PEOPLE VS JAURIGUE
requirements are fulfilled, according to Art. 11(1) RPC:
Facts: Defendant Avelina Jarigue(girl) and appellant Amado Capino lived in the same
barrio. Prior to the incident at hand, Capino had been courting Jarigue to no avail. A
month prior to the incident, Capino stole a hanky belonging to Jarigue bearing her
nickname aveling while I was being washed. On another night, Jarigue was feeding a
dog under her house, when Capino approached her and spoke to her of his love, which
she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her
boobs. She thereafter kept a long fan knife to protect herself. A few days later, Capino
climbed up the house of Jarigue and entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt
her forehead with the intention of raping her. She immediately screamed for help, which
awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Capino then came out from where
he was hiding, under the bed, and kissed the hand of Jarigues father to beg for
forgiveness. Several days later on the fateful night, her family went to the local church
where it was quite bright. When Jarigue was left alone in the bench while her father
tended to some business, Capino sat beside Jarigue and placed his hand on top of her
thigh. On observing this highly improper conduct, Jaurigue stabbed Capino in the neck,
fatally causing a single wound from which he died. Jaurigue surrendered without
question.
Issue: WON defendant acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and should be
completely absolved from all criminal liability.
Side issue: WON there were mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Held: She is not absolved from criminal liability. If the defendant had killed Capino when
he climbed up her house to rape her, she could have been perfectly justified in killing
him. However, when the deceased sat beside defendant on the same bench in a well lit
chapel with several people inside, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant
where there is no possibility of being raped. She cannot be legally declared completely
exempt from criminal liability for fatally wounding the deceased since the means
employer by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive.
On the side: The fact that she voluntarily surrendered to the lieutenant in the chapel
and admitted to stabbing the deceased , and the fact that she had acted in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon
such provocation as to produce passion or temporary loss of reason, should be
considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor.
The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious
worship cannot be legally sustained as there is no evidence to show that defendant had
murder in her heart when she entered the chapel. She should therefore be charged with
homicide without aggravating circumstances and with mitigating circumstances.
PEOPLE VS. NARVAEZ
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of
David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia when the two
were constructing a fence (that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and
rice mill). Narvaez, who was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction, awoke
and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over.
Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Narvaez lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher first, then Rubia, who was running towards the jeep to
get his gun. Both died.
Narvaez voluntarily surrendered and claimed he killed in defense of his person and of his
rights. The CFI convicted him of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premediation and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved
in a legal battle with the Narvaez over certain pieces of property. At the time of the
shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of
property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). Narvaez had leased his property from
Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
Narvaez received a letter terminating the contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months
after letter.
ISSUE: W/N CFI erred in convicting Narvaez despite the fact that he was acting in
defense of his person and of his rights.
HELD/RATIO: YES (with respect to rights) Narvaez ordered released immediately coz
his penalty was reduced and he had already served it as he was imprisoned for 14 years.
Defense of his person - NO
The courts said that although the fencing of Narvaez house was indeed a form of
aggression against him, this aggression was not done against his person but rather on
his rights to property. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the
courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code, which recognizes the right of owners to close
and fence their land. But the Narvaez cant subscribe to the article because his ownership
of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting
ownership into question. It is accepted that Narvaez
Defense of his rights YES (although incomplete)
The argument of the justifying circumstance of self- defense is applicable only if the 3
1. Unlawful aggression.
2. Reasonable necessity of means employed to
prevent or repel attack.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of
person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression due to the utterance of
Fleischer and the invasion of Narvaezs property was clear. The pending case regarding
ownership was decided only over a year after the incident, and even then, Fleischer had
given Narvaez until the end of the year to leave the land. Lack of sufficient provocation
was clear because Narvaez was asleep in his house, then asked Fleischer to stop so
they could talk. Firing a shotgun from a window, however, was a disproportionate means
of resistance.
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion & obfuscation.
DISSENTS:
Abad Santos: Self-defense in the penal code refers to unlawful aggression on persons
and not property. Gutierrez, Jr.: Appellant defended from an attack on his property that
was not coupled with an attack on his person. There should be no special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense. The sentence should have been modified to prision
mayor and the defendant should have been ordered released immediately.
People vs. Ernesto UlepG.R. no. 132547September 20, 2000
Facts:SPO1 Ernest Ulep is convicted for the murder of Buenaventura Wapili. His case
isautomatically elevated for review to the Supreme Court due to the imposed penalty of
death.On December 22, 1995 at around 2:00am at Mundog Subdivision,
Poblacion,Kidapawan, Cotabato, Buenaventura Wapili was having a high fever and was
heard talkinginsensibly to himself in his room. Dario Leydan, his brother-in-law,
convinced him to come outand talk. But Wapili refused. A little later, there was a
disturbance inside the room as if Wapiliwas smashing the furniture, until he was already
running without any particular direction as if completely gone crazy. After several
attempts to pacify Wapili, Leydan went to another neighbor to solicit her help. The
neighbor, Norma Plando was a policewoman who radioed SPO1 Ernesto Ulep,
SPO1Edilberto Espadera and SPO2 Crispin Pillo.The three responding policemen,
armed with M-16 rifles, arrived around 4:00am. SPO1Ulep fired a warning shot and told
Wapili to put down his weapon or they would shoot him.However, Wapili refused and
instead advanced towards the police officers. At about two or three meters away, SPO1
Ulep shot various parts of the victims body. As the victim slumped tothe ground, SPO1
Ulep fired another bullet into his head. An Information for murder was filed against SPO1
Ulep through the Office of theOmbudsman for the Military. The accused pleaded not
guilty to the charge and insisted that heacted in self-defense.On October 27, 1997, the
trial court convicted the accused of murder and sentenced himto death.
Issue:Whether or not the circumstance of fulfillment of duty should be appreciated in the
case.
Whether or not the circumstance of self-defense is present.
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery should be appreciated in thecase
as to qualify the offense from homicide to murder.
Held:In order that the circumstance of fulfillment of duty be appreciated, two requisites
mustconcur. First, that the appellant acted in the performance of a duty or is in the lawful
exercise of a right or an office; and second, that the injury caused or the offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.In the instance case, the second requisite is absent. When
he fatally shot the victim inthe head even after the latter slumped to the ground cannot
be exonerated. Obviously, it wasunnecessary even perhaps in his desire to take no
chances.For the appreciation of self-defense, the elements are: the existence of
unlawfulaggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the accused; reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and the lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.In the case, the records show
that when the appellant fired while the victim was alreadylying on the ground affirmed the
absence of aggression. The first indispensable requisite for self defense being absent is
fatal to the claim. As to treachery, it is appreciated whenever the offender commits any
of the crimesagainst persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tenddirectly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defensewhich the offended party might make.The accused fired a
warning shot in the air and specifically ordered the victim to lower his weapon. This shows
that the appellant did not seek the killing of Wapili on purpose. Theappellants decision
to kill was made in an instant and the victims helpless position was merelyincidental to
his having been previously shot.The presence of the incomplete justifying circumstance
of fulfillment of a duty or lawfulexercise of a right is deemed a special or privileged
mitigating circumstance. Such circumstancecannot be offset by aggravating
circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or twodegrees than that prescribed
by law in accordance to Article 69 of the RPC.Furthermore, the court credited in favor of
the appellant the presence of the mitigatingcircumstance of voluntary surrender. The
police blotter shows that appellant immediatelyreported to the police headquarters and
voluntarily surrendered himself after the incident.In appreciation of the incomplete
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawfulexercise of a right lowered the
penalty by one degree from reclusion temporal to prision mayor.The existence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender imposed the penalty of prision mayor in
its minimum period.The Supreme Court held SPO1 Ulep guilty of Homicide instead of
Murder. He issentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 4 years, 2 months and 10 day
of prisioncorreccional medium as minimum, to 6 years, 4 months and 20 days of prision
mayor minimumas maximum. He is further ordered to indemnity the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P50,000and to pay the costs.
PEOPLE VS GUILLERMO BELLO
J. AQUINO
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE CFI OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR
FACTS:
- Alberio went to the municipal building and saw Ural, a policeman inside the
jail where he was boxing prisoner Napola (who was imprisoned for being drunk). When
Napola fell to the ground he U kicked him and poured some liquid on N and then ignited
Ns body.
- Dr. Luzonia Bakil who treated the victim, said that he sustained 2nd degree
burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one half of the body including the back.
She also testified that without any medical intervention, the burns would have caused
death

KEYWORD: White Slave Trade

- Napola died on Aug 25 1966. Death certificate indicated burn as the cause
of death.
FACTS: Bello is a 54 year old widower who was having a common law relationship with
Alicia Cervantes who was then only 24 years old. Because of financial strain, Bello
induced Alicia to work as a public hostess in Marings Bar; to which she agreed. Bello - During the trial, the prosecutors failed to present the detention prisoners who
was very infatuated with Alicia that he watched her dance all the time in the bar. One saw the burning of Napola as witnesses as well as the wife of the deceased
night, Bello saw Alicia enter a movie house with another guy. Bello took her out of the
movie house and reminded her to be discreet about her personal conduct. - Nevertheless, Ural was convicted of murder, was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and was ordered to pay for costs
One night, he approached Alicia while the latter was working in the bar to ask for some
money. He was sent away by Maring, the bar owner, telling him to stop bothering Alicia ISSUE: Whether the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
as he was already an old man. On his way home, Bello encountered Justo and Luis reasonable doubt.
Marasigan who said so this is the man whose wife is being used by Maring for white
slave trade. Infuriated, Bello went to the bar, got hold of Alicia from behind with his left
hand and stabbed her several times with a balisong his right hand. He surrendered Held: TC did not err in convicting Ural for murder.
immediately by going to the municipal building.
- Ural had his own version of the story. According to him he heard a scream
The trial court made a finding of treachery, evident premeditation, and in cold blood and for help from Napola whose shirt was in flames when found by him, he removed the shirt,
without provocation. In the dispositive portion however, the trial court considered the but did not summon the doctor because he thought that the burns were not serious.
aggravating circumstances of (1) nighttime (2) abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness and (3) superior strength offset only by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Bello was convicted to die through electrocution. o SC: this statement cannot prevail over the testimony of Alberio

ISSUE: o This statement does not prove that he was not the one who burned Napola,
at most this could only mean that he was alarmed by the consequences of his evil act

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of

- Ural assailed the credibility of Alberio as a witness, saying that he was not
listed as a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder in the past
treachery, evident premeditation, superior strength, nighttime and abuse of confidence
and obvious ungratefulness may be appreciated. NO
o Wouldnt preclude him from being a credible witness.

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation may be

appreciated - YES o Since there was no police investigation (accused a police officer), the
investigation that ensued was done by a special counsel of the fiscals office. A possible
explanation of alberio not being listed at first.
HELD:
o The statements of the witnesses for the defense were not inconsistent with
TREACHERY there was no treachery. True, Alicia may have been stabbed at the back that of Alberios.
yet this is but a continuation of earlier stabbing which Bello inflicted in the breast,
hypogastric region and left wrist. The back stab was inflicted when Alicia was about to
run.

EVIDENT PREMEDITATION there was no evident pre- meditation. Bello carried the Therefore, there is no reason to not believe in Alberios testimony.
Balisong not because he planned on killing Alicia but because he always brings it for
protection. The killing was a spur of the moment. - The present case is covered by article 4 (par.1-result greater than what was
intended).
SUPERIOR STRENGTH there was no superior strength. Bello was an old man and
invalid [baldado] while Alicia was in the prime of her youth, and not infirm. The facts are o Aggravating circumstance: art 14(1).
not sufficient to draw a comparison of their relative strength.

o TC erred in not appreciating the Mitigating circumstance that the offender

NIGHTIME although the killing was done at night, it was not purposely sought or taken had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
advantage of by Bello. In fact, Marings bar was well lit.

No intent to kill but only to maltreat the drunk napola who might have been
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE AND OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS - There is nothing to making a nuisance of himself
show that the assailant and his common-law wife reposed in one another any special
confidence that could be abused, or any gratitude owed by one to the other that ought to
be respected, and which would bear any relation, or connection, with the crime He realized the fearful consequence of his felonious act, he allowed Napola
committed. None is inferable from the fact that the accused was much older than his to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary
victim, or that he was penniless while she was able to earn a living and occasionally gave
him money, since both lived together as husband and wife. Neither is it shown that the
- Since the mitigating circumstance offset the aggravating circumstance, TC
accused took advantage of any such special confidence in order to carry out the crime.
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the
penalty for murder.
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION the remarks of the Marasigan brothers hurt the
feelings of Bello prompting him to indulge in heavy drinking and thereafter, plead to Alicia
DECISION: TC decision AFFIRMED.
to leave her work. This constitutes passion and obfuscation.

People v. Gonzales
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE) VS. DOMINGO URAL
(ACCUSED-APPELLANT)
FACTS: Gonzales-Flores was found guilty of illegal recruitment as seamen three different
people at the same time and collecting money from them without the necessary license.
L-30801 MARCH 27 1974
The complainants filed a complaint after they tried to follow-up their applications and
nothing happened for three months and they found out from the POEA that the accused
wasnt licensed. The evidence consisted of the complainants testimonies and
testimonies of other witnesses. Accused now argues that the Court didnt have enough
evidence to convict her.
ISSUE: W/N the Court had enough evidence to convict the accused.
HELD: The SC upholds the conviction. The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale
are: (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the
accused has no license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or
overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons,
individually or as a group. All the conditions are present. The evidence shows that she
could do something to get their applications approved. Accused contends that all she did
was to refer the complaints but the Labor Code, recruitment includes referral which is
defined as the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant for employment after initial
interview of a selected application for employment or a selected employer, placement
after initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer,
placement officer, or bureau. Also she did more than just make referrals, she actively
and directly enlisted complainants for employment aboard, when promising jobs as
seamen, and collected money.
People v. Pagal
Facts: Accused-appellants Pagal and Torcellino were charged with the crime of robbery
with homicide, with the generic aggravating circumstances of nightime purposely sought
to better accomplish their criminal design; evident premeditation; in disregard of the
respect due the offended party; and with abuse of confidence, the accused being then
employees of the offended party. When the case was called for arraignment, the accused
entered a plea of guilty but they were allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceding the act, and that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
to produce passion and obfuscation. The RTC, after considering the 4 aggravating
circumstances and mitigating circumstance of only plea of guilt, found them guilty of the
crime charged, sentencing them with the penalty of death. The case was elevated to the
SC by virtue of the mandatory review on account of the penalty of death imposed on the
accused.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in not appreciating in favor of the accused the
mitigating circumstances of (1) sufficient provocation and (2) passion or obfuscation.
Held: NO, the RTC is correct. As a rule, two or more mitigating circumstances arising
from the same act cannot be considered as separate and distinct circumstances but
should be treated as one. Thus, in this case, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation cannot be considered because the alleged provocation which caused the
obfuscation arose from the same incident, which is the alleged maltreatment and/or ill-
treatment caused by the victims towards the accused-appellants.
As to the circumstance of passion and obfuscation, it cannot be treated as mitigating if
the crime involved was planned and calmly meditated before its execution, such as in
this case of robbery where the appellants are expected to have carefully planned its
execution. Thus, in People vs. Daos, a case of robbery with homicide, this Court rejected
the claim of the appellants therein that passion and obfuscation should have been
estimated in their favor, because the death of the victim therein took place on the
occasion of a robbery, which, before its execution, had been planned and calmly
meditated by the appellants.
Finally, the maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed against them
occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation in order
to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately proceeding the act.
We hold that the trial court did not commit any error in not appreciating the said mitigating
circumstances in favor of the appellants.
PEOPLE v BENITO (74 SCRA 271) December 17, 1976 G.R. No. L-38091
The accused (who had a pending case with the Civil Service) contended that the victim
insulted him when he (the victim) remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises of
the Civil Service Commission and further argued that that remark "was tantamount to
kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was
made publicly and in a loud voice, he was exposed to ridicule in the presence of his
officemates. Assuming that the remark was directed at the accused, the Court did not
apply the mitigating circumstance of vindication for a grave offense for the killing of the
victim because the accused had more than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over
said remark if he ever did resent it.
BACABAC V. PEOPLE
Facts: Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance with Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and
Melchor Selibio (Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel
Talanquines (Edzel).
Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Quidatos group also left. They encountered
Jonathan and Edzel. The two groups had a misunderstanding.
On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), noticed a commotion. He soon saw that
Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later "tying" Jonathan "with his hands." He then saw
the victim hit Edzel with a "stick." He thus told the victim and his companions that Edzel
is the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon Eduardo told Jesus to
go away for they might shoot him. Jesus left and went to Edzel's house to report to his
father what he had witnessed. Meanwhile, Edzel and Jonathan escaped.
The victim and his companions then headed for home. They met Pat. Ricardo Bacabac
(Bacabac), with Edzel and Jonathan who are Bacabacs nephews; Also there were
Edzel's father, Jose, Edzels mother, and his two sisters. Bacabac and Jose were
carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel had a piece of wood and a revolver,
respectively.
Jesus then pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled
Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions
mistook Jonathan and Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted out, however, "You are just
bragging that you are brave. You are only bullying small children. Bacabac, at that
instant, fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his armalite ("as if spraying his rifle
from right to left") at the victim and Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as he
(Jonathan) "was on the move to strike Quidato with a piece of wood." Eduardo fell. And
so did Quidato who was in a kneeling position, and as he was raising his hands in
surrender, Jose shot him again.
Melchor escaped. Quidato, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. Quidato
was pronounced dead on arrival. Eduardo died two hours later.
Two informations were filed. One for the murder of Quidato and the other for Eduardos.
The RTC found them (Bacabac, Jose, Jesus, Edzel and Jonathan) all guilty. They all
appealed but only Bacabac filed a brief and only his was given due course.
Issue: Whether or not Bacabac should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense. NO.
Ratio: Bacabac is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of
a grave offense. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be,
following Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives
by affinity within the same degree." The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear
with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's own
clarification, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his] head." That act would certainly not be
classified as "grave offense." And Edzel is Bacabacs nephew, hence, not a relative by
affinity "within the same degree" contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Note: There was a long discussion about conspiracy and the SC said there was
conspiracy. There was also treachery. Bacabac is guilty of murder.
UNITED STATES VS. HICKS (once you go black...)
Facts: Agustina Sola was the mistress of Augustus Hicks, an afro-american. They lived
together for about 5 years
until Sola decided to leave Hicks. Sola found another afro- american lover in Wallace
Current. When Hicks learned about this he went to Currents house to confront the two.
While conversing, Hicks said God damn, Ive made up my mind as he was about to
grab his revolver. Current got hold of Hicks hand but the latter slapped it away. Current
ran inside a room just as Hicks drew his revolver and shot Sola, who was close by in the
sala of the house, on the left side of the breast. Sola died. Hicks was charged and found
guilty of murder, sentenced to death.
Issue: W/N there is the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation?
Held: None!
Generic aggravating circumstance of premeditation
SC held that the crime was attended with the aggravating circumstance of premeditation
because it found, according to one of the witnesses, that before the crime, the witness
and Hicks were drinking and the latter, while cleaning a revolver said that Solas time had
come. SC found that Hicks deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the
woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse
intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean
and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in
his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with
his victim, in what appeared to be a proper manner, disguising his intention and claiming
her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish
his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do beforehand.
Absence of mitigating circumstance
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstances is
present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss
of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as
the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are
such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy,
and immoral passions.

U.S. V. DELA CRUZ March 29, 1912 G.R. No. L-7094
The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his former lover upon discovering her in
flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. The accused was entitled
to the mitigating circumstance because in this case, the impulse upon which defendant
acted and which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was not that the woman
declined to have illicit relations with him but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to
him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.
SUMMARY:
Defendant, in the heat of passion, killed his querida (concubine or lover) upon catching
her red-handed in the arms of another. Trial court convicted defendant of homicide and
sentenced him to 14 years 8 months 1 day of reclusion temporal. Supreme Court found
extenuating/mitigating circumstances in the commission of the act of homicide therefore
reducing defendants sentence to 12 years 1 day of reclusion temporal.
ISSUES: 1 WoN there is an extenuating/mitigating circumstance present - YES FACTS
Defendant (De la Cruz), in the heat of passion, killed his querida when he caught her red-
handed in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.
2. Trial court found defendant guilty of homicide without any extenuating circumstances
present. Defendant was sentenced to 14 years 8 months 1 day of reculsion temporal
(medium degree of penalty prescribed by the code).
HOLDING: 1. YES. There is an extenuating circumstance present in the case. The Court
is of the opinion that the defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion and obfuscation when he caught his querida in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance.
The Court mentioned the view taken by the Supreme Court of Spain regarding a case
with similar state of facts: A man who kills a woman (his lover) for having caught her in
her underclothes with another man and afterwards shoots himself inflicting a serious
wound should be responsible for the act but with extenuating circumstance considered
because he acted as such due to strong emotion which impelled him to perform the
criminal act. The situation presents a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course
to produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason
for extenuation
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GUILLERMO BELLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Facts: Guillermo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. Guillermo was a 54 year old widower, and Alicias senior by 30 years. Prior to
Alicias employment at Marings Place, the couple led a blissful life. Due to poverty, voluntary. All these requisites appear to have attended their surrender.
Alicia became an entertainer/public hostess at the said bar, and Guillermo used to watch
her there everyday; very much smitten by her beauty[1].
However, on May 16, Guillermo saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater with a man, and
surprised the man caressing her inside the movie house. Guillermo dragged her outside.
Two weeks later, Guillermo visited Marings Place to ask Alicia for money, but the owner,
Maring (who was fantastically creative enough to name the bar after him), told him to go
home and to leave Alicia alone because he was an old invalid. He proceeded to walk
home empty handed, but upon passing Bonifacio Street, he came across the Marasigan
brothers who mocked him with the above stated remark. The self-loathing Guillermo
proceeded to Patys place and downed give glasses of Tuba.
By nighttime of the same day, Guillermo returned to Marings Place and did then and
there stab Alicia several times. Realizing what he had done, he ran to Gumarca and
surrendered to the police there. He was found guilty by the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City of murder attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, alevosia,
and abuse of confidence and ungratefulness; The penalty for which is death; thus the
automatic review of the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the victim should be given the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation, albeit his relationship with the victim being
merely a common-law marriage?
HELD: Yes. By stare decisis, passion or obfuscation on the part of the offender must
arise from legitimate and moral sentiments. Since common-law marriages are considered
unlawful in the Philippines, Obfuscation, when relationship is illegitimate, cannot be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
To answer this question, we must first differentiate the circumstances of this case with
that of U.S. v Hicks. In the said case, the common-law wife of Mr. Hicks terminated her
relations with the American, and contracted new relations with a certain corporal. Mr.
Hicks shot his ex-common-law-wife when she refused to go home with him and resume
their relationship. Since they were not married, she was entitled to do so. What she did
cruel as it may be was legal in the eyes of law. Passion and obfuscation were not
appreciated in such a case, since:
The common-law wife had a right to leave her common-law husband, as they were not
united in holy matrimony. He had no right to compel her to go with him. Remember that
the first requirement of passion or obfuscation is that there be an unlawful act, sufficient
to produce diminution of self-control or the exercise of will power.
Returning now to the case at hand, what Guillermo was asking from Alicia was that she
(1) quit her job as a hostess; an ill-reputed profession corroborated by her promiscuous
relations with other men, and (2) resume her job as a hostess.
The Supreme Court held that Alicias flat out refusal was an exhibition of immorality itself.
A monogamous illegitimate relationship is definitely of higher standing than illicit
relationship for the sake of gain or gainful promiscuity as the court put it.
This, coupled with the cruel words against him were enough to constitute passion and
obfuscation in the old soul. Thus, he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.WILLIE AMAGUIN, GILDO
AMAGUIN AND CELSO AMAGUIN, accused. January 10, 1994
(Accused) brothers Willie, Gildo and Celso, all surnamed
Amaguin being charged with the murder of the Oro brothers Pacifico and Diosdado.
Facts: On their way to the plaza, Pacifico (deceased) was called by accused Celso
Amaguin. After the refusal of the deceased, the accused, Celso, with a butcher's knife in
hand, rushed towards Pacifico. Gildo, Celso's younger brother, followed with a knife and
slingshot. Celso hacked Pacifico. Gildo then stabbed Diosdado with a knife. Thereafter,
Willie, the eldest of the Amaguin brothers, appeared with a handgun and successively
shot the brothers Pacifico, Diosdado and the fleeing Danilo. Diosdado, own kneeling,
gasping for breath and pleading for his life, was again shot by Willie who next fired anew
at Pacifico. Meanwhile, Gildo and Celso repeatedly stabbed Pacifico who already lying
prostrate and defenseless.
*Other survivors also gave their respective versions. The defense however maintains
that it was the Oro brothers who started the fight. Accused Gildo Amaguin recounted that
Pacifico with five others went to their house and approached his brother Celso and there
deceased together with his companions initiated a fight. Nenita Amaguin, mother of the
accused brothers, affirmed that her son Celso was indeed troublesome, but added that
Willie had no prior violations against the law. After a joint trial, and finding the version of
the prosecution to be more credible, the CIF of Iloilo found Gildo Amaguin, guilty of
murder and Willie Amaguin as accomplice. Issue: Whether or not the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in favor of the accused? Ruling: Yes.
While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the
fact is, they voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be
effected. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
following elements must be present: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be
PEOPLE V DELA Cruz (1935 case)
1 braza is a measure of six feet
Francisco Ramos, his wife along with Ramos and Santoyo (4 persons) went to the house
of Remedios Dela Cruz (defendant) and asked her to join the wake of Sion. The
defendant and her friends started to walk on their way to their respective houses at
around 9 P.M. They were later on followed, 5 minutes later, by Francisco
Rivera(deceased-victim) and Bautista. Rivera and Bautista overtook defendants party.
When they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that time
the members of the defendant's party were walking in single file and defendant was the
hindmost. She was about two brazas from the person immediately ahead of her.
Francisco Ramos heard someone cry out "Aruy, Dios mio". He went back and found that
Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast. The wounded man was taken
to the hospital, where he died the next afternoon.
Francisco Ramos testified that it took him about two minutes to go back to the place
where Rivera was. He found and that Bautista was with the wounded man, and the
defendant had started back towards the house of mourning. He overtook her. She had a
knife in her hand. When they reached the house where the wake was being held,
Remedios de la Cruz stuck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed Francisco
Rivera because he embraced her.
Prosecutions version:
According to Bautista, the defendant waited on the right side of the path near some guava
trees and stabbed Francisco Rivera with a knife in her right hand when he arrived in front
of her; that the injured man cried "Aruy, Dios mio", while the defendant turned around
and returned to the house of Maria Inguit, saying "Icao ay malaon na" (hacia tiempo ya)
Defendant-appelants version:
After they reached a narrow part a man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind,
caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and seized her in her private parts; that she
tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that when she felt weak
and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a knife from her
pocket, opened it, and stabbed him in defense of her honor. She further testified that the
man who attacked her did not say anything; that she asked him who he was but he did
not answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for help, saying "Madre mia; Dios
mio"; that when she was seized, she was about twobrazasbehind her nearest companion;
that when she was face to face with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely
recognize his face in the darkness and could not be sure that it was Francisco Rivera.
She further testified that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the fanknife in question
was in a pocket of the overcoat she was wearing that day; that she went off with her
friends without having an opportunity of changing her clothes.
Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of homicide.
Held: No. This case is similar to the case of Ah chong. The court held that a person is
not criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which
he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would constitute
murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time, provided that the ignorance or
mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
We cannot believe the testimony of Enrique Bautista, because Francisco Ramos, one of
the witnesses for the prosecution, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista himself
said that he could scarcely see anyone in the darkness
The appellant is an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely eighteen
years old. We do not believe her story is a fabrication. In this connection it is to be noted
that almost immediately after the incident in question took place, the appellant said she
stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her. It is not improbable that she was
reluctant to relate in the presence of all the people in the house of Maria Inguit (where
the wake was held) the details of what had occurred.
belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking
is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is with or without intent to gain;
and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person
or force upon things.
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow belongs
to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner's only defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good
faith and in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner,
without the consent of the owner, took the cow from the custody of the caretaker,
Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he knew all along that the latter was holding the
animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the taking to make it appear that he
owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to
deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the commission of
the crime.
P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus
indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the Revised Penal Code with
respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10 of the law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The SC Affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification on the prison penalty.

The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of the
knife, and undoubtedly could have inflicted other wounds on him if she had desired. In
other words she desisted as soon as he released her

Appelant acquitted.

Canta vs People

Facts: That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, Southern Leyte,
Philippines, the above-named accused, Exuperancio Canta, with intent to gain steal and
carry away one (1) black female cow belonging to Narciso Gabriel valued at (P3,000.00)
without the knowledge and consent of the aforesaid owner, to his damage and prejudice
in the amount aforestated. It appears that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986,
Agapay(caretaker) took the cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay
Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However, when he came back for it at past 9
o'clock in the morning of March 14, Agapay found the cow gone. He found hoof prints
which led to the house of Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Canta had taken the animal.

Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern Leyte. As a result,
Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were called to an investigation. Petitioner admitted
taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He
presented two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and another dated
February 27, 1985, to support his claim. Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership was,
however, denied by the municipal treasurer.

On 1997, trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged.
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated from the
affidavits and testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses, it is indubitable that it
was accused Canta who actually took the cow away without the knowledge and consent
of either the owner. That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy
and stealth considering that it was made at the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his
shelter-hut forty (40) meters away tethered to a coconut tree but separated by a hill.

The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by claiming
ownership however, failed to prove such ownership. Accused alleged that on February
27, 1985 he was issued a Certificate for his cow by Franklin Telen, a janitor at the Office
of the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, a neighboring town. On rebuttal Franklin
Telen denied in Court the testimony of the accused and even categorically declared that
it was only on March 24, 1986 that the accused brought the cow to the Municipal Hall of
Padre Burgos, when he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle for the cow,
and not on February 27, 1985.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the accused violated PD 533

Held:

P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as

. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or
whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force
upon things.

The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is taken; (2) it