Issue Six - 2001
Captain In Command (2)
Windshear Encounter
Introduction
We are told that the probability of
encountering a microburst wind shear
is once in two lifetimes. However the
consequences of an encounter are
potentially so severe that all flight
crews should be trained in the
recognition of wind shear and, for an
inadvertent encounter, the appropriate
flight manoeuvres to escape the
hazard. Many modern aircraft have
automatic detection systems (ATP,
BAe146) and some have automatic
recovery flight guidance (Avro RJ).
The following report is of an incident
initiated by a wind shear encounter; it
is an excellent example of many good
aspects of flight safety, in particular
human behavior - experience,
training, CRM and decision making. Lesson. Any probability of encounter-
ing a hazardous situation does not
Capt. Ray Sherwood and F/O. Craig recognise age, experience or length
Rable were crewing an Air Zimbabwe of service - if it can happen it will
BAe146 - Flight UM 225 from happen, probably to you!
Victoria Falls to Hwange. Ray was in
his last two weeks of his aviation Narrative Capt. Ray Sherwood
career prior to retirement; he would
have hoped not to encounter wind The set up.
shear nor have to deal with the
ensuing diversion with aircraft
"We were approximately 21nm from
systems failures and a landing with
the airfield. We had the runway in
unsafe gear warnings. But he did.
sight during the descent once we
Furthermore, Ray , Chris, the other
were below the general cloud (FL
five crew members and all fifty nine
105 7000ft a.g.l.). No Cumulonimbus
passengers survived to tell the tale.
was observed, but there was some
For all of us this incident is a classic
rain falling from a large Cumulus
for flight safety and a first class
near the airfield. The weather radar
example of a 'Captain in Command'
was on and showed weather returns
( See JETSETS Issue 5)
on track. ATC were asked for further
weather information. The reply was
13
 Issue Six - 2001

'light rain was falling at the airfield'.

The runway in use was 08, wind
020/10kts, QNH 1013, OAT +32ºC,
Few at 7000ft, Visibility 10km plus.
(A nice summers day in Africa)

I realised that the rain area would

probably be on our final approach.
Thus the briefing was for the Non
Precision VOR NDB 08 (see chart).
As a supplement to the approach
plate I noted several passing altitudes
for DME ranges - the DME was not a
declared nav aid but was in service -
the altitude and distances were a back
up. At 'PO' the altitude should be
4700ft and the DME reads 3.8 nm.
The Minima at 'WN/VWN' is 3850ft
(307ft a.g.l.) this requires an 850ft
descent in 3.8 nm i.e. approx. 220
ft/nm. The radio altimeter bug was
set to 310ft for advisory purposes
only. F/O Rabie was briefed to call
out the DME range and altitudes. Air
Zimbabwe's standard operating
procedure requires that at 500ft agl
the aircraft should be in the slot. The
slot is :-
IAS Vref +5 to +15 kts
Rate of descent 600 to 800'/min ILS
LOC and G/S within 1 dot . ADF 5
deg L or R of inbound track. If these
criteria are not met a go around is to
be carried out. - On this approach we
were about to reach these decision
points!" down. After 'PO' we flew into rain l0 kts.
which increased in intensity as we Full power was applied.
Lesson. Always prepare back up got closer to the runway. The noise The pitch attitude was held and then
plans:- use all available aids, work level of the rain hitting the aircraft adjusted more nose up.
together as a crew, use an instrument became louder. The turbulence The stick shaker was respected as per
approach when VFR flight is in increased; the instruments were all inadvertent wind shear encounter drill
doubt; note altitudes with distance, perfectly visible i.e. the turbulence by adjusting the pitch attitude.
calculate the descent path - these was not severe. F/O Rabie called 100ft to minima
preparations may not always be used "Just before the 'Standard' 500ft call - (3850ft) and recalls the altimeter
but when things go wrong……. we were approaching 4050ft (QNH) - going down very fast. I concentrated
I heard the F/O Say 'What the.…..' on flying a suitable pitch attitude and
heading. A second stick shaker
At 4050ft the aircraft suddenly and activation occurred. The pitch attitude
And things do go wrong. very rapidly descended towards tree at onset of both stick shakes was well
top level (the actual altitude was not below the normal go around attitude.
"The aircraft crossed 'PO' in the observed on the radio altimeter). The aircraft attitude was again
landing configuration at 4700ft. The stick shaker operated. I increased avoiding stick shaker warn-
DME 3.8 - with all checks immediately advanced the thrust ings. Target attitude was 12 degrees
completed. The pitch attitude on an levers, checked the pitch attitude, nose up.
approach with normal approach which was already 4 degrees nose
power of 65% N1 is 3 degrees nose up. Lesson. Remember what was taught
The IAS had dropped to Vref minus in the simulator - wind shear go-
14

Fig 1
around - maximum power, aim for a
pitch attitude of 12 degrees but
always respect the stick shaker.
The aircraft climbed away
through some treetops in the climb
out! i.e. from below the height of the
trees. The airfield chart shows trees
on the 08 end at 3599ft. The 08
threshold elevation is 3543ft. This
would give a possible tree top height
(12 years ago) of 56ft. Some growth
could have taken place of course.
The flaps and gear were only
retracted when clear of possible
ground contact, at this stage I wanted
to have the best aircraft performance
in case we had engine failures due to
damage sustained.
In the initial climb away we were out
of the rain and in clear weather.
The aircraft was levelled off at 6000'
and 180kts in a clean configuration.
The engines when checked were
found to be all operating normally
with no abnormal vibration levels. I
observed the airfield ahead. The
visibility from 'WN' to the airfield
was more than l0km.with no cloud
up to 7000ft"
--------------------------
At this time Ray and his crew had
survived what has been subsequently
shown to be a very severe microburst
wind shear (once in two life times?)
so what next. Just imagine what the
crews the state of mind was - what
would you do next? Deal with the
next level of emergency?
Lesson. If you have been unfortunate
to have a severe safety event you are
not exempt from another! Having
one event can to lead to a consequen-
tial event.
What next?
Clearly the aircraft was damaged; -
double hydraulic failure!
The Green hydraulic system 'Lo
Quantity' and Yellow hydraulic
Issue Six - 2001
system 'Hi Temp' Abnormal check-
lists were carried out (No flaps,
emergency gear lowering, no rudders
no spoilers/lift dump). An evaluation
of the aircraft state was made with
visual inspections of the engines,
landing gear, flaps and wings being
carried out from the cabin by an on
board engineer. He reported that
there was no visible damage or leaks
evident. After crew consultation and
agreement the decision was to divert
to Harare. Note: Hwange is a remote
airfield; the nearest medical facilities
are 75 nm distant.
The Senior Flight Attendant was
informed; I informed the passengers
using the PA as to what had hap-
pened and our intention to divert to
Harare. ATC were informed and
clearance obtained to climb to FL 90.
This kept us clear of cloud. Later we
climbed to FL 110 but the pressurisa-
tion was not used due to
concern over possible structural dam-
age. The IAS was held at 200kts
within the Gear limiting speed of
205kts. The Fuel remaining was
15
5100kg. The fuel flow
was 400kg/hour per
engine.

Lesson. Evaluate the

situation, decide on the
appropriate course of
action. Use all available
resources; then commu-
nicate - this is an
essential part of CRM.

The cabin crew carried

out a full Emergency
Briefing en route. (The
tour leader translating
into French solved the
problem of giving the
non English speaking
French tour group the
emergency briefing).
The PA was used to
keep cabin staff and
passengers informed
during the flight. Harare
airport was informed of
our status and warned to
expect a fly past if we
had landing gear prob-
lems. The weather at
Harare, which was 190 kts and the aircraft was then now going to land; "ATTENTION
given as fair had now changed to pulled up to see if "G" forces would CREW ON STATIONS" call was
large rain showers. Final preparations get to the nose gear down. It stayed made when the flap was selected to
were made in the holding pattern. UP. Whilst turning the Right main 33 the Gear warning horn operated
gear GREEN light came on but later because the gear was not locked
When cleared for a fly past of the it was to revert back to RED down. 30 flap was reselected for a
tower to check the landing gear the
short time. 33 flap was reset at about
Yellow Hydraulic system was Lesson. Continue to evaluate the 800ft.
re-instated, it operated normally and situation, take time if available, do
for the rest of the flight. 18 flap was not rush. The approach was flown with the
lowered, the gear was lowered using
gear indications: Left GREEN, Nose
the emergency system. As had been
Emergency landing RED and Right RED
expected we had a problem. The gear
The F/O made the "BRACE" call on
indications were Left GREEN, Nose
A further tower fly by was planned PA at 250ft.
RED, and Right RED The fly past
but due to heavy rain and turbulence I made the landing on the Left main
was made at 160kts to the left of the
on the approach it was abandoned. It wheel only, this was to keep
tower, ATC reported that they were
was now almost dark. The Fuel was directional control and also our
unable to ascertain the exact status of
down to 1200kgs and having crosswind technique. The Right main
the gear. However two light aircraft
exhausted all means of getting the wheel was gently lowered onto the
pilots taxiing came on the radio to
gear down we had to land. The ground. The Right main gear held
say that our main gear was down but
landing weather was:- 330/08 kts, and in fact was down and locked. At
the nose gear was up. At this stage
light rain falling and the visibility this time the nose was held up clear
we concentrated on getting the right
good. of the runway; at approximately
main gear down. The aircraft was
The R/W had been foamed for the 80kts and as elevator control was
yawed to see if the gear doors would
Nose gear UP landing. ATC were not decreasing I gently lowered the nose
drag the gear fully down. The
too sure of its effectiveness as the onto the runway. The ground contact
engineer in the cabin reported that it
heavy rain might wash the foam was "juddery" and the noise level
appeared to be down but there was
away. increased.
some damage visible to the gear
The Cabin was told that we were The Yellow wheel brakes were
doors. We now increased the IAS to
applied and the Aircraft brought to a
16

stop. As we were stopping I shut off
the fuel levers and once stopped
applied the parking brake. On the PA
I ordered the "EVACUATION" with
both sides of the aircraft to be used.
The evacuation
The F/O carried out his Evacuation
drills which I monitored I gave the
F/O the fire extinguisher; I took my
torch. I estimate an elapsed time
about 50 secs since ordering the
Evacuation. I checked the whole
Cabin and Toilets for people none
were found. The Emergency light
system was working and giving good
lighting in the cabin. As I was about
to exit the Aircraft the F/O asked me
to switch off the aircraft batteries.
Once out of the aircraft I checked on
the passenger evacuation. All had
been accounted for; 39 on the right
hand side and 20 on the left. The
cabin crew was also OK. I made my
way to the right hand group of pas-
sengers and cabin crew. Once we had
done all that we could at the Aircraft
the F/O and I were taken back to the
airport by car. We joined the passen-
gers and Cabin Crew in the Business
class departure lounge. Here the Air
Force Doctors gave us a medical
check. Of the 59 Pax I understand 10
Fig 2
had minor injuries which were sus-
tained during the slide evacuations.
Lesson. A text book example of an
evacuation - checks, CRM and
communication.
FDR and incident analysis.
The Zimbabwe authorities in
accordance with ICAO Annex 13
investigated the accident. BAE
SYSTEMS was given access to the
FDR and requested to assess the
aircraft flight path and windshear
conditions.
Fig 1 shows the FDR radio altitude
plotted against along track distance
based on the computed ground speed;
the lowest altitude was 35 ft. By
evaluating the FDR airspeed and
attitude data in a design simulator it
was possible to reproduce the aircraft
actual air-mass flight path. In Fig.2
the horizontal profile, headwind
shear, is shown as a solid line,
increasing headwind being positive.
As a comparison the dashed line
shows the horizontal wind for the
FAA 'Level 4' wind shear training
model. Fig 3 shows the correspond-
ing vertical velocity, down burst; the
FAA profile is again shown as a
Fig 1
Issue Six - 2001
dotted line. A windshear downburst is
shown a negative value.
The simulation showed that the
aircraft encountered a classic
microburst wind shear. The core of
the down flow appears to have been
approximately 7,000 ft (1.6 nm)
diameter. The overall microburst
diameter, including out flow and up
draught is approximately 20,000 ft
(3.3 nm).
The aircraft's initial, undetected,
encounter with the microburst was
with the increasing head wind and up
draught. However as the head wind
and up draught changed to a severe
down draught, the aircraft's vertical
flight path followed the vertical wind
profile. The head wind sheared
rapidly, -40 ft/sec to zero, a decrease
of 25 kts, at the same time as encoun-
tering the peak down draught of -30
ft/sec, a descent rate of 1800 ft/min.
The rapid loss of airspeed resulted
from the head wind shear. The initial
stall warning occurring in the down
draught, probably due to changes in
angle of attack rate as opposed to the
steady angle of stall a warning.
17

Fig 3
The elapsed time from
the initial crew
awareness at 880 ft to
the minimum altitude of
35 ft was only 20
seconds.
Thus the aircraft's average vertical
speed was 2400 ft/min; approximate-
ly a 12 degree flight path.
During the manufacturers certifica-
tion stall tests and simulator tests of
stall recovery in the landing
configuration with approach power
settings of 60 to 65% N, the stick
shaker operated at pitch attitudes of
10 to 12 degrees nose up. The IAS
for stick shaker operation at the
Landing weight of 33,356kgs was
97kts. The IAS at the stick shake in
the windshear (104kts ) was well
above the normal stall speed of
97kts; the pitch attitude was only 4
degrees nose up, this was probably
due to the turbulence within the
microbust. Refer to the BAe146
MOM Vol 2 write up on windshear.
The crew actions were in accordance
with Manufacturers Operating
Manual (MOM) and the aircraft
performance achieved was as
anticipated for the conditions.
18
The BAe146 characteristics of
having high lift, rapid engine
response and robust construction
made a positive contribution to this
incident. If the microburst encounter
happened at any lower altitude or if
there was any lesser crew response,
then the resulting aircraft flight path
could have led to a major accident.
Lesson. Follow recommended
procedures to give the optimum
performance.
Practice an encounter with the FAA
level 4 wind shear in the simulator.
Lesson. Severe wind shear or micro
downburst conditions can occur near
any cumulus clouds; they are not
limited to Cb clouds.
Lesson. The most significant yet
unusual warning of the encounter
was the crew's awareness of the
exceptional noise of very intense
rain.
Epilogue
Captain Ray Sherwood has now
retired from active flight duty, we
wish him a safe and lengthy
retirement. However many of you
may meet him during occasions of
temporary duty in the BAe 146
simulators; take heed of his advice
Issue Six - 2001
and experience.
First Officer Craig Rable continues
flying with Air Zimbabwe. He is
probably their most experienced pilot
in windshear (if not the most
experienced in the world).
Lesson. Experience cannot be
taught; it can only be gained. To
avoid gaining unnecessary
windshear experience, note the above
lessons in Captaincy, approach
preparation, flight procedure, CRM
and decision making.
Lesson. Windshear, like many other
severe aviation weather hazards, is
best avoided. Note the warning signs
- clouds, temperature, and rain - if in
any doubt during an approach,
commence a go around immediately;
if on the ground do not take off.
BAe 146 and ATP
Service Bulletins install a
windshear warning
system that provide basic
flight director
guidance for recovery.
“Enhanced” GPWS
provides a windshear
warning system.