dr. Lopez made the following
diagnosis:
Compound fracture, (R) and (L) Frontal area 2 to hacking wound GCS 15 RLS 1
Probable healing time will be Fourteen (14) days barring complication. 57
There is therefore, a dearth of medical evidence on record to prove that the nature of injuries inflicted by
Aradillos showed any willful intent to kill Gloria.
Nonetheless, Aradillos must be answerable for the injuries he inflicted on Gloria. He cannot hide behind the defense
of accident to escape the consequences of his act. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a person,
who while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by accident without fault or intention of causing
it, is exempt from criminal liability. 58 It cannot be said that Aradillos was performing a lawful act when he
struggled with Gloria for the ax as the latter's act of taking hold of the ax was equivocal, and it cannot be deduced
therefrom that he was under the threat of an unlawful aggression from her. The defense of accident, therefore, cannot
exempt Aradillos from liability. aEDCAH
Although the Information charged petitioners with Frustrated Murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less
serious physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since
the essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of
murder. 59 Similarly, an accused may be convicted of slight, less serious or serious physical injuries in a prosecution
for homicide or murder, inasmuch as the infliction of physical injuries could lead to any of the latter offenses when
carried to its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential requisite of the crime of homicide or murder intent to
kill is not required in a prosecution for physical injuries. 60
In conclusion, absent competent proof, and there being no conspiracy, Aradillos should be held liable only for less
serious physical injuries underArticle 265 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, 61 as the wounds sustained by
Gloria required medical attendance of fourteen days. 62
Galabo must be absolved from any liability as the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that he conspired with
Aradillos in the commission of the crime.
In imposing the proper penalty, the lower courts failed to take into consideration the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in favor of petitioner Aradillos. Evidence show that Aradillos spontaneously and unconditionally
surrendered to the authorities immediately after the incident, placing himself at their disposal, and saving them the
time and effort attendant to a search. 63 Purok Leader Benjamin Autida testified that Aradillos and Galabo
immediately went to him after the incident and surrendered. 64 This was corroborated by SPO2 Celso Hernandez
who attested that by the time Rosa Alviola reported the incident to them, Autida had already endorsed petitioners
Aradillos and Galabo to their office. 65 Thus, the mitigating circumstance should lighten the penalty to be imposed
on petitioner Aradillos.
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries
with arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one month and one day to six months. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law is not applicable in this case because the maximum penalty does not exceed one year. 66 Appreciating
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and there being no aggravating circumstance, the penalty should
be imposed in its minimum period, or anywhere within a period of one month and one day to two months.

As regards the damages awarded, the Court finds that the award of P1,664.00 as reimbursement for medical
expenses is in order, it being supported by evidence. 67 Likewise, the victim having suffered actual injuries, she is
entitled to moral damages. 68 The award of P5,000.00 is sufficient under the circumstances. 69
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17316 is
MODIFIED. Petitioner Adonis Aradillos is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious
Physical Injuries, and sentenced to suffer two (2) months of imprisonment, and to pay Gloria Alviola the amount of
One Thousand Six Hundred and Sixty-Four Pesos (P1,664.000) as actual damages, and Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) as moral damages.
Petitioner Albino Galabo is ACQUITTED and the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled and
released.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
||| (Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135619, [January 15, 2004], 464 PHIL 650-680)