Bonsato vs CA

95 PHIL 481
FACTS: The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, by respondents Josefa Utea and other
heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and
damages) charged that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been
induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his
nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land situated in the municipalities of
Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and
documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite
formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their
favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato;
that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and
prayed for the dismissal of the case.
After trial, the CFI rendered its decision finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the
latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any
condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated
were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea
Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described
therein.
ISSUE: W/N the donation was a donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos?
HELD: Donation inter vivos. If it was a donation mortis causa, then the documents should reveal any or all of the
following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs.
Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may
be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed
(Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The
donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owners share of the fruits or produce (de los productos
mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo), a reservation that would be unnecessary if
the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that
the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be irrevocable, a
quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of
the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737;
New Civil Code, Art. 828).
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase that after the death of the donor the aforesaid
donation shall become effective (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion).
However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning
clearly appears to be that after the donors death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the
absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the
donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or
encumbrance that would disappear upon the donors death, when full title would become vested in the donees.

ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ-
Donation Mortis Causa
All provisions of a deed of donation should be construed together in case of conflicting statements in order to
determine whether it is inter vivos or mortis causa.

FACTS:
Sps. Gavino Diaz and Severa Mendoza executed a Deed of Donation in favor of their children, Olimpia, Angel and
Andrea Diaz. In the deed of donation, the Sps. Donated 8 lots, with reservations on certain lots, to their children and
daughters-in-law and with conditions that they are not allowed to alienate the same to 3rd persons while the couple
are still alive and that they shall continue to administer the same until their death. The donees manifested their
acceptance in the same deed of donation. When Gavino died, Severa executed a deed of donation in favor of Angel
and Andrea, giving the siblings each a portion of Lot 2377-A. When Severa died, Andrea sued Angel to have the
lots 2377-A and 2502 partitioned. Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia, moved to intervene claiming
1/3 portion of Lot 2502.

The CFI ruled that the donation was a donation mortis causa because the ownership of the properties donated did
not pass to the donees during the donors lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only upon the death of the
donors. It, however, sustained the partition of Lot 2502 since it was an extrajudicial partition. Both parties appealed
to the SC, Andrea contending that it is a donation inter vivos while Alejandro contending it to be mortis causa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is a donation inter vivos

or mortis causa

RULING: Donation inter vivos

The donation is a donation inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors as provided in Art. 729.
It was stipulated in the deed that out of love and affection by the donors to the donees, the latter are donating
wholeheartedly and unconditionally free from any kind of lien and debt. Likewise, it was accepted by the donees
which is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa are never accepted during the donors
lifetime.

The reservation clause which provides that the donees cannot sell the lots to 3rd persons while the couple is still
alive implies that the ownership already passed.

Although there was a stipulation where the couple reserved to themselves the administration, ownership and rights
over the properties mentioned, this should not be construed as to mean that ownership will pass only after their
death. This refers to the beneficial ownership and not the naked title and what the donors reserved to themselves by
means of that clause was the management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof.

ZAPANTA VS POSADAS

AVANCEA, C. J.:

Father Braulio Pineda died in January 1925 without any ascendants or descendants leaving a will in which he
instituted his sister Irene Pineda as his sole heiress. During his lifetime Father Braulio donated some of his property
by the instruments to the six plaintifffs, severally, with the condition that some of them would pay him a certain
amount of rice, and others of money every year, and with the express provision that failure to fulfill this condition
would revoke the donations ipso facto. These six plaintiff-donees are relatives, and some of them brothers of Father
Braulio Pineda. The donations contained another clause that they would take effect upon acceptance. They were
accepted during Father Braulio's lifetime by every one of the donees.

Every one of the six plaintiffs filed a separate action against the Collector of Internal Revenue and his deputy for the
sums of which each of them paid, under protest, as inheritance tax on the property donated to them, in accordance
with section 1536 of the Administrative Code, as amended by section 10 of Act No. 2835, and by section 1 of Act
No. 3031. Section 1536 of the Administrative Code reads:

Every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of
inheritance, devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands and real rights in such
property; . . .

The trial court in deciding these six cases, held that the donations to the six plaintiffs made by the deceased Father
Braulio Pineda are donations inter vivos, and therefore, not subject to the inheritance tax, and ordered the
defendants to return to each of the plaintiffs the sums paid by the latter.

The defendants appealed from this judgment.

The whole quetion involved in this appeal resolves into whether the donations made by Father Braulio Pineda to
each of the plaintiffs are donations inter vivos, or mortis causa, for it is the latter upon which the Administrative Code
imposes inheritance tax. In our opinion, said donations are inter vivos. It is so expressly stated in the instruments in
which they appear. They were made in consideration of the donor's affection for the donees, and of the services
they had rendered him, but he has charged them with the obligation to pay him a certain amount of rice and money,
respectively, each year during his lifetime, the donations to become effective upon acceptance. They are therefore
not in the nature of donations mortis causa but inter vivos.

The principal characteristics of a donation mortis causa, which distinguish it essentially from a donation inter vivos,
are that in the former it is the donor's death that determines the acquisition of, or the right to, the property, and that it
is revocable at the will of the donor. In the donations in question, their effect, that is, the acquisition of, or the right to,
the property, was produced while the donor was still alive, for according to their expressed terms they were to have
this effect upon acceptance, and this took place during the donor's lifetime. The nature of these donations is not
affected by the fact that they were subject to a condition, since it was imposed as a resolutory condition, and in this
sense, it is necessarily implies that the right came into existence first as well as its effect, because otherwise there
would be nothing to resolve upon the nonfulfillment of the condition imposed. Neither does the fact that these
donations are revocable, give them the character of donations mortis causa, inasmuch as the revocation is not the
failure to fulfill the condition imposed. In relation to the donor's will alone, these donations are irrevocable. On the
other hand, this condition, in so far as it renders the donation onerous, takes it further away from the
disposition mortis causa and brings it nearer to contract. In this sense, by virtue of this condition imposed, they are
not donations throughout their full extent, but only so far as they exceed the incumbrance imposed, for so far as
concerns the portion equivalent to or less than said incumbrance, it has the nature of a real contract and is governed
by the rule on contracts (art. 622 of the Civil Code). And in the part in which it is strictly a donation, it is a
donation inter vivos, because its effect was produced by the donees' acceptance during the donor's lifetime and was
not determined by the donor's death. Upon being accepted they had full effect. If the donor's life is mentioned in
connection with this condition, it is only fix the donor's death as the end of the term within which the condition must
be fulfilled, and not because such death of the donor is the cause which determines the birth of the right to the
donation. The property donated passed to the ownership of the donees from the acceptance of the donations, and
these could not be revoked except upon the nonfulfillment of the condition imposed, or for other causes prescribed
by the law, but not by mere will of the donor.

Neither can these donations be considered as an advance on inheritance or legacy, according to the terms of
section 1536 of the Administrative Code, because they are neither an inheritance nor a legacy. And it cannot be said
that the plaintiffs received such advance on inheritance or legacy, since they were not heirs or legatees of their
predessor in interest upon his death (sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code). Neither can it be said that they obtained
this inheritance or legacy by virtue of a document which does not contain the requisites of a will (sec. 618 of the
Code of Civil Pocedure). 1awphi1.net

Besides, if the donations made by the plaintiffs are, as the appellants contended, mortis causa, then they must be
governed by the law on testate succession (art. 620 of the Civil Code). In such a case, the documents in which
these donations appear, being instruments which do not contain the requisites of a will, are not valid to transmit the
property to the donees (sec. 618, Code of Civil Procedure.) Then the defendants are not justified in collecting from
the donees the inheritance tax, on property which has not been legally transferred to them, and in which they
acquired no right.

For these reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered

PAULO LAURETA, as administrator of the estate of Severa Magno y Laureta, deceased, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO EMILIO MATA and ESTER MAGNO, defendants-appellants.

N. Segundo and Pedro L. Valdes for appellants.

Jose Fonacier for appellee.

STATEMENT

The following instrument, known in the record as Exhibit A, omitting the description of the lands and other personal
property, was executed February 2, 1918:

DEED OF DONATION EXECUTED In the municipality of Solsona, Ilocos

BY SEVERA MAGNO Y LAURETA Norte, Philippine Islands, I, Severa
IN FAVOR OF PEDRO EMILIO Magno y Laureta, widow, seventy
MATA years old

and resident of the municipality of Solsona, Ilocos Norte, Philippine Islands, a proprietor by occupation,
hereby declared that for the purpose of giving the young Pedro Emilio Mata, single, seventeen years old,
resident of this municipality and son of Pastor Mata, already deceased, and Ester Magno, a reward for the
services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection toward him and of the fact that he stands
high in my estimation, I hereby donate "mortis cause" to said youth all the properties described as follows:

(Here follows an accurate description of a large number of parcels of real estate, and a large amount of personal
property.)

I declare that all the rice lands above mentioned are my exclusive property, and to identify in a clear
manner the halves mentioned in some of the foregoing clauses I hereby state that they are the one-
half that was allotted to me in the petition had between me and the heirs of my deceased husband,
and, therefore, all the part that was allotted to me in the said partition is the subject of this donation.

I also declare that I likewise donate to the said youth the right to, and usufruct of, two parcels of land
situated in Mariquet, on which I hold a mortgage for the sum of P250, subject to the conditions
stipulated in the document executed to evidence the said mortgage.

I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the
properties donated before the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said donee shall
be under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my soul, and also
to defray the expenses of my burial and funerals.

I, Ester Magno, widow, of age, resident of the municipality of Solsona, and mother of the young
Pedro Emilio Mata, the donee under this document, hereby accept this donation on behalf of may
said son, thanking the donor for her liberality and affection toward my said son, Pedro Emilio Mata,
the donee, with all the conditions imposed by the donor.
 In testimony whereof we affixed our marks to these present in Solsona, this 2d day of February,
1918.

(Marked) SEVERA MAGNO

(Sgd.) ESTER MAGNO

(Sgd.) PEDRO EMILIO MATA

Signed in the presence of :

(Sgd.) IGNACIO FLORES

(Sgd.) ELIAS DULDULAO

(Then follows the notarial acknowledgment in due and regular form.)

It is admitted that at the time of its execution, the grantor was the owner in fee simple of all the lands therein
described. In the course of time the grantor died and at the time of her death Pedro Emilio Mata, the grantee in the
deed, and Ester Magno, entered upon and took possession of the lands.

The plaintiff applied for and was appointed administrator of the estate of the grantor Severa Magno y Laureta,
deceased, and made a demand upon the defendants for possession of the lands which was refused, resulting in this
action by the plaintiff as administrator, to recover possession of the premises and the sum of P9,000 as the value of
the products of the land from April 9, 1918, until the termination of the case, for the sum of P1,200 damages, for the
unlawful and wrongful withholding of possession, and costs.

For answer the defendants made a specific denial of all of the material allegation of the complaint, and pray
judgment for costs.

Upon such issues the case was tried and submitted upon a stipulation of facts to the effect that any title or right of
possession which Pedro Emilio Mata has to the possession of the premises is founded upon Exhibit A.

The lower court rendered judgment to the effect that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the lands in
question and the sum of P1,050, the agreed rental value and costs, from which the defendants appeal, assigning
nine different errors, the combined substance of which is that the lower court erred in holding that the donation
made by the deceased, known as Exhibit A, should be construed under the provisions of article 620 of the Civil
Code, and that the defendants did not acquire title to the lands under it, that their possession was illegal, and that
the land was the property of the heirs of the deceased, and in rendering judgment for the plaintiff, and in overruling
the defendants' motion for a new trial.

JOHNS, J.:

Its execution having been admitted, the question involved is the construction, legal force, and effect of Exhibit A.
Among other things it recites that I, Severa Magno y Laureta, widow, seventy years old . . . hereby declare that for
the purpose of giving the young Pedro Emilio Mata, single, seventeen years old, . . . and son of Pastor Mata,
already deceased, and Ester Magno, "a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my
affections toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate "mortis causa" to said
youth all the properties described as follows." In the second paragraph it is said: "Therefore, all the part that was
allotted to me in the said partition is the subject of this donation." In the third it recites: "I also declare that I likewise
donate to the said youth the right to, and usufruct of, two parcels of land situated in Mariquet, etc." In the fourth "I
also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the properties donated
before the death of the donor, etc."

The donee, Pedro Emilio Mata, was the son of Pastor Mata, deceased, and was seventeen years old at the time the
instrument was executed. The instrument further recites that Ester Magno, a widow and the mother of Pedro Emilio
Mara, with all the conditions imposed by the donor, accepted the donation on behalf of her son, and thanked the
donor for her liberality and the affection for her son.

The plaintiff contends and the trial court found that Exhibit A should be construed under the terms and provisions of
article 620 of the Civil Code as follows:

Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of
property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions.

As we analyze it, Exhibit A is a donation in prsenti and conveyed the fee simple title to the lands in question
subject only to the life estate of the donor. It must be conceded that during her lifetime the grantor had a legal right
to convey the fee simple title to her lands to any person in her discretion, reserving to herself a life estate. In legal
effect, that is what she did here. The conveyance of the lands took effect upon the making and delivery of the deed,
reserving a life estate only in the donor. The conveyance itself was not "to become effective upon the death of the
donor," but took effect at the time of its execution. The instrument does not recite that the conveyance itself is not to
become effective until the death of the donor, but, in legal effect, it recites that an actual conveyance is made
subject to the life estate of the donor. Upon its face Exhibit A comes squarely within the provisions of article 623 of
the Civil Code, which reads:

A donation is perfected as soon as the donor has knowledge that it has been accepted by the donee.

Here, it appears from the instrument itself that Ester Magno accepted the donation on behalf of the son, and the
acceptance is incorporated in the body of the instrument and made a part of it, and is signed by the donor and
acceptor in the presence of witnesses and the instrument as a whole is legally acknowledge before a notary public.

Again, when the instrument is construed as a whole it shows upon its face a delivery and acceptance. The donor
conveys the land, and in and by the same instrument the mother of the donee accepts the conveyance upon the
terms and conditions stated in the deed.

Corpus Juris, vol. 18, p. 208, says:

Where, however, a deed containing a provision that it is not to take effect until the grantor's death is actually
delivered to the grantee during the lifetime of the grantor, it will be sustained as a present grant of a future
interest.

That is this case. Legally speaking, it was a delivery and an acceptance of the deed. The facts bring the case
squarely within article 623 of the Civil Code. Here, there was a donation and an acceptance both in the same
instrument which made it a perfected donation within the meaning of article 623.

Commenting on article 620 of the Civil Code in volume 5, page 82, of the 1910 edition, Manresa says:

In pure donations, in donations until an affixed day, and in donations with a resolutory condition the property
is of course conveyed to the donee during the life of the donor and as to this point there is no question.

When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property donated be at the death of the
donor, or when the suspensive condition is related to his death, confusion might arise. To avoid it we must
distinguish between the actual donation and the execution thereof. That the donation is to have effect during
the lifetime of the property must be made during his life or after his death. From the moment that the
donor disposes freely of his property and such disposal is accepted by the donee, the donation exists,
perfectly and irrevocably (articles 618 and 623). Until the day arrives or until the condition is fulfilled, the
donation, although valid when made, cannot be realized. Thus, he who makes the donation effective upon a
certain date, even though to take place at his death, disposes of that which he donated and he cannot
afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another. If the thing is lost thru
the fault of the donor, or if it is damaged, indemnity may be recovered. Regarding donations with suspensive
conditions, it is sufficient to read articles 1120 and 1122 to understand the effects which this kind of donation
has during the lifetime of the donor. He who makes a donation effective after his death, makes a donation,
not a legacy. The mere name of the act, when a different intention does not clearly appear, is enough in
 order to make applicable thereto the rules of law referring to donations. However, if the ill-named donor not
only postpones the date of the execution of the donations until his death but also reserves the right to revoke
said act at his pleasure, then this act is not valid as a form of contract; this is in truth a disposition of
property mortis causa which requires the same solemnities as required in making a will.

Although it is not include in the stipulation of facts, it does appear from the record that some of the property
described in Exhibit A was sold and disposed of by the donee during the lifetime of the donor.

In any event, Exhibit A was a donation in prsenti as distinguished from a gift in futuro, hence does not come under
the provisions of article 620 of the Civil Code.

The effect of this decision is to hold that Pedro Emilio Mata took and acquired a valid title to the premises in dispute
at the time Exhibit A was executed, subject only to the life estate of the donor, and he is now the owner of the lands
described in the pleadings. But the defendants made a general denial, and did not ask for affirmative relief, hence
none can be granted.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with costs in favor of the
defendants. So ordered.

LORENZA CONCEPCION, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
EMILIA CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.

Enrique J. Corpus and Jose T. Nery for appellant.

Nemesio Balonso for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

The present appel involves the interpretation of Exhibit A, a deed of donation, whether it is inter vivos or mortis
causa, because if the former, it is valid having been duly accepted by the donee, but if the latter it would be void
because being in the nature of disposal of property by will, according to the article 620 of the Civil Code, it shall be
governed by the rules established for testamentary succession. According to the law governing the execution of
wills, a will should be attested by three witnesses, and there should be an attestation clause. But here there are only
two witnesses to the deed of donation (Exhibit A), and it contains no attestation clause. For a better understanding
of and to facilitate reference to said Exhibit A, we reproduce its pertinent provisions.

ESCRITURA DE DONACION ONEROSA MORTIS CAUSA

Sepan Todos Por La Presente:

Yo, Manuela Concepcion, mayor de edad, viuda, Filipina, con residencia y direccion postal en el municipio
de San Antonio, provincia de Zambales, Filipinas, hago constar que, en consideracion a los buenos
servicios prestados a mi por mi sobrina, Emilia Concepcion, antes y durante estos dias y teniendo, ademas,
especial predileccion por sus buenas cualidades y el cario que tengco de ella, en quien cifro un porvenir
provechoso, por la presente declaro que hago DONACION MORTIS CAUSA a favor de mi citada sobrina,
Emilia Concepcion, sujeta a las condiciones que mas abajo se especifican, de las siguientes propiedades
que se describen a continuacion, a saber:

(Description of the properties donated.)

CONDICIONES

Que las condiciones de esta DONACION son las siguientes, a saber:

 (a) Que el producto de una tercera (1/3) parte del terreno arriba descrito como parcela No. 1, o sea la
cosecha de una extension superficial de SEIS MIL DOSCIENTOS CINCUENTA METROS CUADRADOS
(6,250 m. c.) equivalentes a una balita, hacia el lado Este de dicho terreno, sera separado anualmente y se
empleara para los gastos de la celebracion de mi aniversario, en caso de mi muerte, y en memoria tambien
de la muerte de mis mayores y parientes y en sufragio de las almas de los difuntos, por lo menos una vez al
ao, pero tambien puede hacerse dicha celebracion tantas veces como creyera conveniente y propio la
mencionada donatoria, Emilia Concepcion, que no pasara de P50 al ao.

xxx xxx xxx

Que yo declaro ademas que no tengo hijos, ni ascendientes ni descendientes, ni herederos forzosos,
motivo por el cual me he creido con derecho y facultad sufficiente para disponer en la forma como lo hice de
mis citadas propiedades, habiendome reservado lo necesario para mi mantenimiento.

Que estas parcelas de terreno arriba descritas y deslindadas no estan aun registradas bajo la ley del
Registro de la Propiedad No. 496 ni bajo la ley Hipotecaria espaola, por lo que las partes convienen, para
los efectos que procedan, registrar esta escritura bajo las disposiciones de la Ley No. 3344.

Que yo declaro por ultimo que esta DONACION MORTIS CAUSA como su mismo nombre lo indica, ha de
producir efectos solamente por muerte de la donante.

ACEPTACION

Yo, Emilia Concepcion, mayor de edad, soltera, filipina, con residencia y direccion postal en el municipio de
San Antonio, provincia de Zambales, Filipinas, por la presente hago constar que acepto la donacion arriba
expresada por lo que quedo sumamente agradecida a mi dicha tia, Doa Manuela Concepcion, por tal
generosidad, y me comprometo a cumplir fielmente todas y cada una de las condiciones arriba impuestas.

En testimonio de todo lo cual firmamos la presente en el municipio de San Antonio, provincia de Zambales,
Filipinas, hoy a 7 de Marzo de 1944, A.D.

(Fda.) MANUELA CONCEPCION

(Donante)

(Fda.) EMILIA CONCEPCION

(Donatoria)

A little more than three years after the execution of the above-quoted deed of donation, or rather on November 18,
1947, the donor Manuela Concepcion died. Plaintiffs-appellees who are six nephews and nieces of the donor, all
surnamed Concepcion instituted special proceedings No. 491 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales for the
summary settlement of the estate of their aunt, the donor. Because the estate or the greater portion thereof sought
to be summarily settled and distributed was included in the donation, the donee Emilia Concepcion filed opposition
to the petition for summary settlement claiming that the six parcels subject of the donation belonged to her. The
Court in said special proceedings without deciding the title and right of possession to the six parcels claimed by
Emilia, merely ordered the partition of the estate of Manuela Concepcion among all her heirs who are besides the
six petitioners, Emilia Concepcion and her four brothers. Therefter, and because Emilia refused to give up the
parcels said to have been donated to her including a house and a granary as well as personal properties, the six
original petitioners in the special proceedings filed the present action (civil case No. 1230) in the Court of First
Instance of Zambales to have themselves declared owners of and entitled to the possession of their shares in those
properties claimed by Emilia in the proportion of one-eleventh (1/11) for each.

In her answer Emilia claimed title to said properties by reason of the donation and submitted a copy of the deed of
donation. After trial, the lower court found that the donation was one mortis causa and because it was not executed
in the manner required by law on wills, it was declared null and void; the properties therein included were all
declared part if the estate of the deceased Manuela Concepcion subject to distribution among the heirs in the
proportion of 1/11 for each as declared by the court in special proceedings No. 491; defendant Emilia Concepcion
was ordered to deliver to each of the plaintiffs their respective shares of the products of the land for the agricultural
year 1947-48 and those to be obtained thereafter in the proportion of 1/11 to each heir.

Emilia Concepcion appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the parties filed their respectiive briefs, but
finding that only questions of law were involved in the appeal, said court by resolution certified the case to this
Court.

Examining the deed of donation, Exhibit A, we find the title using the phrase mortis causa which phrase was
repeated in the paragraph just before the acepatacion with the clause that the donation was to "producir efectos
solamente por muerte de la donante." The lower court, evidently impressed by these features, concluded that the
donor intended to make her donation effective after her death, and that consequently, it was a donation mortis
causa.

The trial court is not entirely to blame. The deed of donation is really confusing and far from clear. The one who
drafted the document would appear to have been himself, confused, and in using legal phraseology rather added
not a little to the confusion. We confess that the distinction between a donation inter vivos and a donation mortis
causa, in spite of the comments of legal writers and the doctrines laid down by the courts is not always sharp and
clear, specially when the donation is couched in language which admits of possible different interpretations. But, it is
a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of the donation and the statements
contained therein, and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here, the
donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the body, however, we find that the donation
was of a nature remunerative rather that onerous. It was for past services rendered, services which may not be
considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services rendered to her onerous and in goodwill. The donation
instead of being onerous or for a valuable consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation was more of
remuneratory or compensatoruy nature, beside being partly motivated by affection.

We should not give to much importance or significance to or be guided the use of the phrase "mortis causa" in a
donation and therby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In the case of De Guzman et al. vs. Ibea,
et al. (67 Phil., 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice Avancena said that if a donation by its terms is inter vivos,
this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.

In the case of Laurenta vs. Mata et al. (44 Phil., 668), the court held that the donation involved was inter vivos.
There, the donor Severa Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as

a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection toward him and of the
fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate "mortis causa" to said youth all the properties
described as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the properties
donated before the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said donee shall be under
obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my soul, and also to defray the
expenses of my burial and funerals.

It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta above cited are similar in that in both cases the
donation was being made as a reward for services rendered and being rendered, and as a token of affection for the
donee; the phrase "mortis causa" was used; the donee to take possession of the property donated only after the
death of the donor; the donee was under obligation to defray the expenses incident to the celebration of the
anniversary of the donor's death, including church fees. The donation in both cases were duly accepted. In said
case of Laureta this Court held that the donation was in praesenti and not a gift in futuro. In support of its ruling, this
Court reproduced the comment of Manresa on Article 620 of the Civil Code reading as follows:

In pure donations, in donations until an affixed day, and in donations with a resolutory condition the property
is of course conveyed to the donee during the life of the donor and as to this point there is no question.
 When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property donated be at death of the
donor, or when the suspensive condition is related to his death, confusion might arise. To avoid it wew must
distiguish between the actual donation and the execution thereof. That the donation is to have effect during
the lifetime of the donor or at his death does not mean in delivery of the property must be made during his
life or after his death. From the moment that the donor diposes freely of his property and such disposal is
accepted by the donee, the donation exist, perfectly and irrevocably (articles 618 and 623). Until the day
arrives or until the condition is fulfilled, the donation, although valid when made, cannot be realized. Thus,
he who makes the donation effective upon a certain date, even though to take place at his death, disposes
of that which he donated and he cannot afterwards revoked the donation nor the dispose the said property in
favor of another. If the thing is lost thru the fault of the donor, or if it is damaged, indemnity may be
recovered. Regarding donations with suspensive conditions, it is sufficient to read articles 1120 and 1122 to
understand the effects which this kind of donation has during the lifetime of the donor. He who makes a
donation effective after his death, makes a donation, not a legacy. The mere name of the act, when a
different intention does not clearly appear, is enough inorder to make applicable thereto the rules of the law
referring to donations. However, if the ill-named donor not only postpones the date of execution of the
donation until his death but also reserves the right to revoke said act at his pleasure, then this act is not valid
as form of contract; this is in truth a diposition of property mortis causa which requires the same solemnities
as required inmaking a will.

In the case of Sambaan vs. Villanueva, (71 Phil., 303), the donor made a donation "en consideracion al afecto y
carino que profeso a mi ahijado Jesus Flavio Villanueva."The donor furthermore impose the condition that "esta
donacion la otorgo bajo las consideracion que: solamente surtira efectos despues de ocurrida mi muerte, . . . ."This
court citing the same comment of Manresa just quoted above held that since the donation was simply made in
consideration not of the death of the donor but of the affection to the donee, the donation was inter vivos and
not mortis causa, and that the condition imposed to the effect that the donation "solamente surtira efectos despues
de ocurida mi muerte," did not argue against the nature of the donation..

Again, in the case of Joya vs. Tiongco (71 Phil., 379), wherein the donor made the donation of a parcel of land to
the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya because of her relationship to them, and where said donation was duly
accepted and registered, the decision of the Court of Appeals which found the donation to be mortis causa was
reversed by this court and the donation was held to be inter vivos for the reason that the death of the donor was not
the consideration of the donation but only a suspensive condition, and that the mere fact that the property donated
was not to be delivered immediately to the donee but only after death of donor did render the donation mortis causa.

From all the the preceding considerations, it is clear that even when the donor calls the donation mortis
causainstead of inter vivos, even if he says it is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the instrument
or donation is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but rather
services rendered to him, by the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter
vivos, and when duly accepted, it transfers title immediately to the donee, and the condition that the donation is to
take effect only after the death of donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the
fruits of the property donated should take place only after donor's death. To this effect, is the holding of this court in
the case of Balaqui vs. Dongso (53 Phil., 673), where the donor Hipolita Balaqui made a donation to Placida Dongso
in consideration of her good services rendered and because the donee had lived with the donor sa a daughter, the
donation containing the following paragraph:

This gift to said Placida Dongso resident of Candon, Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, in recompense for her
services to me, does not pass title to her during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of
the two aforementioned parcels, including my house and shed thereon, and she shall be rightfully entitled to
transmit them to her children. I also bind my self to answer to said Placida and her heirs and successors for
this property, and that none shall question or disturb her right.

This court in that case held that the donation was inter vivos and irrevocable, and not mortis causa, notwithstanding
the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did not transfer the ownership of the two parcels of land donated,
until upon her death, for such a statement could mean nothing else than that she only reserved to herself the
possession and usufruct of said property, and because the donor could not very well guarantee the aforesaid right
after her death.
In the present case, we may hold as we do that the donor or rather the person who drafted the deed, in using the
phrase "mortis causa" and in providing that the donation should take effect only after the donor's death simply
meant that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the properties donated should take effect only after the
donor's death and not before, although this intention is rendered even dubious due to the fact that in one paragraph
of the donation, she stated that she had reserved that was sufficient and necessary for her main tenance which may
mean that all the properties donated were deemed transferred to the donee imnmediately after the donation had
been accepted.

One other consideration may be mentioned in support of our stand. The donation here was accepted by Emilia; said
acceptance is embodied in the deed of donation, and both donor and donee signed below said acceptance
conclusively showing that the donor was aware of said acceptance. The deed and acceptance was by agreement of
both recorded or registered. Everything was complete. Only donations inter vivos need be accepted.
Donation mortis causa being in the nature of a legacy need not be accepted. (Manresa, Vol. 5, Fifth edition [1932].
p. 83.) Presuming that the donor Manuela and the donee Emilia knew the law, the fact that they not only be agreed
to the acceptance but regarded said acceptance necessary argues for their understanding and intention that the
donation was inter vivos.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the donation in question is inter vivos and not mortis causa, and that it is valid
because the requisites of the law about the execution of wills do not apply to it. The decision appealed from is
hereby reversed with costs.

ANTONINA CUEVAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CRISPULO

CUEVAS, Defendant-Appellee.

Pedro D. Maldia for appellant.

Teodoro P. Santiago for appellee.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance

entitled "Donacin Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the
northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in barrio Sinasajan, municipality
of Penaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A). In the same instrument
appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

"Subsequently, on May 26, 1952, the donor executed another notarial

instrument entitled "Revocacion de Donacion Mortis Causa" (Exhibit B)
purporting to set aside the preceding conveyance; and on August 26, 1952,
she brought action in the Court of First Instance to recover the land conveyed,
on the ground (1) that the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully
revoked by the donor; and (2) even it if were a donation inter vivos, the same
was invalidated because (a) it was not properly accepted; (b) because the
donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own maintenance, and (c)
because the donee was guilty of ingratitute, for having refused to support the
donor. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Issues having been joined, and trial had, the Court of First Instance denied the
recovery sought, and Antonina Cuevas thereupon appealed. The Court of
Appeals forwarded the case to this Court because, the case having been
submitted on a stipulation of facts, the appellant raised only questions of
law.chan roble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

The first issue tendered converns the true nature of the deed "Exhibit A";
whether it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of property mortis
causa revocable freely by the transferor at any time before death. 1 chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

It has been rules that neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision
that a donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor", is a controlling
criterion in defining the true nature of donations (Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil.,
668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil., 823). Hence, the crux of the
controversy revolves around the following provisions of the deed of donation:

Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, and

lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin and patuloy na
mamomosecion, makapagparatrabaho, makikinabang at ang iba pang
karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindo ko binabawian
ny buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko nga iya-alis pagkat kung ako
ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya.

There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that the donor
reserves to herself "the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other
rights and attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of life by the
Almighty"; but right after, the same donor states that she "will not takle away"
(the property) "because I reserve it for him (the donee) when I die." chanrobles v irt ual law l ibrary

The question to be decided is whetehr the donor intended to part with the title
to the property immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later,
when she had died. If the first, the donation is operative inter vivos; if the
second, we would be confronted with a disposition mortis causa, void from the
beginning because the formalities of testaments were not observed (new Civil
Code, Arts. 728 and 828; heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 2 50 Off. Gaz.
(8), p. 3568; Tuason vs. Posadas, 54 Phil., 289; Sent. Trib. Sup. of Spain, 8
July 1943). chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

We agree with the Court below that the decisive proof that the present
donation is operative inter vivor lies in the final phrase to the effect that the
donor will not dispose or take away ("hindi ko nga iya-alis" in the original) the
land "because I am reserving it to him upon my death." By these words the
donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in favor
of another (a right essential to full ownership) and manifested the
irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to the property in favor of
the donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante,
such irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is
incompatible with the idea of a disposition post mortem. Witness article 828 of
the New Civil Code, that provides:

ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death.
Any waiver or restriction of this right is void.

It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor
intended that she should retain the entire beneficial ownership during her
lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably pass to the donee. It is
only thus that all the expressions heretofore discussed can be given full effect;
and when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the "possession,
cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she
meant only the dominium utile, not the full ownership. As the Court below
correctly observed, the words "rights and attributes of ownership" should be
construed ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of "possession,
cultivation and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed. Had the donor
meant to retain full or absolute ownership she had no need to specify
possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in
full or absolute ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right of free
disposition from the "rights and attributes of ownership" that she reserved for
herself.chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Hence, the Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid
donation inter vivos, with reservation of beneficial title during the lifetime of
the donor. We may add that it is highly desirable that all those who are called
to prepare or notarize deeds of donation should call the attention of the donors
to the necessity of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation,
they wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property
before their death, without need of the consent or intervention of the
beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right would be conclusive
indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor's death, and
therefore, the formalities of testaments should be observed; while, a converso,
the express waiver of the right of free disposition would place the inter
vivos character of the donation beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of
Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568). chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the deed
"merely recites that (1) the donee has duly read all the contents of this
donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its terms'; and (3) that 'for the act
of benevolence' he is expressing his gratitude" but there is no show of
acceptance (Appellant's brief, p. 7), is without basis. To respect the terms of
the donation, and at the same time express gratitude for the donor's
benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance, If the donee did not accept,
what had he to be grateful about? We are no longer under the formulary
system of the Roman law, when specific expressions had to be used under
paid of nullity. chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law li bra ry

Also unmeritoriious is the contention that the donation is void because the
donor failed to reserve enough for ther own support. As we have seen, she
expressly reserved to herself all the benefits derivable from the donated
property as long as she lived. During that time, she suffered no diminution of
income. If that was not enough to support her, the deficiency was not dur to
the donation. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeaboe with ingratitude, because it was
expressly stipulated that the donee had a total income of only P30 a month,
out of which he had to support himself, his wife and his two children. Evidently
his means did not allow him to add the donor's support to his own burdens.
virtua l law lib rary
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary ch anro bles

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this instance,

appellant having obtained leave to litigate as a pauper. So ordered. chanroblesvi rt

ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ESTELLA MAGBANUA PEAFLORIDA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Salonga and Ordonez for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Fulgencio Vega for the defendants-appellants.

RESOLUTION

(Main opinion was promulgated on November 29, 1965).

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al., insist that the reservation by the donor of the right to
dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949 indicates that title had passed to the
donee in her lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be superfluous, and they cite American
authorities in support.

This thesis would be plausible if the reservation of the power to dispose were the only indication to be considered in
deciding whether the donation of December 28, 1949 was mortis causa or inter vivos. But such is not the case. The
Court in its decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but also the fact that the deceased
expressly and consistently declared her conveyance to be one of donation mortis causa, and further forbade the
registration of the deed until after her death. All these features concordantly indicated that the conveyance was not
intended to produce any definitive effects, nor to finally pass any interest to the grantee, except from and after the
death of the grantor.

We see nothing in the deed itself to indicate that any right, title or interest in the properties described was meant to
be transferred to Doa Estela Magbanua prior to the death of the grantor, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon. Not
ownership, certainly, for the stipulation:

Que esta escritura de donacion mortis causa no se registrara en la oficina del Registrador de Titulos de
Iloilo sino despues del fallecimiento de la Donante
necessarily meant, according to section 50 of the Land Registration Act, that the deed in question should not take
effect as a conveyance nor bind the land until after the death of the "donor".

Neither did the document operate to vest possession upon Doa Estela Magbanua, in view of the express condition
that (paragraph 3) if at the date of her death the donor had not transferred, sold, or conveyed one-half of lot 58 of
the Pototan Cadastre to other persons or entities, the donee would be bound to pay to Caridad Ubalde, married to
Tomas Pedrola, the amount of P600.00, and such payment was to be made on the date the donee took possession
of Lot No. 58. As the obligation to pay the legacy to Caridad Ubalde would not definitely arise until after the death of
the donor, because only by then would it become certain that the "donor" could not transfer the property to someone
else, and such payment must precede the taking possession of the property "donated", it necessarily follows that the
"donee's" taking of possession could not occur before the death of the donor.

It being thus clear that the disposition contained in the deed is one that produces no effect until the death of the
grantor, we are clearly faced by an act mortis causa of the Roman and Spanish law. We thus see no need of
resorting to American authorities as to the import of the reservation of the donor's right to dispose of the donated
property, for the Spanish authorities are very clear on this point:

Desde el momento en que la muerte del donante es la que determina la adquisicion o el derecho a los
bienes; desde el montento en que la disposicion puede ser revocada voluntariamente, se salva la linea
divisoria entre unos y otros actos: la donacion equivale a un legado; mas aun que esto: es un legado en
realidad. (5 Manresa, 5th Ed., p. 107)

Ahora bien: si el mal llamado donante no solo dilata la fecha de la ejecucion para el momento de su muerte,
sino que ademas se reserva la facultad de revocar a su arbitrio la disposicion, entonces el acto no es valido
bajo la forma de contrato; hay en realidad una disposicion mortis causa que exige las solemnidades del
testamento. (V Manresa, 5th Ed., p. 109) (Emphasis supplied)

The presence of an acceptance is but a consequence of the erroneous concept of the true nature of the juridical act,
and does not indicate that in the same is a true donation inter vivos.

Appellant Magbanua further argues that the reserved power of the donor to convey the donated property to other
parties during her lifetime is but a resolutory condition (albeit a potestative one) that confirms the passing of the title
to the donee. In reality, this argument is a veritable petitio principii; it takes for granted what has to be proved, i.e.,
that some proprietary right has passed under the terms of the deed, which, as we have shown, is not true until
thedonor has died.

It is highly illuminating to compare the condition imposed in the deed of donation of December 28, 1949 with that
established in the contract dealt with in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao & Tau Liuan, 43 Phil. 874, invoked by appellants.

In the alleged deed of donation of December 28, 1949, the late Doa Carmen Ubalde imposed expressly that:

Que antes de su muerte, la Donante podra enajenar, vender, traspasar e hipotecar a cualesquiera personas
o entidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de la Donataria en concepto de Donacion mortis causa.

In the Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao case, on the other hand, the condition read:

It is understood and agreed that should the machinery to be installed in said factory fail, for any reason, to
arrive, in the City of Manila within the period of six (6) months from date hereof, this contract may be
cancelled by the party of the second part at its option, such cancellation, however, not to occur before the
expiration of such six (6) months. (pp. 874-875, cas. cit.).

In the Uy Tieng Piao case the contract could only be cancelled after six months, so that there could be no doubt that
it was in force at least for that long, and the optional cancellation can be viewed as a resolutory condition (or more
properly, a non-retroactive revocatory one); but no such restriction limited the power of the donor, Doa Carmen
Ubalde, to set at naught the alleged conveyance in favor of Doa Estela Magbanua by conveying the property to
other parties at any time, even at the very next instant after executing the donation, if she so chose. It requires no
argument to demonstrate that the power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any time,
and that it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it impossible to channel the
property elsewhere. Which, in the last analysis, as held in our main decision, signifies that the liberality is
testamentary in nature, and must appear with the solemnities required of last wills and testaments in order to be
legally valid.

Wherefore, the motion to reconsider is denied.

JUANITA KAPUNAN, ET AL. Petitioners, vs. ALIPIO N. CASILAN and the

COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

E. Granador, J. B. Velasco, D. T. Reyes, Luison & Cruz for petitioners.

Manuel Lim and Julio Siayco for respondent.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is a petition to review on certiorari a decision of the Court of Appeals

declaring the respondent Alipio N. Casilan owner of certain real property
described in the complaint and ordering petitioners to deliver possession
thereof to said respondent. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The facts are not disputed. The property in question, which is a commercial
lot1 located in Tacloban City, was on October 2, 1935 donated by the spouses
Ruperto Kapunan, Sr., and Iluminada Fernandez de Kapunan to their daughter
Concepcion K. Salcedo, who accepted the donation in the same document. The
deed of donation was acknowledged on the same date by the donors and done
before Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, the donors' son-in-law and the donee's
brother-in-law. The property, however, remained in the possession of the
donors. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

On December 23, 1939, Concepcion K. Salcedo donated the same property to

her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo, then a minor. In behalf of said minor,
Iluminada Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan, the donee's grandmother and acting
guardian whom the said donee was then living as her parents were estranged
from each other, accepted the donation. The acceptance was contained in the
deed of donation itself, which was authenticated by the same Notary Public
Mateo Canonoy. chanroblesv irtualawl ibra rychanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

On November 4, 1944, Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo and the respondent Alipio

N. Casilan executed a "Deed of Conditional Sale" wherein the former accepted
the latter's offer to purchase the land in dispute, and received the sum of
P2,000 as part of the purchase price, the balance of P4,500 to be paid within 3
years therefrom. Notwithstanding the fact that the property in question was in
the possession of the petitioners and respondent Alipio N. Casilan knew that
Conception Kapunan Salcedo had previously donated the said property in favor
of her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo, the said respondent on June 14, 1945
proceeded to buy the same and paid the balance of the purchase price on the
assurance given by the donor that the donation was not legal. The deed of sale
was annotated on July 27 of the same year in the Daily Book of the Register of
Deeds of Leyte, but not on the original certificate of title because of the refusal
of Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan to deliver the duplicate certificate of title. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

In due time, the respondent Casilan filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte the compel Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan to surrender the
transfer certificate of title, but the petition was dismissed. In connection with
this petition, Concepcion K. Salcedo, on March 9, 1946, gave a deposition that
she had knowledge of the acceptance by her mother Iluminada Vda. de
Kapunan of the donation she made to her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo.
libra ry
chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law

To recover title and possession of the property in question, respondent Casilan

filed the present action in the Court of First Instance of Leyte against
Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo, Iluminada Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan and
Marita Antonia Salcedo. Juanita, Crinidad, Ruperto, Jr., Emma, Lilia, Socorro
and Rosario, all surnamed Kapunan, intervened as alleged co-owners of the
land in dispute and as heirs of their late father Don Ruperto Kapunan, Sr. On
March 31, 1950, after hearing, the trial court, Judge Hipolito Alo presiding,
rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff, herein respondent Casilan, to be the
owner of the property in question and ordering the defendants and intervenors
to deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff. The trial court also dismissed the
complaint in intervention. Acting, however, upon the motions for
reconsideration filed by the defendants and intervenors, the lower court,
through Judge Jose S. Rodriguez, in are solution dated May 30, 1950,
reconsidered its decision and declared the sale of the property in question by
Concepcion K. Salcedo in favor of respondent Alipio N. Casilan null and void.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court reversed the decision and
awarded the land undisputed to Alipio N. Casilan. Hence, this petition for
review. chan rob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

It is petitioners' contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related
to the parties in the donation within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was,
under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish Notarial law, incompetent and
disqualified to authenticate the deed of donation executed by the Kapunan
spouses in favor of their daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said deed of
donation, according to petitioners, became a mere private instrument under
Article 1223 of the old Civil Code, so that under the ruling laid down in the
case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the donation was in efficacious.
The appellate court, however, in the decision complained of held that the
Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No. 496.
We find this ruling to be correct. In the case of Philippine Sugar
Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs. Garcia (Adm.
Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this Court held that "The old Spanish
notarial law and system of conveyance was repealed in the Philippines and
another and different notarial law and system became the law of the land with
the enactment of Act No. 496." chanroble s virtual law lib rary

We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the donation in
favor of Marita Antonia Salcedo was null and void in that there was no
"constancia autentica" given to the donor Concepcion K. Salsedo that the
donation had been accepted. Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 provided
that -

Art 633. In order that a donation of real property be valid it must be made by
public instrument in which the property donated must be specially described
and the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee
expressed. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public

writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the
donor.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

If the acceptance is made by separate instrument, authentic notice thereof

shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both
instruments.

Under the above legal provisions, a donation transfers title effectively if it is

accepted with all the formalities that must accompany the acceptance of
donations of realty, to wit, thru the medium of a public instrument with
authentic notice to the donor, unless the acceptance is made in the deed of
gift itself. (Tagala vs. Ybeas, 49 Off. Gaz., 200).In the present case, the deed
of donation executed by Concepcion K. Salcedo in favor of her daughter Marita
Antonia Salcedo states "that the said donee, Marita Antonia Kapunan Salcedo
being a minor and being represented by hermaternal grandmother, Iluminada
F. Vda. de Kapunan, does express her appreciation and gratefulness for the
generosity of said donor." The acceptance having been made in the deed of
gift itself, notification thereof to the donor in a "constancia autentica" was
evidently not necessary. It is true that the acceptance was made on another
date and in a place other than that where the deed was executed, but the
deed of donation as so worded implied a previous understanding between the
parties who intervened therein, and, and, whatsoever, the donor, Concepcion
K. Salcedo, admittedly knew of the actual acceptance by the donee through
the latter's grandmother. Pursuant to Art. 623 of the old Civil Code, her
knowledge of such acceptance perfected the donation.. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

It is also argued that the acceptance of the donation by the donee's

grandmother was not valid since at the time of the acceptance she had not yet
been appointed legal guardian of the donee. Under article 626 of the old Civil
Code, a donation to an incapacitated donee requires its acceptance by his
lawful representative. This rule, however, appears to be applicable only in case
of onerous and conditional donations, where the donee may have to assume
certain charged or burdens. As was said by former justice Montemayor in
Perez vs. Calingo (CA, 40 Off., Supp. 11, p. 53), "In simple and pure
donations, a formal acceptance is not important for the donor acquires no right
to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to do anything nor assumes
any obligation. In this case, the acceptance may be said to be a mere
formality required by law for the performance of the contract. Whenever the
donation does not impose any obligation upon the donee the acceptance may
be made by the donee himself." Anyway, if under the rule provided in Article
626 of the old Civil Code the donation of realty to a minor may be accepted in
his behalf by his mother (Laurenta vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668), we see reason why
a simple and pure donation made by the mother herself in favor of he own
minor daughter may not be validly accepted through the grandmother, the
donee's acting guardian who was later appointed as her legal guardian. It
should here be stated that Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan who accepted the
donation in behalf of the minor donee was appointed legal guardian of the said
minor on June 12, 1944, or prior to the execution of the deed of conditional
sale between the donor Concepcion K. Salcedo and herein respondent Alipio N.
Casilan. There being no showing that the donation had been revoked prior to
the appointment of the donee's grandmother as her legal guardian, It is
apparent that said donation had been confirmed and impliedly ratified by the
parties intervening therein before the execution of the deed of sale referred to.
(See Atacador vs. Silayan, 67 Phil., 674.) chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

In conclusion, we find and so hold that the donation of the property in dispute
to Maria Antonia Salcedo by Concepcion K. Salcedo was valid, and
consequently the sale thereof by the latter in favor of respondent Alipio N.
Casilan was null and void. Said respondent however, may still recover what he
has paid under the equitable principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefited at the expense of another. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

WHEREFORE, the decision complained of is reversed and the sale of the

property in controversy in favor of respondent Alipio N. Casilan declared null
and void.

Justice Panganiban, Lagozo vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Catalina Jacob Vda. De Reyes, a widow and grandmother of Lagazo (the petitioner of this case), was awarded
60.10 sq. meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate located in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The Monserrat Estate is
a public owned property by the City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the
landless program. Catalina Jacob then constructed a house on the said lot.

Shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob executed a special
power of attorney in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo Espaol authorizing him to execute all document necessary for the
final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot.

Due to the failure of Eduardo Espaol to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney in an instrument
executed in Canada, Catalina Jacob revoked the said power of attorney. Simultaneous with the revocation, the latter
executed another power of attorney of the same tenor in favor of the petitioner.

Catalina Jacob, thereafter, executed a Deed of Donation in cananda over the subject lot in favor of the
petitioner. Following the donation, petitioner checked with the Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in
the delinquent list and because of that, he paid the installments in arrears and the remaining balance on the lot and
declared the said property in the name of Catalina Jacob.

Petitioner then sent a demand letter to respondent Alfredo Cabanlit asking him to vacate the premises. A similar
letter was also sent by the petitioners counsel. However, the respondent refused to vacate the premises claiming
ownership thereof by virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him by Espaol. Hence, petitioner instituted the
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against the respondent.

Furthermore, petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not be
stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically imposed any charges, burdens or
conditions to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid for the installments in
arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be
expressed or implied as provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required
by Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of the arrears and balance and his assertion of his right of possession against
private respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation.

Issue: WON the donation is simple of onerous.

Held: The donation is simple donation. To differentiate between a simple donation and an onerous one; the simple
(pure) donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached) while an onerous donation is one which is
subject to burdens, charges, or future services equal to or mere in value than the thing donated. Under Art. 733 of the
Civil Code, donation with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, hence the formalities required
for a valid simple donation are not applicable.

The Supreme Court ruled that the donation was simple, not onerous, because the act of the petitioner in paying
full payment of the purchase price, even it might have been a burden to him such payment was not however imposed by
the donor as a condition for the donation.

It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as donee. The words in the
deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. SC agreed with the CA that the payments made were his merely voluntary
acts. This much can be gather from this testimony in court which was never even claimed that a burden or charge had
been imposed by his grandmother.

The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina Jacob in
favor of petitioner authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records
shows that such acts were mere meant to be a burden in the donation.

Furthermore, the donation being simple, perfection only happen upon the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee and if it is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified in an authentic form &
this step shall be noted in both instruments. Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable, it
absence makes the donation null and void.

FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of donation inter vivos of of the
land to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he executed another deed of donation inter vivos ceding the other
of the property to Helen Doria. Helen Doria donated a protion of the lot (157 sqm) to the Calauan Christian
Reformed Church. Helen Doria sold and conveyed the remaining portion save some 700 meters for his residence.
Pedro Calapine sought to annul the sale and donation to eduarte and CCRC on the ground that the deed of
donation was a forgery and that Doria was unworthy of his liberality claiming ingratitude (commission of offense
against the person, honor or property of donor [par. 1])

ISSUE:
W/N the falsification of public document committed by Doria is an act of ingratitude against Calapine (considering
that falsification is a crime against public interest)?

RULING: YES
In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes of
revocation. Petitioner attempted to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the RPC by
deleting the first sentence. However, this is unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are
considered crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against
personal liberty and security under the RPC.

Note: Eduarte and the Church still won although the donation was deemed by the Court to be revocable. The Court
applied the CHAIN OF TITLE THEORY because the lands were registered lands and it has already passed from the
forger (Doria) to innocent purchasers for value (Eduarte, et al.).

REYES V. MOSQUEDA- Donation

Inter Vivos
The nature of the disposition made is the determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos or mortis
causa and not the title given to a deed of donation.

FACTS:
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters,
herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI
for the administration of Pascuals estate. Ursula then filed a motion to exclude some properties included alleging
that these were donated to her in a donation mortis causa in 1966. This was granted by the CFI without prejudice to
its final determination in a separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC then issued a TRO enjoining the
CFI from enforcing the order.

Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed of donation inter vivos in
favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the donation. When she reached the age of majority,
she had the donation registered but found out that the certificate of title was missing so she filed a petition for
reconstitution of title which was granted and she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT in her name.

Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Ofelias
TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of possession against Benjamin Reyes. The CFI issued a
joint decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelias TCT was null and void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the SC.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula
(2) Whether or not the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a donation inter vivos

RULING:
(1) YES
It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final determination in a separate
action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties, it can
determine whether or not the properties should be included in the inventory to be administered. Such determination
is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action.

(2) YES
Although the donation was entitled donations mortis causa it has been held that dispositions in a deed of donation
do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the body of the document which should be
considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.

For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following characteristics should be present:
1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership over the property
2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will
3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the transferee

The following are not present in the case. The transfer of ownership was immediate and independent of the death of
the donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved sufficient properties for himself to maintain him for life
confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership immediately after execution of the deed of donation.
 Liguez v. CA

Dec. 18, 1957 | Reyes, JBL, J. | Void contracts

PETITIONER: Conchita Liguez
RESPONDENT: CA, Maria Ngo, et al.
SUMMARY: Through a deed of donation, Salvador Lopez donated a parcel of land to Conchita Liguez, who was then 16. In an action commenced
by Conchita to recover the same, the CA found that the deed was null and void for having an illegal causa and for Salvadors lack of right to donate
conjugal property. This was based upon the finding that Salvador donated the land in order to cohabit with and have sexual relations with Conchita.
The CA also rejected the claim based on the in pari delicto rule. The SC found that the conveyance was indeed predicated on an illegal causa.
However, the pari delicto rule does not apply since at the time of the donation, Salvador was a man advanced in years and Conchita was only 16.
Furthermore, Salvadors forced heirs are barred from invoking the illegality of the causa, and are thereby only entitled to a declaration of the donation
as inofficious.
DOCTRINE: The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by the law but will both be left where it finds them, has
been interpreted by this Court as barring the party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a defense.

A donation with illegal causa may produce effects under certain circumstances where the parties are not of equal guilt.

FACTS: legitimes of Salvadors forced heirs. The records are remanded to

1. Conchita Liguez filed a complaint against the widow and
heirs of Salvador Lopez to recover a parcel of 51.84 hectares
of land in Davao. She averred to be its legal owner, pursuant
to a deed of donation executed in her favor by Salvador.
2. At the time the deed was executed, Conchita was 16. She had
also been living with Salvadors parents for barely a month.
3. The deed of donation recites that the donor Salvador, for and
in consideration of his love and affection for Conchita, and
also for the good and valuable services rendered to
[Salvador] by [Conchita], does by these presents, voluntarily
give, grant and donate
4. The donation was made in view of Salvadors desire to have
sexual relations with Conchita. Furthermore, Conchitas
parents would not allow Conchita to live with him unless he
first donated the subject land.
5. The donated land originally belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Salvador and his wife, Maria Ngo.
6. CA: The deed of donation was inoperative, and null and void
because:
a. Lopez had no right to donate conjugal property
to Conchita;
b. The donation was tainted with illegal causa or
consideration.
7. The CA also rejected Conchitas claim based on the rule in
pari delicto non oritur actio, as embodied in Art. 1306 of the
1889 Civil Code (as reproduced in Art. 1412 in the new Civil
Code).
8. Conchita: under Art. 1274 (of the 1889 Civil Code), in
contracts of pure beneficence the consideration is the
liberality of the donor, and liberality per se can never be
illegal, since it is neither against law or morals or public
policy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the conveyance was predicated on illegal causa YES
2. WON the in pari delicto rule applies NO
3. WON the alienation of conjugal property was void only
insofar as it prejudices Maria Ngo
RULING: Decisions appealed from reversed and set aside.
Conchita Liguez entitled to so much of the donated property as
may be found, upon proper liquidation, not to prejudice the share
of the widow Maria Ngo in the conjugal partnership or the
the court of origin for further proceedings.
RATIO:
1. Under the cited Art. 1274, liberality of the donor is deemed
causa only in contracts that are of pure beneficence, or
contracts designed solely and exclusively to procure the
welfare of the beneficiary, without any intent of producing
any satisfaction for the donor.
2. In this case, Salvador was not moved exclusively by the desire
to benefit Conchita, but also to secure her cohabiting with him,
and so that he could gratify his sexual impulses. This is clear
from Salvadors confession to two witnesses that he was in
love with her.
3. Lopez would not have conveyed the property in question had
he known that Conchita would refuse to cohabit with him. The
cohabitation was an implied condition to the donation and
being unlawful, necessarily tainted the donation.
4. Therefore, the donation was but one part of an onerous
transaction (with Conchitas parents) that must be viewed in
its totality.
5. The CA erred in applying the pari delicto rule. The facts are
more suggestive of seduction than of immoral bargaining.
a. It cannot be said that both parties had equal guilt.
Salvador was a man advanced in years and
mature experience, and Conchita was only 16
when the donation was made.
b. The CA did not find that she was fully aware of
the terms of the bargain entered into by her
parents.
c. Her acceptance of the deed does not imply
knowledge of conditions and terms not set forth
therein.
d. Witnesses testified that it was Conchitas
parents who insisted on the donation.
6. The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty,
will not be aided by the law but will both be left where it
finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as barring
the party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either
as a cause of action or as a defense. But where the plaintiff
can establish a cause of action without exposing its illegality,
the vice does not affect the right to recover.
7. Applied to the case: Conchita seeks recovery of the land based
on the strength of a donation regular on its face. To defeat its
 effect, the heirs must plead and prove that the same is illegal,
which they cannot do, since Lopez himself, if living, would be
barred from setting up that plea.
8. Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property to the
prejudice of his wife. The donation is void only insofar as
it prejudices the interest of his wife.
a. FC 1409: The conjugal partnership can be charged
anything given or promised by the husband in order to
obtain employment for his children, or give them a
profession.
b. 1415: The husband may dispose of the property of the
conjugal partnership for purposes in Art. 1409.
c. 1413: The husband may for a valuable consideration
alienate and encumber the property of the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the wife.
9. To determine the prejudice to the widow, it must be shown
that the value of her share in the property donated cannot be
paid out of the husbands share of the community profits.
However, the requisite data are not available to the court. The
records need to be remanded to the court of origin that settled
Salvadors estate.
10. Salvadors forced heirs cannot invoke the illegality of the
donation, but are entitled to have the donation set aside
insofar as inofficious, based on their rights to a legitime out
of his estate. However, only the court of origin has the
requisite data to determine whether or not it is inofficious.
11. Re: improvements in the land governed by rules of
accession and possession in good faith, since Maria and
Salvadors heirs were unaware of the donation to Conchita
when the improvements were made.
12. Re: laches Conchita only enforced her right as donee in
1951. But the Court highlights that in 1943, she was still
sixteen; she only reached the age of majority in 1948. Her
action 1951 was only delayed three years. Furthermore, she
couldnt have intervened in Salvadors estate proceedings
because she was a minor for its great part. Also, the donation
did not make her a creditor of the estate.
13. A donation with illegal causa may produce effects under
certain circumstances where the parties are not of equal
guilt.
Tan Queto v. CA [G.R. No. L-35648. February 27, 1987.]; Resolution

Jul

En Banc, Paras (J): 10 concur, 1 votes to deny reconsideration, 1 dissents, 2 took no part

Facts: Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot (Lot 304-B of the
Cadastre Survey of the Municipality of Centro, Misamis Occidental) either as a purported donation
or by way of purchase on 11 February 1927 for P50.00 as the alleged consideration thereof. The
transaction took place during her mothers lifetime (her father having predeceased the mother) and
consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. On 22 January
1935, Juan filed an application of Torrens title over the land for himself and his supposed co-owner
Restituta. On 22 November 1938, a decision was promulgated (GLRC 1638, Cadastral Case 12)
pronouncing Juan (married to Restituto) as the owner of the land. On 22 September 1949 a contract
of lease over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta (with the consent
of her husband) for a period of 10 years.

Meanwhile, On 27 December 1960 Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer (the lease
contract having expired) before the Municipal Court of Ozamis City.

On 22 April 1962, as a consequence of the cadastral case, an OCT was issued in Juans name. On 10
October 1962, Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the
owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses in turn became the owners of a parcel of land with the
house constructed thereon previously owned (that is, before the barter) by Tan Queto. Thereafter,
Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete building, without any objection on the part
of Restituta.

The Municipal court ruled in favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case; but on appeal in the
CFI, the entire case was dismissed because of an understanding (barter) entered into by Juan and
Tan Queto.

Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but
disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages. The CFI and
the Court of Appeals found the disputed lot as paraphernal and that Tan Queto was a builder in bad
faith. These findings were regarded by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily
conclusive upon the Court. Tan Queto filed for a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court
decision dated 16 May 1983.
The Supreme Court set aside its decision promulgated on 16 May 1983, and rendered a new one
declaring the questioned lot together with the building thereon, as Tan Quetos exclusive property;
without costs.

1. Findings of the lower courts ordinary conclusive upon the Court; exception, if erroneous

The findings of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals were regarded by the Supreme
Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. Assuming they are factual
findings, still if they are erroneous inferences from certain facts, they cannot bind the Court.

2. Land not transferred to Restituta by donation, for it to be paraphernal

The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation inter-vivos because it was not executed in a
public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a
will were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to Restituta of her
hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual
transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited.

3. Land is conjugal, not paraphernal; Ownership by tradition

The land is conjugal, not paraphernal. Ownership was acquired by the spouses by tradition (delivery)
as a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable
amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been
acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal, there being
no proof that Restituta had paraphernal funds of her own).

4. Sale not fictitious nor simulated; Allegation of simulation cannot prejudice a stranger

The sale cannot be said to be fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) as there was a valid
consideration therefor. Assuming that there had indeed been a simulation, the parties thereto
cannot use said simulation to prejudice a stranger to said strategem (like petitioner herein).

5. Tan Queto recognized Restituta as an owner, not the owner

Tan Queto admitted Restituta was an owner (not the owner) of the lot in his Answer, and this is
true, for she was a co-owner (with Juan, and therefore an owner.) There is no admission of
Restitutas exclusive ownership.

6. Assuming Tan Queto recognized Restituta as the owner; bad faith of one neutralizes the bad faith
of the other

Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as conjugal, Tan Queto nursed the belief that the
lot was actually Restitutas (making him in bad faith), still Restitutas failure to prohibit him from
building despite her knowledge that construction was actually being done, makes her also in bad
faith. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle Tan Qyeto to the rights of a builder in good
faith (Art. 448, Civil Code), ergo, reimbursement should be given him if Restituta decides to
appropriate the building for herself (Art. 448, Civil Code).

7. Tan Queto an owner-possessor

Tan Queto having bartered his own lot and small house with the questioned lot with Juan (who has
been adverted to by a court decision and by the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be the owner-
possessor of the lot. Certainly he is not merely a possessor or builder in good faith (this phrase
presupposes ownership in another); much less is he a builder in bad faith. He is a builder-possessor
(jus possidendi) because he is the owner himself.

8. Jus possessionis, jus possidendi; good faith and bad faith

The Chapter on Possession (jus possessionis, not jus possidendi) in the Civil Code refers to a
possessor other than the owner. The difference between a builder (or possessor) in good faith and
one in bad faith is that the former is not aware of the defect or flaw in his title or mode of
acquisition while the latter is aware of such defect or flaw (Art. 526, Civil Code). But in either case
there is a flaw or defect. In the present case, there is no such flaw or defect because it is Tan Queto
himself (not somebody else) who is the owner of the property.

EDUVIGIS J. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

PLANA, J.:
This a petition for review of the decision of the defunct Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1981
in CA-G.R. No. 65338-H reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. and dismissing
petitioner's complaint for revocation of donation against herein private respondents Teresita,
Lydia and all surnamed De Leon.

In Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq.m residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay
Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces private
respondents herein, in a deed of donation entitled "Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala". The property was
accordingly transferred to the names of private respondents.

In 1974, Eduvigis Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she
extrajudicially tried to revoke the donation, but the donees resisted, alleging that

(a) the property in question was co-owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother. the
late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own 1/2 of the
property by inheritance; and

(b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another property, an agricultural land of more than two
hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the donation did not
impair the presumptive legitime of the adopted child.

In 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 21049) invoking Article 760, paragraph 3 of the New Civil
Code, which reads:

Art. 760, Ever donation inter vivos made by a person having no children or descendants,
legitimate or legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced as
provided in the next article, by the happening of any of these events:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) If the donor should subsequently adopt a minor child.

After trial, the trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation. It did not find merit in
defendants' claim that the lot, by donor and her deceased brother, Maximo Cruz, because the
donor's ownership was deemed admitted by the donees by accepting the deed of donation. It
also rejected defendants' argument that the donation did not impair the legitime, saying that
claim was "beside the point" and did not limit plaintiff's right under Art. 760 of the Civil Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint. It found
that.

a) the trial court took into consideration only Article 760 of the Civil Code and ignored Article 761
which states: " In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall be revoked or
reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into
account the whole estate of the donor of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor
at the time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child.

(b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another lot in Dolores Taytay Rizal, although the subject of a pending
litigation valued at P273,420.00 in 1977.

(c) The donated lot did not belong entirely to Eduvigis as thereof belonged to her brother
Maximo Cruz, grandfather of defendants. 1974 it had a total market value of P17,000. One-half
thereof was P8,500. Adding thereto a P50,000 value of the apartment house constructed
thereon, the total value of the donation would still be within the free portion of donor's estate and
therefore would not impair the legitime of the adopted child.

(d) In an action for revocation of donation, the donor has the burden to show that the donation
has impaired the legitime of the subsequent child; but in this case, Eduvigis did not even allege it
in her complaint.

In the instant petition for review, petitioner imputes to the appellate court alleged errors which boil
down to the question as to whether under the facts as established and the law, the decision
under review correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject donation. We hold that it did.

In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or
all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation
within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted,
taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil
Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who
must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment
or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.

Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject
donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of the
total assets of the donor.

Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that
the donor has another piece of land (27,342 sq. m.) situated in Dolores, Taytay, Rizal worth
P273,420.00 in 1977, although then subject to litigation.

The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is made worse by the factual finding of the
Court of Appeals that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the
donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more
easily be taken from the portion of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is affirmed.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v CA

G.R. No. 77425/77450 June 19, 1991

DOCTRINE
There is no need for prescription to be applied in cases where there is stipulation for automatic reversion.
Nonetheless, the stipulation is against public policy and thus, is void.

FACTS
The administrators of the estate of deceased spouses Eusebio and Martina De Castro filed a complaint
to nullify the deed of donation, rescission of contract, and reconveyance of the property against spouses Florencio
and Soledad Ignao, Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.

The administrators alleged that in 1930 the De Castros executed the deed of donation over their Cavite
property to the Archbishop, said deed allegedly providing that the latter cannot dispose or sell the property within
100 years from execution. The administration of the said properties was transferred to the Bishop of Imus in 1962.
And in 1980, the Bishop of Imus sold the property to the spouses Ignao. The Ignaos were then able to transfer the
TCT under their names.
 The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed and dismissed the complaint. This was
reversed by the CA.

The Ignaos and the Bishops contend that the cause of action had already prescribed, relying on Art. 764
which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply
with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after
four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be
exercised against the donee's heirs.

ISSUE

WON the action has already prescribed

HELD / RATIO

ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED. Art. 764 is not applicable in this case. The deed of donation involved
expressly provided for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the, as was correctly
recognized by the CA.
A judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be
revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. This cancellation can be applied in the case
at bar. Art. 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions
on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined by the law on donations.
In contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of
obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper.
Thus, the cause of action has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes
in ten (10) years. Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention
of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic
revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the
situation in the case at bar.
NONETHELESS, while the action may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be
dismissed on the ground that the estates of the De Castros have NO CAUSE OF ACTION against the Ignaos and
other petitioners.
The cause of action of the De Castros is based on the alleged breach of the resolutory condition that the
property donated should not be sold within the prohibited period. Said condition, however, constitutes an undue
restriction on the rights arising from ownership and is, therefore, contrary to public policy and should be declared
as an illegal or impossible condition.
The Ignaos won. The CA decision is reversed.

RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner, vs. GLICERIA ALCANTARA,

LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and JOSE
REYES, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing
an area of 94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
17214 of the Register of Deeds for Manila.
 The Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos consists of two pages. The first page contains
the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor,
Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses.[1] The second page contains the
Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the
notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and
deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina
Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala
and the other witness.[2] The Acknowledgment reads:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )

QUEZON CITY ) S.S.

Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon, Philippines, this
20th day of Feb. 1981, personally appeared CATALINA QUILALA, with
Residence Certificate No. 19055265 issued at Quezon City on February 4, 1981,
known to me and to me known to be the same person who executed the foregoing
instruments and acknowledged to me that the same is her own free and voluntary
act and deed.

I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2) pages, including the page
on which this acknowledgement is written, has been signed by CATALINA
QUILALA and her instrumental witnesses at the end thereof and on the left-hand
margin of page 2 and both pages have been sealed with my notarial seal.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City of Quezon,

Philippines, this 20th day of Feb., 1981.

(SGD.) NOTARY PUBLIC

Until December 31, 1981
(illegible)

DOC NO. 22;

PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.

The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT
No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22,
1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan
Reyes, claiming to be Catalinas only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating
unto themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. San
Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the
donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No. 143015 in the name of Violeta
Quilala. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-26603 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 17. Subsequently, respondents withdrew their complaint as against Guillermo
T. San Pedro and he was dropped as a party-defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and
Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina.Consequently,
there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the
donation null and void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalinas SSS records
does it appear that Violeta was Catalinas daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to therein as
an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence that the adoption was legal. On the other
hand, the trial court found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However,
since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that respondents deed of
extrajudicial settlement can not be registered. The trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Gliceria

Alcantara, Leonarda Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes and against defendant
Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:

1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real property inter
vivos executed on February 20, 1981 by Catalina Quilala in favor of Violeta
Quilala (Exhs. A as well as 11 and 11-A.);

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title

No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala and to issue a transfer certificate of title
in the name of the Estate of Catalina Quilala;

3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the registration of the deed of

extrajudicial settlement (Exhs. B and B-1.) and the issuance by the Register of
Deeds of Manila of a transfer certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs; and

4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.

No costs.

SO ORDERED. [3]

Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing
the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings
of Catalinas alleged last will and testament.[4]

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following

MODIFICATION:

(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the
filing of the necessary probate proceedings by the interested parties so as not to
render nugatory the right of the lawful heirs.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on
February 11, 1998.[5] Hence, this petition for review, raising the following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION
OF REAL PROPERTY INTER-VIVOS IS NOT REGISTRABLE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURTS
RULING THAT VIOLETA QUILALA IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CATALINA
QUILALA.[6]
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by Catalina in favor of
Violeta. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in
a public instrument in order to be valid,[7] specifying therein the property donated and the value
of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation
results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, [8] and is
perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee,[9] provided the
donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation
is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,[10]and the donee becomes the absolute owner
of the property.[11] The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the
donor and the donee.[12] It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document,[13] and
the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.[14]
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as
well as the technical description as the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was
made for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the
DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity.[15] This was sufficient cause for a
donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.[16]
The donees acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in the penultimate
paragraph of the deed, which reads:

That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation made in her
favor by the DONOR and she hereby expresses her appreciation and gratefulness
for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR. [17]

Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses
affixed their signature. However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page
mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violetas failure
to acknowledge her acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a
private instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which
states:

Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney and other

voluntary instruments, whether affecting registered or unregistered land, executed
in accordance with law in the form of public instruments shall
be registrable: Provided, that, every such instrument shall be signed by the person
or persons executing the same in the presence of at least two witnesses who shall
likewise sign thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the
person or persons executing the same before a notary public or other public officer
authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where the instrument so
acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page whereon
acknowledgment is written, each page of the copy which is to be registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each page of
the copy to be kept by the notary public, except the page where the signatures
already appear at the foot of the instrument, shall be signed on the left margin
thereof by the person or persons executing the instrument and their witnesses, and
all the pages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of
pages shall be stated in the acknowledgment. Where the instrument acknowledged
relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two or more parcels of land,
the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said acknowledgment.
(underscoring ours).

As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment
appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee
and the other witness on the right-hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting
parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not
absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the
instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification
of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a
contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is
agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact
that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page, that does not invalidate the
document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-
quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public
does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its
entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another
part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in
its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public
in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the
first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not make a determination
of whether Violeta was the daughter of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of
Violeta. These issues should be ventilated in the appropriate probate or settlement proceedings
affecting the respective estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the donation,
which we declare herein to be valid, will still be subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under
Article 771,[18] in relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil Code. Moreover, property
donated inter vivos is subject to collation after the donors death,[19] whether the donation was
made to a compulsory heir or a stranger,[20] unless there is an express prohibition if that had been
the donors intention.[21]
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is
rendered dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26603.

HEMEDES vs CA Case Digest

HEMEDES vs CA
316 SCRA 347
FACTS: Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory
Conditions conveying ownership a parcel of land, together with all its improvements, in favor of
his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the resolutory condition that upon the latters death or
remarriage, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children, or heirs, of the
DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE.
Pursuant to said condition, Justa Kausapin executed a Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered
Real Property by Reversion conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property.

Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the
subject property in favor of R & B Insurance to serve as security for a loan which they obtained.

R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the
loan even. The land was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder. A
new title was subsequently issued in favor the R&B. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa
Kausapin was maintained in the new title.

Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin
executed a Kasunduan whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D.
Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by
her late husband Jose Hemedes. Enrique D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real
property, when the assessed value of the property was raised. Also, he has been paying the
realty taxes on the property from the time Justa Kausapin conveyed the property to him. In the
cadastral survey, the property was assigned in the name of Enrique Hemedes. Enrique
Hemedes is also the named owner of the property in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.

Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation
(Dominium).

Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who
made constructions therein. Upon learning of Asia Brewerys constructions, R & B Insurance
sent it a letter informing the former of its ownership of the property. A conference was held
between R & B Insurance and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.

Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting that she is the rightful
owner of the subject property and denying the execution of any real estate mortgage in favor of
R&B.

Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the CFI for the annulment of TCT
issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property
alleging that Dominion was the absolute owner of the land.

The trial court ruled in favor of Dominium and Enrique Hemedes.

ISSUE: W/N the donation in favor of Enrique Hemedes was valid?

HELD: NO. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over
the subject property. Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had
earlier transferred to Maxima Hemedes the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the
first condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband. Thus, the donation in
favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist at the
time of the transfer, having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject
property by Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more
rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since
Enrique D. Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it relied.
The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his payment of realty taxes, and his
being designated as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna
and in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Calamba, Laguna cannot defeat a
certificate of title, which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. Particularly, with regard to tax declarations and
tax receipts, this Court has held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves
conclusively prove title to land.