Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Connecticut
381 U.S. 479 ll June 7, 1965 ll Douglas, J.
FACTS: HELD:
Appellants Griswold, an Executive
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Yes. Appellants have standing, in so far as
Connecticut and Buxton, a licensed physician that they assert that the crimes for which they
were arrested tried, convicted and fined $100 were charged is, constitutionally, not a crime.
for violating provisions of the General Statutes
of Connecticut sections 53-32 and 54-196. They Yes. While the right to privacy is not
provided medical advice to a married couple explicitly included in the Bill of Rights, the right
that wanted to be informed on contraception of married couples to decide on reproductive
methods and subsequently prescribed choices and to be assisted in doing so is
contraceptive devices and materials for the protected by peripheral rights or the
wife's use. "penumbra" of other rights provided by the
Section 53-32 provides that the use of any First Amendment (right to teach, as in Pierce v.
drug, medicinal article or instrument to prevent Society of Sisters, supra; and Meyer v.
conception is punishable by fine or mandatory Nebraska; right to association, NAACP v.
jail time. Section 54-196 provides that any Alabama), the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
accessory to such crime is punished as if they and the Ninth amendment.
were the principal offender.
Intermediate appellate court and the Court reversed Connecticut
State's highest court affirmed the judgment.
151 Connecticut 544, 200 A.2d 479
Appellants asserted that their conviction
pursuant to the statute is in violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus they
believe that Connecticut is unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
Whether appellants have standing to assert
right of married couples to privacy?
Whether their conviction as accessories due
to enforcement of said Connecticut statute
violated appellants Fourteenth Amendment
rights?
Dilag 1 332
Persons and Family Relations
Eisenstadt v. Baird
405 U.S. 438 ll March 22, 1972 ll Brennan, J.
HELD: Baird is now in a position to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to
contraceptives
2. Whether the Massachusetts statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
a. The deterrence of fornication cannot be taken as the purpose of the ban on distribution
of contraceptives.
b. The Massachusetts statute on restricting access to non-married persons does not
serve any health purpose. If that were the case, then the restriction should also
apply to married persons.
c. If the r ight to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
HELD: The Massachusetts statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Dilag 2 332
Persons and Family Relations
Geluz v. CA
G.R. No. L-16439 ll Jul. 20, 1961 ll Reyes, J.
FACTS: ISSUES:
During the Japanese invasion, the Navarro Between the mother and son, who died
family, consisted of Joaquin Navarro Sr., 70; first?
Angela Joaquin de Navarro, ~67; Joaquin
Navarro Jr., ~30; and sisters Pilar, ~33; In answering this question, must the
Concepcion, ~23; and Natividad, ~25, were presumption of survivorship in Rule 131,
killed in various orders. The established fact is Section 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court or
that the three sisters, Pilar, Concepcion and simultaneous death in Section 43 of the Civil
Natividad, were the first ones to get killed, Code be applied?
while their father, Joaquin Navarro Sr., was the
last. The disputed order of death however
concerns that of Angela Joaquin de Navarro and HELD:
Joaquin Navarro Jr., because no clear evidence Based on the preponderance of evidence
shows that at the time when Joaquin Navarro provided by Francisco Lopezs testimony, the
Jr. got shot on the head, Angela Joaquin had court ruled that it is most probable that Joaquin
already been dead or was still alive. Navarro Jr. died before her mother. The
It is important to solve the mystery because contrary position is merely speculative, and is
it has a bearing on the rights to succession of thus trumped by the formers circumstantial
Ramon Joaquin, herein referred to as Petitioner, FACTS.
who is the biological son of Angela Joaquin to a Thus, there is no need to use the
previous relationship, as well as the legally presumption of survivorship in Rule 131,
adopted child of Joaquin Navarro Sr., and Section 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court, or the
Antonio Navarro, herein referred to as presumption of simultaneity of death in Section
Respondent, who is the biological son of 43. These two provisions only apply when the
Joaquin Navarro Sr. to a previous marriage. FACTS are unknown and unknowable, which is
not true for the case at hand.
ISSUE:
WON the sale can be annulled on the
grounds that petitioners were minors without
legal capacity to contract on the date of its
execution, and that the defendant availed 1
If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets
himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five
petitioners consent. years of age, and this assertion is believed by
another person who takes him to be of about that
HELD: age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to
be of the age he asserted, and should not (3)
afterwards be released from liability on the plea that
No, the sale cannot be annulled.
was not of said age when he assumed the obligation.
The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived
First, the evidence adduced at the trial and not the deceivers.
FACTS: ISSUES:
Isidro Bambalan, the plaintiff, executed a Whether or not the sale was invalid because the
deed of sale involving a piece of land to plaintiff who executed the same was a minor
Genoveva Muerong, one of the defendants. At
the time he signed and executed said deed, RULING:
Isidro was a minor, and made no The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
misrepresentation that he was of legal age. In the lower court.
fact, Genoneva was aware that Isidro was still a
minor, as she was the one who purchased his RATIO DECIDENDI
first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the The doctrine laid down in the case of
document. The plaintiff now wishes to Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu, where the
invalidate said sale. minor was held to be estopped from contesting
the contract executed by him pretending to be
of age, is not applicable in this case, since the
plaintiff did not pretend to be of age and since
his minority was well known to the purchaser.
FACTS: RULING:
Rosario and her sons loaned Japanese war The Court held Rosarios liability but only
notes in the amount of P70,000 from Fernando made the sons liable to the extent that they
F. de Villa Abrille, promising to pay him with benefitted from the loan.
interest in Philippine currency two years after
the cessation of the war as soon as RATIO DECIDENDI
International Exchange has been established in NO. Mere failure to disclose minors age
the Philippines. Upon their failure to pay, Villa does not constitute fraud, hence the minors
Abrille sued them, to which the defendants cannot be held liable. There is no juridical duty
asserted the sons minority during the time they on their part to disclose their incapacity on the
signed the promissory note as an excuse for basis of their minority. Misrepresentation of
their liability. Further, Villa Abrille, when the age, for it to be fraudulent, must be active and
defendants signed said promissory note, was not passive; that is, the minors actually have to
not aware that the sons were still minors, since lie about their age and not just fail to disclose it.
none of the defendants made any Meanwhile, the minors are nonetheless
representation as to the twos ages at the time. required to make restitution insofar as they
have benefited from the money they received.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the minors were liable to
pay since they failed to disclose their being
minors
FACTS:
Plaintiff Antonia Loanco-De Jesus worked as ISSUES:
a cashier for a barber shop of which defendant WON the breach of promise to marry is
Cesar Syquia, an unmarried man from a actionable.
prominent family, was accustomed to get his WON the letters made by defendant prove
haircut. The two became acquainted and sufficiency of acknowledgment of paternity.
developed an amorous relationship which
resulted to Antonia getting pregnant and giving HELD:
birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
During the early months of Antonias the trial court in refusing to give damages to
pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor at Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The
her home, and in February 1931, he handed action has no standing in civil law, apart from
Antonia a letter which was addressed to the the right to recover money or property
priest who was to christen the baby advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
acknowledging that the baby is his and that it promise. This case exhibits none of the features
be christened in his name. necessary to maintain such an action.
Defendant showed paternal interest in the Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
situation that even when he was abroad, he judgment could be based requiring the
continued to write to Antonia cautioning her to defendant to recognize the second child, Pacita
take care of herself so that junior would be Loanco.
strong. The sufficiency of acknowledgement of
After giving birth, Syquia took Antonia and paternity is satisfied by the production of one or
the child in his house where they lived together more documents, of indubitable authenticity,
in regular family style with all household written by the recognizing father, as
expenses paid for by Syquia. When Antonia contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of
showed signs of a second pregnancy, Syquia left the Civil Code. The admission of paternity is
her and thereafter married another woman. contained in the note to the priest and the
During the christening of the child, the other letters addressed to Antonia during her
defendant caused the child to be given the pregnancy.
name Ismael Loanco instead of the originally
planned Cesar Syquia, Jr.
FACTS: ISSUE:
The petitioner, Piccininni, claims that the WON Piccinnini can recover his property in
defendant, Hajus, made him believe that they light of the Heart Balm Act
would get married and live at her house.
Because of this, Piccininni spent $40,000 to HELD:
renovate and improve her house. Yes. Piccininni is not asking for damages
Hajus claimed that she cant be charged because of a broken heart or a mortified spirit.
with fraud and that what she committed was a He is asking for the return of things which he
breach of promise to marry. Therefore, no gave to Hajus because of her fraudulent
action can be brought upon her because of the representations. Picininni does not assert that
Heart Balm Act. Hajus wronged him in failing to marry him. He
The Heart Balm Act states no action shall just asserted that she wronged him in
be brought upon any cause from alienation of fraudulently inducing him to transfer property
affections or from breach of promise to marry. to her. His complaint is based on what she did,
Trial court ruled that the Heart Balm Act and not on what she refused to do.
bars Piccininni from charging Hajus. Case
brought to SC. Hence, trial courts judgment was reverse.
FACTS:
The statute of Illinois on the subject of ISSUE:
admissions to the bar enacts that no person WON the decision violates a provision of
shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or the Federal Constitution.
counsellor-at-law without having previously
obtained a license for that purpose from some HELD:
two of the justices of the Supreme Court. No--the decision of the Illinois court upheld,
Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied to the judges of and Mrs. Bradwell still cannot practice law.
the Supreme Court of Illinois for a license to There are privileges and immunities
practice law. With this petition are a certificate belonging to citizens of the United States, and
from an inferior court of her good character, that it is these and these alone which a State is
and that on due examination she had been forbidden to abridge. However, the right to
found to possess the requisite qualifications. admission to practice in the courts of a State is
Pending this application, she also filed an not one of them. The SC here, referring to the
affidavit, stating that she was born in the State opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, says that
of Vermont; that she was (had been) a citizen of the power of a State to prescribe the
the State; that she is now a citizen of the United qualifications for admission to the bar of its
States, and has been for many years past a own courts is unaffected by the 14th
resident of the city of Chicago, in the State of amendment, and that they cannot inquire into
Illinois. She also filed a paper asserting that she the reasonableness or propriety of the rules it
was entitled to the license prayed for by virtue may prescribe.
of the second section of the fourth article of the The Supreme Court also dismissed any
Constitution of the United States, and that of claim under the privileges and immunities
the 14th article of amendment of that clause of the unamended ConstitutionArticle
instrument. IV, Section 2, Clause 1. Bradwell argued that
Her application was denied, and it was because she had been born in Vermont but
stated as a sufficient reason that under the later moved to Illinois, Illinois' denial of a law
decisions of the SC of Illinois, the applicantas license was inter-state discrimination. But the
a married woman would be bound neither by Court noted that under the recently-enacted
her express contracts nor by those implied Fourteenth Amendment, "All persons born or
contracts which it is the policy of the law to naturalized in the United States, and subject to
create between attorney and client. The the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
decision also states that admitting women United States and of the State wherein they
would mean that the courts would be exercising reside." Because Bradwell had been a resident
the authority conferred upon them in a manner of Illinois for several years, she was now a
that was never contemplated by the legislature. citizen of Illinois, and the interstate provision of
Plus, God designed the sexes to occupy Article IV did not apply.
different spheres of action, and that it belonged
to men to make, apply, and execute the laws.
FACTS: ISSUES:
Rosary Palermo, a Nashville lawyer, married WON it is mandatory for a married woman
Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She to assume the name of her husband repute
has continued to use and enjoy her maiden
name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for RULING:
all purposes. Subsequent to her marriage, she The Court ruled in favour of the appellee.
lodged with the Registrar a change of address
form listing her name as Palermo. She was RATIO DECIDENDI:
advised that she was required to register anew There is no constitutional question that
under the surname of her husband, or have her needs to be answered as regards the Texas
name purged from the registration records. statute as it does not mandate any change of
Upon her refusal to so register, her name was name by a woman upon marriage. It merely
purged from the registration list. Thus this recognizes the prevalence of the virtually
action, wherein appellee seeks a declaratory universal custom under which a woman
judgment declaring that the defendants' normally adopts the surname of her husband.
interpretation of Sec. 2-206, is erroneous, or in We hold that in this jurisdiction a woman, upon
the alternative that this statute be declared marriage, has a freedom of choice; she may
violative of the Due Process and Equal elect to retain her own surname or she may
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth adopt the surname of her husband. So long as a
Amendment, and of the Nineteenth person's name remains constant and consistent,
Amendment to the Constitution of the United and unless and until changed in the prescribed
States. manner, and absent any fraudulent or legally
impermissible intent, the State has no
legitimate concern.
PETITIONER-COMPLAINANT: OSG
RESPONDENT: Roque Santiago
FACTS: RULING:
Saturnino Selanova charged Judge The respondent is severely censured but
Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with not disbarred due to the attending
gross ignorance of the law for having prepared circumstances.
and ratified a document extrajudicially
liquidating the conjugal partnership of the RATIO DECIDENDI:
complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One The agreement in question is void because
condition of the liquidation was that either it contravenes the Art 221 of the Civil Code
spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw which makes void any (1) any contract for
the complaint for adultery or concubinage personal separation between husband and wife;
which each had filed against the other and that and (2) every extrajudicial agreement, during
they waived their "right to prosecute each other marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would partnership of gains or of the absolute
commit against the other. Judge Mendoza community of property between husband and
claimed that he was aware of the invalidity of wife. They also cited that Judge Mendozas
the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it on reliance on Art. 191 Par.4 of the Civil Code was
the assurance of the spouses that they would misplaced and that the Court had already ruled
ask the Court of First Instance of Negros in an earlier case that judicial sanction for the
Oriental to approve the agreement. He said that dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
he relied on the provision that "the husband the marriage should be secured beforehand
and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of before it can be ratified. Meanwhile, in regard
the conjugal partnership during the marriage, to the other main stipulation of the contract in
subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, question, which waives the right of either
Civil Code). spouse to file a complaint against any
adulterous offense the other may commit, was
ISSUES: also cited to be "contrary to law, morals and
WON the document of extrajudicial public order, and as a consequence not
liquidation of conjugal partnership ratified by judicially recognizable" They held that while
the respondent is void. while adultery and concubinage are private
crimes, they still remain crimes and a contract
legalizing their commission is therefore void.
Plaintiffs were denied marriage license by the Department of Public Health, due to same-sex
marriage.
FACTS: ISSUES:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a WON the trial court erred in ordering the
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth correction of entries in the birth certificate of
Certificate before the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna. respondent to change her name and gender, on
She asserted that she was registered as a the ground of her medical condition known as
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while CAH
growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have RULING:
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is The Republics petition is denied.
a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. RATIO DECIDENDI:
Tests revealed that her ovarian structures had No. The respondents condition, CAH, is one
minimized, she has stopped growing and she of many conditions involving intersexuality,
has no breast or menstrual development; she which apply to human beings who cannot be
has become a male person. In her petition with classified as either male or female. Here, the
the RTC to have her birth certificate be rule of determining a persons gender at birth
corrected such that her gender be changed cannot apply because the sexual development
from female to male and her first name be in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
changed from Jennifer to Jeff, her physician classification at birth inconclusive.
testified on her condition by presenting a Instead, it is at maturity that the gender of
medical certificate to back her alleged such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Thus,
condition. The RTC granted her petition, the Court is of the view that where the person
recognizing her proven medical condition. Thus is biologically or naturally intersex, the
(OSG) filed this petition seeking areversal of the determining factor in his gender classification
abovementioned ruling based on (1) violations would be what the individual, like respondent,
on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court regarding (a) having reached the age of majority, with good
Cagandahans failure to implead the local civil reason thinks of his/her sex. In the case of
registrar in her petition with the RTC and (b) her respondent, his having ordered his life to that of
plea to have her gender changed in the birth a male is backed by preponderant biological
certificate (OSG believes her condition does not bases. Unlike in the case of individuals who
make her male; and (2) a violation on Rule 103 underwent sexual reassignment, respondent
of the Rules of Court, in which Cagandahan here has simply let nature take its course and
failed to state that respondent is a bona fide has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
resident of the province where the petition was interfere with what he was born with. In the
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date absence of a law on such an unusual matter, the
of such filing. The court dismissed the two Court will not dictate on respondent concerning
procedural ISSUES on Rules 108 and 103, and a matter so innately private as ones sexuality
decided on the substantive merit regarding the and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether
change of gender in Cagandahans records due or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse
to her medical condition. the male tendency due to CAH.
NATURE: ISSUE:
This is an appeal brought to the Supreme WON the marriage of the appellant and the
Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of victim is considered valid to exempt him from
First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija criminal liability. NO.
finding the appellant guilty of rape and
sentencing him to undergo imprisonment, RATIO:
reclusion temporal; requiring him to endow the The court found that the offense of rape
offended party; requiring him to recognize and has indeed been committed, but the marriage
maintain the offspring, if there should be any, ceremony was only a mere ruse of the
as consequence of the rape; and requiring him appellant to escape from criminal liability. The
to pay further costs. actions of Santiago before and after the
marriage would prove that he really had no
FACTS: intention to marry Masilang other than for the
Felicita Masilang (victim), aged 18, was aforementioned reason. Furthermore, because
Felipe Santiagos (appellant) niece by marriage. the victim was under duress, the marriage is
On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked void for lack of consent. Consequently, the
the victim to accompany him to cross the river appellant is not exempt from criminal liability.
and from there he led her to a place far from
the highway with tall grass hiding them from The judgment appealed from is in accordance
public view. The appellant manifested a desire with law, and will be affirmed. Costs against
to have sexual intercourse with the girl but she the appellant.
FACTS:
The plaintiff met the defendant in March RULING:
1938. After several dates, they were engaged The judgment appealed from is deemed to
on 19 September of that year. On 26 November be in accordance with law, and is thus affirmed.
the same year, the plaintiff married the
defendant in the Catholic Cathedral of the City RATIO DECIDENDI:
of Baguio. After living together as husband and NO. The plaintiff's allegation that he had
wife for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave not suspected the pregnancy of the defendant
birth to a child of nine months, on February 23, when he married her is highly improbable, given
1939. Because of this the plaintiff abandoned her obvious advanced pregnancy. Therefore it is
the defendant and did not return to their life as unnecessary to consider the appellants
husband and wife. allegation of fraud. He also argued that it is not
The plaintiff then requests the annulment uncommon to find people with big stomachs,
of the marriage he had with the defendant on but we find this argument too puerile to even
the grounds that he consented to the marriage consider, especially since the appellant is a
because the defendant had assured him that freshman in law school.
she was virgin. Marriage is a most sacred institution: it is
the cement, the very foundation, on which
ISSUES: society rests. For annulment to proceed, it is
WON annulment can proceed given entirely necessary that the pieces of evidence
plaintiffs claim that he had been defrauded by provided be clear and reliable. No such
his wife whom he thought was a virgin evidence can be found in this case.
FACTS: HELD:
Eduardo Eigenmann [who represented No. He is estopped because of his
himself as of legal age] and Maryden Guerra got misrepresentation of his age [claimed to be
married before Judge Prudencio Encomienda as 25yrs,8mos] when he applied for marriage
solemnizing officer and 4 witnesses, including license. With regards to the consent of his
Eduardos mother. After living together for mother, the fact that the mother was a witness
quite a time, Eduardo filed an action for the to the marriage and did not object to the
annulment of his marriage to Maryden Guerra marriage implies consent. Consent may be
on the grounds of his age and lack of parental given in any form [written,oral or implied] A
consent, his consent not freely given [use of written consent under oath is not necessary.
force, intimidation by Froilan Guerra, wifes
father], and lack of legal authority of the one No. There was no factual or legal for the
who administered the oath [councillor of claim.The Court did not see any reasonable or
Quezon City] making the marriage void ab initio. well-grounded fear of an imminent danger and
grave evil upon Eigenmanns person or property
ISSUES: that would arise from the statement of Froilan
WON his lack of statutory age and lack of Guerra [Balita ko lumiligaw ka sa aking anak.
parental consent may be grounds for Pag niloko mo iyan, mag-ingat ka.] The
annulment of marriage statement for the court was only an admonition
WON his consent being not freely given natural for a father and not a threat.
may render the marriage void
WON the marriage is void ab ignition No. What is declared null and void by the
because of the lack of legal authority by the law are marriages solemnized w/o a marriage
officer who administered the oath license. A marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained. The local civil registrar and
the solemnizing officer are not required to
inquire about the authority of the officer
administering the oath.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo G. Navarro submitted ISSUES:
evidence in relation to two specific acts WON respondent exhibited gross
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit misconduct and ignorance of the law.
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which,
he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well RULING:
as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy
law: is SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and
1.) Respondent judge solemnized the wedding given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
Borga, despite the knowledge that the severely.
groom is merely separated from his first
wife. (In violation of Art. 41 of the FC) RATIO DECIDENDI:
2.) Respondent judge performed a marriage YES. Judge Domagtoys gross ignorance of
very basic legal principles enshrined in the
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
Family Code resulted to a bigamous and
and Gemma G. del Rosario at the
therefore void marriage for the first marriage
respondent judges residence in the he solemnized, and to the second, a lack of the
Municipal of Dapa, which does not fall necessary authority of the solemnizing officer,
within his jurisdictional area of the since he solemnized the marriage outside of his
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. jurisdiction.
(In violation of Art. 7 Par. 1 of the FC)2 Judge Domagtoys reliance on the said
affidavit of Tagadans 7-year separation with his
In response, Judge Domagtoy claimed that
former wife, which said affidavit was proven to
his act of solemnizing the marriage between
have not been ISSUEd by the MTC Judge of
Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from Basey, Samar but only sworn before him, is
his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga was predicated on insufficient justification for his having
an affidavit supposedly ISSUEd by the Municipal solemnized Tagadans second marriage on the
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact basis of his wifes presumptive death.
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not Regardless of whether Tagadan had a well-
seen each other for almost seven years. With founded belief that his wife, who had not been
respect to the second charge, he maintains that heard of for almost 7 years, was dead, it was
in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo still necessary for him to have undergone a
and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7 Par. summary proceeding officially declaring his
1 of the Family Code, and that he merely former wifes presumptive death. Absent such
mandatory proceeding, the subsequent
worked within the ambit of Art. 8 of the same
marriage is considered bigamous, and
code, which provides for other possible venues
therefore, void.
to solemnize a marriage.
Art. 7 Par. 1 of the Family Code provides
that marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction. For members of
2
I believe its this issue and its corresponding ruling the Appellate and Supreme courts, this
that would be important for purposes of our jurisdiction extends throughout the Philippines
discussion in class
ISSUE:
WON the certification of due search and
inability to find marriage license presented as
evidence is sufficient to render the marriage
void.
HELD:
Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an
Yes. Unaccompanied by any circumstance
officer having custody of an official record or by his
of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
132 of the Rules of Court3, a certificate of "due specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office
3
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court contain no such record or entry
PETITIONER: TomasaVda.DeJacobasSpecialadministratixoftheIntestateEstateof
DeceasedAlfredoEJacob
RESPONDENTS: CA, PedroPilapil,ProvinceofCamSur,JuanTrivino
NATURE: WONTomasasmarriagetoDr.Jacobw
Petitionforreviewoncertiorariofade asvalid
cision of CA
RATIO:
RULING: It
PetitionisGRANTEDandtheassailedde hasbeenestablishedthatTomasaandDrJ
cisionoftheCAisRESVERSEDandSETASI acoblivedtogetherashusband
DE.MarriagebetweenpetitionerandAlfred andwifeforatleastfiveyears
oJacobisherebyrecognizedanddeclared (affidavitwasexecuted).Marriage is
VALID exceptionalincharacteranddidntrequire
marriagelicense
Secondaryevidence:trialandCAcommi
FACTS: ttederrorswhentheyexcludedtestimonies
TomasaVda.DeJacobclaimstobethe ofAdelaPilapilandMsgrFlorencioYllana.
survivingspouseofDrAlfredoJacob, and Also,therewerephotosoftheweddingcer
wasappointedSpecialAdministratrixofhis emony
estatesbyvirtueofareconstructedmarriag DueexecutionwasestablishedbyAdela
econtractbetweenthem Pilapilwhowaspresentatmarriagecerem
PedroPilapil,thedoctorsallegedadopt ony
edson,claimsthatthemarriagebetweenT Subsequentlossofthedocumentwass
omasaandDrJacobwasvoidforhavingn hownbytestimonyofYllana
omarriagelicenseandonlya Giventhattheylivedtogetherashusba
reconstructedmarriagecontract,plusnoma ndandwife,presumptionofmarriageisgiv
rriageceremony en
ISSUE:
judicial decree is necessary to establish the deceased Amado, but the petitioner.
invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely Rectification of the erroneous entry in the
concluded, then, without need of further proof records of the Local Civil Registrar may,
nor remand to the Court below, that the private therefore, be validly made.
respondent is not the surviving spouse of the
FACTS:
In an action filed before the Juvenile and ISSUES:
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, WON the marriage between respondent
herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for and petitioner was valid based on the
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondents first marriage being void.
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the
ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to RULING:
one Eduardo A. Maxion that has been subsisting The Supreme Court reversed the appealed
when she married the respondent. Lilia, while judgment and acquitted the defendant-
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting appellant
marriage claimed that said marriage was null
and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. Even if the petitioner proves that her
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter
first marriage was vitiated by force committed
said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued,
against her and her first husband, the marriage
the ISSUE agreed upon by both parties was
would still be valid until annulled since it was
whether the first marriage, assuming the
merely voidable and not void. Since no
presence of force exerted against both parties,
annulment was made, it is clear that when she
was void or merely voidable.
married respondent, she was still validly
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial
married to her first husband, consequently, her
order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an
marriage to respondent is VOID. There is
opportunity to present evidence showing that
likewise no need for evidence about the existing
(1) the first marriage was vitiated by force
prior marriage of her first husband at the time
exercised upon both her and the first husband;
they married each other, for then such a
and (2) the first husband was at the time of the
marriage, though void, still needs, according to
marriage already married to someone else.
this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact.
Respondent judge ruled against the
Hence, she would still be regarded as a married
presentation of evidence because the existence
woman at the time she contracted her marriage
of force exerted on both parties of the first
with the respondent, with such marriage being
marriage had already been agreed upon as the
void ab initio.
set of facts on which judgment will be based.
Hence, the petitioner filed this present case.
FACTS: RULING:
Dorothy and Jordan Terre met each other The Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent
while they were in high school, during such Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from
time, Dorothy was already married to another the Roll of Attorneys.
man who was allegedly her first cousin, while
Jordan was single. Jordan courted her and RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes. When the second marriage was
continued doing so through his pursuance of
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
law studies, to which she decided that it was
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action
futile but was nonetheless convinced by the having been initiated or any judicial declaration
former that they could marry since her first obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage
marriage with her first cousin, it being contrary of respondent with complainant. Respondent
to public policy and morals, was void ab initio. Jordan Terres defense of having believed in
The two eventually got married with Jordan good faith that his prior marriage with
convincing Dorothy that she was single and complainant Dorothy Terre was null, and void
could marry, and that there was no need for her ab initio and that no action for a judicial
first marriage to be declared void by the Court. declaration of nullity was necessary is spurious,
During their relationship as spouses, Dorothy considering that (1) he did not rebut
had been supporting him through law school. complainant's evidence as to the basic facts
Ultimately, she conceived his child and it was underscoring his bad faith; and (2) it was the
same argument he used to inveigle complainant
during this time when Jordan suddenly
into believing that her prior marriage, being
disappeared for no apparent reason. She soon
incestuous and void ab initio, made her free to
found out that he had married another woman, contract a second marriage with him.
prompting her to file a case of abandonment Respondent, being a lawyer, knew or should
and bigamy, as well as an administrative case, have known that such an argument ran counter
against her husband. to the prevailing case law of this Court which
In his defense, Jordan contended that he holds that for purposes of determining whether
married Dorothy on the belief that she was a person is legally free to contract a second
single; that when he found out about her marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
previous marriage, she drove him out of their marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
home; that the child Dorothy was carrying was Furthermore, even if respondents argument
not his but her former husbands; and that he about the lack of need for the judicial
contracted a second marriage believing in good declaration of marriage nullity were to be
accepted, thus rendering his first marriage to
faith that his marriage with Dorothy was void ab
complainant valid, it would still result to him
initio, she having been married already when
being criminally liable for bigamy since he
they contracted their marriage. contracted his second marriage with the first
one still subsisting. This, and other
ISSUES:
circumstances showing his flawed moral
WON the respondent is liable for character, are enough grounds to adjudge him
contracting a second marriage unfit to remain as a member of the Bar, as well
as inadequate to uphold the purpose and
responsibility of his gender in support of
marriage as a basic social institution.
FACTS: RULING:
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano filed The Court adopted the recommendation of
charges against respondent Judge for gross the Court Administrator with an increased fine
ignorance of the law for the latters action of of 20,000 imposed upon the respondent Judge.
solemnizing the marriage between David
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao, who were Yes. Respondent Judge knew or ought to
both in existing marriages when they married know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
each other, with the former being diriment impediment, which would make the
complainants late husband. Complainant subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in
contends that when respondent Judge his comment, he stated that had he known that
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to the late Manzano was married he would have
know that the same was void and bigamous, as discouraged him from contracting another
the marriage contract clearly stated that both marriage. Likewise, respondent Judge cannot
contracting parties were "separated." deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, subsisting previous marriage, as the same was
initially claims that when he officiated the clearly stated in their separate affidavits which
were subscribed and sworn to before him. The
marriage between Manzano and Payao, he did
fact that Manzano and Payao had been living
not know that Manzano was legally married.
apart from their respective spouses for a long
What he knew was that the two had been living time already is immaterial, as such does not
together as husband and wife for seven years dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize
already without the benefit of marriage, as the parties to remarry. This holds true all the
manifested in their joint affidavit. However, more when the separation is merely de facto, as
during his later Manifestation, he presented in the case at bar. Further, respondent Judge
two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
of Payao, which expressly stated that they were David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, that they had been cohabiting as husband and
respectively. Respondent Judge alleges that on wife for seven years. Just like separation, free
the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to and voluntary cohabitation with another person
solemnize the marriage in question in for at least five years does not severe the tie of
a subsisting previous marriage; it is merely a
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
ground for exemption from marriage license. It
could not serve as a justification for respondent
ISSUES: Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
WON respondent Judge can be held liable vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
for solemnizing the void marriage between marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge
Manzano and Payao demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
ANTECEDENT FACTS: (2) WON the absence of Maria Apiag for more
According to Maria Apiag, she and Judge than 7 years raises the presumption that
Cantero were married after living together as she is dead and there was no need for any
husband and wife. They had 2 children, Teresita judicial declaration.
and Glicerio. Judge Cantero then disappeared (3) WON the crime of Bigamy and Falsification
without any apparent cause and left Maria to had already prescribed.
raise their children alone. They suffered from
(4) WON the charge of Grave Misconduct is
his abandonment and didn't hear from him for
applicable to him because at the time of the
many years, until they found out that he was in
offense he wasn't a member of the
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. They asked for his
judiciary.
support in a letter but were ignored.
Afterwards, they found out he was already
married to Nieves Ygay and that all the public HELD:
documents required of the defendant had the The results of the investigation done by
latter's name instead of Maria's as his wife. Exec. Judge Gualberto Delgado (RTC Toledo
(1993) In a letter complaint, Maria Apiag, City, Cebu) show that the first marriage was
along with her children, Teresita and Glicerio, valid. Judge Cantero's argument that not having
charged Judge Cantero (MTC of Pinamungajan seen his wife for 40 years has no merit because
Aloquinsan, Cebu) with Gross Misconduct for a judicial declaration of death must be filed
allegedly having committed bigamy and before one can remarry. He was also found to
falsification of public documents. The Court have committed misrepresentation in his
referred this case for investigation, report, and documents and his conduct was also found to
recommendation. have failed in meeting the standard of moral
(1994) Teresita, on behalf of her mother, fitness in his profession.
and Judge Cantero had a compromise
agreement. In it, the parties settled the case HOWEVER:
amicably, by letting Teresita and Glicerio (1) YES, the first marriage is void. Judge Cantero
receive 1/4 of the retirement money that Judge alleged that the marriage was not valid because
Cantero would get, and that they would be in his consent was not freely given. He was merely
included as beneficiaries of the First forced to marry Maria because he got her
Party in case of death, inherit properties pregnant. He also said that they never lived
from the First party, and that Teresita is together, and that is was suspicious for the
authorized to receive and collect 4000php complainants to show up now when he was
monthly out of the 2nd check salary of Judge about to retire.
Cantero. Also in the agreement, it was agreed
upon that there would be a voluntary (2/3) YES. The marriage of Judge Cantero to
withdrawal of the case, and if this were not Nieves Ygay took place and all their children
done, the agreement would be void. were born before the effectivity of the Family
Code. The doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante,
ISSUES: wherein it was decided by the Court that no
(1) WON the first marriage with Maria Apiag is judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages, applies in favor of
void.
the respondent. So Judge Cantero's 2nd
marriage is considered VALID. The Falsification case, the Judge didn't have any wrongdoing in
charge also does not prosper because it is based his record. It was found however, that he
on the Bigamy charge, which Judge Cantero was violated Canon 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial
not found guilty of. Conduct. But, he shouldn't be judged solely for
a mistake committed in his youth. The Court
(4) NO. Gross misconduct cannot be applicable would have imposed a penalty for neglecting
in this case because the acts pertain to Judge and refusing to support his first family, but in
Cantero's personal life, and have no direct view of his death before this Decision, the case
relation to his judicial function. Other than this is DISMISSED.
FACTS: ISSUE:
March, 12 2007: Myrna Antone, WON the trial court erred to
executed an affidavit-complaint for conclude that the first element of
Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla, alleging bigamy (a valid first marriage) is
that her marriage with respondent in 1978 lacking.
had not yet been legally dissolved when
Beronilla contracted a second marriage HELD: YES
with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
Beronilla moved to quash the promulgated in 1987 states that: The
information on the grounds that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
facts charged do not constitute an be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
offense the basis of a final judgment declaring such
He declared that his marriage with marriage void.
Antone was null and void by the RTC This court held that under the FC, a
branch 16, Nacal, Biliran on April 26 subsequent judicial declaration of
2007, and it was final and executory. the nullity of the first marriage is
Given that it was null and void from immaterial in a bigamy case, by
the beginning, there was no first then, the crime has already been
consummated.
marriage and the facts alleged in the
This court declared that a person,
information do not constitute the
who contracts a subsequent
crime of bigamy. marriage absent a prior judicial
Prosecution pointed out that the first declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage on Nov 18 78 has not been one, is guilty of bigamy.
severed when he contracted the second The issue on the declaration of nullity of
marriage on Feb 16 91 which means that the marriage bet. Petitioner and
bigamy has been executed prior to the respondent only after the latter contracted
declaration that the 1st marriage was null the subsequent marriage is, immaterial for
and void on April 27 2007 the purpose of establishing that the facts
March 26 2008: Petitioner alleged to alleged in the information for bigamy does
the CA that the Pasay City Trial court acted not constitute an offense.
without or in excess of its jurisdictions or
with grave abuse of discretion when it THE ORDERS OF THE RTC AND
dismissed the case of bigamy and denied
RESOLUTIONS OF CA IS SET ASIDE.
her motion for reconsideration
CRIMINAL CASE IS REMANDED TO THE
July 18 2008: CA denied the
respondents motion for reconsideration for TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER
the lack of merit PROCEEDINGS.
FACTS: REASON:
Around 11 months before his death, The marriage between the late Sen.
Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, rites. The only law in force governing
subsequently, under a civil ceremony marriage relationships between Muslim
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, sand non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code
Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their of 1950, under the provisions of which only
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil one marriage can exist at any given time.
status was indicated as divorced. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil
Since then, Estrellita has been Code, divorce is not recognized except
representing herself to the whole world as during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his 394 which was not availed of during its
widow. On November 23, 1994, private effectivity. As far as Estrellita is concerned,
respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. has been severed by way of divorce under
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim
behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1)
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for thereof provides that the law applies to
the declaRATIOn of nullity of marriage marriage and divorce wherein both parties
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for are Muslims, or wherein only the male
being bigamous. The complaint alleged that party is a Muslim and the marriage is
Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
1958 under civil rights, and that this or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
marriage remained subsisting when he But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
married Estrellita in 1993. provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim
rites.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even beyond the means of the party involved.
if it were otherwise, the cure would be
FACTS: HELD:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez Ting met 1. (Discussion on stare decisis, its definition
in medschool, fell in love, and got married. Ben etc. similar to Legmeth. No need, and is
worked as an anesthesiologist in a hospital only procedural, not the main issue of the
owned by Carmen s family. They had 6 kids. case) Interpretation or construction of a law
After 18 years of marriage, Carmen filed for a by courts constitutes a part of the law as of
petition asking for the nullity of their marriage. the date the statute is enacted.
According to her, Ben has psychological
2. Molina doctrine, not abandoned. In
incapacity because his chronic alcoholism,
previous cases, the set of rules evaluating
violence (hurting Carmen and forcing her to
the psychological incapacity should not be
have sex), compulsive gambling habit,
rigidly applied because no two cases are
irresponsibility in the failure to give regular
financial support to his family. similar. We must give weight to the
Dr. Pureza Trinidad Oate (psychiatrist) authority of the expert opinion, juridical
compulsive gambling, physical abuse of antecedence, gravity and incurability.
respondent are clear indications that husband is TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE IS ENOUGH, to
suffering from a personality disorder. sustain a finding, not only on the factors
Dr. Obra refuting Oate s opinion: provided above.
(stenographic notes, psychiatric evaluation of 3. Marriage VALID, Reversed CA ruling.
interview with Bens brothers) nothing wrong Petitioner failed to prove the pre-existing
with petitioner s personality, considering the psychological defect prior marriage, there
latter s good relationship with his fellow doctors are two conflicting expert opinions but
and good record as anesthesiologist. more weight is given to Dr. Obra s findings
RTC nullified the marriage, saying that his because of the extent of his evaluation
compulsive gambling, habitual alcoholism,
(used a report from a third psychiatrist from
violence, etc, are grounds for psychological
South Africa). Semper praesumitur pro-
incapacity. CA reversed the decision.
matrimonio. Presumption is always in favor
ISSUES: of the validity of marriage. Totality of
1. WON CA decision violated stare decisis of evidence is inadequate to declare him
Molina and Santos cases psychologically unfit. Although the Court
2. WON requirement for declaration of the condones the behavior or the husband for
nullity of marriage has been liberalized no rational explanation could be made. He
3. WON petitioner is psychologically owes love, respect and fidelity to his wife,
incapacitated as much as the latter owes the same to him.
Her aunts testimony This could also have stemmed from the
- Corroborated parts of Jocelyn's fact the two were married young and they
testimony never the developed the love and respect
that a married couple should have
The psychologists testimony developed.
- Claimed that the respondent suffered The respondent could have blamed the
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder;
family of the girl because he was forced to
described it as serious and severe;
enter a marriage he did not want at that time.
chronic (incurable) and long- standing
Based on the psychological incapacity
even before the marriage
- This disorder has been deemed as requisites enunciated by the Court in Santos v.
incurable since the person itself is not CA, the RTC concluded that the respondent did
aware that he possesses such a disorder suffer from psychological incapacity which is
- Although no physical examination was not only grave but incurable and it did render
done, these findings were based on the him to be unfit to fulfill his marital obligations.
report given by Jocelyn (who was found The testimonies given are enough to prove this
to display no pattern of lying and very and to give to the petitioner the relief prayed
responsive and coherent her for.
psychological examination) Letting the marriage remain valid (wife will
- Claimed that the disorder has still use the last name of the husband, etc.) will
prevented the respondent from only remind the beaten party of the hardship
interacting normally with his wife and that she has to go through.
other people and this hindered him
from functioning as the husband of the RULING OF THE CA: reversed the RTC
family (they have no children, he lets decision
his wife work as a maid, etc.)
- This disorder thus affect the The courts should have used the
psychological incapacity of to perform
totality of evidence approach: If the totality
marital obligation he is a good for
nothing person of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
The SG, representing the Philippines, examination of the person concerned need
opposed the petition for the declaration of the not be resorted to.
nullity of the marriage saying that the There is much scarcer evidence to hold that
psychologist did not examine and test the respondent was psychologically incapable
Angelito all of her report findings were of entering into the marriage state, that is, to
merely hearsay since they only came from the assume the essential duties of marriage due to
testimony of the petitioner. an underlying psychological illness.
RULING OF RTC: annulled the marriage The theory of the psychologist that the
respondent was suffering from an anti - social
No particular instance in the law to
personality syndrome at the time of the
consider a person as psychologically
marriage was not the product of any adequate
incapacitated yet there are some admitted medical or clinical investigation, but it was
grounds that would render a person to be merely based on the testimony of the wife
unfit to comply with his marital obligation which is found to be inconclusive.
(in this case: refusal to work, habitual It can only be due to simple causes like
alcoholism). immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
Respondent has not shown love and equivalent to psychological incapacity. It can
respect; he is irresponsible, immature, also be rebelliousness because of their loveless
jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all a marriage.
wife beater. The concept of psychological incapacity is
not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality psychologist can find out about the
are convenient excuses of parties to separate background of the person in consideration.
and divorce. The Court then concluded that the
Jocelyn filed another petition for the psychologist, using only the petitioners
reversal of the CA ruling and it included testimony could not have secured a complete
the following arguments: personality profile and could not have
The Court of Appeals went beyond conclusively formed an objective opinion or
what the law says, as it totally disregarded diagnosis of Angelitos psychological
the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the condition.
marriage null and void.
Article 36 of the Family Code did not Jocelyns Testimony: The Court finds this
define psychological incapacity; this omission testimony as insufficient. All of the beatings
was intentional to give the courts a wider and refusal to work arguments happened after
discretion to interpret the term. the marriage. She did not clearly specify what
was the exact time that all of these alleged
ISSUE: arguments happened. This is a clear
evidentiary gap that materially affects her
WON there is a basis to nullify their cause, as the law and its related
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. jurisprudence require that the psychological
NO. incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
RATIO:
The Court finds Jocelyns evidence Habitual drunkenness, gambling and
insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological refusal to find a job, while indicati ve of
incapacity to perform essential marital psychological incapacity, do not, by
obligations. themselves, show psychological incapacity.
Expert Opinion Evidence: Both the Moreover, while it may be conceded that
psychologists testimony and the psychological physical violence on women indicates
report did not conclusively show the root abnormal behavioral or personality patterns,
cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos such violence, standing alone, also does not
alleged psychological condition. The constitute psychological incapacity.
psychologist evaluated Angelitos
psychological condition only from the Wherefore, premises considered, we deny the
testimony of Jocelyn. petition for lack of merit. We affirm the
It is not mandated that a personal appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals.
examination must be done because there are Costs against the petitioner.
times when this is not entirely possible;
however, there are other measures on how a
Code, there must be a severe psychological to appear as counsel for the state; no
illness afflicting a party even before the decision shall be handed down unless the
marriage has been celebrated; a mental Solicitor General ISSUES a certification,
incapacity rendering the party incapable of which will be quoted in the decision,
giving meaning and significance to the briefly stating therein his reasons for his
marriage he or she has contractedthe party agreement or opposition, as the case may
must be truly incognitive of the basic marital be, to the petition
covenants that must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. The Petitioner had relied completely on
Among the guidelines laid down by the psychological examination and findings of
Republic vs. CA for psychological incapacity are Dr. Tayag, but these were insufficient to
the ff.: establish the petitioners psychological
i. Burden of proof rests on the plaintiff; any capacity, as it merely made general
doubt is to be resolved in favor of the conclusions about the petitioners alleged
continuation of marriage and against its suffering from Anti-social Personality
dissolution and nullity Disorder without stating factual basis for
ii. Root cause of psychological incapacity finding the petitioner to be socially deviant,
must be: a) medically/clinically identified, rebellious, impulsivenessetc.
b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently As held in Suazo vs. Suazo, the declaration
proven by experts and d) clearly explained for nullity must be based on an in-depth
in the decision assessment of the parties by a psychologist or
iii. Incapacity must be proven to be existing expert, for conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
at the time of the celebration of the severe and incurable presence of psychological
marriage incapacity. However, in Dr. Tayags evaluation:
iv. Such incapacity must be shown to be The report did not specify how the
medically or clinically permanent or Petitioners actions were a result of his
incurable psychological incapacity. ii. There was no
v. Such illness should be grave enough to established link, medical or otherwise,
bring about disability of the party to between the petitioners acts and his alleged
assume essential obligations of marriage psychological incapacity.
vi. Essential martial obligations must be those The Court ruled that sexual infidelity by
embraced by Articles 6871 of the Family itself is not sufficient proof that the petitioner
Code as regards husband and wife, as well is suffering from incapacity, as the latter must
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the Code as be more than just difficulty, refusal or
regards parents and their children neglect in the performance of marital
vii. Interpretations given by the National obligationsSantos vs. Court of Appeals ruled
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the that the intention of the law to confine the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while meaning of psychological incapacity to the
neither controlling nor decisive, should be most serious cases of personality disorders
given great respect clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
viii. Trial Court must order the prosecuting or inability to give meaning and significance to
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General the marriage
FACTS:
October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed Yes. The validity of a marriage is tested
in the RTC a petition for the celebration of according to the law in force at the time the
the absolute nullity of the marriage marriage is contracted. As a general rule,
contracted on December 26, 1949 the nature of the marriage already
between his late brother Cresenciano celebrated cannot be changed by a
Ablaza and Leonila Honato. subsequent amendment of the governing
The petitioner alleged that the law. Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-
marriage between Cresenciano and 11-10-SC [(Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Leonila had been celebrated without a Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
marriage license, due to such license Voidable Marriages: took effect on March
being issued only on January 9, 1950, 15, 2003] which explicitly provides the
thereby rendering the marriage void ab limitation that a petition for declaration of
initio for having been solemnized without absolute nullity of void marriage may be
a marriage license. filed solely by the husband or wife was not
Being the surviving brother of in effect since it extends only to marriages
Cresenciano, who had died without any under
issue, entitled him to one-half of the real Family Code (1988). The marriage was
properties acquired by Cresenciano before solemnized under the regime of the Civil
his death, thereby making him a real party Code w/c contains no provision on who can
in interest; and that any person, himself file a petition to declare the nullity of a
included, could impugn the validity of the marriage and when. Court cited Ninal v
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila Bayadog and distinguished between a void
at any time, even after the death of and voidable marriage and how they can be
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being impugned.* However, not anyone can file a
void ab initio. petition. The only party who can
demonstrate a proper interest can file the
RTC dismissed the petition: (1)
action. Interest within the meaning of the
petition is filed out of time and (2) the
rule means material interest, or an interest
petitioner is not a party to the marriage. in ISSUE to be affected by the decree or
CA affirmed* RTC. [no prescription judgment of the case. Assuming the
but should be real party: brother is not petitioner was as he claimed himself to be,
real party] then he has a material interest in the estate
of Cresenciano that will be adversely
ISSUE: affected by any judgment in the suit. But
WON the petitioner is a real party in this right hinges upon a prior determination
interest in the action to seek the declaration of WON Cresenciano had any decendants,
ascendants, or children, and of whether the
of nullity of the marriage of his deceased
petitioner was the lates Cresencianos
brother
surviving heir. Thus, hes a party of interest
HELD: but needs to implead Leonila and Leila
[RTC decision set aside, case remanded [Cresies wife and daughter] as theyre
to RTC for further proceedings w/ indispensable party whose substantial right
instructions to require petitioner to amend will be affected by any judgment of this
pleading] action.
PETITIONERS: Engrace Nial for Herself and as Guardian of the minors Babyline Nial, Ingrid Nial,
Archie Nial and Pepito Nial, Jr.
RESPONDENT: Norma Badayog
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa RATIO DECIDENDI:
Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 YES. They cannot be exempted even
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, though they instituted an affidavit and
petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito claimed that they have cohabited for at least
to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985. 1 5 years, since their cohabitation was not the
year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma type contemplated by law, he having been
Badayog got married without any marriage still married to his first wife when he started
license. Instead, they instituted an affidavit cohabiting with Norma. The five-year period
stating that they had lived together for at least
of cohabitation that exempts couples from
5 years, therefore exempting them from
acquiring a marriage license should be
securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
car accident on February 19, 1977. After his
"husband and wife" where the only missing
death, petitioners filed a petition for the
factor is the special contract of marriage to
declaration of nullity of the marriage between
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage validate the union. In their case, since a legal
was void for lack of marriage license. impediment was existing, they cannot be
Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion to deemed to have been exempted from the
dismiss the charge on the ground that requirement of a marriage license, which lack
petitioners have no cause of action since they thereof resulted to the status of the second
are not among the persons who could file an marriage as void ab initio.
action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code. YES. Unlike voidable marriages, void
marriages are imprescriptible, and can
ISSUES: therefore be the subject of a declaration of
WON the second marriage of Pepito was nullity even after the death of either of the
void for a lack of a marriage license parties. Art. 47, which was invoked by
WON the heirs of the deceased may file respondent, cannot apply to this case as said
for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos article refers not to void but to voidable
marriage after his death marriages. The trial courts conclusion that
the death of petitioners father extinguished
RULING: the alleged marital bond between him and
The petition is GRANTED, and the assailed respondent is erroneous and proceeds from a
Order of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED wrong premise that there was a marriage
and SET ASIDE. bond that was dissolved between the two.
FACTS:
In 1958, Emilio and Isabel got married. They had 3 kids, Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aquino and
Emilio Aguinaldo. However, after 4 years, the marriage turned sour and Isabel filed a case against Emilio
for parricide. In retaliation, Emilio petitioned for legal separation for his schizophrenia (which has
already manifested even before the celebration of the marriage).
In 1967, the TC granted said petition with the ff. dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties.
In 1990, Cristina (grandmother of Isabel Aquino respondent) died without a will. Isabel prayed that
she be appointed as administratix of the estate. However, her legitimacy is being contested because of
the declaration of nullity between her parents. Federico, on the other hand, is contending that he is the
surviving spouse of the decedent. Hence the case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a declaration of nullity or an annulment was indeed granted to Isabel Aquinos parents?
2. WON Isabel Aquino is a legitimate daughter of her parents thus qualified to be an administratix of
her grandmothers estate?
HELD/ RATIO:
1. ANNULMENT- Apparently, there was a conflict between the dispositive portion and the body. As
such, the entire case must be read so as to construe the real intent (like in LegMeth). In the body,
it was clearly stated that: The marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are
considered voidable. Art. 85 (3) allows annulment if either of the parties was of unsound mind.
The Civil Code was followed in the case and NOT the family code; and in the Civil Code, only Arts.
80, 81, 82 and 83 were grounds for a void marriage.
2. YES- Having established that the marriage was only annulled, Isabel Aquino is deemed legitimate.
A voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage
dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of
children born in voidable marriages is legitimate (Art. 89). The terms annul and null and void
have different legal connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate;
obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas null and
void is something that does not exist from the beginning.
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya appealed the dismissal of the A. In marriage, the law prohibits only
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Manila specific frauds, of which non-divulgement is
of her complaint for the annulment of her not part.
marriage to Fernando Palaroan. Art. 85 and 86 of the Civil Code refer to
Fernando had earlier filed for annulment on fraud as a vice of consent, which may be
the ground that his consent had been obtained grounds for the annulment of marriage.
through force and intimidation. This complaint However, only specific frauds
was dismissed: the validity of their marriage
misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure
was upheld, and Auroras counterclaim was
granted. as to a previous conviction and concealment of
While the negotiations for the amount of pregnancy constitute grounds for the
the counterclaim was underway, Fernando annulment of marriage.
revealed to Aurora that, several months prior to The Court reasoned that it was clear the
their marriage, he had a premarital relationship Congress, in writing these provisions, intended
(assumption: sex) with a close relative of his. to exclude all other frauds and deceits. To
This non-divulgement, Aurora alleged, emphasize this intention further, Art. 86
definitely wrecked their marriage. contains the interdiction: No other
Furthermore, Aurora alleged that Fernando misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
had pretended to shower her with love and rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
affection when he was courting her, but only fraud as will give grounds for action for the
intended to marry Aurora so that he could
annulment of marriage.
evade marrying his close relative, from whose
The Court also stressed the state interest in
family he was receiving threats forcing him to
the institution of marriage, saying, The law
marry her.
does not assuage her grief after her consent
She also alleged that since he had not
married her out of love, he had never intended was solemnly given, for upon marriage she
to perform the marital duties and obligations entered into an institution in which society, and
not herself alone, is interested.
and had even covertly made up his mind against
living with her.
B. The cause for the second fraud charge
Finally she alleged that he had courted
that Fernando had courted her and obtained
a third girl with whom he later cohabited
her hand without intending to comply with his
and had several children with over a span marital duties and obligations had long since
of nine years. lapsed.
The Court said, Any secret intention on the
ISSUE husbands part not to perform his marital duties
Whether or not a husbands non-disclosure must have been discovered by the wife soon
to his wife of his premarital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of after the marriage. Aurora should have
marriage. brought her charges based on that fraud within
four years after the marriage, which was
RATIO celebrated in December 1953. However, since
The Court voted to affirm the lower court this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it was
and uphold the validity of their marriage on declared barred.
the following grounds:
RULING: HELD:
Decree appealed from is set aside. Case - Marriage is an institution in w/c the
remanded to lower court for further community is deeply interested. It is
proceedings surrounded w/ safeguards to maintain
purity, continuity and permanence.
FACTS: - The law specifically enumerates legal
- Joel Jimenez filed for annulment of his grounds that must be proved to exist by
marriage w/ Remedios Canizares for indubitable evidence to annul a
impotency. marriage
- He says that her vagina was too small to - Husband's testimony isn't sufficient
allow penetration evidence
- Respondent, on the other hand, refused - Respondent's refusal to be examined or
to undergo physical exam to determine failure to appear in court must not be
capacity for copulation (even if ordered presumed as suppression of evidence
by court) because women of this country are by
- Because of this, Zamboanga court nature coy, bashful and shy and would
entered a decree annulling the marriage not submit to a phys exam unless
between the plaintiff and defendant. compelled to.
- Impotency should not be presumed ->
the presumption is in favor of potency
FACTS: HELD:
o Plaintiff and defendant were married and No. Judgment of the Court of First Instance
on the same day, plaintiff tried to have affirmed.
carnal knowledge of defendant. The later
RD:
showed reluctance and begged him to
o Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase
wait until evening. Although he found the
physically incapable of entering into the
orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for
married state as with the capacity to
his organ, she complained of pains in her
procreate. Impotency is not the ability
private part later that night. Plaintiff also
to procreate but the ability to copulate.
noticed oozing of some purulent matter
Defect must be one of copulation and not
offensive to the smell coming from
of reproduction. Bareness will not
defendants vagina.
invalidate the marriage.
o Every attempt to have carnal access to his
o The removal of the organs rendered her
wife proved to be futile because she always
sterile but it by no means made her unfit
complained of pains in her genital organs. for sexual intercourse. It would appear that
o Upon the advice of the physician,
it was the memory of this first unpleasant
defendants uterus and ovaries were, experience with her that made him gave up
with consent of the plaintiff removed due the idea of having carnal knowledge of her.
to the presence of a tumor. The removal of o Defendant was not impotent at the time
said organs rendered defendant incapable she married the plaintiff for the existence
of procreation. of tumor did not necessarily render her
incapable of copulation.
o Plaintiff declared that from the time he
o Plaintiff also contends that his consent of
witnessed the operation, he lost all desire
the marriage was procured through fraud
to have access with his wife and thus filed
in that the defendant did not reveal to him
this complaint for annulment of marriage
that she was afflicted with a disease in her
on the ground of impotency.
sex organs. According to the Court, this
ISSUE: contention in untenable since fraud is not
WON their marriage can be annulled on the alleged in the complaint and has not been
ground of physical impotency. proved at the trial.
FACTS: (Im narrating it in a more chronological the partitioning of her mothers estate.
way than found in the courts description)
In December, 1914, Marciana Escano ISSUE:
married Arthur W. Jones. Escano would give WON the marriage between Escano and
birth to their only child, Angelita Jones. On the Hortiguela is void.
10th of January, 1918, Jones left the country
after obtaining a passport and was never heard HELD:
of again. Escano initiated proceedings to have The validity of the second marriage was
her husband judicially declared an absentee in upheld by the court. According to the court, the
October, 1919. The court obliged her request 7- year requirement should be counted from
on the 25 th of the same month pursuant to the last known sighting of the spouse absent,
article 186 of the Civil Code with the condition not from the courts official declaration.
that the declaration of absence would only take Therefore, Jones should have counted from
effect 6 months after its publication. The court the 10 th of January
declared the declaration of absence in effect 1918 which was the last sighting of her
on April 23, 1921. On May, 1937, Escano father. Court pointed out that both Escano and
married Felix Hortiguela. Angelita believed Arthur Jones to be dead as
Upon the death of Escano, Hortiguela was proven by the fact that she grew up recognizing
appointed judicial administrator of her estate. Hortiguela as her stepfather.
Hortiguela then proceeded to split the estate
between himself and his stepdaughter (There was also a brief discussion regarding the
Angelita; they were Escanos only heirs. This fact that the marriage between Hortiguela and
partitioning of property and final accounting Escano was not present in the civil register.
was approved on June 26, 1933. However, on Court held that the marrying parties are not to
May 1934, Angelita filed a motion alleging that be held liable, nor the marriage invalidated, for
the marriage between Escano and Hortiguela the failure of the solemnizing official to
was void ab initio because they failed to meet transmit the marriage certificate to the
the seven -year absence requirement of one municipal secretary. Just in case maam
spouse for the spouse present to be legally able touches on this issue)
of entering a subsequent marriage. According ** also note: For the purposes of the civil
to her the amount of time between the
marriage law, it is not required to have the
declaRATIOn of absence (April 21, 1921) and
former spouse judicially declared absent. Such
the marriage of Escano to Hortiguela (May 6, declaration is only required for the
1927) is only 6 years and 14 dayswell below administration of the estate of the absentee.
the 7-year requirement. If proven right,
substantial changes would have to be made to
FACTS: HELD:
Andres Bondoc filed a case againse his wife, YES. Adultery is a crime of result and not of
Guadalupe Zapata, and Dalmancio Bondoc for tendency. Each time you have sex constitutes a
cohabiting and having sex from 1946-47. crime of adultery. The two parties may be the
Wife found guilty and was sentenced to 4 same, but this does not argue against the
months of arresto mayor. commission of the crime.
Husband filed for a second case There is no constitutional or legal provision
complaining about the adulterous acts of his that bars the filing of as many complaints for
wife and Bondoc from 1947-48. adultery as there were adulterous acts
Both defendants filed a motion to quash committed, each constituting one crime.
this complaint on the ground that they would Two reasons why there is no double
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the jeopardy in this case:
same offense.
Trial Court upheld this and quashed the 1) A continuous crime exists if there is unity of
complaint. They stated that both complaints criminal intent or purpose. In this case this
must be deemed one continuous offense does not apply. Basically, the times they
because the defendants and offenses in both had sex after the filing of the first complaint
complaints were the same. are separate and distinct crimes.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of 2) Another reason why there was no double
punishment for the same offense." jeopardy in this case is because after the
first complaint, Bondoc does not have the
ISSUE: defense that he did know the wife was
WON Trial Court erred in quashing the married anymore. If this were double
second complaint of adultery because of double jeopardy and the second complaint
jeopardy quashed, Bondoc would go unpunished.
FACTS: ISSUES:
Felicidad Munoz and Jose del Barrio were Whether the maltreatments that the
married civilly in 1942 and canonically later that appellant suffered at the hands of the
same year. They lived together and had two respondent after their separation of dwelling,
children, Felix Luis Del Barrio(11) and Maria which allegedly occurred in Dec. 1950 or Jan.
Teresa Del Barrio(9). During their married life, 1951 and September 1951, furnish ground for
they had frequent quarrels wherein Jose legal separation applied for under Art. 97(2) CC. -
maltreated Felicidad. Felicidad was unable to > NO
take the abuse and they ended up separating.
Notwithstanding such separation, the wife HELD:
claimed that her husband maltreated her in Decision appealed from is affirmed.
several more occasions (Dec. 1950 or Jan. 1951
and September 1951). She filed a petition in the RATIO:
Court of First Instance of Bulacan and alleged In the case at hand, we only look at the
that their marriage was governed by the system alleged maltreatments that occurred after the
of conjugal partnership and no property was separation as the ones previous couldn't have
acquired during the marriage except for one amounted to attempts on the life of the wife
portion of land. She prayed for legal separation, because she didn't institute any action for legal
custody of their children, support of respondent separation then.
for their children, and for the conjugal property
to pay for the costs of this case. Art. 97 NCC states that:
Respondent denied petitioner's accusations. A petition for legal separation may be filed:
The court tried to for them to reconcile, (1) For adultery on the part of the wife
pursuant to Art. 98 CC but failed. The Court and for concubinage on the part of the
proceeded to try the case and the plaintiff husband as defined in the Penal Code; or
presented witnesses testify: (2) An attempt by one spouse against the life
(1) Jovita Faustino (a tenant of the apartment of the other.
owned by her father who witnessed their
fights) An attempt on the life of another requires
(2) Felix Munoz (her father) the intention to kill. Without proof of such, a
(3) Faustino Mallari (patrolman who was called person cannot be convicted of attempted or
to intervene in a fight and saw evidence of frustrated murder. According to RPC 2nd Ed.
scratches and ecchymosis on the appellant) Bk. 2 part 1 of Dean Francisco, "it is absolutely
(4) Atty. Manuel Macias (stopped respondent necessary that the homicidal intent be
when he boxed his wife and twisted her evidenced by adequate acts to produce the
neck in a quarrel) death of the victim."
The Court however, dismissed the petition We see here that the respondent only
for lack of merit. used are his bare fists at most and desisted
Art. 98. In every case the court must take from giving further chastisement after the
steps, before granting the legal separation, first blows were given at the spur of the
toward the reconciliation of the spouses, and impulse.
must be fully satisfied that such reconciliation is
highly improbable. **The Court points out that this being a civil
Petitioner appealed the said judgment. case, only preponderance of evidence is
necessary, however, the petitioner should
have filed a case against her husband for
attempted parricide and have him prosecuted
as a means of establishing her right to secure applied. In relation to this however, I think
legal separation that she applied for in this that the result would've been different had it
case. been tried using the FC Art. 55(1)
**note: In the present case, it is the CC that is
This is a special civil action for certiorari, with WON the criminal case for concubinage
application for injunction, to annul the Order of should be settled before the civil case for legal
the respondent Judge ordering Froilan to pay separation can proceed
support pendente lite to Teresita and their
child, and the Order of the same respondent HELD: NOPE
Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal
petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in the Procedure, a civil action for legal separation,
action for legal separation filed against him by based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of,
private respondent as well as his motion to or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing concubinage, because said civil action is not one
and trying the case. "to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense" even if both the civil and criminal
FACTS: actions arise from or are related to the same
29 May 1986: Teresita filed with the RTC of offense
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, presided Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it
over by respondent Judge, a complaint against refers to civil action for the recovery of civil
petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of liability arising from the offense charged.
concubinage. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply
13 October 1986: Teresita also filed a referred to "Civil action arising from the
criminal case to the MTC of General Santos City, offense."
a complaint against petitioner for concubinage. - Sec. 1 of Rule 107:
Froilan claims that the civil action for legal Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising
separation and the application for support from offenses.-Except as otherwise
pendente lite, should be suspended in view of provided by law, the following rules shall
the criminal case for concubinage filed against he observed:
him the private respondent (c) After a criminal action has been
He cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on commenced, no civil action arising from
Criminal Procedure: the same offense can be prosecuted
- SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from and the same shall be suspended in
offenses. Whenever the offended whatever stage it may be found until
party shall have instituted the civil final judgment in the criminal
action to enforce the civil liability proceeding has been rendered.
arising from the offense. as This action for legal separation is not to
contemplated in the first Section 1 recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at
hereof, the following rules shall be the conjugal rights of the spouses and their
observed: (a) After a criminal action has relations to each other
been commenced the pending civil Froilan says that his conviction for
action arising from the same offense concubinage will have to be first secured before
shall be suspended, in whatever stage it the action for legal separation can prosper or
may be found, until final judgment in succeed
the criminal proceeding has been - Court says that his assumption is
rendered. erroneous
A decree of legal separation, on the ground
ISSUE: of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for
FACTS: ISSUE:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for MAIN - WON the death of the plaintiff
legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio before a final decree in an action for legal
(married civilly and canonically) from 1934 to separation abates the action
1943 until her husband abandoned her. They SUB(?) - WON it will also apply if the action
had no child; however, acquired properties involved property rights
during their marriage.
She discovered her husband cohabiting with HELD:
a Chinese woman named Go Hiok. An action for legal separation which
She prayed for an issuance for a decree of involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
legal separation. (Also, that the defendant separation of the spouses is purely personal. It
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his is recognized in Article 100 of the Civil Code
share of the conjugal partnership profits. where only the innocent spouse has the right
Eufemio S. Eufemio counter-claimed for the to claim for legal separation. On the other
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage hand, Article 108 provides the spouses to stop
with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy on the ground of his or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. decree of legal separation already rendered
Trial commenced but before it could be through reconciliation. Since it is personal in
completed, Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular character, it follows that the death of one party
accident. to the action causes the death of the action
Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for itself
legal separation" on two (2) grounds - Death has settled the question of
- Petition for legal separation was filed separation beyond all controversy and
beyond the one-year period provided deprived the court of jurisdiction
for in Article 102 of the Civil Code
- Death of Carmen abated the action for
Further, an action for legal separation is
legal separation
abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
Counsel for petitioner substitute the
property rights are involved. These rights are
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
mere effects of decree of separation, their
Lapuz. Eufemio opposed the motion.
source being the decree itself; without the
Court dismissed the case. Plaintiffs cause of
decree such rights do not come into
action did not survive.
existence, so that before the finality of a
Eufemio acquiesced with the dismissal of
decree, these claims are merely rights in
his counterclaims by praying for the affirmance
expectation. If death supervenes during the
of the order that dismissed not only the
pendency of the action, no decree can be
petition for legal separation but also his
forthcoming, death producing a more radical
counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz
and definitive separation; and the expected
marriage to be null and void ab initio.
consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
FACTS HELD
The parties were married and had six NO. The Court held that the defendant is
children. After more or less 20 years of not guilty of abandonment of his wife nor abuse
marriage, the of his administrative powers. To entitle the
plaintiff filed a case alleging that the plaintiff to any of the remedies she asks for,
defendant had abandoned her as well as under article 178, there must be real
mismanaging their conjugal partnership abandonment, and not mere separation. The
properties (in the form of several successful abandonment must not only be physical
business ventures), praying for 1) separation of estrangement but also amount to financial and
property, 2) monthly support of P2500 during moral desertion. The Court believes that the
the pendency of the action and 3) payment of defendant did not intend to leave his family
P20,000 as attorneys fees. permanently. The facts show that he continued
Her reasoning was that the defendant to give support in his absence, thus he was not
stopped residing in their conjugal home in guilty of abandonment as it was held in People
Bacolod City and instead started living in Manila v Schelske where abandonment meant an act of
and denied communications with her. Plaintiff separation with intent that it shall be perpetual,
was also alleging that based on unsigned notes since contributing to their support negatived
she found, that the defendant was having illicit such intent.
liaisons with another woman. She fears that the The Court also believed that there was
defendant will squander their conjugal assets insufficient evidence to prove that the
on this alleged mistress. Plaintiff also alleges defendant had married and was living with a
that defendant had abused his powers of concubine.
administration of the conjugal partnership for The Court believed that the defendants
his failure to inform the plaintiff the state of refusal to inform the plaintiff of the progress
their business enterprises. and status of their family businesses does not
For the defendants part, he vehemently constitute abuse. Abuse connotes willful and
denied the accusation of having a mistress and utter disregard of the interest of the
that the reason he lived separately was because partnership, evidenced by a repetition of
he could not concentrate with work at their deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to
conjugal home because of the plaintiffs the latter, which is not the case for the
quarrelsome nature. He asserts that instead of defendant.
mismanaging their conjugal partnership Courts must need exercise judicial restraint
property, he has successfully expanded through and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation
his own hard work and diligence. He also alleges of conjugal properties because the basic policy
that he had never abandoned the family. In of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy
fact, he had been giving the plaintiff P500 family life and to preserve the union of the
monthly support, allowances for their children spouses, in person, in spirit and in property.
ranging from P1200- P1500 a month, as well as Consistent with its policy of discouraging a
financing their education. regime of separation as not in harmony with
the unity of the family and the mutual affection
ISSUE and help expected of the spouses, the Civil
WON the defendant abandoned his family Code (both old and new) requires that
and abused his powers of administration, separation of property shall not prevail unless
making it grounds for legal separation of the expressly stipulated in marriage settlements
conjugal partnership properties. before the union is solemnized or by formal
judicial decree during the existence of the
marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code, Article support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until
1432, old Civil Code): and in the latter case, it he shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home,
may only be ordered by the court for causes which amount may, in the meantime, be
specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code. reduced or increased in the discretion of the
The judgment of the Court of First Instance court a quo as circumstances warrant. The
is reversed and set aside. Conformably to our award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff is
observations, however, the defendant is reduced to P10,000, without interest.
ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of
HELD: NO OBITER:
Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for
RATIO: legal separation cannot be filed except within
Court held that according to CC ART. 100. one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became
The legal separation may be claimed only by the cognizant of the cause and within five years
innocent spouse, provided there has been no from and after the date when such cause
condonation or of consent to the adultery or occurred.
concubinage. Where both spouses are In this case, Brown only filed for legal
offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed separation after 10 years of knowing about
by either of them. Collusion between the Yambaos infidelity therefore action for legal
parties to obtain legal separation shall cause separation on the basis of her infidelity has
the dismissal of the petition. prescribed.
PETITION: ISSUE:
Petition for appeal of the dismissal of the WON the act of sleeping with his wife
CA on the legal separation case of the constitutes condonation of the act of adultery,
petitioner, on the grounds of adultery thus being a valid defense for legal separation
FACTS: HELD:
Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy, YES it is an act of condonation
married Ginez on 1949 Defined as the forgiveness of a marital
After some time, when husband went offense constituting a ground for legal
back to the US again, he began receiving separation; conditional forgiveness or
letters from Valeriana Polangco, his sister- remission of a matrimonial offense
in-law, and some anonymous writers, We are assuming that plaintiff's line
alleging acts of infidelity of his wife (1951) of conduct that he really believed his
A letter from his wife, which he said that he wife guilty of adultery, as the issue on
destroyed, said that a certain 'Eliong' kissed her the letters are not on question
(1952) he went to Pangasinan and stayed According to American jurisprudence, any
with his wife for 2 nights & 1 day cohabitation with the guilty party, after the
He tried to verify from his wife the commission of the offense, and the
veracity of the info, but she just packed knowledge of such by the injured party, will
hear things and left. amount to conclusive evidence of
Despite the answer, he kept on looking condonation, but this presumption may be
for her, and upon failing to do so, went to rebutted by evidence.
igloos Norte "to soothe his wounded Even a singular voluntary act of marital
feelings" intercourse between the parties ordinarily is
(1952) husband filed a case of legal sufficient to constitute condonation, and if they
separation at the CFI of Pangasinan, but was lived in the same house, it is presumed that
dismissed on the issue of condonation of they live on matrimonial cohabitation
husband of the acts of the wife Art. 100 of the civil code states that legal
separation may be claimed by the innocent
spouse provided that there had been no
condonation or consent.
FACTS: ISSUE:
In January 1943, Socorro Matibus (plaintiff) (1) WON the lower Court erred in having
and Zoilo Praxedes (defendant) legally married considered that the period to bring action
at Iriga, Camarines Sur. had already elapsed. NO.
In May 1944, the couple agreed to live from (2) WON there was consent on the part of the
each other because they could not agree on plaintiff to the concubinage. YES.
how to live as husband and wife.
In April 1948, plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreement, with the significant RATIO:
portion (to the case) provided below: (1) Based on their interpretation by the
(b) That both without any interference Court of Article 102 of the new Civil
by any of us, nor either of us can Code, the complaint was indeed filed
prosecute the other for adultery or outside the periods provided for in the
concubinage or any other crime or suit Article. By the very admission of
arising from our separation. plaintiff, she came to know the
concubinage in January, 1955, but she
In January 1955, defendant began only instituted the complaint only on
cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado and they April 24, 1956.
deported themselves as husband and wife. In (2) Condonation and consent on the part of
September of the same year, their common plaintiff are necessarily the quoted
paragraph of the agreement. The living legally separately from each other long
condonation and consent here are not before the effectivity of the new Civil Code. The
only implied but expressed. Court cannot subscribe to this contention
As a matter of fact, the counsel of the because it is contrary to the law.
plaintiff does agree with the courts decision
that the complaint should be dismissed; Conformably with the foregoing, we find that
however, it does not agree that it should be the decision appealed from is in accordance
dismissed based on the grounds laid out by the with the evidence and the law on the matter.
lower Court. They argue that it should be based The same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
on the fact that the couple have already been
FACTS:
On September 23, 1996, Cebu RTC made ISSUES:
the following decisions: (1) WON execution of judgment pending
The legal separation of Aida Baez and appeal was justified
Gabriel Baez on the ground husbands (2) WON multiple appeals are allowed in an
sexual infidelity action for legal separation
The dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and the division of the net RULING:
conjugal assets Petitions denied for lack of merit. Affirmed
The forfeiture of husbands one-half share CAs decision (to set aside execution of
in the net conjugal assets in favor of the judgment pending appeal)
common children
The payment to wifes counsel of the sum of RATIO:
P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken (1) No. Based on the courts prior ruling in the
from her share in the net assets case Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, execution
The surrender by husband of the use and pending appeal is allowed when superior
possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and circumstances demanding urgency
the smaller residential house located at outweigh the damages that may result from
Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to wife the issuance of the writ. In this case, court
and the common children within 15 days sees that there is no superior or urgent
from receipt of the decision circumstance that outweighs the damage
which Gabriel would suffer if he were
Aida then filed an urgent ex-parte motion to ordered to vacate the house, as Aida has,
modify the decision, specifically on the payment according to the husband, two houses and
attorneys fees, which was granted by the RTC. lots in the US where she is a permanent
She also filed a motion for moral and exemplary resident.
damages, which was denied by the court, and (2) No. Legal separation is not subject to
another motion for execution pending appeal multiple appeals. The effects of legal
regarding the husbands expulsion from the separation, such as entitlement to live
conjugal residential house and the surrender of separately, dissolution and liquidation of
the Mazda vehicle, which was granted by the the absolute community or conjugal
court. partnership, and custody of the minor
Gabriel elevated the case to the CA, which children, follow from the decree of legal
set aside RTCs ruling on the execution of separation. They are mere incidents of legal
judgment pending appeal of the assets and separation, not separate or distinct matters
denied Aidas motion for reconsideration, which that may be resolved by the court.
gave rise to the instant petitions.
FACTS: consideration
The parties were married in 1950. The Equitable distribution of marital property
husband exclusively handled the financial affairs began when the courts equitable powers are
while the appellant wife worked for 7 years, applied to secure equitable rights for one
earning $51,000, and then, having been spouse in the property held by the other due to
encouraged by the husband, was a homemaker constructive trust impressed on said property.
for the rest of the marriage, raising their two In Patterson v. Patterson, where the wifes
children and caring for the house. interest in property toward which she had
The trial court granted their divorce in made a material economic contribution was
March 1980, stating that the husbands abusive secured, constructive trust, particularly on
conduct far outweighed the wifes. The divorce property acquired through joint funds or efforts
order granted her alimony and health but in the name of only one spouse, is a redress
allowance, but did not provide for the against unjust enrichment (as it is unfair to
distribution of marital assets. permit the possessing spouse to keep the entire
interest where the other supposedly has a
She petitioned the Ohio circuit court for: material contribution to the acquisition of said
interest of all of husbands personal property). This was used as a special equity
property doctrine.
Undivided interest of all of husbands South Carolina has applied this doctrine,
real property which is, as defined in the Burgess case, the
Conveyance to her of all real & personal wife is entitled to a special equity in the
property in the name of and under husband's property acquired during coverture
husbands control where the wife has made a material
Reservation for dower interest in real contribution to the acquisition of the property.
property owned by husband The court cited cases, as well as the
situation in other states, to justify that
The court dismissed her petition for failure homemaking services may be a consideration in
to prove the existence of a contract where their the distribution of assets, while rejecting the
marital assets were equally owned, or that any part in Patterson which excludes it.
of her earnings were invested in any of her Homemaking services posted a problem
husbands properties. It did not find any ground since, to an extent, it is merely a part of the
to establish constructive trust for the wife. traditional obligation of the husband to support
Before this said petition, she also filed a his wife upon which the theory of alimony is
separate suit (which she lost) concerning a based, but there has been an increasing
house originally named to her but signed over recognition as of late that homemaking services
to the husband around the time the marriage is no longer viewed as a mere adjunct of the
began to deteriorate. husbands obligation.
In assessing the value of homemaking
ISSUE: services, the court said that it may not depend
WON trial court erred in ruling that wife on a mechanical formula, but that she has
was not entitled to equitable distribution of contributed to the economic wellbeing of the
marital assets. family unit through the performance of the
myriad of household and childrearing tasks.
HELD: The length of the marriage, as well as fault on
Yes. The Ohio circuit courts judgment was the part of the wife, is factors in determining its
reversed; the case is remanded for further value. Its value must be considered in relation
Legal Basis: Art. 372 When legal separation She is still married and there was no
has been granted, the wife shall continue severance of the vinculum.
using her name and surname employed before Art. 372 should prevail because it
the legal separation. specifically qualified its application to married
women legally separated from their husbands
FACTS: thus, this applies to Elisea. Even if the Court
Elisea Santamaria petitioned for the use of were to apply Rule 103, it is the opinion of the
her maiden name Elisea Laperal after Supreme Court that it is not a sufficient ground
obtaining legal separation from her husband. to justify a change of the name for to hold
She also supported said petition on the fact otherwise would be to provide an easy
that she has ceased to live with him for many circumvention of the mandatory provisions of
years. Art. 372.
Prior to the decree of legal separation, she On the lower courts justification above, the
has been using her married name, Elisea Supreme Court held that it was not sufficiently
Santamaria.
proven that there will be confusion in her
The lower court used Rule 103 of the Rules
finances. Secondly, with the issuance of the
of Court, Change of Name, and granted the
petition. decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal
The rationale of the lower court was that partnership between petitioner and her
to continue using her married name would husband had automatically been dissolved and
give rise to confusion in her finances and the liquidated. Consequently, there could be no
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
ISSUE: **Just in case it will be asked, the previous
WON the Court may use Rule 103 despite related case is Dunn v. Palermo- Palermo
the specific stipulations in Art. 372 of the Civil wants to retain her maiden name even after
Code
marriage. This was allowed by the Court. The
HELD / RATIO: legal name of any person is the one written in
No. Elisea should retain her married name. the birth certificate.
FACTS: HELD:
Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, YES. The provision states: If there is a
married in the Philippines (1941). They got a controversy before the court as to who are the
divorce (filed 1950) in San Francisco, California, lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
USA, and submitted evidence of their distributive shares to which each person is
agreement to live separately & a settlement of entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
their conjugal properties. Final judgment of heard and decided as in ordinary cases. There is
divorce was on 1954, and Quita subsequently no controversy as to the children, but the
contracted 2 marriages, still in the USA, since controversy lies as to who is the legitimate
then. surviving spouse of Arturo. In Quitas comment
In 1972, Arturo died. Dandan, along with on her entitlement to inherit despite their
her and Padlans alleged 6 children claimed to divorce, she says that Arturo was a Filipino, and
be heirs of the intestate of Arturo. The trial so they remained legally married. From this, the
court, without a proper hearing, decided in SC interpreted that Quita was no longer a
favour of the subsistence of the marriage of Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce
Quita and Padlan, stating that a foreign divorce should have prompted the trial court to conduct
between Filipino citizens sought & decreed a hearing establishing Quitas citizenship. Her
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code citizenship is important to determine, in light of
was not entitled to recognition as valid in the ruling in Van Dorn v Romillo Jr. Trial court
Philippine jurisdiction, declaring Quita and based citizenship solely to the time of their
Arturos brother as the only heirs. Upon partial marriage as the trial court was not supplied
reconsideration, the Padlan children, except for with a basis to determine petitioners
one (illegitimate) were recognized as heirs, citizenship at the time of divorce.
excluding the brother. Dandan was still not Quita became an American citizen in 1954,
counted because her marriage to Padlan was the same year final judgment of divorce was
contracted on 1947, which makes it bigamous, obtained. If proven that she was no longer a
thus void ab initio. Dandan appealed, stating Filipino citizen, she will lose her right to inherit.
that the court erred in deciding without a SC emphasizes that the question to be
hearing, because there was an actual determined by the trial court should be limited
controversy as to the lawful heirs of the only to the right of Quita to inherit from Arturo
deceased. CA affirmed appeal, declared null and as his surviving spouse, since Dandans claim
void trial courts decision, and remanded the has already been resolved (bigamous marriage).
case for further proceedings. Quita appealed to
SC. Petition denied. CAs direction to remand the
case for further proceedings affirmed.
ISSUE: Emphasis on question of hereditary rights of
WON case should be remanded to the petitioner.
lower court for further proceedings.
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz (Gerbert) was a former HELD:
Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian NO. The alien spouse can claim no right
citizenship through naturalization. He later under Art. 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code as the
married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
(Daisy). Gerbert left for Canada soon after FILIPINO SPOUSE.
the wedding because of his work. He
returned after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but RD:
discovered that she was having an affair with Art. 26, Sec. 2 was included in the law to
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
returned to Canada and filed a petition for spouse remains married to the alien spouse
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice in who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
Ontario, Canada granted his petition for married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative
divorce. intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
2 years after the divorce, Gerbert found spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
another Filipina to love. Gerbert went to the settling the doubts created by the divorce
Civil Registry Office and registered the decree. Essentially, Art. 26, Sec. 2 provided
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisys the
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of Filipino spouse a substantive right to have
the divorce decree, an official of the National his or her marriage to the alien spouse
Statistics Office (NSO) informed him that the considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
marriage between him and Daisy still subsists her to remarry. Without Art. 26, Sec. 2, the
under Philippine law. To be enforceable, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
recognized by a competent Philippine court, precisely for that purpose or as a related issue
pursuant to a NSO Circular. in another proceeding, would be of no
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial significance to the Filipino spouse since our
recognition of foreign divorce and/or laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the severing the marital bond.
RTC. Daisy did not file any responsive pleading An action based on Art. 26, Sec. 2 is not
and offered no opposition to the petition. In limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
fact, Daisy alleged her desire to file a similar decree. If the court finds that the decree
case but was prevented by financial capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
constraints. She, thus, requested that she be courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar likewise capacitated to contract another
prayer to Gerberts. marriage. However, no Philippine court can
The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC make a similar declaration for the alien spouse,
concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE PROPER whose status and legal capacity are generally
PARTY to institute the action for judicial governed by his national law.
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
is a NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled Article 26 (par. 2) of the Family Code:
that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
the remedy, under Art. 26, Sec 2 of the Family a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
Code. thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
ISSUE: Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
WON Art. 26, Sec. 2 extends to aliens the under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render claimed that he adhered to the sanctity of
help and support. Respondent admitted that he marriage, but ultimately his acts proved
was away from home because of work but the otherwise. Complainant was able to establish
evidence showed that he was only away by clear and convincing evidence that
because he spent time with his paramour. The respondent had breached the high and exacting
resentful testimony of his two sons showed the moral standards set for members of the law
impact of his actions on his family. His son profession.
Jervis would not bear to forgive him while
another son, Dominador, mentioned the DOMINADOR M. NARAG DISBARRED, His
trauma he went through which led to the name ORDERED STRICKEN from ROLL of
dissolving of his own marriage. Respondent ATTORNEYS
a) Lord Hale's contractual theory: "but a (2) There is an implicit marital exclusion
husband cannot be guilty of a rape within the aggravated sodomy statute that
committed by himself upon his lawful makes it legally impossible for a husband
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial to be guilty of an offense of aggravated
consent and contract the wife hath sodomy performed upon his wife.
given up herself in this kind unto her
husband which she cannot retreat." Sodomy was originally defined as "the
carnal knowledge and connection against the
b) Medieval time: the wife is the order of nature by man with man, or in the
husband's chattel/property and thus, same unnatural manner with woman." One
rape was nothing more than a man accused of sodomy cannot defend himself by
making use of his own property alleging consent because the same is not an
element of the offense.
c) Unity in marriage/Unity of Person
theory: A woman's legal existence is (3) If the Court finds no marital exemptions
suspended or under the rape and aggravated sodomy
incorporated/consolidated into that of statutes it would.
her husband's and therefore, them
of his wife, the deceased Mena Escano, P5,000 See Art 69 of FC and relate it to the case,
by way of damages and attorneys' fees. regarding the exemptions and rules.
FACTS: returned.
April 8, 1910 - Cipriana married to Isabelo; Also, keeping the two young people under
they lived together as husband and wife the same roof with the opportunity to continue
February 3, 1925 - continued family their illicit relations would create a very
dissentions compelled her to leave the conjugal embarrassing situation for the girls mother.
dwelling To compel the plaintiff to cohabit with
Alejo (son of Isabelo by his first wife) her husband can only lead to further
seduced Prisca Aurelio (daughter of Cipriana quarrels, thus the separation therefore seems
by her first husband) and Prisca gave birth to a necessary.
child
Isabelo did not require his son to marry WON the court should restrain Isabelo
Ciprianas daughter, thus seemingly tolerating from conveying properties of the conjugal
their illicit relationship partnership and WON he is unfit to administer
Isabelo has been conveying, and is the property of the CP (due to his public illicit
attempting to convey to his son lands, relations with Geronima Yap)
producing around 4,500 cavanes of palay at
P4 per cavan annually, belonging to their NO. Cipriana failed to prove that the property
conjugal partnership to the prejudice of his conveyed is community property. In fact, it is
wife shown by documentary evidence that the land
Isabelo continually refused to provide for was acquired by Isabelo before his marriage to
her support. Moreover, he just answered Cipriana.
Ciprianas allegations by a general denial. There is NO reason to deprive the husband
of his right to administer the CP
ISSUES AND RDS:
WON Ciprianas separation from Isabelo is WON the Cipriana is entitled to a monthly
unjustified. pension of P500
NO. The spouses led a rather stormy life YES, but the sum requested is too large, an
subsequent to the dishonor of the plaintiffs allowance of P50 per month is enough at
daughter; Isabelo ordered her to leave his present.
house and threatened to maltreat her if she
As long as the home is maintained and the clothing, things she wanted, and groceries. The
parties are living as husband and wife it house was not equipped with a bathroom,
may be said that the husband is legally bathing facilities, or an inside toilet. She was
supporting his wife and the purpose of the privileged to use all the rent money she wanted
marriage relation is being carried out. from the 80 acres of land. She used this money
to visit her daughters, and her husband
PETITION: provided no funds for such use. She had
Recover suitable maintenance and three abdominal operations for which her
support money. Procedural history district husband paid for, but she was no longer able to
court ruled in favor of plaintiff. raise chickens. Her husband had land in the
value of $83,960, bank deposits in the sum of
RULING: $12,786.81, and income of $8,000 or $9,000 a
Reverse the district courts decision. year. Her husband appealed the trial courts
ruling in favor of her, alleging that the decree
FACTS: was not supported by sufficient evidence, and
Lydia McGuire married Charles McGuire on is contrary to law.
August 11, 1919. At the time of marriage,
Charles was a bachelor of 46 or 47 years of age ISSUE:
and had a reputation of extreme frugality, of WON wife is entitled to relief
which Lydia was aware. Lydia had been
previously married and had inherited a one- HELD:
third interest in 80 acres of land from her No. To maintain an action such as the one
previous husband. She brought an action at bar, the parties must be separated or living
against her husband to recover suitable apart from each other. Parties are not living
maintenance and support money. She testified apart and wife has been supported in the same
that her husband was a poor companion and manner without complaint. As long as home is
that he would give her only small amounts maintained and the parties are living as
of money on request. She worked the fields and husband and wife it may be said that the
did chores. For several years she had raised husband is legally supporting his wife and the
chickens and sold poultry and eggs to buy purpose of the marriage is being carried out.
FACTS: ISSUE:
Physician Pelayo was called to Laurons WON the parents are liable for services
house on the night the defendants daughter in rendered to Pelayo. NO
law to help her give birth. The birthing was
difficult and fetus was remove by means of RATIO:
forceps wherein Pelayo had done till morning The rendering of medical assistance in case
and he visited the patient several times. Pelayo of illness is comprised among the mutual
is asking for 500 Php as equitable payment obligations to which the spouses are bound by
which defendants do not want to pay. way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
Defendants contend that their daughter in Court held that within the meaning of the
law died. Even when she was alive, she lived law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers
independently of them and it was only with respect to the obligation that devolves
fortuitous circumstance that she gave birth in upon the husband to provide support, among
their house. They held that they are not liable which is the furnishing of medical assistance to
for the complaint. his wife at the time of her confinement.
Whatever the period, the action has long WHY: Consuelo has established that
prescribed whether the cause accrued on April granting an injunction would be an act of
1945, when Constancia and Arturo were serious dislocation to her.
married, or August 1959 when the present Civil Presented proof of entering into contracts
Code took effect or in 1951 when Constancia with third persons, acquired properties and
came to know of the fact that Consuelo David entered into other legal relations using the
was still using the surname Tolentino It is the surname Tolentino.
legal possibility of bringing the action, which Constancia failed to show that she would
determines the starting point for the suffer legal injury or deprivation of legal rights
computation of the period of prescription inasmuch as she can use her husbands
Constancia should have brought legal action surname and be fully protected in case
immediately against Consuelo David after Consuelo David uses the surname for illegal
gaining knowledge of the use of the latter of the purposes.
surname of her former husband There is NO USURPATION of Constancias
Action was brought only on Nov. 1971, after name and surname
twenty years The mere use by Consuelo of the surname
CA: where plaintiff fails to go to Court cannot be said to have injured Constancia
within the prescriptive period, he loses his Usurpation of identity implies injury to the
cause, not because the defendant acquired interests of the owner of the name; elements of
ownership by adverse possession over his name usurpation of a name
but because the plaintifs cause of action had i. Possibility of a confusion of identity
lapsed thru the statute of limitations between owner and usurper
Constancia MAY NOT exclude Consuelo ii. Use is unauthorized
from using the name of her former husband, iii. Use of anothers name is to designate
from whom she was divorced. personality or identify a person
To sustain Consuelos use of the surname None of these elements exist in the case at bar;
does not contradict Articles. 370 and 371 of the Constancia did not claim that
Civil Code. Consuelo had impersonated her
It is public knowledge that Constancia is the
Senator Tolentinos commentary on Art. 370 of legal wife of Arturo Tolentino; invitations to
the Civil Code: public functions are always addressed to her as
the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to the wife
use the husbands surname. She cannot be Consuelo never represented herself after
prevented from using it; but neither can she the divorce as Mrs. Arturuo Tolentino but
restrain others from using it. simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino
Consuelo David has legitimate children who
Arr. 371: not applicable because it speaks of have every right to use the surname Tolentino
annulment while the case at bar refers to She cannot be compelled to use the prefix
absolute divorce where there is a severance of Miss or use the name of Mrs. David
valid marriage ties. different from the surnames of her children;
Effect of divorce is more akin to the death records do not show that she has legally
of the spouse where the deceased woman remarried
continues to be referred to as the Mrs. of the
husband, even if the latter has remarried rather RULING:
than to annulment, as if there had been no Use of the surname Tolentino by
marriage at all Consuelo David does not impinge on the rights
Consuelo David MAY NOT be enjoined by of Constancia.
her former husbands present wife from using
his surname.
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. CA mandatory injunction by the trial court, set
decision affirmed. Writs of preliminary and aside.
FACTS: HELD:
Melchor Solomon married Alejandria No. The court agrees fully with the trial
Feliciano on June 21, 1948. On the same day, court, citing in support Article 1327 of the Civil
but before the marriage ceremony, he executed Code on donation proper nuptias, which was
a Deed of Donation where he donated all his reproduced for Article 126 of the New Civil
exclusive properties as basic capital for their Code1. Whether the Old Civil Code (as the
conjugal and family life. The donation further marriage was contracted in 1948) or the New
provides in the case that they begot no children Civil Code will apply, the result will be the same.
that, should he die before his wife, that his The court questioned whether the
brothers and sisters will be heirs to of his donation was made in consideration of their
property (including those acquired in the marriage or in consideration of the death of
conjugal union) and if the wife dies before him, either of them in the absence of children. The
that Estanislao Serrano will be heirs to the same court ruled that marriage in itself was not the
half. only consideration or condition; it must be a
Less than nine months after the childless marriage and either spouse must die
marriage, the wife died. Then, Serrano before for the donation to operate.
commenced the action to enforce the terms Even granting that it is in consideration of
of the donation. Solomon filed a motion for the marriage, the donation was not in favor of
dismissal and was granted by the trial court, the wife but of Serrano. Citing Manresas
who ruled that the said donation cannot be commentary, the court said that donations
counted as donation propter nuptias because it granted to persons other than the spouses even
was not made in consideration of the marriage If founded on the marriage are among those
and that the donation was made not to either excluded from those excluded from Art. 1327.
of the parties but to a third person. Serrano No. It cannot be considered a donation
appealed the decision. inter vivos because it was never accepted by
the donee either in the same instrument or
ISSUE: donation or in a separate document as required
WON the donation can be validly by law.
considered as a donation propter nuptias Neither can it be considered a donation
WON the donation may be held valid and mortis causa because the donor is still alive,
effective as a donation other than donation and time and occasion have not arrived for
propter nuptias considering its operation and implementation,
and, as it will be counted equivalent to a last
will, it must conform to the strict requisites and
provisions for executing wills, which the
donation does not.
FACTS: pending
Cipriano Lagua = owner of the 3 parcels of
land ISSUE:
Cipriano Lagua and Alejandro Dumlao are WON inofficious donations can be reduced
the parents of Alejandro Lagua
Alejandro Lagua was to be married to HELD:
Bonifacia Mateo
Cipriano Lagua, in a public instrument, YES
donated 2 out of the 3 lots to his son in DPN properties may be reduced for being
consideration of the latters marriage inofficious
The newlyweds took possession of the DPN are without onerous consideration (no
properties but the Certificate of Title obligation burdening the done), the
remained in the donors name marriage being merely the occasion or
o 6 years later, Alejandro Lagua died, his motive for the donation, not its causa.
wife and daughter stayed with Cipriano o They are subjection to reduction if they
Lagua should infringe the legitime of a forced
Cipriano Lagua undertook the farming of the heir
donated lots
o At start, he was giving the owners share Steps to consider in determining legal share of
o After 3 years, he refused to deliver the compulsory heirs
share 1) Net estate = Value of properties at the time
o Mateo filed a case for possession and of death LESS payable obligations and
damages = GRANTED charges
Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of 2) Net Estate + all donations subject to
the same 2 parcels in favor of his younger collation
son, Gervasio Lagua 3) Determination of legitimes per heir
o Share of the proceeds of the land were
still being given to Mateo until 1965 In order to say that a donation is inofficious,
o On the stopping of the share, she found it should be proven that it exceeds that of
out about the sale the disposable free portion plus the donees
o She filed for recovery of possession of share as legitime in the properties of the
the properties = GRANTED donor
Gervasio Lagua filed for annulment of the o Pieces of evidence to such are
donation of the 2 lots incomplete. They lacked proof that
o ARGUMENT: When Cipriano donated the these were the only properties of
lots (which were allegedly the only Cipriano Lagua and that there are only 2
properties he owned), he neglected heirs left.
leaving something for his own support
and for Gervasios legitime as forced heir. DISMISSED
o Cipriano Lagua died while case was
FACTS: ISSUE:
Andrea Rodriguez and Juan Aben were WON Nazareno, may recover title and
married and had a daughter named Alberta possession of a parcels of land described? NO
Aben. Their daughter Alberta later got
married to Mariano Meleno Nazareno and HELD/ RATIO:
had a child named Bonifacio Nazareno. When Not only did Nazareno lose ownership of
Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo the two portions of the land that the
Braganza. Andrea and her second husband Birogs and Ariolas possess, he signed a
Cirilo had no offspring. deed in favor of Ariola on the third and
In March 1917, Cirilo executed a deed of last portion; therefore, he is estopped
donation of land to his then six-year old step- from claiming the land.
grandson Bonifacio. The donation was More importantly, appeal must be
accepted in the same deed by Alberta and dismissed since Nazareno has no cause
Mariano, parents of Bonifacio. Cirilo of action under Art.1335 OCC. The
continued to possess and enjoy the land. donation was made by the husband to
Begin ning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the a grandchild of his wife by a previous
land: marriage. When the donation was
made, the spouses were already
1930 71 ares and 30 centares to Birog for married hence it falls under the
1, 100 (paid) prohibition provided by law. Donations
1933 2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200 from the spouse to the children, as
(initially with remaining balance of well as grandchildren, of the other by a
300, later paid 275, wrote previous marriage are void.
promissory note for 25) Neither has the plaintiff acquired the
1934 1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for land by prescription for there is no
1, 600 (balance of 600, promissory evidence that he ever possessed it or
note for that sum payable at end of claimed it against his grandfather (as
Feb or March 1935) evident in deed in favor of Ariola,
signed by Nazareno as witness).
These two buyers immediately took
possession of the land and cultivated them. NOTE:
Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since Ariola This is a wrong decision since the doctrine
had not paid by Feb 1935, plaintiff wrote cannot be applied to all cases. For example,
him a letter demanding the payment. when the grandchildren already have children
Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo) collected of their own, the spouse of the original owner
balanc e of 25 from Birog in March1935. can no longer benefit from the donation since
he/she will cease to be a compul sory heir of the
Hence, the contest for land ownership is grandchild.
between the donee (Nazareno) and buyers of
land (Birog and Ariola).
validity of the donation does not necessarily Lower court decision reversed. Questioned
result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the donation declared void, with the rights of both
disputed property. After all, her brother and the parties as heirs recognized. Case remanded to
defendant were legally married; w/c makes the the lower court.
defendant her brothers widow. As provided for
in the CC, defendant is entitled to of the NOTE: There are annotations in the last part of
inheritance, and the plaintiff, as surviving sister, the case that expounds on donations.
to the other half.
FACTS: RD:
Crispulo Javillo contracted two marriages. 1. NO. Gutierrez adopting the view of
His first marriage was with Ramona Levis where Matienzo states that: When the marriage is
they had 5 children [petitioners-appellees]. Ater dissolved, the cause that brought about the
Ramonas death, he married Rosario Onas community ceases, for the principle of an
[oppositor-appellant] where four children were ordinary partnership are not applicable to
born. During the first marriage, 11 parcels of this community, which is governed by
land were acquired while 20 parcels of land special rules. Provisions of law governing
were acquired during the 2nd marriage. the subject should cease to have any effect
Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of for the community of property is admissible
May, 1927 and Santiago Andrada was named and proper in so far as it conforms to unity
administrator of his estate. He submitted two of life, to the mutual affection between
projects of partition, the first disapproved by husband and wife, and serve as a
the lower court and second partition is the one recompense for the care of preserving and
now on appeal in this case. Partition was made increasing the property; all of which
on the claim that the properties of the 2nd terminates by the death of one of the
marriage were products of the first marriage. partners.
Appellant now alleges that the lower court Community terminates when the
committed the following errors: marriage is dissolved or annuled or when
1. All the properties acquired during the during the marriage an agreement is
second marriage were acquired with the entered into to divide the conjugal
properties of the first marriage. property. The conjugal partnership does not
2. Lower court erred in approving the partition exist as long as the spouses are united.
dated Sept. 9, 1931 notwithstanding that
the same did not include all of the 2. NO. Whatever is acquired by the surviving
properties of the deceased, Crispulo Javillo. spouse on the dissolution if the partnership
by death or presumption of death whether
ISSUES: the acquisition be made by his or her
1) WON the community partnership shall lucrative title, it forms part of his or her
continue to exist between the surviving own capital, in which the other consort, or
spouse and the heirs of the deceased his or her heirs, can claim no share.
spouse.
2) WON the properties of the second marriage 3. NO. The project of partition approved the
can be claimed as products of the lower court is based on the absurd claim
properties of the first marriage. that it does not appear that there was
3) WON the partition that was approved by liquidation of the partnership of property of
the lower court is valid. the first marriage nor does it appear that
they asked for such liquidation. Partition
HELD: was based on the erroneous assumption
Judgment of the lower court is reversed and that the properties of the second marriage
case REMANDED for further proceedings. were produced by the properties of the first
marriage. Partition is not in conformity with
the law.
FACTS:
In dispute are the conjugal properties of HELD:
Nicolas Delizo from his first and second The Supreme Court held that the lands
marriages. Delizo was married to Rosa Villasfer composing the Caanawan properties could not
from 1981 to 1909 and to Dorotea de Ocampo have been the properties of the first marriage
from 1911 to 1957. The partition for the because they were public lands before
separation was initiated by the heirs of the first becoming homesteads. According to the law, it
marriage whose claims were refuted by the was only after 5 years of cultivation that lands
claims of the second marriage. The main from the public domain would be given to the
problem was that they could not agree on occupant. The court also held that possession of
which properties fell under the property regime these lands was not established during the start
of the first marriage and which fell under the of the occupation but at the precise time that
second. This was complicated because of the the occupants were given ownership. However,
extensive scope of properties Delizo acquired although the first marriage did not technically
throughout his lifetime17 pieces of property own any lands and imparted to its heirs only
were under consideration. In particular, inchoate rights, the Court held that justice and
however, 66-hectares found in Caanawan, equity demanded that the rights to the
Nueva Ecija are being disputed. While the trial properties by apportioned in proportion to the
court and Court of Appeals found that it was extent to which the requirements of the public
acquired during the first marriage, the division land laws had been complied with during the
of the fruits of the properties was not clear existence of each conjugal partnership. Since
mainly because majority of the improvement of the capital of either marriage could not be
the 66-hectare property were implemented determined with mathematical precision, the
during the second marriage; only 20 hectares of Court divided the total mass of the properties in
the 66 were cultivated during the first marriage. proportion to the duration of each partnership.
This was made more complicated by the fact Thus the second conjugal partnership had 46/64
that although only 20 hectares were cultivated of the total mass of properties and the first
during the first marriage, it was the money 18/64. Of these Nicolas is entitled to half;
made from the 20 hectares that was used to 32/64. Dorotea and her heirs are entitled to
acquire all subsequent property. Taking those 23/64 while Rosa Villasfers share would be
facts into consideration, the Court of Appeals 9/64. Each of the kids of the first marriage are
held that 20% of all properties acquired during entitled to 142/1664 of the entire estate while
the first marriage should go to the children of the children of the second marriage are entitled
the first marriage and 80% to the conjugal to 64/1664 of the all the properties.
partnership of Nicolas and Dorotea.
ISSUE:
How much were each of the heirs of Nicolas
Delizo entitled to given the fact that properties
acquired during his first and second marriages
could not be divided with mathematical
precision?
FACTS:
Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903. The trial HELD:
court ruled that the entire estate had been Yes, the properties are conjugal. It is
conjugal property except a house and a sum of presumed that all the estate of the married
10,000 pesos. The children of the deceased filed couple will be considered conjugal partnership
an appeal against the widow to reverse the property unless proven that it is a part of the
decision. separate estate of the husband and wife.
The buildings in question were constructed
ISSUE: out of partnership funds - the building erected
WoN the estate was really conjugal during the coverture on land belonging to one
property considering that the widow brought of the married couple will be considered as
nothing to the conjugal partnership as it was conjugal partnership property.
alleged?
obtain loans, without marital consent, for the benefit of said property (January, 1928)
DOCTRINES:
All property of the marriage is presumed ISSUES:
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it WON said properties were part of their
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the conjugal property
husband or to the wife.
> Burden of proving that property is exclusive or HELD:
conjugal rests upon the party asserting it. NO, it was not a part of their conjugal
> Names in titles or in deeds are just indications property. Petitioner lacks merit.
do not automatically rebut the above Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides
presumption. that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
FACTS: be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
Teresita Francisco alleges that since her husband or to the wife. However, the party
marriage on February 10, 1962 with Eusebio, who invokes this presumption must first prove
she and her husband have acquired the that the property in controversy was acquired
following: during the marriage. Needless to say, the
presumption refers only to the property
(1) A sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, acquired during the marriage and does not
and an apartment house, operate when there is no showing as to when
(2) A house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
Rodriguez, Rizal. In this case, petitioner failed to adduce
ample evidence to show that the properties
She further avers that these properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired
were administered by Eusebio until he was during her marriage with Eusebio.
invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart
disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite,
unfit to administer them. She also claims that Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the
his children his first marriage succeeded in testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the
convincing their father to sign a general power same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner
of attorney which authorized Conchita even admitted that Eusebio brought into their
Evangelista (daughter) to administer the house marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of
and lot together with the apartments situated a possessor only as it was not yet registered in
in Rodriguez, Rizal. his name.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property
for damages and for annulment of said general prior or subsequent to his second marriage is
power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its inconsequential. The property should be
enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of
declared as the administratrix of the properties law, pursuant to Article 148 of the New Civil
in dispute. Code.
However, trial court eventually favored the Essentially, property already owned by a
respondents for it found that the Teresita failed spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to
to adduce proof that said properties were the marriage, is considered his or her separate
acquired during the existence of the second property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to
conjugal partnership, or that they pertained properties acquired gratuitously and include
exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court those acquired by either spouse during the
ruled that those properties belong exclusively marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or
to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to donation (hence, it is still a separate property
administer them. CA affirmed this decision. even if obtained during marriage).
(The answer to this question will define Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted
whether the property may be subject to levy by the husband or the wife before the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of
partnership. the liquidation of the partnership such spouse
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary shall be charged for what has been paid for the
indemnities imposed upon them be charged to purposes above- mentioned.
the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted Art 116 FC
by the husband or the wife before the marriage, All property acquired during the marriage,
and that of fines and indemnities imposed upon whether the acquisition appears to have been
them, may be enforced against the partnership made, contracted or registered in the name of
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in one or both spouses, is presumed to be
Article 161 have been covered, if the spouse conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
who is bound should have no exclusive property
acquisition be for the partnership, or never had any kind of fund which could
for only one of the spouses;" be called conjugal partnership funds,
o The presumption found in Article 160 that they acted independently from one
of the Civil Code must be overcome by another whenever either one engaged
one who contends that the disputed in any business.
property is paraphernal. o Estoppel can only be invoked between
"ART. 160. All property of the marriage the person making the
is presumed to belong to the conjugal misrepresentation and the person to
partnership, unless it be proved that it whom it was addressed. It is essential
pertains exclusively to the husband or that the latter shall have relied upon
to the wife." the misrepresentation and had been
As stated in a precedent, "it is influenced and misled thereby.
sufficient to prove that the property The alleged misrepresentation was
was acquired during the marriage in never addressed to the petitioners,
order that the same may be much less made with the intention
deemed conjugal property." that they would act upon it.
o The disputed properties were acquired WON the petitioners acted in bad faith
by onerous title during the marriage, o YES.
and the funds used to buy the land and o On cross-examination, Mrs. Mendoza
to build the improvements thereon admitted that she learned of the RFC
came from the loans obtained by the mortgage when the lots were about to
spouses from RFC. be purchased.
To rebut the presumption and the o Property acquired during a marriage is
evidence of the conjugal character of the presumed to be conjugal and the fact
property, the petitioners have only the that the land is later registered in the
testimony of Julia de Reyes to offer. But her name of only one of the spouses does
claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the not destroy its conjugal nature.
ITRs where she made it to appear that the o The Mendozas demanded the consent
properties in question are conjugal assets of of Ponciano on the mere lease of the
the partnership. Also, she made a properties allegedly for their
statement that the rentals paid by her co- protection, yet on the actual sale where
appellees were income of the conjugal there is a transfer of greater rights they
partnership. have not required such consent.
WON the doctrine of estoppel applies in this WON there is an unjust enrichment of
case Ponciano if the deed of sale is nullified
o NO. o NO. Mr. Reyes did not receive any part
o It is mentioned that in another case of the proceeds of the sale and his wife
which is filed against Mr. Reyes, he has been aligning herself with the
stated defenses that he and his wife Mendoza couple.
PROVISION:
Art 118. Property bought on installment ISSUE:
paid partly from exclusive funds of either or WON the 2nd and 3rd payment came from
both spouses and partly from conjugal funds the CPG
belongs to the buyer/s if full ownership was
vested before the marriage and to the conjugal HELD:
partnership if such ownership was vested Yes, the loans become obligations of the
during the marriage. In either case, any amount CPG.
advanced by the partnership or by either or Using the ruling in Palanca v. Smith Bell that
both spouses shall be reimbursed by the if money borrowed by the husband alone on
owner/s upon liquidation of the partnership. the security of his wifes property is conjugal in
character, a fortiori should it be conjugal when
PETITION: borrowed by both spouses. The reason
Review and reversal of the decision of CA obviously is that the loan becomes an obligation
declaring the fishpond in San Roque as the of the conjugal partnership which is the one
exclusive paraphernal property of Macaria primarily bound for its repayment.
Pasco. Deeds show that the loans indicate that
Castillo, Sr. and Pasco are joint borrowers of the
RULING: Jacinto and Gonzales loans. The loans thus
CA decision revoked and set aside, case became obligations of the conjugal partnership
remanded to the court of origin for further of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned
proceedings. is logically conjugal property.
Since the fishpond is undivided property of
FACTS: Pasco and the conjugal partnership with
Macaria Pasco is married to Marcelo Castillo, Sr. his heirs are entitled to ask for its
Castillo, Sr. During the marriage, Gabriel and partition and liquidation. The ultimate interest
Purificacion Gonzales executed a deed of sale to of each party must be resolved after due
the spouses for the fishpond in question. The hearing, taking into account:
fishpond was payable in three installments: a) Pascos 1/6 direct share
P1000 upon the execution of the deed. This b) Her half of the community property
installment was paid from Pascos own c) Her successional rights to a part of Castillo,
account. Sr.s share pursuant to the governing law of
P2000 paid with the proceeds of the loan succession when he died
from Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, who later assigned d) Her right to reimbursement for any amount
his interest to Dr. Antonio Pasco. advance by her in paying the mortgage
P3000 paid from a loan secured by a debt.
mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in
the name of Macaria Pasco.
TOPIC: Charges upon the CPG [FC Art. 121 formal demand but the spouses failed to
(2)(3)] comply with the obligation. . Abelardo
contended that the amount was never intended
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be as a loan but his share of income on contracts
liable for: obtained by him in the construction firm and
(2) All debts and obligations contracted that the petitoner could have easily deducted
during the marriage by the designated the debt from his share in the profits. RTC
administrator-spouse for the benefit of decision was in favor of the petitioner, however
the conjugal partnership of gains, or by CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision
both spouses or by one of them with for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there
the consent of the other; was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by owner of the Paranaque property which
either spouse without the consent of became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses.
the other to the extent that the family The wife executed an instrument
may have been benefited; acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to sign. [Spouses separated in fact for more than 1
cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall year]
be solidarily liable for th e unpaid balance with
their separate properties. ISSUE:
WON the spouses CPG is liable for the said
QUICK GUIDE: loan
Petitioner issued US$25,000 as a loan to his
daughter and son-in-law for the spouses HELD:
conjugal home [house and lot]. The loan is Yes, undisputed is the fact that they used
liability of CPG even if the husband denies the money to buy a house and lot which served
giving consent by not signing the as their conjugal home. Even though it was only
acknowledgement executed by his wife to such the wife who executed the instrument of
because the loan redounded to the benefit of acknowledgment of accountability which the
the family. husband refused to sign, CPG is still liable for
the loan since such redounded to the benefit of
FACTS: the family. Defendant-husband and defendant-
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against wife are jointly [CPG] and severally [in case of
Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of insufficiency of CPG] liable in the payment of
the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and the loan.
lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989
when the petitioner issued a check worth as MINOR ISSUE:
such to assist the spouses in conducting their Abelardos contention that it is not a loan
married life independently. The seller of the rather a profit share in the construction firm is
property acknowledged receipt of the full untenable since there was no proof that he was
payment. The petitioner tried to collect the part of the stockholders that will entitle him to
money but was met w/ threats so he made a the profits and income of the company.
Husband obtained loan from PNB and marriage, and within ten years from the
mortgaged land by forging wifes signature. transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
Contract VALID because H cannot come to court annulment of any contract of the husband
with unclean hands and loan was automatically entered into without her consent, when such
assumed to have benefited the family because consent is required, or any act or contract of
it was obtained for family business. the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
FACTS property) does not guarantee that Courts will
Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB declare annulment of contract, but rather only
Laoag on Oct. 14, 1974 and mortgaged a parcel upon a finding that the wife did not give
of land as security. PNB foreclosed on the consent. It was not sufficiently proven that the
property and bought it in an auction. The land signature was forged. Also, the documents were
was then registered in the name of PNB in 1978. notarized, therefore they are public documents
Aguete claimed that she had no knowledge that has in their favor presumption of
of the loan obtained by her husband without regularity.
her consent and filed to annul the mortgage, Ros admitted in the complaint that he had
sale and consolidation of the property, alleging forged his wifes signature. If he were alive at
that her signatures were forged and that the the time of the decision he would have been
loan did not redound to the benefit of the prosecuted for forgery. By this admission, he
family. cannot bring the action against PNB because he
needed to come to court with clean hands.
ISSUES 2. YES. The Court ruled that the benefit to
1. WON the wife did not consent to the the family was apparent at the signing of the
mortgage executed by the husband, contract, which application included for
thereby making the contract void. additional working [capital] of buy & sell of
2. WON the loan from PNB redounded to the garlic & Virginia tobacco. Where the husband
conjugal partnership contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes that such obligation
HELD & RD: will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
1. NO. The Court held that the Civil Code partnership.
was in effect at the time of the mortgage, thus
the property is considered part of the CPG. Art. Petition denied.
173 of the CC (The wife may, during the
DOCTRINE: HELD:
3rd Parties or Strangers to the marriage do 1. NO
not have cause of action when one spouse o A cause of action is an act or omission
petitions for appointment as the sole of one party (defendant) in violation of
administrator of the properties. the legal right of the other (plaintiff).
o Elements:
FACTS: A right in favour of the plaintiff
In 1968, Husband left Wife and 4 legitimate An obligation on the part of the
children defendant
He arrogated unto himself full and exclusive An act/omission on the part of
control and administration of the conjugal defendant that violated the rights
properties of the plaintiff / breach of
Spent and used for sole gain and benefit obligation that gives rise to an
and excluded the wife and children action for recovery of damages
VALID during that time, as husband was o The complaint is by an aggrieved wife
sole admin against the husband
In 1976, Husband got into an illicit Cause of action arises only between
relationship and cohabited with the the husband and the wife who have
Petitioner/Paramour rights and obligations to each other.
Started to build up a fortune consisting of o Petitioner is a complete stranger to the
stockholdings in Lopez- owned or controlled marriage and to the cause of action
corporations, and other properties Administration is between the
(buildings, vehicles, lots, jewelry, etc.) married couple only
o Came from actual contribution of o Wifes petition for forfeiture is on the
properties and money (which were share of the husbands share of the
conjugal) of Husband properties co-owned by him and
o Concealed these from the original petitioner
family, entered into using his name or It does not involve the issue of
his paramours name or both validity of the co- ownership
o In 1993, Petition of Wife to be sole o Seeking of support by wife is from the
administratix of properties, forfeiture, husband, also not from the stranger
etc. against husband and petitioner
o A motion to dismiss the petition filed by 2. NO
Petitioner on the ground that wife has o An indispensable party is one without
no action against her whom there can be no final
DENIED: as she was impleaded as a determination of an action
necessary or indispensable party o A real party in interest is an
because some of the properties indispensable party, who stands to be
were registered in her name. benefited/injured by the judgement of
the suit
ISSUES: Since petitioner would not be
1. WON wifes petition for appointment as affected in any way, she is not a
sole administratix establish a cause of real party in interest, and is not an
action against petitioner indispensable party to the suit.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the subject lot is part of the exclusive
property of Florentino;
2. WoN the sale of land was valid.
HELD:
No. Petitioners claim that it is exclusive
property because the Chiongs were already
separated in fact. This cannot be, because the
separation in fact between husband and wife
without judicial approval does not affect the
conjugal partnership. Elisera both showed the
certificate of title and a real property tax
declaration showing that it was part of their
conjugal property, and Florentino also admitted
the conjugal nature of the lot.
FACTS:
Edna Lindo borrowed P400,000 from Arturo
Flores, and executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage to secure the loan. The deed
covered property in her name and her
husbands, Enrico Lindo, Jr. She signed the
deed, as well as a Promissory Note, for herself
and her husband, as his attorney-in-fact.
When she failed to pay the loan, Flores filed
an action to foreclose the property. However,
Edna alleged that Enrico had not been a party
to the loan, because she had contracted it
without his signature.
The Regional Trial Court had ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to foreclosure, upon
finding that the Deed had been executed on 31
Oct. 1995, but the Special Power of Attorney by
Enrico in his wifes favor was only dated 4 Nov.
1995.
ISSUE:
Whether Edna had validly mortgaged their
property.
RATIO:
The Court held that she had. An
administrator does not have the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the owner- assume sole powers of administration. These powers
spouses written consent, and any transaction do not include disposition or encumbrance without
done without the consent shall be void. authority of the court or the written consent of the
However, paragraph 2 of Art. 1248 provides other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
for the perfection of the contract upon the consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as
a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
8
As stated in FC Art. 124, paragraph 2: spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
otherwise unable to participate in the administration other spouse or authorization of the court before
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
DOCTRINE: RD:
In the system established by the Civil Code, Article 191 cannot be availed by the
the wife does not administer the CPG unless husband where the administration of the CPG
with the consent of the husband, or by decree has been forcibly taken from him by his wife
of court under its supervision. Legally, the wife and she abuses the management thereof.
cannot mismanage the conjugal partnership Consistent with its policy of discouraging a
unless the husband tolerates it. regime of separation and not in harmony with
the unity of the family and mutual affection
FACTS: expected of the spouses, the old and new Civil
Plaintiff and respondent are husband and Codes require that separation of property shall
wife but they have been living separately from not prevail unless expressly stipulated in 1)
each other since 1948, all attempts at marriage settlements, 2) or by formal judicial
reconciliation between them having failed. decree during the existence of marriage (Art.
As a result of their joint efforts, plaintiff and 190, NCC)
defendant acquired and accumulated real and Under Article 191, the only grounds for
personal properties. And upon the sepaRATIOn separation of properties are 1) spouse has been
of the spouses, the defendant (wife) assumed sentenced to a penalty which carries civil
the complete management and interdiction 2) spouse has been declared absent
administRATIOn of the conjugal partnership or 3) when legal separation has been granted.
properties. This enumeration must be regarded as
Husband alleged that his wife has been limitative, in view of the Codes restrictive
enjoying said property, as well as its fruits to policy.
the exclusion, has fictitiously transferred or Article 167 of the CC grants cause of action
alienated majority of said properties, has exclusively to the wife in cases of
neglected to file any income tax returns and has mismanagement and maladministration by the
failed to turn over his rightful share. husband (since CC grants administration of CPG
As a result, petitioner prayed for 1) to husband). In the system established by the
complete accounting of CPG and its fruits and Civil Code, the wife does not administer the
that 2) his rightful share be given pursuant to CPG unless with the consent of the husband, or
law. by decree of court under its supervision.
Defendant filed to dismiss the petition on Legally, therefore, the wife cannot mismanage
the ground of failure to state a cause of action the CPG unless the husband or courts tolerate
under Article 191 of the New Civil Code. it.
In the event of such maladministration by
ISSUE: the wife, the remedy of the husband does not
1) WON husband has cause of action under lie in a judicial separation of property but in
Article 191 of the NCC revoking the power granted to the wife and
If none, WON he is entitled to some relief assume administration of the community and
under the allegations of his complaints the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal
partnership.
HELD: The articles above quoted contemplate
DISMISSED. Complaint is not under the exclusively the remedies available to the wife
provisions of Articles 190 and 191 of NCC and against the abuses of her husband because
complaint does not establish a case for normally only the latter can commit such
separation of property. abuses.
DOCTRINE:
The law allows the separation of property HELD:
of the spouses and the dissolution of their YES. The settlement/compromise
conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction agreement between the two spouses is valid
is secured beforehand. with respect to the separation of property and
In the absence of an express declaration in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. (See
the marriage settlements, the separation of doctrine aforementioned) Judicial sanction was
property between the spouses during the obtained upon the CFIs approval of the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a separation of their property as well as the
judicial order (Art 190, CC) dissolution of the conjugal property. Moreover,
The husband and the wife may agree upon the propriety of severing the spouses financial
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership interests is manifest given that they have been
during the marriage, subject to judicial separated in fact for at least five years already
approval (Art 191, CC) and at the same time the court had no power to
compel the spouses to live together. However,
FACTS: the approval of separation of property and the
Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson dissolution of the CPG does not mean the court
were married and had four children. On January legalizes/recognizes the separation in fact of
9, 1963, Carmen left the conjugal home in the spouses.
Bacolod and went on to reside in Manila. She As to the custody of the children, the Court
filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic held that the CFI erred in depriving the mother
Relations Court of Manila for custody of all their of the custody of the two older children, citing
children as well as support for them and herself. Art 363 of the CC which commands that no
However, the spouses were able to reach an mother shall be separated from her child under
amicable settlement with respect to the seven years of age, unless the court finds
custody of the children (Two elder children compelling reasons for such measure. When
would go to Alfonso, the two younger children the settlement was approved by the CFI, the
to Carmen), separation of property, and two older children were then 6 and 5 years old
support (Alfonso would pay Carmen P300 respectively and the court did not have any
monthly) which was approved by the Court of compelling reasons to grant their custody to the
First Instance. Carmen later on filed a motion father other than to rely on the mutual
praying for custody of all her children. Alfonso agreement of the spouses in their settlement.
opposed the motion which was sustained by The courts, in determining which parent
the JDRC. Carmen subsequently raised the custody of the child should be granted, should
validity of the settlement with regard to the take into account where the child can best be
custody of their children. assured of the rights granted to him by law.
TOPIC: Voluntary separation of property 4. Lawyer did not intelligently inform him
of the consequential effects of the
DOCTRINE: agreement.
Art. 134 - The separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place ISSUE:
except by judicial order. Such judicial separation WON the Compromise Agreement is valid
of property may either be voluntary or for given the arguments of the husband
sufficient cause.
HELD:
FACTS: Petition denied. Ruling of CA affirmed.
Spouses married with one son. However, Compromise Agreement is valid.
their relationship soured when husband found
out wife was cheating on him. 1. Husbands argument that wife cant get a
He filed a case of adultery against wife = share and that her share should go to their
both wife and her paramour found guilty. common child under Articles 43(2) and 63
Wife then filed for nullity of marriage, of the FC is wrong. The provisions he cited
dissolution of CPG, and damages on the are inapplicable to this case and it is Article
grounds that husband was psychologically 134 of the FC that should be applied. Under
incapacitated. Article 134 of the Family Code, separation
During this case, spouses entered into a of property may be effected voluntarily or
Compromise Agreement to partially divide their for sufficient cause, subject to judicial
CPG. approval. The questioned Compromise
However, husband filed an Omnibus Motion Agreement which was judicially approved is
praying for the repudiation of the agreement, exactly such a separation of property
stating that his lawyer did not inform him of the allowed under the law. This conclusion
consequences of it. This was denied so he holds true even if the proceedings for the
appealed to the CA >> also denied husband declaration of nullity of marriage was still
hence this case. pending.
The husband argues that:
2. Solicitor Generals participation is not
1. The Compromise Agreement should not required. The proceedings pertaining to the
have been deemed valid since it is Compromise Agreement involved the
against law and public policy (wife was conjugal properties of the spouses. The
guilty of adultery hence cant get share settlement had no relation to the questions
of property) surrounding the validity of their marriage.
2. That the proceedings where it was 3. The conviction of adultery does not carry
approved is null and void, there being the accessory of civil interdiction, therefore
no appearance and participation of the wifes right to manage property is not
Solicitor General or the Provincial deprived.
Prosecutor
4. Negligence of lawyer binds client. Only
3. That the respondent, having been reckless or gross negligence of counsel
convicted of adultery, is therefore deprives the client of due process of law.
disqualified from sharing in the conjugal
property. Other notes:
a. P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the owned by the plaintiff while the Honda
bank jointly in the name of the spouses Dream shall be for the defendant;
shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor
and in trust of their common child, Neil d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff
Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint who shall pay the defendant the sum of
account of the parties. P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full
settlement thereof;
b. The store that is now being occupied by the
plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the e. The house and lot shall be to the common
bodega shall be for the defendant. The child.
defendant shall be paid the sum of
P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the Art. 34 of RPC - Civil interdiction shall deprive
store in full settlement thereof. the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or
c. The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the guardianship, either as to the person or
bodega until the time the owner of the lot property of any ward, of marital authority, of
on which it stands shall construct a building the right to manage his property and of the
thereon; right to dispose of such property by any act or
any conveyance inter vivos.
The motorcycles shall be divided between
them such that the Kawasaki shall be
of her common law relationship with the that the Forbes home is Teresita's exclusive
deceased property may not override the prima facie
presumption that since the house was
HELD: constructed on Isidro's lot during his marriage
Petition for certiorari dismissed, Writ of with Josefina, the same is part of the conjugal
preliminary injunction set aside. (No errors as to property of the couple and is thus subject to the
orders of respondent judge.) control of the special administratix.
(1) No. Although the long standing rule is that (2) No. Art. 144 CC which states, "When man
injunction is not to be granted for the purpose and a woman live together as husband and
of taking property out of possession and/or wife, but they are not married, or their
control of a party and placing it in that of marriage is void from the beginning, the
another whose title thereto has not been property acquired by either or both of them
clearly established, the same rests upon the through their work or industry or their wages
sound discretion of the Court. Teresita wasn't and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
able to clearly establish that the loans she co-ownership," is circumscribed with conditions
contracted during the construction of the house that must first be shown before rights may
were made for the same. On the contrary, it accrue. Petitioner was not able to CLEARLY
was evident that the loans were made for SHOW that she had contributed to the
purposes other than the construction of the acquisition of the property involved.
Forbes home. Also, the unsupported assertion
beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the share in his estate upon his death should she
retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
will be given to his legal heirs in accordance partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no putative heir she has an interest in the
beneficiary is named in the insurance policy. husband's share in the property here in dispute.
GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that With respect to the right of the second
the proceeds should be divided equally wife, although the second marriage can be
between his first living wife and his second. The presumed to be void ab initio as it was
lower court has correctly applied the ruling of celebrated while the first marriage was still
this Court in the case of Lao v Dee. subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the
NOTE: conjugal partnership formed by the second
Gomez v. Lipana: marriage was dissolved before judicial
In construing the rights of two women who declaration of its nullity, "the only lust and
were married to the same man, held "that since equitable solution in this case would be to
the defendant's first marriage has not been recognize the right of the second wife to her
dissolved or declared void the conjugal share of one-half in the property acquired by
partnership established by that marriage has her and her husband and consider the other
not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
relinquished her status as putative heir of her the first.
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
the legal wife of the deceased is not alone as a government employee, Article
one of them. 147 creates a co- ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share 1/2
Apply Art 147 for Nicdao: Wages and salaries thereof.
earned by either party during the cohabitation of the death benefits under scrutiny
shall be owned by the parties in equal shares shall g o to the petitioner as her share in the
and will be divided equally between them, even property regime, and the other half
if only one party earned the wages and the pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
other did not contribute thereto. intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
Conformably, even if the disputed death namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
benefits were earned by the deceased
PETITIONERS: (in relation to Pacita Gonzales) Four properties under the name of
Elino and Dominador as half-brother, Gonzales and Villanueva should NOT go to
Soledad as half-sister-in-law and Teofila and petitioners. (Refer to main doctrine)
Cecila as children of half-brother. Their interest The one lot under Gonzales name only is
is for the partition of Gonzales estate. her property because the efficacy of the title
was not rebutted.
FACTS: The rest of the property under Gonzales
Pacita Gonzales cohabited with Romualdo and Villanuevas name after the death of
Villanueva in an adulterous relationship from Musngi (1963), according to Art 144 CC, one
1927-1980. Villanueva is legally married to half should go to Gonzales heirs and the other
Amanda Musngi, who died in 1963. Gonzales should go to Villanuevas heirs. They are to
died intestate in 1980. Villanueva and share the property equally.
FACTS: HELD:
17 old Gina S. Rey was married but Given that Gina and Jacinto are not
separated in fact from her husband. capacitated to marry (Gina having a subsisting
She met Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, in marriage) Art. 148 of the Family Code must
July 1987. govern which applies to bigamous marriages,
Gina and Saguid decided to cohabit as adulterous relationships, relationships in a state
husband and wife in a house built on a lot of concubinage, relationships where both man
owned by Jacintos father and woman are married to other persons, and
Jacinto made a living as the patron of their multiple alliances of the same married man
fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the ...only the properties acquired by both
other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but of the parties through their actual joint
decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from contribution of money, property, or
1992 to 1994 when her relationship with industry shall be owned by them in
Jacintos relatives turned sour. common in proportion to their
They separated after 9 years of cohabiting respective contributions ...
with each other Even if the marriage commenced in 1987,
Gina filed a complaint for Partition and which is before the date of the effectivity of the
Recovery of Personal Property with Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148
Receivership, alleging that from her salary as thereof applies because this provision was
entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
P70,000.00 in the completion of their 144 of the Civil Code (As seen in Sempio-Dy).
unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings While there is no question that both parties
as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able contributed in their joint account deposit, there
to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact
furniture and household effects, with a total amount of their respective shares therein
value of P111,375.00. Stated in Article 148 of the Family Code, in
RTC and CA decided in favor or Gina and the absence of proof of extent of the parties
stated that both Gina and Jacinto contributed to respective contribution, their share shall be
presumed to be equal.
REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER CC Art 144. When a man and a woman live
EVIDENCE. Under Van Dorn ruling, which was together as H&W, but they are not married, or
also the basis of FC Art 26 par 2, it would be their marriage is void ab initio, the property
absurd and unjust for a Filipino spouse not to acquired by either or both of them through
be allowed to remarry despite a foreign divorce their work or industry or their wages and
granted to his/her foreign spouse. If Felicisimos salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
divorce with American wife were true and valid, ownership.
he should therefore be allowed to remarry with *In co-ownership, any property acquired
Felicidad. If such remarriage with Felicidad were during union is prima facie presumed to have
validly contracted under US law (being been obtained through joint efforts. Hence,
contracted in the US), such marriage should also shares are presumed equal, unless the contrary
be valid in the Philippines. is proven.*
HOWEVER, evidence is insufficient to prove
the validity of both the divorce and the FC Art 148. In cases of cohabitation not
remarriage in light of rules on evidence for falling under Art 147, only the properties
foreign divorce and foreign laws. (Refer to case acquired by both of the parties through their
if you want to know more about these rules, actual joint contribution of money, property, or
but this issue is not of primary importance to industry shall be owned by them in common in
the lesson.) proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their
WON Felicidad has legal contributions and corresponding shares are
standing/personality to file petition for letters presumed to be equal...
of administration *Ct: Art 148 has been held to have
retroactive effect.*
YES. Given the insufficiency of evidence,
Felicidads legal standing may fall under three WHEREFORE: In all three situations, Felicidad
possible situations wherein she is: has legal standing to file petition for letters of
administration.
single family residential use in its application permanence in the relationship of residents.
and appeal to the Board and that is where the The Board of Appeals found that the residents
issue originated from. would not control "the choice of who the
The plaintiffs' principal argument is that the incoming residents would be nor when other
interpretation of the ordinance by the Board residents would leave." Some residents would
and its affirmance by the Superior Court placed ultimately be transferred to foster homes. They
undue emphasis on the role of the staff and further found that the average stay of a
ignored the fact that the plain purpose of the resident would be one to one and one-half
group home was to create a family environment years. These facts are not consistent with the
for the residents. The requirement of a development of permanent and cohesive
domestic bond would have been met by the relationships among the residents, especially in
relationship forged among the residents the absence of a resident authority figure.
themselves as they lived and worked together. Finally, the definition of family further
The plaintiffs cited several decisions from other specifies that the persons comprising the
jurisdictions in which similar definitions of collective should not only be living together
family have been construed to include group in a relationship founded on a domestic bond
homes to strengthen their argument. but should be "doing their own cooking and
The Court finds no merit in their arguments. living together upon the premises as a sep arate
The concept of "domestic bond" implies the housekeeping unit." The Board found that the
existence of a traditional family-like structure of Corporation and its rotating staff would plan
household authority. Such a structure would and manage the activities of the residents.
include one or more resident authority figures Further, staff members were to be responsible
charged with the responsibility of maintaining a for preparing meals and providing "some
separate housekeeping unit and regulating the cleaning and other services." They concluded
activity and duties of the other residents. In so that such an arrangement would not comply
doing, this resident authority figure serves with the requirement of the ordinance.
legitimate zoning interests of a community by The Corporation's proposal failed to meet
stabilizing and coordinating household activity the definitional criteria of a domestic bond
in a way that is consistent wit h family values and it also failed to satisfy the more concrete
and a family style of life. The Board found that specifications of the ordinance as well. While
although a staff would be employed by the the purpose of such homes is laudable, the
Corporation for the purposes of maintaining a scrutiny that is needed to be done under the
home for six retarded adults, staff members local zoning ordinances should not be easily
would not necessarily reside at the home; abandoned. If the problem of locating group
rather, the Board's findings suggested the staff homes is pervasive in this state, legislative, not
would serve on a rotating basis. Thus, a central judicial, action may be most appropriate.
figure of authority residing on the premises
similar to a parent or parents in a t raditional Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.
family setting was clearly absent. The absence
of a resident authority figure in the ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (that are not
Corporation's proposal clearly distinguishes this related to the topic of family):
case from cases cited by the plaintiffs in which
the definition of family was held to include Venue: The City of Brewer tried to dismiss
group homes. the petition in the Superior Court based on
Another note pointed out by the Court was improper venue, but they were dismissed.
in terms of the permanence of the residents in Particularly, what was being challenged was
the home. In relationships founded on marriage whether the State of Maine and the Bureau of
or birth, the notion of domestic bond also Mental Retardation were parties that had
connotes a quality of cohesiveness and standing to bring legal action. A statute was
raised saying that any party was allowed to from local zoning ordinances. Their decision
file an appeal to a decision rendered by a court. was based on other ordinances present. For
But it was clarified that these parties must have instance, there was a law saying that these
a legal standing such that they have obtained exemptions can only be recognized when it is
particularized injuries. At first, the Court opined proven that it is reasonably necessary for public
that the State and the Bureau did not suffer a welfare and convenience and the like. State
particularized injury sufficient for purposes of involvement is also necessary. The court below
standing and the status of party which standing concluded that evidence before the Board of
confers. Although the State and the Bureau Appeals was insufficient to support findings of
went on to argue that they were injured in such. Furthermore, there was no showing that
such a way that the refusal of the City to there were no other suitable locations that can
approve the occupancy permit was a hindrance be used for that purpose. The Court therefore
to the mandate of state and federal laws to concluded that the Corporation was not exempt
protect the rights of mentally retarded citizens from legitimate local zoning regulations.
and to promote their welfare, the Court said
that these concerns still did not give rise to Constitutional arguments: The Corporation
particularized injuries in the case. However, claims that the interpretation of the ordinance
given that the Bureau was named as the legal violates their rights to due process and equal
guardian of the three retarded persons who protection of the law under Fourteenth
were proper parties in this case in the amended Amendment of the Constitution. The Court
petition, any problem of venue was cured. They opined that it was unclear to them if any rights
concluded finally that the venue was properly were indeed violated since the plaintiffs were
laid in the Kennebec Court. not able to show any evidence of this violated
right upon the imposition of the ordinance.
Zoning exemption for the State: The Zoning ordinances are part of the police power
Corporation raised the point that according to a of municipalities and they are presumed to
statue, zoning ordinances are advisory with comply with due process when they bear a s
respect to the State. They contend that this ubstantial relation to the advancement of public
statutory provision exempted its proposed principles. The argument of the Corporation
group home from the Brewer ordinance extends as far as confusing the power to control
because the Corporation was acting as an land use with the power to distinguish persons
agent of the State in furtherance of clearly making use of the land, but this is again without
articulated state obligations and interests by merit. In sum, these Plaintiffs have failed to
initiating the group home project in the City of overcome the presumption of constitutional
Brewer. The Court opined that the statute was validity of the ordinance which they challenge.
not intended to exempt all such corporations
ISSUES/RATIO:
FACTS:
An action was filed by petitioner Guerrero WON the absence of an allegation in the
against private respondent Hernando regarding complaint that earnest efforts towards a
ownership of real property. The two are compromise were exerted, which efforts failed,
brothers-in-law, they being married to half- is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
sisters. During the pre-trial conference,
respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., noted the RULING:
relationship between them and on the basis The Court granted the petition and ordered
thereof, he gave the petitioner five (5) days "to the RTC Judges dismissal of the action to be set
file his motion and amended complaint" to aside, directing the latter to continue.
allege that the parties were very close relatives,
their respective wives being sisters, and that the RATIO DECIDENDI:
complaint to be maintained should allege that NO. The enumeration of "brothers and
earnest efforts towards a compromise were sisters" as members of the same family does
exerted but failed. Guerrero moved to not comprehend "brothers-in-law". Sisters and
reconsider said order, claiming that since brothers by affinity not listed under Art. 217 of
brothers by affinity are not members of the the New Civil Code as members of the same
same family, he was not required to exert family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code
efforts towards a compromise. He also argued repeats essentially the same enumeration of
that Hernando was precluded from raising this "members of the family", the Court found
issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss noreason to alter existing jurisprudence on the
nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in matter. Thus, the court a quo erred in ruling
his answer. that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law
Said motion was denied by the judge who of private respondent Hernando, was required
reiterated the 5-day deadline for Guerrero to to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise
amend his complaint. However, the 5-day before filing the present suit.
period expired without Guerrero following the
order; thus, the respondent Judge dismissed the NO. Attempt to compromise as well as the
case. inability to succeed is a condition precedent to
the filing of a suit between members of the
ISSUES: same family, the absence of such allegation in
WON brothers by affinity are considered the complaint being assailable at any stage of
members of the same family contemplated in the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of
Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil cause of action. It is not therefore correct, as
Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of petitioner contends, that private respondent
the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts may be deemed to have waived the aforesaid
towards acompromise before a suit between defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the
them may be instituted and maintained same in the Answer.
ISSUES
A. Procedural: Whether the lack of verification
required by Art. 151 is sufficient ground for
dismissal.
B. Whether Art. 151 is applicable.
RATIO
11
ART. 151. No suit between members of the same
mily shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be
the subject of compromise under the Civil Code
DOCTRINES: support.
Art.203, FC - The obligation to give support The RTC ruled in favor of the sisters and
shall be demandable from the time the person their mother and ordered Edward to pay them
who has a right to receive the same needs it for 18 months worth of support in arrears,
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except amounting to around P2.5 million. Edward
from the date of judicial or extrajudicial appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTCs
demand. decision, which led to this petition for review to
Art.207, FC - When the person obliged to the SC. He contends that he should not be
support another unjustly refuses or fails to give made to pay for support in arrears from 1976-
support when urgently needed by the latter, 1994 since there was no previous extrajudicial
any third person may furnish support to the or judicial demand from the respondents, citing
needy individual, with right of reimbursement Art.203 of the Family Code. The computation
from the person obliged to give support. for support should just start from 1995 as that
was the date when the sisters formally asked
FACTS: for support by lodging the complaint.
Edward Lacson is married to Lea Daban and
they have two daughters, Maowee and ISSUES:
Maonaa. Not long after the birth of their second 1. WoN Edward should pay for the support in
child in 1976, Edward left the conjugal home in arrears from 1976-1994 despite the
Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and absence of an extrajudicial or judicial
children to seek shelter and financial assistance demand
elsewhere. For a month, they stayed with Leas 3. WoN Noel Daban is subject to
mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her reimbursements for loans he provided for
mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. the familys sustenance
From 1976 to 1994 (18 years), they transferred 4. WoN the sale by Lea of half of what Edward
from one dwelling place to another not their claims to be his exclusive or capital
own. Lea did not badger Edward for support, property, amounting to P5 million, can be
holding on to her husbands promise of doing so considered as payment for his support in
on his letter dated December 10, 1975, which arrears to his daughters
he failed to comply with. He, however,
occasionally gave meager amounts for the RULING:
childrens school expenses. Edwards mother Petition denied. RTC & CAs decision
also contributed to help in the childrens affirmed.
schooling, but it was Leas brother, Noel Daban,
who lent a large sum to the family (between RATIO:
P400,000-600,000). Lea, in behalf of her 1. Yes. Edward overlooked the fact that he
daughters, then filed a complaint against abandoned his children at their tender
Edward for support before the Iloilo RTC in years and as such could not demand for
1995. support since he was also difficult to get in
In his answer, Edward alleged giving to touch with. It also appeared that Lea made
Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet an extrajudicial demand sometime in 1976
their needs. He explained, however, that his when she came to her mother-in-laws
lack of regular income and the unproductivity of house asking for financial support, as also
the land he inherited, not his neglect, embodied in Edwards note dated
accounted for his failure at times to give regular December 10, 1975. Thus, RTC was correct
DOCTRINE: Code;
The fact of a property being a family home 2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of
must be properly determined by the court petitioners claim that the property
(according to the procedure below). was his family home through:
- Ocular inspection of the premises
FACTS: - Examination of the title
Petitioner Josef had bought shoe materials on - Interview of members of community
credit from respondent Otelio Santos, who, upon where alleged family home is located,
Josefs failure to pay, brought a case for collection to determine whether petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The actually resided within its premises
RTC ruled that Josef was liable to Santos for - Order that photographs of the
P404,836.50, with a 12% per annum interest. premises, depositions and/or
As a result, some of Josefs personal properties affidavits of proper individuals /
were auctioned off, including a real property in parties be submitted, or conduct a
Marikina, for which Santos was the winning solemn examination of petitioner,
bidder. his children and other witnesses.
Josef questioned the sale of the personal and
real properties, claiming that he was insolvent and The respondent must be given the opportunity
had no property to answer for the judgment. He to cross-examine and present contrary
further claimed that the personal properties evidence.
belonged not to him but to his children, and that
the house and lot was his family home, thus 3. If the property is found to be the petitioners
exempt from execution. family home, the court should determine:
a. If the obligation sued upon was
ISSUE: contracted or incurred prior to the
Whether Santos could validly seize the real effectivity of the Family Code;
property claimed to be a family home. b. If the petitioners spouse is still alive,
and if there are other beneficiaries of
RATIO the family home;
The Court held that the trial court failed to c. If the petitioner has more than one
determine the truth to petitioner Josefs residence, in order to determine which
allegations. The court must adhere to the of them, if any, is his family home;
following procedure: d. Its actual location and value, in order to
apply Arts. 15713 and 16014.
1. Determine if petitioners obligation to
respondent falls under either of the
service or furnished material for the construction of the
exceptions under Art. 15512 of the Family building.
13 ART. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not
FACTS: ISSUE:
William Liyao, Jr. contends that he is WON the petitioner may be recognized as
entitled to successional rights as a William Liyaos illegitimate child based on the
compulsory heir of William Liyao. According evidence he presented
to the petitioner, his mother Corazon Yulo and
William Liyao cohabited with each other from HELD:
1965-1975. During that time, they lived in the NO. The presumption is always in favor of
same house together with Corazons two the legitimacy of the child. The petitioner may
children from her subsisting marriage with not impugn his possible legitimacy without
Ramon Yulo. During this period, he alleges strong and conclusive pieces of evidence.
that his father furnished him generously for According to the New Civil Code a child born
support by giving him allowance and paying and conceived during a valid marriage is
for his education. As evidence of this, the presumed to be legitimate. As Ramon and
petitioner provided numerous pictures, Corazon Yulo were not legally separated nor
anecdotes, and witnesses in order to was their marriage annulled, then William
corroborate his claim for successional rights. Liyao Jr. is presumed to be the legitimate fruit
The respondents (Liyaos children from his of that marriage.
marriage) deny his allegations. They argued The Court held that the fact that the fact
that their father never had affairs and that that Corazon cohabited with William Liyao for
their parents never legally separated from 10 years was immaterial because only the
each other. Also, they point out the fact that husband or his heirs may impugn the
Corazon Yulo never separated from her legitimacy of a child. The fact that Corazon
husband neither. In fact, they claim to have Yulo claims his illegitimacy with another man
seen the two together during the time in which as a result of adulterous relations has no
Liyao and Yulo were supposed to be bearing if the Ramon Yulo does not impugn
cohabiting. Lastly, they testified that their the legitimacy of the child in question. Lastly,
father never issued checks in favor of the the Court held that even if the petition was
petitioner and that they never received any coursed through the children of Ramon Yulo
formal request for the recognition of Liyao, Jr. (note: the legitimacy of a child may only be
as an illegitimate child of their father. The impugned in a direct action by the proper
trial court granted the petition citing a party) who might be in a position to impugn
preponderance of evidence while the Court of his legitimacy as his heirs, they could not be
Appeals reversed it. certain that Ramon Yulo was already dead.
As such, the petition is denied.
FACTS:
The Sterns entered into a surrogacy She claims primary custody with
agreement with Mary Beth Whitehead in visitation rights for Mr. Stern, both on a
which she agreed to bear the child of Mr. best-interests basis as well as on the
Stern (through artificial insemination) in policy basis of discouraging surrogacy
exchange for costs plus $10,000 and to contracts. The standard for determining
terminate her rights as a mother (before best interests is that the child should be
the baby was even conceived). Upon the placed with the mother absent a showing
birth of the baby (Melissa) and the of unfitness.
subsequent handover to the Sterns as
agreed, Mrs. Whitehead "became deeply STERNS ARGUE:
disturbed, disconsolate, stricken with Contract is valid and should be
unbearable sadness." She persuaded the enforced. They have a right to privacy,
Sterns to give her one last week with the which includes the right of procreation and
child by telling them that she was suicidal the right of consenting adults to deal with
(so they handed their child over to a matters of reproduction as they see fit.
suicidal woman) and she fled to Florida Given the circumstances, the child is
with her husband and the baby. There, better off in their custody with no
they took evasive maneuvers to avoid residual parental rights reserved for Mrs.
detection before being ordered to turn Whitehead. Furthermore, the statute
over the child. The Sterns filed suit, which grants full parental rights to a
seeking ultimate custody of the child and husband in relation to the child
enforcement of the surrogacy contract (in produced, with his consent, by the union
which the child would be placed of his wife with a sperm donor denied him
permanently in their custody and Mrs. equal protection of the laws.
Whitehead's parental rights would be
permanently terminated). After a RULING:
lengthy trial, the court ordered that Mrs. Pre-birth contract under which a
Whitehead's parental rights be woman agrees to be impregnated,
terminated and that sole custody of the through artificial insemination, by a man
child be granted to Mr. Stern. The court not her husband and to give up,
also entered an order allowing the irrevocably, all parental rights upon the
adoption of Melissa by Mrs. Stern, all in birth of the resulting child for the purpose
accordance with the surrogacy contract. of permitting the natural father and his
Mrs. Whitehead appealed. wife to adopt the child as their own where
the woman is to be paid $10,000 and
WHITEHEAD ARGUES: Surrogacy where there is no showing that the
contract is invalid because: woman is an unfit mother or that the
1. It conflicts with public policy since it natural father and his wife are fit parents
guarantees that the child will not have runs counter to laws governing adoption
the nurturing of both natural and termination of parental rights and
parents, presumably New Jersey's the public policies of keeping children with
goal for families. both of their natural parents and of
2. It deprives the mother of her treating the rights of natural parents
constitutional right to the equally concerning the custody of children
companionship of her child. and is therefore VOID. Nonetheless, based
4. It conflicts with statutes concerning solely on the best interests of the child,
termination of parental rights and custody was granted to the Sterns, with
adoption. visitation rights to Mrs. Whitehead.
DOCTRINE: HELD:
Under California law, she who intended to NO. Because undisputed evidence shows
bring about the birth of a child that she that Anna gave birth to the child and that only
intended to raise as her own is the natural Crispina is genetically related to such child, and
mother. no clear legislative preference is given between
blood tests and gestation as means of
PROOF GIVEN: establishing a mother and child relationship,
For the Calverts; Evidence of blood tests then the case can only be decided by looking at
showing that Crispina is genetically related to the intent of both parties as manifested by the
the child surrogacy agreement. Basing it on such
agreement, it is clear then that the parties aim
FACTS: was to bring the Calverts child into the world,
Mark and Crispina Calvert are married but and not for them to donate the zygote to Anna.
unable to have a child. Anna Johnson offered to From the outset, Crispina intended to be the
serve as surrogate mother. The two parties mother of the child. Annas act of carrying the
enter into a contract where Anna serves as child may have been indispensible for
surrogate, while the Calverts pay her $10,000 in eventually giving birth to him, but she would
installments as well as purchase a life insurance not have been able to do so had she manifested
policy for Johnson. The relationship between her intent to keep the child as her own prior to
the two sides soured, with Anna demanding the the implantation of the zygote. Although the
payment of the balance or else she would Uniform Parentage Act, which bases parent and
refuse to give up the child. The Calverts child rights on the existence of a parent and
responded with a lawsuit seeking a declaration child relationship, recognizes both genetic
that they were the legal parents of the child. consanguinity and giving birth as means of
Upon the birth of the child, it was proven establishing a mother and child relationship,
through blood tests that Anna was NOT the when the two means do not coincide in one
genetic mother of the child. The trial court ruled woman, she who intended to procreate the
that 1) the Calverts were the genetic, biological child is the natural mother under California law.
and natural parents of the child, 2) Anna had no
parental rights to the child, and 3) the surrogacy NO. Gestational surrogacy is completely
contract was legal and enforceable against different from adoption, and as such, should
Annas claims, all of which were affirmed by the not be subject to adoption statutes. Both
Court of Appeals. parties voluntarily agreed to participate in in
vitro fertilization before the child was
ISSUES: conceived. Moreover, the financial
- WON Anna can claim custody of the child considerations given to Anna ($10,000 and the
- WON the surrogate contract violates public purchase of an insurance policy) were NOT for
policy her giving up her parental rights over the child
but rather for carrying the child and undergoing
labor.
seven months after their first illicit intercourse [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal
and consequently the separation between the administered, in conformity with the rites of the
husband and the wife (if in fact they did). Note, Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the
the couple had been already married years child, but it does not prove the veracity of the
before such date (with 4 children). declarations and statements contained in the
certificate that concern the relationship of the
HENCE: person baptized. Such declarations and
After 180 days following marriage: Check! statements, in order that their truth may be
Before 300 days following (alleged) separation: admitted, must indispensably be shown by
Check proof recognized by law.
FACTS: ISSUE:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. WON the accused committed the crime of
Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. rape
Prieto were charged with the crime of rape
committed against a 15 year old Mongoloid HELD:
child (Sandra). Accused held that he was always with Col.
The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, but this was proven to be untrue, and
Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and the mom testified that there were times that
wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two- Sandra was left alone with accused.
storey officers' quarters Accused simplistically and quite erroneously
Four security men were assigned to argues that his conviction was based on the
Salcedo, two of whom were accused Constable medical finding that he and the victim have the
Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno same blood type "O".
Tumimpad. Accused-appellants' culpability was
Sandra complained of constipation, established mainly by testimonial evidence
irritability and moodiness. given by the victim herself and her relatives.
Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out The blood test was adduced as evidence only to
from the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, show that the alleged father or any one of many
patayin mo 'yan, bastos." others of the same blood type may have been
Sandra was brought to the hospital and was the father of the child.
confirmed pregnant, 9 months later she gave
FACTS: ISSUE:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel WON petitioners certificate of live birth will
Chipongian were owners of various properties suffice to establish her legitimacy.
located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his
husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and HELD:
nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of The Court dismissed the case for lack of
letters of administration of Vicentes estate in merit. The mere registration of a child in his or
favor of the nephew, herein private respondent. her birth certificate as the child of the supposed
The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was parents is not a valid adoption. It does not
raised and cared by the deceased spouses since confer upon the child the status of an adopted
childhood, though not related to them by child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to
blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove simulation of the child's birth or falsification of
that she is the only legitimate child of the his or her birth certificate, which is a public
spouses submitted documents such as her document.
certificate of live birth where the spouses name It is worthy to note that Vicente and
were reflected as her parents. She even brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed
testified that said spouses continuously treated of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
her as their legitimate daughter. On the other latter. In the notarized document, they stated
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said that they were the sole heirs of the deceased
spouses were unable to physically procreate because she died without descendants and
hence the petitioner cannot be the biological ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente
child. Trial court decided in favor of the effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live
petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole Birth of the petitioner where it appeared that
heir of the spouses. he was the petitioners father.
more careful with so that any incidental their fathers estate, and thus, the possibility
acknowledgment made therein enjoys a that Raymundo has personal hidden motives
presumption of truth. This only applied to Art. other than establishing filiation cannot be
131 of the Old Civil Code, which required discounted.
filiation to be acknowledged only in a public Besides the application of the
document. Meanwhile, the private document abovementioned provision, the court also cited
shown by plaintiffs-appellants could have made that all the documents presented by the
a case for compulsory recognition if it has plaintiffs-appellants ran contrary to the public
qualified as an indubitable writing under Art. documents made by Pedro and Raymundo,
135 of the Old Civil Code. However, the acknowledging their relationship as father and
requisite for this type of recognition, in contrast son, and by Bibiano, corroborating the same in
to the voluntary recognition contemplated in his own personal statement. The latters
Art. 131, is that acknowledgment be direct and statement, if it were to be conceded that
express. Bibiano, at any time, recognized Raymundo as
As already mentioned Su Padre was his son, can be taken to be a renunciation of the
insufficient to make the note qualify as an same, which renunciation is not prohibited by
indubitable writing, therefore, Art. 135 also law. These public documents are more reliable,
does not apply. also taking into consideration the fact that
Raymundo did not make any claim for
(2) and (3) The school records and marriage compulsory recognition as Bibianos heir during
certificates are likewise insufficient proofs the eight years that passed before Bibianos and
because they were not personally prepared by his death. Trinidads testimony that all these
Bibiano. There are no records of any evidence facts were unknown to her prior to her
to show that Bibiano Baas furnished the husbands death is belied by human experience
statements therein or that he had any and her inconsistent testimonies during the
participation in securing the enrollment and the trial.
marriage certificate of Raymundo nor made
representations in connection therewith. B. NO. Granting that, after the death of
Meanwhile, as regards Bibianos signature Bibiano Baas, Raymundo could file an action
appearing at the back of Raymundos report for compulsory recognition against Bibiano's
card, it could either mean parental solicitude, or heirs despite his not being under the exceptions
Bibiano signing it in his capacity as guardian. set forth by Art. 135 of the Old Civil Code or Art.
283 of the New Civil Code, still plaintiffs-
(4) Nowhere in the letters of Raymundo to appellants cannot invoke Raymundo's right to
Atty. Faustino did he claim his right against the file such action, because it is not transmissible
estate of Bibiano. Also, the statement of to the natural child's heirs; the right is purely a
personal circumstances and autobiography personal one to the natural child, and such
were made at a time after Raymundo aired his action for the acknowledgment of a natural
grievances over Bibianos heirs treatment to child can only be exercised by him
FACTS:
On October 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos
brought an action for compulsory recognition
against Bienvenido Rodriguez. Agbulos brought
her mother as first witness. She identified the
plaintiffs father, but the opposing counsel
objected, on the basisof Art. 280 CC16.
The trial court sustained it but CA, which is
of the opinion that the testimony may be
allowed, reversed the order. Rodriguez filed a
petition for certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the mothers testimony identifying
the putative father of Agbulos may be accepted.
HELD:
Yes. By tracing the counterpart provisions
from the Spanish Civil Code, New Civil Code and
the Family Code, the Court concluded that Art.
280 referred to voluntary recognition and not to
be applied for compulsory recognition.
The Court noted that the respondent relied
on Art. 283 CC and Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court17 to defend the
admissibility of her mothers testimony. Article
172 FC has adopted Art. 283 CC, particularly
paragraph 4, where filiation may be proven by
any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
Furthermore, the Court also noted that Art.
280 CC was not just repealed; it no longer has a
counterpart prohibition in the Family Code,
which undoubtedly discloses the intention of
the legislative authority to uphold the Code
Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate
children.
16
When the father or the mother makes the
recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal he
name of the person with whom he or she had the
child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance
whereby the other party may be identified.
17
Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
22
Art. 172 FC. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
PETITIONERS: Jose E. Aruego, Jr., Simeona San Juan Aruego, Ma. Immaculada T. Alanon, Roberto A.
Torres, Cristina A. Torres, Justo Jose Torres and Agustin Torres
RESPONDENTS: The Hon. Court of Appeals, 13th Division and Antonia Aruego
(3) No. To rule as such would be premature, therefore that the resolution of the issue of
because respondents have yet to present prescription depends on the type of evidence to
evidence. Illegitimate children who were still be adduced by private respondents in proving
minors at the time the Family Code took effect their filiation. While the original action filed by
and whose putative parent died during their private respondents was a petition for letters of
minority are given the right to seek recognition administration, the trial court is not precluded
for a period of up to four years from attaining from receiving evidence on private
majority age. Under the Family Code, when respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to
filiation of an illegitimate child is established by matters incidental and collateral to the exercise
a record of birth appearing in the civil register of its recognized powers in handling the
or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation settlement of the estate, including the
in a public document or a private handwritten determination of the status of each heir. That
instrument signed by the parent concerned, the the two causes of action, one to compel
action for recognition may be brought by the recognition and the other to claim inheritance,
child during his or her lifetime. However, if the may be joined in one complaint is not new in
action is based upon open and continuous our jurisprudence.
possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the rules or Petition denied. Case remanded for reception
special laws, it may only be brought during the of evidence.
lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear
FACTS: ISSUES:
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her 1) WON CA erred in not declaring Joanne as
mother and guardian, Jinky Diaz, filed a the legitimate child of Hasegawa and Jinky
complaint for compulsory recognition with 2) WON DNA Analysis is still feasible
prayer for support pending litigation against notwithstanding the death of Rogelio
Rogelio Ong before RTC of Tarlac.
Jinky, who was married to a Hasegawa HELD:
Katsuo Feb 1993, cohabited and lived together 1) Though there is a reasonable presumption
with Rogelio from Jan 1994- Sept 1998 in favor of legitimacy for a child born in a
She alleges that from this relationship, marriage, this is not conclusive. This can be
Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25 1998 overthrown by evidence like:
Rogelio paid for all the hospital and - impossibility for the parents to conceive the
baptismal expenses. However, in September child on said date
1998, Rogelio abandoned Joanne and Jinky - impotence of the husband
RTC ruled in favor of Jinky and Joanne, - record of birth appearing in the civil
recognizing the latter as an illegitimate child registrar admission of legitimate filiation in
since Hasegawa only went home once a year, a public document or a private handwritten
thus making it impossible to be the father instrument signed by parent concerned etc
Rogelio appealed to the CA. During 2) New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
pendency of the case though, he died. conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio
CA ruled in the reverse and ordered that or upon application of any person who has
the case be remanded to trial courts for DNA a legal interest in the matter of ligitation
Testing. Petitioner, estate of Rogelio Ong,
challenges this decision alleging that: Sec 4 provides that DNA testing can push
1) Joanne is the legitimate heir of Jinky and through if a biological sample exists
Japanese man - Even if Rogelio already died, any of
2) That DNA testing would be not advisable biological samples (saliva, tissues, hairs, and
since Rogelio's already dead bones) can be used for DNA Testing. (Any
physical residue of the long dead parent can be
resorted to)
CA ruling affirmed
filiation but the parents themselves? But the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs
suppose the child claiming the illegitimate child filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or
of a certain person is not really the child of the she is already dead.
latter? The putative parent should thus be given
The crime of rape committed by the accused a girl who was raped.
carries with it, among others, the obligations to
acknowledge the offspring if the character of its HELD:
origin does not prevent it and to support the The record shows that it was possible for
same. the defendant to have raped the girl. The
testimony of the jailer could not be conclusive
FACTS: because his task was merely to oversee the
Margie Pagaygay, a mental retardate, was records and not check the physical presence of
raped three times by defendant the defendant in jail.
Namayan. On the allegation that victim betrayed the
Her mother noticed that her stomach was normal behavior of a girl that was sexually
bulging and upon medical examination, she was threatened, the court reminds us that she was a
found to be four to five months pregnant. mental retardate and had no will to resist his
Namayan was convicted for rape, but advances.
appealed his decision saying that it was There is no doubt that defendant is the
impossible for him to have intercourse since he father of the child, the acts of sexual
was jailed during the time of the alleged rapes intercourse having occurred one month before
and that victim's testimony betrays behavior of the start of conception.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC committed a reversible error
when it allowed the deletion of the date and
place of marriage, but failed to order the
change of the minors surname from Abadilla
to Celestino.
RULING:
YES. The OSG, which brought the petition
up for certiorari, was correct in saying that such
change should have been made, considering
that the minors parents are still not married,
23
ergo Emerson and Rafael are illegitimate Article 176, FC. Illegitimate children shall use the
children. surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the
legitime of a legitimate child.
KEYWORDS: Legal support; woman and child - Although the issuance of a protection order
abuse; temporary protection against the respondent in the case can include
the grant of legal support for the wife and the
FACTS: child, this assumes that both are entitled to a
- Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer protection order and to legal support.
for the issuance of a temporary protection - Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had
order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera for been abusing her and her child. But it became
alleged woman and child abuse under Republic apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was
Act (R.A.) 9262. not the case since, contrary to her claim,
- In her complaint, she added a handwritten neither she nor her child ever lived with
prayer for financial support from Vallecera for Vallecera. She just wanted to get support from
their supposed child. She used the child's him in filing the case.
Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as - To be entitled to legal support, petitioner
the child's father. must, in proper action, first establish the
- Vallecera opposed, and claims that her filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted
petition was essentially one for financial or acknowledged.
support rather than for protection against - Since Dolina's demand for support for her son
woman and child abuses and that he was not is based on her claim that he is Vallecera's
the child's father given that the signature in the illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to
Certificate of Live Birth was not his. such support if he had not acknowledged him,
- RTC dismissed petition. She filed for a motion until Dolina shall have proved his relation to
for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this him. The child's remedy is to file through her
case. mother a judicial action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond
ISSUE: question, support follows as matter of
WON RTC correctly dismissed Dolina's action for obligation. In short, illegitimate children are
temporary protection and denied her entitled to support and successional rights but
application for temporary support for her child their filiation must be duly proved.
- What she could have done is to file for the
RULING: benefit of her child an action against Vallecera
Petition is denied. for compulsory recognition in order to establish
filiation and then demand support.
RATIO: Alternatively, she may directly file an action for
- Yes. She filed the wrong action to obtain support, where the issue of compulsory
support. RA 9262 is for protection women and recognition may be integrated and resolved.
children from from abuse.
KEYWORDS: Parents petition for child to drop could then decide whether he will change his
middle name because of plan to stay in name by dropping his middle name.
Singapore - Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision but this was denied in a resolution
FACTS: explaining that the Singaporean practice of not
- Julian Lin Carulusan Wang was born in Cebu carrying a middle name does not justify the
City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa dropping of the middle name of a legitimate
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not Filipino child who intends to study there (i.e.
yet married to each other. When his parents dropping of the middle name would be
subsequently got married on September 22, tantamount to giving due recognition to or
1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of application of the laws of Singapore
their son so that the childs name was changed instead of Philippine law which is controlling).
from Julian Lin Carulusan to Julian Lin Carulusan The court said that change of name which
Wang. would not prejudice public interest or would
- Parents plan to stay in Singapore for a not be for a fraudulent purpose would not
long time to let Julian study there together suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the
with his sister, Wang Mei Jasmine (born in change of name is itself not reasonable.
Singapore) - Petitioner then filed this petition.
In Singapore, middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in ISSUE:
a persons name. WON dropping the middle name of a minor
They anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang child is contrary to Art. 174 of the FC
will be discriminated because of his
current registered name which carries a middle RULING:
name. Petition denied.
- The RTC rendered a decision denying the
petition for they found that the reason given for RATIO:
the change of name did not fall within the - Yes. Middle names serve to identify the
grounds recognized by law. They found that the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well
change sought is merely for the convenience as further distinguish him from others who may
of the child, however they said that names have the same given name and surname as he
cannot be changed to suit the convenience of has.
the bearers. The court further reasoned that - The only reason for dropping his middle
legitimate children have the right to bear the name is convenience. How such change of
surnames of the father and the mother, (Art. name would make his integration into
174 of the FC) and there is no reason why this Singaporean society easier and convenient is
right should now be taken from Julian (a minor). not clearly established.
When Julian reaches the age of majority, he
KEYWORDS: Sister na, mother pa! the courts in different jurisdictions regarding
the matter of adoption of relatives, thus it
FACTS: cannot be stated as a general proposition that
- Atty. Luis Santos, Jr. and Edipola Villa Santos the adoption of a blood relative is contrary to
would like to adopt the 4-yr old Edwin Villa y the policy of the law.
Mendoza. - Art. 335 CC enumerates those persons who
- Edipola and Edwin are siblings. (Edipola is may not adopt, and it has been shown that
already 32 yrs. old, anlayo nung age gap!) petitioners herein are not among those
- Edwin, being a sickly child since birth, was prohibited from adopting. Art 339 CC names
entrusted by his parents to the petitioners. those who cannot be adopted, and the minor
- His parents testified that they have voluntarily child whose adoption is under consideration, is
given their consent to the adoption of their son. not one of those excluded by the law.
- The Trial Court dismissed the petition and - Art. 338, on the other hand, allows the
their motion for reconsideration upon the adoption of a natural child by the natural father
reasoning that there will be an incongruous or mother, of other illegitimate children by their
situation where Edwin, who is her legitimate father or mother, and of a step-child by the
brother, will also be her son. step-father or stepmother. This last article
removes all doubts that adoption is not
ISSUE: prohibited even in these cases where there
WON an elder sister may adopt a younger already exist a relationship of parent and child
brother between them by nature.
- Regarding the dual relationship, it should be
RULING: noted that relationship established by the
The decision appealed from is set aside, and the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and
petition for the adoption of the subject minor, does not extend to their other relatives, except
granted. as expressly provided by law.
- Lastly, we do not have any provision in the law
RATIO: that expressly prohibits adoption among
- Yes. A study of American precedents would relatives, thus they ought not to be prevented.
reveal that there is a variance in the decisions of
KEYWORDS: American couple adopting brother married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
of naturalized US citizen (wife) jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
FACTS: - Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt
- Respondent spouses Clouse sought to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the
the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision.
brother of respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. - In the first place, he is not a former Filipino
- Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the citizen but a natural born citizen of the United
United States of America. On August 19, 1988, States of America. In the second place, Solomon
Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
United States of America in Guam. consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
- His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise spouse.
consented to the adoption due to poverty and - When private respondents spouses Clouse
inability to support and educate her son. jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon
- Lower court granted the adoption. Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private
- Solgen contended that lower court erred respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
because BECAUSE THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship
QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW. when she was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1988.
ISSUE: - Though it may appear that Evelyn may appear
WON Solomon can be adopted by the Spouses to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article
Clouse 184 of E.O. 209, since she was a former Filipino
citizen who sought to adopt her younger
RULING: brother, unfortunately, the petition for
Petition granted. adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
without violating Art. 185. which mandates a
RATIO: joint adoption by the husband and wife.
- No. Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Art. 185 FC: Husband and wife must jointly
Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When
persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: one spouse seeks to adopt his own
(3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks
who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child - Alvin is neither of the above.
of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is
KEYWORDS: Mother wanted to singly adopt - It is true that upon the age of emancipation,
their unofficially adopted children who are parental authority over the person and
already adults property of the child terminates. However, this
is only one of the effects of adoption.
FACTS: - The following are the effects of adoption:
- Monina and Primo Lim were a childless couple. Sever ties between biological parents
- Michelle and Michael were entrusted to them except when the spouses of adopter is
by Lucia Ayuban in 1977 and 1983. They were the biological parent
so eager to have children so they made it Legitimate child of the adopter (surname,
appear that they were their real parents. They support and succession)
raised them as their own, sent the kids in Endow them reciprocal rights and
exclusive schools, and were given the surname, obligations from the relationship of
Lim. parent and child (not limited to)
- Primo died in 1998 and Monina married Angel Choose the name of the child
Olario, an American citizen in 2000. Right to be the legal and compulsory heirs
- On 2002, Monina filed separate petitions for of each other
the adoption of Michelle and Michael, who - The law is clear. According to Sec. 7 Art. 3 of
were 25 (already married) and 18 years old RA 8552, the husband and wife shall jointly
respectively. Michelle, her husband, Michael, adopt except in certain cases.
and Olario all gave their consent to the - Monina is not adopting the legitimate children
adoption. of Olario. The children were not her illegitimate
- DSWD issued a certification stating that children. Nor were the spouses separated from
Michelle and Michael were abandoned each other. The use of the word shall means
children whose natural parents whereabouts that the provision is mandatory and that the
are unknown. However, RTC still denied the couple must jointly adopt.
petition. - Furthermore, Olario, an American citizen, has
additional requirements aside from his affidavit
ISSUE: of consent. These cannot be waived by Sec. 7
WON the petitioner, who has remarried, can because the children are not relatives within
singly adopt? the fourth civil degree nor the legitimate child
of the petitioner. He must show that:
RULING: His country has diplomatic relations with
Petition denied. RTC affirmed. the Philippines
He has been living in the Philippines for
RATIO: at least three continuous years prior
NO. Parental authority is only one of the effects to the filing of petition for adoption
of adoption. Husband and wife must adopt He must maintain residency until the
jointly except for instances allowed by law. adoption decree is entered
- Petitioner is contending that she can file for He has legal capacity in his country
adoption singly because parental authority is no Adoptee is allowed to enter in his country
longer required in this case since Michelle is as the latters adopted children
already married and Michael has attained the
age of majority.
KEYWORDS: The will in the safety deposit box; box but there was no will or any document
when secondary evidence of adoption admitted resembling a will therein.
- November 6, 1974: The safety deposit box was
FACTS: opened, at which time it was found to be
- January 13, 1974: Dr. Lazatin died intestate. empty, because prior Nora had already
He was survived by his wife, Margarita, and his removed all of its contents.
adopted twin daughters, Nora (de Leon) and - November 22, 1974: Seven months after the
Irma (Veloso). death of Margarita, Renato intervened for the
- February 1974: Margarita commenced an first time in the proceedings to settle the estate
intestate proceeding. [Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio of Dr. Lazatin as an admitted illegitimate (not
and Yvonne intervened claiming to be admitted natural) child. On this day, Ramon also filed a
illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin. petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita
One Lily also intervened claiming to be another to examine private respondents on the contents
admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.] of the safety deposit box
- April 11, 1974: Margarita also died, leaving a - August 20, 1975: Renato filed a motion to
written will, providing for: a legacy of cash, intervene in the estate of Margarita as an
jewelry, and stocks to Arlene de Leon, a adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit
granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Dr.
Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of Lazatin, stating that the petitioner was an
education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later
Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. adopted by him. This affidavit was modified to
- During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a state that petitioner was adopted by both of
safety deposit box at the People's Bank and the spouses.
Trust Company that only she and Nora could - Respondent court heard Renatos motion to
open. intervene as an adopted son in the estate of
- April (16), 1974: Nora, accompanied by her Margarita. During the hearings, he was not able
husband, Bernardo, opened the safety deposit to present any decree of adoption in his favor.
box and removed its contents: (a) shares of He instead resorted to prove his adoption by
stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her stating the following evidence: 1) he recognized
sister, Irma; and (c) jewelry belonging to her the deceased spouses as his parents and he had
and to her mother. Her sole reason for opening been supported by them until their death; 2) he
the box was to get her stock certificates and was formerly known he was known as "Renato
other small items deposited therein. When she Lazatin" but was compelled to change his
was to close the deposit box, the bank surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased
personnel informed her that she needed an spouses refused to give consent to his marriage
authority from the court to do so, in view of her to his present wife; 3) he and his wife used to
mother's death and so, she removed everything stay at the residence of the father of Margarita,
from the box. but a few months later, they transferred to
- June 3, 1974: Private respondents filed a another property owned by the deceased
petition to probate the will of the late spouses, where they continuously resided up to
Margarita, the present; 4) photographs of Irma where she
Days after having learned that Nora had opened addressed herself as his sister, of deceased
the safety deposit box: Ramon, son of Renato, Margarita and him when he was a boy; and 5)
filed a motion claiming that the deceased had document showing that his real name is
executed a will subsequent to that submitted "Renato Lazatin
for probate and demanding its production. He - November 14, 1975: Respondent court
likewise prayed for the opening of the safety discontinued the hearing when Renato could
deposit box. Nora admitted that she opened the not present evidence on the issue of his alleged
legal adoption.
- March 4, 1976: Respondent court barred the legal basis for a presumption of adoption in
introduction of petitioner's evidence since they favor of petitioner. This is because there was no
would not prove or tend to prove the fact of proof that petitioner was really adopted in
their adoption but rather of a recognized Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in
natural child. the Court of first Instance of Manila by the
- March 16, 1976: Renato then filed, in both deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a
cases, a motion to declare as established the judgment of approval was rendered by said
fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora's court.
refusal to comply with the orders of respondent - Moreover, if there was really such adoption,
court to deposit the items she had removed petitioner could have conveniently secured a
from the safety deposit box of Margarita. copy of the newspaper publication of the
Private respondents opposed the motion. adoption as required by law.
- March 26, 1976: Respondent court denied - The absence of proof of such order of
Renato's motion. adoption by the court cannot be substituted by
- June 3,1976: Respondent court, ruling on the claim that the child has lived with a person,
petitioners motion for reconsideration, not his parent, and has been treated as a child
declared that Renato has failed to establish his to establish such adoption. The attempts of
status as an adopted child. Renato to prove his adoption by acts and
- Hence, the petition at bar. declarations of the deceased do not discharge
the mandatory presentation of the judicial
ISSUE: decree of adoption. However, declarations in
WON Renato was an adopted child (Upon the regard to pedigree are admissible evidence, but,
determination of this issue, it can also be in proving adoption, there is a better proof
determined if he can intervene in the petitions- available that can be produced.
NO) - Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible
where the records of adoption proceedings
RULING: were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the
Petition dismissed. introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence
RATIO: of the instrument.
- The Supreme Court finds the ruling of the - Renato failed to establish the former existence
respondent court to be in conformity with law of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss
and jurisprudence. Renato was not able to or destruction. His supposed adoption was only
establish his status as an adopted child. testified to by him and is allegedly to be
- The evidence presented by Renato does not testified to a brother of the deceased and
lead the Court to any link to the existence of a others who have witnessed that the deceased
court degree of his judicial adoption. Petitioner spouses treated petitioner as their child.
merely proceeds from an assumption that he - Assuming the mere fact that the deceased
was judicially adopted between the years 1928 spouses treated petitioner as their child does
and 1932. No judicial records of such adoption not justify the conclusion that petitioner had
or copies thereof decreed by a competent court been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses
are presented or attempted to be presented. nor does it constitute admissible proof of
- Furthermore, no witnesses were cited to that adoption.
adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree. - As a necessary consequence, Renato cannot
Even though Renato secured a certification intervene in the settlement of the estate of
from the CFI of Manila which reported that Margarita as an adopted child because of lack
their records have been burned and that the of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an
record of Renatos adoption was not one of the estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has
salvaged documents, it does not furnish any an interest in the estate, either as one who
would be benefited as an heir or one who has a evidence by which such adoption may be
claim against the estate like a creditor. established.
- Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible
Notes: where the records of adoption proceedings
- Nature of adoption proceedings: The fact of were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the
adoption is never presumed, but must be introduction of such secondary evidence, the
affirmatively proved by the person claiming its proponent must establish the former existence
existence. Where, under the provisions of the of the instrument.
statute, an adoption is effected by a court
order, the records of such court constitute the
KEYWORDS: Adoption collaterally attacked in parents and that such was a jurisdictional
settlement proceedings of adoptive moms defect open to collateral attack.
estate - Meanwhile, Petitioners-Santos filed a
preliminary injunction against the Respondents
FACTS: to keep them from intervening in the
- Spouses Santos filed a petition in 1949 for the settlement proceedings, alleging in their
adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos petition for review with the SC that
(Petitioners), aged 17 and 8 yrs old respectively. Respondents (and two other strangers also
- Guardian appointed by the Court gave her claiming to be first cousins of deceased-wife-
written consent to the petition, as did Paulina, Santos) had been receiving 7k each from the
who was above 14 yrs old. probate court.
- Spouses Santos stated in their petition that - SC modified preliminary injunction to enjoin
Paulina and Aurora had lived with them since probate court from hearing the settlement
they were 3 months old and 15 days old, case, or from disbursing any more from the
respectively, and although efforts had estate, disallowing respondents from receiving
been made to find their natural parents, the any funds from intestate estate.
natural parents could not be located.
- After due publication of the petition in the ISSUE:
National Weekly, a newspaper of general 1. WON the adoption decree of the spouses-
circulation, once a week for three consecutive Santos could be collaterally assailed in the
weeks, the case was set for trial and the settlement proceedings
Adoption Court granted the petition of spouses 2. WON the judgment of adoption in this case
Santos in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud
of Court in the Philippines, and Paulina and 3. WON the marriage between the spouses-
Aurora were children of the spouses Santos for Santos, if void, affects the rights of the
all legal intents and purposes from Aug. 1949. adoptees
- Eight years later, wife-Santos passed away
intestate. Husband-Santos filed a petition with RULING:
the Court of First Instance Mnaila for Motion denied. CA erred in reviewing under
settlement of intestate estate, stating wife- collateral attack the determination of the
Santos surviving heirs to be himself and adoption court that parents of adoptees had
Paulina and Aurora, 27 and 17 yrs old abandoned them
respectively. He also asked to be appointed
administratior of the estate. RATIO:
- Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura 1. No. The validity of an adoption may NOT be
(Respondents) filed opposition to the petition assailed collaterally in proceedings for intestate
for appointment of administrator, both claiming succession.
to be first cousins of deceased-wife-Santos; - The CA contends that it can be collaterally
Gregoria alleged the marriage between the attacked because the adoption proceedings did
spouses-Santos was bigamous and void, and not properly dispense with the consent of the
that adoption of Paulina and Aurora were natural parents. Relying on American
likewise void for want of written consent of jurisprudence wherein parental consent is a
their natural parents, who were alive and had jurisdictional requisite, the doption decree is
not abandoned them. Demetria added that she void because the adoption court failed to
is the mother of the child Paulina. express that abandonment by adoptees
- CFI: validity of the adoption could not be natural parents had occurred.
assailed collaterally in intestate proceedings. - However, under our law: if the natural parents
- CA: reversed CFI ruling; said adoption was void had abandoned the children, consent to
due to absence of consent of childrens natural adoption by the court-appointed guardian
consent to the adoption proceedings is not Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the
needed and not the one being required by law. guardian of said infant.
- Meanwhile, there clearly appears only one - Hence, the consent given by her to the
person who could be considered as the adoption proceedings is sufficient for the same
guardian exercising patria potestas over such to be deemed in compliance with the Civil Code
abandoned child, since there was no guardian and Rules of Court provisions on consent to
ad litem appointed by the court and the child is adoption. This decision is in greater consonance
not in the custody of an orphan asylum, with just and humane considerations than the
children's home or any benevolent society. This CFIs harsh and cruel interpretation of the law.
person is no other than Atty. Corazon de Leon
KEYWORDS: Aunt wants to adopt minor petitioners children in Guam, and also failure
children of her deceased brother allegedly to establish petitioners position to support the
abandoned by their mom children. CA reversed TCs ruling. Diwata filed
the instant petition for review on certiorari.
FACTS:
- Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen residing
in Guam, filed a petition for the adoption of her ISSUE:
deceased brothers minor children, Elaine, Elma 1. WON the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
and Eugene (all Dizon Ramos). minors without the written consent of their
- When their father Manuel died in 1990, the biological mother, Amelia Ramos
minors were left under the care of their 2. WON the affidavit of consent purportedly
paternal grandmother while their mother, executed by the petitioner-adopters children
Amelia, went to work in Italy where she sufficiently complies with the law
eventually resided with her live-in partner and 3. WON petitioner is financially capable of
their son. supporting the adoptees
- It was alleged that the mother rarely
communicates with the children and only sends RULING:
minimal financial support. It was Diwata, her Petition denied.
children and other relatives abroad who
financially supported the siblings. Upon the RATIO:
grandmothers death, Diwata decided to adopt 1. No. Written consent of the biological parents
the children and bring them to Guam to live or legal guardian is indispensable for the validity
with her. of a decree of adoption under Section 9 of
- After filing, the trial court ordered the DSWD Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act
to conduct a case study and submit a report of 1998).
before the initial hearing. - The general requirement of consent and
- The minors have given their written consent to notice to the natural parents is intended to
the petition, as affirmed by the eldest minor protect the natural parental relationship from
Elaine. Diwata testified on her behalf, stating unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
that she is a qualified adopter since shes a 57 insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
years old widow, lives alone in her own home interests of the child in the manner of the
and is gainfully employed as a part-time proposed adoption.
restaurant server earning $5.15 per hour and - Though petitioner argues that the written
$1,000 per month in tips. She likewise consent of the biological mother is no longer
presented as evidence the Affidavit of Consent necessary because the biological mother has
executed by her children and notarized in abandoned the children, it is necessary to
Guam. establish that abandonment existed at the time
- Elizabeth Pagbilao, a Social Welfare Officer of adoption.
from DSWD, submitted the report to court, - In this case, it was proven that there was no
recommending the minors adoption by Diwata complete abandonment as children still
as the children are considered abandoned by communicates with the mother, though rare it
their biological mother, who she happened to may be, and Elaine even mentioned that she
personally interview during a chance vacation in consults serious personal problems with Amelia.
the Philippines and who gave her voluntary Amelia also sends minimal financial support to
consent (but not written) to the petition. them.
- Court also stated that if Amelia has indeed
- The trial court granted the petition, ruling in abandoned the siblings, petitioner should have
favor of the adoption. But the OSG appealed to obtained the consent instead from the legal
the decision, citing lack of written consent from guardian, the childrens uncle (fathers cousin).
the childrens biological mother, as well as the
2. No. The joint affidavit of consent by the of rearing the three children in the US. She only
petitioners children notarized in Guam should has a part-time job, her home in Guam is still
have been authenticated or acknowledged being amortized and she is rather of age.
before a Philippine consular office in order to - Petitioner is not stable enough to support the
be acknowledged as duly notarized document in children and is only relying on the financial
our country in compliance to the Rules of Court, backing, support and commitment of her
Section 2 of Act No. 2103. children and her siblings.
- No further proof was introduced by petitioner - The ability to support the adoptees is personal
to authenticate the written consent of her to the adopter (should not come from her
legitimate children, thus it is inadmissible as children and relatives), as adoption only creates
evidence. a legal relation between the former and the
latter.
3. No. It is doubtful whether petitioner will be
able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect
KEYWORDS: Status of natural and adoptive ground that Doribel had already been born, but
children challenged by aunts and uncles in in the same breath they also question Doribels
estate proceeding legitimacy.
- Also, the timeliness of the challenge to the
FACTS: decree of adoption is questionable. They should
- When their parents died, Delia, Edmundo and have brought this with the court even before
Doribel were left with the properties of their the adoption was decreed.
parents which the latter inherited from the - The validity of adoption cannot be challenged
grandparents. collaterally. It should be challenged in a direct
- Their fathers siblings (Aunts and Uncles) filed proceeding.
a complaint for partition and accounting of
the intestate estate. 2. Yes. Doribel is a legitimate child.
- The children resisted the action and filed their - The birth certificate is a formidable piece of
own defense alleging that Delia and Edmundo evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
were adopted children and Doribel was the recognition under Art. 265 CC and Art. 172
legitimate daughter. As such, they were FC.
entitled to inherit their fathers share of his - Although it is only prima facie evidence of
estate by right of representation. filiation and may be refuted by contrary
- The aunts and uncles contend that Delia and evidence, no such evidence was presented in
Edmundo were not legally adopted because the case.
Doribel had already been born when the decree - Doribels legitimacy also could not be
of adoption was issued. Under Art. 335 CC, challenged collaterally.
those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural 3. Yes. Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are
children by legal fiction were ineligible to therefore the exclusive heirs to the intestate
adopt. estate of their parents, conformably with Art.
- They also contend, however, that Doribel is 979 CC, which states: Legitimate Children and
not the legitimate daughter but was in fact born their descendants succeed the parents and
to another woman who manifested in a petition other ascendants, without distinction as to sex
for guardianship of the child that she was her or age, and even if they should come from
natural mother. different marriages.
- An adopted child succeeds to the property of
ISSUE: the adopting parents in the same manner as a
1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally legitimate child.
adopted - The philosophy underlying this article is that a
2. WON Doribel is the legitimate daughter persons love descends first to his children and
3. WON Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are heirs of grandchildren before it ascends to his parents
the intestate estate of their parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral
4. WON they have a right of representation relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave
RULING: them eventually to his children as a token of his
Petition (by the aunts and uncles) denied. CA love for them and as a provision for their
decision affirmed. continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
RATIO:
1. Yes. Delia and Edmundo are legally adopted. 4. Yes but only Doribel, not Delia or Edmundo,
has the right of representation.
- The position of the aunts and uncles is - Art. 970: Representation is a right created by
inconsistent because they question the legality fiction of law, by virtue of which the
of Delias and Edmundos adoption on the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires survive, the former shall inherit in their own
the rights which the latter would have if he were right, and the latter by right of representation.
living or if he could have inherited. - Delia and Edmundo do not have the right of
- Art. 971: The representative is called to the representation because the grandparents are
succession by the law and not by the person considered strangers to the adopted child. The
represented. The representative does not relationship created by adoption exists only
succeed the person represented but the one between the adopting parents and the adopted
who the person represented would have child. Thus, while the adopted children have the
succeeded. right to succeed their parents, they do not have
- Art. 981: Should children of the deceased and the right of representation.
descendants of other children who are dead,
KEYWORDS: Adoptive mother wants to give The order of the court below prescribing the use
adoptee surname of husband who did not of the surname Valdes by the adopted minor is
adopt her affirmed.
FACTS: RATIO:
- Petitioner (Isabel Valdes Johnston) filed a - No. Art. 341 (CC) provides that the adoption
petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel shall: 1) Give to the adopted person the same
Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana (2 yrs rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child
and 10 mos old) of the adopter; 2) Dissolve the authority vested
- Both couples are Filipino, childless and SHE in the parents by nature; 3) Make the adopted
already got the consent of the Mother Superior person a legal heir of the adopter; and 4) Entitle
of the orphanage (where the child stays) and the the adopted person to use the adopter's
husband. surname.
- Petitioner contends that she used her married - Par. 4 refers to the adopters own surname,
surname in filing the petition, and that this is the which is her maiden name, and not her married
surname she has been using after getting surname; She entered the adoption not as a
married and is known by it in the community and married woman.
by her friends/relatives. - Adoption created a personal relationship
between the adopter and the adopted, and the
ISSUE: consent of the husband to the adoption did not
have the effect of making him an adopted
WON adoptee can use the surname of the
father.
father, who did not adopt her
- To allow the minor to adopt the surname of
the husband of the adopter, would mislead the
RULING: public into believing that she had also been
adopted by the husband, which is not the case.
KEYWORDS: Adoptee of Chinese couple wants the object of adoption proceedings. A change of
to use Filipino surname to get rid of social name does not define or effect a change in
stigma in Muslim community ones existing family relations or in the rights
and duties flowing therefrom. Neither does it
FACTS: alter ones legal capacity, civil status or
- Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo citizenship.
Alcala Sr. and Segundina Alcala. - The change of name is justifiable because of
- When he was two and a half years old and the embarrassment and ridicule his family name
then known as Maximo Alcala Jr. and his sister "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives
Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and
were, with the consent of their natural parents living in a Muslim community. Another
and order of the court, adopted by spouses justifiable cause is his desire to improve his
Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both social and business life.
naturalized Filipinos. They decided to adopt the - In granting and denying petitions for change of
children as they remained childless after fifteen name, the question of proper and reasonable
years if marriage. cause is left to the sound discretion of the
- Upon reaching the age twenty-two, herein court. The evidence presented need only be
private respondent, filed a petition to change satisfactory to the court and not all best
his name to Maximo Alcala Jr. It was averred evidence available.
that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed - Among the grounds for change of name which
and isolated him from his relatives and friends, have been held valid are: a. when the name is
as the name suggest a Chinese ancestry when in ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult
truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing to write or pronounce; b. when the change
in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase results as legal consequence, as in legitimation;
any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; c. when change will avoid confusion; d. having
that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese continuously used and been known since
surname, thus hampering his business and childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of alien
social life; and that his adoptive mother does parentage; e. sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
not oppose his desire to revert to his former name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
surname. good faith and without prejudicing anybody; f.
when the surname causes embarrassment and
ISSUE: there is no showing that the desired change of
WON the reasons given by private respondent name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
in his petition for change of name are valid, change of name would prejudice public interest.
sufficient, and proper to warrant the granting of - Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its
said petition primordial purpose which is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and
RULING: provide his best interest.
The reasons given in his petition for change of - Concordantly, the Court held that a change of
name are valid, sufficient, and proper to name does not define or effect a change in
warrant the granting of said petition. one's existing family relations or in the rights
and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter
RATIO: one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship;
- Yes. The change of the surname of the what is altered is only the name.
adopted child is more an incident rather than
KEYWORDS: Clerical error in name: Michael to 2. WON action for correction of entries in the
Midael civil registry may be done in the same action
for adoption
FACTS:
- Caranto couple filed for adoption of Midael RULING:
C. Mazon, fifteen years old, who had been Decision modified, deleting the correction of
living with Jaime Caranto since he was seven the name Midael to Michael.
years old, even when the couple got married.
They prayed that judgment be rendered: a. RATIO:
declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the 1. Yes. Correction involves merely a clerical
child of petitioner for all intents and errorthe substation of the letters ch for the
purposes; b. dissolving the authority vested letter d. Changing the name of the child from
in the natural parents of the child; and c. that
Midael Mazon to Michael Mazon cannot
the surname of the child be legally changed
possibly cause any confusion because both
to that of the petitioners and that the first
names can be read and pronounced with the
name which was mistakenly registered as
same rhyme and tone.
MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL.
- Sol Gen opposed the petition insofar as the - The purpose of the publication requirement is
correction of the name involved. He argued to give notice so that those who have any
that it could not be granted because the objection to the adoption can make their
petition was basically for adoption. objection known.
- RTC dismissed Sol Gens opposition, on the
ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court 2. No. Since the case falls under Rule 108 (o.
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the change of name, in Sec 2. Entries subject to
Civil Registry) applies only to the correction cancellation or correction), Sec. 3 of said rule
of entries concerning the civil status of requires the local civil registrar to be
persons. The RTC further stated that the impleaded in the proceeding. He is an
error could be corrected in the same indispensable party, without whom no final
proceeding for adoption to prevent
determination of the case can be had.
multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to
- Nor was notice of the petition for correction
the petitioners. CA affirmed.
of entry published as required by Sec. 4 of the
ISSUE: same rule. The notice given by publication in
1. WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over this case was only for adoption (Rule 99, $4).
respondents petition for adoption because - Nothing was mentioned that in addition the
publication did not state the true name of the correction of his name in the civil registry was
minor child also being sought. Thus, decision of the RTC
with regard to the correction of the name is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
KEYWORDS: Adoptive parents want to change - An adoption decree does not entitle the
first name of adoptee adoptee to a change of first name, but only to a
change of surname. Change of first name can be
FACTS: achieved only through a Rule 103 proceeding.
- Van and Regina Munson filed a petition to - According to Art. 189 of the Family Code:
adopt minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. At For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed
the time of the filing, Kevin had been in the to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
Munsons care for almost a year. shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
- In the same petition, they prayed for the obligations arising from the relationship of
change of Kevins name to Aaron Josephthe parent and child, including the right of the
name he was baptized with, and the name his adopted to use the surname of the adopters.
adoptive family, relatives and friends had - The change of surname was deemed a natural
called him by since his arrival in the Munsons consequence of an adoption. In contrast, the
home. creation of the adoptive relationship does not
- The petitioner opposed the inclusion of the give the adopter license to change the adoptees
change of name in the petition for adoption, registered first name. Such a change is beyond
arguing that change of name should be a the scope of an adoption proceeding.
separate proceeding from adoption, - The change of first name may only be done by
according to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. strictly complying with Rule 103 of the Rules of
- The trial court found that the Munson Court. It is an independent and separate
couple was fit to adopt Kevin. It also held that proceeding whose result cannot be granted
Kevins name could be changed to Aaron through any other proceeding.
Joseph, saying: The first name sought to be - Further, the adoption and the change of name
changed belongs to an infant over a year old. are not actions that warrant a joinder.
Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor A joinder of causes of action is the union of two
engaged in any contractual obligations. or more civil causes of action in the same
Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf be complaint, declaration or petition, even if each
deemed to have any immoral, criminal or of them could be made the basis of a separate
illicit purpose for seeking said change of suit. Joinder is usually left to the discretion of a
name. There is no way that the state or any litigant party, though there are certain
person may be so prejudiced by the action for requisites: a. It will not violate the rules on
change of Kevin Earls first name. jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and b.
- Thus, petitioner appealed by certiorari. The causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between the
ISSUE: parties, or are for demands for money, or are of
WON an adoption decree entitles the the same nature and character.
adopted to a change of first name
- The Court held that there is no relation
RULING: between the petition for adoption and the
No. The Court modified the order of Judge petition for a change of name. They are not of
Hernandez, affirming the adoption of Kevin the same nature and character, and do not
and giving him the surname Munson, but present any common question of fact or law.
maintaining his given name, so that he is Thus, they do not warrant a joinder.
known as Kevin Earl Andrade Munson. - Also, there is no legal ground for the change of
name. The grounds for change of name
RATIO: recognized by jurisprudence are the following: a.
The name is ridiculous, dishonorable or - The Court held that Kevins baptism under the
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; b. The new name or the continuous use of it by him, his
change results as a legal consequence of family and their friends do not constitute proper
legitimation or adoption; c. The change will and reasonable ground for a legal change of
avoid confusion; d. One has continuously used name. When a name given in church records or
and been known since childhood by a Filipino by which one is known by the community is
name and was unaware of alien parentage; e. different from that in the civil register, it is
The change is based on a sincere desire to adopt unofficial and cannot be recognized as ones real
a Filipino name to erase signs of former name.
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice - Lastly, the change of name without proper
to anybody; and f. When the surname causes proceeding will be prejudicial to the State.
embarrassment and there is no showing that the Because the State is naturally interested in the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent methodical administration of justice and the
purpose or that the change of name would maintenance of its system of identifying its
prejudice public interest. citizens, it stands to be prejudiced by the
wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case.
KEYWORDS: Natural father who adopted her Petition granted. The assailed decision is
illegitimate daughter petitions for her use of her partly modified in the sense that Stephanie
mothers surname as her middle name should be allowed to use her mothers
surname GARCIA as her middle name.
FACTS:
- Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt RATIO:
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy - Yes. The Court observed that there was no law,
Astorga Garcia. even in the FC that regulated the use of a middle
- Stephanie's mom is Gemma Astorga Garcia name.
and Steph has been using her mother's - However, as correctly observed by the OSG,
middle name and surname. members of the Civil Code and Family Law
- When Hector became a widower, he Committees that drafted the FC recognized
became qualified to become Stephanie's the Filipino custom of adding the surname of
adopting parent. the child's mom as middle name.
- With the petition for adoption, he prayed - As adoption's underlying intent is geared to
that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be favor the adopted child, laws or judgments
changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, must be construed in favor of the child.
and her last name Garcia to Catindig. - As one of the effects of adoption is that the
- RTC granted the adoption. Likewise, it ruled adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
that the name would be Stephanie Nathy the adopter for all intents and purposes, it
Catindig. However, RTC denied Honorato's follows that Stephanie is entitled to all rights
motion for reconsideration, saying that there provided by law to a legitimate child w/o
is no law or jurisprudence allowing an discrimination of any kind, including the right
adopted child to use the surname of his/her to bear the surname of her mother and
biological mother as his/her middle name. father.
- Lastly, as stated by the OSG, it is necessary
ISSUE: to maintain Stephanie's filiation w/ her
WON an illegitimate child, upon adoption by natural mother. This is in connection with Art.
her natural father, can use the surname of 189 of the Family Code w/c states that the
her natural mother as her middle name adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent.
RULING: - Besides, she's living with her mother right
now, obtaining support from Honorato.
FACTS:
- Respondent Corazon Chichioco, together ISSUE:
with the other collateral relatives of the WON petitioner needed to give additional
deceased, filed a petition for the issuance evidence to prove her adoption
of letters of administration and settlement
of the estate of Elena Lising before the RTC RULING:
of Tarlac. Petition granted. The Court did not remand
- Ana Joyce Reyes filed an opposition to the the issue back to the RTC to avoid the
petition, alleging the she is the only rightful clogging of the courts dockets and ruled that
heir as the adopted daughter of the deceased there is no need for further admission of
Elena and Serafin Delos Santos, and that evidence in the lower court.
there is no need for an administrator as
there was no debt to settle. RATIO:
- As proof of adoption, she presented the - No. A copy of the judicial declaration of
judicial decree registered in the Municipal adoption and a copy of the clerk of court that
Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac. She also the decree was in file in the general docket of
included a copy of the decree of final the RTC Tarlac, both under the seal of the
distribution issued by Philippine Veterans proper issuing officers. There is the
Affairs Office, showing that the benefits of presumption that these have been regularly
the deceased Serafin was paid to his wife, issued as part of the official duties that said
Elena, and daughter, Ana. public officers perform. The fact that it is a
- Respondents tried to cast a doubt on the public document, found in the Civil Registry is
authenticity of the judicial declaration and a prima facie evidence of the facts contained
decree presented by the petitioner, alleging therein. These are sufficient proof that the
that the natural mother of Ana committed petitioner is adopted by the Delos Santos
fraud. They filed a criminal complaint spouses.
against the petitioner but this did not - Mere imputations of irregularities will not
prosper for want of evidence. case cloud of doubt on the presumption of
- However, RTC enjoined Ana from using the validity of these documents, unless proven
property because she allegedly converted the to the contrary. Furthermore, it cannot be
basement as billiards den without the assailed collaterally in a special proceeding
judgment of the administration. The clerk of for administration and must be raised in a
court, Atty. Saguyod was delegated as separate proceeding contesting the validity of
administrator of the estate. This was reversed the documents.
KEYWORDS: Father challenges tender years WON the tender years presumption violates
presumption on equal protection grounds the equal protection
FACTS: RULING:
- Alice Devine and Christopher Devine were Yes. The tender years presumption is
married in 1966 and separated in 1979. As a unconstitutional because it violates equal
consequence of their separation, the matter protection.
of who would gain custody of their children
was decided by the Court. RATIO:
- During the proceedings that would - By placing upon fathers who intended to
eventually determine who custody of their gain custody of their children upon separation
children would go to, the Court could not find from their spouse an additional requirement
any substantial reason that would render of proving that their wife was unfit and not
either Alice or Christopher suitably unfit to placing any similar requirement of the
raise their children. However, owing to the mothers, the law unjustly favored the
fact that the children still fell within ages mothers.
covered by the tender years presumption, - Under the tender years presumption, it
custody was granted to the mother. This was would not matter if the father was objectively
because in the absence of any evidence to the the parent better suited to raise his children.
contrary, custody of children whose ages fell If he could not prove that his wife was unfit to
within the scope of the tender years doctrine raise their children who were under the
would always go to the mother. tender years, then custody would
- The father contested the decision and automatically be awarded to his wife.
brought the case all the way up to the - Hence, the tender years presumption not
Supreme Court of Alabama. only prejudiced fathers, it also potentially
prejudiced children whose best interests the
ISSUE: Court must consider when deciding custody
hearings.
KEYWORDS: Mother kissing bad man; custody Sempio- Diy) rather than an appreciation of
battle between married couple whose relevant facts. Whether a child is over or under
relationship soured seven, the paramount criterion must always be
the child's interests.
FACTS:
- Petitioner Reynaldo and private respondent 2. It prevails at the time of the decision.
Teresita maintained a common law - The children have already made their choice to
relationship while working in the states be with their father, being over seven years of
where they had a child named Rosalind. They age.
returned to the Philippines to marry. At the - Teresita contested, saying that the
states they had a second child named presumption must prevail having filed the
petition before the children were 7 yrs. old.
Reginald.
- The Court held that considerations involving
- Soon after, their relationship soured and
the choice of the child must be ascertained at
Teresita left for California from their home in the time that either parent is given custody of
Pittsburgh. the child. If parent chosen suffers a character
- Reynaldo returned to the country and filed a change, the matter of custody can always be
bigamy case against Teresita after learning reexamined. Once the choice has been made,
that a marriage was subsisting when they the burden returns to the court to investigate of
lived together. Teresita soon filed a habeas the parent chosen is unfit.
corpus suit praying for custody of the two
kids below seven years old. 3. No. The basis noted by Judge Bersamin was
- RTC thru Judge Bersamin (future Justice and not biased and unfair.
ponente of De Castro v. JBC) denied the - The findings of Social Worker Emma Lopez
petition and awarded custody to Reynaldo. and Psychologist Macabulos were not made
CA, however, reversed the decision based on for the purpose of litigation but for travel
Art. 213 of the Family Code. clearance and school purposes, respectively.
They found that Rosalind hated her mom
ISSUE: after catching her in the act of having an
1. WON CA erred in giving custody based affair with her dad's co- worker and she
solely on Art 213 of the FC suffered emotional disturbance.
2. WON the tender years presumption - The contention that Teresita's habit of
prevails at the time of filing the petition or at flirting did not fall under compelling reasons
the time of decision was ruled in the negative, for her illicit and
3. WON the basis for denying custody was immoral activities had caused emotional
biased and unfair disturbances, personality conflicts and
exposure to conflicting moral values.
RULING: Reynaldo, however, has proven himself to be
Petition granted. a fit parent, being able to attend to the needs
of the children unlike Teresita who
RATIO: abandoned the family home (to pursue the
1. Yes. The CA was swayed by an abstract affair).
presumption of law (by none other than
KEYWORDS: Mom praying in the rain; custody - In all controversies involving the custody of
battle after dad charges mom unfit minors, the sole and foremost consideration is
the physical, educational, social and moral
FACTS: welfare of the child concerned, taking into
- Respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a account the respective resources and social and
petition for habeas corpus against petitioner moral situations of the contending parents.
Wilson Sy before the RTC, praying that said writ However, the law favors the mother if she is fit
be issued ordering Sy to produce their two enough to have custody over her children so
minor children. that they may not only receive her attention,
- Writ was issued in favor of the respondent care, supervision but also have the advantage
along with an order for petitioner to pay and benefit of a mothers love and devotion for
P50,000 a month for support so petitioner which there is no substitute. The love, solicitude
appealed to the CA, alleging that the court erred and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by
in awarding to the respondent sole custody of another and are worth more to a child of tender
the minor children and in ordering petitioner to years than all other things combined. Hence, no
provide respondent with monthly support of child under seven years of age shall be
P50, 000. separated from the mother unless the court
- CA held that petitioner was unable to finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
substantiate his contention that respondent was - Trial Court was correct in granting custody to
unfit to have custody and that questions as to the respondent given that at the time the case
care and custody of children may be raised in a was decided, the children were below seven
petition for the writ of habeas corpus. years of age.
Moreover, contrary to his claim, petitioner was
properly heard on the matter involving support 2. No. Petitioner contends that matter of
for the respondent. Motion for reconsideration support was not included in the prayer for
filed by petitioner was likewise denied. issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, hence,
court had no reason to order him to provide
ISSUE: support for respondent.
1. WON CA erred in granting custody of minor - However, applying Sec 5, Rule 10 of the Rules
children to respondent of Civil Procedure, since the issue of support was
2. WON CA erred in ordering petitioner to pay tried with the implied consent of the parties, it
support should have been treated in all respects as if it
had been raised in the pleadings. Respondent,
RULING: under direct examination during the trial,
CA decision affirmed. Custody of children expressed the need for support which was to be
remains with respondent Mercedes Tan Uy- Sy, taken from the petitioner.
and the petitioner Wilson Sy is ordered to pay - Art. 203 of the Family Code states that the
P50, 000 a month for support, of which is merely obligation to give support is demandable from
provisional as the amount may be modified. the time the person who has a right to receive
the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall
RATIO: not be paid except from the date of judicial or
1. No. The applicable provisions to the case at extrajudicial demand. It was clear from the
hand are Art. 213 of the FC and Sec 6, Rule 99 of respondents testimony that there was a need
the Rules of Court. for support, and such testimony served as the
demand for the said support.
mothers loving care. If she has erred, as in It is not enough for Crisanto to show merely
cases of adultery, the penalty of that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also
imprisonment and the (relative) divorce demonstrate that she carried on her purported
decree will ordinarily be sufficient relationship with a person of the same sex in
punishment for her. Moreover, her moral the presence of their son or under
dereliction will not have any effect upon the circumstances not conducive to the childs
baby who is as yet unable to understand proper moral development. Such a fact has not
the situation. The word "shall" in Article 213 been shown here. There is no evidence that the
of the Family Code and Section 642 of Rule son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual
99 of the Rules of Court has been held to proclivities or that his proper moral and
connote a mandatory character. psychological development suffered as a result.
KEYWORDS: ISSUE:
Evil in-laws WON the father may be prevented to visit
his son based on the Tender Years Presumption
FACTS: (TYP).
- Loran and Antonette are the parents of the
2-year old Lorenzo Emmanuel. RATIO:
- They lived with the wifes parents. NO.
However, due to problems with his in-laws, Art 213 FC (TYP) only deals with the judicial
Loran suggested to his wife that they adjudication of custody and serves as a
transfer to their own place but she refused. guideline for the proper award of custody by
Thus, he left the house of the Salientes the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter
argument for Lorans petition for custody, but it
- Thereafter, Loran was prevented from cannot serve as a basis for preventing the father
seeing his son. He then filed a Petition for to see his own child. Nothing in the said
habeas corpus and custody in the RTC. provision disallows a father from seeing or
- RTC: directed Antonette and her parents to visiting his child under seven years of age.
bring Lorenzo to the court Also Art 211 FC states that the father and
- CA: dismissed their petition. It also held the mother have joint parental authority over
that the RTC was still about to conduct a full their children. This parental authority also
inquiry in a summary proceeding regarding includes joint custody.
the cause of the minors detention and his Although they are already separated de
custody. facto, the issue has yet to be adjudicated by the
- Hence, they appealed for certiorari in the court. In the absence of judicial grant of custody
SC. to one parent, both parents are still entitled to
the custody of the child.
KEYWORDS:
Twisted Romeo and Juliet ISSUE:
WON Wendells parents are civilly liable for
DOCTRINE: their sons action (YES)
CC 2180 Parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from HELD:
criminal offenses committed by their minor Amelita Libi (Wendells mom) admitted that
children under their legal authority or control, her son knew the keys to the deposit box
or who live in their company, unless it is proven holding the gun was in her bag and that the gun
that the former acted with the diligence of a is now missing from the deposit box. This
good father of a family to prevent such showed a lack of due diligence of a good father
damages. of a family
Wendells parents never knew that the gun
FACTS: was taken from the deposit box since 1978 as
- Julie Gotiong (age 18) and Wendell Libi evidenced by a picture (of Wendell holding the
(aged 1819) were sweethearts gun) given to Julie and Wendell was said to
- Julie broke up with Libi for being sadistic have kept said gun in his car for his supposed
and irresponsible, Wendell persistently role of CANU agent
tried to reconcile with her Jan 14, 1979 Court Held: It is still the duty of parents to
Julie and Wendell died from a single know the activity of their children who may be
gunshot wound inflicted with the same engaged in this dangerous activity involving the
firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver menace of drugs. Had the defendants-
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio appellees been diligent in supervising the
Libi (Wendells father) activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping
- There were no eye witnesses said gun from his reach, they could have
- Libis family contends that an unknown prevented Wendell from killing, Julie Ann
third party, whom Wendell may have Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under
displeased or antagonized by reason of his Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:
work as a narcotics informer of the The father, and in case of his death or
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
must have caused Wendell's death and then damages caused by their minor children who
shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and live in their company.'
thereby avoid identification.
responsible for the defilement of her room where her other brothers are
daughter. sleeping. That it is highly improbable that a
4. The behavior of her daughter after the series of acts constituting the rape lasted
alleged incident is not consistent with the for 40 minutes. (And really lame excuse that
behavior of a raped victim. Without merit it is only 10:30 where people are not yet
for different people react differently. The soundly asleep) lacks merit for lust is no
failure of the victim to immediately reveal respecter of time and place. This is a trivial
the incestuous acts is not indicative of matter as lust may be consummated in a
fabricated charges. Her shame and genuine matter of seconds or it could last hours
fear of what the appellant might do to her depending on the parties and
brothers and mother prevented her from circumstances.
reporting the incident. 7. The irregularity regarding his arrest because
5. The testimony of the girl could not convict of the invitation from the police station
him (credibility) the presumption that a he waived any objection when he
young and decent Filipina would not submitted himself under the jurisdiction of
humiliate herself unless that is the truth for the court. Furthermore, he was convicted
it is her natural instinct to protect her not on the basis of what was illegally
honor. obtained by the police, but on the credible
6. That he could not have raped her in a small testimony of the witness.
common-law right to disaffirm the consent statute expressly permits a certain class of
given defendant by her parent. While another agreements to be made by infants, it settles the
Justice added that the consents were governed question and makes the agreement valid and
by section 3-105 of the General Obligations Law enforceable.
and therefore could be interpreted to have By adopting section 51, a new cause of
expired after three years. But it accepted the action was created and it provided in the
trial court's findings that the consents were statute itself the method for obtaining an
valid and unrestricted as to time and use. infant's consent to avoid liability. Construing the
statute strictly, the parent's consent is binding
ISSUE: on the infant and no words prohibiting
WON an infant model may disaffirm a prior disaffirmance are necessary to effectuate the
unrestricted consent executed on her behalf by legislative intent. Inasmuch as the consents in
her parent and maintain an action pursuant to this case complied with the statutory
section 51 of the Civil Law Rights against her requirements, they were valid and may not be
photographer for republication of photographs disaffirmed.
of her. NO. The consents cannot also be considered as
void because it failed to comply with the
RATIO: provisions of section 3-105 of the General
Historically, New York common law did not Obligations Law requiring prior court approval
recognize a cause of action for invasion of of infants' contracts. This statute applies only to
privacy. In 1909, however, responding to a performing artists, such as actors, musicians,
previous court decision, the Legislature enacted dancers and professional athletes. Moreover,
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law. the Legislature has purposively differentiated
Section 50 is penal and makes it a misdemeanor between child performers and child models.
to use a living person's name, portrait or picture Thus, what are referred to in the
for advertising purposes without prior "written aforementioned statute are child performers
consent". Sect ion 51 is remedial and creates a and not child models. Furthermore, section 3-
related civil cause of action on behalf of the 105 was not designed to expand the rights of
injured party permitting relief by injunction or infants to disaffirm their contracts but to
damages. Section 51 of the statute further provide assurance to those required to deal
states that the prior "written consent" which with infants that the infants would not later
will bar the civil action is to be as "above disaffirm executory contracts to the adult
provided", referring to section 50 which in turn contracting party's disadvantage. Sections 50
provides that: "A person, firm or corporation and 51 are interpreted to serve the same
that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purpose.
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture The court, as a parting statement gave the
of any living person without having first advice that if a parent wished to limit the
obtained the written consent of such person, or publicity and exposure of her child then he/she
if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is need only limit the use authorized in the
guilty of a misdemeanor. consent, for a defendant's immunity from a
The statute acts to restrict an advertiser's claim for invasion of privacy is no broader than
prior unrestrained common-law right to use the consent executed to him.
another's photograph until written consent is
obtained. Once written consent is obtained, The order of the Appellate Division should
however, the photograph may be published as be modified that striking the further injunction
permitted by its terms. It may abrogate an against the use of the photographs for uses of
infant's common-law right to disaffirm the advertising and trade, and as so modified, the
consent or, conversely, it may confer upon order should be affirmed.
infants the right to make binding. Where a
ISSUE:
WON the father is entitled to visitorial
rights to his children? (The right of access of a
KEYWORDS:
Daffon 1, fistfight, school liability ISSUE:
Whether defendants school officials are
QUICK READ: jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors
Daffon killed Palisoc in a fistfight while at
school so the parents of the latter are suing HELD:
Daffon + member of the Board of Directors, YES. Valenton (head) and Quibule (teacher)
President and Instructor of MTI invo king Art. are liable for damages under Art 2180 CC.
2180.TC absolved all co-defendants using Brillantes is not liable as being a member of the
doctrine in Mercado requiring a kind of living schools board of directors. School heads and
and boarding arrangement between the teachers, to a certain extent, stand in loco
student and school for the latter to be liable as parentis to students who remain in their
suggested by the phrase so long as they custody. Custody, as used in Art 2180, means
remain in custody. Ct reversed TC and said the protective and supervisory custody that the
there was nothing in the law that requires that school and its heads and teachers exercise over
kind of arrangement and that the liability stems their students for as long as they are in
from the substitute parental authority that attendance in the school, including recess time.
requires them to exercise protective and The basis of the presumption of negligence in
supervisory custody over the students as long Art 2180 is some culpa in vigilando that the
as theyre attending school even during recess parents, teachers, etc.are supposed to have
time. Mercado dictum was set aside and Ct held incurred in the exercise of their authority.
that Daffon, President and Instructor were Where the parent places the child under the
jointly and severally liable for damages [12k] custody of the teacher, the latter, and not the
arising from Palisocs death. Brillantes was not parent, should be the one responsible for the
being a mere board director [only head of trade tortuous act of the child. Palisoc. The
school liable]. unfortunate death could have been avoided,
had said defendants but complied with their
FACTS: duty of providing adequate supervision over the
Dominic Palisoc [16] and Virgilio Daffon activities of the students in the school premises
were classmates at the Manila Technical to protect their students from harm, whether at
Institute (MTI), a non-academic institution. the hands of fellow students or other parties.
While Daffon was working on a machine at the
schools laboratory, he remarked that Palisoc NOTE:
was acting like a foreman. Palisoc slightly The basis of TC for absolving is a dictum in
slapped Daffon in the face. The latter retaliated Mercado v CA which is also based on
with a barrage of blows causing Palisoc to another dictum in Exconde, both of which
retreat. While retreating, Palisoc stumbled on are set aside in this case
an engine block and fell unconscious. He died Brillantes was the former owner of the
thereafter. The cause of death was internal school but during the occurrence of the
injuries probably caused by strong fist blows. incident, the school was already
Parents of Palisoc sued Antonio Brillantes incorporated thus hes not liable as being a
[member of Board of Directors], Teodosio member of the Board. The school could be
Valenton [President], and SantiagoQuibulue held liable but since it wasnt properly
[instructor] along with Daffon. Daffon was of impleaded, then Ct cant hold it liable.
legal age at the time of the incident, hence the
parents were not liable under Art 2180.The trial DISSENT (Makalintal):
court found Daffon guilty for quasi-delict, but The size of enrollment of educational
absolved the defendants-officials of MTI, citing institutions makes it highly unrealistic to
the ruling in Mercado v CA. consider students as in the custody of
teachers or school heads merely from the fact basis of liability of teachers and school heads is
of enrollment and class attendance, unless the in loco parentis, the said provision should be
latter can prove due diligence. The restrictive applied by analogy, i.e. so long as they remain
interpretation of Art 2180 in Mercado should be in their custody should be equated with who
maintained. Under Art 2180, parents are live in their company; and school heads and
responsible for the tortious acts of their minor teachers should not be responsible for damages
children who live in their company. Since the caused by children who are no longer minors.
grandparent, can exercise substitute parental guardian of minor Vincent, Bonifacia cannot
authority only in case of death, absence or qualify as a substitute guardian as she is an
unsuitability of respondent. Considering that American citizen and a resident of Colorado,
the mother is very much alive and has exercised and as such, she will not be able to perform the
continuously parental authority over Vincent, responsibilities and obligations required of a
Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to guardian. In addition to this, her old age and her
be the minors guardian, respondents conviction of libel will give her a second thought
unsuitability. She, however, has failed to of staying in the Philippines. Generally, courts
provide convincing evidence showing that should not appoint persons as guardians who
Helen is not suited to be the guardian of are not within the jurisdiction of our courts,
Vincent. She merely insists that Helen is morally despite not being a statutory requirement for
unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that the guardianship or administration, for they will
latters live-in partner raped Valerie several find it difficult to protect the wards and their
times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is properties.
no longer a subject of the guardianship
proceeding. SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as AUTHORITY
KEYWORDS:
Adulterous mom, custody ISSUES:
WON A woman found guilty of adultery is
QUICK READ: unfit for custody of her children - Yes
The mother who was found guilty of
adultery was deemed unfit to acquire custody RATIO:
of her children from her mother-in-law. (The entire ratio is just one paragraph long, and
I might as well copy it verbatim)
FACTS: "Article 171 of the Civil Code, presumably
- Maria Cortes was found guilty of adultery still in force, because of continued judicial
by the trial court but Col. Alejandro Herrera, construction and enforcement, provides that
her husband, condoned her and came back parents who, by the example set by them, tend
to live with her. to corrupt their offspring, may be deprived by
- On the suspicion that she might be the courts of their parental authority. (There
committing adultery again, he left, took the can also be noted sections 770 and 771 of the
kids with him, and stayed with his mother. Code of Civil Procedure.) This provision of the
He filed an action for divorce, but law imposes a discretionary power on the
- He died in the line of duty (he was a courts, which should be made use of, with a
policeman, apparently) Maria then primary regard for the welfare of the minor.
proceeded to re-obtain custody of her (See 2 Manresa, Codigo Civil, pp. 63, et seq.;
children from her mother-in-law but the decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 23,
latter refused. 1905.) Both under the civil law and the common
- The trial court sided with the mother-in- law, the best interests of the child is the
law. paramount consideration"
- Hence this appeal.
ground which the court overlooked i.e., abandonment by the petitioner of her child
KEYWORDS: RATIO:
Sibling love, organ transplant, substituted YES. The Court AFFIRMED the judgment of
judgement the lower courts and PERMITTED THE ORGAN
TRANSPLANT, reasoning that:
FACTS: A. Through the doctrine of substituted
Arthur and Ava Strunk had two sons: judgment, the court has jurisdiction on all
Tommy, 28, married, and suffering from a fatal matters pertaining to a wards well-being.
kidney disease called chronic glomerulus The doctrine of substituted judgment is the
nephritis; and Jerry, 27, handicapped by a right of the court to act in behalf of any person
speech defect, feeble-minded and committed with a legal disability, not only with regard to
to a state institution for such individuals. their property, but also in the interest of their
In order to keep Tommy alive, he had an well-being.
artificial kidney and was undergoing treatment, This power has been delegated by the
but this could no longer be sustained. A kidney courts to the incompetents committees. The
transplant would better help him survive. court stated its belief that such power would
The Strunks and other relatives were tested not extend so far as to allow a committee to
for the compatibility of their blood type or subject his ward to serious surgical techniques
tissue with that of Tommys, but only Jerrys [] unless the life of his ward be in jeopardy.
was found to be acceptable. Thus, in this case, it was only in exercise of
Tommy and Jerrys mother Ava thus this delegated power that Ava Strunk, the
petitioned the county court, praying for the mother and committee of Tommy, sought the
authority to proceed with the operation. approval of the county court, and only in
The county court held that going through exercise of the power conferred by the doctrine
with the organ donation would beneficial to of substituted judgment did the county court
both the brothers. First, Tommy would have a give its permission.
new, better-functioning kidney. Second, Jerry B. The surgery would be for the benefit of
would not have to lose his brother, on whom he both brothers.
was emotionally and psychologically The Department of Mental Health was
dependent. amicus curiae. It recommended that the surgery
Upon the appeal of the guardian ad litem, be permitted not only so that Tommys life may
Morris E. Burton, the Franklin Circuit Final Court be saved, but also to prevent Jerry from feeling
adopted the findings of the country court and any guilt if his brother were to die.
also ruled to allow the transplant. The court also noted that all the members
of the immediate family have recommended
ISSUE: the transplant, in addition to the Dept. of
Whether a court may permit an organ Mental Health and the county and circuit
transplant from an incompetent ward of the courts.
state at the petition of his mother and Based on the lower courts findings that the
committee. procedure would be to Jerrys best interest, the
judgment was affirmed.
KEYWORDS: HELD:
Surrogate mom 1. NO. Because undisputed evidence shows
that Anna gave birth to the child and that
DOCTRINE: only Crispina is genetically related to such
Under California law, she who intended to child, and no clear legislative preference is
bring about the birth of a child that she given between blood tests and gestation as
intended to raise as her own is the natural means of establishing a mother and child
mother. relationship, then the case can only be
decided by looking at the intent of both
PROOF GIVEN: parties as manifested by the surrogacy
For the Calverts; Evidence of blood tests agreement. Basing it on such agreement, it
showing that Crispina is genetically related to is clear then that the parties aim was to
the child bring the Calverts child into the world, and
not for them to donate the zygote to Anna.
FACTS: From the outset, Crispina intended to be
Mark and Crispina Calvert are married but the mother of the child. Annas act of
unable to have a child. Anna Johnson offered to carrying the child may have been
serve as surrogate mother. The two parties indispensible for eventually giving birth to
enter into a contract where Anna serves as him, but she would not have been able to
surrogate, while the Calverts pay her $10,000 in do so had she manifested her intent to keep
installments as well as purchase a life insurance the child as her own prior to the
policy for Johnson. The relationship between implantation of the zygote. Although the
the two sides soured, with Anna demanding the Uniform Parentage Act, which bases parent
payment of the balance or else she would and child rights on the existence of a parent
refuse to give up the child. The Calverts and child relationship, recognizes both
responded with a lawsuit seeking a declaration genetic consanguinity and giving birth as
that they were the legal parents of the child. means of establishing a mother and child
Upon the birth of the child, it was proven relationship, when the two means do not
through blood tests that Anna was NOT the coincide in one woman, she who intended
genetic mother of the child. The trial court ruled to procreate the child is the natural mother
that 1) the Calverts were the genetic, biological under California law.
and natural parents of the child, 2) Anna had no 2. NO. Gestational surrogacy is completely
parental rights to the child, and 3) the surrogacy different from adoption, and as such,
contract was legal and enforceable against should not be subject to adoption statutes.
Annas claims, all of which were affirmed by the Both parties voluntarily agreed to
Court of Appeals. participate in in vitro fertilization before the
child was conceived. Moreover, the
ISSUES: financial considerations given to Anna
1. WON Anna can claim custody of the child ($10,000 and the purchase of an insurance
2. WON the surrogate contract violates public policy) were NOT for her giving up her
policy parental rights over the child but rather for
carrying the child and undergoing labor.
prescribe the treatment is wholly a matter of only as long as they were needed for the
the doctors discretion. He may prescribe only if protection of the child and such rights yielded
she has the capacity to consent1 or if to the child's right to make his own decisions
exceptional circumstances exist which justify when he reached a sufficient understanding and
him in exercising his clinical judgment without intelligence to be capa ble of making up his own
parental consent. The adjective clinical mind. Accordingly, a girl under 16 did not,
emphasizes that it must be a medical judgment merely by reason of her age, lack legal capacity
based upon what he honestly believes to be to consent to contraceptive advice and
necessary for the physical, mental and treatment by a doctor. According to Lord
emotional health of his patient. The bona fide Scarman, the parental right to determine
exercise by a doctor of his clinical judgment whether or not their minor child below the age
must be a complete negation of the guilty mind of sixteen will have medical treatment
which is an essential ingredient of the criminal terminates if and when the child achieves
offence of aiding and abetting the commission sufficient understanding and intelligence to
of unlawful sexual intercourse. understand fully what is proposed." (Also
known as the Gillick Competence)
*Parental rights were recognized by the law
petitioners.