RULE 138-A : LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

9) CRUZ VS MINA

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor
on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in
Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or
friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent
in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling
of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:

whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant

Ruling:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified that the
said Rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer.

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Section 34, Rule 138 provides that in the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.

The phrase "in the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the
court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138.

In Section 34 of Rule 138, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is
expressly allowed, while Rule 138-A provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student.

As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear,
as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

THE LAWYERS OATH

10) In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26

FACTS:
Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyers Oath and to
sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide from a
hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the
Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a
proof of the required good moral character he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15)
certifications among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of
religious order. In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship
foundation in honor of their hazing victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the Rolls of Attorneys, and
practice law.

HELD:

YES. Petition granted.

RATIO:
Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required good moral
character as required before taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court
considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr.
Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyers Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality before the
practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the
more unfortunate members of the society.
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MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

11) IN RE: ATTY. MARCIAL EDILLON

PONENTE: CASTRO, C.J.:

FACTS:
NOTE: We already tackled this case in Constitutional Law 1
NOTE 2: I no longer included other side issues since I think theyre not important in the topic.
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon stubbornly refused to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) since the latter's constitution, notwithstanding due notice.
The Board of Governors of the IBP unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a
resolution recommending the removal of Edillon's name from its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par.
2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.
CONTENTIONS OF EDILLON:
o Edillon, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the
obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the
Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution.
o Edillon likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll
of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court
but is of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.
CONTENTIONS OF IBP:
o Edillon should be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys from his
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP.
o The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal
of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article
III of the IBP By-Laws, whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found
in Section 10 of the Court Rule (See provisions in the case *Sections 10, 9, and 1)

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision on membership fee by IBP is an infringement to the right to associate
of Edillon.

HELD: NO. It is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.
o He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
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 services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.

RULING: Edillon is disbarred.

CANON 1 PROMOTE AND RESPECT LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS

12) PLUMPTRE VS ATTY SOCRATES RIVERA

In the matter of Adegoke Plumptre versus Atty. Socrates R. Rivera, the Court suspended respondent Rivera
from the practice of law for three years for violation of Canon 1, Canon 7 , Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon
17 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The suspension is effective upon finality of
the decision, the SC said through Atty. Theodore Te.

Rivera was also ordered to return the amount of P28,000 to the complainant.

The complainant had alleged that he went to Rivera for help in his application for a work permit but despite
paying him a total of P28,000, the lawyer was not able to deliver any results.

Plumptre paid the lawyer P28,000 for assistance in his application for work permit, but Rivera was not able
to deliver any results.

The IBP board recommended Riveras disbarment, but the SC lowered the penalty to suspension for three
years.

The SC said that of the total amount of P28,000, P8,000 was sought by respondent supposedly for another
case of complainant and to facilitate the same through payment of the judge.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended disbarment but the SC said three years' suspension is consistent
with other cases of similar nature and circumstances.

13) ZALDIVAR VS GONZALES

[G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989]

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution,
respondents.

PONENTE: PER CURIAM:

PRECEDENT FACTS:
NOTE: We already tackled this case in Constitutional Law 1
NOTE 2: I no longer included other side issues since I think theyre not important in the topic.
Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan.
On 10 September 1987, Zaldivar filed with SC a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
(G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez.
Among other things, petitioner assailed:
o the 5 February 1987 Resolution of the Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal
informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused; and
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 o the 1 September 1987 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to Quash the
criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan."
In this respect, Zaldivar alleged that respondent Gonzales, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions
of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to
investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and
employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal cases were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, SC issued a Resolution, which required the respondents to COMMENT and
issued a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from SC, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying
Criminal cases insofar as Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special
Prosecutor's motion to suspend.
On 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by SC of a TRO in G.R. No. 80578, the
Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 with the Sandiganbayan, which issued
on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest for Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No.
12570. Upon Motion of Zaldivar, SC issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987.

IMPORTANT FACTS:
On 9 February 1988, Zaldivar filed with SC a Motion to Cite in Contempt directed at respondent
Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in:
o having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal case No. 12570
before the Sandiganbayan; and
o issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the
proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a
photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November
1987 issue of the "Philippine daily Globe."
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order
stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar
"can aggravate the thought that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial.
''What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for
an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.' Gonzales told the Daily
Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order 'heightens the people's apprehension over the justice
system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fry can
get it while big fishes go scot-free.'Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last
week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed
against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to
help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan. Acting on
Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against the
governor, and from instituting any complaint the Sandiganbayan. 'While President Aquino had
been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme
Court had been restraining me.' Gonzalez said. Gonzalez said that while some cases against local
against local officials during election time could be mere harassment's suits, the Constitution
makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the character of the candidate, who should be
subject to scrutiny."
On 27 April 1988 , the Court rendered its Decision in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive
portion thereof read:
o GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the
criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and

5
 o ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and
filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and
functions of the Ombudsman.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion,
respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following
statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own
Motion:
o That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court . . . and he was
asked to 'go slow' on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;'"
o That he "was approached and asked to 'refrain' from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the Court; '" and
o That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone be a
leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of
the Court)."
Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes which he claimed were sent by "some
members of SC, interceding for cases pending before this office (i. e., the Tanodbayan)." He either
released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to
the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days
carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof.
It appearing that Gonzalez has made public statements to the media which not only deal with
matters sub-judice but also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual
members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and
ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require
respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should
not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making
such public statements reported in the media.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actions of Gonzales warrants the application of contempt power granted by
the Constitution to the Supreme Court.

HELD: Of course, YES.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court has authority to discipline officers of the court and members of the
court and members of the Bar.
The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority
over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to
regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice
itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice
and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent
to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of
the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court. The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of justice, " "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of
any of the parries litigant."
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us
here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt.
Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where

6
 the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may
come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
contempt of court. The powers to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members
of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar.
A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon
to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act
on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
RULING: Gonzales is suspended in the practice of law indefinitely.

2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

14) SPOUSES SANTUYO vs. ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO,

[A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005]

FACTS:

According to respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where
he was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several documents
in that office, these, however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of
office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was only when they gave
their approval that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law
firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating to cases
handled by the law firm. Respondent added that he normally required the parties to exhibit their
community tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary
public. He would have remembered complainants had they actually appeared before him. While he
admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latters husband and co-complainant
only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale.
Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed
that it was forged; the strokes were smooth and mild. He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging
his signature.

To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the subject deed of sale
was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants
must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior
lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.

ISSUE: Can be the notary public be held liable for the acts of the forger?

RULING:

Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should have been
more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted
everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary public.

For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the
secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondents signature which is the only one left for him
to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.
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As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed
the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done
and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody else.

Respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties
as notary public.

15) SICAT vs ARIOLA

Facts:
Arturo Sicat, Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal charged Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola of
committing fraud, deceit, and falsehood in notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA).
Said SPA was purportedly executed by Juanito Benitez, of the JC Benitez Architect and Technical
Management. Said company had a contract with the Municipality of Cainta for the construction of low
cost houses.
What is fraudulent about it is the fact that the SPA was notarized more than 2 months after the death of
Benitez, the person who supposedly executed it.
P3,700T was paid to JC Benitez Architect and Technical Management for services not rendered (as
consultants).
Ariola claims that the document he notarized was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one,
and therefore he should be exonerated the document was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence
legally there was no public document that existed.

Issue:
W/N Ariola can be held liable.

Held:
Yes.
Notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very
same persons who executed them an personally appeared before the, to attest to the contents and truth
of what are stated therein.
His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the
legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act.
Ariola is disbarred, and not merely suspended for a year.

16) BAYSAC VS PAPA

Canon 1: PROMOTE AND RESPECT LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS

No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful Conduct Rule 1.01

17) UI VS BONIFACIO
Facts:

Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was
filed by complainant against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with
8
the complainants husband. It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit
because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true
civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her.

A complaint for disbarment was filed by the complainant, Leslie Ui against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP on the grounds of immorality, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. It is respondents contention that her relationship
with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1998 when respondent
discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.

Issue:
Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from
the practice of law.

Held:

The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was
dismissed.

All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it
was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the
same must be grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

18) FIGUEROA VS BARRANCO

[SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997]

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent

PONENTE: ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco, Jr. were sweethearts since their teens.
Their intimacy eventually resulted to a son (Rafael Barranco, Dec. 11, 1964) born out of wedlock.
At this point (1964) Barranco promised Figueroa that he would marry her when he passes the
bar examinations.
After four takes, he finally passed but did not hold true to his promise of marriage with Figueroa.
In 1971, their relationship ended when Figueroa learned that Barranco married another woman.
When Barranco was about to take his oath to enter the legal profession, Figueroa filed
a complaint relaying to the Court what happened between her and Barranco.
Barranco filed 3 Motions to Dismiss.
o February 18, 1974, for failure of Figueroa to comment on the motion by Judge Cuello. Figueroa
filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reason for failing to comment earlier. DENIED
on June 19, 1974.
o September 17, 1979, on the ground of abandonment. DENIED on October 2, 1980.
o 1988, he has become elected in the Sangguniang Bayan, has actively participated in various civic
organizations and has acquired a good standing within his community while the case was
pending. GRANTED on September 29, 1988.
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 November 17, 1988, cancelled his schedule for oath-taking upon opposition of Figueroa (Side
Comment: Ang TINDI ni Patricia!)
IBP: recommended the dismissal of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barranco should be allowed to take his oath despite the accusations of Figueroa.

HELD: Yes. The acts of Barranco did not constitute gross immorality.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
The maintenance of an intimate relationship between a man and a woman, both of whom had no
impediment to marry and voluntarily carried on with the affair, does not amount to a grossly immoral
conduct even if a child was born out of the relationship.
His previous acts may be said to be a question to his moral character but none of these are so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. (Description of Gross Immoral Act)
Her allegations that she was forced to have sexual relations with him cannot lie as evidenced by her
continued cohabitation with him even after their child was born in 1964.
The ignobleness of his treatment of Figueroa is sufficiently punished by the 26 years that he has been
prevented from entering the profession he has worked so hard for.

RULING: Petition is DISMISSED. Barranco is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer.

Canon 1: PROMOTE AND RESPECT LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS

No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful Conduct Rule 1.01

19) BARRIOS VS MARTINEZ

[A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004]
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent

PONENTE: PER CURIAM:

FACTS:
Atty. Francisco Martinez was convicted of the crime involving BP 22 (RTC of Tacloban City).
Atty. Martinez did not heed upon the continuous and persistent requirement of the Court for him to
comment. Thus, on April 5, 1999, the NBI reported that he was arrested in Tacloban City but was
released by remitting the amount of P2,000 (fine required by the Court) and submitting his long
overdue Comment. To defend himself, he said that:
o He failed to respond because he was undergoing medical treatment in Leyte;
o Barrios already passed away sometime in June 1997;
o The admin complaint is an offshoot of a civil case that he won against Barrios.
Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter to the Court
reporting that Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case. (Side Comment: sinasayang nito ang
pagka-lawyer niya.)
The estafa case pertains to his legal services rendered on the victim of Doa Paz tragedy.
Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims for free.
When Sulpicio Lines issued a check of P90,000.00, Martinez asked the victim to endorse the said check
then deposited it in the account of Dr. Martinez (wife of Atty. Martinez).

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 The victim he represented filed a complaint because money that the victim had received from Sulpicio
Lines was later deducted by Atty. Martinez (P30,000.00 was given instead of P90,000.00) and said that
the P60,000 constitutes his attorneys fees.
On September 27, 2003 the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving the report and the
recommendation of its investigating commissioner that Martinez be disbarred and stricken out of the
roll of attorneys.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of issuing worthless check constitutes moral turpitude.
Whether or not the act of Martinez constitutes a ground for disbarment.

HELD: YES to both issues.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Court finds Martinez guilty of BP 22 which imposts deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. It involves n act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it waited for his
comment on the original petition. (Side comment: Nagsawa na rin ang Court, wala na syang pasensya)

RULING: In this case, the Court finds DISBARMENT as the appropriate penalty and ordered that the name
of the respondent be STRICKEN from the roll of attorneys.

20) YUPANGCO NAKPIL VS ATTY ROBERTO UY

REBECCA MARIE UY
YUPANGCO-NAKPIL,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 9115

SEP 17, 2014

Facts:
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy. She was adjudged as the sole
and exclusive legal heir of Pacita by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 34. Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring,
developing, and leasing real properties (one of these companies is Uy Realty Company, Inc [URCI]).
Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent, continuously failed and refused to
comply with the court order declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacitas properties, as well
as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming
from Pacitas stockholdings in the corporations. She added that respondent mortgaged a commercial
despite an existing Trust Agreement wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI, already
recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.

11
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility

Held:
Respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Ratio Decidendi:
The Court finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the
subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own
claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not
have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which
would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. 26
By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also
that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a guardian of law and justice.

21) DONTON VS TANSINGCO

Canon 1: PROMOTE AND RESPECT LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS
No Counseling to Defy Law Rule 1.02
Prepared by: Michael Joseph Nogoy, JD 1
CASE No. 16

[A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006]

PETER T. DONTON, complainant, vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, respondent

PONENTE: CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
On May 20, 2003, Peter T. Donton filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of public
document against Duane O. Stier, Emelyn A. Maggay, and Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco, as the
notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
Subsequently, Tansingco filed a counter-charge for perjury against Donton. The affidavit-complaint
stated that:
o The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized under the
following circumstances:
Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33
Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real
property in his name agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a
Filipino.
Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that
would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the
transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr.
Stiers free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations.
The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.
12
 Thereafter, Donton prayed that Tansingco be disbarred in violation of the Code (not stated, maybe
the CPR) for the act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite the knowledge that Stier was
disqualified to own a real property for being a foreign national.
On Oct 1, 2003 the Court referred the matter to the IBP for investigation and on Feb 26, 2004,
Commissioner San Juan found Tansingco liable for taking part in a scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines and recommended
Tansingcos suspension from the practice of law for 2 years and cancellation of his commission as
Notary Public.
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report with modification and
recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for 6 months. Then on July 28,
2004, Tansinco filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP stating that his practice of law is his
only means of supporting his family and 6 minor children.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tansingco is guilty of violation of Canon I and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD: YES, he is guilty of it.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the
laws which he is bound to uphold.
Tansingcos knowledge that Stier, a US citizen, was disqualified from owning real property and his
preparation of Occupancy Agreement that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of
the property, aided in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
lands.
He violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
Tansingco used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.

RULING: GUILTY and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

22) IN RE TERREL

LEGAL ETHICS #18

TITLE: In Re Terrell, 2 Phil 266 [May 15, 1903] (No Counselling to Defy Law Rule 1.02)

PONENTE: Per Curiam

FACTS:

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1 Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at least lessening confidence in the legal system.
CHARGES AGAINST TERRELL:
o He had assisted in the organization of Centro Bellas Artes Club, after he had been notified
that the organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in the city,
and
o For acting as secretary for said Centro Bellas Artes during the time of and after its
organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading
the law.

13
 BASED ON THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCES, the Court of First Instance of Manila concluded that the
charges were true, ordered the suspension of Terrell, and directed the clerk of court to submit to the
Supreme Court certified copy of the suspension and full statement of the facts upon which the
suspension was based:
o Reading the testimony of Howard D. Terrell in his case of estafa against the US;
o Reading the affidavits presented by his counsel on his behalf;
o Hearing his counsel (W.A. Kinkaid)

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not Terrell is guilty of activities aimed at defying the law.

HELD:

1) Yes, Terrell was found guilty by the Supreme Court of activities aimed at defying the law.

RATIONALE:

The promoting of organizations, with the knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating or
evading the laws against crimes constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, officer of the
court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct of his office, and for which he may be removed
or suspended. (Civil Code Procedure section 21).
The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at
the violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
SUPREME COURT RULING: One year suspension starting February 7, 1903.

23) ESTRADA VS SANDIGAN BAYAN

EN BANC [G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN[SPECIAL

DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON.TERESITA LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Facts:

-Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have violated
Rule5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the
assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987
Constitution.

Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of
political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly
endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan politicalactivities.

-Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the
acttaken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo(353 SCRA
452and356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.-

14
According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of hisMosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the
three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality agains
this client.

-Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and
disrespectfullanguage when she blurted out,Magmumukha naman kaming gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and
Justice TeresitaLeonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution
could file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant
Estradas motion would result in chaos and disorder.(Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias and partial
attitude of theSandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their
disqualification.

-The petitioner also asked the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief
JusticeDavide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:a) going to EDSA 2;b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-
President Arroyo as President on the ground of permanent disability even without proof of compliance
with the correspondingconstitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or
majorityof his cabinet; andc) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of
permanentdisability.

-In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate
JusticeArtemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for
severaladvisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.

-Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be
DISMISSEDfor gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed
no graveabuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary
relief of petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

-In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of
disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court
or to its Members.

-Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on
end. In fact, on the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say

What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law? It renders the
decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not observed.
There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide
and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already made
and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to
voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?

Issue:

WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

-Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness,
of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court
and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney
15
Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the judicial forum. Indeed,
he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media.

Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making such
public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his acts,
Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat
to the administration of justice.

-It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context, relates to acts
designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed
certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming
President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the
Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no
different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the
Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.

-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to
practice law in the Philippines.

-Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct
by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity,
and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

-The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his
grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all
take heed.

-WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective
upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

24) SABURNIDO VS MADRONO

Facts: Spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Florante Madro Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty. The cases filed
were:

1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755, for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido.

2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758, for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and
two others.

3. Crim. Case No. 93-67, for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code,
filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido.

4. Adm. Case No. 95-33, filed by respondent against Rosalia

16
 Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Previous to this case, complainants (spouses Saburnido) also filed 3 separate administrative cases
against respondent, which led to the latters dismissal from the judiciary and forfeiture of his
retirement benefits.

SC referred this case to the IBP, the latter concluded hat complainants submitted convincing proof
that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Madronos act of filling multiple complaints constitute gross misconduct
that will warrant the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Held: YES. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants
reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a
decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were
instrumental in respondents dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondents tenacity in
pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been grievously
wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.

Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It
constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.

We find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme
penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove
an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we
will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case,
we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not
primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.

24) LINSANGAN VS ATTY TOLENTINO

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

FACTS
Tolentino, with the help of Labiano, was pirating the clients of Labiano by offering, in some instances, a
50K loan.

ISSUE
Is it an encroachment on the professional practice of Labiano, thereby violating rule 8.02 which provides
that, A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer,?

HELD

17
Yes.
Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result, or reduced fees for his service. In this case, promise of a loan.

Loan to client. The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is
handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of
his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
clients cause. Pedro L. Linsangan vs. Atty. Nicodemes Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009.

26) YSASI III VS NLRC

YSASI III V. NLRC

Facts:

Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was
responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to
such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm,
occupying the upper floor of the house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to
work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and
August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a
deep sinuous ulcer. His recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses
and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private
respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an
explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.

Issues:

(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not
he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal
dismissal.

Held:

18
The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a
period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being
considered as one (1) whole year.

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."

Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes
beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if
not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of
court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their
clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible
by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.

Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of
the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not
but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than
faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts
towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least
entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.

27) CASTANEDA VS AGO

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON,petitioners,vs.PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975 CASTRO, J.

FACTS

In 1955, the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). Ago failed to
redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees
Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of
possession to the properties.

However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale. The
Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed
of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and
from carrying out any writ of possession.

While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the
Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of
May 26, 1966.

19
The Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the
petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court. The Court dismissed the petition in a minute
resolution on February 8, 1967. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they
filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. Failing to obtain
reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the
aforesaid decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal
remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment.

HELD

Yes. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil
case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in
the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in
and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court)

The Court condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, far from viewing courts as
sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court,
Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead
of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.

NOTES

However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on
the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the
replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal
residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for
the satisfaction of the judgment.

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged
and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the
patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If
he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce
and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

20