VOL.
328, MARCH 27, 2000 749 petitioners marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
Ong Chia vs. Republic
G.R. No. 127240. March 27, 2000.*
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of
Evidence; Judgments; The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) is clearly
not applicable to a petition for naturalization; Decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.Petitioner failed to note
Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides thatThese rules shall not apply to
land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34)
now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case
involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is practicable and
convenient. That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later
on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
________________
*SECOND DIVISION.
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong Chia vs. Republic
Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission
of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their admissibility.Petitioner claims that as a result of the
failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before
the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity,
effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. We
are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of
evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to
the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in
fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Public Documents; Where a party fails to make a satisfactory
showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of
documents which have been executed under oath, the court may rely on them.The
Court notes that these documentsnamely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioners income tax returnsare all public documents. As such, they have been
executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Sinoe petitioner failed to make a
satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did
not err in relying upon them.
Naturalization; Statutory Construction; It is settled that naturalization laws
should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant.The above discussion would have been enough to dispose
of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of
petitioners failure to include the address J.M. Basa St., Iloilo in his petition, in
accordance with 7, CA. No. 473. This address appears on petitioners Immigrant
Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A
of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention
said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other
annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7. This is
allegedly because the publication effectively
751
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 751
Ong Chia vs. Republic
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give
investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the
background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any
possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at
one time or another. It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. As noted by the State, CA. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant
for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of
residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioners argument of substantial compliance with
the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the
instant petition ought to be denied.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Algarra, Mutia & Trinidad Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South
Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-
year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel Angking. Since
then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually
started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he
__________________
Per Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by Justices Gloria C. Paras
1 Annexed to the States appellants brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for
and Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez.
2 Presided by Judge Rodolfo C. Soledad.
752
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong Chia vs. Republic
had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to
be admitted as a Filipino citizen under CA. No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his
qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3
of the law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of
Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office
of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same
was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on
Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that
processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was
suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented
three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac
Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the
court whether the State intended to present any witness against him, he
remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather
surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of
the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor
Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines.
And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute
the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the
names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former places of
residence in violation of CA. No. 473, 7;
___________________
3TSN, p. 152, June 27, 1991. (Emphasis added)
753
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 753
Ong Chia vs. Republic
(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his
entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade
or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also
in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.4
naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of
Ong Chia, he had likewise been known since childhood as Loreto Chia Ong. As
petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 The state also
annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to
show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove
that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner
claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge
in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife
without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was
alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any.
The State also annexed a copy of petitioners 1977 marriage contract8and a
JointAffidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that
when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage
license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because
petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband
_________________
4 Appellants Brief, pp. 21-22; CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.
5 Annex B; Id., pp. 129-138.
6 Citing Watt v. Republic, 46 SCRA 683 (1972); Id., p. 37.
7 Annexes F, F-1, F-2, F-3 and F-4; Id., pp. 144-157.
8 Annex D; Id., p. 139.
9 Annex E; Id., p. 140.
754
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong Chia vs. Republic
and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State,
belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already
been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioners Immigrant Certificate of
Residence,10 petitioner resided at J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo, but he did not include
said address in his petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as
already noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioners application for
naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases, the
State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal.11 The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia commissions and allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and
failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, LORETO precarious . . .
CHIA ONG, which name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for
naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his I.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
favor . . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT
(petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the authorities of CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE
any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship. BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
he formerly resided in J.M. Basa St., Iloilo and Alimodian, Iloilo. Section 7 of
the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition his
present and former places of residence. This requirement is mandatory and II.THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER
failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS
PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
the Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as the
investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of the petition, an
opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the petitioner. 756
By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and 756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
said
Ong Chia vs. Republic
_________________
III.CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
10 Annex A; Records, p. 16. PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS
11 CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 50. Citations omitted. PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
755
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 755 IV.THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER
FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE
Ong Chia vs. Republic MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law
...
Petitioners principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellants brief
manner when he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children
and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial courts-decision. Not
out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the applicants 8-year
having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere scrap(s) of
cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
paper devoid of any evidentiary value,12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132,
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as
34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which
required by the Revised Naturalization Law, and therefore disqualifies him from
has not been formally offered.
becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 14313of the Rules of
...
Court which provides that
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chias alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00,
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
failure to file an income tax return because he is not liable for income tax yet
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
confirms that his income is low . . . It is not only that the person having the
practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34)
the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of
now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case
his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the
involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is practicable and
becoming the object of charity or public charge. . . . Now that they are in their old
convenient. That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
their children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant
practical
cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative because like bonuses,
________________
12Petition, p. 21; Id., p. 29.
13Now found under Rule 1, 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
757
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 757
Ong Chia vs. Republic
and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.14 Consequently, a final
favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a
revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and
formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the
right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his
fundamental right to procedural due process.15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the
reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been
formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility.16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object
to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.
He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with
the Court of Appeals, thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767)
which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established.
In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization . . .
is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee
is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered
by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal.17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most,
can be accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That
SCN Case No. 031767, a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the
___________________
14 Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 (1982).
15 Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 25.
16 See Peninsula Construction, Inc. v. Eisma, 194 SCRA 667 (1991).
17 Appellees Brief, p. 13; CA Rollo; p. 184.
758
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong Chia vs. Republic
correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet18 of the Special
Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as SCN Case No. 031767.
Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documentsnamely, the petition in
SCN Case No. 031767, petitioners marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed
by him and his wife, and petitioners income tax returnsare all public documents.
As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since
petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that
may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that
the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this
case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of
petitioners failure to include the address J.M. Basa St., Iloilo in his petition, in
accordance with 7, CA. No. 473. This address appears on petitioners Immigrant
Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A
of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention
said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully published,19 with the petition and the other
annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7.20 This is
allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be
achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the
government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and
prevent
_______________
18 Annex C; CA Rollo, p. 133. Said evaluation sheet recommended that the
petition be dismissed as petitioner failed to meet the requirements under LOI 491
because his income is insufficient for his support and that of his family and also
because he failed to show that he believes in the principles underlying the
Constitution.
19 In the Official Gazette and in the Sarangani Journal.
20 Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 30.
759
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000 759
Ong Chia vs. Republic
suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any
community where he may have lived at one time or another.21 It is settled,
however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed
in favor of the government and against the applicant.22 As noted by the State, CA.
No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in
the petition his present and former places of residence.23 This provision and the
rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioners
argument of substantial compliance with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the
instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.A former citizen who opts to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru
naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law is duty bound to follow the
procedure prescribed by said law, and it is not for him to decide and to select the
requirements which he believes are applicable to his case and discard those which
he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. (Republic vs. De la
Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994])
An applicant for naturalization may only take his oath of allegiance after the
Solicitor General finds that within the period of two years from the date the
decision granting citizenship is promulgated, the applicant has complied with the
conditions set out in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 530. (Hermo vs. Dela Rosa, 299
SCRA 68 [1998])
o0o
VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996 699
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.*
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO
MARTIN, respondents.
Evidence; Illegally Obtained Evidence; Constitutional Law; Privacy of
Communication and Correspondence; Privacy of communication and
correspondence is inviolable. The only exception in the Constitution is if there is a
lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires, otherwise, as
prescribed by law.Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person by contracting marriage does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it privileged.The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence
by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Leonides S. Respicio & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Galileo P. Brion for private respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner
to return docu-
701
VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996 701
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
ments and papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters
knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On
March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine,
and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers
and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further
described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin
and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction
earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence
the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the
herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial
court declared the documents and papers to be properties of
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 702
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground is
that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents
and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondents comment in that case)
were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney,
Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this
reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of
the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty.
Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive
order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this
Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be
impressed with merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.],
he maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial
Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex A-1 to J-7. On
September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which
order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the
genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as
malpractice. Notably, petitioner
_______________
1163 SCRA 111 (1988).
2Id. at 120-121, 126.
703
VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996 703
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes.
At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioners admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr.
Martin himself under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and,
therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his
admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands admission and use the same
in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no
more than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose
of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their genuineness and authenticity did
not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means
does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and
papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge
of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only
because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order
of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this
Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against
the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Consti-
_______________
31973 CONST., Art. IV, 4(1); 1987 CONST., Art. III, 3(1).
704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
tution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
 Note.The documents are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there
was no showing that appellant was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto
put into writing. (People vs. De Lara, 236 SCRA 291 [1994])
o0o
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Yatar
G.R. No. 150224. May 19, 2004.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias
KAWIT, appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; The Supreme Court will not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has
been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.The issue
regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not
the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and
unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, the trial judges assessment of credibility
deserves the appellate courts highest respect. Where there is nothing to show that
the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; An accused can be convicted even if
no eyewitness is available, so long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented
to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.The weight of the
prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as
long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Same; DNA Testing; Words and Phrases; DNA is a molecule that encodes the
genetic information in all living organisms, and a persons DNA is the same in each
cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetimethe DNA in a persons
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of
hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
Significantly, subsequent testing
_______________
*EN BANC.
505
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004 505
People vs. Yatar
showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from
the vagina of the victim was identical semen to be that of appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A
persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva,
sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and
vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.
Same; Same; DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly
accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left.DNA print or
identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link
a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification
is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist
immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently
facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and
ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. DNA evidence collected
from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in
the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault
would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva
which can be left on the victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from
clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victims
body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there
was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from
the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to
place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
Same; Same; In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factorshow the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests; Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances
in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be
cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters though we can benefit
from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other
jurisdictions.The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which
conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing,
506
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Yatar
tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within
hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it
became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method. In
assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia,
the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based
on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA
profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The
blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene
types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical
with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists
between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant
in open court during the course of the trial. Admittedly, we are just beginning to
integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal
justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence
that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in
the U.S. has proven instructive.
Same; Same; Evidence; Evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact
in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one
such novel procedure. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates
directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
Applying the Dauberttest to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through
PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Same; Same; Same; Self-Incrimination; The right against self-incrimination
is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an
admission of guiltit does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.In an attempt to exclude the
DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as
well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as
well as his right
507
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004 507
People vs. Yatar
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution. This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against
all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; No ex-post facto law is involved in
DNA testing since the science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance
and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Courtwhereas an ex-
post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.Appellant further
argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application
of an ex-post factolaw. This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved
in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance
and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-
post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The legal relevancy of evidence
denotes something more than a minimum of probative value, suggesting that such
evidentiary relevance must contain a plus valueevidence without plus value
may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict.Generally, courts
should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes something
more than a minimum of probative value, suggesting that such evidentiary
relevance must contain a plus value. This may be necessary to preclude the trial
court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated
by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without plus value may be logically
relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court
to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would
result from its admission. The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only
when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly find or infer
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty
is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and
satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This requires that the
circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one
else, committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence appreciated
thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Motive; As a matter of
procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the
identity of the culprit.As a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting
the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for
conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Thus, appellants
motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is
a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the
testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express
it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.
Same; Rape with Homicide; Elements.Accordingly, we are convinced that
the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or
on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed
the victims lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant
had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved
by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of
such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed
the woman. However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father,
step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary
that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes
the place of violence and intimidation. The fact that the victims hymen is intact
does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into
the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the
hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. The strength and dilatability of the hymen
are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse
especially when the victim is of tender age.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao,
Tabuk, Kalinga, Br. 25.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for appellant.
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias Kawit to Death for the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of
the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages
amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following
Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have
carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter
inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the
occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by
means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against
her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen
year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother,
Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter
sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through
Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier
that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel
Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two
_______________
1 Decision penned by Judge Milnar T. Lammawin on 27 August 2001.
2 Original Records, p. 1.
3 TSN, Direct Examination of Isabel Dawang, 30 September 1998, pp. 296-306.
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Yatar
kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn
that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to
leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their
aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped
by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went
inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water.
Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting
lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw
appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang
and run towards the back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was
wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the
back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to
live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house.
This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant
told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel
could use it. She noticed that appellants eyes were reddish and sharp. Appellant
asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him.
Judilyns husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards
the back of the house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that
the lights in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn
Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container
she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the
ladder
_______________
Id., at pp. 317-319.
4
TSN, Direct Examination of Beverly Deneng, 27 January 1999, pp. 531-540,
5
568-576. See also Exhibit W, Joint Affidavit of Anita Wania and Beverly Deneng
executed on 3 July 1998, Original Records, p. 17.
6 TSN, Cross-Examination of Judilyn Pas-a, 30 September 1998, p. 377.
7 Id., at pp. 275-324. See also TSN, supra note 7 at pp. 356-358.
8 Id., at pp. 314-323, 339-344.
511
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004 511
People vs. Yatar
to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the
door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was
the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and
her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the
beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines
protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer
assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SPO4 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead
woman was found in Isabel Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers,
Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with
multiple stab wounds. The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that
appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at
approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and
sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty
white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of
Kathylyns death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself.
Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten
meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the
Ilocano dialect, Nagtaray! (Hes running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel
exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away.
Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the sta-
_______________
Id., at pp. 267-270.
9 People vs. Yatar
Id., at pp. 271-273.
10
11 TSN, Direct Examination of SPO4 Melchor Faniswa, 9 September 1998, pp.
9-20. See also TSN, Cross-Examination of SPO4 Melchor Faniswa, 9 September
1998, pp. 21-38.
512
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Yatar
tion when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with
Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded not guilty.
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined
and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly,
sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be
resolved against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched
is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a re-
examination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former
is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses
_______________
12 TSN, Cross-Examination and Re-Direct Examination of Police Officer
Orlando Manuel, 9 September 1998, pp. 76-84. See also TSN, Direct and Cross-
Examination of SPO1 Felix Turingan, 9 September 1998, pp. 88-96.
13 People v. Remudo, G.R. No. 127905, 30 August 2001, 364 SCRA 71.
513
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004 513
and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that
the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judges
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest respect. 15 Where
there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16
 The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the
well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented
by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. 17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6)
stab and five (5) incised, were found on the victims abdomen and back, causing a
portion of her small intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the victims
body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1,
1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine
(9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words,
the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June
30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of
appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending
physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations,
contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the
presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr.
Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be
done through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from
the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim
was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating
resistance to the appellants assault on her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical semen to be that
of appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living
organisms.23 A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change
throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA
found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine,
skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same
DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely
effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused
suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal
investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account
of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing
the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in
every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or
eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are
used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as
hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victims body or
at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture
could also be transferred to the victims body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA
evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant
and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA
can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the
crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the
DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification
method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts
of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting
sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to
reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter
alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified
by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification
techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungrias testi-
_______________
Id.
26
Id.
27
28 Id., at pp. 1-2.
29 People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209.
30 Dr. de Ungria is Head of the Genetic Engineering Laboratory, University of
the Philippines, Assistant Supervisor of the DNA Analysis Laboratory, University
of the Philippines, and Assistant Professor at the Ateneo de Manila University. In
December 1999, Dr. de Ungria was a 1999 Jose Rizal Young Awardee for the
Professional Sector for her participation in the identification of the body of a victim
of the Paco fire. She commenced working as Assistant Supervisor of the U.P. DNA
Laboratory
516
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Yatar
mony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. 31The blood sample taken
from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19,
TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
from the victims vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen
found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court
during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the
wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they
would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying
the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is
relevant and reli-
_______________
in February 1999 after returning from Sydney, Australia. Prior to February
1999, she worked as a DNA Analyst. An alumna of the Philippine Science High
School, Dr. de Ungria obtained a Bachelor of Science (Honours) degree in Biology
at Macquarie University, and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Molecular
Microbiology at the University of New South Wales, in Australia. She is a member
of the Philippine Society of Microbiology and an associate member of the National
Research Council of the Philippines. See TSN, Direct Examination of Dr. Ma.
Corazon Abogado de Ungria, 18 February 2000, pp. 739-743.
31 TSN, 18 February 2000, pp. 789-790. See Exhibits XX and YY-1, Original
Records, p. 144, 149-150. See also TSN, Continuation of Direct Examination of Dr.
de Ungria, 18 April 2000, p. 842.
32 TSN, 18 April 2000, p. 842. See also Exhibits Z, ZZ and ZZ-1, Original
Records, pp. 152-154.
33 509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469.
34 Rules of Court, Rule 128, sec. 4.
517
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004 517
People vs. Yatar
able since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics
and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the
victims vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial
evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1)
Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with
the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the house because
of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba,
a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning of June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant
was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998
near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a
dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder
of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30
p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the
husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant
in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day
Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house
of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a
pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of
the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes
scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the
victims vagina (Exhibits H and J); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found
in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibits
J and H, compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13)
Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently
apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused,
to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there
is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circum-
_______________
35Decision, pp. 46-48. See Rollo, pp. 300-302.
518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Yatar
stances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the
blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation
of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under
Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero 38 that although accused-appellant insisted that
hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau
of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion
or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing,
paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police
authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled
that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused
may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood
sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence
of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution
against him are unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount
to the application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar.
The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of
the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law
refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic
DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his
presence at Isabel Dawangs house during the time when the crime was committed,
undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate
with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same
time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same
barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the
crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other.
This fact severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a
quo committed reversible error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges
that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence
and never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence
denotes something more than a minimum of probative value, suggesting that
such evidentiary relevance must contain a plus value.41 This may be necessary
to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable
of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without plus
value may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent
upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the
likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant
evidence from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty
of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty
that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and
judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty
beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together,
should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a
satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense
charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the
present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction
when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim,
testified that she last saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the
house of Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of
Isabels house and proceeding to the back of the same house. 46 She also testified
that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her
that Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school.47The victim
told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days
before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmothers house on
June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz
Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, this Joel Yatar
threatened to kill our family.49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present
during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered
by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, If you leave me, I will kill all
your family and your relatives x x x.50 These statements were not contradicted by
appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in
the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused
before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may
express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. 51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually
assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to
conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victims lips by stabbing her
repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the
appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was
achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the
occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation,
appellant killed the woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as
the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it
is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. 53 Moral influence
or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the
victims hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere
entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture
or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. 55 The strength and
dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without
laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove
sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims aunt. He is seven
years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated,
appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his
wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents,
approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-laws house. Being a
relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal
contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed
when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although
three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that
the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57actual damages
incurred by the family of the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting
to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light
of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as _______________
part of
60Article 2230, Civil Code.
_______________ 524
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
56 People v. Llanita, G.R. No. 134101, 5 September 2001, 364 SCRA 519.
57 People v. Manguera, supra; People v. Seranilla, G.R. Nos. 113022-24, 15 SMC Quarry 2 Workers Union-February Six Movement (FSM) Local Chapter No. 1564
December 2000, 348 SCRA 227; People v. Payot, G.R. No. 119352, 8 June 1999, 308 vs. Titan Megabags Industrial Corporation
SCRA 43. DNA test is synonymous to DNA typing, DNA fingerprinting, DNA profiling,
58 Arts. 2199 and 2202, Civil Code, Art. 2199, states that [e]xcept as provided genetic tests, and genetic fingerprinting. (People vs. Marquez, 380 SCRA
by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such 561 [2002])
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Art. 2202 provides that [i]n
crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are o0o
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is
not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant.
59 People v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 136299, 29 August 2003, 410 SCRA 183.

523
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004 523
People vs. Yatar
the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao,
Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel
Yatar alias Kawit to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family
of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00,
P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED. Upon the finality of this Decision and in
accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep.
Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President
of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.) and Puno, J., On Official Leave.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.DNA, being a relatively new science, has not yet been accorded official
recognition by the courtspaternity will still have to be resolved by conventional
evidence. (Pe Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 1 [1997])
Being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge, but eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. Courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since
to reject said result is to deny progress. (Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, 354 SCRA
17 [2001])

VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 79
Tating vs. Marcella
G.R. No. 155208. March 27, 2007.*
NENA LAZALITA** TATING, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA,
represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to
be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement
(relatively simulated).The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale
between petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties
do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal
their true agreement (relatively simulated). The primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. Such
intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as from
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
Same; Same; The most protuberant index of simulation is the complete
absence on the part of the vendee of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights
of ownership over the disputed property.In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA
430 (1995), the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the
complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert
his rights of ownership over the disputed property. In the present case, however,
the evidence clearly shows that petitioner
_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
Also spelled as Lasalita in other parts of the Rollo.
**
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tating vs. Marcella
declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name.
Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate
taxes due on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to
pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece
of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire
to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.
Same; Same; Property; Sales; Ownership; Possession along with ownership
is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance.It is true
that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed
the subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was
transferred in petitioners favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property
in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner continued to
reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that ownership and possession
are two entirely different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a definite proof
of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first
paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made
through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with
ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance. Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present case, it is of no legal
consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of the
disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she
was already able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the subject
property.
Civil Procedure; Evidence; Affidavits; The admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence; It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not gener-
81
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 81
Tating vs. Marcella
ally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them.There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn
statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted
and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may
be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are
classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant
but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
Same; Same; As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.Private
respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their
allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when
she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence
of the defendant. Aside from Danielas sworn statement, private respondents failed
to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the
testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different
intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pamplona, Genito and Valdezco for petitioner.
Guanzon and Guanzon Law Firm for respondents.
82
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tating vs. Marcella
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the
Decision1 dated February 22, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental,
Branch 60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land
denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision plan Psd31182, located at Abelarde St.,
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject lot, containing an area of 200 square
meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
the City of Cadiz.3
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter,
herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied
in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of
Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name
of Nena.5 She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real
estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and
1988.6 However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she
had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her
and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of
_______________
1 Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Justices
Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a member of this Court) and Sergio L.
Pestao; Rollo, p. 53.
2 Original Records, pp. 318-342.
3 Exhibit A, Id., at p. 138.
4 Exhibit Q/1, Id., at p. 177.
5 Exhibit 3, Id., at p. 179.
6 Exhibits 8-A to 8-AA, Id., at pp. 183-212.
83
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 83
Tating vs. Marcella
the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the
purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that
Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the
name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.7
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely:
Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was
represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died
they discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a
consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares
over the subject property as heirs of Daniela.9 Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle
the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son
Salvador, filed a complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against
Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela
in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of
a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. 10 The complaint
also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys
fees and litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint with leave of court for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party
plaintiff, he having died intestate and without issue in March 1991. 11He left
Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as his sole heirs.
_______________
7 Exhibit D, Id., at p. 142.
8 Exhibit I, Id., at p. 149.
9 Exhibit E, Id., at p. 143.
10 Id., at p. 1.
11 Id., at p. 55.
84
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tating vs. Marcella
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the
execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the
letter of her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in
her counterclaim, she asked the trial court for the award of actual, exemplary and
moral damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. 12
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of
sale dated October 14, 1969 (Exh. Q) executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de
Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID and further ordering:
 1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu
thereof to issue a new title in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-
indiviso owner of one-fourth (1/4) portion of the property; Felicidad
Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (1/4) portion; Julio
Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (1/4) portion and Nena Lazalita
Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (1/4) portion, all of lot 56 after
payment of the prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-
00672 and in lieu thereof issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of
Carlos Tating, 1/4 Pro-indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella,
1/4 Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, 1/4 Pro-indiviso portion; and
Nena Lazalita Tating, 1/4 Pro-indivisoportion, all of lot 56 as well as the
house standing thereon be likewise declared in the names of the persons
mentioned in the same proportions as above-stated after payment of the
prescribed fees;
3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P20,000.00 by way of moral damages, P10,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages, P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and P3,000.00 by way of
litigation expenses; and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its
Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC.14
Nenas Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated August 22, 2002.15
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA has
decided the instant case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable
laws and Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even against
the evidence on record.16
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering
that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA finally disposed of the case,
the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the petition actually
avers errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects
of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court decided to
treat the present petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
especially considering that it was filed within the reglementary period for filing
the same.17
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private
respondents rests on the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October
14, 1969 is simulated because Danielas actual intention was not to dispose of her
property but simply to help petitioner by providing her with a collateral. Petitioner
asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding
that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated
December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should
have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long
been dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner
the right to cross-examine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October
14, 1969, the Sworn Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28,
1977 and was discovered only after the death of Daniela in 1994. 18 Petitioner
argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would have taken
action against the petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that
up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed, she never uttered a word of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from
the doctrine held time and again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and
convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance is required to show the falsity or
nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC and the CA
erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between Daniela and petitioner
created a trust relationship between them because of the settled rule that where
the terms of a contract are clear, it should be given full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that
petitioner failed to show that the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at their assailed judgments; that Danielas Sworn Statement
is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of sale by and between her and
petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between
petitioner and Daniela created a trust relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner
and Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be
bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement
(relatively simulated).19 The primary consideration in determining the true nature
of a contract is the intention of the parties.20 Such intention is determined from
the express terms of their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts.21
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in
proving their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true
intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated December
28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private
respondents evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great
probative weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However,
the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.22 The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade.23 Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements, which may
thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. 25Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.26 For this
reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 27 The Court finds
that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as
she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on
Danielas sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale
between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust
relationship was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove
their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property
when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil
cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside from Danielas sworn
statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence
to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that
Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with
petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant
index of simulation is the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any
attempt in any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed
property.30 In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner
declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name.
Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate
taxes due on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to
pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a piece
of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire
to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government.32 Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.33 On the other hand, private respondents failed to
present even a single tax receipt or declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes
due on the disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax
Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private respondents presented in
evidence, refers only to the house standing on the lot in controversy. 34 Even the
said Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot
56) upon which said house was built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale did not really reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained
silent until her death; she never told any of her relatives regarding her actual
purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her true
intentions through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the
existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration
therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never
took any concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her
death more than ten years later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after
she executed the subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property
was transferred in petitioners favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the
property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner
continued to reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that ownership and
possession are two entirely different legal concepts. 35 Just as possession is not a
definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership.
The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is
made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with
ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance.36 Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present case, it is of no
legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of
the disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because
she was already able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the
subject property.
As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which
confirmed the validity of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no
probative value, as the sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay.
Naturally, private respondents were not able to cross-examine the deceased-
affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.
However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact
remains that private respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing
evidence beyond mere preponderance of evidence37 that the contract of sale
between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal presumption is in favor
of the validity of contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has the burden
of proving its simulation.38 Since private respondents failed to discharge the
burden of proving their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela was simulated, the presumption of regularity and validity of the October
14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner
and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity
to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created between
them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60,
in Civil Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the
private respondents is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazarioand Nachura,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution reversed and set aside.
Complaint dismissed.
 Note.Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
strong evidence of ownership. (Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 375 SCRA
390 [2002])

o0o

G.R. No. 173476. February 22, 2012.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO
SALAFRANCA y BELLO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Alibi; Denials; Denial and alibi interposed by the accused are
worthless in the face of his positive identification as the assailant.Salafrancas
denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by
Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith
to such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not even project
any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it
was upon the truth.
Same; Treachery; Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.Based on
Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had
encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow
using the right (hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another
one encircling the blow towards below the left nipple. Relying on Mendozas
recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to
be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CAs
concurrence because Mendozas eyewitness account of the manner of attack
remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method
and means Salafranca employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against
Bolanon from behind and included an aggressive physical control of the latters
movements that ensured the success of the attack without any retaliation or
defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code, treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Dying Declarations; Res
Gestae; The statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the
hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the
res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.It appears from
the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his
uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had
hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had
stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca;
that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time
breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten
minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had
expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the
utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour
before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either
of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to
the hearsay rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A dying declaration is generally inadmissible for
being hearsay; Exceptions.A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible
as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the
following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time
the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration
is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated
his ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who
had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his
impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to
Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed
in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred
under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that
the declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be
503
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 503
People vs. Salafranca
shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence,
such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the
opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the
subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was
offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Gestae; Requisites for declaration or an
utterance as part of the res gestae to be admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule.A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and
thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. The requisites for admissibility of a
declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the
identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling
occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab
that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his
identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca
having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The term res gestae has been defined as
those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a particular litigated
act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act.The term res
gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the undesigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative
of such act. In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea
of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneousreaction or utterance inspired by the excite-
504
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
 ment of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence
as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation
is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether
it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
Civil Law; Damages; Civil Indemnity; Damages to be awarded when death
occurs due to a crime.We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the
RTC to only the death indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs
of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the damages
to be awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or
compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e)
temperate damages.
Same; Same; Same; The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to
crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the
mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.
The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate
and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and
emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim. Although mental
anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with
mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that
would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given the
circumstances, the amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages, which,
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we are bound to award despite the absence
of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional suffering.
Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages may be imposed in
criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances.The Civil Codeprovides that exemplary
damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The Civil
505
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 505
People vs. Salafranca
Code permits such damages to be awarded by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should
have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages
because of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an
attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in
murder.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that
meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res
gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal
stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision
promulgated on November 24, 2005.1
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the
credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated him.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 2-11; penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later
Presiding Justice, now retired), with Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring.
506
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was
stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing
Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house
of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to
the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital
Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon
eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical
attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto
Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.2
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long
period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on
April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2)
stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm
encircled around Bolanons neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand
at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanons death. Not only because it was
testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estao, the victims
uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when
he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was
suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo
Salafranca who stabbed him.3
The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness
Mendoza on how Salafranca had effected his attack against Bolanon, observing
that by encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the victim on the latters
neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand,
_______________
2 Id., pp. 3-4.
3 CA Rollo, p. 36.
507
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 507
People vs. Salafranca
Salafranca did not give Bolanon any opportunity to defend himself. 4 The RTC
noted inconsistencies in Salafrancas and his witness testimonies, as well as the
fact that he had fled from his residence the day after the incident and had stayed
away in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had he not
been hiding, there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence,
especially because he was also working near the area.5
The RTC disposed thus:
With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is
hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Article 248
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code with the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery
(248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other aggravating
circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of
Correction, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of
Manila.
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00
representing death indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, 7 citing
the dying declaration made to his uncle
_______________
4 Id., p. 38.
5 Id., pp. 36-38.
6 Id., p. 39.
7 Supra, at note 1.
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafrancas positive identification as
the culprit by Mendoza.9 It stressed that Salafrancas denial and his alibi of being
in his home during the incident did not overcome the positive identification,
especially as his unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and
employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt.10
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses against Salafranca would be
unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estao
were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence and credibility of
witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its unique
and unequalled position of observing their deportment during testimony, and of
assessing their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and
candor. Absent a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made
and conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by
such assessment and conclusions,11 considering that the CA as the appellate court
could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions without a
persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted
significant evidentiary matters that would alter the result. 12 Salafranca did not
persuasively show a misappreciation or omis-
_______________
8 Id., at p. 6.
9 Id., at p. 9.
10 CA Rollo, p. 110.
11 People v. Resuma, G.R. No. 179189, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 728, 737.
12 People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219,
230; Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 157804, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 489, 496.
509
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 509
People vs. Salafranca
sion by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to
contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great weight
and respect.13
Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive
identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly
accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca
did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify
against him unless it was upon the truth.14
Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind
and had encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the
stabbing blow using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways
and another one encircling the blow towards below the left nipple. 15 Relying on
Mendozas recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found
treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We
join the CAs concurrence because Mendozas eyewitness account of the manner of
attack remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The
method and means Salafranca employed constituted a surprise deadly attack
against Bolanon from behind and included an aggres-
_______________
13 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 177569, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 306,
314; People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537,
547, People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219, 230; Perez
v. People, G.R. No. 150443, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 209, 219; People v. Tonog,
Jr., G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139, 153-154; People v. Genita, Jr.,
G.R. No. 126171, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 343, 349; People v. Pacheco, G.R. No.
142887, March 2, 2004, 424 SCRA 164, 174; People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231,
February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260, 265-266; People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 137542-
43, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 248, 256.
14 Domingo v. People, G.R. No. 186101, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 488, 508.
15 TSN, September 1, 2003, pp. 3-4.
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
sive physical control of the latters movements that ensured the success of the
attack without any retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon. According to
the Revised Penal Code,16 treachery is present when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The Court further notes Estaos testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of
statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing
incident. The testimony follows:
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
A Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako.
Q What did you do?
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he
answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How long have you known him?
A Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami.
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
_______________
16 Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code.
511
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 511
People vs. Salafranca
Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore
because he will just suffer more.
Q What happened when you told him that?
A He kept silent.
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
A He was pronounced dead.17
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence
of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that
Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General
Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon
who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been
Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a
hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that
about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital,
Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified
the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour
before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either
_______________
17 TSN, March 18, 2003, pp. 3-4.
512
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to
the hearsay rule.18
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its
hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites
concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made,
the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the
declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a
victim.19
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him.
At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death,
having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then
experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital
emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours
after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief
in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarants own statements or
from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made
in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician.20 Bolanon
_______________
18 People v. Loste, G.R. No. 94785, July 1, 1992, 210 SCRA 614, 621,
citing People v. Mision, G.R. No. 63480, February 26, 1991, 194 SCRA 432, 339-
340.
19 People v. Labagala, G.R. No. 184603, August 2, 2010, 626 SCRA 267, 278;
see also People v. Garma, G.R. No. 110872, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 517,
522;People v. Elizaga, No. L-78794, November 21, 1988, 167 SCRA 516, 520; People
v.Lanza, No. L-31782, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 613, 625; People v. Saliling,
No. L-27874, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 427, 438.
20 M. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence 7074, Interim
Edition, Vol. 30B, 2000, West Group, St. Paul, Minne-
513
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 513
People vs. Salafranca
would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he
survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for
murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestaeand thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.21
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was
then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no
time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance
about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it
identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of
_______________
sota; citing Shepard v. United States, 290 US 96, 100; Mattox v. United States,
146 US 140, 151 (sense of impending death may be made to appear from the
nature and extent of the wounds inflicted, being obviously such that he must have
felt or known that he could not survive.); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395-396
(7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mobley, 491 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1970).
21 People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 94570, September 28, 1994, 237 SCRA 218,
224; People v. Maguikay, G.R. Nos. 103226-28, October 14, 1994, 237 SCRA 587,
600.
514
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
such act.22 In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea
of deliberation and fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement.24 The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether
it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.25
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the
death indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon
were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the damages to be
awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or
compensatory damages; (c)
_______________
22 Alhambra Bldg. & Loan Assn v. DeCelle, 118 P. 2d 19, 47 C.A. 2d 409; Reilly
Tar & Chemical Corp. v. Lewis, 61 N.E. 2d 297, 326 Ill. App. 117.
23 Kaiko v. Dolinger, 440 A. 2d 198, 184 Conn. 509; Southern Surety Co. v.
Weaver, Com. App. 273 S.W. 838.
24 People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74740, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 70, 79.
25 Molloy v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 166 N.E. 530, 335 Ill. 164; Campbell
v. Gladden, 118 A. 2d 133, 383 Pa. 144, 53 A.L.R. 2d 1222.
515
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 515
People vs. Salafranca
moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.26
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages
which were different from the death indemnity.27The death indemnity
compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral
damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the
surviving family of the victim.28 Although mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical
precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore
the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the
amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound to award despite the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional suffering. The
rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow,
torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal
killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the
deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection
_______________
26 People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012; People v. Domingo,
G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 455.
27 Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
327, 333.
28 Article 2206, (3), in relation to Article 2217 and Article 2219, Civil Code,
and Article 107, Revised Penal Code.
29 People v. Salva, G.R. No. 132351, January 10, 2002, 373 SCRA 55,
69; People v. Osianas, G.R. No. 182548, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 319,
340; People v. Buduhan, G.R. No. 178196, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 337, 367-
368; People v. Berondo, Jr., G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 547.
516
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has
been done to them.30
 The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-
recognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already
settled that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not
substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are
warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to
deny them compensation by way of actual damages.31
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in
criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances.32 The Civil Code permits such damages
to be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 33 Conformably with
such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement
of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of
treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in
murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained
so in People v. Catubig:34
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches
the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings,
_______________
30 People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 690-
691.
31 People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784,
804-805.
32 Article 2230, Civil Code.
33 Article 2229, Civil Code.
34 G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621, 635.
617
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 617
People vs. Salafranca
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment
for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase
of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically
a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would
make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be
withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature
of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of P30,000.00 is
deemed reasonable and proper,35 because we think that a lesser amount could not
result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages
by adding to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts
of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of
6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
_______________
35 See People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA
738, 752, People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 625,
637-638.
518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Villarama, Jr. and Perlas-Bernabe,** JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
Notes.As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as
evidence. (People vs. Labagala, 626 SCRA 267 [2010])
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or
the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission
these statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate
a false statement. (People vs. Fallones, 645 SCRA 650 [2011])
o0o

70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 128538. February 28, 2001.*
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and
LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Evidence; Rule that hearsay evidence is
excluded and carries no probative value admits of an exception; It is settled that it
is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters
testified to by a witness are hearsay.As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and
carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a
party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The
rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine.
It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim
that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to
crossexamine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the
witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a
judicial admission requires no proof.As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through
private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial suf-
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
71
VOL. 353, FEBRUARY 28, 2001 71
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
ficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission
having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be
treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a
judicial admission requires no proof.
Civil Law; Attorneys Fees; Award of attorneys fees is the exception rather
than the rule, hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and
law, which would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the
award.It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than
the rule, hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law,
which would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the award.
Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the
rationale for the award of attorneys fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the
present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to explain
the award of attorneys fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Romeo B. Batino & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
Escober and Alon Law Office for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No.
45742 entitled State Investment House, Inc. v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC
Chemical Corporation. The questioned decision affirmed in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case
No. 84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally
the plaintiff the following: a) To pay plaintiff State Investment House, Inc., the
sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at
72
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
30% per annum reckond (sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount is fully paid;
b) To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and
demandable as attorneys fees and to pay the cost(s) of suit.
SO ORDERED.1
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated
February 27, 1997, denying SCC Chemicals Corporations motion for
reconsideration.
The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals,
is as follows:
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through
its chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito)
Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House, Inc., (hereinafter SIHI)
in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus
penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon
non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan,
Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive
Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation
on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent
demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no
payment was made.
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with
a prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
 In its answer, SCC asserted SIHFs lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended
that the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null,
void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-
court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but
the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
_______________
1Rollo, p. 33.
73
VOL. 353, FEBRUARY 28, 2001 73
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the
defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its
merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to
sue and to be sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC
Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of
account of even date which were both received by the herein defendant;
and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and
Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983
for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984. 2
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants
were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said
witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance
of either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time,
SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the
trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the
case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where
it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance
of evidence, that the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness
presented by SIHI to prove its claim was insufficient as the competency of the
witness was not established and there was no showing that he had personal
knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of
the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as
evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence
by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents were
not presented in court.
On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment
appealed from.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated February 27, 1997.
Hence, petitioners recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments
of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND
OVERCAME ITS BURDEN OF PROOF.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:
1. (1)Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding
that private respondent SIHI had proved its cause of action by
preponderant evidence; and
2. (2)Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of
attorneys fees to SIHI.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary
evidence through the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established
and whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not
demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of Sections 363 and
_______________
3 SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded.A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules.
75
VOL. 353, FEBRUARY 28, 2001 75
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
48,4 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the Court of
Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole witness
of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document presented in evidence executed
or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran
afoul of Section 2,5 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of due
execution and authenticity of private documents before the same can be received
as evidence. Petitioner likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the
documentary evidence presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently
argues that such was in violation of the requirement of Section 34, 6 Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate court to
consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the
originals of the documents presented in evidence allows the presumption of
suppression of evidence provided for in Section 3(e),7 Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, to come into play.
Petitioners arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.
_______________
4 SEC. 48. General Rule.The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except
as indicated in the following sections.
5 SEC. 2. Proceedings to be recorded.The entire proceedings of a trial or
hearing; including the questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto,
the statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with
reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by
other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer,
stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie
a correct statement of such proceedings.
6 SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered shall be
specified.
7 SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions.The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx
1. (e)That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
76
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times
on scheduled hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those
scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone
witness offered by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges the appellate
court with committing an error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in
evidence of said testimony pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided
in these rules.
Petitioners reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As
a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.8 However, the
rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence,
then the same is admissible.9 The rationale for this exception is to be found in the
right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-
examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay.10 However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated
failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine
the other partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these
opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it
sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-
examine the opposing partys witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising
this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found
that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he
knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Respecting petitioners other submissions, the same are moot and academic.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admission as to the
execution of the promissory note by it through private respondent Arrieta and
Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of
signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial
by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4,11 Rule
129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
Nor will petitioners reliance on the best evidence rule12advance its cause.
Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there
was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the
promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner
to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these
documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any
evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of
said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court
when it held petitioner liable on its obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil
Code which reads:
_______________
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a
11
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
12 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 3 and 4.
78
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error
for having sustained the trial courts award of attorneys fees. Petitioner relies
on Radio Communications of the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899, 909
(1990), where we held that when attorneys fees are awarded, the reason for the
award of attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts decision. Petitioner
submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the same,
the award of attorneys fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court.
We find for petitioner in this regard.
It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the
rule, hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which
would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the
award.13 Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state
the rationale for the award of attorneys fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the
present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to explain
the award of attorneys fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated
November 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
that the award of attorneys fees to private respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition partly granted, judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.The failure of a party to interpose a timely objection to the presentation
of prosecutions testimonial evidence results in the waiver of any objection to the
admissibility thereof. (People vs. Sanchez, 308 SCRA 264 [1999])
o0o
B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED CASES
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004 543
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004.*
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE
BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Due Process; The determination of just
compensation of the property taken involves the examination of the factors specified
in Section 17 of R.A. 6657the trial court cannot dispense with the hearing and
merely order the parties to submit their respective memoranda.The RTC failed to
observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in
determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the
hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just compensation
involves the examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A.
6657, as amended: 1. the cost of the acquisition of the land; 2. the current value of
like properties; 3. its nature, actual use and income; 4. the sworn valuation by the
owner; the tax declarations; 5. the assessment made by government assessors; 6.
the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the government to the property; and 7. the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any.
Obviously, these factors involve factualmatters which can be established only
during a hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence.
In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land,
Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.
Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Well-settled is the rule that courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge.Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been
tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do
so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party,
which are not obtaining here. Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court
shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard,
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of
a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus: SEC.
3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.During the
_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce
its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its
own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue
in the case. (emphasis added)
Same; Same; It is error for the trial court to apply the formula prescribed in
E.O. No. 228 and R.A. No. 3844, as amended, in determining the valuation of land
planted to coconut and rice and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994it should have applied DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11.
The RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No.
228 and R.A. No. 3844, as amended, in determining the valuation of the property;
and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No.
13, Series of 1994. It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural
leasehold relation between the person who furnishes the landholding, either as
owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same. Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and
does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have
applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
Same; Same; DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply
to lands taken under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 whose owners have not been
compensated.As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state
that DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject
land but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive
Order No. 228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property
is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the
provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
Same; Same; While the determination of just compensation involves the
exercise of judicial discretion, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds
of the law.While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of
judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds
of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its
implementing rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11).
545
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004 545
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Miguel M. Gonzales, Rosemarie M. Ozoteo, Ricarte P.A. Reyand Norberto L.
Martinez for petitioner.
Manuel Ferrer for private respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of
19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines
Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land
consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600
planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No.
6, Series of 1992,2 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of
1994,3 the Land Bank of the Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the
following valuation of the property:
_______________
Effective June 15, 1988.
1
Rules and Regulations Amending the Valuation of Lands Voluntarily Offered
2
and Compulsorily Acquired As Provided For Under Administrative Order No. 17,
Series of 1989, As Amended, Issued Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657.
3 Revising the Rules and Regulations Covering the Valuation of Lands
Voluntarily Offered or Compulsorily Acquired as Embodied in Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992.
4 Executive Order No. 405, dated June 14, 1990, vests the Land Bank of the
Philippines the primary responsibility to determine the land valuation and
compensation for all private lands covered by R.A. 6657, as amended.
See Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132767, January 18,
2000, 322 SCRA 139, 145.
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
Acquired property Area in hectares Value
Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
P173,918.55
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A.
6657, as amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of
the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbanks
valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a
Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of just compensation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the
Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per
hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC
the following admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the
provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-
beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based
on the valuation made by the DAR.5
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with
the hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.6
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just
compensation for the coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at
P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents valuation of
P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in
cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
_______________
5Pre-trial Order, Rollo at pp. 76-77.
6Rollo at pp. 25, 82.
547
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004 547
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
1. 1.Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr.
Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of
coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in
bonds in the proportion provided by law;
2. 2.Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600
hectares of riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law; and
3. 3.Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of
SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO
PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED.7
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the
facts established in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, Luz
Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.), using the following formula:
For the coconut land
1. 1.Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut)
= Net Income (NI)
2. 2.NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula
under Republic Act No. 38448)
For the riceland
1. 1.2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH
(using the formula under Executive Order No. 2289
2. 2.AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant
to DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
_______________
RTC Decision at p. 7, Id., at p. 68.
7
Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines.
8
9 Entitled Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries
Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27, Determining the Value of Remaining
Unvalued Rice and Corn Lands Subject of P.D. No. 27, and Providing for the
Manner of Payment by the Farmer Beneficiary and Mode of Compensation to the
Landowner, dated July 17, 1987.
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision 10affirming in
toto the judgment of the trial court. The Landbanks motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred
in sustaining the trial courts valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there
was no trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the
Landbank is charged primarily with the determination of the land valuation
and compensation for all private lands suitable for agriculture under the
Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement . . . For its part,
the DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and compensation by
the Landbank.12
Based on the Landbanks valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the
landowner.13 If the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the
purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and
surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government.14 In case the
landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator15 conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land
by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land.16 These functions by the DAR
are in
_______________
10 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred by Associate
Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis.
11 Resolution dated May 16, 2000, Rollo at p. 60.
12 Sec. 1, Executive Order No. 405 (1990); Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 122256, October 30, 1996, 263 SCRA 758 and Philippine Veterans Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, supra.
 13 Sec. 16(a) of R.A. 6657, as amended. 550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
14 Sec. 16(c), Id.
15 The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) and the Regional Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), depending on the value of the land within the DARs rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as
their respective territorial jurisdiction (Rule II, Sec. 2, DARAB Rules of amended.21
Procedure). The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as
16 Sec. 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended; Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of follows:
Appeals, supra. LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
549 LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004 549
CS = Comparable Sales
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant
amended, which provides: and applicable.
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.The DAR is hereby vested with A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and formula shall be:
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of formula shall be:
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
x x x. A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the formula shall be:
matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court17 for final LV = MV x 2
determination of just compensation.18 Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of requirements in determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it
Court19 and, on its own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, appoint dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their
one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination
the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in
thereof x x x.20 In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just 1. 1.the cost of the acquisition of the land;
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like 2. 2.the current value of like properties;
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, 3. 3.its nature, actual use and income;
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be 4. 4.the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment
_______________
of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
21 Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations.The PARC and the DAR shall have the
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, power to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry
Series of 1994, issued pursuant to out the object and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10) days
after publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
_______________ 551
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004 551
17 Sec. 56, Id. Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
18 Sec. 16(f), in relation to Sec. 57, Id.
19 Sec. 57, Id.
20 Sec. 58, Id. 1. 5.the assessment made by government assessors;
2. 6.the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
550
farmworkers and by the government to the property; and
 3. 7.the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any.
Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only
during a hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence.
In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land,
Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property
is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in the
Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties,
thus:
x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares,
defendants determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos
only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and
decided by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for
coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the
lands in the above-entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein was
1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per
kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present
case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be
very low considering that farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-
five days. We cannot also comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this
case there is a great variance in average production per year when in the two cases
the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of Basud, Camarines Norte.
We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as
average gross production. In the Rodriguez case, the defendants fixed the
average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The court
is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the Rodriguez
case to the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the
coconut land taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the
average gross production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by
Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both cases are in the
same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this court then to adapt
1,061 kilos as the average gross production a year of the coconut land in
this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is the value that
Landbank fixed for this case.
The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the
net income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare.
Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19
divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore,
the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972
has an area of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the
average gross production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the
.7600 hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore
in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.22
PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13,
granted interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The
compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00
per cavan, the value of the compounded interest is P79,732.00.23(emphasis added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge.24 They may only do so in the
absence of
_______________
22 The formula used by the trial court in its valuation of the Riceland is taken
from Executive Order No. 228. Section 2 of the said EO states that (t)he average
gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product
of which shall be multiplied by Thirty-Five Pesos (P35.00), the government support
price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived
at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose
of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to the landowner.
However, instead of using the government support price of P35.00, the trial court
used P400.00, the then current price per cavan of palay (RTC Decision, p. 3, Rollo,
p. 64).
23 Rollo at p. 67.
24 BPI-Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122480, April
12, 2000, 330 SCRA 507, 517; People vs. Kulais, G.R. Nos. 100901-08, July 16,
1998, 292 SCRA 551, 565; Occidental Land Transpor
553
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004 553
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party,25 which are not
obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court
takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.During the trial, the court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case. (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive
Order (EO) No. 22826 and R.A. No. 3844,27 as amended, in determining the
valuation of the property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.28 It must be stressed that EO No. 228
covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A.
3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between the person who furnishes
the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor,
and the person who personally cultivates the same.29 Here, the land is planted to
coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the
trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative
_______________
tation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96721, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA
167, 175.
25 People vs. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123, 1146; 260 SCRA 25, 41 (1996),
citing Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85423, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA
650 and U.S. vs. Claveria, 29 Phil. 527 (1915).
26 Supra.
27 Supra.
28 Rules and Regulations Governing the Grant of Increment of Six Percent (6%)
Yearly Interest Compounded Annually on Lands Covered by Presidential Decree
No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228.
29 Sec. 6, RA 3844, as amended.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but
to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 2730 and Executive Order No.
228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is covered
by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional
compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial
discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the
law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its
implementing rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining
the valuation of the subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to
the RTC for trial on the merits wherein the parties may present their respective
evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court shall
consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended,
mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order
No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of
1994, shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own
initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one
or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the
dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil
Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for
trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the
procedures specified above in determining the proper valuation of the subject
property.
_______________
30 Entitled Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the
Soil Transferring To Them The Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing
the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor, dated October 21, 1972.
555
VOL. 434, JULY 21, 2004 555
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Antipolo City
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman) and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., On Leave.
Petition granted, assailed decision reversed.
Notes.The CARL and E.O. 407 were not intended to take away property
without due process of law nor were they intended to impair the obligation of
contracts. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA
245 [1996])
It would subvert the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the
DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials
and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
What agrarian adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to land-owners,
leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide the question. (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 263 SCRA 758 [1996])
o0o
Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 551
People vs. Kulais
G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JAILON KULAIS,
CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ Commander Falcasantos, AWALON KAMLON
HASSAN @ Commander Kamlon, MAJID SAMSON @ Commander Bungi,
JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS,
SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH,
JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA
HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ Ajid and several JOHN and
JANE DOES, accused. JAILON KULAIS, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Right of Confrontation; Judicial
Notice; As a general rule, courts should not take judicial
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais
notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been
tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending
before the same judge.True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial
notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried
or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending
before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused
has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him.
Same; Kidnapping; The fact that the victims were detained for only three
hours does not matter if said victims are public officers.Victims Virginia San
Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the
government monitoring team abducted by appellants group. The three testified to
the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even
so, appellants identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by
Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when
the abduction occurred. That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only
three hours does not matter. In People vs. Domasian, the victim was similarly held
for three hours, and was released even before his parents received the ransom note.
The accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no
enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all.
Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4)
of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy,
was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going home. The Court
justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of
his liberty. Likewise, in People vs. Santos, the Court held that since the appellant
was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the
duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the
victim, a minor, was locked up.
Same; Witnesses; Alibi and Denial; Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the
defense.The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker
in the face of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him.
Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution
witnesses
553
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 553
People vs. Kulais
than to the negative testimonies of the defense. Between positive and
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare
denial on the other, the former generally prevails. Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank
manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover, no
ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.
Same; Penalties; Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion
perpetua.The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of
life imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised
Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988,
when the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum
penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment
is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua carries with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code
and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for
serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed
in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Br. 12.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial courts erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness testimony in
another case, also pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant,
whose guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and
overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this
occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not
synonymous with life imprisonment.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos.
10060, 10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping
(Crim. Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were
filed1 before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos
Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina
Hassan de Kamming,2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan,
Imam3 Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and several John and Jane Does.
The Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations
save for the names of the victims, read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of FELIX
ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060]4 and for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario,5 a male
public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, who was then aboard a
Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being ambushed by the herein
accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and
_______________
1 These Informations were signed by Zamboanga City First Assistant
Prosecutor Manuel Tatel and approved by City Prosecutor Wilfredo M. Yu.
2 Referred to as Jaliha Hussin in the Decision.
3 Also referred to as Iman.
4 Record, p. 1; ALLAN BASA in Crim. Case No. 10061, record, p. 1;
EDILBERTO PEREZ y SALVADOR in Crim. Case No. 10062, record, p. 1;
JESSICA S. CALUNOD in Crim. Case No. 10063, record, p. 1; ARMANDO O.
BACARRO in Crim. Case No. 10064, record, p. 1. Brackets supplied.
5 Ibid.
555
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 555
People vs. Kulais
brought said Felix Rosario6 to different mountainous places of Zamboanga City
and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained, held hostage and deprived of his
liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when he was released only after payment
of the ransom was made to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said
victim; there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited
offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the
victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of person, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and
detain the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No.
10065]7 a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his
will, there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited
offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais,
Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not
guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. On
_______________
6Ibid.
7Record, p. 1; VIRGINIA SAN AGUSTIN GARA, a female public officer, in
Crim. Case No. 10066, record, p. 1; CALIXTO FRANCISCO in Crim. Case No.
10067, record, p. 1. Brackets supplied.
8 See Decision, p. 3. Although the trial court listed the nine arrested accused,
it erroneously wrote that there were only eight of them.
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais
April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this
Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:
1. 1.FREDDIE MANUEL, alias AJID and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH
[n]ot [g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for
[k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-
10067).
1. 2.JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR
MAMARIL y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as
principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom
and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of
armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them shall
be at their maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant
to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer
and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4), another life imprisonment
is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066).
 For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, One (1) Seiko wrist watch P 250.00
and their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268,
Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four One Bracelet P 2,400.00
accusedJainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alihare sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms Cash P 200.00
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years 558
of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).
557 558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 557 People vs. Kulais

People vs. Kulais To Armando C. Bacarro:

1. 3.JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three One (1) wrist watch P 800.00
charges of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges (Crim. One Necklace P 300.00
Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).
One Calculator P 295.00
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges Eyeglasses P 500.00
of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. One Steel Tape P 250.00
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)
imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. To Edilberto S. Perez
10060-10064).
One (1) Rayban P1,000.00
1. 4.NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN One Wrist Watch P1,800.00
(charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in
the three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of Cash P 300.00
these three charges (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).
To Virginia San Agustin-Gara
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as One (1) Wrist Watch P 850.00
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being minors, they
The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be
are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which lowers the
extended to those sentenced.
penalty imposable on them by one degree.
The cases against Majid Samson, alias Commander Bungi Awalon Kamlon
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced
a.k.a. Commander Kamlon Carlos Falcasantos and several John Does and Jane
to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as
Does are ARCHIVED until their arrest.
minimum to TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum
Costs against the accused convicted.
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
SO ORDERED.9
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan
convicted of an offense punishable by death or life by Presidential Decree No.
de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.10 In a letter dated
1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such
February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their
an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de
appeal because of their application for amnesty. In our March 19, 1997
Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.
Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are
the consideration of this Court.11
sentenced further to return the following personaleffects taken on December 12,
1988, the day of the kidnapping, ortheir value in money, their liability being
_______________
solidary.
To Jessica Calunod: Decision, pp. 33-36; rollo, pp. 52-55.
9

Through Atty. Catherine P.C. Fabian of the Public Attorneys Office, who
10

represented them during the trial.

 11 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 21, 1997, when
the Court received a letter from the Bureau of Cor-
559
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 559
People vs. Kulais
The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:
On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government
agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government
projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the head
of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del
Rosario, representing the non-government; Edilberto Perez, representing the City
Assessors Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and
Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineers Office. (p. 3, TSN, October
22, 1990.)
On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to
check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the
Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on their way,
they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at them. (p. 4,
TSN, ibid.)
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their
personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader
of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos. (p. 5,
TSN, ibid.)
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government
troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup
themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp. 7-8,
TSN, ibid.)
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During
their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all
times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic chores
like cooking. (pp. 9-10, TSN, ibid.)
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes
which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and
_______________
rections confirming the confinement of Appellant Jailon Kulais at the NBP.
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais
P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 oclock noontime, the victims were
informed that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00
oclock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 oclock midnight, the victims
were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom
money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same was
reached after several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga
City and the representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
x x x.12
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims
themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San
Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.
The Version of the Defense
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:13
On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning, while weeding their farm
in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked
up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion was stationed.
Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were already detained.
In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma
Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On
May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga
City. Here on the same date, they were joined by accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.
_______________
12 Appellees Brief, pp. 8-10; rollo, pp. 149h-149j.
13 Appellants Brief, prepared by the Public Attorneys Office and signed by
Public Attorney III Bartolome P. Reus and Public Attorney II Rector E. Macapagal,
pp. 8-11; rollo, pp. 92-95.
561
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 561
People vs. Kulais
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the
captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought
her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his two
wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the wives
and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other errands for
everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she
had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos other wives one of whom was armed.
After about two months, while she was cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives
were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not looking, she took her chance
and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was
thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the
instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to
the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than a month
sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing housekeeping errands for
Kamming and his men. She made good her escape during an encounter between
the group of Kamming and military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at
Ligui-an where she took a bachelor bus in going back to her mothers house at
Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 oclock
in the afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of
Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army
battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused
for the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of a day in
May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them. The
soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they shown
any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck. There were
no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion
and placed them inside the building where there were civilians and soldiers.
Among the civilians present were her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador
Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya
Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul,
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais
Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City
where they stayed for six days and six nights. On the seventh day, the accused
were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated,
was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990.
He has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their arrest
and in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN, January 22, 1991,
pp. 2-4)
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for
ransom and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses
it imposed upon him six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of
two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and
Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:
Principally, the issue here is one of credibilityboth of the witnesses and their
version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this
pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and their
testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No taint of evil
or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this
Court, who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only
because they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of
alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what
happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the accused
explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to February 3,
1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused
were keeping the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course
of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani;
(2) Jaliha Hussin; (3)
563
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 563
People vs. Kulais
Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and
(7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and
Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as
conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven accused
belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose of kidnapping
for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from established
communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in
order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed band moved along with their
husbands, attending to their needs, giving them material and moral support.
These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them
or comforting them.
xxx xxx xxx
II) The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and
Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8
cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were
armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the
military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and in
guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively
identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped the eight kidnap
victims on December 12, 1988.
The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
1. (1)The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to
prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts,
conditions and circumstances which may vary according to the purposes
to be accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there
was a common design, understanding or agreement among the
conspirators to commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil.
64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
2. (2)The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for
the murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et al., 3 Phil. 89, 98.)
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais
1. (3)When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object,
whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally
 or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the
wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et al., 25 SCRA 759, 772
[1968].)14
The Assigned Errors
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz.:
I Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in
another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the
government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants in an
encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-examine
him.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken
judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same
for being highly improbable and contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani,
Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et al., with
material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping
for ransom cases.
IV
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders
considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of the offense.15
_______________
14Decision, pp. 29-33.
15Appellants Brief, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 85-86.
565
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 565
People vs. Kulais
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had
withdrawn their appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which
pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues
pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other
pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a
defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed
by the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took
judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades
and his purported cohorts.16Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-
examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that
the latters testimony should not be used against him.17
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the
same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same
judge.18 This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
_______________
Appellants Brief, p. 11; rollo, p. 95.
16
Ibid., p. 12; rollo, p. 96.
17
18 Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650, May 6, 1991. See
also Occidental Land Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 167,
March 19, 1993.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial
notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in
deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made
by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellants counsel. At best, then, the trial courts mention of
Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected
the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latters testimony:
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with the
group?
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four days. Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them? you alight, what else was he doing while you were in their captivity?
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we came A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.
to know first our foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some food. COURT:
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of you? Q Who?
A Yes. A Tangkong.
Q And to whom were you assigned? xxx xxx x x x19
A To Ila Abdurasa.
567 _______________
VOL. 292, 567 19TSN, October 22, 1990, pp. 8-11. Italics supplied.
JULY 16, 568
1998 568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais People vs. Kulais
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarros testimony pointing to appellant
to, who else did you come to know? as one of the culprits:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of
xxx xxx xxx
Commander FalcasantosMating and Janiraanother brother-in-law of
Q And what happened then?
Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to]
xxxxxxxxx
g[i]ve food to us.
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you
Q [To] whom were you assigned?
really came to know them. Will you still be able to recognize these persons
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.
if you will see the[m] again?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, maam.
Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember how
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you
he looks like?
mentioned are here?
A Yes.
A Yes, they are here.
Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and his
Q Some of them are here?
wife are here?
A Some of them are here.
A Yes, maam.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself]
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those
as Jailon Kulais.
nine armed men who took us from the highway.
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?
RTC INTERPRETER:
A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he
xxx xxx xxx
gave his name as JAILON KULAIS.
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us. Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was A Yes.
one of those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not mention Q Will you please identify?
Tangkong? A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified
A I did not mention but I can remember his face. himself as Jailon Kulais.)
xxx xxx xxx
_______________
Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell you
that he [was] one of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him? 20TSN, October 23, 1990, pp. 9 and 25. Italics supplied.
569 570
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 569 570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
1998 People vs. Kulais
People vs. Kulais xxx xxx xxx
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN
shoes. Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?
COURT: FISCAL CAJAYON:
Q Who? Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word
A Tangkong, your Honor. Tangkong.
xxx xxx x x x20 ATTY. FABIAN
Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez candid narration:
Q You said Tangkong guarded you [.W]hat do you mean?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours
xxx xxx xxx
another will be on duty guarding us.
Q Who else?
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
A The last man.
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.
Q Did you come to know his name?
xxx xxx x x x21
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that
himself as Jailon Kulais.) kidnapping or detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain? will, for fifty-three days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also
evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who staged
A The same, guarding us. the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the victims during the
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way from of the trial court that he was a conspirator.

[the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
Q They did not fire any shots?
A But they were pointing their guns at us.
Kidnapping for Ransom
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
is also apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in
identifying the accused and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing
of the ransom letters.

Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge, _______________
you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?
A Yes. 21TSN, October 24, 1990, pp. 18-23. Italics supplied.
571
VOL. 292, 571 572
JULY 16, 572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
1998 People vs. Kulais
People vs. Kulais Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
CP CAJAYON D MS: A And over it is a signature.
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these Q That is your signature?
meetings for possible negotiation with the City Government. What do you A Yes, maam.
mean by this? What were you supposed to negotiate? Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?
A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms.22 A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms? Q There are namesother names hereEddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro,
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did you come
Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter. up to know who signed this one?
Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic]
write for your ransom? Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them. signature above the same. Did you come to know who signed it?
Q Why will you able to identify the same? A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
A Because I was the one who wrote it. xxx xxx xxx
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship? Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to us the portion here
A Yes. which says the terms? . . .
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the A (Witness reading) Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang kantidad nga
Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5there are five letters P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3,
all handwritten. 1989).23
COURT: xxx xxx xxx
Original? INTERPRETER (Translation):
CP CAJAYON D MS: This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00
Original, your Honor. in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these xxx xxx xxx
were the ones you were asked to write. Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21,
A (Witness going over [letters]) 1988.24 Now, could you please ex
This one2 pages. This one2 pages. No more.
_______________
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters,
23 This letter, dated January 31, 1989 and consisting of two pages, was marked
what else will make you remember that these are really the ones you wrote
while there? Exhs. A and A-1; Jessica Calunods signature thereon was marked Exh. A-2.
This quoted portion was marked Exh. A-3.
A The signature is there. 24 This letter, dated January 21, 1989, was marked Exh. B; the second page

thereof, Exh. B-1, and Jessica Calunods signature, Exh. B-2.

_______________ 573

22 TSN, October 22, 1990, p. 13. Italics supplied.

VOL. 292, 573 574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
JULY 16, People vs. Kulais
1998 Calunods testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando
Bacarro27 and Edilberto Perez.28 The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made
People vs. Kulais
to raise and deliver the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of
plain to us why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero 31, 1989 the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan29 and Teddy
or January 31, 1989? Mejia.30
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989. Revised Penal Code,31 having been sufficiently
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes. _______________
xxx xxx xxx
TSN, October 23, 1990, pp. 10-11. During his testimony, Bacarro confirmed
27
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned? that Jessica Calunod and Engineer Perez were made to write ransom letters, and
Please go over this. that he, along with the other hostages, was made to sign the letters. He also
A (Going over the letter) identified another letter, marked as Exh. D, dated January 15, 1988 and
addressed to Mayor Vitaliano Agan. Written in response to the mayors request to
Yes, maam. reduce the ransom money from P500,000 to P350,000, this letter stated that
Q Could you please read it aloud to us? Commander Falcasantos did not want to reduce the aforesaid amount, but he
A (Witness reading) agreed to the reduced amount of P450,000, as he took pity on the plight of the
hostages.
Gusto nila ang P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong 28 TSN, October 24, 1990, pp. 13-15. Perez stated that he also wrote a ransom

uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium letter and identified the same; he also confirmed that Jessica Calunod likewise
ug tunga large size.25 wrote ransom notes, and that he and all the other hostages were asked to sign
them.
xxx xxx xxx 29 TSN, December 11, 1990. Mayor Agan testified that he received ransom

INTERPRETER: letters; that he facilitated their delivery to the kidnappers; and that upon payment
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform of the ransom money, the kidnap victims were released.
30 TSN, November 7, 1990, pp. 2-7. Mr. Mejia testified that he was one of those
(7 colors, marine-type not including the shoes), one half medium, one half who delivered the money to the kidnappers and witnessed the release of the
large. victims.
31 Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual
xxx xxx xxx
who shall detain or kidnap another, or in any other manner, deprive him of his
Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
signed by your companions and all of you, do you know if these letters were
sent? If you know only. 1. 1.If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by 2. 2.If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when
575
we were alreadyI was asked again to write, we were ordered to affix our
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 575
signature to serve as proof that all of us are alive.26 [sic]
People vs. Kulais
_______________ proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly identified by
the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial courts finding of appellants
guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.
25This portion was marked Exh. B-3.
26TSN, October 22, 1990, p. 13. Kidnapping of Public Officers
574 Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were
members of the government monitoring team abducted by appellants group. The
three testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify
the appellant. Even so, appellants identity as one of the kidnappers was
sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara,
Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours32 does
not matter. In People vs. Domasian,33 the victim was similarly held for three hours,
and was released even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused
therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure
was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all. 34Convicting
appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an
_______________
1. 3.If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
2. 4.If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or public
officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense. (This definition has been amended by Section 8, RA No. 7659, effective
December 31, 1993. The crimes happened in 1988.)
32 TSN, November 6, 1990, p. 9.
33 219 SCRA 245, March 1, 1993.
34 Ibid., p. 250.
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais
eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going
home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not
only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him,
in any manner, of his liberty.35 Likewise, in People vs. Santos,36 the Court held
that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph
4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but
the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for
only a few hours is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public
officers37Gara was a
_______________
Ibid., p. 253.
35
GR No. 117873, December 22, 1997. Citing Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised
36
Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. III, pp. 1-2, the Court said that the Spanish version of
Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms lock-up (encerrar) rather than
kidnap (sequestar or raptar). Lockup is included in the broader term
detention, which refers not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which
he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty.
37 Art. 203, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 203. Who are public officers. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this
and the preceding titles of this book, any person who, by direct provision of law,
popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or
shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be
a public officer.
In defining public officers, former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino
cited Maniego vs. People, in which the Court held: The definition of public officer
in Art. 203 is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does every public servant from
the lowest to the highest. It obliterates the distinction between officer and
employee in the law of public officers, it does not distinguish between permanent
and temporary employees x x x. He likewise presented a list of persons held to be
public officers in various cases, e.g. a customs secret service agent, a public
577
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 577
People vs. Kulais
fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineers
Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping
occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under Article 267,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,38 which held that the
crime committed was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only
grave coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim
into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled when
a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court
noted that the victims testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate
that the appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably
established that the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof
beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was
a member of the armed group which abducted the victims.
Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi
The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face
of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives
greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the
_______________
works inspector, a sanitary officer, a barrio lieutenant, a laborer discharging
clerical functions, an emergency helper in the Bureau of Forestry on a daily wage
basis, performing the duties of janitor and messenger. See Ramon C.
Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed., Vol. II, pp. 409-410.
38 GR No. 110097, December 22, 1997.
 578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kulais
negative testimonies of the defense.39 Between positive and categorical testimony
which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the
former generally prevails.40Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto
Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies
were compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the
kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial courts observation that the appellant did not meet the
charges against him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the
day he was arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain
where he was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3,
1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him
as one of their kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life
imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal
Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the
capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that
could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not
synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua carries with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code
and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for
serious offenses penalized by special
_______________
39 People vs. Angeles, 218 SCRA 352, February 2, 1993; People vs. Guibao, 217
SCRA 64, January 15, 1993; People vs. Mendoza, 210 SCRA 517, June 26,
1992; People vs. Bausing, 199 SCRA 355, July 18, 1991; People vs. Bacatcat, 188
SCRA 175, July 31, 1990.
40 People vs. Waggay, 218 SCRA 742, February 9, 1993; People vs. Andasa, 206
SCRA 636, February 27, 1992.
579
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998 579
People vs. Kulais
laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal
Code.41
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five
counts of kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED,
but the penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced
to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for
kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the
kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto
Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED
to return the personal effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap
victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 representing
the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
_______________
People vs. Layno, GR No. 110833, November 21, 1996; People vs.
41
Magana, GR No. 105673, July 26, 1996; People vs. Gregorio, 255 SCRA 380, March
29, 1996; People vs. Magalong, 244 SCRA 117, May 12, 1995. See People vs.
Samson, 244 SCRA 146, May 16, 1995. NOTA BENE: It is noteworthy that
Appellant Kulais was also the appellant in this cited case. He appealed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 12, presided by
Judge Pelagio S. Mandi who penned the Decision appealed in the present case. In
that case, Kulais was convicted of kidnapping with ransom for the abduction of one
Airman Ruben Monteverde, committed on January 30, 1990. The persons he was
charged with were the same ones he was charged and convicted with in the case at
bar. See also People vs. Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237, October 28, 1991; and People
vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459, April 30, 1991.
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Zapanta vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Notes.Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi,
and that when an accused puts up the defense of alibi, the court should not at once
have a mental prejudice against him. (People vs. Escalante, 238 SCRA 554 [1994])
When the prosecutions cause is weak, an accuseds alibi assumes importance
and becomes crucial in negating his criminal liability, and his alibi should be
considered for there are times where an accused has no other possible defense but
alibi, as that could really be the truth. (People vs. Adofina, 239 SCRA 67 [1994])
The exception to the right of confrontation contemplated by law covers only the
utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and
does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments. (People vs. Ortiz-
Miyake, 279 SCRA 180[1997])
o0o
Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000.*
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OP APPEALS AND
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
 Actions; Conflict of Laws; The party who claims the applicability of a foreign
law has the burden of proof, and where said party has failed to discharge the
burden, Philippine law applies.At the outset, we find it necessary to state our
concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law,
thus: Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendants failure to show which
specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in
the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the
laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore
Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so.
Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.
Same; Labor Law; Prescription; Illegal Dismissals; In illegal dismissal, it is
settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code
may not be invoked, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable
to claims arising from employee-employer relations.What rules on prescription
should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In illegal
dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144
of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of
general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor
Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from
employee-employer relations.
Same; Same; Same; Although the commencement of a civil action stops the
running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary
abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though
no action had been commenced at
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
415
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 2, 2000 415
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
all.Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled
when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant
consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that although the commencement of a civil action stops
the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary
abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though
no action had been commenced at all.
Same; Same; Same; Contracts; It is a settled rule that contracts have the force
of law between the parties.As to whether petitioners separation from the
company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that the
employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We
agree with the Court of Appeals when it said, It is a settled rule that contracts
have the force of law between the parties. From the moment the same is perfected,
the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the
offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months
written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear and
readily understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Montilla Law Office for petitioner.
Bengzon, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Bengson & Jimenez for private
respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in CA. G.R.
No. CV 34476,
416
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as
follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then
Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for
employment with defendant company [herein private respondent] through its Area
Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to
plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an
original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted
the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-
month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21,
1979. (Annex B, p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year
contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to
the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter
accepted (Annex C, p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in
command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for
which plaintiff apologized. (Exh. 3, p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail
of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended
for a few days until he was investigated by a board headed by Capt. Choy. He was
reprimanded.
 On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300
conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at defendants expense.
Having successfully completed and passed the training course, plaintiff was
cleared on April 7, 1981 for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and
subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300
in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes D, E and F, pp. 34-38, Rec.). Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated costcutting
measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in
excess of the defendants requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 11). Consequently,
defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and
advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. 15, p. 466, Rec.).
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided
to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however,
immediately terminate its A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for
possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed,
twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective
November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three
months notice (Annex I, pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family
on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to
exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave
only two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary, (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987, p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter,
plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of
services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter
alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and
(2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant
contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim
arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment thus it is the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the
Labor Code and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects
of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall
have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendants arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the
items demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a
breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil
dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of
labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the employees dismissal
per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case
falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendants motion to dismiss (pp.
82-84, Ibid.). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, (p. 95, ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds
relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by
laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he has no
cause of action. (pp. 102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro
to pay plaintiff the amounts of
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as
consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary
damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the
issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court,
thus, . . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination
was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years
after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-
appellees action has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioners and Singapore Airlines respective motions for reconsideration were
denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1.IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH
PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE
RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2.CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE
RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3.CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY
FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT,
IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly
ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal
under the Singapore Laws because of the defendants failure to show which specific
laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws
of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to
this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the
Philippine law should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal
before said court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article
1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of
employment effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract
which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided
for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article
1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court
concluded that the action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor
Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before
the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here
pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz.:
Article 291. Money claims.All money claims arising from employee-employer
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3)
years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever
barred.
_______________
4 Id. at 54.
5 Id. at 32.
6 Id. at 33.
7 Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
xxx
8 Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
xxx
421
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 2, 2000 421
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
x x x
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been
decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year
prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by
petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive
period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim
was based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court
held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only
to money claims specifically recoverable under said Code but covers all money
claims arising from an employee-employer relations (Citing Cadalin v. POEA
Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996])....
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law
applicable to money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it
necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should prevail.
(Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia
specialibus non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate courts
conclusion that petitioners action for damages due to illegal termination filed
again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the
effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellees
action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on Article 291 of
the Labor Code, which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which
governs, under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when
he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National
Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it
has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
we held that although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of
the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment
by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had
been commenced at all.12
Now, as to whether petitioners separation from the company due to
retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract
of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court
of Appeals when it said,
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From
the moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment
of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according
to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when
plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract, among others, the right of mutual termination
by giving three months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such
provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for
interpretation.
xxx
 Further, plaintiff-appellees contention that he is not bound by the provisions
of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be
noted that when plaintiff-appellees employment was confirmed, he applied for
membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the
signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped
from questioning the legality of the said agreement or any proviso contained
therein.13
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent courts
decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including
the reason for the retrenchment:
When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline
industry resulting in a slow down in the companys growth particularly in the
regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice
but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services, number of
frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300
fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off
A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is
reasonably needed.14
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that
petitioners termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which
he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company.
No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent
appellate court.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.
Notes.It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law
between the contracting parties. (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 11 [1987])
The parties are charged with knowledge of the existing law at the time they
enter into a contract and at the time it is to become operativeand, a person is
presumed to be more knowledgeable about his own state law than his alien or
foreign contemporary. (Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 260 SCRA 673 [1996])
A manning agency cannot be faulted for complying with the applicable foreign
law. (Omanfil International Manpower Development Corporation vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 300 SCRA 455 [1998])
o0o
G.R. No. 195649. July 2, 2013.*
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, and LINOG G. BALUA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; Foreign Laws; The Supreme Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public
documents of a foreign country and must be evidenced by an official publication
thereof.Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act
of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his
Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims
that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was
divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to
use his US passport after
_______________
* EN BANC.
368
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim. The Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public
documents of a foreign country and must be evidenced by an official publication
thereof. Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be
considered in deciding a case.
Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; Citizenship; Dual Citizens;
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read
together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy
that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen.With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act. This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. Section 5(2) requires those who have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign
citizenship. This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship,
when read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position,
indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine
citizenship to continue using a foreign passport which indicates the recognition
of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has
renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no doubt that the use of a passport is a
positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport,
or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person
named therein as its national.Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for
local elective positions. There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a
positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport,
or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person
named therein as its national.369
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 369
 Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement that the renunciation must be
made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of
renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to.It is unquestioned that
Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship
by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his
American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American
citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times. If there is any
remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his
American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The
requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the
solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he
has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is
convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues
the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Well-settled is the rule that findings
of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the
aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence.Well-settled
is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with
by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said
agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. They are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are
binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had
arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as
to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.
Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; Citizenship; Dual Citizens; If
we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign
citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating
a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition
in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.It must be stressed that what is
at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively
370
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who
wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards
continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for these
dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code.
BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; Citizenship; Dual Citizens;
View that the majority in fact concedes that Arnados use of his U.S. passport is not
a ground for loss of Filipino citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 as the
law requires express renunciation and not by implication or inference from
conduct.After complying with the twin requirements of RA 9225, Arnado not
only became a pure Filipino citizen but also became eligible to run for public
office. To be sure, the majority in fact concedes that Arnados use of his U.S.
passport is not a ground for loss of Filipino citizenship under Commonwealth Act
No. 63 as the law requires express renunciation and not by implication or
inference from conduct. Why the norm will be any different with respect to the loss
of citizenship rights is, to my mind, a question that the majority ruling left hanging
and unanswered as it disregards a directly related jurisprudential landmark
Aznar v. Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 703 (1990) where the Court
ruled that the mere fact that therein respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmea
was a holder of a certificate that he is an American did not mean that he was no
longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration did
not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. Through the Courts
ruling in the present case (that by Arnados isolated use of his U.S. passport, he is
reverted to the status of a dual citizen), the Court effectively reversed Aznar and,
under murky facts and the flimsiest of reasons, created a new ground for the
loss of the political rights of a Filipino citizen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in a situation of doubt, doubts should
be resolved in favor of full Filipino citizenship since the thrust of R.A. No. 9225 is
to encourage the return to Filipino citizenship of natural-born Filipinos who lost
their Philippine citizenship through their acquisition of another citizenship.In a
situation of doubt, doubts should be resolved in favor of full Filipino citi-
371
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 371
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
zenship since the thrust of RA 9225 is to encourage the return to Filipino
citizenship of natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship through
their acquisition of another citizenship. Note in this regard that Arnado
consciously and voluntarily gave up a very much sought after citizenship status in
favor of returning to full Filipino citizenship and participating in Philippine
governance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9225; View that under R.A. No.
9225, natural-born citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine
citizenship because of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country and who
subsequently complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 are deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship.Under RA 9225, natural-born citizens who
were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship because of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country and who subsequently complied with
the requirements of RA 9225 are deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship. RA 9225 cured and negated the presumption made under CA
63. Hence, as in Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 576 SCRA 331 (2009), Arnado
assumed pure Philippine citizenship again after taking the Oath of Allegiance
and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his American citizenship under RA 9225.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the law requires express
renunciation in order to lose Philippine citizenship. The term means a renunciation
that is made distinctly and explicitly and is not left to inference or implication; it is
a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished
from that which is inferred from conduct.That Arnados use of his U.S. passport
amounts to an express renunciation of his Filipino citizenship or some of his rights
as a citizen when its use was an isolated act that he sufficiently explained and
fully justified is not a conclusion that is easy to accept under the available facts
of the case and the prevailing law. I emphasize that the law requires express
renunciation in order to lose Philippine citizenship. The term means a
renunciation that is made distinctly and explicitly and is not left to inference
or implication; it is a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate
language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. The
appreciation of Arnados use of his U.S. passport should not depart from this norm,
particularly in a situation of doubt.372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in the absence of clear and
affirmative acts of re-acquisition of U.S. citizenship either by naturalization or by
express acts (such as the re-establishment of permanent residency in the U.S.),
Arnados use of his U.S. passport cannot but be considered an isolated act that did
not undo his renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.In the present case, other than
the use of his U.S. passport in two trips to and from the U.S., the record does not
bear out any indication, supported by evidence, of Arnados intention to re-acquire
U.S. citizenship. In the absence of clear and affirmative acts of re-acquisition of
U.S. citizenship either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the re-
establishment of permanent residency in the U.S.), Arnados use of his U.S.
passport cannot but be considered an isolated act that did not undo his
renunciation of his U.S. citizenship. What he might in fact have done was to violate
American law on the use of passports, but this is a matter irrelevant to the present
case. Thus, Arnado remains to be a pure Filipino citizen and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship or of citizenship rights cannot be presumed or inferred from
his isolated act of using his U.S. passport for travel purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that as a mandatory requirement
under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225, it allows former natural-born Filipino citizens
who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country to enjoy full civil and political rights,
foremost among them, the privilege to run for public office.I do not dispute that
an Oath of Renunciation is not an empty or formal ceremony that can be
perfunctorily professed at any given day, only to be disregarded on the next. As a
mandatory requirement under Section 5(2) of RA 9225, it allows former natural-
born Filipino citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign country to enjoy full civil and
political rights, foremost among them, the privilege to run for public office.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION and SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.373
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 373
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Rexie, Efren, Bugaring and Associates Law Offices and Musico Law Office for
petitioner.
Federico R. Miranda for respondent Linog G. Balua.
Tomas O. Cabili and Rejoice S. Subejano for respondent Mayor Rommel
Arnado.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on
May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20,
2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the
May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has
successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no longer be
granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either
affirm the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run
for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal
of this Courts Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his
accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that
he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be
stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of
his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question
before this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the
United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit
of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he
was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, re-
374
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
spondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was
still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation
repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must be presented
as public documents2 of a foreign country and must be evidenced by an official
publication thereof.3 Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice
for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the
United States providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship
thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by
using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation.4
_______________
1 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, 4 September 2001, 364 SCRA
334 citing Vda. de Perez v. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722, 735 (1994), which in turn
cited Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 265 (1974).
2 See Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
 (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country.
3 Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
SEC. 24. Proof of official record.The record of public documents referred to
in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
4 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2.
375
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 375
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact
that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino
citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application
of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados
disqualification to run for any local elective position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA)
9225 is that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act.5 This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section
5(2)6 requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek
elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read
together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code 7 which disqualifies
those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates
a Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
_______________
5 Sec. 2, RA 9225.
6 Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
7 SECTION 40. Disqualifications.The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
[]
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
376
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively
a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship
to continue using a foreign passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign
state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a
situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration
that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport
proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its
national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he
acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable
that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at
least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados
renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S.
passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and
unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an
oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to
remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign
passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a
hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial
formality.377
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 377
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado a man without a
country. On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than
one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What
the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be
interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.8 They are accorded not only great respect but even finality,
and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body
had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent
as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated. 9
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that
Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American
citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that
Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados
claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine
passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was
able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following
dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May
2010, and 4 June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January
2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his U.S.
Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-
American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four
times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon
departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents
sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his
use.10 This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that
his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he
continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine
passport. Arnados travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24
November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were
never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of
the facts that the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained
his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be
considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those
who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual
citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and
afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special
privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I join the dissent of J. Brion.
Brion, J., I dissent.
Del Castillo, J., I join in the dissent of J. Brion.
Mendoza, J., I join the position of J. Brion.
Leonen, J., I join in the dissent of J. Brion.
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I maintain my dissent and vote to reconsider the Courts April 16, 2013
Decision. I so vote for the reasons stated in my main Dissent, some of which I
restate below for emphasis. Most importantly, I believe that the majoritys ruling
runs counter to the policy behind Republic Act No. (RA) 9225,1 is legally illogical
and unsound, and should thus be reversed.
a) The assailed Decision rules on a situation of doubt and in the
relatively uncharted area of application where RA 9225 overlaps with our
election laws. It reverses the Com-
_______________
1 AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT. AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH
ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
380
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
mission on Elections (COMELEC) ruling that respondent Rommel C. Arnados
use of his United States (U.S.) passport was isolated and did not affect his
renunciation of his previous U.S. citizenship and his re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship. These, to my mind, should have been the starting points in the Courts
consideration of the present case and the motion for reconsideration.
b) After complying with the twin requirements of RA 9225, Arnado not only
became a pure Filipino citizen but also became eligible to run for public office. To
be sure, the majority in fact concedes that Arnados use of his U.S. passport is not
a ground for loss of Filipino citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 as the
law requires express renunciation and not by implication or inference from
conduct. Why the norm will be any different with respect to the loss of citizenship
rights is, to my mind, a question that the majority ruling left hanging and
unanswered as it disregards a directly related jurisprudential landmark Aznar
v. Commission on Elections,2 where the Court ruled that the mere fact that
therein respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmea was a holder of a certificate that
he is an American did not mean that he was no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship. Through the Courts ruling in the present case (that
by Arnados isolated use of his U.S. passport, he is reverted to the status of a dual
citizen), the Court effectively reversed Aznar and, under murky facts and the
flimsiest of reasons, created a new ground for the loss of the political
rights of a Filipino citizen.
c) In a situation of doubt, doubts should be resolved in favor of full Filipino
citizenship since the thrust of RA 9225 is to encourage the return to Filipino
citizenship of natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship through
their
acquisition of another citizenship.3 Note in this regard that Arnado consciously
and voluntarily gave up a very much sought after citizenship status in favor of
returning to full Filipino citizenship and participating in Philippine governance.
From the perspective of our election laws, doubts should also be resolved in
favor of Arnado since his election to the office of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte was never in doubt. The present voters of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte have
eloquently spoken and approved Arnados offer of service not only once but twice
in 2010 and now in 2013. Note that the present case was very much alive in the
minds of the Kauswagan voters in the immediately past May 13, 2013 elections,
yet they again voted Arnado into office.
d) To reiterate what I have stated before, under RA 9225, natural-born
citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship because of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country and who subsequently complied with
the requirements of RA 9225 are deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship. RA 9225 cured and negated the presumption made under CA 63.
Hence, as in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,4 Arnado assumed pure
Philippine citizenship again after taking the Oath of Allegiance and executing an
Oath of Renunciation of his American citizenship under RA 9225.
In this light, the proper framing of the main issue in this case should be
whether Arnados use of his U.S. passport affected his status as a pure Philippine
citizen. In question form did Arnados use of a U.S. passport amount to a
ground under the law for the loss of his Filipino citizenship under CA 63
or his rights thereunder or, alternatively, the retention of his dual citizenship
status?
That Arnados use of his U.S. passport amounts to an express renunciation of
his Filipino citizenship or some of his rights as a citizen when its use was an
isolated act that he sufficiently explained and fully justified is not a conclusion
that is easy to accept under the available facts of the case and the prevailing law.
I emphasize that the law requires express renunciation in order to lose
Philippine citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made distinctly
and explicitly and is not left to inference or implication; it is a
renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.5 The appreciation
of Arnados use of his U.S. passport should not depart from this norm, particularly
in a situation of doubt.
Aznar, already cited above, presents a clear and vivid example, taken from
jurisprudence, of what express renunction is not. The Court ruled that the
mere fact that Osmea was a holder of a certificate that he is an American did not
mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate
of registration did not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
In the present case, other than the use of his U.S. passport in two trips to and
from the U.S., the record does not bear out any indication, supported by evidence,
of Arnados intention to re-acquire U.S. citizenship. In the absence of clear and
affirmative acts of re-acquisition of U.S. citizenship either by naturalization or by
express acts (such as the re-establishment of permanent residency in the U.S.),
Arnados use of his U.S. passport cannot but be considered an isolated act that did
not undo his renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.
What he might in fact have done was to violate American law on the use of
passports, but this is a matter irrelevant to the present case. Thus, Arnado
remains to be a pure Filipino citizen and the loss of his Philippine citizenship or
of citizenship rights cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of using
his U.S. passport for travel purposes.
I do not dispute that an Oath of Renunciation is not an empty or formal
ceremony that can be perfunctorily professed at any given day, only to be
disregarded on the next. As a mandatory requirement under Section 5(2) of RA
9225, it allows former natural-born Filipino citizens who were deemed to have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country to enjoy full civil and political rights, foremost among them, the privilege
to run for public office.
It is another matter, however, to say that Arnado effectively negated his Oath
of Renunciation when he used his U.S. passport for travel to the U.S. To reiterate,
if only for emphasis, Arnado sufficiently justified the use of his U.S. passport
despite his renunciation of his U.S. citizenship: when he travelled on April 14,
2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no Philippine passport that he could
have used to travel to the U.S. to attend to the business and other affairs that he
was leaving. If at all, he could be faulted for using his U.S. passport by the time he
returned to the Philippines on November 24, 2009 because at that time, he had
presumably received his Philippine passport. However, given the circumstances of
Arnados use and that he consistently used his Philippine passport for travel after
November 24, 2009, the true character of his use of his U.S. passport stands out
and cannot but be an isolated and convenient act that did not negate his Oath of
Renunciation.
In these lights, I maintain the conclusion that no basis exists to overturn
the ruling of the COMELEC for grave abuse of discretion; its ruling was
neither capricious nor arbitrary as it had basis in law and in fact.
e) With the Courts assailed pronouncement and its underlying negative
policy implication, the Court has effectively left Arnado [A] MAN WITHOUT A
COUNTRY6 neither a U.S. citizen by U.S. law, nor a Filipino citizen with full
political rights despite his compliance with all the requirements of RA 9225. The
only justification given for the treatment was the isolated use of Arnados old U.S.
passport in traveling between the U.S. and the Philippines before the duly
applied for Philippine passport could be issued. Under this situation, read in
the context of the election environment under which Japzon v. Commission on
Elections7 was made, the following ruling was apparently lost on the majority:
Finally, when the evidence of x x x lack of residence qualification of a
candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly
appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding
the victors right to the office, the will of the electorate should be
respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voters. x x x In this case, Japzon failed to
substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.8
For all these reasons, I urge the Court to reconsider its position in the assailed
April 16, 2013 Decision and grant Rommel C. Arnados motion for reconsideration.
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
denied.
Notes.The party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the law under the doctrine of processual presumption. (ATCI Overseas
Corporation vs. Echin, 632 SCRA 528 [2010])
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. (Ibid.)
o0o
Case law teaches that the issue as to the identity of the drugs allegedly sold is
commonly resolved by a scrutiny of the chain of custody of the recovered drugs.
(People vs. Bernardino, 602 SCRA 270 [2009])

o0o

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baharan
G.R. No. 188314. January 10, 2011.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.KHADDAFY
JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a.
Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI
a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other
JOHN and JANE DOES, accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, accused-appellants.
Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilty; All trial judges must refrain from
accepting with alacrity an accuseds plea of guilty, for while justice demands a
speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it
that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea
and the import of an inevitable conviction; The requirement for a judge to conduct
a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.As early as
in People v. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798 the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial
judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accuseds plea of guilty, for
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. Thus, trial
court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3.
Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf. The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of
re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, 378 SCRA 389 (2002), the Court noted that
since accused-appellants original plea was not guilty, the trial court should have
exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.
Same; Same; The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be
deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accusedthe conduct of a searching inquiry
remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves
that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty
plea.The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People
v. Alborida, 359 SCRA 495 (2001), this Court found that there was still an
improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court
that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he
understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the
penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been
intimidated, bribed, or threatened. We have reiterated in a long line of cases that
the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under
coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the
significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is
stringent and mandatory.
Same; Same; Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.In People v. Oden, 427 SCRA
634 (2004), the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a
searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the plea of guilt
is made loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense
charged. Thus, in People v. Nadera, 324 SCRA 490 (2000), the Court
stated: Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied
on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of
the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Principals; One who gave instructions and
training to another on how to make bombscoupled with their careful planning
and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and his
confirmation that another would be getting TNT from one of the accused as part of
their missionmake him a principal by inducement since it is his co-inducement
which was the determining cause of the commission of the crime.In the light of
the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat.
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads: Art. 17. Principals.The following are
considered principals: 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act 2.
Those who directly force or induce others to commit it 3. Those who cooperate in
the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second
paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The instructions and
training he had given Asali on how to make bombscoupled with their careful
planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and
Rohmats confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of
their missionprove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the
determining cause of the commission of the crime. Such command or advice [was]
of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized.
Same; Same; Evidence; While it is true that statements made by a conspirator
against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the
conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial
confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to
both conspirators.Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible
pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule,
statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only
when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled
in People v. Buntag, 427 SCRA 180 (2004), if the declarant repeats the statement
in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the
testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon, 343 SCRA
486 (2000), the Court held the following: [W]e must make a distinction between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in
evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived
of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against
the declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-
examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only
to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the
party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was given on the
witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover,
where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a
co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The
latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellantsnamely, Gamal B.
Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat
Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zakyof the complex crime of multiple murder
and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required
by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route,
from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were
about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor
noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so
the conductor obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary
of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away
from each otherone sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the
back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also
noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the
person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers,
the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was
paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man
seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he
became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a
holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept
on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also
noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched
out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was
tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would
glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious
characters to the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and
EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus
driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus
driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got
off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus
towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw
their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few
hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the
whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf
GroupAbu Solaimanannounced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network
an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in
the Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the
network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident.
Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied
the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor
identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the
two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Groupnamely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat
Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and Jane Doeswere
then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only
Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused
remain at-large.
 On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-
476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand,
upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No.
05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not
guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the
parties stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali
admitted knowing one another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the
RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT
terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he
claims taught him how to make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February
14 bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the
bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more
or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period
March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network
admitting their participation in the commission of the said crimes, subject
of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these
crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child
in the first bus that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave
a television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the
explosive devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and
which resulted in the filing of these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are
members of the Abu Sayyaf.1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their
pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and
explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged
the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the
Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge
of multiple frustrated murder.2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while
under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky,
and two other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees
were told that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and
that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit
(LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu
Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of
TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of
which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in
November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT
that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm
that Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT
was allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of
them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing,
Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening
of 14 February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to
leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad
had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali,
repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a
call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the
mission.3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag success din
yung tinuro ko sayo.
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt
despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants
for the crimes charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.4
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not
conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to
guilty. The transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraign-
ment before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
Court :Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations
that were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of
pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated murder charges by the two
accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they
entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier
pleas of not guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges
remain [I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were
entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they
admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at least
four people and injury of about forty other persons and so under the
circumstances, Atty Pea, have you discussed this matter with your
clients?
Atty. Pea :Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I havent
conferred with them about this with regard to the multiple murder case.
 Court :Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the two accused
because if they are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear
it from your lips.
Atty. Pea : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad
and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the
consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to
the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple
murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
Court :With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty. Pea:Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to
the murder case, then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from
not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor, for re-
arraignment.
prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two
INTERPRETER:(Read again that portion [of the information] and translated
it in Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime
charged.
COURT:All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they
have withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of
guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there any matters
you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate
pretrial and accommodate5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial
judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accuseds plea of guilty, for
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. 6Thus, trial
court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellants
original plea was not guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.7 According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a
case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave
no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood
the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People
v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty,
even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had
explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation
of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be
meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. 9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching
inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences
of their guilty plea.10 This requirement is stringent and mandatory.11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt
against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another chargemultiple murderbased on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that
other confessions of guiltone through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive
television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the
other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing
circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching
inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted,
as the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment
under consideration.12
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of
conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the
plea of guilt is made loses much of great significance where the conviction can
be based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused
of the offense charged.13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if
such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of
the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the
conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the
evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the
stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor,
Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively
identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted
suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in
violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus
moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had
given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in
Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently
established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective
judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were
indeed the perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court
upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the
transcript of stenographic notes on the state prosecutors direct examination of
state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q: You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances
did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and
Trinidad?
A: Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo
Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q: Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
A: If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and
two weeks.
Q: Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training
at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with
respect to that mission?
A: No, sir.
A: Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of
Metro Manila, sir.16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan
and Trinidad.
Q: Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to
the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in
November 2004?
A: That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.
Q: How did you know, Mr. witness?
A: He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
Q: What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to
you by Trinidad?
A: On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
Q: Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that
date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
A: He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could
detonate a bomb
Q: Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with
respect to the taking of the explosives from you?
A: There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q: What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
A: He told me that this is your first mission.
Q: Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are
referring to?
A: That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the
Christians.
Q: The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if
the bomb explode?
A: I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad
from me until after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman that
interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus,
which also did not explode.
Q: So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo
Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?
A: If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.
Q: Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A: Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
Q: How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
A: They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q: Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?
Q: Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives,
which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
A: That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Q: Why did you know, Mr. witness?
A: Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told
me not to leave the house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay
and Angelo Trinidad exploded.
Q: Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
A: I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive
that he took exploded already, sir.
Q: How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb
exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A: It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with
the bombing in General Santos.
A: He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it
was sometime in February 2005.
Q: Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the
bombing exploded in Makati, any other call?
A: There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q: What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
 A: He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.
A: He told me that sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
Q: By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that
Abu Zaky called you up the following day, that was February 15, and
congratulating you for the success of the mission. My question to you, Mr.
witness, if you know what is the relation of that mission, wherein you
were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been
indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A: They are connected, sir.
Q: Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A: Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu
Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the
city.
Q: Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A: The government, sir.17
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group
was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their anger
towards the Christians.18 It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani
and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines Day bombing incident,
months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs
and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission
was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According
to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would
get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were about to commence their first
mission.19 They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but
to no avail. The day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got another two
kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced
that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their
third try, their plan finally
succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that
there would be more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from
Rohmat, praising the former: Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.20
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt
against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals.The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the
provision on principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had given
Asali on how to make bombscoupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats confirmation that
Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their missionprove the
finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission
of the crime.21 Such command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the
crime would not have materialized.22
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed.23 In People v. Sanchez, et al.,
the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the
crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or
the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and
co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor
was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. 24 The same finding must be
applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving
accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from
the collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime. As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus
Decision:
Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its
major points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by
the two other accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched
between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist group Abu
Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately killing
and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive
explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly
admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically
with respect to the latters participation in the commission of the crimes,
nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence,
which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable
participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators criminal
design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design
to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the
accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado,
353 SCRA 643).25
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in
concluding that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy when the
defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and
the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.26
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec.
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made
by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during
the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag,
if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession
becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.27Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
 [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions.
An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but
not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since
the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions
and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.Mercenes admission implicating
his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against
appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same
offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.28
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Brion, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Appeal denied.
Notes.It bears to note that a searching inquiry must focus on the
voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the
plea. (People vs. Aranzado, 365 SCRA 649 [2001])
The procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it commits grave
abuse of discretion. (People vs. Chua, 366 SCRA 283 [2001])
o0o

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ligtas vs. People

G.R. No. 200751. August 17, 2015.*

MONICO LIGTAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari;
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are conclusive and
binding on the Supreme Court (SC) when affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive
and binding on this court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This court has
differentiated between a question of law and question of fact: A question of
law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of factexists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There are exceptions to the rule that only questions
of law should be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45.Petitioner
admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are beyond the
scope of the Rule he seeks redress from. However, there are exceptions to the rule
that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition for review under Rule
45: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6)
when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7)
when the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is
an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question of fact.The issue of tenancy,
in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question
of fact. To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal
conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the statutory elements of
tenancy.
Administrative Proceedings; Generally, decisions in administrative cases are
not binding on criminal proceedings; Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge
is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.We hold that a DARAB
decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on
courts if supported by substantial evidence. Generally, decisions in administrative
cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of
cases that: It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that
administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or
omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability;
quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. . . . Thus, considering
the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and
the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings
and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the
evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same
evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.
Tenancy Relationship; Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board;
Jurisdiction; The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is
the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether
there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.The DARAB is the quasi-
judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a
tenancy relationship between adverse parties. This court has held that judicial
determinations [of the DARAB] have the same binding effect as judgments and
orders of a regular judicial body. Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB
include controversies relating to: tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; It is true that trial courts are not
mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other
cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge.It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of
decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge. In declaring that the DARABs
findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant
are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals relied on Cornes,
et al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., 560 SCRA 545 (2008).
Criminal Law; Theft; Elements of.The essential elements of theft are: (1)
taking of personal property; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the
taking was done without the owners consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5)
the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or force
upon things.
Agrarian Reform; Tenants, Defined; Words and Phrases.Tenants have
been defined as: persons who in themselves and with the aid available from
within their immediate farm households cultivate the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latters consent, for purposes of production, sharing
the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the
leasehold tenancy system. (Citation omitted) Under this definition, a tenant is
entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The landowners share in
the produce depends on the agreement between the parties. Hence, the harvesting
done by the tenant is with the landowners consent.
Constitutional Law; Right to be Presumed Innocent; No less than the
Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until
proven guilty.In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was
entitled to the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private
complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it is with the consent of
the owner. No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be
presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. [I]t is better to acquit ten
guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person. Thus, courts must consider
[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.] Equally settled is
that [w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent
with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of
doubt and should be acquitted.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka? tanong ni Tata Selo. Dinaya ko na ba
siya sa partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya? Siya ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang
niya ako. Hindi bat kaya maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong
magpamigay ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?
Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya
sa rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas ngunit wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.
....
Binabawi po niya ang aking saka, sumbong ni Tata Selo. Saan pa po ako
pupunta kung wala na akong saka?
....
Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay
kinuha na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila.
Tata Selo (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat
The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft
beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest cannot be deemed
to have taken their own produce.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated March 16, 2010 and the
Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of theft.6
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code.7 The Information provides:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-23.
2 Id., at pp. 92-110. The case was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CEB CR No. 00482.
The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred
in by Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (Chair) and Socorro B. Inting of
the Eighteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
3 Id., at pp. 118-119. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo
L. Delos Santos (Chair) and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon Paul L.
Hernando and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes of the Nineteenth Division, Court of
Appeals, Cebu City.
4 Id., at p. 21.
5 Id., at pp. 35-49A. The Decision was penned by Judge Rolando L. Gonzalez
of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte.
6 Id., at p. 109.
7 Id., at p. 92. See Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 308. Who are Liable for Theft.Theft
is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to
the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another,
shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall
hunt or fish
7
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 7
Ligtas vs. People
That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, BarangaySan
Juan, Municipality of Sogod, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent of
gain, entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate, and once
inside the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo,
without the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate, to her damage and prejudice in
the aforestated amount of Twenty-Nine Thousand Pesos (Php29,000.00),
Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero
(Cabero), Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and
Ernesto Pacate.10
According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an
abaca plantation situated at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern
Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantations administrator, and several men,
including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacates
instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas
harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3)
unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would be loss of life if
they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita
Pacate and the police.11
On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted
a survey on the condition of the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca,
valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by Ligtas.12
 On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the
Sogod Police Station.13 Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that
he was the plantation owner.14
The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo Palo, his
neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his wife.15 According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of
Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993. 16 Andres Pacate
installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal
case.17
Ligtas allegedly made his first harvest in 1997. 18 He then gave Anecita
Pacate her share to the harvest.19 However, he could not remember the exact
amount anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Palo were workers in another
land, around 15 hectares, owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21
Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest
abaca from the land he cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men from harvesting the
abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the land.22
Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June 29,
2000. He claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay
fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged
harvesting happened.23
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of
Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000.24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB
rendered the Decision25ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.26
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered
as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was
considered by both the trial court27and Court of Appeals28 and without any
objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.29
In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that the
prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft[.]30 Ligtas defense of tenancy
was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of
harvest sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any
witness.31 His defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification . . .
by prosecution witnesses.32
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Theft, this court hereby renders judgment, sentencing him:
1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
ten (10) days as minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum;
2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:
a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca stole[n];
b. The amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages;
c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorneys fees;
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.33
I capable of appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.34According to it,
the burden to prove the existence of the ten-
_______________
32 Id., at p. 100.
33 Id., at p. 49A. Per the testimonies of the witnesses before the trial court
and as adopted by the Court of Appeals, the Kasabutan or Agreement dated
February 24, 2007 was previously executed between Ligtas and Anecita Pacate.
The Agreement involved another incident of theft committed by Ligtas against
Anecita Pacate. He was also charged with theft in 1988; however, the case was
ultimately dismissed (id., at pp. 18-19, 37, 40, 41-43, 46-47, and 49).
34 Id., at p. 109.
11
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 11
Ligtas vs. People
ancy relationship35 belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the
essential elements of a tenancy agreement.36
The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas reliance on the DARAB Decision
declaring him as a bona fide tenant of the . . . land is irrelevant in the case at
bar:37
Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that findings of or certifications
issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a
given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not
binding upon the courts.[]38
As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas had
taken conflicting positions. While he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also
assailed Anecita Pacates title over the land. Under Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court, a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the
commencement of the tenancy relation.39
The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas allegations on
ownership. He claims that the parcel of land owned by [Anecita Pacate] is
different from the subject abaca land. However, such assertion was based merely
on the testimony of the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to identify
parcels of land.40
More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft by
harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacates plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive
possession of the subject of the theft without the owners consent.42 The subject of
the crime need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land in order to
consummate the crime of theft.43
Furthermore, Ligtas argument that the abaca did not constitute as personal
property under the meaning of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code was
erroneous.44 Following the definition of personal property, the abaca hemp was
another.45The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts finding that about 1,000
kilos of abaca were already harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently established by the
prosecution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas defense of alibi could not excuse him
from criminal liability.47 His alibi was doubtfully established. [W]here an
accuseds alibi is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial
of culpability should be accorded the strictest scrutiny.48
Ligtas attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper.49 He failed to
show that the case was initiated only through Anecita Pacates quest for revenge
or to ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the land.50
The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas appeal and affirmed the trial courts
Decision finding Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code.51The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision dated . . . August 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern
Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. R-225, finding accused-appellant Monico
Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.52
Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals denied
on February 2, 2012.54
II
On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution.55 This court required People of the Philippines to file its
Comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice.56
_______________
51 Id., at p. 109.
52 Id.
53 Id., at pp. 112-115.
54 Id., at pp. 118-119.
55 Id., at p. 21. Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review for 30 days dated March 2, 2012 (id., at pp. 2-4), which the court granted
(id., at p. 122).
56 Id., at p. 122. The Resolution was dated March 4, 2013. Respondent,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on June 27, 2013
(id., at pp. 128-143). In the Resolution (id., at p. 145) dated August 14, 2013, this
court noted the Comment and required petitioner to file a Reply to the Comment.
Petitioner filed his Reply (id., at pp. 147-149) dated October 14, 2013, which we
noted on January 15, 2014 (id., at p. 152). In the Resolution (id., at pp. 165-167)
dated July 14, 2014, this court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda within 30 days from notice.
Petitioners Memorandum (id., at pp. 184-201) dated October 8, 2014 was posted
on October 10, 2014 (id., at p. 184). Re-
14
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;
Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as
tenant of the land owned by private complainant Anecita Pacate and located
at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or can
be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft; and
Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld
the conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Petition is meritorious.
III
Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of
Appeals must be revisited for being conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence of evidence on the claim
of petitioner [as] tenant.57
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 4558 of
the Rules of Court.59 Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive
and binding on this court
_______________
spondent filed its Memorandum (id., at pp. 174-182) dated October 2, 2014 before
this court on October 3, 2014 (id., at p. 174).
57 Id., at p. 190.
58 Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
59 See Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado v. People, G.R. No. 186030, March 21, 2012,
668 SCRA 768, 778 [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].
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VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 15
Ligtas vs. People
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.60 This court has differentiated between a
question of law and question of fact:
 A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.61(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are
beyond the scope of the Rule he seeks redress from.62However, there are exceptions
to the rule that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition for review
under Rule 45:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6)
when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7)
when the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.63 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
This court has held before that a reexamination of the facts of the case is
justified when certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by
the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in
that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal.64
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not,
is generally a question of fact.65 To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy
relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the
statutory elements of tenancy.66
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when
it held that all the essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the
prosecution despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the
land from which he allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the case is, thus,
proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.
IV
Petitioner claims that private complainants filing of criminal charges was
motivated by ill will and revenge.68 The charges were designed to remove
petitioner from the land he has legitimately occupied as tenant. 69 Telling is the
fact that petitioner filed his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000,
while the Information for Theft was filed on December 8, 2000. 70
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private
complainants tenant.71 The DARAB Decision is entitled to respect, even finality,
as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the administrative agency vested with
primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy
relationship.72
The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence.73 To
require petitioner to prove tenancy relationship through evidence other than the
DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the witnesses is absurd and goes beyond
the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence.74
Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality since
private complainant did not file an appeal. The DARABs finding as to the parties
tenancy relationship constitutes as res judicata.75
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly
disregarded the DARAB Decision.76 The trial court could not have taken judicial
notice of the DARAB Decision:
While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bona fide tenant of Pacate,
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge.77 (Citation omitted)
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses:
that there is a legitimate tenancy relationship between him and private
complainant and that he did not take the abaca hemp. 78Nevertheless, respondent
maintains that petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a tenancy
relationship between him and private complainant.79 Private complainant did not
consent to the alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also failed to provide
evidence as to any sharing of harvest between the parties.81
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is
conclusive and binding on courts if supported by substantial evidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal
proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases that:
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative
cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus,
an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution,
or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the
criminal liability for the same act.
....
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the
procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative
proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding
on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal
cases.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
 However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from
the same set of facts involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where
one act results in both criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case No.
VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy
relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No.
R-225 involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the
tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements of theft
were proven by the prosecution.
In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB found:
All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship as
required in the above quoted Supreme Court ruling, has been established by the
evidence submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences were not controverted by any
evidence submitted by the respondent.
In fine, this board found plaintiff a bona fide tenant of the land in question and
as such is entitled to a security of tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed
of his holdings by the landowner except for any of the causes provided by law and
only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized by
the Court and in the judgment that is final and executory[.]83 (Citations omitted)
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding Monico Ligtas a bona fide tenant of the land subject in this case and well
described in paragraph three (3) in the complaint, and ordering as follows, to wit:
1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her behalf to maintain
plaintiff in the peaceful possession of the land in dispute.
2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the cluster Manager
of Sogod Bay DAR Cluster to call the parties and assist them in the execution of a
leasehold contract covering the land in dispute, and for the parties to respect and
obey such call of the said MARO in compliance with the legal mandate.
3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos representing the expenses incurred by plaintiff in vindicating
his right and other actual expenses incurred in this litigation.
Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.
No cost.
SO DECIDED.84
Private complainant did not appeal the DARABs findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence. 85 This
court is not tasked to weigh again the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of
evidence.86
V manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to
determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties. 87 This
court has held that
_______________
87 Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 50 provides:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed
to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious
manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in
accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it
shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony,
require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and
answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena, and subpoena duces tecum and
22
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
judicial determinations [of the DARAB] have the same binding effect as
judgments and orders of a regular judicial body.88Disputes under the jurisdiction
of the DARAB include controversies relating to:
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.89
In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian
Reforms primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which includes the
relationship between landowners
_______________
to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall
likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same
Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow
farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided,
however, That when there are two or more representatives for any individual or
group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent
such party or group before any DAR proceedings.
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall
be immediately executory. (Emphasis supplied)
88 Martillano v. Court of Appeals, 447 Phil. 226, 236-237; 433 SCRA 195, 202
(2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division], citing Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988),
Secs. 50 and 51.
89 Suarez v. Saul, 510 Phil. 400, 409; 473 SCRA 628, 637 (2005)
[Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division], citing Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 3(d)
in relation to Sec. 50 and DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Sec. 1.
90 596 Phil. 472; 576 SCRA 447 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
23
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 23
Ligtas vs. People
and tenants.91 The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding on courts when
supported by substantial evidence.92 This court ruled that administrative res
judicata exists in that case:
Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995
of the DARAB in DARAB Case # II-380-ISA94; consequently, the same has
attained finality and constitutes res judicata on the issue of petitioners status as
a tenant of respondent.
Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in
accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the
rule of administrative res judicata: The rule which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers. It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is
examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final
adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata. To be sure, early jurisprudence was
already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively
to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without
unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude
is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers
have been conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicataapplies only to
decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
purely administrative proceedings:
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature,
as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and
evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and
(c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of
quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the
contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication
of the respective rights and obligations of the parties.95 (Citations omitted)
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior
judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Rizal
Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al.,96 this court discussed and
differentiated the two concepts of res judicata:
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated
in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of
judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of
issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases,
then res judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as
between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes
of action, then res judicata as conclusiveness of judgment applies.97 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties was declared by this court
as conclusive on the parties.99 As in this case, the DARAB
Decision100 in Martillano attained finality when the landowner did not appeal the
Decision.101 This court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata applies:
 Under the aforecited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform
is empowered, through its adjudicating arm the regional and provincial
adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and controversies on all matters
pertaining to the implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides
that the decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
and no appeal was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.
In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-
Bul 89, there being no appeal interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly,
the matter regarding the status of Martillano as a tenant farmer and the validity
of the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and no longer
open to doubt and controversy.
....
We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul 89 was for the cancellation of petitioners
CLT and Emancipation patents. The same effect is sought with the institution of
DARAB Case No. 512-Bul 94, which is an action to withdraw and/or cancel
administratively the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner.
Considering that DARAB Case 062-Bul 89 has attained finality prior to the filing
of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul 94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to
understand that the issues raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul
89, which have been resolved with finality, may not be litigated anew.
The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include
Martillano as party-defendant in the case before the adjudication board and the
DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect
the applicability of the doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that
the issues which have already been litigated in a final and executory judgment
precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res
judicata, and even under the doctrine of law of the case, the re-litigation of the
same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as
it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be
binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was
predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding
effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since
said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle
of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment also applies in criminal cases.104Petitioner in that case was charged
with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for the alleged non-
remittance of Social Security System contributions.105 This court upheld the
findings of the National Labor Relations Commission in a separate case, which
declared the absence of an employer-employee relationship and had attained
finality.106 This court held that:
The reasons for establishing the principle of conclusiveness of judgment are
founded on sound public policy. ... It is allowable to reason back from a judgment
to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion
is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the
premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once
determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been
rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the same
parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which,
from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule
39, Section 47(b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39,
Section 47(c). Both concepts are founded on the principle of estoppel, and are based
on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits. Like the
splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters
settled by a Courts final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again.
Re-litigation of issues already settled merely burdens the Courts and the
taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy
that could be devoted to worthier cases.107(Citations omitted)
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,108 this
court ruled that tenancy relationship must be duly proven:
[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove
this allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship
exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what
the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. 109 (Citation
omitted)
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential
elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by petitioner.110 It found that there
was substantial evidence to support petitioners claim as tenant of the land. 111 In
rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings
_______________
107 Id., at pp. 70-71; pp. 392-393.
108 480 Phil. 28; 436 SCRA 392 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
109 Id., at p. 35; p. 398.
110 Rollo, p. 33. See VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, id., at p. 35; pp. 398-399: The requisites of a tenancy relationship are
as follows: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing
of the harvests.
111 Rollo, p. 33. See Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. Substantial evidence.In cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
30
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Ligtas vs. People
and affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant. 112 It was convinced by
petitioners evidence, which consisted of sworn statements of petitioners witnesses
that petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres Pacate sometime in
1993.113 Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after
harvest.114However, Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest.115Petitioner
then gave the landowners share to private complainant, and had done so every
harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000.116
We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private
complainant failed to heed the Notices sent to her and refused to attend the
scheduled hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its Decision the reason offered
by private complainants counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as counsel:
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has
already shown her intention not to participate the proceedings of the case for
reasons known only to her;
That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her
decision not to participate in the proceedings of the case;
That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to
withdraw as he is now withdrawing as counsel for the respondent of the above
entitled case[.]118
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions
of other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or are pending
in the same court or before the same judge.119 In declaring that the DARABs
findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant
are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals120relied
on Cornes, et al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc.121
In Cornes, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in
Tarlac that was principally devoted to sugar and rice and who claim the rights of
their predecessors-in-interest, filed separate Complaints before the Provincial
Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that when the
registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaa, sold the land to respondents,
respondents were aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and
Josefina Roxas Omaa.122
_______________
119 See Rules of Court, Rule 129, Secs. 1 and 2 provide:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent
of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SECTION 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
See also Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 51, 56-57; 196 SCRA 650, 655-
656 (1991) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
120 Rollo, p. 104.
121 Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., supra note 38.
122 Id., at pp. 533-534; p. 551.
32
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the
renunciation of their tenancy rights under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. However, they failed to comply with their obligations under the terms of the
compensation package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of Complaints before the
DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the Provincial
Adjudicator.124
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that there was no
tenancy relationship [that] existed between the parties.125He found that
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were mere hired laborers, not
tenants. Tenancy cannot be presumed from respondents offer of a compensation
package.126
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It
found that there was an implied tenancy between the parties. Petitioners were
deemed tenants of the land for more than 30 years. They were entitled to security
of tenure.127
The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the
Provincial Adjudicators Decision. It held that there was no substantial evidence
to prove that all the requisites of tenancy relationship existed. However, despite
the lack of tenancy relationship, the compensation package agreement must be
upheld.128
This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that petitioners
failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of a tenancy relationship:
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants.
While it appears that there was personal cultivation by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding, what was established was that
petitioners claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of
petitioner Rodolfo Cornes that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in a 50-50 sharing
scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINAs grandmother, the previous owner
thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be
adduced. Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The
burden rests on the shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of
tenancy, which burden they failed to discharge with substantial evidence. Such a
juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the
issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of
proof never parts. The same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the
complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to
show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. . . .
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a
sharing of harvests in the context of a tenancy relationship between petitioners
and/or their predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is
illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any
other evidence must be presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as
testaments to the claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to
establish the purported sharing of harvests was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo
Cornes. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the basis
alone of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes claim. It is self-serving and is without
evidentiary value. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent
proof must be adduced. If at all, the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to
establish a tenancy relationship.
We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the
Court of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in
Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was tenanted cannot overcome
substantial evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may
be made upon the said public officers testimony. What cannot be ignored is the
precedent ruling of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality
concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending
parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts.
This ruling holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that
petitioners, as herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the
indispensable elements of tenancy.130 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, in Cornes, this court did not categorically hold that the DARABs
findings were merely provisional and, thus, not binding on courts. What was
deemed as a preliminary determination of tenancy was the testimony of the
Department of Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was
tenanted. Further, the tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners
were bona fide tenants.
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the
DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into
finality.131 It is also established that private complainant participated in the initial
stages of the DARAB proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the existence of a
tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally review
the DARABs findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that
tenancy exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
VI
According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code were not established since he was a bona fide tenant of the land.133 The
DARABs recognition of petitioner as a legitimate tenant necessarily implie[d]
that he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private complainants
land].134This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.
As to the existence of another element of theft that the taking was done
without the consent of the owner petitioner argues that this, too, was negated
by his status as private complainants tenant:
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as alleged
by the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for . . . Anecita
Pacate to stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting the produce of the landholding
because as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right entitled
him to continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is
terminated or until his eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is
final and executory.135(Citation omitted)
Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
upheld:
Well-settled is the rule that where inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. In
acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven
snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecutions evidence
failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law
requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, then his acquittal must follow in faithful
obeisance to the fundamental law.136 (Citations omitted)
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ARTICLE 308. Who are Liable for Theft.Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons
nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same
to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by
him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall
hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm
products.
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the owners
consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence
against or intimidation of the person or force upon things.137
Tenants have been defined as:
persons who in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latters consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce
with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder Notes.In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not authorized to take a
a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
tenancy system.138 (Citation omitted) have been tried or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding that both
cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge; Rule
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she admits of exceptions. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 662
cultivates. The landowners share in the produce depends on the agreement SCRA 152 [2011])
between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the The Supreme Court takes judicial notice that proceedings at the first level
landowners consent. courts, especially in cities and capital towns, are relatively slower than those at
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy the Regional Trial Court because of its more numerous pending cases. (Boto vs.
between petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element Villena, 706 SCRA 1 [2013])
that the taking was done without the owners consent. The DARAB Decision
implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca.
o0o
The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.
In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and
banana crops on the basis of reasonable doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove _______________
lack of criminal intent on petitioners part.141 It failed to clearly identify the
person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was 148 Id., at pp. 257-258; p. 271, citing People v. Mijares, 358 Phil. 154, 166; 297
wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him.142 There were doubts as to SCRA 520, 534 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division]; People v. Corpuz, 459
whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private Phil. 100, 113; 412 SCRA 479, 489 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
complainants lot when petitioner had planted her own plants adjacent to
it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property belonged
to private complainant. This court found that petitioner took the sugarcane and
bananas believing them to be her own. That being the case, she could not have had
a criminal intent.144
In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to
the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private
complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it is with the consent of
the owner.
No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed
innocent of the crime until proven guilty.145 [I]t is better to acquit ten guilty
individuals than to convict one innocent person.146 Thus, courts must consider
[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.] 147 Equally settled
is that [w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is
consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the
benefit of doubt and should be acquitted.148
In view of petitioners acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it
unnecessary to discuss further the other errors raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution dated February 2, 2012
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of
the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is
ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful
cause. Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.
SO ORDERED.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. Petitioner
Monico Ligtas acquitted and ordered immediately released.

C. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY CASES
G.R. No. 172953. April 30, 2008.*
JUNIE MALILLIN y LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Criminal Law; Appeals; Although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled
to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where
facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied
in a case under appeal.Although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where
facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied in a case under appeal. In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain
which, if properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that
arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Same; Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs; Chain of Custody Rule; The
mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind
the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guiltmore than just the fact
of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the
same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.Prosecutions
for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together
with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital
to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity
of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere
fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the
moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of
possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the
same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of
custody requirement performs this
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
620
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed.
Same; Same; Same; As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be; The likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an
exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to
people in their daily lives.As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same. While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it
is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and
is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard
likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits
level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to
whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in
the application of the chain of custody rule. Indeed, the likelihood of tampering,
loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and
is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to
substances familiar to people in their daily lives.621
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 621
Malillin vs. People
Same; Same; Same; A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they
are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and naturehence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are
readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain
of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable
that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated
or tampered with.A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are
not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine
their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody
over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence
was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing.
Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied
to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more
exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
Same; Same; Same; Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized
drugsit mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a
search warrant must conduct the photographing and the physical inventory of the
item at the place where the warrant has been served.Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-
seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too plain to
require a different construction, it mandates that the officer acquiring initial
custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the photographing and the
physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served.
Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the close
of the search of petitioners house, he brought the seized items immediately to the
police station for the alleged purpose of making a true inventory thereof, but
there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in
petitioners house when in622
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
fact the apprehending team was able to record and mark the seized items
and there and then prepare a seizure receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the
raiding team has had enough opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant
which means that it has had as much time to prepare for its implementation. While
the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance
therewith, the same cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any
acceptable justification for Esternons course of action.
Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The approval by the court which
issued the search warrant is necessary before police officers can retain the property
seized and without it, they would have no authority to retain possession thereof and
more so to deliver the same to another agencymere tolerance by the trial court of
a contrary practice does not make the practice right because it is violative of the
mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very purpose for the
enactment.Esternons failure to deliver the seized items to the court
demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items
seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory
of the same, as required by Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court. People v.
Go, 411 SCRA 81 (2003) characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to
preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties.
Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo, 439 SCRA 601 (2004)
declared that the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is
necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they
would have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the
same to another agency. Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice
does not make the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory
requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very purpose for the enactment.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Presumption of Regularity;
The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable
by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded
as binding truth, and it cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.Given the foregoing
deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in
the implementation of the warrant and in tak-623
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 623
Malillin vs. People
ing post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police
duty is manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just that
a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by
the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this
presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails
if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack
of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner,
coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under
police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Equipoise Rule; In dubio pro reo
when moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable
doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.In our constitutional system, basic
and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an
accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be
the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until
the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability
hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter
of right.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lynette J. Tan for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by
its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of
guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing dis-624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
trust on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his
culpability.
In this Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Junie Malillin
y Lopez (petitioner) assails the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January
2006 as well as its Resolution3 dated 30 May 2006 denying his motion for
reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City, Branch 52 5 which found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, a prohibited drug.
The antecedent facts follow.
On the strength of a warrant6 of search and seizure issued by the RTC of
Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of
petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team was
headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon
(Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera
(Gallinera) as members. The searchconducted in the presence of barangay
kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother,
Normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty
plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11,7 Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-22.
2 In CA-G.R. No. 28915. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and
concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C. Librea-
Leagogo. CA Rollo, pp. 81-90.
3 Id., at p. 109.
4 In Criminal Case No. 2003-5844. Records, pp. 114-119.
5 Presided by Judge Honesto A. Villamor.
6 Records, pp. 11-12.
7 Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thou-
625
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 625
Malillin vs. People
as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in a criminal information
whose inculpatory portion reads:
_______________
sand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug
in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof;
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu;
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or ecstasy,
paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those similarly designed
or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as
determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI
of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life
imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten
(10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Malillin vs. People
That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning
in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] shabu with an
aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets containing shabu
residue, without having been previously authorized by law to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Petitioner entered a negative plea.9 At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on
the circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were
allowed entry
_______________
or shabu, or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or
ecstasy, PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements;
or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500)
grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12 years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00)
to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin,
cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, or other dangerous drugs
such as, but not limited to, MDMA or ecstasy, PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB,
and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three
hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
8 Records, p. 2.
9 Id., at pp. 41, 43.
627
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 627
Malillin vs. People
into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant; that
upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup,
whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the warrant, to
conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside
the house to make sure that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the
search from about a meter away; that the search conducted inside the bedroom of
petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu residue
contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets
containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by Esternona
discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner. 10 On cross examination,
Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its progress to
petitioners mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the
search being conducted by Esternon.11
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was
found behind the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then
found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on
Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked.12 On cross, he admitted that it
was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing behind him
in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the things
to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were
kept;13 that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a true
inventory, then to the trial court14 and thereafter to the laboratory.15
_______________
10 TSN, 22 April 2003, pp. 6-9.
11 Id., at pp. 15-16.
12 TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 6-7, 10.
13 Id., at pp. 16-17.
14 TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 13-15.
15 Id., at p. 9.
628
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the
examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify
the items submitted to the laboratory.She revealed that the two filled sachets were
positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of
containingresidue of the same substance.16 She further admitted that all seven
sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same
day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain
Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory.17
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and
seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began
the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it
was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos
that petitioners wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear.
Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheilas body inside the
same bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of
the room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer.
Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store and
when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was found on Sheilas
body.18 Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her
children.19
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by
Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him
to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him
and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon
showed him sachet of shabu which according to him came from a pillow on the
bed.20 Petitioners account in its entirety was corroborated in its material respects
by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and
Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire
duration of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to
buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. 21 Licup for his
part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic
sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of
the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon,
who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled
sachets.22
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned
to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a
fine of P300,000.00.23 The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found
in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioners animus
possidendi sufficient to
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 11-12.
21 TSN, 11 November 2003, p. 3; TSN, 23 March 2004, p. 4.
22 TSN, 4 February 2004, pp. 4-5, 9.
23 Records, p. 119. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Junie
Malillin y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Sec. 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and he is hereby sentence[d] to suffer the
penalty of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to Twenty (20) years and fine
of P300,000.00.
The shabu recovered is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government and the same shall be turned over to the Board for proper
disposal without delay.
SO ORDERED.
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over
which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted
petitioners failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges
against him.24
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.25 In his Appeal Brief26 filed with
the Court of Appeals, petitioner called the attention of the court to certain
irregularities in the manner by which the search of his house was conducted. For
its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the contrary,
the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioners conviction and that the defense
never advanced any proof to show that the members of the raiding team was
improperly motivated to hurl false charges against him and hence the presumption
that they had regularly performed their duties should prevail.27
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
affirming the judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an
indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years as
maximum.28 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
appellate court.29 Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same
issues.
In its Comment,30 the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had
regularly performed its duties in the conduct of the search. 31 It points to
petitioners incredulous claim that he was framed up by Esternon on the ground
that the discovery of the two filled sachets was made in his and Licups presence.
It likewise notes that petitioners bare denial cannot defeat the positive assertions
of the prosecution and that the same does not suffice to overcome the prima
facie existence of animus possidendi.
This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records.
Prefatorily, although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of
weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a
case under appeal.32In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if
properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that arrived at by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the
elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral
certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. 33 Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. 34 Be
that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create
in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt.
More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed
in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a
finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.35
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.36 It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same.37
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and
is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. 38 The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,
tampering, contamination39 and even substitution and exchange.40 In other words,
the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout
regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit
is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics
fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their
daily lives.41 Graham vs. State42 positively acknowledged this danger. In that case
where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by two police officers
prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and
whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas excluded
from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized
could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It
ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of
police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition,
testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible. 43
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody
over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence
was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing.
Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied
to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more
exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the
identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who
came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified
for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to
whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and
marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the
seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in
court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items.
Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets
of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested
and offered in court as evidence?
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer.
Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his
testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items
handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the
initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could have, but
nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the
items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her
possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of
establishing the identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not only the
testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such
failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits
inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which
cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the
two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the
search and seizure was conducted in a regular manner and must be presumed to
be so, the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police officers
from the commencement of the search of petitioners house until the submission of
the seized items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of the
unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife, that prior to
the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he
posted some of the members of the raiding team at the door of petitioners house
in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of
logic can it be conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on
an errand when in the first place the police officers were in fact apprehensive that
he would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two
filled sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner
returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able to witness the
conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that he was away.
It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who
handed to him the items to be searched including the pillow from which the two
filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary human behavior that
petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that
illegal drugs are concealed therein. In the same breath, the manner by which the
search of Sheilas body was brought up by a member of the raiding team also raises
serious doubts as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the police
officers that he saw Sheila tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the
attention of the members of petitioners household away from the search being
conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be
omitted, the Court likewise takes note of Esternons suspicious presence in the
bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The confluence of these
circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecutions
claim of regularity in the exercise of duty.
Moreover, Section 2144 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure
_______________
44 Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment.x x x
 637
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 637
Malillin vs. People
procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too plain to require
a different construction, it mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of
drugs under a search warrant must conduct the photographing and the physical
inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served. Esternon
deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the close of the
search of petitioners house, he brought the seized items immediately to the police
station for the alleged purpose of making a true inventory thereof, but there
appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioners
house when in fact the apprehending team was able to record and mark the seized
items and there and then prepare a seizure receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten,
the raiding team has had enough opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant
which means that it has had as much time to prepare for its implementation. While
the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance
therewith, the same cannot benefit the
_______________
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
the said items; x x x (emphasis ours).
638
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for Esternons course of
action.
Likewise, Esternons failure to deliver the seized items to the court
demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items
seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory
of the same,45 as required by Rule 126, Section 1246 of the Rules of Court. People v.
Go47characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the
substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties. 48Thus, as a
reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo49 declared that the approval by the
court which issued the search warrant is necessary before police officers can retain
the property seized and without it, they would have no authority to retain
possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency. 50 Mere
tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right
because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby
defeats the very purpose for the enactment.51
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and
normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure
custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly
misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot
be regarded as binding truth.52 Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.53 In the present case the lack of conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the
irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody
before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that
the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must
rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the law
presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.54In dubio pro
reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on
reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January
2006 affirming with modification the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying
reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Junie
Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered
immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another
offense.

Note.In rape cases, the credibility of the complainants testimony is almost
always the single most important issue. (People vs. Dela Torre, 567 SCRA 651
[2008])
o0o mandatory terms.
G.R. No. 179029. August 9, 2010.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FELIMON
PAGADUAN y TAMAYO, appellant.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Prohibited Drug;
Evidence; To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court
is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
fails.In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e.,the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually
been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To
remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is
the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Required procedure on the seizure and custody of
drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165.The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states: (1) The
apprehending team
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
309
VOL. 627, AUGUST 9, 201 309
People vs. Pagaduan
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Same; Same; Same; Same; Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is
required.Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of
the illegal drugs unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily
identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by
accident or otherwise. The records of the present case are bereft of evidence
showing that the buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure despite its
Same; Same; Same; Same; Procedural lapses however must be recognized and
explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.We recognize
that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied
conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in
the handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last sentence of the
implementing rules provides that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] Thus,
noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not
necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These
lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their
justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The justifiable ground for noncompliance must be
proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.We emphasize that for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the
prosecution explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and value of the seized evidence had been preserved. In other words, the
justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Definition of Chain of
Custody.Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002
which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines Chain of Custody as follows: Chain of
Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
Same; Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody explained in Malillin v. People,
553 SCRA 619 (2008).In Malillin v. People, 553 SCRA 619 (2008), the Court
explained that the chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the
time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to
it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
Same; Same; Same; Evidentiary presumption that official duties have been
regularly performed cannot by itself overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA relied on the
evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This
presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself,
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity
affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In
the present case, the failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph
1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement
of this Act effectively negates this presumption.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for appellant.
BRION, J.:
We review the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01597 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 27, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in Criminal Case No. 4600, finding
appellant Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Background Facts
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under an Information that states:
That on or about December 27, 2003 at about 4:30 oclock (sic) in the afternoon,
in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, dispense, deliver and give
away 0.01 gram, more or less, of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, as contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet to PO3
Peter C. Almarez, a member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
who posed as a buyer of shabu in the amount of P200.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits,
thereafter, followed.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts.
After having received information that the appellant was selling illegal drugs
in Nueva Vizcaya, Captain Jaime de Vera called, on his cellular phone, PO3 Peter
Almarez and SPO1 Domingo Balidowho were both in Santiago Cityand
informed them of a planned buy-bust operation. They agreed to meet at the SSS
Building near LMN Hotel in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.4 On their arrival there,
Captain de Vera conducted a briefing and designated PO3 Almarez as
the poseur buyer. Thereafter, Captain de Vera introduced PO3 Almarez to the
police informant (tipster),5 and gave him (PO3 Almarez) two P100 bills (Exhibits
D and E) which the latter marked with his initials.6
After this briefing, the buy-bust team went to Bintawan Road, Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya to conduct the entrapment operation.7 PO3 Almarez and the informant
rode a tricycle, while Captain de Vera and SPO1 Balido followed on board a tinted
van.8 The buy-bust team arrived at the target area at
around 4:30 p.m., and saw the appellant already waiting for the informant. The
informant approached the appellant and introduced PO3 Almarez to him as a
buyer. PO3 Almarez told the appellant that he needed shabu worth P200, and
inquired from him (appellant) if he had a stock. The appellant replied in the
affirmative, and then handed one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance to PO3 Almarez. PO3 Almarez, in turn,
gave the two pre-marked P100 bills to the appellant.9 Immediately after, PO3
Almarez made the pre-arranged signal to his companions, who then approached
the appellant. Captain de Vera took the marked money from the appellants right
pocket, and then arrested him.10PO3 Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet with
his initials.11Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi
Police Station for investigation.12
At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory
examination (Exh. C).13 The appellant was transferred to the Diadi Municipal
Jail where he was detained.14 Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3
Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized
plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2
Fernando Dulnuan.15 Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic
Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimen
submitted, and found it to be positive for the presence of shabu (Exh. B).16
On the hearing of August 13, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as
exhibits:
Exhibit Athe shabu confiscated from the appellant
Exhibit Bthe report by the PNP Crime Laboratory
Exhibit Cthe request for laboratory examination
Exhibits D and Ethe buy-bust money
Exhibit Fthe request for laboratory examination received by Forensic
Chemist Quintero
The defense presented a different version of the events, summarized as follows:
At around 4:30 p.m. of December 27, 2003, Jojo Jose came to the appellants
house and informed him that Captain de Vera was inviting him to be an asset.
The appellant and Jojo boarded a tricycle and proceeded to the SSS Building where
Captain de Vera was waiting for them.17 As the tricycle approached the Methodist
Church along Bintawan Road, Jojo dropped his slippers and ordered the driver to
stop. Immediately after, a van stopped in front of the tricycle; Captain de Vera
alighted from the van and handcuffed the appellant. Captain de Vera brought the
appellant inside the van, frisked him, and took P200 from his pocket. 18 Afterwards,
Captain de Vera took the appellant to the SSS Building, where he (Captain de
Vera) and the building manager drank coffee. Captain de Vera then brought the
appellant to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained for almost two days. 19
 On the morning of December 29, 2003, the appellant was transferred to the
Provincial Jail. He signed a document without the assistance of a lawyer after
being told that it would result in his immediate release.20
The RTC, in its decision21 of August 16, 2005, convicted the appellant of the
crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. The
RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01597.
The CA, in its decision22 dated May 22, 2007, affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA found unmeritorious the appellants defense of instigation, and held
that the appellant was apprehended as a result of a legitimate entrapment
operation. It explained that in inducement or instigation, an innocent person is
lured by a public officer or private detective to commit a crime. In the case at bar,
the buy-bust operation was planned only after the police had received information
that the appellant was selling shabu.
The CA also held that the failure of the police to conduct a prior surveillance
on the appellant was not fatal to the prosecutions case. It reasoned out that the
police are given wide discretion to select effective means to apprehend drug
dealers. A prior surveillance is, therefore, not necessary, especially when the police
are already accompanied by their informant.
The CA further ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove an
unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It explained that PO3 Almarez sealed the
plastic sachet seized from the appellant, marked it with his initials, and
transmitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero
conducted a qualitative examination and found the specimen positive for the
presence of shabu. According to the CA, the prosecution was able to prove that the
substance seized was the same specimen submitted to the laboratory and
presented in court, notwithstanding that this specimen was turned over to the
crime laboratory only after two days.
In his brief,23 the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting
him of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He harps on the fact that the police did not conduct a prior
surveillance on him before conducting the buy-bust operation.
The appellant further contends that the prosecution failed to show an
unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized drug. He claims that there
was no evidence to show when the markings were done. Moreover, a period of two
days had elapsed from the time the shabu was confiscated to the time it was
forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the
chain of custody of the shabu was sufficiently established. It explained that
the shabu was turned over by the police officers to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
where it was found by the forensic chemist to be positive for the presence of shabu.
The OSG likewise claimed that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties by the police. The OSG further
added that a prior surveillance is not indispensable to a prosecution for illegal sale
of drugs.24
The Courts Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the
prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the
prosecution failed to show that the police complied with paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act: A Brief Background
R.A. No. 9165 was enacted in 2002 to pursue the States policy to safeguard
the integrity of its territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the
youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental
well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their
development and preservation.
R.A. No. 9165 repealed and superseded R.A. No. 6425, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Realizing that dangerous drugs are one of the most serious
social ills of the society at present, Congress saw the need to further enhance the
efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. The new law thus mandates the
government to pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug
abuse policies, programs and projects.25
Illegal Sale of Drugs under Section 5
vis--vis the Inventory and Photograph
Requirement under Section 21
In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually
been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. 26 To
remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is
the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.27
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the
illegal drugs unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable,
and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise.28 The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the
buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure despite its mandatory terms. The
deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:
PROSECUTOR [EMERSON TURINGAN]:
Q: After you handed this buy-bust money to the accused, what happened next?
[PO3 ALMAREZ:]
A: When the shabu was already with me and I gave him the money[,] I signaled
the two, Captain Jaime de Vera and SPO1 Balido, sir.
xxxx
Q: After you gave that signal, what happened?
A: Then they approached us and helped me in arresting Felimon Pagaduan, sir.
Q: After Pagaduan was arrested, what happened next?
A: After arresting Pagaduan[,] we brought him directly in Diadi Police Station,
sir.
Q: What happened when you brought the accused to the Police Station in Diadi?
A: When we were already in Diadi Police Station, we first put him in jail in the
Municipal Jail of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.
Q: What did you do with the shabu?
A: The request for laboratory examination was prepared and was
brought to the Crime Lab. of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.
xxxx
Q: After making the request, what did you do next[,] if any[,] Mr.
Witness?
A: After submission of the request to the Crime Lab.[,] we prepared our
joint affidavit for submission of the case to the Court, sir.29
From the foregoing exchanges during trial, it is evident that the apprehending
team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the
seized items to the police station, and, once there, made the request for laboratory
examination. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken
in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice, and an elective official. PO3 Almarez, on cross-
examination, was unsure and could not give a categorical answer when asked
whether he issued a receipt for the shabu confiscated from the appellant.30 At any
rate, no such receipt or certificate of inventory appears in the records.
In several cases, we have emphasized the importance of compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. We have
repeatedly declared that the deviation from the standard procedure dismally
compromises the integrity of the evidence. In People v. Morales,31 we acquitted the
accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and inventory the seized
items, without giving any justifiable ground for the non-observance of the required
procedures. People v. Garcia32 likewise resulted in an acquittal because no
physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was
taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing
rules. In Bondad, Jr. v. People,33 we also acquitted the accused for the failure of
the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized items, without
justifiable grounds.
We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,34 People v. Denoman,35 People
v. Partoza,36 People v. Robles,37 and People v. dela Cruz,38 where we emphasized
the importance of complying with the required mandatory procedures under
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police
operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties
of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last
sentence of the implementing rules provides that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items[.] Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present
case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms
of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.39
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to
justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to show why an
inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in the
place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the
Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the
saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of
the seized evidence had been preserved.40 In other words, the justifiable
ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.41
The Chain of Custody Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be
observed in establishing the corpus delictithe body of the crime whose core is the
confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust
operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.42
Blacks Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:
 In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the narcotics in a trial
of drug case, must account for the custody of the evidence from the moment in
which it reaches his custody until the moment in which it is offered in evidence,
and such evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence. Com. V. White,
353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.
Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of
2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs
or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
In Malillin v. People,43 the Court explained that the chain of custody rule
requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain.
In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that
would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen
seized from the appellant.
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the heat-sealed
plastic sachet from the appellant. PO3 Almarez mentioned on cross-examination
that he placed his initials on the confiscated sachet after apprehending the
appellant. Notably, this testimony constituted the totality of the prosecutions
evidence on the marking of the seized evidence. PO3 Almarezs testimony,
however, lacked specifics on how he marked the sachet and who witnessed the
marking. In People v. Sanchez, we ruled that the marking of the seized items
to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidenceshould be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. In the present case,
nothing in the records gives us an insight on the manner and circumstances that
attended the marking of the confiscated sachet. Whether the marking had been
done in the presence of the appellant is not at all clear from the evidence that
merely mentioned that the evidence had been marked after the appellants
apprehension.
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the apprehending
team to the police station. PO3 Almarez testified that the appellant was brought
to the Diadi Police Station after his arrest. However, he failed to identify the
person who had control and possession of the seized drug at the time of its
transportation to the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we cannot
presume that PO3 Almarez, as the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachetto the
exclusion of othersduring its transfer from the place of arrest and confiscation
to the police station. The prosecution likewise failed to present evidence pertaining
to the identity of the duty desk officer who received the plastic sachet
containing shabufrom the buy-bust team. This is particularly significant since the
seized specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after two days.
It was not, therefore, clear who had temporary custody of the seized items during
this significant intervening period of time. Although the records show that the
request for laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet was prepared by
Captain de Vera, the evidence does not show that he was the official who received
the marked plastic sachet from the buy-bust team.
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the
seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on
December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined
by PSI Quintero. However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized
illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified. As earlier
discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as well as
the person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not
been established.
The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of
custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from the
appellant were the same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory
for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the
absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of the
crimethe corpus delictihas not been adequately proven.44 In effect, the
prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating
reasonable doubt on the appellants criminal liability.
Presumption of Regularity in the
Performance of Official Duties
In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption,
it must be emphasized, is not conclusive.45 It cannot, by itself, overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole
performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present case,
the failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act
effectively negates this presumption. As we explained in Malillin v. People:46
The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot
be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the
irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody
before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they are
lingering maladies that destroy families and relationships, and engender crimes.
The Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing an intensive and
unrelenting campaign against this social dilemma. Regardless of how much we
want to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by the
Constitution, most particularly the presumption of innocence bestowed on the
appellant. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those
who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome this constitutional presumption.
If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all the elements of the crime
charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no
less than an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the May 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01597.
Appellant Felimon Pagaduan yTamayo is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five
days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Bersamin, Abad** and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside, appellant FelimonPagaduan y Tamayo
acquitted.
Note.The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. (People vs. Agulay, 566 SCRA 571 [2008])
o0o
G.R. No. 180284. September 11, 2013.*
NARCISO SALAS, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; In personal actions, the Rules give the
plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place
(1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found.It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue
of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their
witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an
action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of
Court. In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the
option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where
he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be
residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action
is commenced.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments,
an objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is
filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived.Petitioner raised the issue of improper
venue for the first time in the Answer itself and no prior motion to dismiss based
on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments,
an objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is
filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived. Not having been timely raised,
petitioners objection on venue is therefore deemed waived.
Same; Same; Motion for Postponement; A motion for continuance or
postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound
discretion of the court.A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter
of right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking
for postponement have
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
561
 VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 561
Salas vs. Matusalem
absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus,
they must be prepared on the day of the hearing. Indeed, an order declaring a party
to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions
upholds the trial courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.
Due Process; Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process.With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial courts
denial of the motion for postponement filed by petitioners counsel, petitioners
contention that he was deprived of his day in court must likewise fail. The essence
of due process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. Where a party was
afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If the opportunity is not availed of,
it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Filiation; Illegitimate Children;
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: The
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
Same; Same; Paternity; Evidence; Birth Certificates; A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of
the certificate.We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.
Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by
the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.
Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument
and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Baptismal Certificates; While baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of
the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
childs paternity.As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo
Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
the childs paternity.
Same; Same; Evidence; Pictures; Pictures taken of the mother and her child
together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove
paternity.Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged
father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. Exhibits E and F showing
petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account (Exhibit C) from the Good
Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee
is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioners admission in his answer that he shouldered the
expenses in the delivery of respondents child as an act of charity.
Same; Same; Same; Handwritten Notes; As to the handwritten notes of
petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and
romantic trysts, these are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to
petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of
admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child.As to the handwritten
notes (Exhibits D to D-13) of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange
of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not suffi-
563
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 563
Salas vs. Matusalem
cient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not
signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he
is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not
qualify under Article 172 (2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits
as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Filiation; Illegitimate Children; An illegitimate child is
now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.An illegitimate
child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondents evidence insufficient to
establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo. The testimonies of
respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo,
petitioners financial support while respondent lived in Murillos apartment and
his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with details, do not
approximate the overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial
presented in Ilano.
Same; Same; Same; Paternity; The Supreme Court has ruled that a high
standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.Time and again,
this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
Same; Same; Support; Illegitimate Children; The death of the putative father
is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his
illegitimate child.The action for support having been filed in the trial court when
petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code.
We have also held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action
commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child. The
rule on substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, thus applies. SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.Whenever
a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall
be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall
be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal
representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so
named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the
opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor
or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jennifer Patacsil-Arceo for petitioner.
Oscar C. Sahagun for respondent.
565
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 565
Salas vs. Matusalem
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint 3 for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo
Salas who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the
time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is
a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of
caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused
the offer of petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned
respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still
petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the
amount of P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 75-84. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok
with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Mario L. Guaria III, concurring.
2 Id., at p. 93. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with
Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Lucenito N. Tagle.
3 Records, pp. 1-6.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and
counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne
her first child also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her
return to the country, respondent spent time riding on petitioners jeepney which
was then being utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima de
Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro and her
charge of sexual abuse against said police officer was later withdrawn in exchange
for the quashing of drug charges against respondents brother-in-law who was then
detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time respondent introduced herself
to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she was pregnant with another child.
Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no
other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for
the delivery of said child, unaware of respondents chicanery and deceit designed
to scandalize him in exchange for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was
declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered
submitted for decision based on respondents evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his kumadre
Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their
subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a widower and he has no
more companion in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned
that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing subdivision
(petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner
at the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her
former boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will
take care
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 24-26.
567
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 567
Salas vs. Matusalem
of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the
thought that she and her child will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each
other weekly and petitioner gave her money for her child. When she became
pregnant with petitioners child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not
a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he
wanted to have another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where
she stayed with a housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave
birth to their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in
Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room
and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She filled out
the form for the childs birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by
petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her
baby home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is his
look-alike, and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo,
the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after
the babys birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He
confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also informed about his
having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt the baby and
just give respondent money so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer,
petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived
through the help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide
by drug overdose and was brought to the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill.
Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City Police Station which set their
meeting with petitioner. However, it was only peti-
_______________
5 TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 21; TSN, November 17, 1995, pp. 4-7, 13; TSN,
March 22, 1996, pp. 14-25; TSN, June 3, 1996, pp. 19-29, 33-37.
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
tioners wife who showed up and she was very mad, uttering unsavory words
against respondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the payment by petitioner
of apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her,
his presence during and after delivery of respondents baby, respondents
attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which
she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with
petitioners wife at the headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision 8 in favor of respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO
THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for the child Christian Paulo through the
mother;
2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00
by way of litigation expenses; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case
without affording him the right to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the
trial court erred
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 8-21; id., at pp. 10-12; id., at pp. 7-11; id., at pp. 9-10, 14-18, 43-46;
TSN, February 19, 1996, pp. 6, 10-12.
7 TSN, July 8, 1996, pp. 5-11; TSN, November 29, 1996, pp. 4-9, 15-26.
8 Rollo, pp. 65-73. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Johnson L. Ballutay.
9 Id., at pp. 72-73.
569
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 569
Salas vs. Matusalem
in finding that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo and ordering
him to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal. The
appellate court found no reason to disturb the trial courts exercise of discretion in
denying petitioners motion for postponement on April 17, 1998, the scheduled
hearing for the initial presentation of defendants evidence, and the motion for
reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for postponement and
submitting the case for decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling that respondent
satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and
consequently no error was committed by the trial court in granting respondents
prayer for support. The appellate court thus held:
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record
of birth in the civil registry which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso
Salas. He cannot claim open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child.
It had been established by plaintiffs evidence, however, that during her
pregnancy, Annabelle was provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at
a rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for (TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 18).
Narciso provided her with a household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a
month (TSN, October 6, 1995, ibid). He also provided her a monthly food
allowance of P1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with Annabelle at the
hospital while the latter was in labor, walking her around and massaging
her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented
apartment after Annabelles discharge from the hospital. People living in
the same apartment units were witnesses to Narcisos delight to father a
son at his age which was his look alike. It was only after the 18th day
 when Annabelle refused to give him Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew
his support to him and his mother.570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by
Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment which Narciso rented, was never
rebutted on record. Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal or
documentary, to repudiate plaintiffs evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA(245
SCRA 150), the Supreme Court made it clear that Article 172 of the Family
Code is an adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said legal provision
provides that the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child
x x 3) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision
that practically covers all the other cases in the preceding
paragraphs. Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the
father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs
of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements
of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last
paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation
evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to
illegitimate filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the
son of defendant Narciso Salas, he is entitled to support from the latter
(Ilano vs. CA, supra).
It shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to
recover the same needs it for maintenance x x. (Art. 203, Family Code of
the Philippines).10
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 82-83.
571
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 571
Salas vs. Matusalem
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition submitting the following arguments:
1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT
BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF
BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING
THAT PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE
WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT
TO ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO
SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER.11
We grant the petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for
the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is
the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice;
the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the
option of choosing where to file his complaint.
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 180-181.
12 Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012, 678 SCRA 699, 705,
citing Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp. v. Goldstar Elevators, Phils., Inc., 510
Phil. 467, 476; 473 SCRA 705, 714 (2005).
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. 13 The plaintiff or
the defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted
at the time the action is commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the
Answer itself and no prior motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under
the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments, an objection to an improper venue
must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed
waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioners objection on venue is
therefore deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the
resetting of the initial presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find
that it was not the first time petitioners motion for postponement was denied by
the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondents
last witness on November 29, 1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set
the continuation of hearing for the reception of evidence for the defendant
(petitioner) on January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order dated
December 17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his evidence at those
hearing dates earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997, petitioners
former counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested for the can-
_______________
13 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 4, Section 2.
14 Ang v. Ang, supra note 12, at pp. 705-706, citing Baritua v. Court of Appeals,
335 Phil. 12, 15-16; 267 SCRA 331, 335 (1997).
15 Fernandez v. International Corporate Bank, 374 Phil. 668, 677; 316 SCRA
326, 334 (1999), citing Rule 14, Section 4 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court which
provides that [w]hen improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it
is deemed waived. The Complaint in this case was filed on May 26, 1995 and the
Answer was filed on July 3, 1995.
573
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 573
Salas vs. Matusalem
cellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997 hearings in order to give him time to
prepare for his defense, which request was granted by the trial court which thus
reset the hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17, 1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral
manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection from respondents counsel, Atty.
Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the hearing to March 14 and 17, 1997.
With the nonappearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the
trial court upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared their absence as a
waiver of their right to present evidence and accordingly deemed the case
submitted for decision.16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael
E. Villarosa filed his appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same
date he filed entry of appearance, Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration
of the March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and magnanimity of the trial
court, without offering any explanation for Atty. Balas failure to appear for the
initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its
March 14, 1997 Order, finding it better to give petitioner a chance to present his
evidence. On August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the
presentation of their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997. On August 29,
1997, the trial court received his motion requesting that the said hearing be reset
to October 10, 1997 for the reason that he had requested the postponement of a
hearing in another case which was incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and
24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing to October 10, 1997. On
said date, however, the hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On
February 16, 1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it
was unclear whether Atty. Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17
_______________
16 Records, pp. 81-83, 109, 111 and 113.
17 Id., at pp. 115-126, 128 and 130.
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court
received on April 16, 1998 an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty.
Villarosa. The reason given by the latter was the scheduled hearing on the issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998 Order
issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 1946. But
as clearly stated in the said order, it was the plaintiffs therein who requested the
postponement of the hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of
Gapan that he had a previous commitment considering that the April 17, 1998
hearing was scheduled as early as February 16, 1998. Acting on the motion for
postponement, the trial court denied for the second time petitioners motion for
postponement. Even at the hearing of their motion for reconsideration of the April
17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed to appear and instead
filed another motion for postponement. The trial court thus ordered that the case
be submitted for decision stressing that the case had long been pending and that
petitioner and his counsel have been given opportunities to present their evidence.
It likewise denied a second motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who
arrived late during the hearing thereof on December 4, 1998.18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a
request addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for
postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be
granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.19 Indeed, an
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 131-138, 140 and 142-146.
19 Gochan v. Gochan, 446 Phil. 433, 454; 398 SCRA 323, 341 (2003),
citing Tiomico v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 558, 571; 304 SCRA 216, 229
(1999); Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 859, 867; 299
SCRA 518, 525 (1998); Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 361 Phil.
186, 196; 301 SCRA 237, 246 (1999) and Iriga Telephone Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 350
Phil. 245, 252; 286 SCRA 600, 606 (1998).
575
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 575
Salas vs. Matusalem
order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing
dilatory actions upholds the trial courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite
the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.20
Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in
view of his own negligence in failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial
schedules. As we held in Tiomico v. Court of Appeals:21
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if
there is evidence of bad faith, malice or inexcusable negligence on the part
of the movant. The inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to take
note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court of any
conflict in his schedules of trial or court appearances, constitutes
inexcusable negligence. It should be borne in mind that a client is bound by
his counsels conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial courts denial
of the motion for postponement filed by petitioners counsel, petitioners contention
that he was deprived of his day in court must likewise fail. The essence of due
process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. Where a party was afforded
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot
complain of deprivation of due process. If the opportunity is
_______________
20 Memita v. Masongsong, G.R. No. 150912, May 28, 2007, 523 SCRA 244, 254,
citing Rockwell Perfecto Gohu v. Spouses Gohu, 397 Phil. 126, 135; 343 SCRA 114,
122 (2000).
21 Supra note 19.
22 Id., at p. 572, citing Cing Hong So v. Tan Boon Kong, 53 Phil. 437 (1929)
and Suarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91133, March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 274,
279.
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional
guarantee.23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts
erred in ruling that respondents evidence sufficiently proved that her son
Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation
may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit A-1) of
Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but
which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the
entries and signed the said document though she claims it
_______________
23 Memita v. Masongsong, supra note 20, at p. 253, citing Air Phils. Corp. v.
International Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., 481 Phil. 366, 386; 438 SCRA
51, 66-67 (2004) and Tiomico v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19, at pp. 570-571; p.
228.
24 Records, p. 88.
577
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 577
Salas vs. Matusalem
was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. 25 Thus, if the
father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. 26Neither
can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument 27 and it
has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father. 28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo Salas also
indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates
may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
the childs paternity.30
_______________
25 Cabatania v. Court of Appeals, 484 Phil. 42, 51; 441 SCRA 96, 103 (2004).
26 Berciles, et al. v. GSIS, et al., 213 Phil. 48, 71; 128 SCRA 53, 77 (1984); Roces
v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050, 1054 (1958).
27 Reyes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 220 Phil. 116, 128 (1985),
citing Intestate Estate of Pareja v. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167, 172 (1954).
28 See Nepomuceno v. Lopez, G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 145,
153 and Puno v. Puno Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 177066, September 11, 2009, 599
SCRA 585, 590-591.
29 Records, p. 90.
30 Fernandez v. Fernandez, 416 Phil. 322, 339; 363 SCRA 811, 825-826
(2001);Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108366, February 16, 1994, 230
SCRA 130, 136; Reyes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note
27; Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, No. L-49542, September 12, 1980, 100
SCRA 73, 84.
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes
and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside
their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.31Exhibits E and F32 showing
petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit C) from the Good
Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee
is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioners admission in his answer that he shouldered the
expenses in the delivery of respondents child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits D to D-13) of petitioner and
respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts,
these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as
they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were
authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis--vis Article 175 of the
Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an
admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.35
Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is misplaced. In
the said case, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission
that he is the father of private respondents daughter and were signed by him. The
Court therein considered the totality of evidence which established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private respondents
daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court sustained
the appellate courts finding that private respondents evidence to establish her
filiation with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the
latters public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondents mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts and
words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by documentary
evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of
continuous possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and
continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered
the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.38 Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
respondents evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of
Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth
of Christian Paulo, petitioners financial support while respondent lived in
Murillos apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though
replete with details, do not approximate the overwhelming evidence, documentary
and testimonial presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate
courts ruling anchored on the following factual findings by the appellate court
which was quoted at length in the ponencia:
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas
(sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia
underwent prenatal examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33,
5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in a car
owned and driven by Artemio himself (id., at p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of Ilano since birth without any
objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her
discernment she had always known and called Artemio as her Daddy
(TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he
would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat,
and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id., at p. 34) and does all
what a father should do for his child bringing home goodies, candies, toys
and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives to
Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that
Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such.
Special attention is called to Exh. E-7 where Artemio was telling Leoncia
the need for a frog test to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to
her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. E-2 and E-3, and D-
6),
581
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 581
Salas vs. Matusalem
or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the
form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh.
G) and the signature appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia
as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio
would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49,
7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature
were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and
wife, Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When
Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio
signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. H) for the fourth and fifth
grading period(s) (Exh. H-1 and H-2) as the parent of Merceditas (sic).
Those signatures of Artemio [were] both identified by Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. H-1 and H-2 at their
residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN,
p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite[,]
Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: To Nene,
with best regards, Temiong. (Exh. I). (pp. 19-20, Appellants Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset
the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon
belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and
Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia
is not appellees daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by
Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves
are not competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondents evidence failed
to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required
to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of
the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioners counsel
informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was
still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also
held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced
during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child. 43 The rule on
substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.Whenever a party to a
pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be
the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his
duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
 administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30)
days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased
party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period,
the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure
the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64379 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch G.R. No. 209588. February 18, 2015.*
26 is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERIC
SO ORDERED. ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Where there is no showing that
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely
abused its discretion, the Supreme Court (SC) will not disturb the trial courts
Notes.To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the Regional Trial
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged; Court (RTC) was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented
Illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their during trial.It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that
filiation must be duly proved. (Dolina vs. Vallecera, 638 SCRA 707 [2010]) the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the
to establish paternity and filiation. An order for support may create an facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that
so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are
convincing evidence. (Perla vs. Baring, 685 SCRA 101 [2012]) binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
o0o
_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.
205
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 205
People vs. Rosauro
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Buy-Bust Operations; Decoy
Solicitation; It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at
the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives
feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its
commission.The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of accused-appellant to
be the result of a legitimate entrapment procedure, and we find nothing in the
records as to warrant a contrary finding. In People v. Bartolome, 690 SCRA 159
(2013), we had the occasion to discuss the legitimacy of a decoy solicitation, to
wit: It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission
were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the decoy
solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission.
Especially is this true in that class of cases where the office is one habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the
police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an
intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs.
They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with
appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the appellant to sell
illegal drugs to him.
Same; Same; Informants; As a rule, the informant is not presented in court
for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation
of the culprit arrested through his efforts.Similarly, the presentation of an
informant as witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a
prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in
court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant from the
retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality
of the informants identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to
law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is considered
absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to
protect his security be disregarded. In the present case, as the buy-bust operation
was duly witnessed by the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task
Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro
Lorenzo Larot (SPO4 Larot) and PO3 Juancho Dizon, their testimonies can
take the place of that of the confidential informant.
Same; Same; Buy-Bust Operations; The delivery of the illicit drug to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction.In a catena of cases, this Court laid down
the essential elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu,
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof
that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti.
Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody; The identity of the prohibited drug
must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same
degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust
operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit.Indeed, as we held in People
v. Torres, 697 SCRA 452 (2013), equally important in every prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the presentation of evidence of the seized
drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with
moral certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of certitude that
the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item
offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the protection
of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody; The prosecutions failure to submit in
evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required
under Article 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, will not render the accuseds arrest
illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.This Court has, in many cases,
held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is almost
always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and the eviden-
207
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 207
People vs. Rosauro
tiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the
physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article
21 of R.A. No. 9165, will not render the accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized
from him inadmissible. The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance
with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in
the presence of the enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states:
x x x Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
For the consideration of the Court is an appeal of the Decision 1dated 19 June
2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00552-MIN, which
affirmed the Judgment2 dated 24 November 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2004-856, finding
accused-appellant Eric Rosauro y Bongcawil (accused-appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Sec. 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-17; penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, with
Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Jhosep Y. Lopez, concurring.
2 CA Rollo, pp. 72-75; penned by Judge Noli T. Catli.
208
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro
 2002, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering
him to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
In an Amended Information dated 21 February 2005, 3 accused-appellant was
charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit:
That on the 3rd day of July, 2004 at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, more
or less, at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Villanueva, Province of
Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, not being authorized by law to possess
and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly, willfully and feloniously, did then and
there, sell and convey to a third person, who acted as a decoy in a buy-bust
operation, one (1) sachet of shabu, containing 0.04 grams (sic) of shabu, which
when examined gave POSITIVE result to test for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.4
Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.5 Thereafter, pretrial and trial on the merits ensued.
_______________
3 Records, p. 1; The Original Information dated 21 September 2004 reads:
That on the 3rd day of July, 2004 at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, more
or less, at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Villanueva, Province of
Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, not being authorized by law to possess
and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly, willfully and feloniously did then and
there sell and convey to a third person one (1) sachet of Shabu, containing 0.08
grams (sic) of shabu, which when examined gave POSITIVE result to the test for
the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
4 Rollo, p. 6; CA Decision.
5 CA Rollo, p. 72; RTC Judgment.
209
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 209
People vs. Rosauro
Based on the records, the prosecutions version of the facts is as follows:
On October 13, 2002, on the basis of unconfirmed reports that accused-
appellant Eric Rosauro (Rosauro for brevity) was selling and distributing drugs,
the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of Misamis Oriental conducted a test-buy
operation in the Municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental using a confidential
agent. The confidential agent bought shabufrom Rosauro
at Purok 2, Barangay Katipunan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The substance
bought from Rosauro was examined by the PNP crime laboratory and yielded a
positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (commonly known as shabu).
On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that again drugs
were being distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis
Oriental. Thus, at 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs-
Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot
and PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned themselves in the house of their confidential
agent.
There, the PAID-SOTU elements saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential
agent. In exchange for the one (1) sachet of shabu given by Rosauro to the
confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked 100-peso bill with serial number
YZ712579.
After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their hiding place and
arrested Rosauro. Thereafter, the confidential agent handed the sachet to Larot,
who taped it, marked it with the marking Exhibit A, and placed it inside his
pocket. He also took pictures of Rosauro and the drugs. In the police station, he
prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory Examination.
Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime laboratory.
On the basis of the request made by Larot, Police Chief Inspector Ma. Leocy
Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemi-
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro
cal Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory conducted a laboratory examination on
the contents of the sachet, on accused-appellant, and the marked money. The
examination of the seized item yielded positive result for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu); while the accused-appellant and the marked money tested
positive for the presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder.6
For his part, accused-appellant claims that he was merely a victim of
instigation:
Accused-appellant Rosauro, on the other hand, tells a different tale. He
testified that on July 3, 2004, the police asset went to his house four (4) times and
convinced him to do an errand for him. Rosauro refused to buy shabu as he did not
know where to buy one. It was the confidential informant who told him to buy the
prohibited drug from a certain Kael and to deliver it to the formers house. It was
also the informant who gave the money to Rosauro to buy the shabu. But Rosauro
was not able to meet or buy directly from Kael because it was a young man who
got and handed to him the shabu on the road. When Rosauro went to the house of
the confidential informant as instructed, he was arrested by SPO4 Larot and
Dizon. The sachet of shabu was not even recovered from him but from the
confidential informant.7
Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of
accused-appellant, the RTC rendered a judgment of conviction, viz.:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby renders
Judgment finding accused ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information for selling and delivering
a sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer a Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165 and imposes
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 3-5; CA Decision.
7 Id., at p. 5.
211
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 211
 People vs. Rosauro
a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
(Php500,000.00) Pesos and to pay the cost.
The accused ERIC B. ROSAURO who has undergone preventive imprisonment
shall be credited in the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty,
with the full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rule imposed upon convicted prisoners, except those disqualified by law.
The sachet of shabu, Exh. A is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be destroyed in accordance with law.8
Accused-appellant appealed before the CA, assigning a lone error:
I 14 Id., at p. 15.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.9
After a review of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment. The
appellate court ruled that what transpired in the case at bar was an entrapment
and not an instigation;10 that all the elements of illegal sale of regulated or
prohibited drugs were duly proven;11 that the nonpresentation of the confidential
agent in court is not fatal;12 that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the lone
witness of the prosecution do not affect the result of the case; 13 and that the
apprehending
_______________
8 CA Rollo, pp. 74-75; RTC Judgment.
9 Id., at p. 49; Brief for the Accused-Appellant.
10 Rollo, p. 8; CA Decision.
11 Id., at pp. 11-12.
12 Id., at p. 12.
13 Id., at p. 13.
212
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro
team was able to preserve the integrity of the subject drug and that the
prosecution was able to present the required unbroken chain in the custody of the
subject drug.14 Thus, the CA held:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 2004-856 is
hereby AFFIRMED.15
Accused-appellant is now before the Court seeking a review of his conviction.
After a thorough review of the records, however, we dismiss the appeal.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial
court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused
its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the facts
and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess
and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the
factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are
binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.16
The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of accused-appellant to be the result
of a legitimate entrapment procedure, and we find nothing in the records as to
warrant a contrary finding. In People v. Bartolome,17 we had the occasion to
discuss the legitimacy of a decoy solicitation, to wit:
_______________
15 Id., at p. 17.
16 People v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 200304, 15 January 2014, 714 SCRA 78, 101.
17 G.R. No. 191726, 6 February 2013, 690 SCRA 159, 172, citing People v. Sta.
Maria, 545 Phil. 520, 528-529; 516 SCRA 621, 628 (2007).
213
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 213
People vs. Rosauro
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission
were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the decoy
solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission.
Especially is this true in that class of cases where the office is one habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by
the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an
intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs.
They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with
appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the appellant to sell
illegal drugs to him.
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as
indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule,
the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to
protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his
efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informants identity is protected in
deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the testimony
of the informant is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of
the culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded.18 In the present
case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by the Provincial Anti-Illegal
Drugs-Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo
Larot (SPO4 Larot) and PO3 Juancho Dizon, their testimonies can take the place
of that of the confidential informant.
As to whether accused-appellants guilt was established beyond reasonable
doubt, we rule in the affirmative.
_______________
 18 Id., at p. 175.
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro
In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements to be duly
established for a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of
dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.
Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the
marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.
What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.19
Verily, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs were proven by the prosecution: the identity of accused-appellant
as the seller, and that of the confidential informant as poseur-buyer were
established, as well as the exchange of the sachet of shabu and the marked money.
It was also ascertained that the seized item was positive for shabu, a dangerous
drug, and that the same item was properly identified in open court by SPO4 Larot.
Moreover, the P100.00-bill with serial number YZ712579, or the subject marked
money, as well as the living body of the accused-appellant revealed a positive result
for ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus
delicti, and that the statutory safeguards provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165
were not followed.
Indeed, as we held in People v. Torres,20 equally important in every prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the presentation of evidence of
the seized drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be
proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with
_______________
19 People v. Torres, G.R. No. 191730, 5 June 2013, 697 SCRA 452, 462-463.
20 Id., at p. 464.
215
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 215
People vs. Rosauro
the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the
buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit. In this regard,
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule)
provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous
drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernali
a and/or Laboratory Equipment.The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody
should ideally be perfect, in reality it is almost always impossible to obtain an
unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit in
evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required
under
216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro
Article 21 of R.A. No. 9165, will not render the accuseds arrest illegal or the
items seized from him inadmissible.21
The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed
physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the
enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165
on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states:
x x x Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.22 (Italics, emphasis,
underscoring omitted)
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant
gave the seized item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the sachet and marked it
Exhibit A. Upon reaching the police station, SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate
of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory examination. The request, the
specimen, as well as the marked money and accused-appellant were then brought
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2
Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then
forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory.23 Moreover, the seized item was
duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open court as the same item seized from accused-
appellant.
Accused-appellants guilt having been established, we likewise affirm the
penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA.
_______________
 21 People v. Loks, G.R. No. 203433, 27 November 2013, 711 SCRA 187, 196-
197.
22 Supra note 19 at pp. 465-466.
23 Rollo, p. 15; CA Decision.
217
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 217
People vs. Rosauro
Under the law, the offense of illegal sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), regardless of the quantity
and purity of the substance.24 Thus, the RTC and CA were within bounds when
they imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Appeal dismissed.
Notes.The presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the prosecution
of drug cases. (Quinicot vs. People, 590 SCRA 458 [2009])
Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their
identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. (Id.)
o0o
G.R. No. 203984. June 18, 2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO
y DIMALANTA, accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Searches and
Seizures; The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter
from destroying evidence within reach.The purpose of allowing a warrantless
search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the arresting officer
from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law
enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have
lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks
to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under
the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
Same; Same; Same; Plainview Doctrine; The Plain View Doctrine is actually
the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his
immediate control.The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his immediate control. This
is so because [o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the ac-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
21cused and permits the warrantless seizure. The Plain View Doctrine
thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation because the police officers
purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently
come across the black bag, which was in Calantiaos possession; they deliberately
opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiaos lawful arrest.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule; Marking; The
failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the
integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these
would be utilized in the in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will
not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention marking.
What they require are (1) physical inventory, and (2) taking of photographs. As
this Court held in People v. Ocfemia, 706 SCRA 312 (2013): What Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
marking of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence
seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than
at the place of arrest. Consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that
the marking of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same items
that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be
done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation.
Same; Same; Same; Unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will,
or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has
been preserved will remain.Unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill
will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the
evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to
overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized
22drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is
on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.
Same; Same; Marking; Denial; Frame-Up; The defenses of denial and frame-
up have always been frowned upon by the Supreme Court (SC).His theory, from
the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being framed for
having offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial
and frame-up. However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the
Court, to wit: The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by
this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In
order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong
and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present
sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions,
no plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations. Hence, as Calantiao
failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers were
stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies
deserve full faith and credit.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 17, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04069, affirming in totothe July 23, 2009 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with
Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.
2 CA Rollo, pp. 22-29; penned by Judge Victoriano B. Cabanos and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 69566.
23Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 127, finding accused-appellant Medario
Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in an Information, 3 the pertinent
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 11th day of November, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2)
bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997.9 grams, knowing
the same to be a dangerous drug.
The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the afternoon, while PO1
NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain
EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police assistance regarding
a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing
truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic
dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until
they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat,
the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and
fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving
until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.
3 Records, p. A.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3
EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to
said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where
they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted
therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away. PO1
Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano
recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana
fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez
recovered from Calantiaos companion [a] .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO
TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation.
Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag
with his initials, NM. Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted
by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3
RAMIREZ who testified that he personally saw those bricks of marijuana
confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he was with PO1 Mariano when
they apprehended said accused and his companion and testified that while PO1
Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his part,
he confiscated from accuseds companion a .38 revolver.
MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects boarded
was also presented in open court and testified as to what he knows about the
incident. He confirmed that on that date, two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and
upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and ran away.
Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution also offered
the following documentary evidence to boost their charge against the accused:
Exh. A Request for Laboratory Examination dated November 12, 2003
Exh. B Physical Sciences Report No. D-1423-03 dated November 12, 2003
Exh. C-1 Picture of First brick of marijuana fruiting tops
Exh. C-2 Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting tops
Exh. D Referral Slip dated November 12, 2003
Exh. E Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 12, 2003
of PO3 Eduardo Ramirez and PO1 Nelson Mariano
Exh. E-1 Their respective signatures
 Exh. F Sinumpaang Salaysay of Crisendo Amansec (Erroneously
marked as Exh. E)
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE
The accused offered a different version of the story. According to his testimony,
this instant case originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi he and his
companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost collided with another car. Reyes
then opened the window and made a fuck you sign against the persons on board
of that car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught in
a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on board of that other car
alighted and kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano
slapped the latter and uttered, Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba
ako kilala? Said police officer poked his gun again[st] Reyes and when Calantiao
tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and were
brought to the police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking
26and their wallets and money were taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some
documents and informed them that they will be charged for drugs. A newspaper
containing marijuana was shown to them and said police officer told them that it
would be sufficient evidence against them. They were detained and subjected to
medical examination before they were submitted for inquest at the prosecutors
office.4
Ruling of the RTC
On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the
prosecutions case. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
accused MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A.
9165, for illegally possessing 997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting tops. Henceforth,
this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).5
In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was
admissible in evidence as it was discovered during a body search after Calantiao
was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers.
Moreover, the RTC found all the elements of the offense to have been duly
established by the prosecution.6
Aggrieved, Calantiao appealed7 his conviction to the Court of Appeals,
assigning the following errors:
I Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ITEMS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS PATENT
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER
CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE
PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiaos conviction. It
found that there was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police
officers were acting on a legitimate complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that
the persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense. Likewise,
the Court of Appeals held that the search and subsequent seizure of
the marijuana in question was lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful
arrest.9
Finding that all the elements of the charge of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs to be present and duly proven,10 the Court of Appeals, on January 17, 2012,
promulgated its Decision, affirming in toto the RTCs ruling.
Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an acquittal, adding
the following arguments in support of his position:
First, the plain view doctrine is not an exception to a search incident to a valid
warrantless arrest.
xxxx
Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the seized items.
xxxx
Finally, the seized items custodial chain is broken.11
In essence, Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found
in his possession, as evidence against him on the grounds of either it was
discovered via an illegal search, or because its custodial chain was broken.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no merit in Calantiaos arguments.
Search and Seizure of
Marijuana valid
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiaos contention that the marijuana in
his possession cannot be admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally
discovered and seized, not having been within the apprehending officers plain
view.12
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful
arrest is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested,
who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach.13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the
States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be
inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from
being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting
officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of
the arrestee.
In Valeroso v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court had the occasion to reiterate the
permissible reach of a valid warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful
arrest, viz.:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order
to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable
for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
_______________
13 Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, 614 Phil. 236, 252; 598 SCRA 41, 58 (2009).
14 Id., at p. 251; pp. 55-56.
30
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of
the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach. Otherwise
stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on
the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase within the area of his immediate control means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a
table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. (Citations
omitted)
In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized
from him could not be used against him because they were discovered in a room,
different from where he was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the
area searched could not be considered as one within his immediate control that he
could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against him.15
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiaos
possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any
weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black
bag containing the marijuanawas in Calantiaos possession, it was within the
permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a
warrantless search.
Calantiaos argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against
him because its discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of
evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the
suspects person and
_______________
15 Id., at p. 252; p. 57.
31premises under his immediate control. This is so because [o]bjects in the plain
view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 16 The doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object,
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and
permits the warrantless seizure.17
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation
because the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police
officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiaos
possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiaos
lawful arrest.
Inventory and Chain of
Custody of Evidence
Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected,
the marijuana is still inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the
apprehending officers to comply with the rules on chain of custody, as the item was
marked at the police station.18
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment.The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof[.]
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment.The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:33
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.](Emphasis
supplied)
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply
with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking
seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody
because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.19
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention marking. What they require are
(1) physical inventory, and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People
v. Ocfemia:20
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly
specify is the matter of marking of the seized items in warrantless seizures to
ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected
to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police
station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the chain of custody
rule requires that the marking of the seized items to truly ensure that they
are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2)
immediately upon confiscation.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the
seized marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was
turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination.21This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs
to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao
inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or
tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has
been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the
presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and
that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately,
Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.22
It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his
appeal. He himself admits this.23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that he
did not do it, and that he was being framed for having offended the police officers.
Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up. However, those
defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:
The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court
with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing
evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in
support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was
presented to bolster his allegations.24
Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the
apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform
their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04069.
SO ORDERED.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.As an incident to the lawful arrest of the accused after the
consummation of the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority
to search the person of the accused. (People vs. Mantalaba, 654 SCRA 188 [2011])
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to
the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure. (Miclat, Jr. vs. People, 656 SCRA 539 [2011])
o0o
G.R. No. 181045. July 2, 2014.*
SPOUSES EDUARDO and LYDIA SILOS, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is not the function of the Supreme
Court (SC) to reexamine or reevaluate evidence adduced by the parties in the
proceedings below. The rule admits of certain well-recognized exceptions.Before
anything else, it must be said that it is not the function of the Court to reexamine
or reevaluate evidence adduced by the parties in the proceedings below. The rule
admits of certain well-recognized exceptions, though, as when the lower courts
findings are not supported by the evidence on record or are based on a
misapprehension of facts, or when certain relevant and undisputed facts were
manifestly overlooked that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. This case falls within such exceptions.
Banks and Banking; Interest Rates; In a number of decided cases, the
Supreme Court (SC) struck down provisions in credit documents issued by
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to, or required of, its borrowers which allow the
bank to increase or decrease interest rates within the limits allowed by law at any
time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future.It appears that
respondents practice, more than once proscribed by the Court, has been carried
over once more to the petitioners. In a number of decided cases, the Court struck
down provisions in credit documents issued
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
618
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
by PNB to, or required of, its borrowers which allow the bank to increase or
decrease interest rates within the limits allowed by law at any time depending on
whatever policy it may adopt in the future. Thus, in Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 536 (1991), such stipulation and similar ones were
declared in violation of Article 1308 of the Civil Code. In a second case, Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 20 (1994), the very same stipulations
found in the credit agreement and the promissory notes prepared and issued by
the respondent were again invalidated.
Same; Same; A borrowers current financial state, his feedback or opinions,
the nature and purpose of his borrowings, the effect of foreign currency values or
fluctuations on his business or borrowing, etc. these are not factors which
influence the fixing of interest rates to be imposed on him.In Aspas enumeration
of the factors that determine the interest rates PNB fixes such as cost of money,
foreign currency values, bank administrative costs, profitability, and
considerations which affect the banking industry it can be seen that
considerations which affect PNBs borrowers are ignored. A borrowers current
financial state, his feedback or opinions, the nature and purpose of his borrowings,
the effect of foreign currency values or fluctuations on his business or borrowing,
etc. these are not factors which influence the fixing of interest rates to be
imposed on him. Clearly, respondents method of fixing interest rates based on one-
sided, indeterminate, and subjective criteria such as profitability, cost of money,
bank costs, etc. is arbitrary for there is no fixed standard or margin above or below
these considerations.
Same; Same; Any modification in the contract, such as the interest rates, must
be made with the consent of the contracting parties.Any modification in the
contract, such as the interest rates, must be made with the consent of the
contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed
modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In
the case of loan agreements, the rate of interest is a principal condition, if not the
most important component. Thus, any modification thereof must be mutually
agreed upon; otherwise, it has no binding effect.
Same; Same; Truth in Lending Act (R.A. No. 3765); The Truth in Lending
Act, or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3765, was enacted to protect citizens from a lack of
awareness of the true cost of credit to
619
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 619
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
the user by using a full disclosure of such cost with a view of preventing the
uninformed use of credit to the detriment of the national economy.Accordingly,
petitioners are correct in arguing that estoppel should not apply to them, for
[e]stoppel cannot be predicated on an illegal act. As between the parties to a
contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is
against public policy. It appears that by its acts, respondent violated the Truth in
Lending Act, or Republic Act No. 3765, which was enacted to protect x x x citizens
from a lack of awareness of the true cost of credit to the user by using a full
disclosure of such cost with a view of preventing the uninformed use of credit to
the detriment of the national economy. The law gives a detailed enumeration of
the specific information required to be disclosed, among which are the interest and
other charges incident to the extension of credit. Section 4 thereof provides that a
disclosure statement must be furnished prior to the consummation of the
transaction.
Same; Same; Same; By requiring the petitioners to sign the credit documents
and the promissory notes in blank, and then unilaterally filling them up later on,
respondent violated the Truth in Lending Act, and was remiss in its disclosure
obligations.By requiring the petitioners to sign the credit documents and the
promissory notes in blank, and then unilaterally filling them up later on,
respondent violated the Truth in Lending Act, and was remiss in its disclosure
obligations.
Same; Same; Same; Loan and credit arrangements may be made enticing by,
or sweetened with, offers of low initial interest rates, but actually accompanied by
provisions written in fine print that allow lenders to later on increase or decrease
interest rates unilaterally, without the consent of the borrower, and depending on
complex and subjective factors.Loan and credit arrangements may be made
enticing by, or sweetened with, offers of low initial interest rates, but actually
accompanied by provisions written in fine print that allow lenders to later on
increase or decrease interest rates unilaterally, without the consent of the
borrower, and depending on complex and subjective factors. Because they have
been lured into these contracts by initially low interest rates, borrowers get caught
and stuck in the web of subsequent steep rates and penalties, surcharges and the
like. Being ordinary individuals or entities, they naturally dread legal
complications and cannot afford court litiga-
620
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
tion; they succumb to whatever charges the lenders impose. At the very least,
borrowers should be charged rightly; but then again this is not possible in a one-
sided credit system where the temptation to abuse is strong and the willingness to
rectify is made weak by the eternal desire for profit.
Same; Same; Starting July 1, 2013, the prevailing rate of interest shall be 6%
per annum pursuant to the Supreme Courts (SCs) ruling in Nacar v. Gallery
Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013) and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board
Circular No. 799.With regard to interest, the Court finds that since the
escalation clause is annulled, the principal amount of the loan is subject to the
original or stipulated rate of interest, and upon maturity, the amount due shall be
subject to legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum. This is the uniform ruling
adopted in previous cases, including those cited here. The interests paid by
petitioners should be applied first to the payment of the stipulated or legal and
unpaid interest, as the case may be, and later, to the capital or principal.
Respondent should then refund the excess amount of interest that it has illegally
imposed upon petitioners; [t]he amount to be refunded refers to that paid by
petitioners when they had no obligation to do so. Thus, the parties original
agreement stipulated the payment of 19.5% interest; however, this rate was
intended to apply only to the first promissory note which expired on November 21,
1989 and was paid by petitioners; it was not intended to apply to the whole
duration of the loan. Subsequent higher interest rates have been declared illegal;
but because only the rates are found to be improper, the obligation to pay interest
subsists, the same to be fixed at the legal rate of 12% per annum. However, the
12% interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Starting July 1, 2013, the
prevailing rate of interest shall be 6% per annum pursuant to our ruling in Nacar
v. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013) and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-
Monetary Board Circular No. 799.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is an elementary principle in the
subject of appeals that an appellee who does not himself appeal cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of
the court below.With regard to attorneys fees, it was plain error for the CA to
have passed upon the issue since it was not raised by the petitioners in their
appeal; it was the respondent that improperly brought it up in
621
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 621
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
its appellees brief, when it should have interposed an appeal, since the trial
courts Decision on this issue is adverse to it. It is an elementary principle in the
subject of appeals that an appellee who does not himself appeal cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision
of the court below. x x x [A]n appellee, who is at the same time not an appellant,
may on appeal be permitted to make counter assignments of error in ordinary
actions, when the purpose is merely to defend himself against an appeal in which
errors are alleged to have been committed by the trial court both in the
appreciation of facts and in the interpretation of the law, in order to sustain the
judgment in his favor but not when his purpose is to seek modification or reversal
of the judgment, in which case it is necessary for him to have excepted to and
appealed from the judgment. Since petitioners did not raise the issue of reduction
of attorneys fees, the CA possessed no authority to pass upon it at the instance of
respondent. The ruling of the trial court in this respect should remain undisturbed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Stephen C. Arceo for petitioners.
Lyna B. Brotarlo-Pasco for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In loan agreements, it cannot be denied that the rate of interest is a principal
condition, if not the most important component. Thus, any modification thereof
must be mutually agreed upon; otherwise, it has no binding effect. Moreover, the
Court cannot consider a stipulation granting a party the option to prepay the loan
if said party is not agreeable to the arbitrary interest rates imposed. Premium may
not be placed upon a stipulation in a contract which grants one party the right to
choose whether to continue with or withdraw from the agreement if it discovers
that what the other party has been doing all along is improper or illegal.622
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 questions the May 8, 2007 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 79650, which affirmed with
modifications the February 28, 2003 Decision3 and the June 4, 2003 Order4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5975.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Eduardo and Lydia Silos (petitioners) have been in business for about
two decades of operating a department store and buying and selling of ready-to-
wear apparel. Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) is a banking
corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.
To secure a one-year revolving credit line of P150,000.00 obtained from PNB,
petitioners constituted in August 1987 a Real Estate Mortgage5 over a 370-
square meter lot in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT)
T-14250. In July 1988, the credit line was increased to P1.8 million and the
mortgage was correspondingly increased to P1.8 million. 6 And in July 1989,
a Supplement to the Existing Real Estate Mortgage7 was executed to cover the
same credit line, which was increased to P2.5 million, and additional security was
given in the form of a 134-square meter lot covered by TCT T-16208. In addition,
petitioners issued eight
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 9-45.
2 Id., at pp. 47-64; penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and
concurred in by Executive Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and Associate Justice
Agustin S. Dizon.
3 Records, pp. 361-367; penned by Judge Niovady M. Marin.
4 Rollo, pp. 72-73.
5 Records, p. 94.
6 See Whereas Clause of Supplement to Existing Real Estate Mortgage, id., at
p. 10.
7 Id., at pp. 10-11.
623
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 623
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
Promissory Notes8 and signed a Credit Agreement.9 This July 1989 Credit
Agreement contained a stipulation on interest which provides as follows:
1.03. Interest. (a) The Loan shall be subject to interest at the rate of
19.5% per annum. Interest shall be payable in advance every one hundred twenty
days at the rate prevailing at the time of the renewal.
(b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate
in the Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank may adopt in the
future, including without limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate
system to the fixed interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has
imposed on the Loan interest at a rate per annum, which is equal to the Banks
spread over the current floating interest rate, the Borrower hereby agrees that
the Bank may, without need of notice to the Borrower, increase or
decrease its spread over the floating interest rate at any time depending
on whatever policy it may adopt in the future.10(Emphases supplied)
 The eight Promissory Notes, on the other hand, contained a stipulation
granting PNB the right to increase or reduce interest rates within the limits
allowed by law or by the Monetary Board.11 The Real Estate Mortgage agreement
provided the same right to increase or reduce interest rates at any time depending
on whatever policy PNB may adopt in the future.12
Petitioners religiously paid interest on the notes at the following rates:
1. 1st Promissory Note dated July 24, 1989 19.5%;
_______________
8 Rollo, p. 148.
9 Records, pp. 47-54.
10 Id., at p. 47.
11 Id., at p. 192.
12 Id., at p. 74, dorsal portion.
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
2. 2nd Promissory Note dated November 22, 1989 23%;
3. 3rd Promissory Note dated March 21, 1990 22%;
4. 4th Promissory Note dated July 19, 1990 24%;
5. 5th Promissory Note dated December 17, 1990 28%;
6. 6th Promissory Note dated February 14, 1991 32%;
7. 7th Promissory Note dated March 1, 1991 30%; and
8. 8th Promissory Note dated July 11, 1991 24%.13
In August 1991, an Amendment to Credit Agreement14 was executed by the
parties, with the following stipulation regarding interest:
1.03. Interest on Line Availments. (a) The Borrowers agree to pay
interest on each Availment from date of each Availment up to but not including
the date of full payment thereof at the rate per annum which is determined
by the Bank to be prime rate plus applicable spread in effect as of the
date of each Availment.15 (Emphases supplied)
Under this Amendment to Credit Agreement, petitioners issued in favor of
PNB the following 18 Promissory Notes, which petitioners settled except the
last (the note covering the principal) at the following interest rates:
1. 9th Promissory Note dated November 8, 1991 26%;
2. 10th Promissory Note dated March 19, 1992 25%;
3. 11th Promissory Note dated July 11, 1992 23%;
4. 12th Promissory Note dated November 10, 1992 21%;
5. 13th Promissory Note dated March 15, 1993 21%;
6. 14th Promissory Note dated July 12, 1993 17.5%;
7. 15th Promissory Note dated November 17, 1993 21%;
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 192-199.
14 Id., at pp. 55-58.
15 Id., at p. 56.
625
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 625
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
8. 16th Promissory Note dated March 28, 1994 21%;
9. 17th Promissory Note dated July 13, 1994 21%;
10. 18th Promissory Note dated November 16, 1994 16%;
11. 19th Promissory Note dated April 10, 1995 21%;
12. 20th Promissory Note dated July 19, 1995 18.5%;
13. 21st Promissory Note dated December 18, 1995 18.75%;
14. 22nd Promissory Note dated April 22, 1996 18.5%;
15. 23rd Promissory Note dated July 22, 1996 18.5%;
16. 24th Promissory Note dated November 25, 1996 18%;
17. 25th Promissory Note dated May 30, 1997 17.5%; and
18. 26th Promissory Note (PN 9707237) dated July 30, 1997 25%.16
The 9th up to the 17th promissory notes provide for the payment of interest at
the rate the Bank may at any time without notice, raise within the limits allowed
by law x x x.17 On the other hand, the 18thup to the 26th promissory notes
including PN 9707237, which is the 26th promissory note carried the following
provision:
x x x For this purpose, I/We agree that the rate of interest herein
stipulated may be increased or decreased for the subsequent Interest
Periods, with prior notice to the Borrower in the event of changes in
interest rate prescribed by law or the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank of the Philippines, or in the Banks overall cost of funds. I/We hereby
agree that in the event I/we are not agreeable to the interest rate fixed
for any Interest Period, I/we shall have the option to prepay the loan or
credit facility without penalty within ten (10)
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 174-191.
17 Id., at p. 191.
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
calendar days from the Interest Setting Date.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent regularly renewed the line from 1990 up to 1997, and petitioners
made good on the promissory notes, religiously paying the interests without
objection or fail. But in 1997, petitioners faltered when the interest rates soared
due to the Asian financial crisis. Petitioners sole outstanding promissory note for
P2.5 million PN 9707237 executed in July 1997 and due 120 days later or on
October 28, 1997 became past due, and despite repeated demands, petitioners
failed to make good on the note.
Incidentally, PN 9707237 provided for the penalty equivalent to 24% per
annum in case of default, as follows:
Without need for notice or demand, failure to pay this note or any installment
thereon, when due, shall constitute default and in such cases or in case of
garnishment, receivership or bankruptcy or suit of any kind filed against me/us by
the Bank, the outstanding principal of this note, at the option of the Bank and
without prior notice of demand, shall immediately become due and payable and
shall be subject to a penalty charge of twenty-four percent (24%) per
annum based on the defaulted principal amount. x x x19 (Emphasis
supplied)
 PNB prepared a Statement of Account20 as of October 12, 1998, detailing the In its Answer,24 PNB denied that it unilaterally imposed or fixed interest rates;
amount due and demandable from petitioners in the total amount of that petitioners agreed that without prior notice, PNB may modify interest rates
P3,620,541.60, broken down as follows: depending on future policy adopted by it; and that the imposition of penalties was
Principal P2,500,000.00 agreed upon in the Credit Agreement. It added that the imposition of penalties is
Interest 538,874.94 supported by the all-inclusive clause in the Real Estate Mortgage agreement which
_______________ provides that the mortgage shall stand as security for any and all other obligations
18 Id., at p. 174. of whatever kind and nature owing to respondent, which thus includes penalties
19 Id. imposed upon default or nonpayment of the principal and interest on due date.
20 Id., at p. 12. On pre-trial, the parties mutually agreed to the following material facts,
627 among others:
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 627 a) That since 1991 up to 1998, petitioners had paid PNB the total amount of
P3,484,287.00;25 and
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank b) That PNB sent, and petitioners received, a March 10, 2000 demand letter.26
Penalties 581,666.66 During trial, petitioner Lydia Silos (Lydia) testified that the Credit Agreement,
Total P3,620,541.60 the Amendment to Credit Agreement, Real Estate Mortgage and the Supplement
thereto were all prepared by respondent PNB and were presented to her and her
Despite demand, petitioners failed to pay the foregoing amount. Thus, PNB husband Eduardo only for signature; that she was told by PNB that the latter alone
foreclosed on the mortgage, and on January 14, 1999, TCTs T-14250 and T-16208 would determine the interest rate; that as to the Amendment to Credit Agreement,
were sold to it at auction for the amount of P4,324,172.96.21 The sheriffs certificate she was told that PNB would fill up the interest rate portion thereof; that at the
of sale was registered on March 11, 1999. time the parties executed the said Credit Agreement, she was not informed about
More than a year later, or on March 24, 2000, petitioners filed Civil Case No. the applicable spread that PNB would impose on her account; that the interest
5975, seeking annulment of the foreclosure sale and an accounting of the PNB rate portion of
credit. Petitioners theorized that after the first promissory note where they agreed _______________
to pay 19.5% interest, the succeeding stipulations for the payment of interest in 23 Id., at p. 71.
their loan agreements with PNB which allegedly left to the latter the sole will 24 Id., at pp. 37-43.
to determine the interest rate became null and void. Petitioners added that 25 Id., at p. 165.
because the interest rates were fixed by respondent without their prior consent or 26 Id., at p. 149.
agreement, these rates are void, and as a result, petitioners should only be made 629
liable for interest at the legal rate of 12%. They claimed further that they overpaid
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 629
interests on the credit, and concluded that due to this overpayment of steep
interest charges, their debt should now be deemed paid, and the foreclosure and Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
sale of TCTs T-14250 and T-16208 became unnecessary and wrongful. As for the all Promissory Notes she and Eduardo issued were always left in blank when they
imposed penalty of P581,666.66, petitioners alleged that since the Real Estate executed them, with respondents mere assurance that it would be the one to enter
Mortgage and the Supplement thereto did not include penalties as part of the or indicate thereon the prevailing interest rate at the time of availment; and that
secured amount, the same should be excluded from the foreclosure amount or bid they agreed to such arrangement. She further testified that the two Real Estate
price, even if such penalties are provided for in the final Promissory Note, or PN Mortgage agreements she signed did not stipulate the payment of penalties; that
9707237.22 she and Eduardo consulted with a lawyer, and were told that PNBs actions were
In addition, petitioners sought to be reimbursed an alleged overpayment of improper, and so on March 20, 2000, they wrote to the latter seeking a
P848,285.00 made during the period August 21, 1991 to March 5, 1998, resulting recomputation of their outstanding obligation; and when PNB did not oblige, they
from respondents impo- instituted Civil Case No. 5975.27
_______________ On cross-examination, Lydia testified that she has been in business for 20 years;
21 Id., at p. 13. that she also borrowed from other individuals and another bank; that it was only
22 Id., at pp. 68-70. with banks that she was asked to sign loan documents with no indicated interest
628 rate; that she did not bother to read the terms of the loan documents which she
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED signed; and that she received several PNB statements of account detailing their
outstanding obligations, but she did not complain; that she assumed instead that
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank what was written therein is correct.28
sition of the alleged illegal and steep interest rates. They also prayed to be awarded For his part, PNB Kalibo Branch Manager Diosdado Aspa, Jr. (Aspa), the sole
P200,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.23 witness for respondent, stated on cross-examination that as a practice, the
determination of the prime rates of interest was the responsibility solely of PNBs
Treasury Department which is based in Manila; that these prime rates were
simply communicated to all PNB branches for implementation; that there are a
multitude of considerations which determine the interest rate, such as the cost of
money, foreign currency values, PNBs spread, bank administrative costs,
profitability, and the practice in the banking industry; that in every repricing of
each loan availment, the borrower has the right to question the rates, but that this
was
_______________
27 Rollo, pp. 51-52.
28 Id., at p. 52.
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
not done by the petitioners; and that anything that is not found in the Promissory
Note may be supplemented by the Credit Agreement.29
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 28, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing Civil Case
No. 5975.30 It ruled that:
1. While the Credit Agreement allows PNB to unilaterally increase its spread
over the floating interest rate at any time depending on whatever policy it may
adopt in the future, it likewise allows for the decrease at any time of the same.
Thus, such stipulation authorizing both the increase and decrease of interest rates
as may be applicable is valid,31 as was held in Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Court of Appeals;32
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 52-53.
30 Records, pp. 361-367; penned by Judge Niovady M. Marin.
31 Id., at pp. 365-366.
32 408 Phil. 803, 811-812; 356 SCRA 671, 679 (2001). The Court therein held:
While it may be acceptable, for practical reasons given the fluctuating
economic conditions, for banks to stipulate that interest rates on a loan not be fixed
and instead be made dependent upon prevailing market conditions, there should
always be a reference rate upon which to peg such variable interest rates. An
example of such a valid variable interest rate was found in Polotan, Sr. v. Court of
Appeals. In that case, the contractual provision stating that if there occurs any
change in the prevailing market rates, the new interest rate shall be the guiding
rate in computing the interest due on the outstanding obligation without need of
serving notice to the Cardholder other than the required posting on the monthly
statement served to the Cardholder was considered valid. The aforequoted
provision was upheld notwithstanding that it may partake of the nature of an
escalation clause, because at the same time it provides for the decrease in
the interest rate in case the prevailing market rates dictate its reduction.
In other words, unlike the stipulation subject of the instant case, the interest rate
631
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 631
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
2. Banks are allowed to stipulate that interest rates on loans need not be
fixed and instead be made dependent on prevailing rates upon which to peg such
variable interest rates;33
3. The Promissory Note, as the principal contract evidencing petitioners loan,
prevails over the Credit Agreement and the Real Estate Mortgage. As such, the
rate of interest, penalties and attorneys fees stipulated in the Promissory Note
prevail over those mentioned in the Credit Agreement and the Real Estate
Mortgage agreements;34
4. Roughly, PNBs computation of the total amount of petitioners obligation is
correct;35
5. Because the loan was admittedly due and demandable, the foreclosure was
regularly made;36
6. By the admission of petitioners during pre-trial, all payments made to PNB
were properly applied to the principal, interest and penalties.37
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
respondent and against the petitioners by DISMISSING the latters petition.
Costs against the petitioners.
_______________
involved in the Polotan case is designed to be based on the prevailing market
rate. On the other hand, a stipulation ostensibly signifying an agreement to any
increase or decrease in the interest rate, without more, cannot be accepted by this
Court as valid for it leaves solely to the creditor the determination of what interest
rate to charge against an outstanding loan. (Emphasis supplied)
33 Records, p. 365.
34 Id., at p. 366.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id., at p. 367.
632
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
SO ORDERED.38
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. In an Order39 dated June 4, 2003, the
trial court granted only a modification in the award of attorneys fees, reducing the
same from 10% to 1%. Thus, PNB was ordered to refund to petitioner the excess in
attorneys fees in the amount of P356,589.90, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered upholding the validity of the
interest rate charged by the respondent as well as the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings and the Certificate of Sale. However, respondent is directed to refund
to the petitioner the amount of P356,589.90 representing the excess interest
charged against the latter.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.40
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners appealed to the CA, which issued the questioned Decision with the
following decretal portion:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is PARTLY
GRANTED. The modified Decision of the Regional Trial Court per Order dated
June 4, 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
1. [T]hat the interest rate to be applied after the expiration of the first 30-day
interest period for PN No. 9707237 should be 12% per annum;
2. [T]hat the attorneys fees of 10% is valid and binding; and
_______________
38 Id.
39 Rollo, pp. 72-73.
40 Id., at p. 73.
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
3. [T]hat [PNB] is hereby ordered to reimburse [petitioners] the excess in the
bid price of P377,505.99 which is the difference between the total amount due
[PNB] and the amount of its bid price.
SO ORDERED.41
On the other hand, respondent did not appeal the June 4, 2003 Order of the
trial court which reduced its award of attorneys fees. It simply raised the issue in
its appellees brief in the CA, and included a prayer for the reversal of said Order.
In effect, the CA limited petitioners appeal to the following issues:
1) Whether x x x the interest rates on petitioners outstanding obligation were
unilaterally and arbitrarily imposed by PNB;
2) Whether x x x the penalty charges were secured by the real estate mortgage;
and
3) Whether x x x the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale are valid.42
The CA noted that, based on receipts presented by petitioners during trial, the
latter dutifully paid a total of P3,027,324.60 in interest for the period August 7,
1991 to August 6, 1997, over and above the P2.5 million principal obligation. And
this is exclusive of payments for insurance premiums, documentary stamp taxes,
and penalty. All the while, petitioners did not complain nor object to the imposition
of interest; they in fact paid the same religiously and without fail for seven years.
The appellate court ruled that petitioners are thus estopped from questioning the
same.
The CA nevertheless noted that for the period July 30, 1997 to August 14, 1997,
PNB wrongly applied an interest
_______________
41 Id., at pp. 63-64.
42 Id., at p. 55.
634
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
rate of 25.72% instead of the agreed 25%; thus it overcharged petitioners, and the
latter paid, an excess of P736.56 in interest.
On the issue of penalties, the CA ruled that the express tenor of the Real Estate
Mortgage agreements contemplated the inclusion of the PN 9707237 stipulated
24% penalty in the amount to be secured by the mortgaged property, thus
For and in consideration of certain loans, overdrafts and other credit
accommodations obtained from the MORTGAGEE and to secure the payment of
the same and those others that the MORTGAGEE may extend to the
MORTGAGOR, including interest and expenses, and other obligations
owing by the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE, whether direct or
indirect, principal or secondary, as appearing in the accounts, books and
records of the MORTGAGEE, the MORTGAGOR does hereby transfer and convey
by way of mortgage unto the MORTGAGEE x x x.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The CA believes that the 24% penalty is covered by the phrase and other
obligations owing by the mortgagor to the mortgagee and should thus be added to
the amount secured by the mortgages.44The CA then proceeded to declare valid the
foreclosure and sale of properties covered by TCTs T-14250 and T-16208, which
came as a necessary result of petitioners failure to pay the outstanding obligation
upon demand.45 The CA saw fit to increase the trial courts award of 1% to 10%,
finding the latter rate to be reasonable and citing the Real Estate Mortgage
agreement which authorized the collection of the higher rate.46
_______________
43 Records, p. 74.
44 Rollo, p. 61.
45 Id., at pp. 61-62.
46 Id., at p. 62.
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
Finally, the CA ruled that petitioners are entitled to P377,505.09 surplus,
which is the difference between PNBs bid price of P4,324,172.96 and petitioners
total computed obligation as of January 14, 1999, or the date of the auction sale,
in the amount of P3,946,667.87.47
Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
The following issues are raised in this Petition:
I
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS AS WELL AS THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN NOT NULLIFYING THE INTEREST RATE PROVISION IN THE CREDIT
AGREEMENT DATED JULY 24, 1989 X X X AND IN THE AMENDMENT TO
CREDIT AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST 21, 1991 X X X WHICH LEFT TO THE
SOLE UNILATERAL DETERMINATION OF THE RESPONDENT PNB THE
ORIGINAL FIXING OF INTEREST RATE AND ITS INCREASE, WHICH
AGREEMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW, ART. 1308 OF THE [NEW CIVIL
CODE], AS ENUNCIATED IN PONCIANO ALMEIDA V. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. [NO.] 113412, APRIL 17, 1996, AND CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AND
PUBLIC INTEREST, AND IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL
ARISING FROM THE ALLEGED DELAYED COMPLAINT OF PETITIONER[S],
AND [THEIR] PAYMENT OF THE INTEREST CHARGED.
B. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PNB IS NOT AT ALL ENTITLED
TO ANY INTEREST EXCEPT THE LEGAL RATE FROM DATE OF DEMAND,
AND IN NOT APPLYING THE EXCESS OVER THE LEGAL
_______________
47 Id., at p. 63.
636
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
RATE OF THE ADMITTED PAYMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER[S] FROM
1991-1998 IN THE ADMITTED TOTAL AMOUNT OF P3,484,287.00, TO
PAYMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL OF P2,500,000.[00] LEAVING AN
OVERPAYMENT OF P984,287.00 REFUNDABLE BY RESPONDENT TO
PETITIONER[S] WITH INTEREST OF 12% PER ANNUM.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PENALTIES ARE INCLUDED IN THE SECURED AMOUNT,
SUBJECT TO FORECLOSURE, WHEN NO PENALTIES ARE MENTIONED
[NOR] PROVIDED FOR IN THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE AS A SECURED
AMOUNT AND THEREFORE THE AMOUNT OF PENALTIES SHOULD HAVE
BEEN EXCLUDED FROM [THE] FORECLOSURE AMOUNT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE
LOWER COURT, WHICH REDUCED THE ATTORNEYS FEES OF 10% OF THE
TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS CHARGED IN THE X X X EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE TO ONLY 1%, AND [AWARDING] 10% ATTORNEYS FEES.48
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners insist that the interest rate provision in the Credit Agreement and
the Amendment to Credit Agreement should be declared null and void, for they
relegated to PNB the sole power to fix interest rates based on arbitrary criteria or
factors such as bank policy, profitability, cost of money, foreign currency values,
and bank administrative costs; spaces for interest rates in the two Credit
Agreements and
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 23-24.
637
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
the promissory notes were left blank for PNB to unilaterally fill, and their consent
or agreement to the interest rates imposed thereafter was not obtained; the
interest rate, which consists of the prime rate plus the bank spread, is determined
not by agreement of the parties but by PNBs Treasury Department in Manila.
Petitioners conclude that by this method of fixing the interest rates, the principle
of mutuality of contracts is violated, and public policy as well as Circular 905 49 of
the then Central Bank had been breached. Petitioners question the CAs
application of the principle of estoppel, saying that no estoppel can proceed from
an illegal act. Though they failed to timely question the imposition of the alleged
illegal interest rates and continued to pay the loan on the basis of these rates, they
cannot be deemed to have acquiesced, and hence could recover what they
erroneously paid.50
Petitioners argue that if the interest rates were nullified, then their obligation
to PNB is deemed extinguished as of July 1997; moreover, it would appear that
they even made an overpayment to the bank in the amount of P984,287.00.
Next, petitioners suggest that since the Real Estate Mortgage agreements did
not include nor specify, as part of the secured amount, the penalty of 24%
authorized in PN 9707237, such amount of P581,666.66 could not be made
answerable by or collected from the mortgages covering TCTs T-14250 and T-
16208. Claiming support from Philippine Bank of Communications [PBCom] v.
Court of Appeals,51 petitioners insist that the phrase and other obligations owing
by the
_______________
49 Which removed the ceiling on interest rates for secured and unsecured
loans, regardless of maturity (Section 1), but required that the rate of interest on
a floating rate loan during each interest period shall be stated on the basis of a
reference rate plus a margin as may be agreed upon by the parties (Section 7).
50 Rollo, p. 167, citing United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses Beluso, 557
Phil. 326; 530 SCRA 567 (2007).
51 323 Phil. 297; 253 SCRA 241 (1996).
638
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
mortgagor to the mortgagee52 in the mortgage agreements cannot embrace the
P581,666.66 penalty, because, as held in the PBCom case, [a] penalty charge does
not belong to the species of obligations enumerated in the mortgage, hence, the
said contract cannot be understood to secure the penalty;53 while the mortgages
are the accessory contracts, what items are secured may only be determined from
the provisions of the mortgage contracts, and not from the Credit Agreement or
the promissory notes.
Finally, petitioners submit that the trial courts award of 1% attorneys fees should
be maintained, given that in foreclosures, a lawyers work consists merely in the
preparation and filing of the petition, and involves minimal study. 54 To allow the
imposition of a staggering P396,211.00 for such work would be contrary to equity.
Petitioners state that the purpose of attorneys fees in cases of this nature is not
to give respondent a larger compensation for the loan than the law already allows,
but to protect it against any future loss or damage by being compelled to retain
counsel x x x to institute judicial proceedings for the collection of its credit.55 And
because the instant case involves a simple extrajudicial foreclosure, attorneys fees
may be equitably tempered.
Respondents Arguments
For its part, respondent disputes petitioners claim that interest rates were
unilaterally fixed by it, taking relief in the CA pronouncement that petitioners are
deemed estopped by their failure to question the imposed rates and their contin-
_______________
52 Records, p. 74.
53 Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, supra note 51 at p.
313; p. 254.
54 Citing Mambulao Lumber Co. v. Philippine National Bank, 130 Phil. 366,
380-381; 22 SCRA 359, 372 (1968).
 55 Citing New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. v. Philippine National
Bank, 479 Phil. 483, 510; 435 SCRA 565, 592 (2004).
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
ued payment thereof without opposition. It adds that because the Credit
Agreement and promissory notes contained both an escalation clause and a de-
escalation clause, it may not be said that the bank violated the principle of
mutuality. Besides, the increase or decrease in interest rates have been mutually
agreed upon by the parties, as shown by petitioners continuous payment without
protest. Respondent adds that the alleged unilateral imposition of interest rates is
not a proper subject for review by the Court because the issue was never raised in
the lower court.
As for petitioners claim that interest rates imposed by it are null and void for
the reasons that 1) the Credit Agreements and the promissory notes were signed
in blank; 2) interest rates were at short periods; 3) no interest rates could be
charged where no agreement on interest rates was made in writing; 4) PNB fixed
interest rates on the basis of arbitrary policies and standards left to its choosing;
and 5) interest rates based on prime rate plus applicable spread are indeterminate
and arbitrary PNB counters:
a. That Credit Agreements and promissory notes were signed by petitioner[s]
in blank Respondent claims that this issue was never raised in the lower court.
Besides, documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence; Lydia Silos
testimony in this regard is self-serving, unsupported and uncorroborated, and for
being the lone evidence on this issue. The fact remains that these documents are
in proper form, presumed regular, and endure, against arbitrary claims by Silos
who is an experienced business person that she signed questionable loan
documents whose provisions for interest rates were left blank, and yet she
continued to pay the interests without protest for a number of years.56
_______________
56 Rollo, pp. 100, 102.
640
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
b. That interest rates were at short periods Respondent argues that the
law which governs and prohibits changes in interest rates made more than once
every twelve months has been removed57with the issuance of Presidential Decree
No. 858.58
c. That no interest rates could be charged where no agreement on interest rates
was made in writing in violation of Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which provides
that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing
Respondent insists that the stipulated 25% per annum as embodied in PN 9707237
should be imposed during the interim, or the period after the loan became due and
while it remains unpaid, and not the legal interest of 12% as claimed by
petitioners.59
d. That PNB fixed interest rates on the basis of arbitrary policies and
standards left to its choosing According to respondent, interest rates were fixed
taking into consideration increases or decreases as provided by law or by the
Monetary Board, the banks overall costs of funds, and upon agreement of the
parties.60
e. That interest rates based on prime rate plus applicable spread are
indeterminate and arbitrary On this score, respondent submits there are
various factors that influence interest rates, from political events to economic
developments,
_______________
57 Id., at p. 103.
58 Amending Further Act Numbered Two Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Five,
as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Usury Law.
59 Rollo, pp. 103-104.
60 Id., at pp. 104-105.
641
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
etc.; the cost of money, profitability and foreign currency transactions may not be
discounted.61
On the issue of penalties, respondent reiterates the trial courts finding that
during pre-trial, petitioners admitted that the Statement of Account as of October
12, 1998 which detailed and included penalty charges as part of the total
outstanding obligation owing to the bank was correct. Respondent justifies the
imposition and collection of a penalty as a normal banking practice, and the
standard rate per annum for all commercial banks, at the time, was 24%.
Respondent adds that the purpose of the penalty or a penal clause for that matter
is to ensure the performance of the obligation and substitute for damages and the
payment of interest in the event of noncompliance.62 And the promissory note
being the principal agreement as opposed to the mortgage, which is a mere
accessory should prevail. This being the case, its inclusion as part of the secured
amount in the mortgage agreements is valid and necessary.
Regarding the foreclosure of the mortgages, respondent accuses petitioners of
preempting consolidation of its ownership over TCTs T-14250 and T-16208; that
petitioners filed Civil Case No. 5975 ostensibly to question the foreclosure and sale
of properties covered by TCTs T-14250 and T-16208 in a desperate move to retain
ownership over these properties, because they failed to timely redeem them.
Respondent directs the attention of the Court to its petition in G.R. No.
181046,63 where the propriety of the CAs ruling on the following issues is squarely
raised:
_______________
61 Id., at pp. 106-107.
62 Citing Article 1226 of the Civil Code and Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines
Annotated (Commentaries) Vol. IV, p. 298, 1989, 12th edition.
63 Philippine National Bank, petitioner, versus Spouses Eduardo and Lydia
Silos, respondents.
642
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
1. That the interest rate to be applied after the expiration of the first 30-day
interest period for PN 9707237 should be 12% per annum; and
 2. That PNB should reimburse petitioners the excess in the bid price of
P377,505.99 which is the difference between the total amount due to PNB and the
amount of its bid price.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Before anything else, it must be said that it is not the function of the Court to
reexamine or reevaluate evidence adduced by the parties in the proceedings below.
The rule admits of certain well-recognized exceptions, though, as when the lower
courts findings are not supported by the evidence on record or are based on a
misapprehension of facts, or when certain relevant and undisputed facts were
manifestly overlooked that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. This case falls within such exceptions.
The Court notes that on March 5, 2008, a Resolution was issued by the Courts
First Division denying respondents petition in G.R. No. 181046, due to late filing,
failure to attach the required affidavit of service of the petition on the trial court
and the petitioners, and submission of a defective verification and certification of
nonforum shopping. On June 25, 2008, the Court issued another Resolution
denying with finality respondents motion for reconsideration of the March 5, 2008
Resolution. And on August 15, 2008, entry of judgment was made. This thus settles
the issues, as abovestated, covering a) the interest rate or 12% per annum
that applies upon expiration of the first 30 days interest period provided under PN
9707237, and b) the CAs decree that PNB should reimburse petitioner the excess
in the bid price of P377,505.09.
It appears that respondents practice, more than once proscribed by the Court,
has been carried over once more to the
643
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 643
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
petitioners. In a number of decided cases, the Court struck down provisions in
credit documents issued by PNB to, or required of, its borrowers which allow the
bank to increase or decrease interest rates within the limits allowed by law at any
time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future. Thus, in Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals,64 such stipulation and similar ones were
declared in violation of Article 130865 of the Civil Code. In a second case, Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals,66 the very same stipulations found in the credit
agreement and the promissory notes prepared and issued by the respondent were
again invalidated. The Court therein said:
The Credit Agreement provided inter alia, that
(a) The BANK reserves the right to increase the interest rate within the
limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever policy it may
adopt in the future; Provided, that the interest rate on this accommodation
shall be correspondingly decreased in the event that the applicable maximum
interest is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. In either case, the
adjustment in the interest rate agreed upon shall take effect on the effectivity
date of the increase or decrease in the maximum interest rate.
The Promissory Note, in turn, authorized the PNB to raise the rate of
interest, at any time without notice, beyond the stipulated rate of 12% but
only within the limits allowed by law.
The Real Estate Mortgage contract likewise provided that
_______________
64 273 Phil. 789, 796-797, 799; 196 SCRA 536, 543 (1991).
65 Art. 1308. The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity
or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.
66 G.R. No. 107569, November 8, 1994, 238 SCRA 20.
644
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
(k) INCREASE OF INTEREST RATE: The rate of interest charged on the
obligation secured by this mortgage as well as the interest on the amount
which may have been advanced by the MORTGAGEE, in accordance with the
provision hereof, shall be subject during the life of this contract to such
an increase within the rate allowed by law, as the Board of Directors
of the MORTGAGEE may prescribe for its debtors.
xxxx
In making the unilateral increases in interest rates, petitioner bank relied on
the escalation clause contained in their credit agreement which provides, as
follows:
The Bank reserves the right to increase the interest rate within the limits allowed
by law at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the
future and provided, that, the interest rate on this accommodation shall be
correspondingly decreased in the event that the applicable maximum interest
rate is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. In either case, the adjustment
in the interest rate agreed upon shall take effect on the effectivity date of the
increase or decrease in maximum interest rate.
This clause is authorized by Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1684
which further amended Act No. 2655 (The Usury Law), as amended, thus:
Section 2. The same Act is hereby amended by adding a new section after Section
7, to read as follows:
Sec. 7-a. Parties to an agreement pertaining to a loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits may stipulate that the rate of interest agreed upon may be in645
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 645
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
creased in the event that the applicable maximum rate of interest is increased by
law or by the Monetary Board; Provided, That such stipulation shall be valid only
if there is also a stipulation in the agreement that the rate of interest agreed upon
shall be reduced in the event that the applicable maximum rate of interest is
reduced by law or by the Monetary Board; Provided, further, That the adjustment
in the rate of interest agreed upon shall take effect on or after the effectivity of the
increase or decrease in the maximum rate of interest.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1684 also empowered the Central Banks Monetary Board
to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for loans and certain forbearances.
Pursuant to such authority, the Monetary Board issued Central Bank (C.B.)
Circular No. 905, Series of 1982, Section 5 of which provides:
Sec. 5. Section 1303 of the Manual of Regulations (for Banks and Other
Financial Intermediaries) is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1303. Interest and Other Charges.The rate of interest, including
commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on any loan, or forbearance of
 any money, goods or credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or
unsecured, shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to
the Usury Law, as amended.
P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow contracting parties
to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent adjustment in the interest rate that
shall accrue on a loan or forbearance of money, goods or
646
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
credits. In fine, they can agree to adjust, upward or downward, the interest
previously stipulated. However, contrary to the stubborn insistence of
petitioner bank, the said law and circular did not authorize either party
to unilaterally raise the interest rate without the others consent.
It is basic that there can be no contract in the true sense in the absence
of the element of agreement, or of mutual assent of the parties. If this
assent is wanting on the part of the one who contracts, his act has no more
efficacy than if it had been done under duress or by a person of unsound
mind.
Similarly, contract changes must be made with the consent of the
contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the
proposed modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of
the agreement. In the case of loan contracts, it cannot be gainsaid that
the rate of interest is always a vital component, for it can make or break a
capital venture. Thus, any change must be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, it is
bereft of any binding effect.
We cannot countenance petitioner banks posturing that the
escalation clause at bench gives it unbridled right to unilaterally
upwardly adjust the interest on private respondents loan. That would
completely take away from private respondents the right to assent to an
important modification in their agreement, and would negate the
element of mutuality in contracts. In Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 196 SCRA 536, 544-545 (1991) we held
x x x The unilateral action of the PNB in increasing the interest rate
on the private respondents loan violated the mutuality of contracts
ordained in Article 1308 of the Civil Code:
647
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 647
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
Art. 1308. The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law
between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on their
essential equality. A contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment
dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties,
is void . . . . Hence, even assuming that the . . . loan agreement between the PNB
and the private respondent gave the PNB a license (although in fact there was
none) to increase the interest rate at will during the term of the loan, that license
would have been null and void for being violative of the principle of mutuality
essential in contracts. It would have invested the loan agreement with the
character of a contract of adhesion, where the parties do not bargain on equal
footing, the weaker partys (the debtor) participation being reduced to the
alternative to take it or leave it . . . . Such a contract is a veritable trap for the
weaker party whom the courts of justice must protect against abuse and
imposition.67(Emphases supplied)
Then again, in a third case, Spouses Almeda v. Court of Appeals,68 the Court
invalidated the very same provisions in the respondents prepared Credit
Agreement, declaring thus:
The binding effect of any agreement between parties to a contract is premised
on two settled principles: (1) that any obligation arising from contract has the force
_______________
67 Id., at pp. 22-26.
68 326 Phil. 309; 256 SCRA 292 (1996).
648
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
of law between the parties; and (2) that there must be mutuality between the
parties based on their essential equality. Any contract which appears to be heavily
weighed in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result is
void. Any stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract which is
left solely to the will of one of the parties, is likewise, invalid.
It is plainly obvious, therefore, from the undisputed facts of the case
that respondent bank unilaterally altered the terms of its contract with
petitioners by increasing the interest rates on the loan without the prior
assent of the latter. In fact, the manner of agreement is itself explicitly
stipulated by the Civil Code when it provides, in Article 1956 that No interest
shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. What has been
stipulated in writing from a perusal of interest rate provision of the
credit agreement signed between the parties is that petitioners were
bound merely to pay 21% interest, subject to a possible escalation or de-
escalation, when 1) the circumstances warrant such escalation or de-
escalation; 2) within the limits allowed by law; and 3) upon agreement.
Indeed, the interest rate which appears to have been agreed upon by
the parties to the contract in this case was the 21% rate stipulated in the
interest provision. Any doubt about this is in fact readily resolved by a
careful reading of the credit agreement because the same plainly uses the
phrase interest rate agreed upon, in reference to the original 21%
interest rate. x x x
xxxx
Petitioners never agreed in writing to pay the increased interest rates
demanded by respondent bank in contravention to the tenor of their credit
agreement. That an increase in interest rates from 18% to as much as 68% is
excessive and unconscionable is indisputable. Between 1981 and 1984,
petitioners had paid an amount equivalent to virtually half of the entire
649
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 649
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
principal (P7,735,004.66) which was applied to interest alone. By the time
the spouses tendered the amount of P40,142,518.00 in settlement of their
obligations; respondent bank was demanding P58,377,487.00 over and
above those amounts already previously paid by the spouses.
Escalation clauses are not basically wrong or legally objectionable so long as
they are not solely potestative but based on reasonable and valid grounds. Here,
as clearly demonstrated above, not only [are] the increases of the interest rates on
the basis of the escalation clause patently unreasonable and unconscionable, but
also there are no valid and reasonable standards upon which the increases are
anchored.
xxxx
In the face of the unequivocal interest rate provisions in the credit agreement
and in the law requiring the parties to agree to changes in the interest rate in
writing, we hold that the unilateral and progressive increases imposed by
respondent PNB were null and void. Their effect was to increase the total
obligation on an eighteen million peso loan to an amount way over three times that
which was originally granted to the borrowers. That these increases, occasioned by
crafty manipulations in the interest rates is unconscionable and neutralizes the
salutary policies of extending loans to spur business cannot be
disputed.69 (Emphases supplied)
Still, in a fourth case, Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,70 the
above doctrine was reiterated:
The promissory note contained the following stipulation:
For value received, I/we, [private respondents] jointly and severally promise to
pay to the ORDER of the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, at its office in San
_______________
69 Id., at pp. 316-317, 322, 325; pp. 299-308.
70 328 Phil. 54; 258 SCRA 549 (1996).
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
Jose City, Philippines, the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND ONLY (P15,000.00),
Philippine Currency, together with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum until paid, which interest rate the Bank may at any time without
notice, raise within the limits allowed by law, and I/we also agree to pay
jointly and severally ____% per annum penalty charge, by way of liquidated
damages should this note be unpaid or is not renewed on due dated.
Payment of this note shall be as follows:
*THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE DAYS* AFTER DATE
On the reverse side of the note the following condition was stamped:
All short-term loans to be granted starting January 1, 1978 shall be made
subject to the condition that any and/or all extensions hereof that will leave any
portion of the amount still unpaid after 730 days shall automatically convert the
outstanding balance into a medium or long-term obligation as the case may be
and give the Bank the right to charge the interest rates prescribed under
its policies from the date the account was originally granted.
To secure payment of the loan the parties executed a real estate mortgage
contract which provided:
(k) INCREASE OF INTEREST RATE:
The rate of interest charged on the obligation secured by this mortgage as
well as the interest on the amount which may have been advanced by the
MORTGAGEE, in accordance with the provision hereof, shall be subject during
the life of this contract to such an increase within the rate allowed by law,
as the Board of Directors of the MORTGAGEE may prescribe for its
debtors.
xxxx
To begin with, PNBs argument rests on a misapprehension of the import of the
appellate courts ruling. The Court of Appeals nullified the interest rate
increases651
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 651
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
not because the promissory note did not comply with P.D. No. 1684 by providing
for a de-escalation, but because the absence of such provision made the clause so
one-sided as to make it unreasonable.
That ruling is correct. It is in line with our decision in Banco Filipino Savings
& Mortgage Bank v. Navarro that although P.D. No. 1684 is not to be retroactively
applied to loans granted before its effectivity, there must nevertheless be a de-
escalation clause to mitigate the one-sidedness of the escalation clause. Indeed
because of concern for the unequal status of borrowers vis--vis the banks, our
cases after Banco Filipino have fashioned the rule that any increase in the rate
of interest made pursuant to an escalation clause must be the result of
agreement between the parties.
Thus in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, two promissory
notes authorized PNB to increase the stipulated interest per annum
within the limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever
policy [PNB] may adopt in the future; Provided, that the interest rate on
this note shall be correspondingly decreased in the event that the
applicable maximum interest rate is reduced by law or by the Monetary
Board. The real estate mortgage likewise provided:
The rate of interest charged on the obligation secured by this
mortgage as well as the interest on the amount which may have been
advanced by the MORTGAGEE, in accordance with the provisions hereof,
shall be subject during the life of this contract to such an increase within
the rate allowed by law, as the Board of Directors of the MORTGAGEE
may prescribe for its debtors.
Pursuant to these clauses, PNB successively increased the interest from 18%
to 32%, then to 41% and then to 48%. This Court declared the increases
unilaterally imposed by [PNB] to be in violation of the principle of
mutuality as embodied in Art. 1308 of the Civil Code, which provides that [t]he
contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be
left to the will of one of them. As the Court explained:
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of
law between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties
based on their essential equality. A contract containing a condition which
makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of
the contracting parties, is void (Garcia vs. Rita Legarda, Inc., 21 SCRA 555).
Hence, even assuming that the P1.8 million loan agreement between the PNB and
the private respondent gave the PNB a license (although in fact there was none)
to increase the interest rate at will during the term of the loan, that license would
have been null and void for being violative of the principle of mutuality essential
in contracts. It would have invested the loan agreement with the character of a
contract of adhesion, where the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the weaker
partys (the debtor) participation being reduced to the alternative to take it or
leave it (Qua vs. Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., 95 Phil. 85). Such a contract
is a veritable trap for the weaker party whom the courts of justice must protect
against abuse and imposition.
A similar ruling was made in Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals. The credit agreement in that case provided:
The BANK reserves the right to increase the interest rate within the
limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever policy it may
adopt in the future: Provided, that the interest rate on this accommodation shall
be correspondingly decreased in the event that the applicable maximum interest
is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. . . .
As in the first case, PNB successively increased the stipulated interest so that
what was originally 12% per annum became, after only two years, 42%. In
declaring the increases invalid, we held:
653
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
We cannot countenance petitioner banks posturing that the escalation clause
at bench gives it unbridled right to unilaterally upwardly adjust the interest on
private respondents loan. That would completely take away from private
respondents the right to assent to an important modification in their agreement,
and would negate the element of mutuality in contracts.
Only recently we invalidated another round of interest increases
decreed by PNB pursuant to a similar agreement it had with other
borrowers:
[W]hile the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates was lifted by C.B. Circular
905, nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting
respondent bank carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels
which would either enslave its borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of
their assets.
In this case no attempt was made by PNB to secure the conformity of
private respondents to the successive increases in the interest rate.
Private respondents assent to the increases cannot be implied from their
lack of response to the letters sent by PNB, informing them of the
increases. For as stated in one case, no one receiving a proposal to change
a contract is obliged to answer the proposal.71 (Emphasis supplied)
We made the same pronouncement in a fifth case, New Sampaguita Builders
Construction, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank,72 thus
Courts have the authority to strike down or to modify provisions in promissory
notes that grant the lenders unrestrained power to increase interest rates,
penalties and other charges at the latters sole discretion and without giving prior
notice to and securing the consent of the borrowers. This unilateral authority is
anathema to the
_______________
71 Id., at pp. 56-57, 60-63; pp. 550-557.
72 Supra note 55.
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
mutuality of contracts and enable lenders to take undue advantage of borrowers.
Although the Usury Law has been effectively repealed, courts may still reduce
iniquitous or unconscionable rates charged for the use of money. Furthermore,
excessive interests, penalties and other charges not revealed in
disclosure statements issued by banks, even if stipulated in the
promissory notes, cannot be given effect under the Truth in Lending
Act.73 (Emphasis supplied)
Yet again, in a sixth disposition, Philippine National Bank v. Spouses
Rocamora,74 the above pronouncements were reiterated to debunk PNBs repeated
reliance on its invalidated contract stipulations:
We repeated this rule in the 1994 case of PNB v. CA and Jayme-Fernandez and
the 1996 case of PNB v. CA and Spouses Basco. Taking no heed of these
rulings, the escalation clause PNB used in the present case to justify the increased
interest rates is no different from the escalation clause assailed in the 1996 PNB
case; in both, the interest rates were increased from the agreed 12% per
annum rate to 42%. x x x
xxxx
On the strength of this ruling, PNBs argument that the spouses
Rocamoras failure to contest the increased interest rates that were
purportedly reflected in the statements of account and the demand
letters sent by the bank amounted to their implied acceptance of the
increase should likewise fail.
Evidently, PNBs failure to secure the spouses Rocamoras consent to the
increased interest rates prompted the lower courts to declare excessive and illegal
the interest rates imposed. To go around this lower court finding, PNB alleges that
the P206,297.47 deficiency
_______________
73 Id., at p. 486; p. 571.
74 616 Phil. 369; 600 SCRA 395 (2009).
655
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
claim was computed using only the original 12% per annum interest rate. We find
this unlikely. Our examination of PNBs own ledgers, included in the records of the
case, clearly indicates that PNB imposed interest rates higher than the agreed
12% per annum rate. This confirmatory finding, albeit based solely on ledgers
found in the records, reinforces the application in this case of the rule that findings
of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are binding upon this Court.75 (Emphases
supplied)
Verily, all these cases, including the present one, involve identical or similar
provisions found in respondents credit agreements and promissory notes. Thus,
the July 1989 Credit Agreement executed by petitioners and respondent contained
the following stipulation on interest:
 1.03. Interest. (a) The Loan shall be subject to interest at the rate of 19.5%
[per annum]. Interest shall be payable in advance every one hundred twenty days
at the rate prevailing at the time of the renewal.
(b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate in
the Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank may adopt in the future,
including without limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate system to
the fixed interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has imposed on the
Loan interest at a rate per annum which is equal to the Banks spread over the
current floating interest rate, the Borrower hereby agrees that the Bank
may, without need of notice to the Borrower, increase or decrease its
spread over the floating interest rate at any time depending on whatever
policy it may adopt in the future.76 (Emphases supplied)
while the eight promissory notes issued pursuant thereto granted PNB the
right to increase or reduce interest rates
_______________
75 Id., at pp. 382-383; 409-410.
76 Records, p. 74.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
within the limits allowed by law or the Monetary Board77 and the Real Estate
Mortgage agreement included the same right to increase or reduce interest rates
at any time depending on whatever policy PNB may adopt in the future.78
On the basis of the Credit Agreement, petitioners issued promissory notes
which they signed in blank, and respondent later on entered their corresponding
interest rates, as follows:
1st Promissory Note dated July 24, 1989 19.5%;
2nd Promissory Note dated November 22, 1989 23%;
3rd Promissory Note dated March 21, 1990 22%;
4th Promissory Note dated July 19, 1990 24%;
5th Promissory Note dated December 17, 1990 28%;
6th Promissory Note dated February 14, 1991 32%;
7th Promissory Note dated March 1, 1991 30%; and
8th Promissory Note dated July 11, 1991 24%.79
On the other hand, the August 1991 Amendment to Credit Agreement contains
the following stipulation regarding interest:
1.03. Interest on Line Availments. (a) The Borrowers agree to pay
interest on each Availment from date of each Availment up to but not including
the date of full payment thereof at the rate per annum which is determined
by the Bank to be prime rate plus applicable spread in effect as of the
date of each Availment.80 (Emphases supplied)
and under this Amendment to Credit Agreement, petitioners again executed
and signed the following promissory notes in
_______________
77 Id., at p. 192.
78 Id., at p. 74, dorsal portion.
79 Id., at pp. 192-199.
80 Id., at p. 56.
657
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 657
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
blank, for the respondent to later on enter the corresponding interest rates, which
it did, as follows:
9th Promissory Note dated November 8, 1991 26%;
10th Promissory Note dated March 19, 1992 25%;
11th Promissory Note dated July 11, 1992 23%;
12th Promissory Note dated November 10, 1992 21%;
13th Promissory Note dated March 15, 1993 21%;
14th Promissory Note dated July 12, 1993 17.5%;
15th Promissory Note dated November 17, 1993 21%;
16th Promissory Note dated March 28, 1994 21%;
17th Promissory Note dated July 13, 1994 21%;
18th Promissory Note dated November 16, 1994 16%;
19th Promissory Note dated April 10, 1995 21%;
20th Promissory Note dated July 19, 1995 18.5%;
21st Promissory Note dated December 18, 1995 18.75%;
22nd Promissory Note dated April 22, 1996 18.5%;
23rd Promissory Note dated July 22, 1996 18.5%;
24th Promissory Note dated November 25, 1996 18%;
25th Promissory Note dated May 30, 1997 17.5%; and
26th Promissory Note (PN 9707237) dated July 30, 1997 25%.81
The 9th up to the 17th promissory notes provide for the payment of interest at
the rate the Bank may at any time without notice, raise within the limits allowed
by law x x x.82 On the other hand, the 18thup to the 26th promissory notes which
includes PN 9707237 carried the following provision:
x x x For this purpose, I/We agree that the rate of interest herein
stipulated may be increased or decreased for the subsequent Interest
Periods, with
_______________
81 Id., at pp. 174-191.
82 Id., at p. 191.
657
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 657
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
prior notice to the Borrower in the event of changes in interest rate
prescribed by law or the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, or in the Banks overall cost of funds. I/We hereby agree that
in the event I/we are not agreeable to the interest rate fixed for any
Interest Period, I/we shall have the option to prepay the loan or credit
facility without penalty within ten (10) calendar days from the Interest
Setting Date.83 (Emphasis supplied)
These stipulations must be once more invalidated, as was done in previous
cases. The common denominator in these cases is the lack of agreement of the
parties to the imposed interest rates. For this case, this lack of consent by the
petitioners has been made obvious by the fact that they signed the promissory
notes in blank for the respondent to fill. We find credible the testimony of Lydia in
this respect. Respondent failed to discredit her; in fact, its witness PNB Kalibo
Branch Manager Aspa admitted that interest rates were fixed solely by its
Treasury Department in Manila, which were then simply communicated to all
PNB branches for implementation. If this were the case, then this would explain
why petitioners had to sign the promissory notes in blank, since the imposable
interest rates have yet to be determined and fixed by respondents Treasury
Department in Manila.
Moreover, in Aspas enumeration of the factors that determine the interest
rates PNB fixes such as cost of money, foreign currency values, bank
administrative costs, profitability, and considerations which affect the banking
industry it can be seen that considerations which affect PNBs borrowers are
ignored. A borrowers current financial state, his feedback or opinions, the nature
and purpose of his borrowings, the effect of foreign currency values or fluctuations
on his business or borrowing, etc. these are not factors which influ-
_______________
83 Id., at p. 174.
659
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 659
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
ence the fixing of interest rates to be imposed on him. Clearly, respondents method
of fixing interest rates based on one-sided, indeterminate, and subjective criteria
such as profitability, cost of money, bank costs, etc. is arbitrary for there is no fixed
standard or margin above or below these considerations.
The stipulation in the promissory notes subjecting the interest rate to review
does not render the imposition by UCPB of interest rates on the obligations of the
spouses Beluso valid. According to said stipulation:
The interest rate shall be subject to review and may be increased or decreased by
the LENDER considering among others the prevailing financial and
monetary conditions; or the rate of interest and charges which other
banks or financial institutions charge or offer to charge for similar
accommodations; and/or the resulting profitability to the
LENDER after due consideration of all dealings with the BORROWER.
It should be pointed out that the authority to review the interest rate
was given [to] UCPB alone as the lender. Moreover, UCPB may apply the
considerations enumerated in this provision as it wishes. As worded in the above
provision, UCPB may give as much weight as it desires to each of the following
considerations: (1) the prevailing financial and monetary condition; (2) the rate of
interest and charges which other banks or financial institutions charge or offer to
charge for similar accommodations; and/or (3) the resulting profitability to the
LENDER (UCPB) after due consideration of all dealings with the BORROWER
(the spouses Beluso). Again, as in the case of the interest rate provision,
there is no fixed margin above or below these considerations.
In view of the foregoing, the Separability Clause cannot save either of the two
options of UCPB as to the
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
interest to be imposed, as both options violate the principle of mutuality of
contracts.84 (Emphases supplied)
To repeat what has been said in the above cited cases, any modification in the
contract, such as the interest rates, must be made with the consent of the
contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed
modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In
the case of loan agreements, the rate of interest is a principal condition, if not the
most important component. Thus, any modification thereof must be mutually
agreed upon; otherwise, it has no binding effect.
What is even more glaring in the present case is that, the stipulations in
question no longer provide that the parties shall agree upon the interest rate to be
fixed; instead, they are worded in such a way that the borrower shall agree
to whatever interest rate respondent fixes. In credit agreements covered by the
abovecited cases, it is provided that:
The Bank reserves the right to increase the interest rate within the limits
allowed by law at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the
future: Provided, that, the interest rate on this accommodation shall be
correspondingly decreased in the event that the applicable maximum interest rate
is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. In either case, the adjustment in the
interest rate agreed upon shall take effect on the effectivity date of the increase
or decrease in maximum interest rate.85(Emphasis supplied)
Whereas, in the present credit agreements under scrutiny, it is stated that:
_______________
84 United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses Beluso, supra note 50 at pp. 342-
343; p. 584.
85 See Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra note 66 at p. 22.
661
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 661
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
IN THE JULY 1989 CREDIT AGREEMENT
(b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate on the
Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank may adopt in the future, including
without limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate system to the fixed
interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has imposed on the Loan
interest at a rate per annum, which is equal to the Banks spread over the current
floating interest rate, the Borrower hereby agrees that the Bank
may, without need of notice to the Borrower, increase or decrease its spread
over the floating interest rate at any time depending on whatever policy it may
adopt in the future.86 (Emphases supplied)
IN THE AUGUST 1991 AMENDMENT TO CREDIT AGREEMENT
1.03. Interest on Line Availments. (a) The Borrowers agree to pay interest
on each Availment from date of each Availment up to but not including the date of
full payment thereof at the rate per annum which is determined by the Bank to be
prime rate plus applicable spread in effect as of the date of each
Availment.87 (Emphasis supplied)
 Plainly, with the present credit agreement, the element of consent or
agreement by the borrower is now completely lacking, which makes respondents
unlawful act all the more reprehensible.
Accordingly, petitioners are correct in arguing that estoppel should not apply
to them, for [e]stoppel cannot be predicated on an illegal act. As between the
parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by
_______________
86 Records, p. 47.
87 Id., at p. 56.
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
law or is against public policy.88 It appears that by its acts, respondent violated
the Truth in Lending Act, or Republic Act No. 3765, which was enacted to protect
x x x citizens from a lack of awareness of the true cost of credit to the user by using
a full disclosure of such cost with a view of preventing the uninformed use of credit
to the detriment of the national economy.89 The law gives a detailed enumeration
of the specific information required to be disclosed, among which are the interest
and other charges incident to the extension of credit.90 Section 4 thereof provides
that a disclosure statement must be furnished prior to the consummation of the
transaction, thus:
SEC. 4. Any creditor shall furnish to each person to whom credit is extended,
prior to the consummation of the transaction, a clear statement in writing setting
forth, to the extent applicable and in accordance with rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board, the following information:
(1) the cash price or delivered price of the property or service to be acquired;
(2) the amounts, if any, to be credited as down payment and/or trade-in;
(3) the difference between the amounts set forth under clauses (1) and (2);
(4) the charges, individually itemized, which are paid or to be paid by such
person in connection with the transaction but which are not incident to the
extension of credit;
(5) the total amount to be financed;
_______________
88 United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses Beluso, supra note 50 at p. 343; p.
585.
89 Section 2 thereof.
90 Heirs of Zoilo Espiritu v. Spouses Landrito, 549 Phil. 180, 190-191; 520
SCRA 383, 391-392 (2007).
663
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 663
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
(6) the finance charge expressed in terms of pesos and centavos; and
(7) the percentage that the finance bears to the total amount to be financed
expressed as a simple annual rate on the outstanding unpaid balance of the
obligation.
Under Section 4(6), finance charge represents the amount to be paid by the
debtor incident to the extension of credit such as interest or discounts, collection
fees, credit investigation fees, attorneys fees, and other service charges. The total
finance charge represents the difference between (1) the aggregate consideration
(down payment plus installments) on the part of the debtor, and (2) the sum of the
cash price and nonfinance charges.91
By requiring the petitioners to sign the credit documents and the promissory
notes in blank, and then unilaterally filling them up later on, respondent violated
the Truth in Lending Act, and was remiss in its disclosure obligations. In one case,
which the Court finds applicable here, it was held:
UCPB further argues that since the spouses Beluso were duly given
copies of the subject promissory notes after their execution, then they
were duly notified of the terms thereof, in substantial compliance with
the Truth in Lending Act.
Once more, we disagree. Section 4 of the Truth in Lending Act clearly provides
that the disclosure statement must be furnished prior to the consummation of the
transaction:
SEC. 4. Any creditor shall furnish to each person to whom credit is extended,
prior to the consummation of the transaction, a clear statement in writing
setting forth, to the extent applicable and in accordance with rules and
regulations prescribed by the Board, the following information:
_______________
91 Central Bank Circular No. 158.
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
(1) the cash price or delivered price of the property or service to be acquired;
(2) the amounts, if any, to be credited as down payment and/or trade-in;
(3) the difference between the amounts set forth under clauses (1) and (2);
(4) the charges, individually itemized, which are paid or to be paid by such person
in connection with the transaction but which are not incident to the extension
of credit;
(5) the total amount to be financed;
(6) the finance charge expressed in terms of pesos and centavos; and
(7) the percentage that the finance bears to the total amount to be financed
expressed as a simple annual rate on the outstanding unpaid balance of the
obligation.
The rationale of this provision is to protect users of credit from a lack
of awareness of the true cost thereof, proceeding from the experience that
banks are able to conceal such true cost by hidden charges, uncertainty
of interest rates, deduction of interests from the loaned amount, and the
like. The law thereby seeks to protect debtors by permitting them to fully
appreciate the true cost of their loan, to enable them to give full consent
to the contract, and to properly evaluate their options in arriving at
business decisions. Upholding UCPBs claim of substantial compliance would
defeat these purposes of the Truth in Lending Act. The belated discovery of the
true cost of credit will too often not be able to reverse the ill effects of an
already consummated business decision.
In addition, the promissory notes, the copies of which were presented
to the spouses Beluso after execution, are not sufficient notification from
UCPB. As earlier discussed, the interest rate provision therein does not
sufficiently indicate with particularity the interest rate to be applied to
the loan covered by said promissory notes.92 (Emphases supplied)
However, the one-year period within which an action for violation of the Truth
in Lending Act may be filed evidently prescribed long ago, or sometime in 2001,
one year after petitioners received the March 2000 demand letter which contained
the illegal charges.
The fact that petitioners later received several statements of account detailing
its outstanding obligations does not cure respondents breach. To repeat, the
belated discovery of the true cost of credit does not reverse the ill effects of an
already consummated business decision.93 Neither may the statements be
considered proposals sent to secure the petitioners conformity; they were sent
after the imposition and application of the interest rate, and not before. And even
if it were to be presumed that these are proposals or offers, there was no acceptance
by petitioners. No one receiving a proposal to modify a loan contract, especially
regarding interest, is obliged to answer the proposal.94
Loan and credit arrangements may be made enticing by, or sweetened with,
offers of low initial interest rates, but actually accompanied by provisions written
in fine print that allow lenders to later on increase or decrease interest rates
unilaterally, without the consent of the borrower, and depending on complex and
subjective factors. Because they have been lured into these contracts by initially
low interest rates, borrowers get caught and stuck in the web of subsequent steep
rates and penalties, surcharges and the like. Being ordinary individuals or
entities, they naturally dread legal complica-
_______________
92 United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses Beluso, supra note 50 at pp. 356-
358; p. 600.
93 Id., at p. 358; id.
94 Supra note 55 at p. 500; p. 583.
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
tions and cannot afford court litigation; they succumb to whatever charges the
lenders impose. At the very least, borrowers should be charged rightly; but then
again this is not possible in a one-sided credit system where the temptation to
abuse is strong and the willingness to rectify is made weak by the eternal desire
for profit.
Given the above supposition, the Court cannot subscribe to respondents
argument that in every repricing of petitioners loan availment, they are given the
right to question the interest rates imposed. The import of respondents line of
reasoning cannot be other than that if one out of every hundred borrowers
questions respondents practice of unilaterally fixing interest rates, then only the
loan arrangement with that lone complaining borrower will enjoy the benefit of
review or renegotiation; as to the 99 others, the questionable practice will continue
unchecked, and respondent will continue to reap the profits from such
unscrupulous practice. The Court can no more condone a view so perverse. This is
exactly what the Court meant in the immediately preceding cited case when it said
that the belated discovery of the true cost of credit does not reverse the ill effects
of an already consummated business decision;95 as to the 99 borrowers who did
not or could not complain, the illegal act shall have become a fait accompli to
their detriment, they have already suffered the oppressive rates.
Besides, that petitioners are given the right to question the interest rates
imposed is, under the circumstances, irrelevant; we have a situation where the
petitioners do not stand on equal footing with the respondent. It is doubtful that
any borrower who finds himself in petitioners position would dare question
respondents power to arbitrarily modify interest rates at any time. In the second
place, on what basis could any borrower question such power, when the criteria or
stan-
_______________
95 Id.
667
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 667
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
dards which are really one-sided, arbitrary and subjective for the exercise of
such power are precisely lost on him?
For the same reasons, the Court cannot validly consider that, as stipulated in
the 18th up to the 26th promissory notes, petitioners are granted the option to
prepay the loan or credit facility without penalty within 10 calendar days from the
Interest Setting Date if they are not agreeable to the interest rate fixed. It has
been shown that the promissory notes are executed and signed in blank, meaning
that by the time petitioners learn of the interest rate, they are already bound to
pay it because they have already presigned the note where the rate is subsequently
entered. Besides, premium may not be placed upon a stipulation in a contract
which grants one party the right to choose whether to continue with or withdraw
from the agreement if it discovers that what the other party has been doing all
along is improper or illegal.
Thus said, respondents arguments relative to the credit documents that
documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence; that the credit
documents are in proper form, presumed regular, and endure, against arbitrary
claims by petitioners, experienced business persons that they are, they signed
questionable loan documents whose provisions for interest rates were left blank,
and yet they continued to pay the interests without protest for a number of years
deserve no consideration.
With regard to interest, the Court finds that since the escalation clause is
annulled, the principal amount of the loan is subject to the original or stipulated
rate of interest, and upon maturity, the amount due shall be subject to legal
interest at the rate of 12% per annum. This is the uniform ruling adopted in
previous cases, including those cited here.96 The interests paid by petitioners
should be applied first to the payment of the stipulated or legal and unpaid
interest, as the case may
_______________
96 See also Equitable PCI Bank v. Ng Sheung Ngor, 565 Phil. 520, 539; 541
SCRA 223, 241-242 (2007).
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
be, and later, to the capital or principal.97 Respondent should then refund the
excess amount of interest that it has illegally imposed upon petitioners; [t]he
amount to be refunded refers to that paid by petitioners when they had no
obligation to do so.98 Thus, the parties original agreement stipulated the payment
of 19.5% interest; however, this rate was intended to apply only to the first
promissory note which expired on November 21, 1989 and was paid by petitioners;
it was not intended to apply to the whole duration of the loan. Subsequent higher
interest rates have been declared illegal; but because only the rates are found to
be improper, the obligation to pay interest subsists, the same to be fixed at the
legal rate of 12% per annum. However, the 12% interest shall apply only until June
30, 2013. Starting July 1, 2013, the prevailing rate of interest shall be 6% per
annum pursuant to our ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames99 and Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board Circular No. 799.
Now to the issue of penalty. PN 9707237 provides that failure to pay it or any
installment thereon, when due, shall constitute default, and a penalty charge of
24% per annum based on the defaulted principal amount shall be imposed.
Petitioners claim that this penalty should be excluded from the foreclosure amount
or bid price because the Real Estate Mortgage and the Supplement thereto did not
specifically include it as part of the secured amount. Respondent justifies its
inclusion in the secured amount, saying that the purpose of the penalty or a penal
clause is to ensure the performance of the obligation and substitute for damages
and the payment
_______________
97 Hodges v. Salas, 63 Phil. 567, 574 (1936), citing Aguilar v. Rubiato and
Gonzalez Vila, 40 Phil. 570 (1920); Go Chioco v. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256, 279-282
(1923); Gui Jong & Co. v. Rivera and Avellar, 45 Phil. 778, 784 (1924); Sajo v.
Gustilo, 48 Phil. 451, 462 (1925).
98 See Philippine Savings Bank v. Castillo, G.R. No. 193178, May 30, 2011,
649 SCRA 527, 538.
99 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.
669
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
of interest in the event of noncompliance.100 Respondent adds that the imposition
and collection of a penalty is a normal banking practice, and the standard rate per
annum for all commercial banks, at the time, was 24%. Its inclusion as part of the
secured amount in the mortgage agreements is thus valid and necessary.
The Court sustains petitioners view that the penalty may not be included as part
of the secured amount. Having found the credit agreements and promissory notes
to be tainted, we must accord the same treatment to the mortgages. After all, [a]
mortgage and a note secured by it are deemed parts of one transaction and are
construed together.101 Being so tainted and having the attributes of a contract of
adhesion as the principal credit documents, we must construe the mortgage
contracts strictly, and against the party who drafted it. An examination of the
mortgage agreements reveals that nowhere is it stated that penalties are to be
included in the secured amount. Construing this silence strictly against the
respondent, the Court can only conclude that the parties did not intend to include
the penalty allowed under PN 9707237 as part of the secured amount. Given its
resources, respondent could have if it truly wanted to conveniently prepared
and executed an amended mortgage agreement with the petitioners, thereby
including penalties in the amount to be secured by the encumbered properties. Yet
it did not.
With regard to attorneys fees, it was plain error for the CA to have passed
upon the issue since it was not raised by the petitioners in their appeal; it was the
respondent that improperly brought it up in its appellees brief, when it should
have interposed an appeal, since the trial courts Decision on this issue is adverse
to it. It is an elementary principle in the
_______________
100 Citing Article 1226 of the Civil Code and Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines Annotated (Commentaries) Vol. IV, p. 298, 1989, 12th edition.
101 Philippine Bank of Communications, supra note 51 at p. 314; p. 255.
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
subject of appeals that an appellee who does not himself appeal cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision
of the court below.
x x x [A]n appellee, who is at the same time not an appellant, may on appeal
be permitted to make counter assignments of error in ordinary actions, when the
purpose is merely to defend himself against an appeal in which errors are alleged
to have been committed by the trial court both in the appreciation of facts and in
the interpretation of the law, in order to sustain the judgment in his favor but not
when his purpose is to seek modification or reversal of the judgment, in which case
it is necessary for him to have excepted to and appealed from the judgment.102
Since petitioners did not raise the issue of reduction of attorneys fees, the
CA possessed no authority to pass upon it at the instance of respondent. The ruling
of the trial court in this respect should remain undisturbed.
For the fixing of the proper amounts due and owing to the parties to the
respondent as creditor and to the petitioners who are entitled to a refund as a
consequence of overpayment considering that they paid more by way of interest
charges than the 12% per annum103 herein allowed the case should be remanded
to the lower court for proper accounting and computation, applying the following
procedure:
1. The 1st Promissory Note with the 19.5% interest rate is deemed proper and
paid;
2. All subsequent promissory notes (from the 2nd to the 26thpromissory notes)
shall carry an interest rate of only 12% per annum.104 Thus, interest payment
made
_______________
102 Saenz v. Mitchell, 60 Phil. 69, 80 (1934).
103 Or 6% per annum, when applicable.
104 Id.
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
in excess of 12% on the 2nd promissory note shall immediately be applied to the
principal, and the principal shall be accordingly reduced. The reduced principal
shall then be subjected to the 12%105interest on the 3rd promissory note, and the
excess over 12% interest payment on the 3rd promissory note shall again be
applied to the principal, which shall again be reduced accordingly. The reduced
principal shall then be subjected to the 12% interest on the 4th promissory note,
and the excess over 12% interest payment on the 4th promissory note shall again
be applied to the principal, which shall again be reduced accordingly. And so on
and so forth;
3. After the above procedure is carried out, the trial court shall be able
to conclude if petitioners a) still have an OUTSTANDING
BALANCE/OBLIGATION or b) MADE PAYMENTS OVER AND ABOVE
THEIR TOTAL OBLIGATION (principal and interest);
4. Such outstanding balance/obligation, if there be any, shall then be
subjected to a 12% per annum interest from October 28, 1997 until January 14,
1999, which is the date of the auction sale;
5. Such outstanding balance/obligation shall also be charged a 24% per
annum penalty from August 14, 1997 until January 14, 1999. But from this total
penalty, the petitioners previous payment of penalties in the amount of
P202,000.00 made on January 27, 1998106 shall be DEDUCTED;
6. To this outstanding balance (3.), the interest (4.), penalties (5.), and the final
and executory award of 1% attorneys fees shall be ADDED;
_______________
105 Id.
106 Rollo, p. 63.
7. The sum total of the outstanding balance (3.), interest (4.) and 1% attorneys
fees (6.) shall be DEDUCTED from the bid price of P4,324,172.96. The penalties
(5.) are not included because they are not included in the secured amount;
8. The difference in (7.) [P4,324,172.96 LESS sum total of the outstanding
balance (3.), interest (4.), and 1% attorneys fees (6.)] shall be DELIVERED TO
THE PETITIONERS;
9. Respondent may then proceed to consolidate its title to TCTs T-14250 and
T-16208;
10. ON THE OTHER HAND, if after performing the procedure in (2.), it turns
out that petitioners made an OVERPAYMENT, the interest (4.), penalties (5.),
and the award of 1% attorneys fees (6.) shall be DEDUCTED from the
overpayment. There is no outstanding balance/obligation precisely because
petitioners have paid beyond the amount of the principal and interest;
11. If the overpayment exceeds the sum total of the interest (4.), penalties (5.),
and award of 1% attorneys fees (6.), the excess shall be RETURNED to the
petitioners, with legal interest, under the principle of solutio indebiti;107
12. Likewise, if the overpayment exceeds the total amount of interest (4.) and
award of 1% attorneys fees (6.), the trial court shall INVALIDATE THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE AND SALE;
13. HOWEVER, if the total amount of interest (4.) and award of 1% attorneys
fees (6.) exceed petitioners
_______________
107 Also, under the Civil Code, Art. 1413, interest paid in excess of the interest
allowed by the usury laws may be recovered by the debtor, with interest thereon
from the date of the payment.
673
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
overpayment, then the excess shall be DEDUCTED from the bid price of
P4,324,172.96;
14. The difference in (13.) [P4,324,172.96 LESS sum total of the interest (4.)
and 1% attorneys fees (6.)] shall be DELIVERED TO THE PETITIONERS;
15. Respondent may then proceed to consolidate its title to TCTs T-14250 and
T-16208. The outstanding penalties, if any, shall be collected by other means.
From the above, it will be seen that if, after proper accounting, it turns out that
the petitioners made payments exceeding what they actually owe by way of
principal, interest, and attorneys fees, then the mortgaged properties need not
answer for any outstanding secured amount, because there is not any; quite the
contrary, respondent must refund the excess to petitioners. In such case, the
extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the properties shall be declared null and void
for obvious lack of basis, the case being one of solutio indebiti instead. If, on the
other hand, it turns out that petitioners overpayments in interests do not exceed
their total obligation, then the respondent may consolidate its ownership over the
properties, since the period for redemption has expired. Its only obligation will be
to return the difference between its bid price (P4,324,172.96) and petitioners total
obligation outstanding except penalties after applying the latters
overpayments.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The May 8,
2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 79650
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The interest rates imposed and indicated in the 2nd up to the 26th Promissory
Notes are DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and such notes shall instead be subject
to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum up to June 30, 2013, and
starting July 1, 2013, six percent (6%) per annum until full satisfaction;
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
2. The penalty charge imposed in Promissory Note No. 9707237 shall
be EXCLUDED from the amounts secured by the real estate mortgages;
3. The trial courts award of one percent (1%) attorneys fees is REINSTATED;
4. The case is ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6 of
Kalibo, Aklan for the computation of overpayments made by petitioners spouses
Eduardo and Lydia Silos to respondent Philippine National Bank, taking into
consideration the foregoing dispositions, and applying the procedure hereinabove
set forth;
5. Thereafter, the trial court is ORDERED to make a determination as to the
validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale, declaring the same null and void
in case of overpayment and ordering the release and return of Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-14250 and TCT T-16208 to petitioners, or ordering the delivery to
the petitioners of the difference between the bid price and the total remaining
obligation of petitioners, if any;
6. In the meantime, the respondent Philippine National Bank
is ENJOINED from consolidating title to Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
14250 and T-16208 until all the steps in the procedure above set forth have been
taken and applied;
7. The reimbursement of the excess in the bid price of P377,505.99, which
respondent Philippine National Bank is ordered to reimburse petitioners, should
be HELD IN ABEYANCE until the true amount owing to or owed by the parties
as against each other is determined;
8. Considering that this case has been pending for such a long time and that
further proceedings, albeit uncomplicated, are required, the trial court
is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch.
675
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,** Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, judgment annulled and set aside.

Notes.Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was

no express contract thereon. (Macalinao vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 600
SCRA 67 [2009])
The payment of interest in loans or forbearance of money is allowed only if: (1)
there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and (2) the agreement
for the payment of interest was reduced in writing. (Prisma Construction &
Development Corporation vs. Menchavez, 614 SCRA 590 [2010])

o0o

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** Per Raffle dated June 9, 2014.

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