FIRST DIVISION complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber the entire property.
Complainant
TOMAS P. TAN, JR.,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA,Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant
Tomas P. Tan, Jr. against respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba for gross unethical conduct.
The facts are as follows.
Complainant, a self-made businessman with a tailoring shop in Naga City, filed a
verified Complaint[1] against respondent, also a resident of Naga City, before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP)-Camarines Sur Chapter. Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3,[2] Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, the said Chapter forwarded the complaint
to the IBP Board of Governors for proper disposition.
Complainant narrated that sometime in August 2000, respondent asked to be lent
350,000.00. Respondent assured him that she would pay the principal plus 12% interest
per annum after one year. She likewise offered by way of security a 105-square-meter
parcel of land located in Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
2055[3] and registered in her fathers name. Respondent showed complainant a Special
Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) executed by respondents parents, and verbally assured
consulted one Atty. Raquel Payte and was assured that the documents provided by
respondent were valid. Thus, complainant agreed to lend money to respondent. With the
A.C. No. 9000
help of Atty. Payte, respondent executed in complainants favor an open Deed of Absolute
Present:
Sale over the said parcel of land, attaching thereto the SPA. Complainant was made to
believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the loan with interest on due date,
CORONA, C.J.,
the deed of sale may be registered. Accordingly, he gave the amount of 350,000.00 to
Chairperson,
respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. despite complainants repeated demands. Left with no recourse, complainant went to the
Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that respondent deceived him since
Promulgated: the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered
respondent to mortgage the property solely to banks. Complainant manifested that he had
October 5, 2011 lent money before to other people albeit for insignificant amounts, but this was the first
time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and it bore disastrous results. He submitted that
respondent committed fraud and deceit or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Upon being ordered by the IBP to answer the above allegations, respondent filed
a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive Pleading [5] but no answer or comment
was ever filed by her before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Likewise, the IBP-
CBD allowed respondent to answer the Amended Complaint subsequently filed by
complainant but she did not file any answer thereto. [6] She also chose not to attend the
mandatory conference hearings set on July 18, 2006, June 13, 2007 and January 25, 2008
despite due notice. Thus, she was deemed to have waived her right to participate in the
proceedings.
On February 9, 2009, IBP Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. rendered his
report[7] finding respondent guilty of violating Canon 1, [8] Rule 1.01[9] and Canon 7[10] of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that she be suspended from the
practice of law for one year. Commissioner De La Rama opined that while respondent appears
to be a co-owner of the property as evidenced by an annotation on the back of TCT No. 2055
showing that half of the property has been sold to her, it was evident that she employed deceit
and dishonest means to make complainant believe, by virtue of the SPA, that she was duly
authorized to sell the entire property.
On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report
and recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-446:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
 rules, and considering Respondents violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for her failure to
submit verified Answer and did not even participate in the mandatory
conference, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year. [11]
We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Responsive Pleading, respondent wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD to
file her answer and to appear for the mandatory conferences despite due
notice. Respondent should bear in mind that she must acknowledge the orders of the IBP-
CBD in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. [15]

We agree with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find that a reduction of Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find, however, that
the recommended penalty is called for, pursuant to the principle that the appropriate suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. It is worth
penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on stressing that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be
the surrounding facts.[12] imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where
any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. [16] In
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined
this case, the Court finds the penalty of suspension more appropriate but finds the
for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether
recommended penalty of suspension for one year too severe. Considering the
his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a suspension of six months is sufficient.
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
After all, suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect
court.[13] Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to
the public and the legal profession.[17]
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly
required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found administratively
liable for grave misconduct. She is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS,
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
Here, respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into
with more severely.
lending money to her through the use of documents and false representations and taking
advantage of her education and complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by
complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an attorney in
respondents misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and if this Court, and notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
respondent had not led him to believe that he could register the open deed of sale if she fails Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
to pay the loan.[14] By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainants
perception of the legal profession but the publics perception as well. Her actions constitute
SO ORDERED.
gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,

grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

xxxx

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015
PATROCINIA H. SALABAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Patrocinia H. Salabao (complainant) against Atty.
Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. (respondent) for abuse of court processes in violation of Canons 10
and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 After respondent filed his Answer2 we
referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.3redarclaw
Factual Background
The facts pertinent to this complaint are summarized in the Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Complainant narrates that in 1995 she filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful or
fraudulent conduct of taking her precious real property situated in Taguig City. After hearing,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162, Pasig City issued its resolution in her favor in 2002.
Respondent then entered the picture as counsel for Lumberio. From then on, Complainant
complained that Respondent had made her suffer because of his abuse of processes and
disregard for her rights as a litigant.
She narrates as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In 2002, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig City which tried Civil Case No. 65147 issued
its resolution in her favor. In order to delay the case, Respondent brought the case on appeal to
the Court of Appeals under CA-GR CV No. 76360. The Court of Appeals decided in her favor on
January 13, 2004 but Respondent again filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under GR No.
167413. Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory.
Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, Branch 162, by
bringing to the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under CA-GR SP No.
97564. When rebuffed, he again appealed to the Supreme Court under GR No. 181243 sans a
clear or new arguments other than what he had presented before the Court of Appeals.
Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order of
the RTC before the Court of Appeals under CA-GR SP No. 101992 which was however dismissed.
From hereon, there was not stopping the Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint
before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil Case No. 08-0666-M. Apart from this,
Respondent filed several Motion, Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay the
resolution of the case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge Briccio Ygaa of
RTC Branch 153, Taguig City. Complainant then complained that Respondent had done more
than enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant and filed this case for abuse of
processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Respondent, for his part, denied the accusation and clarified that the several pleadings he had
filed had centered on the legality of the court's decision ordering the cancellation of the title of
Lumberio in such ordinary proceeding for cancellation of the title. To his mind, the said
ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title before the RTC Branch 153, Taguig City was void
because the law vests upon the government through the Solicitor General the power to initiate a
reversion case if there is such a ground to cancel the title issued by the Land Management
Bureau in favor of Lumberio.
With respect to the civil case before the RTC of Ma[u]ban, Branch 64, he explained that the said
case does not show that herein counsel committed any act of dishonesty which may subject him
to any prosecution as he is just exercising his profession to the best of his ability. 4
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found at respondent
"relentlessly filed petitions and appeals in order to exhaust all possible remedies to obtain relief
for his client"5 which he considered as tantamount to "abusive and a spiteful effort to delay the
execution of Judgment."6 He noted that after the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
162 issued a Resolution in Civil Case No. 65147 adverse to his client, respondent filed a barrage
of cases/pleadings such as an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the RTC
ruling, a petition for review with the Supreme Court which was denied for having been filed out
of time; a petition for annulment of the RTC judgment which was dismissed by the CA; another
petition for review before this Court which was again denied; a petition for certiorari which was
dismissed by the CA; another civil case before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon which was dismissed
for "improper venue, res judicata, and violation of the anti-forum shopping law"7 and that it
involved the same issues as the one filed in Pasig RTC. Moreover, he filed several inhibitions,
motions and an administrative complaint against the presiding judge. The Investigating
Commissioner, stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x [O]ne can immediately appreciate and see the abusive and spiteful conduct of Respondent.
He as a lawyer could have hardly missed knowing that his subsequent actions were merely
meant to harass the opposing litigant as in fact the Supreme Court had already issued its final
ruling on the matter. After the ruling of the High Court, Respondent should have known that the
case had been finally adjudicated and no amount of judicial exercise could turn the decision in
his client's favor. From then on, he should have saved his efforts of filing cases and motions in
court, as they are futile anyway, because he has his duty to the court above that to his client.
Needless to state, the Respondent is found herein to have violated Canon 12, Rule 12.02 and
Rule 12.04 of the CPR for which he should be meted with the appropriate administrative
penalty.8
He thus recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for four months.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-251 dated 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 20, 2013, stating
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
2. x x x he had only exhausted all possible remedies available under the premises;
xxxx
With all candor and honesty, undersigned believes that he was only doing his legal duty as a
lawyer to exhaust all legal remedies taking steps within its framework. He has not done any
wrongdoing while taking such routes. He has never been dishonest;
xxxx
4. Respondent believes that undersigned deserves an acquittal given the fact that it was not
shown that he acted in bad: faith in taking such legal remedies.
5. Respondent cannot also be charged with abuse of judicial process because complainant has
other recourse available to execute the said decision in her favor while there were petitions
filed, complainant also did not allege that respondent has abused the judicial process. The
courts to which the said petitions were filed also did not cite the respondent in contempt of
court [nor was a warning] given.
xx x x
6. Moreover, respondent is now suffering from renal failure which requires him to undergo
dialysis three (3) times in a week. To suspend him for four months would mean that he would
stop his dialysis for four moths [sic] which may cause his immediate death. This Honorable
Commission would not be too happy to see one of its members begging for alms from PCSO and
government officials to shoulder his dialysis of about P100,000.00 per month. 9
In a subsequent Resolution No. XXI-2014-182 dated March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors affirmed its earlier Resolution and denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,
saying that there was no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.
The Court's Ruling
While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their clients, 10 it cannot be
emphasized enough that their first and primary duty is "not to the client but to the
administration of justice."11 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A
lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice." Thus, in the use of Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be
tempered by the paramount consideration that justice be done to all parties involved, and the
la|wyer for the losing party should not stand in the way of the execution of a valid judgment.
This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has iterations
in various forms:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The Lawyer's Oath:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney: xxxx
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
xxxx
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or
delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest; (Emphasis supplied)
Code of Professional Responsibility:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
Court processes. (Emphasis supplied)
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice,
any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes
misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.12redarclaw
In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory by July 27,
2005. Respondent however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12) motions and cases in
various courts subsequent to the Entry of Judgment:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Regional Trial Court of Taguig City:
1. Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 27,2006
2. Motion to Admit Affidavit of Third-Party Claimant
3. Motion for Early Resolution
4. Motion to Observe Judicial Courtesy while the case is pending appeal with the Court
of Appeals
 5. Urgent Motion to Defer/Suspend Execution in view of the Order of the CA
6. Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order
Court of Appeals:
1. Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of
Appeals
2. Motion for Reconsideration
3. Petition for Certiorari
4. Urgent Motion to Reiterate the Issuance of Order for Judicial Courtesy
Supreme Court:
1. Petition for Certiorari
2. Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's
intention was to delay the execution of the final judgment.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent was only doing his duty as a
lawyer to exhaust all legal remedies to protect the interest of his client, his other actions belie
his claim of good faith. Respondent filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Mauban, Quezon in what was clearly a case of forum-shopping. Moreover, respondent filed
three Motions to Inhibit against the three judges hearing these cases, and even a motion to cite
the sheriff in contempt of court who was simply carrying out his duty to execute the decision.
In his defense, respondent argued that the Courts did not call attention to his improper behavior
and dilatory tactics. This is not true. In her Order inhibiting herself from the case, Judge
Homena-Valencia stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This presiding judge would like to emphasize that, having assumed her position as acting
presiding judge of this branch only last September 2005, she does not know any of the parties
from Adam. As such, she could not be inclined to show bias in favor of one of them. She refuses,
however, to be drawn into a discussion, to put it mildly, with respondent's counsel as to her
knowledge of the law.
However, to obviate any suspicion as to her objectivity, she inhibits herself from further hearing
this case although the reasons stated by the defendant are not one of those provided for in the
Rules for the voluntary inhibition of a judge.
Respondent's counsel is hereby advised to be more professional in his language, he, being a
lawyer, is first and foremost an officer of the court.13
In the October 23, 2007 Decision14 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 97564, respondent was rebuked
for the misuse of court processes, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Petition for Annulment of Judgment is petitioner's last-ditch effort to defer the execution of
the 31 July 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162, which has long
attained finality.
xxxx
In epitome, to sustain petitioner's insinuation of extrinsic fraud is to make a mockery of Our
judicial system. We take exception to the unjustified delay in the enforcement of the RTC
Decision dated 31 July 2002 which has long become final and executory. This is obviously a
spiteful ploy to deprive respondent of the fruits of her victory.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED. 15
Moreover, in his Omnibus Order16 dated September 18, 2008, Judge Briccio C.
Ygaa17 stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This case is a clear example of how a party, aided by a smart lawyer, could unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of judgment or misuse court processes. Defendant and counsel are very
lucky that the herein plaintiff has the patience of Job. Should this case reach the attention of the
Supreme Court, where the whole story will be known, they will have a lot of explaining to do. 18
It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court
processes, employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning
ignorance of Ms duties as an officer of the court. He has breached his sworn duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and
12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules of
Court. In so doing, he is administratively liable for his actions.
Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and suspension as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do x x x.
In previous decisions involving abuse of court processes, 19 this Court has imposed the penalty of
suspension ranging from six months to two years. In light of the following aggravating
circumstances - multiplicity of motions and cases filed by respondent, the malice evinced by his
filing of various motions to prevent the judges and sheriff from fulfilling their legal duties,
feigned ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court, and his lack of remorse for his actions -
the Court finds that a penalty of suspension for 18 months would be commensurate to the
damage and prejudice that respondent has inflicted on complainant Salabao for his actions.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. is hereby

found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of
eighteen (18) months.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty.
Villaruel's record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

EN BANC
CATHERINE & HENRY YU,
Complainants,
- versus -
ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA,
Respondent.
On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a complaint [1] for
disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for alleged acts of defraudation,
before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).[2] Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit[3] which
they earlier filed before the City Prosecutors Office of Makati, charging the respondent and
his co-accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).
The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:
Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy) who
introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General Services
Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency trading. [4] Mr. Uy
persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest a minimum amount
of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said company. They were made to believe that
the said company had the so-called stop-loss mechanism that enabled it to stop trading once
the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be reached. If,
on the other hand, the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the
investors the principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth
Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks covering the principal
investments.[5]
It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketings promises were false and fraudulent, and
that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason account closed. The investors,
including the complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketings office. There, they discovered
that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation and a new corporation was formed
named Ur-Link Corporation (Ur-Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations
of the former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met the respondent. As
Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent assured the
complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations of the former company.[6] To put a
semblance of validity to such representation, respondent signed an Agreement [7] to that
effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to further deceive the investors. [8] This
prompted the complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketings officers and
directors which remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for
syndicated estafa against the respondent and his co-accused.[9]
Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has been
successful in defying the law, to this date.
In an Order[10] dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B. Vinluan
required respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to
comply. Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed by the complainants. [11] The case
was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for
investigation. In his continued defiance of the lawful orders of the Commission, respondent
failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file his position paper. Respondent was
thereafter declared in default and the case was heard ex parte.
In his report,[12] the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketings executives (which
included respondent herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the complainants by
engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign
currency trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as Wealth Marketing was
not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in such
undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketings financial status could
not support the investors demands involving millions of pesos. It also appears, said the
Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to perpetuate fraud and to avoid
obligations. The Commissioner likewise found that respondent had been previously
suspended by this Court for committing similar acts of defraudation. [13]Considering the
gravity of the acts committed, as well as his previous administrative case and defiance of
lawful orders, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the documents
presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by the complainants involving the same
respondent, and said decision of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the
undersigned commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa be
disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys upon the approval of the Board
of Governors and the Honorable Supreme Court. [14]
In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Commissioners report and recommendation.[15]
This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.
Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system,
they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their professional or in
their private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good
demeanor.[16]
In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent played a vital role,
being Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board and Ur-Links representative. We quote
with approval the Commissioners findings, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutors Office of Makati, it appears that the
executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation conspired with each (sic) other to
defraud the investors by engaging in unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to
invest in foreign currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that there was no
actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not duly licensed or authorized by
the Securities and Exchange Commission to perform such task.
In the General Information Sheet (Annex I) of Wealth Marketing and General Services
Corporation, the authorized capital stock is only P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at
the time of [in]corporation is (sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the records will
show, has been dealing with investors with millions of pesos on hand, with the hope that
their money would earn interests as promised. However, their company resources and
financial status will show that they are not in the position to meet these demands if a
situation such as this would arise.
xxxx
Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for the return of their
investments, said respondent even formed and made him part of a new company, Ur-Link
Corporation, which according to the complainants, when they met the respondent, would
assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation. It is also evident that
respondent is frolicking with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the purpose of
employing fraud.[17]
To be sure, respondents conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.
The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same set of facts is still
pending in court is of no moment. Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that
administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in
the administrative proceedings.[18] Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final
resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon;
otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and
continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal
case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate.[19] Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice
law.[20] The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court.[21]
As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for
only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing
and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. [22]
The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an administrative
case, for he had been previously suspended from the practice of law in Samala v.
Palaa[23] and Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaa.[24] In Samala, respondent also played
an important role in a corporation known as First Imperial Resources Incorporated (FIRI),
being its legal officer. As in this case, respondent committed the same offense by making
himself part of the money trading business when, in fact, said business was not among the
purposes for which FIRI was created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension
for three (3) years with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be
dealt with more severely.[25] Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six (6) months for
his continued refusal to settle his loan obligations. [26]
The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the warrant
of arrest issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense. [27]

Finally, we note that respondents case is further highlighted by his lack of regard for the
charges brought against him. As in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges head on,
respondent did not bother to file an answer and verified position paper, nor did he
participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct. [28] The Court has
emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of him. [29] Verily, respondents failure to comply
with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial
authorities.[30] As a lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar organization was
merely deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against
lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect of
the Court.[31] By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable
lack of respect for the authority of the Court.[32]

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct
herein-before mentioned for which he was penalized with a three-year suspension with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely; and
another six-month suspension thereafter, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the
instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of
a much graver penalty --- disbarment.[33] Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the
world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example
to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. [34]

WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby DISBARRED, and his name

is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered
in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 City post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt of
Republic of the Philippines court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her address to
SUPREME COURT Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985
Manila expanding the scope of the preliminary injunction to prevent all post offices in the Philippines
from releasing pension checks to complainant.

SECOND DIVISION
On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw the
pension checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of record but
only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney Alexander H. Lim.

A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again without
the participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that
CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner, complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00. It was likewise
vs. stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent. installments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40% per annum discounted every six (6)
months. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial court on 15 August 1985.
Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.
On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment, based on
Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent. the following allegations:

7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking

assistance, advise and signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy
thereof was furnished to either of them or at least to complainant herself
PADILLA, J.:
despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the same;

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the
8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary
latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.
for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only
jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous
The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows: expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her
anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon
Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her
Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything;
assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the United
States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment states 9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by
that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a means of fraud, deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on
special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect and receive her pension her by respondent;
checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City. The above documents were apparently prepared
and notarized by respondent Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to
represent complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned
special power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she was
Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,
revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for
Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other counsel,
injunction with damages against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as
Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of
counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant
complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent) made the
(as defendant).
compromise agreement.

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on

23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was informed
that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers. Complainant
stated that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement
and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed grossly
loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.
Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4 October
1984. There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect to any interest to
be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on the promissory note was
25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the loan.
In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985, complainant's
debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10)
months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five percent (75%) per annum. In
addition, the compromise agreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would be payable in
fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great
amount of mathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the compromise
agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant.
With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise
agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting
and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her lawyers
by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision.
There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise
agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial court of the alleged
abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel, respondent saw
an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the
compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and patently disadvantageous
and prejudicial to complainant.
Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
9. Negotiations with opposite party.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon
the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel; much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but
should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid
everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake
to advise him as to the law.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty.
Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this Court.
Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only
do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from
being attained.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately upon
his receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and member
of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted
since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented
to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this respondent
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, A.C. No. 6396 retorted scornfully, Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals?
Complainant, You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy? Surprised at
this outburst, complainant replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent
Present: to the party you claim to be representing. Respondent then replied, Then you should have
notified me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting
PUNO, J., your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me. Complainant replied, It is not
Chairman, our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the
TINGA, and record of the case? Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals decision. Respondent angrily
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, declared in Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You mean to say
Respondent, Promulgated: you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and left the office, banging the
door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by
October 25, 2005 the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place. [4]

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger
at complainant and shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales
RESOLUTION kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont
turn your ire on me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents words but still managed to
TINGA, J.: reply, I dont even know your client, Sir. Respondent left the office and as he passed by
complainants window, he again shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. woman!)[5]
Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting
their noble profession. Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of
which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had
been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from
her staff.[6]

Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
a Complaint-Affidavit[1] with supporting documents[2] against respondent Atty. Virgil R.
Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [3] The charge in the complaint is
summed up as follows:
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by
an Affidavit[7] signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the
incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said employees.
A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on 25
September 2003.[8]

Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya
Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the
complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S.
Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin, MCTC
Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was
not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9] requiring respondent to submit his answer
to the complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance[10] dated 18 June 2003. Respondent
explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico
Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962
with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to
the office of the complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the
MCTC and the complainant reassured him of the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the
records on 5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day.
Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the records had
not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were returned to
the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25
September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said
date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the case be submitted for
resolution.[11] Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-
appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was
not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on
19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in the
same Manifestation.[12]
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next
hearing date in view of respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and
humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted.[13]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded
and warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt
with more severely.[14]The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and
approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. [15]
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of
Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present
the required certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have
gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of Appeals
furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true copy
of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records
were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and
there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them, respondent had no
right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case
No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of
record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No.
784, respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk
of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but
also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her
subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16] respondent ought to have realized that
this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it.[17] These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to
wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflect on his fitness to practice law, now shall he, whether in public or
private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that
lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must
act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not
categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the
prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents
uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to
Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a case
against respondent pending before this Court.[19] We, however, cannot acknowledge such
allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that
effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
 Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to
say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot
be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their
brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or
contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates
solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of
professional duty.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for
appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, A.C. No. 7269
-versus-
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Promulgated:
Respondent. November 23, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-
Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-
2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284,
where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed
against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one
Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in
court, projecting herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the
minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November
2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and
notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged
that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a
few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him ended in 2000
but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help
of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentesformer secretary. Busmente alleged that he did
not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer1 presented
as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she
represented Ulaso as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-
CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since
2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that
notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent
to Busmentesdesignated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmentes only excuse
was that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and
pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy
M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmentes staff, alleging Macasiebs failure to endorse pleadings and
notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly
refer to Ulasos case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that she actually
witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also
noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmentes office in November 2003 as shown by
the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even
if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until
2005, which belied Busmentes allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law
using his office address without his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosas connivance
with Macasieb. As regards Busmentes allegation that his signature on the Answer was
forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to
submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time he
reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension from the practice of law for not less
than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification
by reducing the period of Busmentes suspension to six months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4 from the NBI stating
that the signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures
submitted to its office, showed that they were not written by one and the same person. In
its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors
denied Busmentes motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly
assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the
practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services.5The Court further ruled that holding ones self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law. 6
The Court explained:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit
his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman
in the unauthorized practice of law.7
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar,
misrepresented herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The
only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal
practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000 and
that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance
with Macasieb, another member of Busmentes staff. As pointed out by the IBP-
CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa
continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent
to Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosas practice should have
ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmentes office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The
7 December 2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case
No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In
that Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8
February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue
representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already
resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmentes office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a
copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No.
9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and
the same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the
questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there
were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14
November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-
Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three
letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all
signed by Busmente. Busmentefailed to impugn his signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only
came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its
status. Busmentes allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted
by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI
Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case
which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of
her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before
Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in
the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or
other court records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us
for, we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe
that it was so since had referred her to us (sic), she was handling some cases
of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any
pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those
were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just
accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation
to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following
elements of the offense are not present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so
in the instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we
never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the
Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her
qualification; we just presumed that she has legal qualifications to
represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed
her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us
paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No.
9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to
prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of
law for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmentes personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[A. C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005]
ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause
of the client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause
of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be
perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of
professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason
to deviate from the norm in this case.
A Complaint[1] dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by
Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and
malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his
former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City. [2] Atty.
Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing
the complaint ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Canoy
submitted all the necessary documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the
position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to
follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of
2000, during which Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was not present, Canoy
decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was shocked to learn that his
complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not
having submitted their position papers.[3] The dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy
alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case, much
less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper.
The Comment[4] filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the
Court that since commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and
low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims that for
more than ten years, his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorneys Office with
its steady stream of non-paying clients in the hundreds or thousands.[5] At the same time,
he hosted a legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung municipalities and
reaching the people who need legal advice and assistance.[6] Atty. Ortiz pursued on with this
lifestyle until his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, a victory which he generously
attributes to the help of the same people whom he had helped by way of legal assistance
before.[7]
Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent.
The lawyer was apparently confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be
resolved by way of compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy,
but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order
dismissing the case.[8] Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the
position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper
to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied
with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing lawyer. Eventually,
his desire to help was beyond physical limitations, and he withdrew from his other cases
and his free legal services.[9]
According to Atty. Ortiz, Mr. Canoy should have at least understood that during all
that time, he was free to visit or call the office and be entertained by the secretary as [he]
would normally report to the office in the afternoon as he had to attend to court trials and
report to the Sanggunian office.[10] He states that it was his policy to inform clients that they
should be the ones to follow-up their cases with his office, as it would be too difficult and a
financial burden to attend making follow-ups with hundreds of clients, mostly indigents
with only two office personnel.[11]
Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoys complaint was without
prejudice, thus the prescriptive period had been tolled. He claims not being able to
remember whether he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though as
far as he could recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him that he had a lawyer to handle
the case, thus his office did not insist on refiling the same. [12]
The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[13] Canoy eventually submitted a motion
withdrawing the complaint, but this was not favorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the
rule that the investigation of a case shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of
withdrawal of the charges.[14] Eventually, the investigating commissioner concluded that
clearly, the records show that [Atty. Ortiz] failed to exercise that degree of competence and
diligence required of him in prosecuting his clients (sic) claim, and recommended that Atty.
Ortiz be reprimanded.[15] The IBP Commission on Discipline adopted the recommendation,
with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz be likewise warned that a repetition of the same
negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent
or low-income litigants. Apart from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the
Public Attorneys Office, groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and the
Office of Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in the quest
to provide legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford the services of
lawyers. The efforts of private practitioners who assist in this goal are especially
commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call of duty and
without expectation of pecuniary reward.
 Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as
grievous as that of non-representation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortizs legal
practice may have been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latters illegal
dismissal case leaves much to be desired.
Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard
against the sort of conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoys
case.
CANON 17A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
...
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
...
CANON 22A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND
UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
...
Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel
of Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a
violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to
the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. [16]
If indeed Atty. Ortizs schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he
would not be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The
relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the
client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not
be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being
defended.[17]
There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on
time the position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to
file the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of
Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by
either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not be
submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to
prosecute could not be avoided.
That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case,
hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper
is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.[18]
Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortizs election as a City
Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him
of his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to
withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public
office.[19] Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from engaging
in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors, [20] and in such instance, the attorney-
client relationship is terminated.[21] However, city councilors are allowed to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours, and in the case of
lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this
case.[22] In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her
services.[23] Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice
of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the
court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the
lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.[24]
Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however,
cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. [25] Indeed, Rule 22.02
requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately
turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with
his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he
took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the
services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination
between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.

In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had
not been filed and that the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty.
Ortiz, much more so considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom Atty. Ortiz
proudly claims as his favored clientele. It does not escape the Courts attention that Atty.
Ortiz faults Canoy for not adequately following up the case with his office. [26] He cannot now
shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire about the status of the case, since, as
stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform his clients of the status of cases entrusted
to him.[27]

The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of
similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of
five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six months, and even
disbarment in aggravated cases.[28] Given the circumstances, the Court finds the penalty
recommended by the IBP too lenient and instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the practice of
law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of an
admonition or a reprimand considering that Atty. Ortizs undisputed negligence in failing to
timely file the position paper was compounded by his failure to inform Canoy of such fact,
and the successive dismissal of the complaint.

Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could
ill afford legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will
not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent
acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal
representation. They deserve quality representation as well.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) month from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same
negligence will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to
all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines Antecedents
Supreme Court
Manila Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who had jointly owned a parcel of land
EN BANC situated in Butuan City in their lifetimes. They died without leaving a will. Their land was
thereafter expropriated in connection with the construction of the Bancasi Airport. An
TERESITA T. BAYONLA, A.C. No. 4808 expropriation compensation amounting to P2,453,429.00 was to be paid to their heirs.
Complainant, Bayonla and her uncle, Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the compulsory heirs of Paz, being,
Present: respectively, Pazs granddaughter and son.[2]
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO, On June 22, 1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit,
VELASCO, JR., conversion, and breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that on October 21, 1993, she and Alfredo
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, had engaged the legal services of Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the expropriation
BRION, compensation from the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De Oro City,[3] agreeing to
PERALTA, her attorneys fees of 10% of whatever amount would be collected; that in November 1993,
-versus- BERSAMIN, Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from the ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty.
DEL CASTILLO, Reyes attorneys fees, would be P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her
ABAD, only P23,000.00, and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated
VILLARAMA, JR., demands; that on June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had collected the amount of P121,119.11 from
PEREZ, the ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would
MENDOZA, be P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes had handed her only P56,500.00, and had failed to deliver
SERENO, the balance of P52,507.20; and that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for depriving her of her
REYES, and just share.[4]
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.:
ATTY. PURITA A. REYES, In her comment dated February 10, 1998,[5] Atty. Reyes admitted that Bayonla
Respondent. Promulgated: and Alfredo had engaged her legal services for the purpose of collecting their share in the
expropriation compensation; that as consideration for her services, Bayonla and Alfredo
November 22, 2011 had agreed upon a 40% contingent fee for her; that she had given to Bayonla more than
what had been due to her; that Alfredo had received from the ATO the check for the second
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
release corresponding to the share of both Bayonla and Alfredo; that Alfredo had gotten
more than Bayonla out of the second release; that on June 5, 1995 she had received out of
DECISION
the second release by the ATO only her 40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and Alfredo had
agreed to bear the expenses for the collection of their share; that she had incurred travel
BERSAMIN, J.:
and other expenses in collecting such share; and that she should be absolved from liability
arising from the complaint.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien
On June 29, 1998, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. [6]
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the
On April 20, 1999, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro (Commissioner Navarro)
same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for
rendered a report,[7] whereby she found and recommended against Atty. Reyes as follows:
his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
- Code of Professional Responsibility.
In so far as this case of disbarment is concerned, the issue hinges
only on the complainants position; one of the heirs of Paz Durban
This canon of professional responsibility is at the center of this administrative
whose legal services of the respondent was not revoked.
complaint for disbarment for gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of trust filed
against Atty. Purita A. Reyes by Teresita T. Bayonla, her client. [1]
The parties were required to submit documents relative to their
respective defenses (sic) specially the actual amounts released by ATO,
actual amount due to the complainant as her share, the remittances
made by the respondent to the complainant of her share and receipts to
prove the same.
Unfortunately, only the respondent filed an answer without the
necessary documents required of them and attached only a xerox copy
of the computation made by Atty. Ismael Laya for the heir of Pedro
Durban which had already been previously attached to the records of
this case.
In the said computation it appears that for the release on
February 17, 1993, the heirs of Durban received P84,852.00 and for the
second release each of them as well as the complainant was
entitled P121,119.11. It could be inferred from here that complainant
was supposed to received (sic) P205,971.11 as her share.
Inasmuch as the attorneys fees of 40% was (sic) supported by
evidence instead of (sic) complainants allegation of ten [10%] percent;
then respondent was entitled to P82,388.45 as attorneys fees; leaving a
balance of P123,582.66 due to the complainant.
Respondents allegation that she gave more than what was
alleged by the complainant is untenable for she did not submit evidence
to prove the same, therefore, as it is complainants allegation that she
received only P79,000.00 for her share as a whole shall be considered
for the moment until such time that proofs to the contrary shall have
been submitted.
Considering that complainant was supposed to receive the
amount due her which was P123,582.66 and actually received
only P79,000.00; then respondent still has to remit to complainant the
amount of P44,582.66.
From the records of this case respondent alleged that she only
collected the 40% attorneys fees for the second release whereby
Alfredo Tabada the other heir of Paz Durban received the check from
ATO and got a large part of the same. Respondent did not mention how
much she got as attorneys fees against complainants share but on the
whole amounting to P496,895.00 which is unfair to the complainant.
As counsel for the heirs of Paz Durban, complainant herein
should have been advised by the respondent and given a breakdown of
whatever amount was received or came to her knowledge as
complainants counsel. Short of the foregoing, respondent violated Rule
16.01 Canon 16 Chapter III of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
to wit:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Respondent was given a chance to rectify whatever errors or
misgivings (sic) she had done for her client but she unfortunately failed
to do so and did not comply with the Order dated October 29, 1998.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned
respectfully recommends that the respondent be required to render an
accounting or inventory duly confirmed by the complainant of all the
collected shares due the complainant and remit to the latter the said
amount of P44.582.66;
Until such time that respondent had complied with the
aforementioned, she is suspended from the practice of her legal
profession.
Respectfully submitted.
On June 19, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report
of Commissioner Navarro through Resolution No. XIII-99-165.[8]
Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but on September 27, 1999 the IBP Board
of Governors denied her motion for reconsideration through Resolution No. XIV-99-117.[9]
Atty. Reyes then filed a motion for reinvestigation. However, through its
Resolution No. XV-2001-111 adopted on July 28, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors denied
the motion for reinvestigation for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the matter had already
been endorsed to the Court.[10]
On July 30, 2002, the Court directed the IBP Board of Governors to report on
whether Atty. Reyes had already accounted for and remitted the amount of P44,582.66 to
Bayonla.[11]
On August 22, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors informed the Court that per the
manifestation of Bayonlas counsel Atty. Reyes had not yet rendered an accounting and had
not yet remitted the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.[12]
Through her manifestation dated September 4, 2002 to the Court, [13] Atty. Reyes
posed some queries, as follows: (a) whether she could be compelled to pay the amount
of P44,582.66 to Bayonla even if the latters claims had been based on perjured statements;
(b) whether the payment of the amount would operate to dismiss the estafa case previously
filed by Bayonla against her for allegedly failing to deliver the balance of Bayonlas share;
and (c) whether she could deposit the amount of P44,582.66 with either the IBP Board of
Governors or the Court.

Atty. Reyes also stated in the manifestation that the IBP Board of Governors did
not accord to her the right to confront Bayonla during the investigation conducted by the
IBP Board of Governors; that Bayonlas counsel had induced Bayonla to file the estafa charge
against her; and that this had prompted her to initiate a disbarment complaint against
Bayonlas counsel.[14]
On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended the final
resolution of this case.[15] The recommendation was noted by the Court on June 29, 2010. [16]
Issue
Whether or not the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors
were proper.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, which were supported by
the records, but we modify the sanctions to be imposed on Atty. Reyes.
I involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall
hold in trust all moneys and properties of her client that may come into her possession. Rule
16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 demands that the lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand, subject to the
lawyers lien over the funds, or the lawyers option to apply so much of the funds as may be
necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
the client.
The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a lawyer
and her client is highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and
good faith. There is no question that the money or property received by a lawyer for her
client properly belongs to the latter.[17] Conformably with these canons of professional
responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the
property and money she has collected for her client. This obligation includes the prompt
reporting and accounting of the money collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable
judgment to his client.[18]
Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle would each receive the amount
of P84,852.00 out of the first release, and the amount of P121,119.11 out of the second
release. Her total share from the two releases was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being
entitled to P82,388.44 as attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of Bayonlas share, the net
share of Bayonla was P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to her
only P79,000.00,[19] which was short by P44,582.67. Despite demands by Bayonla and
despite the orders from the IBP Board of Governors for her to remit the shortage,[20] Atty.
Reyes refused to do so.
By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the
aforestated canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was
unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned over to the client. [21] The
unjustified withholding of money belonging to the client warrants the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer.[22] Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to immediately
account for and to deliver the money upon demand was deceit, for it signified that she had
converted the money to her own use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It
constituted gross misconduct for which the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
became justified pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any
of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension. (As amended by SC Resolution dated
February 13, 1992.)
II
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle
to administrative proceeding against respondent
The filing of the perjury charge by Atty. Reyes against Bayonla and of
the estafa charge by Bayonla against Atty. Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty of Atty.
Reyes to render an accounting and to remit the amount due to Bayonla. Nor did the
pendency of such cases inhibit this administrative matter from proceeding on its due
course. It is indisputable that the pendency of any criminal charges between the lawyer and
her client does not negate the administrative proceedings against the lawyer. We explained
why in Suzuki v. Tiamson,[23] to wit:
The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are different
from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. In this light,
we refer to this Courts ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona, citing In re
Almacen, where it was held:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they
are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the
determination of respondents administrative liability and our
findings herein should not in any way be treated as having any
material bearing on any other judicial action which the parties
may choose to file against each other. [emphasis supplied]
Relevantly, we have also emphasized in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc.
v. Naldoza[24] that
xxx a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil
liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar
finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a
favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative
liability of the lawyer.
It serves well to mention, lastly, that the simultaneous pendency of an
administrative case and a judicial proceeding related to the cause of the administrative case,
even if the charges and the evidence to be adduced in such cases are similar, does not result
into or occasion any unfairness, or prejudice, or deprivation of due process to the parties in
either of the cases.[25]
III
No denial of due process to respondent
Atty. Reyes contends that she was denied her right to due process because the IBP
Board of Governors did not permit her to personally confront the complainant.
We do not consider Atty. Reyess contention valid. She was accorded full due
process, for she in fact participated in all stages of the proceedings.
It is true that a lawyer shall not be disbarred or suspended from the practice of
law until she has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against
her, to produce witnesses in her behalf, and to be heard by herself or counsel.[26] Contrary
to Atty. Reyes insistence, however, the IBP Board of Governors was under no legal
obligation to conduct a trial-type proceeding at which she could have personally confronted
Bayonla. In other words, the lack of such proceeding neither diminished her right to due
process nor deprived her of the right. A formal investigation entailing notice and hearing is
required in administrative proceedings for disbarment, but the imperative need of notice
and hearing does not always mean the holding of an adversarial trial-type proceeding. Due
process is still satisfied when the parties are afforded the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit evidence in support of their respective sides. [27] As the Court said
in Samalio v. Court of Appeals:[28]
Due process in an administrative context does not require
trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process
that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain
degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words,
it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for
an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position
papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the
parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony.
 In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings
which he filed with the Board of Discipline of the BID when he filed his
answer and two motions to dismiss, as well as other motions and
papers. He was also able to participate in all stages of the administrative
proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice
and, subsequently, to the CSC by way of appeal.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process
is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side
or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. And any seeming defect in its observance is cured
by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. [bold
emphasis supplied]
Nevertheless, the IBP Board of Governors actually conducted a formal
investigation of the complaint against Atty. Reyes upon the directive of the Court. In her
formal investigation of the complaint, Commissioner Navarro allowed both parties to
submit their respective proofs on the actual amounts released by the ATO, the amounts due
to Bayonla as her share, Atty. Reyes corresponding contingent fees, the remittances by Atty.
Reyes to Bayonla, and the receipts showing such remittances. [29] In due course, Atty. Reyes
submitted her written answer, attaching to the answer the documents supporting her
defenses.[30] Commissioner Navarro took all of Atty. Reyes submissions into good and
proper account, as borne out by her report.[31] And even after the IBP Board of Governors
had adopted Commissioner Navarros report (and its recommendation), Atty. Reyes was still
afforded the fair opportunity to challenge the adverse findings by filing her motion for
reconsideration, although such motion was ultimately resolved against her. [32]
IV
Sanction
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite
demand of a lawyer to account for and to return money or property belonging to a client
has been suspension from the practice of law for two years. In Almendarez, Jr. v.
Langit,[33] the lawyer who withdrew the rentals pertaining to his client totaling P255,000.00
without the knowledge of the client and who ignored the demand of the client to account
for and to return the amount was suspended from the practice of law for two years.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[34] the lawyer received P155,000.00 from the adversary of his
clients as partial payment of a final and executory decision in favor of the clients pursuant
to a secret arrangement between the lawyer and the adversary, and deposited the amount
to the lawyers personal bank account without the knowledge of the clients; the lawyer
thereafter refused to surrender the money to his clients. The suspension of the lawyer for
two years from the practice of law was ordered by the Court. In Small v. Banares,[35] a similar
penalty of suspension for a period of two years from the practice of law was imposed on a
lawyer who had failed to file a case for the purpose of which he had received an amount
of P80,000.00, and to return the amount upon demand. In Barcenas v. Alvero,[36] the Court
suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law a lawyer who had failed to
immediately account for and to return P300,000.00 received from a client for the purpose
of depositing it in court, after the lawyer had been found not to have deposited the money
in court.
Considering that the sin of Atty. Reyes had striking resemblance with the sins thus
sanctioned in the aforementioned precedents, the proper penalty for her is suspension from
the practice of law for two years, with warning that a similar offense by her will be dealt
with more severely.
Atty. Reyes is further obliged to pay to Bayonla the amount of P44,582.67, which
the IBP Board of Governors found to be still unpaid, by way of restitution. Although the
Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Courts silence about the respondent
lawyers legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No
victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the clients funds or property should be
required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has
already established as the respondents liability. That has been the reason why the Court has
required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases
of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, and Small v. Banares, supra.
In addition, Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of 12% per annum reckoned from
June 22, 1997, the date when she was formally charged with disbarment. This rate of
interest was prescribed by the Court in Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit and Small v. Banares.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ATTY. PURITA A.
REYES guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for a period of two years
effective upon receipt of this Decision, with warning that a similar offense by her will be
dealt with more severely.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Reyes to pay to complainant Teresita T. Bayonla within
30 days from receipt of this Decision the amount of P44,582.67, with interest of 12% per
annum from June 22, 1997, and to render unto the complainant a complete written
accounting and inventory of: - (a) the amounts she had collected from the Air
Transportation Office as expropriation compensation; (b) the total amount due to the
complainant; (c) the total amount she had actually remitted to the complainant; and (d) the
amount she had deducted as her contingent fee vis--vis the complainant.
Within the same period of compliance, Atty. Reyes shall submit to the Court, through the
Office of the Bar Confidant, authentic written proof that her accounting, inventory, and
payment were furnished to and received by the complainant in due course.This Decision is
without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings against Atty. Reyes.
Let this Decision be disseminated to all lower courts and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, with a copy of it to be included in Atty. Reyes file in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
 On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of
EN BANC posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again,
respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she
DOLORES C. BELLEZA, A.C. No. 7815 found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant,
Present: Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions
but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants
PUNO, C.J., son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for
QUISUMBING, her sons defense.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint[2] for disbarment against
CARPIO, respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
CORONA, Attached to the verified complaint was the affidavit[3] of Chua which read:
CARPIO MORALES,
- v e r s u s - CHICO-NAZARIO, I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy.
VELASCO, JR., Bata, Bacolod City, after having been sworn to in accordance with law,
NACHURA, hereby depose and state:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, 1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza
BRION,* [to] Atty. Alan Macasa when she looked for a lawyer to help her son in
PERALTA and the case that the latter is facing sometime [i]n [the] first week of
BERSAMIN, JJ. November 2004;

ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, 2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am

Respondent. Promulgated: the one who facilitated the payment of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA to
July 23, 2009 Atty. Alan Macasa;

x----------------------------------------------------x 3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from

Mrs. Dolores Belleza as payment for Atty. Alan Macasa:
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam: Date Amount

November 11, 2004 P15,000.00

This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza against
respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in connection
with the handling of a criminal case involving complainants son.
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual
friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in connection
with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod
City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. [1] Respondent agreed
to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their
mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid
the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On
all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
A week after 10,000.00
November 18, 2004 5,000.00
4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as
Attorneys Fees were immediately forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the
truth of all the foregoing statements.
x x x x x x x x x[4]
In a letter dated May 23, 2005,[5] the IBP Negros Occidental chapter transmitted
the complaint to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). [6]
In an order dated July 13, 2005,[7] the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within
15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file
an answer dated August 10, 2005,[8] simply brushed aside the complaint for being baseless,
groundless and malicious without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that
he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions [9] for second and third extensions of time
praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.
When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006, they were
ordered to submit their respective position papers. [10]
In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007, [11] the CBD ruled that respondent
failed to rebut the charges against him. He never answered the complaint despite several
chances to do so.
The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.
It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate
and apart from his own and those others kept by him.
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was unfit
and unworthy of the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the bar. The CBD
recommended a suspension of six months with a stern warning that repetition of similar
acts would merit a more severe sanction. It also recommended that respondent be ordered
to return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the provisional liberty of the
complainants son and the P30,000 attorneys fees.
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation
of the CBD with the modification that respondent be ordered to return to complainant only
the amount of P30,000 which he received as attorneys fees.[12]
We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but we modify
the IBPs recommendation as to the liability of respondent.
RESPONDENT DISRESPECTED
LEGAL PROCESSES
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges
against him. Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to answer and
refute the accusations of professional misconduct against him. In doing so, he failed to
observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position paper. His
propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and disrespect for the
proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal
profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities. He
displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also to this Court which is the source of the
CBDs authority.
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not only
irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers.[13] His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court
orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives
as an officer of the court.[14] Respondent should have known that the orders of the CBD (as
the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers) were not mere
requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely. [15]
RESPONDENT GROSSLY
NEGLECTED
THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son.
Such undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxxxxxxx
 CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly
his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he
owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that
nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied. [16]
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve
his client with competence and diligence.[17] He must conscientiously perform his duty
arising from such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he
impliedly makes the following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of
learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best
judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will
exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his
knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately
safeguard his clients interest.[18]
A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and
prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the
ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is
both unprofessional and unethical.[19]
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his
client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the
scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in
a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the
Constitution.[20] However, this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample
legal assistance by his lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's
basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of
a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard
questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused
is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right
assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings,
particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of
the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and
his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence.[21]
[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental
right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little
consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his
other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.[22]
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.[23] Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient
and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation. [24]
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his
attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient
legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client.
Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek
the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the
case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it
also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the
amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client,
respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.
RESPONDENT
FAILED TO RETURN
HIS CLIENTS MONEY
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the
client.[25]
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose
(such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should
promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for
its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.[26] His failure either to
render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does
not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[27]
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they
fall due or upon demand.[28] His failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise
to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.[29] It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment.[30] Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it may constitute transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a shame to the legal
a prima facie case of swindling or estafa. profession.

Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of
posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its
intended purpose yet also never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to
turn over the amount to complainant despite the latters repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to
the P30,000 attorneys fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for
his services is subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship
and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of services to the client. [31] Thus, a lawyer who does not
render legal services is not entitled to attorneys fees. Otherwise, not only would he be
unjustly enriched at the expense of the client, he would also be rewarded for his negligence
and irresponsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only of
dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John Bellezas right
to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, and for
violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01, 16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law
effective immediately.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the amounts
of P30,000 and P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of
this decision until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court
proof of payment of the amount within ten days from payment. Failure to do so will subject
him to criminal prosecution.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
the records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the Court Administrator to
be furnished to the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY SO ORDERED.
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION

For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis
supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands for. In so
doing, he disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in
lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar.[32] Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [33]

Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the
money for the bond of the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in his dealings with his client. [34] He failed to live up to his fiduciary
duties. By keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that he would facilitate
the release of complainants son, respondent showed lack of moral principles. His
 Elayda] did not appear; certified copy of the order is attached as Annex
Republic of the Philippines C;
Supreme Court
Manila 5. That the order setting this case for hearing on February 14,
2006 was sent only to [Atty. Elayda] and no notice was sent to [the
spouses Aranda] that is they were unaware of said hearing and [Atty.
FIRST DIVISION Elayda] never informed them of the setting;

6. That despite receipt of the order dated February 14, 2006,

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA A.C. No. 7907 [Atty. Elayda] never informed them of such order notwithstanding the
ARANDA, follow-up they made of their case to him;
Petitioners,
Present: 7. That [Atty. Elayda] did not lift any single finger to have the
order dated February 14, 2006 reconsidered and/or set aside as is
CORONA, C.J., normally expected of a counsel devoted to the cause of his client;
Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR., 8. That in view of the inaction of [Atty. Elayda] the court
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, naturally rendered a judgment dated March 17, 2006 adverse to [the
DEL CASTILLO, and spouses Aranda] which copy thereof was sent only to [Atty. Elayda] and
PEREZ, JJ. [the spouses Aranda] did not receive any copy thereof, certified xerox
copy of the decision is attached as Annex D;
ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA, Promulgated:
Respondent. 9. That they were totally unaware of said judgment as [Atty.
December 15, 2010 Elayda] had not again lifted any single finger to inform them of such
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x adverse judgment and that there is a need to take a remedial recourse
thereto;

DECISION 10. That [Atty. Elayda] did not even bother to file a notice of
appeal hence the judgment became final and executory hence a writ of
execution was issued upon motion of the plaintiff [Martin Guballa] in
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: the said case;

11. That on July 18, 2006 Sheriff IV Leandro R. Madarag

The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by the spouses
Virgilio and Angelina Aranda (spouses Aranda) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, charging their former counsel, Atty. Emmanuel F.
Elayda (Atty. Elayda), with gross negligence or gross misconduct in handling their case. The
spouses Aranda were the defendants in Civil Case No. 232-0-01, entitled Martin V. Guballa
v. Spouses Angelina and Virgilio Aranda, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Olongapo City, Branch 72.
In the Complaint dated August 11, 2006,[1] the spouses Aranda alleged that Atty. Elaydas
handling of their case was sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow elementary
norms of civil procedure and evidence,[2] to wit:
4. That on February 14, 2006 hearing of the said case, the case
was ordered submitted for decision [the spouses Aranda] and [Atty.
implemented the writ of execution and it was only at this time that [the
spouses Aranda] became aware of the judgment of the Court, certified
xerox copy of the writ of execution is attached as Annex E;
12. That on July 19, 2006, they wasted no time in verifying the
status of their case before Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Olongapo
City and to their utter shock, dismay and disbelief, they found out that
they have already lost their case and worst the decision had already
become final and executory;
13. That despite their plea for a reasonable period to take a
remedial recourse of the situation (the Sheriff initially gave them fifteen
(15) days), Sheriff Madarag forcibly took possession and custody of
their Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate No. 529;
 14. That they were deprived of their right to present their
evidence in the said case and of their right to appeal because of the
gross negligence of respondent.[3]
In its Order[4] dated August 15, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed Atty.
Elayda to submit his Answer to the complaint with a warning that failure to do so will result
in his default and the case shall be heard ex parte.
Atty. Elayda filed his Answer[5] dated September 1, 2006, in which he narrated:
7. That this case also referred to [Atty. Elayda] sometime December
2004 after the [spouses Aranda] and its former counsel failed to appear
in court on February 7, 2005;
8. That from December 2004, the [spouses Aranda] did not bother to
contact [Atty. Elayda] to prepare for the case and in fact on May 30,
2005, [Atty. Elayda] had to ask for postponement of the case for reason
that he still have to confer with the [spouses Aranda] who were not
around;
9. That contrary to the allegations of the [spouses Aranda], there was
not a single instance from December 2004 that the [spouses Aranda]
called up [Atty. Elayda] to talk to him regarding their case;
10. That the [spouses Aranda] from December 2004 did not even
bother to follow up their case in court just if to verify the status of their
case and that it was only on July 19, 2006 that they verified the same
and also the only time they tried to contact [Atty. Elayda];
11. That the [spouses Aranda] admitted in their Complaint that they
only tried to contact [Atty. Elayda] when the writ of execution was being
implemented on them;
12. That during the scheduled hearing of the case on February 14, 2006,
[Atty. Elayda] was in fact went to RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City and
asked Mrs. Edith Miano to call him in Branch 73 where he had another
case if the [spouses Aranda] show up in court so that [Atty. Elayda] can
talk to them but obviously the [spouses Aranda] did not appear and
Mrs. Miano did not bother to call [Atty. Elayda];
13. That [Atty. Elayda] was not at fault that he was not able to file the
necessary pleadings in court because the [spouses Aranda] did not get
in touch with him;
14. That [Atty. Elayda] cannot contact the [spouses Aranda] for the
latter failed to give their contact number to [Atty. Elayda] nor did the
[spouses Aranda] go to his office to leave their contact number;
14. That the [spouses Aranda] were negligent in their I dont care
attitude towards their case and for this reason that they alone should
be blamed for what happened to their case x x x.
At the mandatory conference hearing held on March 14, 2007, all the parties appeared with
their respective counsels. The parties were then given a period of 10 days from receipt of
the order within which to submit their position papers attaching therewith all documentary
exhibits and affidavits of witnesses, if any.
After the submission of the parties position papers, Investigating Commissioner Jordan M.
Pizarras came out with his Decision[6] finding Atty. Elayda guilty of gross negligence, and
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty.
Emmanuel F. Elayda is suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six months, which shall take effect from the date of notice of receipt
of the finality of this DECISION. He is sternly WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. [7]
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-128[8] dated
March 6, 2008, adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Pizarras report, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and in view of respondents negligence and unmindful of his sworn
duties to his clients, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
with Warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a
more severe penalty.[9]
Aggrieved, Atty. Elayda filed with this Court a Petition for Review maintaining that he was
not negligent in handling the spouses Arandas case as to warrant suspension, which was
too harsh a penalty under the circumstances.
After a careful review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the findings and the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Elayda
was negligent and unmindful of his sworn duties to his clients.
In Abay v. Montesino,[10] this Court held:
 The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to
render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. Thus,
the practice of law is considered a privilege, not a right, bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications required for the conferment of such privilege.
Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency and of morality which includes honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in accordance
with the values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Any conduct found wanting in
these considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity,
shall subject them to disciplinary action. In the present case, the failure
of respondent to file the appellants brief was a clear violation of his
professional duty to his client.[11]
The Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for
information.
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and safeguard the
interests of his clients. He should be conscientious, competent and diligent in handling his
clients cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate attention, care, and time to all the cases he
is handling. As the spouses Arandas counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the
progress of said spouses case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy
or defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by the spouses Aranda.
Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda even admitted that the spouses
Aranda never knew of the scheduled hearings because said spouses never came to him and
that he did not know the spouses whereabouts. While it is true that communication is a
shared responsibility between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsels primary duty to
inform his clients of the status of their case and the orders which have been issued by the
court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry about the developments in
their case. Close coordination between counsel and client is necessary for them to
adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the
case. Besides, it is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact
details at the initial stages in order to have constant communication with each other. Again,
Atty. Elaydas excuse that he did not have the spouses Arandas contact number and that he
did not know their address is simply unacceptable.
Furthermore, this Court will not countenance Atty. Elaydas explanation that he cannot be
faulted for missing the February 14, 2006 hearing of the spouses Arandas case. The Court
quotes with approval the disquisition of Investigating Commissioner Pizarras:
Moreover, his defense that he cannot be faulted for what had
happened during the hearing on February 14, 2006 because he was just
at the other branch of the RTC for another case and left a message with
the court stenographer to just call him when [the spouses Aranda]
come, is lame, to say the least. In the first place, the counsel should not
be at another hearing when he knew very well that he has a scheduled
hearing for the [spouses Arandas] case at the same time. His attendance
at the hearing should not be made to depend on the whether [the
spouses Aranda] will come or not. The Order submitting the decision
was given at the instance of the other partys counsel mainly because of
his absence there. Again, as alleged by the [the spouses Aranda] and as
admitted by [Atty. Elayda] himself, he did not take the necessary
remedial measure in order to ask that said Order be set aside. [12]
It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting the spouses
Arandas case for decision. Thus, a judgment was rendered against the spouses Aranda for a
sum of money.Notice of said judgment was received by Atty. Elayda who again did not file
any notice of appeal or motion for reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final and
executory. Atty. Elayda did not also inform the spouses Aranda of the outcome of the
case. The spouses Aranda came to know of the adverse RTC judgment, which by then had
already become final and executory, only when a writ of execution was issued and
subsequently implemented by the sheriff.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal
profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in handling
his clients case but in fact abandoned his clients cause. He proved himself unworthy of the
trust reposed on him by his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to
his clients, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. [13]

On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his
full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether or
not it is for a fee or free.[14] Verily, in Santiago v. Fojas,[15] the Court held:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules
of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because
the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community
to the legal profession.[16]

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the
Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly,
respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Elaydas personal record with the Office of
the Bar Confidant and be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015
MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA,
JR., AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A. APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D.
PAJARILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified
complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo
for allegedly violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests and Canon 15 of the same
Code which enjoins a lawyer to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with clients.
The salient facts of the case follow:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided
into two opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of
Romulo M. Adeva, Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I. Andrade. The other
faction, called the Lukban Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I.
Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban.
In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary with a total
monthly compensation and honorarium of P6,000.
On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution which
authorized Pilar I. Andrade, the Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the
complainant at that time, and Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for Administration and
Finance, to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines
Norte in favor of the complainant.
On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application
because the Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were
allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the
complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the
complainant was having financial difficulties.
On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's
financial capacity to pay the loan.
On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 which was
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant.
On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order
which nullified the appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group
as members of the Board of Trustees of the complainant. As a result, complainant sent a
letter to RBP to inform the latter of the SEC Order.
On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the
SEC Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel,
herein respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter
that it became aware that respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP.
On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased the loan to P400,000.
On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage.
On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
RBP.
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the
respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit
candor, fairness, and loyalty.
Respondent raised three defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First, respondent
argued that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot
represent the complainant in this disbarment case because they were not duly authorized
by the Board of Directors to file the complaint. Second, respondent claimed that he is not
covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest which applies only to the legal counsel of
complainant. Respondent argued that he merely served as the corporate secretary of
complainant and did not serve as its legal counsel. Third, respondent argued that there
was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage because all the documents and information related to the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant were public records. Thus, respondent claimed that he
could not have taken advantage of his position as the mere corporate secretary of the
complainant.
On February 14, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for at least one
year. The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for RBP in the case
for annulment of mortgage filed by his former client, the complainant herein. The
Investigating Commissioner cited cash vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001 showing that
respondent was paid by complainant for his retained legal services. According to the
Investigating Commissioner, these vouchers debunk respondent's claim that the
complainant merely appointed him as its corporate secretary. The Investigating
Commissioner also held that the personality of complainant's representatives to file this
administrative case is immaterial since proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-
7704 which affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and imposed a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year against respondent.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-
2905 which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent.
The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests
when he entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage
filed by complainant against RBP.
We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of the
IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, respondent represented conflicting interests in violation
of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts."
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those
of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on
totally unrelated cases.6Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this
prohibition on representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 7 In Maturan v. Gonzales8 we
further explained the rationale for the prohibition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as
well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with
care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer
must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the
profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to determine the existence of
conflict of interest:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief,
if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of
the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients.10 It also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a
controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigation in which he appeared for the former client. 11This rule applies regardless of the
degree of adverse interests.12 What a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate
the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him
in any matter in which he previously represented him. 13 A lawyer may only be allowed to
represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation.14chanrobleslaw
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented conflicting
interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed
by the complainant, respondent's former client, against RBP.
The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was compensated by
complainant for his retained legal services is supported by the evidence on record, the
cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former client.
And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former client against
RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent
failed to show any written consent of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given
after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests.15chanrobleslaw
We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan
transaction between RBP and the complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, 1999
to RBP to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But
as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the
interest of the complainant, his former client.
Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and
information in connection with the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant
were public records. In Hilado v. David,16 we laid down the following doctrinal
pronouncements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from
thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during
the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the
attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7,
C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation,
the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his
former client during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent
the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)

In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is
unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's
affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the
attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev.,
264.)

This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on
terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the
same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is
irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of interest.

Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is
imbued with public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. Under
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, "[proceedings for the disbarment, suspension
or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person." Thus,
in the present case, we find that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela
Rossana A. Apuya can institute the complaint for disbarment even without authority from
the Board of Directors of the complainant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-
2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one year against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014
CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors
(IBP-BOG), dated January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and approving the
findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco
(Alty Francisco) administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007, 3 filed by
Caroline Castaeda Jimenez (complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of
the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his Answer. 4 On June 26, 2009, the
mandatory conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for Atty. Francisco
appeared. The notice of the said conference addressed to complainant was returned with
the notation "unknown at the given address." No new address was provided by the
complainant. Both parties wererequired to submit their respective position papers. For
this purpose, Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer. The Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa
against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio,
Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez. 5 The said complaint was
docketed as IS No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez
alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty
and Development Corporation (Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the
purpose of purchasing a residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes
property). The incorporators and original stockholders of Clarion were as follows:
Thomas K. Chua - P500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua - P500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - P249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P1.00
Soledad Gamat - P1.00
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarions Articles of Incorporation, the above-named
stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their
respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then Jimenezs common-law
partner.Clarions total capitalization was only P5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its
purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant
in the amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in
the amount of P117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a
check in the said amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was
undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was
purchased for P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was
not reflected in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to
Jimenez by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Mylas 249,997 shares were
transferred to complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one (1) share
was transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarions
General Information Sheet (GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Resultantly, the subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00
Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00
On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another deed
of assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to P1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenezs complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004, he
learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the
complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue Service
(IRS)was about to go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant
to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of
assignment. Again, this was reflected in Clarions GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale
sometimein August 2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest
Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of P118,000,000.00 without Jimenezs
knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at P78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty.
Francisco relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the sale of
the Forbes property and that he handed all the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano
in the presence of complainant.
Jimenezs complaint for estafa was based on complainants alleged participation in the
fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with
Jimenezs money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale to
Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents, however,
misappropriated and converted the fundsfor their personal use and benefit.
In support of Jimenezs complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit
reiterating its factual averments.6A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the
following claims and admissions, among other things, of Atty. Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the
documentation of the sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty.
Francisco asked her if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez and
complainant answered in the affirmative.
2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to
negotiate the sale of the property.
3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San
Francisco Del Monte branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he
withdrew the amount and handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the
presence of complainant.
4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer
taxes, however, were paid.
5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that
the sale of the Forbes property was without his knowledge and approval. The
proceeds of the sale had already been farmed out to different corporations
established by complainant and her sister.
6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal
the money of Mark Jimenez.
The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarions corporate counsel and
secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco
for representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty.
Francisco regarding the legal implications of Clarions transactions. More significantly, the
principal documents relative to the sale and transfer of Clarions property were all
prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office. 7 Atty. Francisco
was the one who actively participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes
property. Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant
argued that its execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as
a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.
The Respondents Position
In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998
for the incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in
Forbes Park, where he intended to live with his long-time partner, the complainant; that
the original incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares in trust
for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were
also pursuant to Jimenezs orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of
Clarion, he prepared all the legal documentation togive effect to the said transfers and,
ultimately, to the purchase of the Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the
United States for excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time,
Jimenezs son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked him again to changethe ownership of
Clarion shares in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenezs properties in a tax evasion
case; that he acceded to the request on the belief that this was in accordance with
Jimenezs wishes; and that as a result, almost 100% of Clarions ownership was
transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective
buyers and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold
for P118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him to believe that Jimenez had
knowledge of the sale as they were in constant communication with him; that all these
representations, however, turned out to be false when Jimenez returned tothe Philippines
and discovered that the proceeds of the sale were coursed through other corporations set
up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez likewise learned of the successive sale of
his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the members of his family; and
that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the complainant and the others. As a
witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit
narrating the facts and circumstances surrounding the said transactions.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged
communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the
ground that complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal
counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant. He might have assisted her in some
matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so.
Further, though he acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship
between him and complainant was formed, as a corporation has a separate and distinct
personality from its shareholders. While he admitted that the legal documentation for the
transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized
by the members of his law firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity
as the corporate secretary and legal counsel ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant.
Therefore, he served no conflicting interests because it was not a "former client" and a
"subsequent client" who were the opposing parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless
prove, the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied
being her lawyer, the complainant should have established, by clear and convincing
evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant
failed to do this.
Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration of
facts by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Caete, 9 where the Court ruled that
"the fact that one of the witnesses for the defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the
defendant in this suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case, he merely
attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and
served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal
motives and purposes were not covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he
fell for the ploy of complainant.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
In the Commissioners Report,10 dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner,
Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of
violations of the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year from the
practice of law. Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent
affidavit of desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the
investigation conducted by the CBD as it was not an ordinary court which accepted
compromises or withdrawals of cases. After weighing on the claims of the parties, the
Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in the records would show that a
lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and Jimenez. 11 The
circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original incorporator and
shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate secretary of the said
corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an original
incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from
Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenezs participation in Clarion affairs again stopped
when he assigned the entirety of his shares in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the
report stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to
Clarions ownership to be reported to the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating
Commissioner also pointed out Atty. Franciscos clear admission that the transfer of
shares within Clarion were "without any consideration," ran counter to the deeds of
assignment that he again admittedly executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco
admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued the consideration of the effected
sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and
deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he executed the
affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and complainant, the
Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the rule on privileged
communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of conflicting
interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the
findings and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for
its reconsideration.13
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty
of suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that in his more than three decades
of practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant the imposition of
disciplinary action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez, experienced a
difficult crisis involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major
upheaval in his professional life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect in dealing
with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the
execution of the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all
connected to his capacity as Clarions corporate secretary and legal counsel, not to
mention his ties with his client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to
Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and
shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought advice in her capacity as a
shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own words, Atty.
Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice versa." 14
Attached to Atty. Franciscos motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by
Jimenez, stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999.
Espousing Atty. Franciscos defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty. Franciscos law firm was
in charge of all the companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty. Francisco to
execute all the documentation to show his ownership of these companies, including
Clarion. These documents were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When
Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in the filing ofhis
certificate of candidacy and the proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in
prison in the United States, it was Atty. Francisco who visited and told him that his
children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian
Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his
childrens betrayal and to wait until he could go home. When he filed the criminal cases
against his children and complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous kidnapping case
against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the people who committed crimes against
him were now exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent
the latter from performing his duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the respondents motion for
reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The Courts Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10
of the CPR and the Lawyers Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To
the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid
any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyers personal deference to the law not
only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience tothe law, on the
part of the public.
Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not
necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to
include such element.16 To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in
principle, fairness and straight forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means the
proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used
upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
imposed upon.18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, inorder to
promote the publics faith in the legal profession.19 "To say that lawyers must at all times
uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over
emphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly
bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law."20
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do
no falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.21
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn
duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to
having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the
significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate
shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment
and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these
transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done for consideration when, in fact,
the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez. The
Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds
of assignment which he executed as corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate
counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on
contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of
Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he
chose to advance the interests of his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a
lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion
and to have undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property. He
permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes. Unquestionably,
therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal infractions and was
content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenezs wishes, or pursuant to
complainants misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Franciscos
act of drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in
public documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the specious reason
that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients flawed scheming and machinations, the
Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of
lawyers as officers of the court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their
clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be
emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of
truth and justice, and mustbe held within the bounds of reason and common sense. His
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warranta course
of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions. 22
In the same vein, Atty. Franciscos admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his
dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the
Court to be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in
the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and
upholding truth and the rule oflaw. They are expected to act with honesty in all their
dealings, especially with the court.23
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the
CPR, namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to actwith
candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his
solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.
Rule on Conflicting Interests and
Disclosure of Privileged
Communication
With respect to Atty. Franciscos alleged representation of conflicting interests and
disclosure of privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-
BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideallybe imbued
with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that
must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to
his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is
duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
withthe client. Part of the lawyers duty in this regard isto avoid representing conflicting
interests"25 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a
lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger a violation of the
prohibition against conflict of interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of
interest in this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to
oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine
whether a lawyers conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is
duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be
opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where
the opposing parties are present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated action. It is of
no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which
the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two
actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of
whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a
lawyer-client relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary
nature of the ties between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not be
precluded from accepting and representing other clients on the ground of conflict of
interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first
place.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a
scrutiny of the parties submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to
establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainants claim of being Atty. Franciscos client remains unsubstantiated,
considering its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco
was Clarions legal counsel and that complainant sought advice and requested
documentation of several transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This was
only successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents pertaining
to the transaction and that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no
detailed explanation as to how she supposedly engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as
her personal counsel and as to what and how she communicated with the latter anent the
dealings she had entered into. With the complaint lacking in this regard, the unrebutted
answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a detailed narrative of his engagement
as counsel of Jimenez and Clarion, would have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the
parties. Atty. Franciscos claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of
the complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by Jimenez
himself. Complainants evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the client of
Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Franciscos
answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence showing their
professional relationship. She also failed to appear during the mandatory conference with
the IBP-CBD without even updating her residential address on record. Her participation in
the investigation of the case apparently ended at its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence,
and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the
complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.
It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining
whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following:
(a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
the nature of the facts towhich they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.27
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among
the members of Jimenezs family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing with
Jimenezs children and complainant. He could have been staunch in reminding the latter
that his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be
that as it may, Atty. Franciscos indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that
the totality of evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the
burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal
counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say,
complainant failed to establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on
conflict of interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v.
Vitriolo,28 the Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the
said privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client. xxx
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose
for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise
agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to
the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a
client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications,
the element of confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights
or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney
for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
[Emphases supplied] practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a
STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to
establish the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and
further bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the
confidential communication was relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision
was that "she sought legal advice from respondent in various occasions." 29 Considering so that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
that complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the
specific confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her
SO ORDERED.
consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if there was any violation
of the rule on privileged communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the
attorney-client privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the
burden of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this regard.

The Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violating of the lawyers oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a profession, a form of
public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
possess good moral character.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 33

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party
without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing
Clarion tomake untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9395 November 12, 2014
DARIA O. DAGING, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit Complaint 1 filed by
Daria O. Daging (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Benguet
Chapter,2 against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis (respondent).
Antecedents
Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased
from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building spaGe located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where
she operated the bar.
Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal3 from Davis & Sabling Law Office
signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This
eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant, the respondent and Atty. Sabling of
a Retainer Agreement4 dated March 7, 2005.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the
lease. Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to
complainant's music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that
Balageo would take over the operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently
respondent acted as business partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business
name, which they later renamed Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time,
Davis & Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained
subsisting and in force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that
ejectment case and filed, on behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer
for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 5
In his Comment,6 respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business
partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole
proprietress of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling, his partner, who
initiated the proposal and was in fact the one who was able to convince complainant to
accept the law office as her retainer. Respondent maintained that he never obtained any
knowledge or information regarding the business of complainant who used to consult only
Atty. Sabling. Respondent admitted though having represented Balageo in the ejectment
case, but denied that he took advantage of the Retainer Agreement between complainant
and Davis and Sabling Law Office. Thus:
3.a Prior to the engagement of the Complainant of the DAVIS and SABLING LAW
OFFICE as her retainer, Novie Balageo was already one of the Clients of
Respondent in several cases;
3.b Sometime in the last week of the month of May 2005, while Respondent was
in his office doing some legal works, Novie Balageo called up Respondent
informing the latter that his assistance is needed for purposes of conducting an
inventory of all items at the former Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.c Respondent [asked] Novie Balageo [the purpose of] the inventory [to which]
the latter x xx responded x xx that she entered into a lease contract with the
present administrator of the building, Benjie Pinlac;
3.d Respondent, to his disbelief requested Novie Balageo to go [to] the LAW
OFFICE for further clarification of the matter. Thereafter, Respondent was later
informed that the business of Complainant was taken over and operated by Mr.
Benjie Pinlac for seven days. Furthermore, Mr. Benjie Pinlac offered the said
place to Novie Balageo which the latter readily accepted;
3.e [Left] with no recourse, Respondent requested one of his staff to assist Novie
Balageo in conducting an inventory. Furthermore, Respondent never acted as
partner of Novie Balageo in operating the former Nashville Country Music
Lounge;
3.f When Complainant filed the civil case for Ejectment against Novie Balageo
and Benjie Pinlac, Respondent represented the former thereof without taking
advantage of the retainership contract between the DA VIS and SABLING LAW
OFFICE [and] Complainant as Respondent has no knowledge or information of
any matters related by complainant to Atty. Sabling regarding the former' s
business;
 3.g While the Complaint was pending, respondent was xx x informed by Novie
Balageo and Benjie Pinlac of the truth of all matters x x x which x x x Respondent
[was unaware of];
3.h However, for the interest of justice and fair play, x x x Respondent [deemed it
prudent] to xx x withdraw as Counsel for Novie Balageo. Hence, Respondent
filed his Motion to Withdraw As Counsel. x x x
3.i The civil case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
[Complaint's] subject matter. x x x7
On October 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and
Recommendation8 finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse
of information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the
advantage of another person. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice oflaw for a period of one year.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 9 Upon motion of the respondent, it
reduced the penalty imposed to six months suspension considering that there is no proof
that respondent actually handled any previous legal matters involving complainant. 10
Our Ruling
It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005
with respondent's law firm. This agreement was signed by the respondent and attached to
the rollo of this case. And during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, respondent
represented and defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the
ejectment case complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed
on behalf of said Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when
respondent withdrew his appearance for Balageo.
Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1wphi1 It provides:
Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client." 11 The
prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even
if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.12 In Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba,13 this Court emphasized that lawyers are
expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.14
Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her
case is actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any
transaction between Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any
information or legal matter complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus
inveigles that he could not have taken advantage of an information obtained by his law
firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement. We are not impressed. In Hilado v.
David,15 reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr., 16 this Court held that a lawyer who
takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the services of his law
firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the
integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took advantage of any
information acquired by his law finn in the course of its professional dealings with the
complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact
that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed
both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of his law firm,
cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be representing
conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed,
respondent could have simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead engage
the services of another lawyer.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or suspension
from the practice of law ranging from six months to two years. 17 We thus adopt the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15, 2012 Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in
the future will result in the imposition of a stiffer penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the records of Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis and
furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of
this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.