CHAVEZ V.

PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the
Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between
AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of
submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed,
violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!

Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title
in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA
violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are
inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Chavez v PEA and AMARI G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.

Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA.
PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring
to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square
meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board
of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands
and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void,
and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating
a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the
Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of
courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final
agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the
government

Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President
cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.

PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended
JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and
AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of
the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas
of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.

Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned corporation performing
public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible
transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas
as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed
area to raise financing for the reclamation project.

2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court
can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed
to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public
disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal
or constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by
PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations.
We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with
its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information
on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they
'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights
to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
 5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution,
thus: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the
right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."
Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the
people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for
the public to expose its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.

However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating
to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the
opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at
his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public
records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the
inspection and copying.

6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some
public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense
of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.

Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to
public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so
used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion
although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory,
shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The
legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use
or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter,
and not otherwise.

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for
non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands
for some future public service.

However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public
agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by
putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
 PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands,
is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under
the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the
public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural
resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested
with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject
to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere
transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD
No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO
No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however,
expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied) There
is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government
is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:...
"In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by
the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."

However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250
hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA,
a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10,
1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double
the area publicly auctioned.

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of
the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of
the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction
a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can
"acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.

7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue.
Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
G.R. No. 88883 January 18, 1991
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LIWAN CONSI, respondents.
Mario C.V. Jalandoni for petitioner. Joy B. Labiaga for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside; (a) the decision* of the Court of Appeals
dated March 13, 1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 13528 entitled "Liwan Consi vs. Hon. Judge Ruben C. Ayson, et al."
declaring that both the petitioner and private respondent hold possessory titles to the land in question, and (b) the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located sometime between
December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called
Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of the
Mining Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other mineral claims, was sold
by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company,
Inc. (Atok for short; herein petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok
has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to the present (Rollo, Annex "B",
p. 21).
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim together
with other mineral claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of
Presidential Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok covering the Fredia mineral claim (Rollo,
Ibid., p. 22).
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide,
Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462.
When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain
a building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one prohibited him from entering the land so he was constructing
a house thereon. It was only in January 1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house that people came
to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said
land which his father before him had occupied (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a construction
was being undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes
instructed the cashier to go and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and other security guards
went to the place of the construction to verify and then to the police to report the matter (Rollo, Ibid.).
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi (Rollo, Annex "C", p.
32).
On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by Judge Irving rendered
a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered dismissed. (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 20).
Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet, Branch VI,
presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson (Rollo, Petition, p. 3). On December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon dated January 29,
1987 appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one entered in its place ordering the defendant Liwan
Consi and all those claiming under him to vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet
immediately, and to restore possession thereof to the plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The defendant, Liwan Consi, is further ordered to remove and demolish his house constructed in the premises of the
land of Fredia mineral claim at Tuding, Benguet, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30).
From said decision, Liwan Consi filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review (Rollo, Petition, p. 4). On
March 13, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the subject forcible entry action. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "C" p. 48).
The Court of Appeals further ruled in part to wit:
The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral land or agricultural awaits the decision of the Secretary of
Natural Resources in a proceeding called for that purpose. Thus, there is a chance that the subject property may be
classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi
as a "squatter" he also has possessory rights over the property. Such rights may mature into ownership on the basis
of long-term possession under the Public Land Law,
Thus it is Our holding, that both Consi and ATOK are of equal legal footing with regards the subject lot. Both hold
possessory titles to the land in question the petitioner through his long term occupancy of the same; the respondent
mining firm by virtue of its being the claim locator and applicant for a lease on the mineral claim within which the
subject lot is found. But it was established that the petitioner has been in actual and beneficial possession of the
subject lot since before the Second World War in the concept of owner and in good faith. (Rollo, Annex "C", pp. 47-
48).
On June 16, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner ATOK (Rollo,
Annex "D", p. 50).
Hence, the petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests
him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining
Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as
good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the
requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed
it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As
the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to
Benguet and Atok (Ibid.).
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in question was acquired through a Deed of Sale executed
between Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to
grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the
terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated
from the public and the property of the locator. When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a
grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment
of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral
right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a
lode locator acquires a vested right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains
in the government until patent issues. (St. Louis Mining & Mineral Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 605, 655;
43 Law ed., 320, 322)
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all
lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The
land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes
(Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent contends that his predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of
said lot even before the war and has in fact cultivated the same.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 288 1988, this Court held:
. . . even if it be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest of the de la Rosas had already been in possession of the
subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as
agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they are claiming it as agricultural land. They
were not disputing the rights of the mining locators nor where they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them
in the mining of the land. . . .
Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession of the subject lot no matter how long did not
confer upon him possessory rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases
of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred;
if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination
of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in continuous and exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral
claim while private respondent's possession started only sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon.
Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than private respondent, Liwan Consi, the former being "the one longer
in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was really petitioner who was in actual physical possession of the
property. Having been deprived of this possession by the private respondent, petitioner has every right to sue for
ejFectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared and held that petitioner Atok has the exclusive
right to the property in question.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 13, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet
dated June 16, 1989 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.