Pi erre Destre, Ricardo Salles

and Marco Zingano (eds.)

What is Up to US?

Studies on Agency and Responsibility

in Ancient Philosophy

Academia Verlag A Sankt Augustin

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 Studies in Ancient Moral
and Political Philosophy

Edited by Pi erre Destre (Louvain), Christoph Horn (Bonn),

Marco Zingano (Sao PauJo)

Advisory Board:
Gbor Betegh (Budapest & Cambridge),
".1argucritc Dcslauricrs (l\kGiIl, MOl1tral),
PililOS Dimas (OsIo),
Su san SauvMeyer (Philadclphia)
Pierre-Marie Morel (Pili'is 1- Panthol1-Sorbonnc),
j(im Mllcr (Wrzburg),
Ricardo Salles (UNAM, Mexico),
Emidio Spinelli (La Sapicntia, Roma),
Teun Tielemilil (Utrecht),
Katja Vogt (Columbia, New York),
james WiliTen (Cilillbridge)

Volume 1
Marcelo D. Boeri 183

Present time and indifferents: making room for

'what depends on us' in Marcus Aurelius'
MoreeIa D. Baeri

1. Marcus Aurelius and fo eph' hemin

From Plato onwards it has been more or less usual that in a philosophical dis-
cussion the logoi - understood in tenns of 'theses' or ' dtalogical arguments'- play
a decisi\'e role: one of the speakers - generally Socrates - draws conc1usions [rom
what allother speaker has admitted or agreed on as the starting point of the debate.
Ifthese conclusions agree with the starting lagoi, such logoi \vere really sound and
the beliefs that they described can continue to be held. If not, fue dialogue - and
along with it the refutation ofthe initial thesis - allows one to display tIte weakness
of fue belief (expressed in the lagos) and to modify one' s belief in addition to the
e\'entual mistake implied in it (this explains why it is so important to keep the
coherence - homolagia - of one's argument, a suggestion present in several pas-
sages of Plato' s dialogues). I l1le question-allswer discourse allows for error correc-
tion: when posing a lagos, a philosophical speaker must commit to what fo11o\\'s
from his or her lagos, which entails the necessity of being well disposed to gentiy
accept a betler lagos, at least \\'hene\'er another lagos is really better. So the phi-
losophical dialogue coincides with what Plato takes to be thinking: a discourse
one' s soul has with itsclfregarding tile matters under consideration by asking itself
questions and answering them, asserting and denying (Theaetetus 18ge-190a).
If phil050phy is regarded as a discourse understood in tenn s of argument, one
might \Vonder to what extent Marcus Aurelius' ,Afeditations are philosophical. As it
is usually pointed out by Aurehan scholars Marcus' typical aphoristic style seerns
to indicate tilat he is not arguing in order to persuade an interlocutor of a particular
thesis. His Afeditations express matters which he addresses only to himself (ra eis
heauton), as the title of his book clearly indicates. ~ This i5 nearly a truism and is

'" This is an expanded version of the lecture given at the colloquium "A no:ao de eph' /bmn no Ps-
Aristotelismo'" (Universidade de Siio P<lulo, Brazil, M<lrch 24-26, 2010). 1 <1m grateful to the organizer
of the comerence, Marco Zingano, for the im'itation, and to Uoyd Gcrson, Roberto Hofmeister Pich,
Christoph Hom, and Pierre-Marie }'lorel for their remarks. The final version ofthis piece \Vas wrinen
with the fmancia] support ofthe Fondec)1 project 1120127 (Chile).
I See e rilo 4238; 52a8, d2. Gorgias 461b; 468e; 482d; 487e. Theaetetus 154c-e; 171d5. Philebus
lId.
~ The titIe la eis hcal/lon is rather an abridged form of Afarkou A ntoninou auto f..-ratoros tn eis heau-
ton biblin, such as the bool.: \Vas entitIed in tIle manuscript used by Xylander for the first printed 1559
edition (see Brunl 1974: 1). On the title ofMarcus ' \vork see Rutherrord 1989: 9 fr.
184 Present time and indifferents

something frequently remarked by sehalars \\'hen they have to describe what kind
of,york the Afeditan'ollS is.3 But ruuess ene has to accoun1 for a peculiar notion in
Mareus, such as that of ro eph' himin, arre does no! clearly realize what scholars
mean when they state that Marcus is not arguing for the purpose of persuasion. In
any case, to sorne e:\.ient it is possible to iso late some of his sayings and presenl
them as theses supported by arguments sillce they can be translated into assertions
and theoretical argmnents of some sort. For instance, when talking to himse1t~
Marcus uses the i.111perative fonn afien. Yet, certainly one can interpret such im-
peratives as the positing of a claim insafar as one can refonnulate the pIrrase as an
assertion.
One of the mos1 important iS5ues in moral Greek philosophy i5 fue question of
ho\\' \Ve ought to live. Plato took this matter to be of utmost seriousness (Gorgias
500cl-4; Republic 352d2-6). Marcus Aurelius, probab1y inspired by tile P1atoruc
approach, regarded philosophy as a way of life. In a we11-known passage of his
Afedilations he argues that philosophy is the only thing able to direct one's life, and
this is so, he contends, because philosophy keeps one' s llmer daemon free from
msult and damage (2 .1 7). For Mareus dOlllg philosophy means praetieil1g how to
live, i.e. ho", to live rightly, \vhieh in his view is tantamount to 'ha\\' to live freely'
- that is, giving up desiring that which does not depend on you and is beyond your
eontro1. 4 If philosophy is a \vay of life which guarantees that one ",i11 be able to
refrain from desmng \\'hat does not depend upon oneself and is beyond one's con-
trol, then ' wha1 depends on us' should play a relevant role in Marcus Aurelius.
Vl hen looking at Marcus' Afeditations one fmds man)' interesting issues ",ith
regard to the wa)' in which he incorporates 1he domain of 10 eph' hemin into his
theory of value. It should be taken into consideration that Marcus presents a de-
tailed account of ",hat the agent should be con cerned \"ith; indeed in tha1 aCCOlll1t

3 Notably P. Hadot has argued Ihal Marcus' Jfeditations are 'spiritual exercises' of meditation thal
were not conceived of as purely inteIlectual, hut as closely linked to the practicallife (see Hadol 1987:
221-222). The purpose ofsuch exercises would bl: to realize an effective transfonnation ofth e agent's
vie\\' oflhe \vorld and thl: place he or she occupies in such a world (see Hadot 1995: chapter 4; 1997:
chaptl:r 3. At Ihis point Hadot's vil:w is closdy follO\ved by Copper 2004: 335-336, even though Cooper
trunks [2004: 336, n.5}, unlil.:e Hadot, Ihal !\1arcus \vas an amateur philosopher). Hadot is panicularly
interested in noting that !darcus (like other Ancient philosophers) considers himself a philosophcr
because he is able lo hve ph ilosop!lcal~l', emphasinng thus the practica] side of philosophy. More
recently, in a similar line of thought and parti ally accepting Hadot ' s approach, Christopher <3111 has
obscrvcd Ibat the.Meditaliom "represen! a self-addressed version afthe prograrnme ofpractical ethics"
(ef. GiIl 2007: 190), and that J\farcus' concem is mainly wilh practicall:trues (193). Sorabji also shares
Hadot's \.iew, and considers that !he \{editatiOlls are "a book of exercises designed lo shape rus whole
life" (Sorabji 2006: 179).
4 Cf. "\fedilations 12.31; see also Chrysippus (from a letter ofFronto to l\1arcus Aurelius, " On elo-
quence" L 9; sr? 3.196) who argues that a wise person "must 110t cQvet (concupiscere) or desire (ad-
petcre) an)1hing which il may be he would covet in vain" (transl. C.R. Raines). Regarding Ihe issue of
giving up desiring what is beyond one's control, Ihough, Marcus is probably drawing on an Epictetean
approach (Handbook chap. 2 and 8). AIl the translations of Marcus ' MeditatlOllS are G. Long's 1890
(sometimes slightly modified); for the Greek texl 1 have used Dalfen 1987. Where appropriate, in the
quotation oE the Stoic passages 1 refer to von Amim 1901-1905 (abbre\.iated Sr'F; as usual, the f!!'St
number indicales the volume and !he second one the tex! number). 1 shall also indicate the section and
number text of the cited passage in Long & Sedley 1987 (abbreviated LS and followed by the section
number); sometimes 1 refer lo Hlser 1987-1988 (abbrC\;ated FDSfollowed by the text number).

Marcelo D. Boeri 185

the present is crucial for deternUning what depends on the agent. Marcus' asser-
tions that one l\'es only in the present (fa paron), which is just a 'tleeting instant'
(akariaon), and that a11 ",hich is bcyond fue present is al1 indifferent are almost
corumon place in his work. s In this paper 1 \\'ould likc to argue fuat lhe link be-
t",een the present and what is indifferent tlll11.S out to be crucial for figuring out
what depends on us according to Mareus. My proposal in this essay is quite simple:
(i) First, I sha11 present some key passages where fue 11011on of ro eph' hemin is
addressed. (ii) Second, I \Vill briefly discuss the connections among \\"hat depends
on US, what is indifferent, and the role the present plays in detcrmining \\'hat rea11)'
is in our power. (iii) Finally, I ,\"ill close by discussing fue \Vay Marcus deals \\'ith
emotions and the place t!ley should occupy in onc' s life. In addition to that, I in-
tend to argue that Marcus depicts a certain Stoic 'orthodoxy' when dealing \\"ith
\\"hat depends on us, as it is quite manifest in rus \\Titings not onl)' that he takes for
granted some basic distinc11ons, present in the Older Stoies (such as the difIerence
bet\\'een extemal and internal causes, the vie\\' that 1l1e pFcsent is the only temporal
instance which is 'real', or e\'cn sorne basie points regarding the psyehology of
action), but also rhat he regards such distinctions as part ofhis teclmical devices for
explaining several issues. G One might object that this faet is, once again, self-
evident given that Marcus is a Stoic philosopher, however, scholars sOllletimes
consider him as an eclectic 1:lllnker who, eyen within his Stoicism, is wi11ing to
combine Platonic, Epicurean, and Stoic ingredients. On occasion tbis has led some
people to reasonably believe that :Marcus' Stoicislll is quite different from the Old-
er and Middle Stoics. 7 To be sure, there are many details in Marcus that are his
o\\'n ideas and developments, but there are reasons to suspect that such develop-
ments are inspired by or strongly dependent on Anclent Stoicism. In recent years
Professor Jo1m Cooper has stated that 'Marcus is a novice at philosophy' and that
he displays a 'greater distance from, and reduced interest in, technical philosophi-
cal terminology'.s The Afeditanol1s as a \\"hole, \\"ith its aphoristic and sometimes
enigmatic style, seems to confirnl Cooper's vie\\', insofar as, for fue 1ll0St part,
Marcus does not seClll to give much attention to tbeoretical discussion and argu-
mentation. Moreoyer, Marcus himself declares his lack of interest for theoretical
mattersY Ho\\"ever, there are some passages where Marcus' discussion reveals

s For the idea that human life is 'fl eeting' or ephemeral see ]\l arcus 2.6; 2.14; 4.48; 6.47; 11.18. On
Ihe present as 'fleeting' see 3.10; 4.48; 5.24 el passilll. In a polemic conlext against the dogmatists and
Ihe notion oftime, Sextus Empiricus reminds US of the Sloic thesis Ihal the present is fleeting (Outlines
cifSkepticism 3.141 w142: in Ihe context Sextus is probably thinking ofPlato and fue Stoics). 1 return lo
this poinl later in section 3.
GIndeed it is hard lo say lo what extent Marcus \Vas an '0!1hodox' Stoic; for differenl assessmenls on
Ihe issue see Ruthenord 1989: 21 w26; 143 w147; 225 ff. See also Long 2002 (quoted infra, n.16), Gill
2003: 50, and Gill 2007.
7 On Ihe issue oflhe apparent eclecticism present in the Afeditations see Cooper 2004: 346, \vho perO.
suasively argues that, in spite ofMarcus' citing ofEpicurus, Ihere is no reason lo think thal!he princiw
pies of Stoicism have undergone any weakening in IheMeditations.
s Cooper 20\14: 336.
9 See 1.7, where he c1aims Ihal nol \\outing on Iheoretical matters was one of the teachings he reO.
ceived from Rusticus. Unlike Brunt, who states that in the Jdeditations sorne "chapters are obscure or
186 Present time and indifferents

some knowledge of Stoic technical tenninology, which appears lo suggest that he

"'as nol completel)' amateur or new to lile philosophical field wtb which he deals.

2. External causes and the power of one's own judgment or belief

1 ",ould like to begin by conm1enting on some passages \yhere Marcus estab-
lishes what is the proper domain of that which depends on USo In man)' places in his
\York he is particularly interested in distinguishing the external from the ulemal
cause, lhe [anner not being dependent on oneself and tlle latter depending on one-
self. TIs is a distinction that goes back. to Cluysippus \\'ho, according to Cicero
and other sources, \Vas interested in making this discrimination in order to preserve
what depends 011 liS. lO In a remarkable passage of his J\feditations (4.3) Marcus
says to himself (i) that people seek retreats for themseh'es, such as houses in the
country, in the mountains and so OIl. However (ii) tltis is just a mark of the most
ordinary (idiotikotatoll) kind of people, as it is possible to retire into oneself (mean-
ing that one is able to leave aside those external things that do nol contribute lo
onc' s peace of milld). One's OWIl soul is, according to Marcus, ' a place' ofgreater
quiemess and calnmcss (especially if one has such things within him, these things
presumably being one's O\\TI retlections), and by looking into one' s OWIl soul, one
is iImllediatcly in a state of complete cahlUless (eumareia). And (i ) this is so be-
cause calnmess is a sort of good order (eukosmia) , namely of one's O\\TI mind. This
being so (iv), one should allow oneself this killd of rctreat (allachoresis). As we
leam later, this 50rt of retreat is liI1ked with the internal cause, the only type of
cause with wruch a real rational agent should be concerned. In fact, with his rec-
01lU11elldatioll that one rid oneself of corporeal things in order tha1 such corporeal
111ings not touch or have an influence on oneself, h1arcus mamtains that one's mind
(dianoia ) is not mixed with the breath (pnema), which can move gently or vio-
lently, when it has dra\\11 itself apart and recognized its o\\n power. If rny sugges-
tion tha1 Marcus takes for granted some basic distinetions belonging to fue Early
Stoa is some\\"hat reasonable, one might object that tlle difference between dianoia
and p/lezima that he appears to establish bere does not look very 'orthodox' in cba-
raeter. In ract, the Older Stoics took the soul (ofwhieh di0110ia is an expression) to
be breath (pneuma), or rather 'breath cotulatural to us' . JI But tbis can be lUlder-
slood as a de\'elopment of Marcus wbo surely is drawing on Platonism when posit-
ing a soul-body dualism. 12 1 catulot sal' why Marcus departs from orthodox Stoic

wholl)' unmemorable" - Brunt providcs as an example ofhis "iew section 9.13, wbere Marcus empba-
sizes Ibat the trouble did not tie outside himself, huI within rumsclf in rus own bcliefs - , and even
accepting thal sometimes arguments are hardly given (Brunt 1974: 2), 1 take these sorts ofpassages lO
be crucial for underslanding 1Iarcus' whole projecl.
10 See Cicero, Defato 42-44 (LS 62C); Alexander, Delato 18 1, 13-182, 20 (SIr 2.979; LS 62G).
11 Galen, In Hippocratis librnm 17 epidemiamm commcnrarit vol. 17b, p. 246, 14-247, 5, ed.l(hn; SIr-
2.782; LS 53E; Diogenes Laertius (DL), 7.1 56-1 57 (SIF2.774 ; LS 52N; FDS 421).
1~ For discussion on Ibis point see ..\.Iesse 2001: 113-118 ; Gil! 2007: 191-1 94. As notcd by Cooper
(2004: 33 7), \vhen stating Iha! pain lasting a long time is tolerable, 1 1arcus even may be having sorne
Epicurean lenets in mind (he is certainly thinking ofEpicurus' view Ihal the most intense pain is present
a very short time; Epi curus, Principal Doctrines 4).
Marcelo D. Boeri 187

psychology in this inlportant point; yet, it is ratller clear that in the recently quoted
passage the di5tinction between mind and breath constitutes an important detail
tllat explains that we cannot control what is corporeal and beyond one's mind (ap-
parently a much subtler substance). Clearly, the idea 15 that corporeal items intro-
duce tunnoil, as the)' can ' move gently or violently', this way preventing one from
achieving the cahnness necessary to evaluate what really matters. i3
Now tlus brings us back to another detail in Marcus' approach that turns out to
be crucial for understanding the notion of what depends on us: the causal power
that one's beliefs possess for yielding certain events or states of affarrs. Indeed
Marcus is intent on proving that we cannot let our beliefs (dogmara) die unless the
impressions (phantasiai) which correspond to them are e"\.1inguished. But it is in
one's power (epi soi) to continuously rekindle (dieneks anazopurefn) these be-
lie1's, iusofar as one can have a belief aoout anytllrlg which one ought to have.
Yet if oue can do that, nothillg will be presented to oneself as a disturbance;
and tlus is so because what is external to ones mind has-no relation at all to one's
mind (7.2). 11' the agent has certainty and clarity regarding this point, he wiII be
able to recover his O\\TI tife since recovering life (allabi6nai) , Marcus goes 011 to
sa)', actually consists in looking again at things as one has looked at them but from
a new perspective based 011 one's beliefs or opinions about things. Tlus depends on
oneself; that is, these beliefs and opinions are the result of one's mental activity.
The meaning of this is certalil.ly that one should look at things bearing in mind the
fac1 that what is eAiernal to oneself does not affect oneself; that this should be the
sense of this admOlution appears to be emphasized by Marcus himself when he
suggests later that there must be freedom from perturbatians regarding what hap-
pens from the e"\.iemal cause, and that there must be justice in the domain of things
done on account afthe internal cause:
TI: Let there be freedom [rom perturbations \vilh respect to the things which come
from the e),.1emal cause: and let there be juslice in the things done by virme of the cause
deriving from you: that is, impulse and an aclion tenninating in a social acting itsel( for this
is according to your own nature. (9.3 1)

13 In 2.2 l\1arcus insisls that om: is "a linle fJesh and breath (OUpl,:iU .son Kut Ii"\'rup.:nov), and the
ruling part (J"ft.LOVtli:v)". As far as 1 can see, !'.Iareus is not entire1y unifonn in the use ofhis tenmnol-
ogy, even though one eertainly may say tbat he usually associates the ruling part to mind (dianoia) or
intelleet (nous), and breath (pneuma) lo fJesh - wmeh is blood, bones, dust, nerves, veins, and artcries -
and body (ef. &.56 and Cooper 2004: 361 , who reminds us ofMareus' expression nous lu}gemonikos at
12.14). He also distinguishes body, soul and mind or intelleet (3.16), and points out that pereeption
be10ngs 10 the bod}', impulses to the soul, and beliefs (dogmata) to intellect. In other passages Marcus
even assimilates soul both lo pneumation and pneuma. On bod}', soul, and intellect as the three constitu-
ents ofhuman being see A.1esse 2001: 113-116 and the Marcus passages cited and discussed there. On
the Platoruc antecedent of sueh a tripartirion of human being see Plato, Timaeus 30b, Laws &96b and
Alesse 2001: 116, 119 n.26. As recently observed by .J\lesse (2009: 256, and n.3), Marcus' dualism
between reason, on the one hand, and body and bread\, on tbe other, c1early moves him away from the
Older Stoics and brings mm closer to lhe late Platonism. In faet, in regarding pneuma as mercly being
'wind' (anem os; 2.2), he leaves aside the crucial metaphysieal and explicati....e features that pneuma
used to have in the Early and M.iddle Stoicism.
188 Present time and indifferents

But ane should here ",onder \yhy Marcus takes the extemal causes as not ha\'-
ing po",er over one' s milld. It is quite clear that he never thinks this and in any case
do the externa! causes alTeet the person' s mil1d; there are cases ",hefe such affec-
tion occurs or rather, Dne might asswne, that is ",hat occurs [or the most parto The
person who is n01 properly disposed and trained to understand ha,," things should
be is potentially vublerable to being affected by the ex1ernal causes. Marcus has no
doubts that ridding oneself of man)' UlU1ecessary disturbances depends on oneself,
as such useless disturbances wholly depelld on one' s O\\TI belief:
T2: )'ou can remove out of the way man)' useless things among thase which disturb
you, for tbey lie entirely in your 0\\11 opinion (J~i'pocps is). (9.32; part)

Marcus repeatedly insisls lhat ir one is pained by any e:-..1ernal thing, it is not
this particular thing thal disturbs oneself, but rather oue' s 0\\11 judgment abaut it
(8.47: krima). In other words, it is one's bebef that really has causal power oyer
oneself, alld this mental state depends on oneself. Ir
an):thing in rny own disposi-
lion gi\'es me pain, nothing hinders me from correcting rn)' 0\\11 opinion or belief,
since ule factor causing me 10 be in pai.n is under rn)' controL Yet, one might won-
der, when and ha\\' m)' mil1d, which is an internal cause, is stronger than tbe exter-
nal things. To respond 10 ulis question 1 shall limit rnyself to briefly commenting
on TI and TI (quoted above). As we have seen in n , Marcus maintains that ule
external causes should not have causal power o\'er one' s mind, insafar as one's
0\\11 opinion or belief is able to remove a11 the perturbatiolls disturbing aneself (he
probably is presupposing thal one ' s mind should be properly trained in arder to be
able to remo ve whal is disturbing onesel!). He elarifies this point by adding that
tl1ere are inlpulses and actions teffilinati.ng il1 a ' common' praxis which depend
upon oneself. 14 \\'hat he is saying, in a rather conservative Stoic manner, is that an
impulse (h017'11e) and its eorrespondi.ng action depend 011 lhe agent, surely thinking
of assent as the mental aet that allows one to produce an impulse and the subse-
quent aetian. That Marcus is considering assellt as the item whieh depellds on the
agent in the i111pulse-action sequence can be confU1ued by looking al Afeditatiolls
8.7:
T3: E\'ery nature is contented \\ith itself when it goes on jls way WI~Il: and a ralional
nature goes on its way well when in its impressions it nssents 10 nothing false or uncer-

14 This 'common acting' probably should be understood in terms of the possibility one has ""to cm
brace the whole COSrnlC order with one's mind'" (9.32: ton halan Kasmon p crici!ephcnal tCi g nmih)., and
IruS is possible once one has taken control ofhis judgmenl as an inlernal (and real) cause to give mean-
ing 10 things. See also 10.6, where the view lhat, as long as one is part of a whole, one will nol be
diseonnected with anr ofthe things thal are assigned lo onese1f OUI oflhe \vhole. TIus presupposes that
\Ve are social beings naturally constilUted for fellowship (see 5.8, where !<.1arcus appears lo be evoking
Ihe Stoic oike isis); see also 12.26, where he says thal a human being is a nou koinnia. 111e connection
between !he human facu1ty which fonns belief or opinion (hllp olpikf dllnamis) and 'familiarization'
(olkeiszs ) is explained in 3.9, where r-.larcus asserts Ihat il depends on such a faculty whetber here wiU
be in lhe ruling part any opinion inconsistenl with nature and Ihe eonstitution of the ralional animal.
This being so, such faculty (presumably when il is properly developed) announces a laek of precipi-
taney (ap roptsia) when gi. . ing assent, familiarizanon with aH human beings, and eoherenee
(akoJollthz<1) with the gods.
Marcelo D. Boeri 189

tain. 15 and \\'he1.1 it directs its impulses to comll1on acts only, and when it confines its
desires and aversions to the things which are in its po\yer, and whell it is satisfied witil
everything that is assigned to it by !he common nature.

Ihis passage makes it c1ear that Marcus, inspired by Epictetus, takes the or-
thodox Stoic view that assent to an impression depends on the agent and consti-
tutes the previous logical step for action. 16 This text also reveals that Marcus was
quite av,'are of the Stoic technical tenninology in action theory, and that he was
",illing to apply it to bis ,,'hole project.
111e last detail 1 ,yould lite 10 briefly cornment on regarding Marcus' idea
about what depends on us is related to tbe causal power of orre' s mind for yielding
some ' phenomenal' state of atlairs, so to speak. Marcus' tenet here is that your
mental states have a real causal power to make you invulnerable to e\.1emal things.
\\'hen a Richter 8.8 earthquake is threatening your town, your emotional state may
be that of fear. However, accordillg to Mareus, the ea:r:!:hquake would just be an
e\.iemal cause, 3nd as such it should not disnrrb you, as you are able to completely
remove what is disturbing you because ",hat reany disturbs you depends on your
belief (see T2: hupolepsei SOll keimena) . Ibis trust in the power of one's mental
states to give reality to a state of affairs is eertainly striking, but that view is consis-
tent ",ith his idea tha~ on the one hand, working on the afinor of one's interiority
tums out to be crucial to rightiy discern what is reall)' valuable in life and, on the
other hand, that adopting an attitude of compromise ,yith oneself gives us the in-
dispensable peace of rnind to deal ,,'ith the e:\.1emal things. 011e might suspect that
such an idea probably draws on al1 Aristotelian vie\\', according to which any pa-
rIJos involves a 'doxastic' ingredient. 1 Fear, rage, or any other emotion or affective
"7

state wouId not be ",hat they are without the agent's beliefthat he or she is some-
how being affected. Thus the agent's belief is crucial in the emotional response.
Going back to Marcus, he has no doubt that when you are in pain due to an)' e:\.ier-
na1 thing "",hat is really disnrrbing you is 110T the e\.1emal thing, but your O\'TI
judgment about that external thing (to SOI1 peri auto J..:rima; 8.47). But given that it
depends on you to wipe out your O"TI judgment, it also depends on you to remove

l 5 This idea is taken from Epiclerus, Dissertationes (Diss.) 1.28, 4; 3.3, 2; 3.7, 14-1 5, bul Ihe pres-
ence of aproptsia in order to avoid giving assent in advance to cognition (katalepsis) goes back to
Chrysippus. For evidence see DL 7.46 (SIr 2.130); DL 7.48 (LS 31B), ando Papyrus Hercul. 1020 (SIr
2.131 ) with the rernarks by G6rler 1977: 85-86 (see also the previous note). Like the Older Stoics,
!\'Iarcus associates lhe absence of precipitation (aproprton) with the full)' rational disposition of a
rational agent.
16 Sec Clernent, Siromatcis 6.8 69, 1 (FDS 298); Plutarch, De stoicorum repugnantiis 1057A (SIr
3.177; LS 53S); Philo, Lcgum alIcgoriae 1.30, 1-6 (FDS 299); Cicero, A eademica 2.37-38 (LS 400,
FDS 363). For Epictelus' influence upon .~\'Iarcus see Long 2002: 12; 40-41; 119, 126; 159. On sorne
divergences bet\veen Epictetus and Marcus (especially regarding their conception of god), sec Long
2002: 179-206 .
17 For .4Jistotle, as for the Stoics, any emotional state involves ajudgrnent or belief (Aristotle, RhelO-
re 1382b29-34; 1385b13-17). A..lthough the Chrysippean ernotions are no! onJy causcdby judgment but
rather are judgments, the idea is similar: the belief is the cause oflhe emotion. See Stobaeus, Ee!. 2.90,
8-12, where it is argued Iba! the cause (aifion) ofappetite (cpifhumia) is to hold the opinion (doxazem)
that a good thing is approaching; Ihat of fear (Phobos) is to hold !he opinion that abad thing is ap-
proaching.
190 Present time and indiffe rents

the state of fear and calm yourself. Moreover, Marcus puts a great deal of trust in
the mind (5 .20): even though some peopIe may seem as if they \Vere obstacles to
your 0\\11 actions, sucIl people mal' becorne il1differents to yOil ('no less than the
sun or wind or a wild beasC). \\7}le rny 0\\'11 actian might be impeded by these
peopIe, they do 1101 constitute real impediments lo rn)' impulse and disposition.
Once again, this is so because these people are just e:\iemal causes, but m)' im-
pulses and actions are ruled by my milld or intellect on account of my reservation
and ability to retire into myself1 s The issue of '"reservation' (or 'circumspection':
hJpexairesis) as a causal factor \vhich impedes the possibility that evellts be COll-
trary to the agent's desire and impulse is aIread)' present in the EarIy Stoieism,19
and indeed it is also present in Epieterus, on whom Mareus seems to be drawing. 20
In the next seetion of this paper 1 return to the issue of ' reservation' and its rele-
vanee to understand that the I'uture, both in Epietetus' and Mareus' view, is totally
lU1eertain and that the past is unimportant sinee it has aIread)' elapsed and therefore
it is unchangeable. This approach argues I'or the thesis that the present is \\'hat
rnatters, that a11 that lies beyond the present is indifferent and hence it has nothing
to do \th wbat is up lo liS.

3. Emotions, indifferents, present time, and what depends on us

So I'ar 1 have been discussing sorne specific passages where Marcus distin-
guishes bet\veen what depends on the agent (bis 0\\'11 judgments or beliefs) and
what does not depend on the agent (the externalities, such as other people trans-
fonned into obstacles for one's life, earthquakes, and other events, apparently mi-
nor I'or one's mm inner citadel, to use Hadot's expression). No\\' 1 would like to
I'ocus 011 the notions of indifferent and the present, so as to establish the proper
cOIU1ections with the issue ofwhat is up to us in Marcus. In doing so 1 sha11 explain
the role that \Ve should give to ernotions in our life, according to Marcus Aurelius.
111e therne oI' adiaphora is well-kno\\TI in Stoic theory oI' value; however, let
me briefly sununarZe it: according to the standard definition, an inditTerent is what
is intennediate between virtue and vice, i.e. \\'hat is neither good nor bad, or, as
they are also called, ' neuter iterns' (o ude/era) which neither benefit nor hann (such
as liI'e-death, health-illness, pleasure-pain, beauty-ugliness, wealth-poverty, and so
on).21 Insofar as indifferents can be 'preI'erred' or '" dispreferred', they are also
closel)' related lo fue notions of value (axia ) and disvalue (apaxia ), a preferred

18 On tIri s poin! sec:: again '"Iarcus, 4.3 : eis hcauton anachrein.

19 Stobaeus, Ec!. 2.115, 5 ff. (Si'P 3.564): "They sa)' that notbing happens to the \Vise man wbich is
contra!}' to his desire and impulse and effort, since he does al! such things with reservation and none of
the events \Vhich oppose bis pIaos befalls bim unexpected!y" (transl. B. Inwood).
20 See Epic!etus, Handbook chapo 2; see also Frag. 27: "\Ve musl discover, he said, an a11 of assent
(technfm [ .. . ] pcri fo sugkatatitlu:sthai), and in the area of impulse, we mus! leep our attention fixed so
that it is exercised with reservation (meth ' hupc=aircscs), from desire we must abstain altogether, and
we mus! not seel to avoid anytrung that is not in our power (ouk "p/' hCmin)" (transL R. Hard). This
passage is quoted in ful! by Marcus (11.36).
21 DL 7.102~107, 165; Galen, PHP 7.2, 434, 31-436, 29 (cf SIP 3.374). See alsoEpicterus., Diss. 1.20,
58.
Marcelo D. Boeri 191

induYerenl being ' valuable ' (as it is according to nature) and a dispreferred indif-
ferent being 'disvaluable' (as it is contrary to nature). :!2
No", before attemptllg to elucidate the way in which illdifferents, fue present,
and ro eph' hmil1 work together in Mareus, it seems reasonable to c:\:plore \\'hat he
means by ' indifferenf. By \Vay of introduction, \Ve mal' eoncentrate on .Aledita-
tfons 6.32, ",here t\\'o senses of adiaphorol1 are distinguished, one related to our
bod)" (somation), and tIlc otIlcr one related to our mind or refleetive faeulty (di-
anoia ). The te:\.1 is as fo11ows:
Ti: 1 consisl ofbody and a souJ. Now to this body all things are indifferent, for it is nol
able to distinguish. But to my mind those things which are not its activities are indiffer-
ent. But whatever things are its 0\\11 activities, all these are in its po\,,'er. A.nd of these
however [my mind] refers itself only 10 lhe present; for as to the future and the past ac-
ti"ities ofthe mind, even these are for the present indifferent.

The main hne of Mareus' argument is simple: (i) 1-collsist of body and soul.
(ii) To my body a11 things are indifferent for it is not able to distinguish (diapher-
estllai). By contrast, (iti) to my mind (dianoia) are indifferent those thillgS which
are not its activites (energem ata). So (iv), whatcver things are the activitics ofm)'
mind depend on i~ i.c. thcy depend on me, since my dianoia is my self As is more
or lcss c1ear, none of these t\\"o meanings of indiflerent seem to match with the
Stoic classical characterizaton of adiaphoron: in both cases (i.e. in fue case of
indifferent with regard to our bod)' and to our mind) \\'hat Marcus appears to mean
is that something is indifferent because it conccms neither my body nor m1' mind.
But Marcus' use of indifferent maintains the Stoic orthodox vie\\' that what is in-
ditTerent aetiyates neither inlpulse nor repulsion;13 this is particularly relevant re-
garding \\'hat is indifferent to dial10ia (al steps i and iv aboye), since a strong
c1aim repeatcd in fue Afeditations is that for a real rational person the only factor
that should promote or actvate his inlpulses and actions is his o\\n mind, not the
e:\.iernal things. 111e last lines of T4 interestingly link the notion of ' indifferent'
\\'ith the present and \\'hat depends on oneself: the agent is on1y concemed witIl
what is present for the future and the past activities of one's mind are indifferent:
onl)" the present depellds on liS since what \Ve really live is the present, that 'tleet-
ing instant', wruch, cven being momentary, is fue only reaJ.24 In another remark-
able passage Marclis clarifies \\'hat he means by ' indifferem' and its relation to
\'o'hat dcpellds on liS:

T5: As to living in the bes! \Vay, this power is in the soul, if oue is indifferent lo things
which are indifferent. And one will be indifferent, if one looks on each af these things
separately and all together, and if ane remembers that not one ofthem produces in us a
belief (hypolcpsis) about itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain immovable,

12 Stobaeus, Eclogae 2.83, 10-11 (LS 58D). This description of indifferents is a simplification; a
complete and useful discussion of Stoic indifferents can be found in Bamey ~003: 307-319. For the
Socratic-Platonic antecedent ofthe Stoic doctrine ofindifferent see Alesse ~OOO: 3~O-331.
13 DL 7.104 (SIr 3.117, 119; 3.82; LS 58A-B), probably repoI1ing a Chrysippean view.
24 See alsoMeditattons 2.14: 3.10.
192 Present lime and indifferenls

and it is \Ve ourselves who produce the judgments (krisc is) ahallt them, and, as ,,;e may
say, ",rite them in oursd\'es, it being in our po\\'er (e:w n) nol 10 \\Tite them, and ir being
in our power, ir perchance tbese judgments haye imperceptibly got admission to our
minds, 10 \Vipe them out [ .. . ]. (11.1 6; part)
In Marcus' view, adiaphora are as they are due to the faet that none of them
produces in liS a belief (h)polepsis ) nor ' comes to liS' , since tllc extemal thillgS
whose pursuits and avoidances disrurb liS are indifferent and do nOl atTeet USo Alld
t!lis is so insafar as one is indifferent towards things inditTerent alld it is olleself
\"\"ho goes to them (cf. 11.11 ). But one might \Vonder \yhat requirement one should
have in arder to be capable of being 'indifferent towards things indifferen!', and
Marcus replies: when one considers each of these things separately and all to-
gether~5 and if one remelllbers t11at those things remain quiescent (atremei) given
that l1'e are those who produce the judglllents (kriseis) about them, being possible
for us oto "Tite them in ourselves' (graphonres en heautois), and even to \Yipe them
out. Once again the po\\'er of our mind and judgrnent, wli.ich depend on us, is \\'hat
actually confers reality or, rather, value to the e\.iemal things.:26 Moreo\'er, our
mind' s power locates the external things where they should be. To be sure, in stat-
ing that our mind is ",hat confers ' reality ' to sornething belonging to the external
world Marcus does nol mean that an e:\.1ra-mental object, such as the rain which is
falling dO\"\TI on me right now, exists because I want it to exist. What he seems to
be suggesting is that my mind, in depending upon me, is able to gi'le 'lalue or dis-
'lalue to such an eAiemal object fer my practicallife: if rain turns out to be annoy-
ing, it is in m)' power to lllake it be indifferent, since both ",hat is rumoying or
pleasant is up to rny OWIl state of rnind. The rain can get me wel, but this is not
significant to me; after all el'er)!thing is belief, and such a belief is up to oneself:
T6: [Consider] that ever:;.thing is opinion, and opinion is in you power (epi SOl) . Tate
away then, when you wanl your opinion, al1d like a mariner who has doubled me
promontory, you will find calm, everything stable, and a \vaveless bayo ( 12.22)

My example of rain indeed is rather futile; Marcus actually thinks of more de-
manding cases, such as pain, pleasure, reputation er e'len death (the Stoic c1assical
examples of indifferents). AH ofthese things produce disturbance in human beings;
but the relevant question is, in Marcus' 'lie\\', 'who is to himself the cause of his
uneasiness?' (ascho/ia; 12.8). And his obvious answer is that each one is such a
cause, since, insofar as 'everything is one' s own hypo/epsis' , no one is hindered by
another person and, one should assume, nobody is compelled to feel disturbance
because of the fact that one is in pain or knows one is about to die. Certainly, this
does not mean that one is not in real pain when one is feeling physical or psycho-
logical pain, but pain should not constirnte a real disturbance to one's life planning.
111e view !hat the present is a fleeting instant and that both the present and the
events seen through the present constitute the only reasonable 'liewpoint of consid-

~ \\'ith tllls expression 11arcus is probably making referc:nce lo his method of reducing a thing to
\vhal il is, decomposing il miO paI1s (Hadol 1998: 133).
:26 Marcus is evoking Epictetus (Handbookchap. 5).

Marcelo D. Boeri 193

eration for a real rational being is conunon place in Marcus. One of the stronges1
accounts adyanced by Marcus for suggestil1g this is that a person Carolot lose either
the past or the future, for wha1 a p~rson does n01 have he cannot lose. If this is so,
the present is the onl)' thing ofwhich a person can be deprived, inasmuch as this is
the only thing which he has, but a person canllot lose a thing if he does not have it
(2.14). Ibis means tha1 every person lives onl)" lhe presen!, which is a 'fleeting
instant' (akariaion): aB111e rest eithcr has alread)' been lived (!he past) or is uncer-
tain (adelon ), the future (3.10) ..~7 lo be sure, Marcus is, once again, closely draw-
ing on Epictetus who is ntent 011 proving that the future is entirely uncertain and
thereby it should be considered with caution. In the previous section \Ve sa", that
Marcus is willing 10 argue 111at impulses and actions are ruled by one's mind be-
cause of one' S reservation and ability to retire into oneself. It \Vould be appropriate
here to reca11 the quoted passage from Stobaeus,2S supposedly referring to an An-
cient Stoic vicw, according to which nothing happens to the Stoic sage \Vhich is
contrary to bis desrre and impulse, ' sillce he does all such things with reservation ' .
11s is an interesting passage because it cmphasizes the important faet that desmng
is related to the future,29 as it envisages a future aetion. J O But the point is that the
future is uncertain, so there is nothing that guarantees that I \\111 get \\"hat I desire.
111at is why resen'ation is so important in dealing \\'ith desire: one's desires can be
of diTerent kinds, some of them reasonable, some others unreasonable (especia11y
if you are not a Stoic sage, which is the condition of most people). But even if you
have a reasonable desire, nothing can guarantee ihat you \vi11 get what you desire,
since there can be impedinlents to your getting that \d ueh you desire and such
impediments do not depend on you. What indeed depends on you is the way in
which you evaluate and control, even moderate, your expectations with regard to
the future. If one' s expeetations are too high, the possibilit), of frustration is ver)'
real. TIle nristake you can make is to believe that the future is real, when in faet it
is no!. 11 is at tlus point tllat it becomes elear how m)' impulses and actions are
ruled by my mind due to my reservation, since my impulse and the aetion conse-
quent 011 said impulse are performed ' with reservation' \vhen I have chosen some-
tllng (5.20). That is to say, fue agent cannot guarantee rumselftllat he vll get \"\'hat
he desITes, and this is so because there may be inlpediments to his getting what he
desires that do not depend on him. This is, again, Epictetus' view,31 wruch Marcus
takes for granted; howe\'er, if ",hat I have discussed earlier is at least plausible,
there seem to be reaSOI1S for trunking that the systematic connections between de-
sire and reservation (and even what depends on liS) go back to fue Older Stoics.

~7 For other remarks in Marcus on the present, see 6.37 (Ha la I/UI/ don pan/a herakcn); 7.8 ( ra
mellonta me tarasset ); 7.29 (perigrapson lo enestos tou chrollou).
~s Cited in full above, n.19.
~9 Brennan 2005: 107.
3(1 Cf. Epictetus, liandb ook chapo 2.
31 See the previous note; Epictetus' approach, surely shared by i\1arcus, is Iha! if one desires what
does no! depend on oneself, one will be necessarily UIortunate. By contras!, if one only makes use of
the psychological movements ofimpulse and rejection (these movements being tO\vard and a\vay from
a11 the externa! things) with reser"l'ation, one will avoid frustration and thercby misfortunc.
194 Present time and indifferents

TI1C interesting point on which Marcus remarks ,,;t11 regard to ",ha! is indiffer-
ent, tbe present, and ",hat depellds on us is focused on tllC faet that what is not
present becomes indifferent alld thereby nol dependent on tbe agent. If we bear in
mind once again TI and what \YC have already pointed out regarding the place of
lhe present for Marcus, it becomes clear that it does not make sense to forrnulate
value-judgments centered on lhe past Dr the future~ as a matter of fact, what dis-
turbs liS is usually based on judgments such as: ' if 1 had done that, cverything
",ould llave gone well'~ similarly. \Ve are disturbed when thinking about lhe consc-
quences a present action mal' have in 111C futurc. But botb the past and the future do
not depcnd on me: the past is necessary, and insofar as it is unchangeable 1 can do
nothing to modify it. \Vith regard to the ruture. it seems to me that Marcus is not
suggesting tllat, as a rational being, 1 should nol plan a course of action. But 5uch
plalUUng must be done \,ith an a"'areness of the fact that there can be no certainty
about ",hat \\'ill happen: fuere may be obstac1es to roy plans 1hat are not up to me.
If litis is so, one should plan his practical life with a clear consciousness that one
cmmot control everytlring~ this can be an effective remed)' for avoiding frustration
and hence pain and disturbance. 3~
Richard Sorabji has suggested in passing that Marcus' emphasis on the present
is e~plained by his interest 'to free himself fmm the fear of assassination by the
exercise ofplacrng value only on tlle presen!, .33 Ho\\'ever, Marcos' insistence on
the present as the on1)' thing which is real in human life probably has some system-
atic reasons. The idea Marcus has in mind, 1 suggest, is the (orthodox) Stoic vie\\',
according to wruch the only temporal instance which is relevant is present, as it is
the only part oftime that is 'existen!' or 'real'.34 If one is interested in stressing fue
ontological Stoic distinction bet\veen 'existing' (or ' bclonging': h)parchein) and
' subsisting' (lryplrestanai), it seems reasonable to brief1y explore the Chrysippean
tenet that 'only the present belongs or exists, while the past and the future sub-
sist' .35 Since a deterrnined body (i.e. an ' existent') is disposed in a certain mrumer
at this present 111omen~ the present 'belongs' to it: \\'hile 1 a111 \\Titing, the predicate
' to be writing' belongs to me and exists in me while I am writing and disposed in
this \\'ay. But in the previous line ofthe above passage cited from Stobaeus Chry-
sippus had said that <no time is present exact(v. but it is broadly said to be so'
(transl. Long-Sedle)'). No\\', this clarification reminds us thal, in the strict sense,
not even the present -is' , or <is wholly present" as ' no time is \\'ho11)' presenC

3~ For sorne: textual e'.ide:nce confmning these insigh1s, see Marcus 8.28, ",here he presen1s the issue
in lerms of.ln cxclush'e disjWlction: pain is eilher .ln evil10 Ihe body or 10 the soul. But the soul is able
lo mainlain its own serenity (aithria) and tranquiliry (ga!ene) and nol belie'.e tha1 pain is .ln evil. The
conclusion (which is no1 given by Marcus) is Ihal pain is nol .ln e\it to tbe soul, insofar as il depends on
1he soul to remove pain (see .lIso 8.29).
33 Sorabji 2006: 179. In rus pre\ious book Sorabji offers a more complete discussion ofthe theme of
presenl in Marcus (see his 2000: 239-240).
~ This is particularly stressed in 8.36.
35Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.106, 5 ff. (= SIF2.509 ; LS 51B).
Marcelo D. Boeri 195

(holos el1is1atai).Y> What the passage intends to sho\\' is that not even the present
(that broadly ma)' 'belong' or 'exist') is present: there is no present, it just subsists.
\Vhen Chrysippus says that walking around (a predicate and thus an incorporeal in
the Stoic ontological map) belongs to me ,\hen 1 am waIking around but when 1 am
seated it does not belong to me, he is poil1ting out that the incorporeal predicate
coincides \\1-th a certan fact or event, and that, because of that, one may broadly
(kata platos) sa)" that the incorporeal ' walking around' belongs or exists.
1 cannot say that Marcus is thinking precisel)' of this discussion when highlighting
that the only real temporal instance il1life is the present; indeed, Ch.r}'sippus' discus-
sion does not fit into Marcus style. Nevertheless, it is not illlpossible that Marcus
has at least kept the conceptual foundations of the Chrysippean discussion of time
and has incorporated the idea ofthe present into his project ofpractical ethics.

4. Epilogue: how should one behave towards emctions and how to

understand the absence of a fine theoretical discussion in Marcus?
Marcus Aurelius opens his ..Heditarions by saying that he leamed good lllorals
(kaloerhes) and to not be an ' irascible person' (aorgelon~ 1.1 ) [mm bis grandfather
Verus. In a memorable passage of rus book Marcus provides nine fundamental
rules in arder to kno\\" ho\\' to behave if S0llleone else offends you. I sha11 only
focus on rule seven and on the general conclusion Marcus draws after listing and
explaining a11 of his mIes. According to rule seven, it is not people' s acts which
di51urb us, but our own beliefs (11.18). So, if one takes away these beliefs and is
wilhng to dismiss rus judgment as if it were something feruful, the anger is gone.
l1lis approach does not add anything new: the real cause of orre's perturbatioll is
one's belief~ but if ever)"thing is reduced to m)" conviction or belief, the \Vay 10 take
a\Vay one' s \\TOl1g beliefs \Vith regard to the external facts is onl)' possible by re-
flecting (logisamellos) that there is not a sharneful act bringing shame on me. Mar-
eus recommends that one guard oneself against being flattered by sycophants as
well as becoming angry ,,,ith them. The reason for this is that both actions are un-
sociable (akoil1oneta ) and lead to hann. In all the cases of auger, Marcus insists,
beillg moved by \\mth is not a manly or brave disposition; mildness and gentleness
are actually manlier or braver, as they are more hunlan or agreeable to human na-
ture. The one \\'ho is able 10 have a mild disposition also has strength and brave-
ness, for insofar as one is free from emotion in the sarne degree one is closer to
strength. In faet, braveness is regarded as a military virtue by Marcus, but \vhat he
seems to be emphasizing here is that courage actually starts by being able to con-
trol oneself, a condition for being a real courageous persono T o be sure, anger is
usually present in fue fighter; it eventuall)' can be a nlitigating factor for fear,
which natural1y is also present in the warrior without being lll1dennining. It seems
to be cOlll1terintuitive to demand that the combatant be calm or lllild; but such
calrrmess and mildness is a hallmark of strength, not of weakl1ess. Surely it is not

Y> The reason for Ihal is Ihat, since continuous lhings are infinilely divisible, and time is a continuous,
every time is infmitely divisible (cf. Stobaeus, Ec!. 1.105, 8-106, 23; SI 11 2. 509; LS 5lB, D, E).
196 Present time and indifferents

easy being an Aureliall Stoic wamor, especially if one thinks that Marcus, like the
OIder Stoics, endorses the thesis that emotions should be eliminated. Learning to
renect properly enomlOusly contributes to the improvement of one's peace of
mind, and this is once again, power, both in battle and in daily life.
Orre of rn)' purposes in this paper has been to argue for the \'i~w that Marcus,
as a thinler not particularl)' interested in theoretical but rather in practical ethics,
leads his discussiollS making use of a rather general kllowledge of some Stoic theo-
retical tec1micalities. There is no daubt that he is not worried abaut such teclmicali-
ties in themselves, but if the examples 1 have given aboye are sound we may have
some rcasan to suspect that Marcus incorporated the Stoic technical tenninology
and even sorne canonical accounts. 1 started this artiele by mentioning ho\\' hard
Marcus' admonitions sometimes may tum out to be if \\'hat \Ve are seeking is sorne
elear theoretical arguments supporting sorne explicit or implicit thesis; but if one
explores the backgrounds of such advices or admonitions, one can realize that for
him practical philosophy is 110t merely a set of conunands or prescriptions, but
such commands and prescriptions are vigorously endorsed by some theoretical
devices belonging to Stoicism that Marcus incorporates and handles in a more or
less conservative Stoic manner. At least sorne ofiliose devices, \yltich can be seen
at work in addressing the notions of indifferents and ",hat depends on us, if not
identical to ",hat the Older Stoics used to sa)', are quite similar to Mareus' Stoic
forerunners. In a more charitable way one might say that he has put into practice
some of the key tenets of Stoic ethics and action theory: his main interest was to
develop a \Vay of life able to express itself in a set of actiolls that translate the theo-
retical principIes of Stoicisrn into practical terms. Certainly, Marcus does not have
the sophistication of the Older or Middle Stoics, but he offers a coherellt picture
which, as recognized by Cooper alld others, never abandoned t1le Stoic principIes.

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