CORNELIO ANTIQUERA vs. HON. SOTERO BALUYOT, et.
al The Trial Court Held: Plaintiff's claim is now a settled matter as it was decided by the
G.R. No. L-3318, May 05, 1952
Facts:
In its plan for reorganization of the different departments and offices of Manila,
the committee on reorganization created by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
recommended the abolition of the position of assistant chief of a division. The Sheriff
was requested by the Mayor to give his comment on such a recommendation, and the
Sheriff assented to the proposal.
As a consequence thereof, the position of assistant chief deputy sheriff held by the
Cornelio Antiquera, the plaintiff, was abolished. Because of this, Antiquera applied for
retirement with gratuity under the provisions of Act No. 4183. The Sheriff
recommended approval thereof.
The Mayor submitted plaintiff's application to the Municipal Board of Manila with
his favorable recommendation, and the latter adopted resolution No. 291 approving
plaintiff's application. The Mayor approved the said resolution 4 days later.
Afterwards, the City Treasurer of Manila certified that there were funds available for
the payment of the twelve installments on plaintiff's gratuity. The Secretary of Justice
recommended the approval of said retirement and the Secretary of Finance
interposed no objection.
However, defendant Sotero Baluyot, Secretary of the Interior, disapproved
Antiquera's retirement under Act No. 4183, for failing to comply with the
requirements of the said law. Plaintiff filed an MR but it was denied.
Section 1 of Act No. 4183, provides that "in order to grant a gratuity to provincial
and municipal officers and employees who resign or are separated from the service by
reason of a reorganization thereof, the provincial boards and municipal councils may,
with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, retire their officers and employees,
granting them, in consideration of satisfactory service rendered, a gratuity
equivalent to one month's salary for each year or fraction of a year of service,
but not exceeding twenty-four months in any case, on the basis of the salary they
receive at the time of leaving the service, to be paid monthly at the rate of thirty-three
and one-third per centum of the monthly salary."
Sotero Baluyot's Argument: There was no reorganization, hence the retirement must
be disapproved. Mere abolition of the item or position of an applicant for retirement
does not necessarily mean reorganization of the service. The number of personnel in
the office of the sheriff of Manila after the alleged reorganization was increased from
53 to 59, and the appropriation for salaries and wages was increased from P48,920 to
P55,900, coupled with the fact that while the position of the appellant was eliminated,
a new position of deputy sheriff as administrative officer was created with a salary of
P1,220
defendant Secretary of the Interior in the exercise of his discretionary power granted
to him by Act No. 4183 and in accordance with its provisions. In view thereof, this
Court is of the opinion and so holds that it is not within its power and authority to
grant to the plaintiff the relief he is seeking.
Issue: W/N Antiquera is entitled to retirement gratuity under Act No. 4183?
Held: Yes!
The simple requirement provided by Act No. 4183, in order that a municipal
officer or employee may be retired thereunder, is that he be separated from the
service by reason of a reorganization. Act No. 4183 does not contain any provision
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations as to the scope of
the term "reorganization." A valid reason for disapproval would have been that the
service of the petitioner was not satisfactory, but the defendant Secretary had not
made even the slightest intimation to that effect.
While it may therefore be admitted that the Secretary of the Interior has the
discretion to approve or not to approve an application for retirement under Act No.
4183, we hold that there was a clear abuse of such discretion under the circumstances
of the case at bar.
The appellant considers his complaint as one for declaratory relief, but we
are inclined to view the same as a special civil action for mandamus, the allegations of
the complaint being sufficient for the purpose. Although the complaint is not under
oath, this is of no moment, since the facts alleged therein are admitted by the
defendants-appellees.
Although the general rule is that the courts will not attempt to interfere with
the exercise of a discretionary power, exceptions to the rule are found in cases of
gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority, because
the discretion must be exercised under the law, and not contrary to law.
"However, although the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an
official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed
by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other, yet it is not accurate to say
that the writ will never issue to control his discretion. There is an exception to the rule
if the case is otherwise proper, as in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice, or palpable excess of authority. In other words, the discretion which will
withstand review by mandamus must be exercised under the law. and not contrary to
law. For the discretion in question is not an arbitrary, vague, or fanciful one, but a
legal, regular, and sound discretion which must be governed by rule and exercised
under established principles of law. If, in the attempted performance of discretionary
acts, the official abuses the discretion, so as to amount to a failure to do the act as the
law requires, or if by a mistaken view of the law, there has been in fact no actual
exercise in good faith of the judgment or discretion vested in the officer, mandamus is
a proper remedy.
WHEREFORE, THE APPEALED JUDGMENT IS REVERSED, DEFENDANTS
Are ORDERED TO APPROVE THE APPLICATION!