THE MARITIME ZONES DILEMMA IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: HOW PREPARED IS

THE PHILIPPINES TO ASSERT HER MARITIME CLAIMS?

By COMMO JOEL S GARCIA PCG, H.D, Al-Haj

(This academic article is the authors personal and sole opinion only and does not reflect his
organizations policy and its leaderships view or position on the subject matter)

30 June 2011

A. Introduction

The Philippines has played a pivotal role in crafting some major provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) before its birth in 1982. The illustrious former Senator
Arturo Tolentino, the then countrys representative to the deliberation in the U.N., had vigorously
pushed for the inclusion of a novel idea that would characterize the unique geographical
configuration of the Philippines with the end-view of asserting the countrys position in its maritime
dominium once the Law of the Sea (LOSC) is passed by the U.N. Assembly. This is globally known
today as the Archipelagic Doctrine, a principle in the LOSC that provides an equitable maritime
delimitation formula to littoral or riparian States, such as the Philippines, to avail of the
opportunities its maritime zones can offer in the exploration and exploitation of natural resources,
both living and non-living.

Although the Philippines has ratified UNCLOS in 1984, the country is now facing a dilemma of
maritime boundary disputes with its neighbors, particularly, in the South China Sea (SCS) area. The
SCS is an area of competing claims involving China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Indonesia in which the determination of sovereignty has become important for the ability to exploit
oil, gas, and fishing resources. Among the claimants, China appears to be the most aggressive. It
should be noted that between 1987 to 1998 Chinas intentions was very clear when it framed its
external policy in the SCS in terms of the recovery of lost territories and exclusive sovereignty
over the area.1

In fact, to bolster their claims, Chinas National Peoples Congress passed on 25 February 1992 the
controversial territorial law converting the SCS area into Chinas internal waters. This is widely
known today as the 9 dotted line or the so-called U-shape line territory. According to China, the
law was in consonance with the provisions of the UNCLOS. The passage of the Chinese law had
stimulated strong alarm within the ASEAN and has confirmed the impressions of Chinas aggressive
intentions.2 In 1995, China has occupied the Mischief or Panganiban Reef in the Philippine-claimed
area and in 1999, it has completed the construction of its support facilities as staging points for oil
exploration, and to serve as a base support for its fishing activities, as well.3
1
Leszek Buszynsk, ASEAN,the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea, Professor, Graduate School of
International Relations, International University of Japan, Niigata, Japan
(www/http:/findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6479/is_3_25/ai_n29056620/pg_6/?tag=mantle_skin;content)
2
Ibid
3
Ibid
1
This year, the world has witnessed the surged in Chinas assertiveness that no less than the U.S. and
Australia have openly cautioned China in its aggressive stand. The Philippines on its part has
recently publicly decried on several occasions this assertiveness as intrusion to its maritime zones,
which was however denied publicly by the Chinese Ambassador in Manila.4 Accordingly, China has
not violated any international law and is just asserting its rights under LOSC. If we are to dissect the
move of China in the SCS, it may appear that they are politically motivated to challenge the
Philippines claim to the area, exploiting the obvious fact that the Philippines is militarily the
weakest among the ASEAN claimants.

Again, among the claimant-nations, it will also appear that China, aside from being a military
heavyweight, she is also the most prepared in terms of the essential requisites of the LOSC in so far
as SCS is concerned (e.g. marine scientific data, legal and technical studies, infrastructure
development in the SCS, hydrographic survey, and many other statistical information). In fact, in
order to show how serious they are in their assertions, some universities in China have even
developed educational programs in masteral and doctoral degrees specializing in South China Sea
studies.

Hence, the assertiveness of China today is borne out of its political vision to regain back its so-called
lost territories by investing in the academic and scientific research, infrastructure development,
technical support facilities, and the assertiveness of its civilian maritime agencies. In addition, in
order to avoid international criticisms for militarizing the area, it resorted to the use of its CIVILIAN
LAW SHIPS under the so-called Five (5) Dragon Agencies, namely, the Chinese Coast Guard
(maritime patrol), Chinas Maritime Safety Agency, Fishery Fleet Command, Chinas Custom Agency,
and China Communication and Surveillance Agency.5

Analyzing Chinas preparation and geopolitical maneuvers, it appears that China is likewise cautious
in using its military or naval fleet to assert its claim. Most of the reported alleged intrusions were
done by the ships coming from these Five (5) Dragon Agencies. In its politically clever moves, we
have yet to establish today some constructive evidences that China indeed had used its military
ships and planes in the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

China, too, in its quest for maritime dominium, appears to be observant of the Posse Comitatus
principle the separation of the military or naval enforcement versus civilian law enforcement
operation, particularly, in the implementation of the provisions of the UNCLOS. They have
recognized the LEGAL difference between a WARSHIP and a LAWSHIP in pursuing their political
objectives in asserting their claims. In short, China has done some good strategic homework
before coming out openly in the international arena with its calibrated geopolitical maneuvers in
the SCS.

The geo-strategic move of China is emboldened by the following groundwork: a) academic,

scientific, technical and LEGAL researches, b) capacity build-up and subsequent infrastructure

4
Roy C. Mabasa, Rumors Fly Spratlys Brouhaha, Manila Bulletin, 10 June 2011
5
Lyle J. Goldstein, Chinese Coast Guard Development: Challenge and Opportunity, China Brief, Vol. IX, Issue 23, The
Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 19 November 2009

2
development, c) the use of civilian law ships to prevent from being charged of militarizing the SCS,
d) political-economic projection, and e) political will to assert its vision.

Conversely, this short writing will attempt to review the preparedness of the Philippines with
respect to defending or asserting its maritime claims in the SCS, in both legal and physical
dimensions. Since the law of the sea convention is a very complex subject, our discussion will only
focus on issues pertaining to Philippines archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone, and the implications of the innocent and transit passage thereof.

B. UNCLOS Maritime Zones: A Basic Review

For simple explanation and applicability, we will attempt to dissect the maritime zones provisions of
UNCLOS in the light of Philippines geographical configuration as an Archipelagic State. We will
focus our attention on the Western Philippine Seaboard (WPS) where most of the conflicts had
stemmed from. For the purpose of review, the Philippines is required under the Law of the Sea
Convention (LOSC) to establish an archipelagic baselines.6 Subsequently, the measurement of the
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the
continental shelf is measured from the archipelagic baseline, as shown in the Figure 1:7

Figure 1

6
Article 47
7
Article 48
3
Archipelagic Waters (Internal)

The waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines are described as archipelagic waters
(domestically known as internal waters, but legally speaking, it is not under the LOSC), regardless of
their depth or distance from the coast;8 and the Philippines as an archipelagic State has sovereignty
over them, except on the rights of the foreign ships for innocent passage and archipelagic sea
lanes passage (ASL).9 Please see Figure 2.

Figure 2 (As proposed)

8
Article 49 (1)
9
Article 52 (1) and 53
4
Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASL), Territorial Sea (TS), Contiguous Zone (CZ), Continental Shelf (CS) and
the Exclusive Economic Zone

a. Archipelagic Sea Lane (ASL)

Ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through the archipelagic waters as long as it is
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.10 This is essentially
important if the Philippines would use the archipelagic doctrine concept under the LOSC as a basis
to register its maritime boundary. The country cannot prevent foreign ships from entering the
archipelagic waters, especially if the sea-lanes therein are internationally recognized as customary
routes of commercial ships, except on cases when such entry is inimical to good order, peace and
security.

In addition, innocent passage shall be subject to the designation of the coastal State of an
archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) without prejudice to the rights of the State to draw closing lines for the
delimitation of its internal waters in relation to its bays, mouths of rivers, and ports.11 On the other
hand, the coastal State may suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the
innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security,
only after due publication has been undertaken by the said State.12

b. Territorial Sea (TS), Contiguous Zone (CZ), Continental Shelf (CS), and the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ)

In relation to this, it shall be noted that foreign ships are entitled to innocent passage and/or
transit passage in the territorial sea (TS), while they are entitled to FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
in the contiguous zone (CZ) and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the LOSC. Transit passage
under the context of the LOSC pertains to navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of
traversing that sea without entering the internal waters (entering archipelagic sea lane is of a
different regime) or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal waters; or proceeding to
or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility.13

Furthermore, the passage shall be continuous and expeditious which may include stopping and
anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered
necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships
or aircraft in danger or distress.14 For the purpose of this paper, it shall be noted that the
Philippines territorial sea is so located from the surrounding archipelagic baseline as shown in
figure 2 and is measured twelve (12) miles going seaward from the baseline.

Entering inside the Philippine so-called internal waters is actually entering the Philippine
archipelagic waters, by which, is governed by a separate regime which was earlier explained

10
Article 19 (1)
11
Article 50 in relation to Article 9, 10 and 11
12
Article 52 (2)
13
Article 18 (1)
14
Article 18 (2)
5
concerning the principle of the rights of foreign ships entering an archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) and
its right of innocent and transit passage therein. The rules for transit passage are applied Mutatis
Mutandis to the rules of innocent passage when entering the ASL.

However, passage of a foreign ship may not be considered innocent at all, if in the territorial sea
(including the Archipelagic waters), it engages in any of the following activities:15

1. Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State;

2. Any exercise or practice of weapons of any kind;

3. Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the
coastal State;

4. Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal State;

5. The launching, landing or taking onboard of any aircraft;

6. The launching, landing or taking onboard of any military device;

7. The loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;

8. Any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to the provisions of UNCLOS;

9. Any fishing activities;

10. The carrying out of research or survey activities;

11. Any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or
installations of the coastal State;

12. Any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.

In the case of the Philippines, where it adopted the archipelagic doctrine legal concept in asserting
its claims to its maritime zones, the LOSC requires the government to establish an archipelagic sea
lane passage suitable for the continuous, expeditious and unobstructed passage of foreign ships
and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea, which is actually
situated inside the surrounding archipelagic baseline. The law also mentions that when a foreign
ship traverses the ASL, it shall be in its normal mode of transiting between one part of the high seas
or EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ, using the normal passage routes for traditional
or customary international navigation.

15
Article 19 (2)
6
Along this line, the LOSC requires the archipelagic State to define the ASLs entry and exit points
using an axis line as navigational routes of foreign ships, and shall likewise prescribe traffic
separation schemes (TSS) therein for the safe passage of ships through narrow channels in such sea
lanes, provided, that such ASL proposal shall be referred to competent international organization
(in this case, the International Maritime Organization) with a view to their adoption.16

Incidentally, the LOSC is categorical in its requirement that ASL proposal of a coastal State shall be
referred to the IMO for deliberation and approval of the assembly. Right now, there is a bill filed in
the Philippine Congress proposing the establishment of the countrys ASL. In the light of this
requirement, it is suggested that the Executive Branch of government should be the one proactive
in preparing the Philippine ASL proposal, and subsequently submit the same to the IMO for
approval, with the end-view of providing notice to the whole world of our nautical routes.

Otherwise, even if legislation of Philippines so-called ASL is made, this will still not have a legal and
binding effect to the international shipping community since the same has not been coursed
through the proper international legal process, or even if this will be coursed through the IMO,
there is no assurance that this will be approved or even recognized by the assembly. In short, aside
from being a tedious process, locally legislating an ASL is perceived to be a political exercise in vain
unless the process is completely consummated upto the IMO. Article 53 section 9 of UNCLOS is
very clear on this.

Although it is desirable and ideal to legislate laws relevant to the LOSC, the countrys experience
when it comes to its track record in legislating laws, taking ages to happen, would indicate to us
that legislative bills filed in the Philippine Congress could take a number of years to be enacted into
laws. Moreso, with maritime related bills, which normally are not given special preference by the
countrys legislators. As an example, the Philippines as a maritime country and Archipelagic State
needs a Merchant Shipping Act or a Maritime Code yet when the bill was filed in Congress to
address this pressing need, this bill was never enacted into law - to the grave loss of a maritime
nation such as ours.

In fact, the proposed Merchant Shipping Act was part of the maritime agenda of the defunct
Presidential Task Force on Maritime Development in 1997.17 Incidentally, it could have been
legislated into law had President Fidel V. Ramos have enough time left on his term as President.
The bill was certified urgent but was overtaken by events wrought by the forthcoming national
election then in 1998. In addition, the formulation of the Philippines archipelagic baseline, TS, ASL,
CS, CZ and EEZ was also part of the afore-cited Task Force agenda. These, too, suffered for lack of
material time to prepare. That was thirteen (13) years ago, yet, we are still grappling up to this
present day to have these maritime zones duly established.

The excerpts from The Law of the Sea, Third Edition, by R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, published in
1999, exemplifies the sloth pace of our compliance to the LOSC, to wit:

16
Article 53
17
Incidentally, the author was the head of the secretariat of the said Task Force in 1997. He pushed for the inclusion of
the proposed Merchant Shipping Act and the compliance of the Philippines with the UNCLOS essential requirements as
Archipelagic State in the Task Force agenda.
7
 When ratifying the law of the sea convention, the Philippines made a declaration that the provisions of the
Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impaired the sovereignty of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State over the sea lanes and .. that the concept of archipelagic waters is similar
to the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these
waters with the economic zone or high seas from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for internal
navigation. This declaration was objected to by Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Ukraine
and the U.S.A. on the grounds that it exceeded the permissible scope of the declarations given by Article 310 of
the Convention and was in reality an impermissible reservation and that it indicated an intention by the
Philippines to contravene the Convention. In response the Philippines said that it intended to harmonize its
domestic legislation with the provisions of the Convention and that the necessary steps are being undertaken to
enact legislation dealing with archipelagic sea lanes passage and the exercise of the Philippines sovereign rights
over archipelagic waters, in accordance with the Convention. As far as we are aware, such legislation has not
yet been enacted.(Underline supplied)

Moreover, it shall be noted that in case the archipelagic State does not designate sealanes or air
routes in its archipelagic waters, the right of ASL passage may still be exercised through the routes
normally used for international navigation.18 In short, the Philippines MAY DECIDE NOT TO
ESTABLISH the ASL for reason of protecting its marine environment within its archipelagic waters,
however, this does not mean that without the ASL, foreign ships are not allowed to pass through
this internal route. The LOSC is explicit in saying that they can, provided they have to pass
through the traditional sea routes normally used for international navigation.

It pays to bear in mind that the Philippine situation vis--vis the LOSC is so unique that special
provisions under the law of the sea has been accorded to those countries similarly situated which
opted to choose the archipelagic doctrine regime as their basis for their respective claim for
maritime zones. Attached Annex will show us the summary of the rights and duties of the coastal
State vis--vis foreign ships in its maritime zones.

C. Reviewing Philippines Initiatives vis--vis UNCLOS Essentials

This paper is not aimed to review the basis of the conflicts arising from the maritime disputes in the
Philippines EEZ or in the countrys claimed territory in the SCS. Instead, it is the objective of this
paper to dissect the political and technical moves of the Philippines vis--vis Chinas assertion in the
past months concerning the alleged Chinese intrusions in our territory, and to provide some
useful insight in order for the country to formulate sustainable and peaceful political solutions in
resolving the looming maritime boundary conflict, and to prepare for the subsequent follow up in
asserting our rights and sovereignty over our claims.

At any rate, given the aforementioned encapsulation of the rights of the archipelagic State under
the LOSC, it might be prudent to probe if there were indeed Chinese intrusions into our maritime
boundaries? If there is any, which part of our maritime domain or zones? Is it within our
territorial sea, contiguous zone or exclusive economic zone? Does the Philippines have the
constructive evidence (legal, scientific, technical) to prove the allegations?

Before answering these questions, a legal premise is ought to be adopted that the Philippines, as a
member-State of the United Nations, has all the rights to invoke its sovereignty over its maritime
dominium under the Law of the Sea Convention, specifically, its territorial sea, contiguous zone,
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. This is the general indivisible rule. Invoking

18
Article 53 (12)
8
such rights, of course, should be within the legal bounds and framework of the LOSC and other
international laws.

However, it must be remembered that before a coastal State can invoke its rights over its claims,
there is a litany of legal, technical, scientific and physical parameters that the LOSC has laid down
prior the consumption and safeguarding of the said rights. These are conditions sine qua non,
which a coastal State must comply. What are these?

As an Archipelagic State

As an archipelagic State, and before asserting maritime claims, has there been an archipelagic
baseline drawn on nautical charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their positions,
inclusive of lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum?19 Has
there been a publication of this in nautical charts, inclusive of the list of geographical
coordinates and deposited the same to the Secretary General of the United Nations?20 Which
government agency has the mandate to do this?

Has there been a measurement of the breadth of Philippines territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, in relation to its baseline, and have
drawn the same on nautical charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their positions,
inclusive of lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum?21 Has
there been a publication of this in nautical charts and deposited to the U.N.? If this
requirement has not yet been complied with, how will foreign ships, or other States for that
matter, recognize legally and technically the Philippines maritime boundaries?

Has there been closing lines drawn in our archipelagic waters for the delimitation of internal
waters in relation to ports, mouth of rivers and bays?22 Has there been a publication of this in
nautical charts and deposited to the U.N.? If this requirement has not yet been complied with,
how will foreign ships observe the rules when entering Philippines bays, mouths of rivers and
ports?

Has there been an identification of existing agreements with other States and traditional fishing
rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately adjacent neighboring States in certain
areas falling within Philippines archipelagic waters?23

Has there been an adoption or formulation of laws and regulations relating to transit passage
on the following navigational aspects: a) safety of navigation and the regulations of maritime
traffic, b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution regarding the discharge of oil, oily
wastes and other noxious substances, c) with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of
fishing, including the stowage of fishing gear, d) the loading or unloading of any commodity,

19
Article 47 (8)
20
Article 47 (9)
21
Article 48
22
Article 50
23
Article 51 (1)
9
 currency or person in contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations.24 Has there been a publication of this for the consumption of international
shipping? Does the Philippines have the capability to enforce in full the aforementioned laws
and regulations within the vast boundary of our archipelagic waters while hundreds of foreign
ships are transiting therein? Which particular agencies of government are responsible in
formulating the regulations on the afore-mentioned?

In the case of the regime of passage through straits used for international navigation, in
particular, the Strait of Balabac (Southern Palawan and Sabah, Malaysia border), has there been
an establishment of the maritime regime passage in consonance with Part III of LOSC? Has this
been done the same to other Straits within Philippines maritime borders?

Has there been an initiative to come up with a treaty of delimitation with Philippines
neighboring countries (Indonesia and Malaysia) in compliance with Article 15 and Article 74 of
LOSC, whichever is applicable?

Are there enough civilian law enforcement ships to enforce the laws and regulations relating to
transit passage within the vast waters of our archipelagic waters? How can the Philippines
assert its claims and enforce its rights if it does not have any? How can the Philippines ensure
the promotion of maritime safety and security and the protection of its marine environment if it
does not have any?

Archipelagic Sea Lane Passage, Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Continental Shelf

As an archipelagic State, has there been a designation of an archipelagic sea lanes and air routes
suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircrafts through or
over our archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea?25 Has there been a submission of
a proposed ASL to the competent international organization (International Maritime
Organization) with a view to their adoption?26 If none, how will the international shipping
community recognize the Philippines rights if this has not yet been done?

Has there been a prescription of traffic separation schemes (TSS) for the safe passage of ships
through narrow channels in such lanes?27 Has there been an establishment of aids to
navigation facilities, buoyage and communications infrastructure, and vessel traffic
management system in the projected ASL and TSS in order to promote safety and security and
to protect the countrys precious marine environment?28 Which particular agency of
government is responsible in formulating the regulations for these schemes and systems? In
case of marine accident or marine pollution, does the Philippines have the capability to conduct
marine casualty investigation with reference to the IMO rules and standards?

24
Article 54, Article 42
25
Article 53 (1)
26
Article 53 (9)
27
Article 53 (6)
28
Article 43
10
 Has there been identification and designation of the Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA),
domestically called as marine protected areas, within the Philippines ASL, TS, CZ and EEZ?29
Has there been a submission of the list of Philippines PSSA to the IMO for recognition of the
assembly? Before submitting such proposal to the IMO, has there been a conduct of necessary
marine scientific study to back-up said claims? Which particular agency is responsible for this?

Has there been an adoption of a compulsory pilotage system in special areas within our ASL, TS
and CZ? Has there been an enactment of such law on pilotage?

Has there been a formulation of regulations on speed restrictions within the countrys ASL, TS
and CZ?30 Which particular agency is responsible for this?

Has there been an identification of known navigational hazards and issuance of notice on the
same to the IMO? Which particular agency is responsible for this?31

Has there been a measurement to establish the Philippines continental shelf in reference to its
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea throughout
the prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that
distance?32 Has there been a submission of the information on the limits of the continental
shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II of the
LOSC?33

Has there been conditions established for laying down of cables or pipelines entering Philippine
territory or territorial sea, or its jurisdiction over cables and pipelines constructed or used in
connection with the exploration of its continental shelf or exploitation of its resources or the
operations of artificial islands, installations and structures under its jurisdiction?34

Has there been regulation established to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf
for all purposes under the LOSC?35

Has there been regulation established to authorize and regulate the construction, operation
and use of artificial islands, installations and structures in relation to Article 56 of the LOSC?36

29
IMO Resolution A. 720 (17)
30
Article 21
31
Ibid
32
Article 76 (1)
33
Article 76 (8)
34
Article 79 (4)
35
Article 81
36
Article 80, mutatis mutandis with Article 60
11
 Does the Philippines have enough civilian law enforcement ships to enforce its laws in relation
to guarding its ASL, TS and CZ while hundred of foreign ships are traversing thereto? How can
the Philippines assert its claims and enforce its rights if it does not have any? How can the
Philippines ensure the promotion of maritime safety and security and the protection of its
marine environment if it does not have any?

Exclusive Economic Zone

Has there been a legislation of enforcement activities to deal with the dumping of waste, other
forms of pollution from ships, and pollution from sea-bed activities in the countrys EEZ?37 If
none, how will the Philippines enforce its rights to prevent marine pollution in its EEZ if it does
not have the necessary laws or regulations? How will the Philippines notify the international
shipping community and the other States of its EEZ regulations based on its maritime rights if it
does not have any?

Has there been an establishment through scientific means of the allowable catch (often
referred to as total allowable catch) for the countrys fish stock within its EEZ?38 This data is
important if the Philippines is to prevent other States from fishing in its EEZ, otherwise, in the
absence of such data, the Philippines may be compelled to allow them to fish in its EEZ. Article
62 (2) provides that where the fishermen of the coastal State are not capable of taking the
whole of the allowable catch, the coastal State is to permit the fishermen of other States to fish
for the balance between what its fishermen take and the allowable catch. What is the countrys
scientific proof that the fish within its EEZ is within its allowable catch? What would prevent
other States from fishing within the Philippines EEZ if it does not have such data to show? Has
there been an establishment of fishing regulations within the Philippines EEZ? If indeed the
Philippines has any, has there been a notification of the other States through the Secretary
General of the United Nations of the countrys fishery regulations?

Has there been a conduct of scientific study on the Philippines straddling stocks, migratory
species, and catadromous species within its EEZ?39

Has there been a designation of PSSA in the Philippines EEZ?40 Has there been a
communication of the same to the IMO for its recognition?

Has there been a provision of the Philippines conditions for the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines in its EEZ?41 Has there been a communication of the same to the competent
authority? What agency in government is in charge in laying such conditions?

37
Articles 208, 210 (5), 211, 214, 216, 220, and 234
38
Article 61
39
Articles 63, 64, and 67
40
IMO Resolution A.720 (17)
41
Article 58 (3)
12
 Has there been a provision of the rules and regulations pertaining to the prevention of marine
pollution, dumping of wastes, speed restrictions and pilotage rules and communicated the same
to the IMO?42

Does the Philippines have civilian law enforcement ships capable to reach the boundary of its
200-mile EEZ to enforce its laws relating to the law of the sea? How can the Philippines assert
its claims and enforce its rights if it does not have any? How can the Philippines ensure the
promotion of maritime safety and security and the protection of its marine environment if it
does not have any?

If the answers to most of these questions are in the negative, the Philippines is really facing a
serious problem. The above technical, scientific and legal requirements are the Philippines only
tools to show to the world the legitimacy of its assertions, crucial to its maritime claims. In simple
language, how can someone assert the exact area of his property when in fact, he does not have an
established metes and bounds of his property? How can someone prevent trespassers from
entering his property when he has not put up fences to fend them off? How can someone put up
fences in his property when in the first place, he has not established, in technical details, the metes
and bounds of the said property?

By analogy, in land disputes, the land title of the property is very important because said land title is
a declaration in rem against the whole world that someone owns such property. But even before
the issuance of the title, authorities normally asked for technical descriptions as represented in
geographical coordinates to measure the exact boundaries of such claim. This is to ensure
avoidance of possible disputes from other prospective claimant in case there is any.

On the other hand, if somebody has encroached on ones property, the authority can easily resolve
the possible dispute because of the technical descriptions spelled on said property. In the absence
of such technical descriptions, how can the authority resolve the dispute and use the applicable
rules when there is no technical basis to solve it? In other words, when one goes to court and file a
complaint, such as in the case of land dispute, one should be prepared in obtaining first from the
proper authority (in this case the DENR or NAMRIA) the technical documents that would support
ones claim.

In the world of ocean and maritime affairs, under the UNCLOS regime, a coastal State should first
go to the competent authority, that is, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or the
Secretary General of the United Nations, whichever is appropriate, to get the imprimatur of the
technical documents for the maritime claims presented. These shall include, among others,
establishments of maritime infrastructures (traffic separation system, vessel traffic management
system, aids to navigation such as lighted buoys and lighthouses, identification of a particularly
sensitive sea area, etc), imposition of maritime safety, security and pollution regulations, pilotage
system, marine scientific study, fishery law, and the like. Once the proposal is granted by the
international competent authority, this is considered as Erga Omnes, or valid against the whole
world, regardless of consent on the part of those affected.

42
Article 56 (1) (b)
13
Ergo, the Philippines should diligently do its homework first, for only then it can really be prepared
and equipped to bring its stake in the international arena with a much better chance of succeeding
for the acknowledgement by the community of nations.

D. Moving Towards the Future

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, it may seem that the Philippines may have a lot of catching
up to do with respect to complying with its duties under the LOSC. Yes, the Philippines may have its
rights under the law of the sea, but these rights have corresponding prerequisite duties and
obligations. The Philippines better not doze off and complacently dawdle, to say the least, in as
much as the stakes are high and the ante are being waged by some, if not many . The Philippines
territorial insecurity today has stemmed from its lack of appreciation of its geo-property rights
under the LOSC.

This is evident by the countrys lack of maritime domain awareness of the exclusivity of its maritime
claims, which has been exacerbated by the fact that the government may have inadvertently not
given primordial importance in securing its rights under the law of nations. The Philippines may
seem to have failed to analyze the importance of the oceans and the seas in its existence as a
sovereign archipelagic nation in relation to geostrategic perspective vis--vis the demographic
inflation and the corresponding decline in living space, resources and standards.

As a result, the importance of the ocean and the sea does not register any clear direction in policy
decisions. The Philippines, although endowed with the abundance and vastness of its seas and
ocean (part of the PACIFIC! which could hardly be imagined by anybody BUT TRULY IS SO!), owing
to its natural archipelagic configuration, has ironically adopted policies that are primarily land-
centered, to the detriment of its maritime potential WEALTH and its SECURITY. Sadly, ocean and
sea use management have just been relegated as incident related and, more often than not, only
acts on maritime complex issues on post incident basis, thus, the difficult struggle.

The UNCLOS was ratified by the Philippine government twenty-seven (27) years ago, but a credible
ocean and sea operational philosophy has yet to be seen, albeit a legal national maritime strategic
policy. The crux of the matter is, the Philippines have left its ocean and seas in the backburner,
devoured by the geopolitical threats arising from the shift in the balance of geopolitical gravity in
the global competition for economic and military supremacy. The strategic balance of power has
now shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific, of which, the South China Sea plays a crucial strategic
role, since it is vital to the strategic interests of the superpowers, in addition to its abundance in
natural resources.

For numerous occasions, the Philippines, along with the smaller claimant States in the SCS, have
been asking the world for assistance in asserting its claims in the contested sea, especially when a
heavyweight claimant starts to flex its muscle through power projection. The Philippines can only
howl and growl in preventive stance. And the question lingers, has the Philippines done its
homework wrought by the lessons of its experiences? Has it answered and worked on its
assignments the essentials of the law of the sea?

With the prevailing power asymmetry in the South China Sea, the threat matrix cube combining all
the claimant States would give us a tale-telling story of ending up on zero-sum conclusion. The
14
Philippines dare not even think of it since in the first place, its political strategy should focus on how
to win the battle unscathed, if ever possible, without drawing its puny wooden sword.

First, the Philippines geostrategic approach should hinge on its capacity to pool its legal and
technical resources together and review whether the country is in the position to assert its rights
with respect to its inherent duties as a coastal State under the UNCLOS regime as earlier
mentioned.

Second, the Philippines has to have faith in the ASEAN system, whereby multilateralism has its
characterized premium in socio-political and economic undertakings. It is therefore wise for the
Philippines to politically engage its fellow ASEAN co-claimants in this unfolding scenario in the
region.

Lastly, the Philippines has to be politically engaged with China with the end-in-view of stimulating a
regional maritime cooperative governance.43

The Philippines should take a cue from Chinas employed scheme by duplicating Chinas operational
culture and propensity of optimizing its assertion through the use of its so-called five (5) dragons,
namely: a) Chinese Coast Guard (maritime patrol police), b) China Maritime Safety Agency, c) China
Customs Authority, d) China Fishery Fleet Command, e) China Maritime Communication and
Surveillance Agency.44 It is worthy to note that all these agencies are civilian agencies enforcing
civilian international laws and conventions in the SCS, cleverly skirting the use of its military and
naval forces to avoid being accused of militarizing the area, a wise application indeed of the Posse
Comitatus principle.

Although bereft with floating assets (ships and sea crafts), the Philippines can still do an ala
China-dragon trick by pooling together its available civilian law enforcement ships owned by the
government (Coast Guard, BFAR, NAMRIA, DA, etc.), with the Philippine Navy ships at the
homefront, ready to back-up Philippine LAW enforcement ships in the forefront (SCS), when
maritime complexities so require.

The Philippine should have a singular maritime force, inspired by a unified maritime strategy,
through the fusion of all the countrys potent force at sea aimed at attaining a collective maritime
security perspective in protecting our treasured maritime archipelagic domain. Maritime strategy
is more than naval strategy. It involves all government bodies with responsibilities in the oceanic
domain.45

In sum, the Philippines approach should be geared towards capacity building and institutional
enhancement, multilateralism through regional maritime cooperative governance, and direct

43
Ambassador Alberto Encomienda, former director of CMOA, advocates the concept of regional maritime cooperative
governance. He is a retired Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) official and is regarded an expert in the LOSC.
44
Lyle J. Goldstein, Chinese Coast Guard Development: Challenge and Opportunity, China Brief, Vol IX, Issue 23, The
Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., U.S., 09 November 2009,
45
James R. Homes, Chinas Maritime Strategy Is More than Naval Strategy, China Brief, Vol XI, Issues 6, The
Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., U.S., 08 April 2011
15
political cum diplomatic engagement with each of the claimant States. Below is the outline of the
proposed diplomatic policy engagement:

a. Capacity Building and Institutional Enhancement

Ocean and sea based policy and legislative formulation is a different dimension from the traditional
land-centered legislation, all together distinct and separate from each other.46 The former is
more complex than the latter as it has an international character where various international laws,
conventions and agreements have to be taken into account with considerable degree of sensitivity
and caution. Deeper insights on ocean and sea use management and knowledge on international
maritime issues, specifically on the promotion of maritime safety, marine pollution prevention,
maritime security, maritime law, and maritime economics, among others, are considered major
requisites in coming up with the much sought comprehensive national maritime strategic policy.

When these vital components of this maritime stratagem shall have been in place, the government
authority can already proceed to embark on capacity building and institutional enhancement
measures to strengthen the Philippines maritime niche in this part of the world. For clarity
purposes, the ensuing discussion will only focus on the backlogs earlier mentioned and proposals
on certain policy directions to address the prevailing issues. In so doing, we are actually trying to
build up our capacity and enhance pertinent institutions in order to comply with the essentials of
the UNCLOS.

The Philippines success of being able to legislate its archipelagic baseline before the deadline set
by the United Nations for UNCLOS compliance is certainly laudable. Indeed, the baseline is crucial
in setting-up the pace to mathematically measure the breadth of the Philippines TS, CZ, CS, EEZ and
even the continental shelf. Unfortunately, the law (RA 9522) which promulgates the Philippine
baseline is, at present, under legal review by the Supreme Court on question of unconstitutionality.
It is on this context that the Supreme Court ought to consider the expeditious resolution in order
for the Philippines to move into the next phase of determining its TS, CZ, EEZ and continental shelf.

Nevertheless, this should not stop the concerned authorities from measuring the TS, CZ, CS and the
EEZ based on the archipelagic baseline. Surprisingly, while the Philippines has a Cabinet Committee
on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CMOA), this collegial body is composed of various government
agencies, most of which are mandated with land-based functions. Hence, reviewing the legal
mandates of its members, it goes to show that the following agencies have the corresponding
further responsibility vis-a-vis the technical, legal and scientific essential requisites of the LOSC, as
earlier mentioned:

NAMRIA

Measurement and identification of the TS, CZ, CS, EEZ and geodetic datum

Drawing of closing lines in the archipelagic waters for the delimitation of internal waters in
relation to ports, mouth of rivers, and bays.

46
Dr. Prabhakaran Paleri, Coast Guards of the World and Emerging Maritime Threats, Ocean Policy Studies, Special
Edition, Ocean Research Policy Foundation of Japan, 2009
16
BFAR

Fishery regulations including the stowage of fishing gears for submission to international
competent authority

In cooperation with U.P. Marine Science Institute, DA, and other agencies specializing in marine
sciences, conduct of marine scientific studies in determining the allowable fish catch in the
Philippines EEZ, and other related studies with respect to highly migratory species, marine
mammals, anadromous stocks, catadromous species, sedentary species, and the like in the said
area.

CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION, and QUARANTINE SERVICES

Publication of pertinent regulations pertaining to the loading or unloading of any commodity,

currency or person in contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitation laws of
the country.

PPA

Initiation of a bill pertaining to the Pilotage System for submission to Congress with a view for
its enactment into law

PCG

Formulation of regulations pertaining to transit passage on the following navigational aspects in

accordance with LOSC and the IMO Conventions (SOLAS, MARPOL, COLREGS, ISPS Code),
specifically on the following:

Safety of navigation and the regulations of maritime traffic in accordance with the International
Convention on the Prevention of Collision at Sea (COLREGS)

Identification of Archipelagic Sea Lane (ASL) passages in consonance with the LOSC and
COLREGS. It is prudent for the Philippines to first submit the proposed ASL to IMO for final
recognition and adoption. Local legislation of the same has no bearing to the international
shipping community unless recognized by the IMO member States.

Identification and establishment of Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) for the safe passage of ships
through narrow channels in the ASL in accordance with LOSC and COLREGS.

Formulation of rules and regulations pertaining to speed restrictions for ships in special areas
within the AW, ASL, TS and CZ in accordance with IMO Conventions and its Resolutions.

Identification of known navigational hazards within the AW, ASL, TS, CZ and EEZ and submission
of same to IMO for notification of international shipping

Establishment of Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) with Automatic Identification

System (AIS) capability in accordance with the SOLAS Convention with special reference to the
17
 ISPS Code in the following areas: Balabac Strait, Zamboanga peninsula, Romblon, Batanes,
Northern Palawan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Cebu. This is for maritime security and marine accident
prevention requirement of LOSC and IMO Conventions and its Resolutions.

Establishment of maritime communications infrastructure compliant with the requirements of

the Global Maritime Distress Signal System (GMDSS) and the ISPS Code in accordance with
SOLAS Convention

Prevention, reduction and control of pollution regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes, and
other noxious substance in accordance with the Marine Pollution Convention (MARPOL)

Promotion of safety of life and property at sea in accordance with SOLAS convention

Capability enhancement for the conduct of marine casualty accident and marine pollution
investigation cases with reference to the IMO rules and standards

Enforcement of the International Safety and Security for Ports and Ships Code (ISPS Code)

Identification of the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA), domestically known as marine
protected area, within the archipelagic waters in accordance with the LOSC, IMO Conventions
and its Resolutions, and other related international laws.

Formulation of regulations for conditions of laying-out submarine cables and pipelines in AW,
TS, CS, and EEZ

Enforcement of laws in fishery, customs, immigration, anti-drug, anti-terrorism, environmental

protection, among others in the absence at SEA of concerned agencies.

Conduct of maritime civilian law enforcement of all the aforementioned regulations within the
679,800 square kilometer of the Philippine archipelagic waters (not included the Philippine
waters in the CZ and the EEZ)

While it is interesting to note that most of the essential requisites of the LOSC can be done through
administrative undertakings (technical, scientific and legal), the hardest part in the implementation
is the physical enforcement requirements of all the laws, rules and regulations espoused under
the law of the sea, requiring physical archipelagic infrastructures and the actual physical law
enforcement activity.

Anent thereto, the Philippines has first to put-up the LOSC infrastructures, such as, the VTMS, TSS,
Communications system, Buoyage system, and the like, to guide foreign ships to their safe passage
within the Philippines AW, ASL, TS, CZ and EEZ. Otherwise, how will the transiting vessels observe
the Philippine rules within the ASL, TS, CZ and EEZ if there are no such systems in place earlier
mentioned? Conversely, how will the Philippines also enforce its Archipelagic laws if the systems
required by the laws are not present?

By parallelism, in roads, it is like driving a car in the middle of the street without any traffic lights,
road markers, and safety signage for directions. One could just imagine the lurking dangers that
18
can happen any moment without warning. So are the perils in the sea, which are even more
unforgiving.

In this light, can the Philippines afford to have accidents at sea? There are scores of foreign big oil
tanker ships that traverse our archipelagic waters, notwithstanding the transiting hundreds of other
type of commercial ships of various flags of registry in a given day, compounded by the thousands
of our own domestic commercial and fishing fleet. Can the Philippines afford a duplication of
marine pollution disaster in a catastrophic proportion as that of the Exxon Valdez accident in Alaska
in 1990 in our own archipelagic waters? The cost of the clean-up operation of that Alaskan marine
pollution accident runs into $30 billions, thus far, and still counting as of this date.

For us to imagine the grave consequences of an oil spill disaster that can bring to us, we can just
refer to our sad experience in Guimaras and Iloilo provinces in the MV Solar 1 oil spill accident,
wherein it became a sensational issue and had caused serious national concern. And to think that
MV Solar 1 incident pale in comparison to that of the Exxon Valdez accident in terms of magnitude
and coverage.

The essential requirement is the physical guarding of the Philippines AW, ASL, TS, and EEZ to
prevent all forms of possible transgressions to all the Archipelagic laws and regulations in
consonance with the LOSC and the IMO Conventions. For the purpose of mathematical
computation, the Philippine archipelagic baseline is estimated at 2,640 miles or 4,248 kilometers,
while the six (6) proposed Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASL) entering and exiting on seven (7) points
within the AW is approximately 2,572 miles or 4,139 kilometers. In addition, the Philippine
maritime waters, inclusive with the EEZ, is estimated at 2.8 million square kilometers, while the
countrys oceanic waters is reported at 1.93 million square kilometers.47

Given this geometrics, in order for the Philippines to modestly guard physically its vast ASL, TS,
CZ and EEZ and physically conduct civilian law enforcement operation is for the country to have at
least ten (10) Off-shore patrol vessels (100 meters), four (4) ocean patrol vessels (140 meters) and
twenty (20) multi-purpose patrol vessels (60 meters), working round the clock to enforce LOSC,
IMO Conventions and the corresponding Archipelagic laws and regulations, to say the least. This is
notwithstanding the fact that the country still needs scores of 25 to 35 meter boats to guard the
822 coastal municipalities which has a total coastal population of 64.7 million people spread across
the 36,289 kilometer coastlines.48 Without these floating CIVILIAN law enforcement assets, our
laws, rules and regulations could easily just be disregarded to our countrys detriment, if not
outright risk.

These thousands of commercial ships, both foreign and domestic plying our archipelagic waters
everyday requires the enforcement of the LOSC and the various civilian mercantile marine IMO
conventions. In fact, all ships in the international trade are required to COMPLY with the
Automatic Identification System (AIS) requirement of the SOLAS Convention (ISPS Code) in order
for the coastal State to easily identify in its VTMS/AIS radar system the name of the vessel, port of
origin and destination, and cargo on board, without calling hundreds of them by mere radio, which

47
Philippine Coastal & Marine Resources: An Introduction, taken last 30 June 2011 from
www/http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPHILIPPINES/Resources/PEMOS-ch
48
Ibid
19
is rendered in obsolescence by todays shipping technological IMO requirement standards.
Otherwise, if the authority sees them on the radar and their ships data are not registered,
automatically these ships are considered suspects, and their passage can be impeded for
boarding/checking purposes. This system can also be employed by our coast guard in all our
domestic merchant fleet for maritime safety and security purposes in its civilian LAW enforcement
mandate.

These investments on maritime resources for the Philippines is considerably just a drop in the
bucket when compared to the countrys economic losses due to smuggling, poaching, destruction
of our corals and reefs, dwindling fish supply because of illegal fishing, marine pollution, maritime
accidents, among many others. Per estimated by competent authorities, the government is poise
to lose at least P50 billion a year due to mismanagement and wanton neglect of the countrys
marine resources. The SCS alleged intrusion incidents are just the tip of the dagger, so to speak.

Yet, the Philippines remain oblivious of the dangers posed by its tendency to neglect its ocean and
seas - it must be a dreaded thought to even think about waking up one dull morning and find-out
that the Philippines ocean and seas are no longer hers due to default (by act of omission). But then
again, it is not impossible, in fact, it is even plausible reckoned from the indicators that are starting
to set in if nothing is done about it.

b. Multilateralism with the End-View of Regional Maritime Cooperative Governance

There are several relevant UNCLOS provisions that can open the floodgates for maritime
cooperation among the claimant States, namely: a) Part IX of the LOSC pertains to governance of
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, b) Part XII of the LOSC pertains to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, c) Part XIII of the LOSC pertains to the conduct of marine
scientific research, d) Part IV of the LOSC pertains to the transfer of marine technology, and, e)
Annex 6 of the LOSC pertains to resolution on the development of national marine science
technology and ocean service infrastructure.49

In as much as the law of the sea is anchored on the underpinning principle of common heritage of
mankind, the Philippines (which straddles between one of the worlds great ocean and the present
day world most important sea-lane of communications), should take the initiative in championing
the cause of this time-honored dictum in behalf of mankind. In addition, the Philippine seas West
Philippine and the Sulu seas are so situated in the center of the worlds marine biodiversity, which
require protection and preservation that can be made through regional maritime cooperative
governance.

This goes without saying that the Philippines, along with its claimant States, have intergenerational
responsibility to take care of the ocean and the seas in behalf of the future generation of mankind.
Aside from the UNCLOS regime, there are numerous IMO Conventions which the Philippines could
utilize to induce claimant States to participate in regional maritime cooperation. In addition, China

49
Ambassador Alberto Encomienda, former director of CMOA advocates the concept of regional maritime cooperative
governance. He is a retired Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) official and is regarded an expert in the LOSC.
20
and a unified ASEAN front can treasure the opportunity to form some kind of development
anchored by strong political will, long-term peace and security in the SCS.50

The international undertakings of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) proved to be good examples of
this regional maritime cooperation. History would show that for more than thirty (30) years now,
the PCG has forged a bilateral agreement with the Indonesian Sea Communications (Coast Guard)
and the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) to assist each other in case of major oil pollution occurrence.
Every year, the three (3) countries conduct marine pollution exercise using their coast guard ships,
making the Indonesian and Philippine waters as their venue, alternately. The MARPOL exercise has
made the relationship of the three (3) coast guards as close as ever, with the promising prospect of
bringing along the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (Coast Guard) and the Vietnamese
Coast Guard to join this noble environmental protection undertaking in the immediate future.

Last year, H.E. President Benigno C. Aquino Jr. had signed a bilateral agreement with his
Vietnamese counterpart calling for a regional cooperation on Search and Rescue Cooperation in
the South China Sea through the use of the coast guards of both countries. Last April 2011, through
the initiative of Admiral Liwag, PCG Commandant, being the Chairman of the Regional Cooperation
on Anti-Piracy in Asia-Pacific (RECAAP) based in Singapore, he invited the Commandant of the
Indian Coast Guard to send Indian Coast Guard ships to visit the port of Manila. His invitation was
cordially accepted and last June 2011, one Indian Coast Guard ship arrived in Manila, sending a
fraternal message for the start of a closer coast guard relationship between the two. The event was
highlighted by no less than the Indian Ambassador to the Philippines, promising to invite PCG
officers for cross-training in the Indian Coast Guard.

The social, political, operational and cooperative dimensions of Coast Guards do not only extend
within the bounds of Asia but has extended across the Pacific. Last 2009, the world has witnessed
the visit of U.S. Coast Guard ships to China and extended its cooperation with its Chinese
counterpart through a joint search and rescue exercise, while during the same period a team of
Chinese scientists embarked briefly on a USCG icebreaker off Alaska to retrieve scientific data.51 In
addition, the U.S. has accommodated Chinese coast guard cadets to study in the prestigious U.S.
Coast Guard Academy (USCGA).52

Not to be outdone, the Philippines, too, has sent two (2) PCG cadets, studying at the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), to study in the USCGA through the generosity of the U.S.
government. Joining the spree of benevolence, the Japanese Coast Guard has provided several
grants to the PCG by way of human resource development projects. In the last five (5) years, the
PCG had sent more than fifty (50) officers to Japan to take up various training courses, all under the
auspices of the Japanese Coast Guard.

50
Professor Zou Keyuan, Harris Professor of International Law, University of Central Lancashire, United Kingdom, The
South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, a Conference Report, S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 16-17 May 2007
51
Lyle J. Goldstein, Chinese Coast Guard Development: Challenge and Opportunity, Volume IX, Issue 23, The
Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C. U.S., 19 November 2009
52
Ibid
21
The Philippines on its part may even initiate to host an ASEAN Coast Guard Institute to cater to
harmonizing the training of ASEAN coast guards, and probably, induce Japan, China and South
Korea to provide the infrastructures and equipment. The explicit display of cooperation among
coast guards is a phenomenon that cannot be found in the navies of the world.

Regional order and security in Asia-Pacific is changing in the light of the common maritime threats
Asia-Pacific nations are facing today.53 Global warming, transnational crimes, marine
environmental degradation, piracy, drug trafficking, among many others, are the common
problems coast guards are faced with today. In examining the role of the coast guards, it will show
that the worlds coast guard are designed for enforcement of national and international
legislations, likewise providing service to humanity, especially the maritime community.

These are some of the performed-roles of the coast guard according to their functions: maritime
security and law enforcement, promotion of maritime safety, marine environmental protection,
search and rescue at sea, maritime disaster management, ocean peace keeping and conflict
resolution, ensuring supply chain movement at sea, humanitarian services, pre-empting threats at
sea, ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity of maritime entity, supporting confidence building
measures, developing ocean awareness in the community, ocean research for bettering the
conditions of life, and many more.

Most of the aforementioned peculiar maritime functions are under the purview of the IMO, the
U.N. body that specializes in international maritime governance, and the beckoning point of the
worlds coast guard for maritime cooperation.

c. Direct Social, Political and Economic Diplomatic Engagement

Given the diplomatic cooperative approaches in the preceding examples, the government through
the PCG can take the proactive stance in engaging our neighboring countries in this so-called coast
guard diplomacy. Like the U.S., it engages its global rival in direct diplomacy by way of providing
human resource development for its personnel, in addition to the search and rescue exercise and
the marine scientific research. The Philippines has a very good maritime cooperation with
Indonesia for many years, and the maritime conflicts centering on our borders were easily resolved
through our friendship with our counterparts in the other territory.

There are instances that conflicts are resolved not through exaction of rules but through the
subjectivity of human element superimposed on the rules. When executives interact, they focus
mainly on the content of the discussion at hand, hoping to get consensus on decisions or find-
resolutions. But the most astute among the negotiators understand that lots of useful information
can also be derived from what occurs outside the pages of the agenda not what people are
saying, but how they are interacting.54 This principle and examples can be applied to the present
day conflict in the SCS.

53
Commodore Sam Bateman, Coast Guards: New Forces for Regional Order and Security,Analysis from the East-West
Center No.65, U.S. Congress, January 2003
54
Richard A. Davis, Ph.D, The intangibles of leadership, RHR Canada, 2010
22
By the sheer economic and muscular brawn of our neighbor, the Philippines can never match its
hegemon in the theater of conflict. The countrys fighting infrastructures can be considered to be
in their functional obsolescence. Reliance on the referent might of the neighbors rival across the
ocean in the opposite side may provide the Philippines some comforting effect. But this is no
guarantee. In the same vein that this may provide the Philippines some discomforting effects, on
the other hand. This presumption is a globalized complex risk the country must avoid. The
Philippines must stand on its own and utilize some other forms of engagement by way of pressing
several identified meridian points withour neighbors. The Philippines may be a tiny Liliputian
compared to an armed Gulliver, but Gulliver, too, has his own share of susceptibility and infirmity in
one way or another.

The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) may have been a good start. But it was stopped
due to some domestic political issue. So is the Joint Oceanographic Marine Scientific Research
Expedition (JOMSRE) between the Philippines and Vietnam, this cooperative attempt, too, was
stopped for unknown reasons. For the sake of reviewing things and seeking solutions, it might be
worthwhile for the government to consider evaluating the earlier wisdom why the Philippines had
forged such agreement, and set aside the political issues in one corner for a while. Let us put the
two examples in a maritime theater threat matrix and determine if indeed the two failed
cooperative activities were highly disadvantageous to the country, or is it still viable for a second
look.

There are some sectors in the Philippine society that profess the principle that what is contested
cannot be negotiated. This principle is somewhat debatable in the light of the present geopolitical
reality, because our neighbors, too, may have the same line of thinking. In the end, the Philippines
may have to end-up with one choice, and that is, to promote homogeny by squarely facing our co-
claimants in a peaceful fashion promoting the ideals of one common heritage of the South China
Sea. After all, we still have our ocean in the Pacific, at its virginal prime, uncontested and
unmolested, waiting to be explored and exploited.

The SCS dilemma should be a catalyst for the governments ocean and sea use management
agenda, and prevent the same lessons from happening in the Eastern seaboard of our territory.
The Philippines must put the necessary mojon (landmark) and establish perimeter fence while
nobody is trespassing yet in our OCEANIC property. Meanwhile, let us look West!

E. Cest-a-dire!

All these are necessary to sustain and enforce a long-term maritime strategic policy. Let us move
forward and learn from the lessons of the past, especially those that have caused us to stumble.
For scores of years, it is our Armed Forces that had kept on awakening our country of the looming
maritime threats within our maritime domain and horizon. The perennial response of our civilian
authority is through their voice of sympathy and diplomatic protest abroad.

This is understandable, since our country is facing equally debilitating political problems in the
domestic front. But meanwhile, our problem in our maritime domain is piling-up waiting for
another day to crumble and fall over our heads. The Philippines may be growling and howling
today due to the intrusion alarm, however, once the sound of the gongs and the tambuli has
piped-down, the country would again return to its usual ordinary way of nonchalance and what-
23
me-worry? attitude, as if nothing has happened. The country has been used to this political roller
coaster, dating way back in the 70s taking a toll to our progress as we plummet near the bottom in
terms of socio-political and economic index. The discourse could go on and on and on but it only
points to one simple fact, now that there is a CLEAR AND PRESENT (sic) DANGER, it would be folly of
us not to ACT NOW assert our rights, we must! And we should put our money where our mouth
is cest-a-dire! (that goes without saying!)

Note: COMMO JOEL S GARCIA PCG, H.D, Al-Haj, is the Commander of the Coast Guard Education and Training
Command (CGETC). Prior to his present assignment, he was the Commander of the Coast Guard Western region based
in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. He has earned his Masters degree in Shipping Management from the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy (PMMA) and in Maritime Safety Administration from the prestigious World Maritime University
(WMU) in Malmo, Sweden. He was conferred a Doctors degree (Honoris Causa) by the Sulu State College for his
humanitarian services. Likewise, he is a candidate of Doctors degree in Public Administration of a joint program by the
Hong Kong Life University and the EARIST. He served as the Head of the Secretariat of the Presidential Task Force on
Maritime Development in 1996 during the presidency of President Fidel V. Ramos. He earned his license as Master
Mariner in 1992.

References

The South China Sea : Towards A Cooperative Management Regime, A Conference Report,
Maritime Security Program, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore, 16 May 2007

Ian Storey, China and the Philippines: Implications of the Reed Bank Incident, China Brief, Vol XI,
Issue 8, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 06 May 2011

James R. Holmes, Chinas Maritime Strategy is more than Naval Strategy, China Brief, Vol XI, Issue
6, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 8 April 2011

Philip C. Saunders, Will Chinas Dream Turn into Americas Nightmare?, Vol X, Issue 7, The
Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 01 April 2010

Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Defense Expenditures: Implications for Naval Modernization, China
Brief, Vol. X, Issue 8, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 16 April 2010

Dennis J. Blasko, Chinese Strategic Thinking: Peoples War in the 21 st Century, China Brief, Vol. X,
Issue 6, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 18 March 2010

L.C. Russel Hsiao, The Modernization of Chinas Border and Coastal Defense Infrastructure, China
Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 3, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 04 February 2010

Willy Lam, Beijing Seeks Paradigm Shift in Geopolitics, China Brief, Vol X, Issue 5, The Jamestown
Foundation, Washington D.C., 05 March 2010

Lyle J. Goldstein, Chinese Coast Guard Development: Challenge and Opportunity, China Brief, Vol
IX, Issue 23, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 19 November 2009
24
L.C. Russel Hsiao, Military Delegates Call for National Maritime Strategy to Protect Expanding
Interests, China Brief, Vol XI, Issue 4, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., 10 March
2011

L.C. Russel Hsiao, Chinas New Submarines and Deployment Patterns: Aimed at South China Sea?,
China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 21, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 22 October 2010

R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, The Melland Schill Studies in International Law,
Third Edition, Manchester University Press, 1999

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Interactive Network, December 2003

Dr. Prabhakaran Paleri, Coast Guards of the World and Emerging Maritime Threats, Ocean Policy
Studies, Ocean Research Policy Foundation of Japan, Special Edition, 2009

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Fourth Edition, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, C.A., 2008

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982

25
 UNCLOS: Salient Points on Maritime Zones of Archipelagic States
A. ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS
(INTERNAL WATERS)
Comprises all the maritime
waters within archipelagic
baselines. (Churchill, R.R. and
Lowe, A.V. The Law of the
Sea (3rded.) Juris Publishing,
Manchester), pg. 125)
Sovereignty extends to the ff:
- Waters within or enclosed
by the archipelagic straight
baselines regardless of
their depth or distance
from the coast.
- air space
- bed and subsoil; and
- its resources (Art.
49, (1&2) LOSC )
The regime of archipelagic sea
lanes (ASL) passage shall not
in other respects affect the
status of the:
- archipelagic waters;
- the sea lanes; or
- the exercise by the
archipelagic State of its
sovereignty as discussed
above. (Art. 49, (4) LOSC, )
Delimitation of internal
waters by drawing closing
lines within archipelagic
waters. (Art. 50, LOSC )
COASTAL STATE
Full sovereignty of the coastal
state
Shall not hamper transit passage
Shall give appropriate publicity to
any danger to navigation or
overflight which they have
knowledge.
Designate sea lanes and air routes
(Art. 53 (1) LOSC )
Prescribe traffic separation
schemes (Art. 53 (6) LOSC )
Lanes and routes must be
designated in consultation with
the IMO (Art. 53 (9), LOSC )
FOREIGN SHIPS (Civilian)
Right of innocent passage
There shall be no suspension of
transit and innocent passage
except:
- For security reasons;
- After due notice;
- Without discrimination
(Art. 52, (2), Art. 44 LOSC )
Enjoy the right of archipelagic sea
lanes (ASL) passage (Art. 53 (1)
LOSC )
Respect ASL and traffic separation
schemes (Art. 53 (11) LOSC )
In the exercise of transit and
innocent passage:, shall:
- Proceed without delay;
- Refrain from any threat or use
of force against the sovereignty
of States:
- Refrain from any activities other
than those incident to their
normal modes of continuous
and expeditious transit unless
rendered necessary by force
majeure or by distress;
- Comply with the International
Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea;
- Comply MARPOL Convention
and other policies relating to
pollution control;
Aircraft in transit and innocent
passage shall:
- Observe the Rules of the Air
- Monitor the radio distress
frequency (Art. 54, Art. 39 (3),
LOSC)
If no sea lanes is designated:
- Passage can be made through
routes normally used for
international navigation
- Submarines can transit
26

B. TERRITORIAL SEA (TS)
12 nautical miles, measured
from baselines (Art. 3, LOSC)
Sovereignty extends to the air
space over the territorial sea
as well as to its bed and
subsoil. (Art. 2, LOSC)
Must respect rights enjoyed by
third States deriving from:
- Existing agreements;
- Traditional fishing rights;
- Existing submarine cables; and
- Other legitimate activities
(Art. 51, Art. 47 (6) LOSC )
Adopt laws and regulations on the
ff:
- Safety of navigation and the
regulation of maritime traffic;
- Prevention, reduction and
control of pollution to include
discharge of oil, oily wastes and
other noxious substances
- With respect to fishing vessels,
the prevention of fishing,
including the stowage of fishing
gear;
- Loading or unloading of any
commodity, currency or person
in contravention of the
customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and
regulations(Art. 54, Art. 42 (1),
LOSC)
Shall published all laws and
regulations (Art. 54, Art. 42 (3),
LOSC)
COASTAL STATE
Full sovereignty
- explore resources
- enforce domestic laws
Prevent passage which is not
innocent ( Art. 25 (1), LOSC)
It has the right to suspend such
passage when the passage would
prejudice the following :
- peace;
- good order; and
- security
submerged (Art. 53 (12)
LOSC).
Should not carry out any research
or survey activities without the
prior authorization, during transit
and innocent passage. (Article 40,
LOSC)
Shall comply with all laws and
regulations. (Art. 54, Art. 42 (4),
LOSC)
State of a ship or the State of
registry of an aircraft shall bear
international responsibility for any
loss or damage(Art. 54, Art. 42 (5),
LOSC)
FOREIGN SHIPS (Civilian)
Allowed transit and innocent
passage.
Passage must be continuous and
expeditious (LOSC, Art. 18 (2) )
Not allowed to hover or cross
around the TS (LOSC, Art. 18 (2)).
Stopping and anchoring is allowed
in the ff cases:
- Incidental to ordinary
navigation;
- Force majeure or distress;
- Seek to assist another ship,
person or aircraft in danger or
distress (LOSC, Art. 18 (2) )
27
 Adopt laws and regulations
relating to innocent passage in
respect of the following:
- Safety of navigation;
- Regulation of maritime traffic;
- Protection of navigational aids
and facilities;
- Protection of cables and
pipelines;
- Conservation of the living
resources of the sea;
- Prevention of infringement of
the fisheries laws and
regulations;
- Preservation of the
environment;
- Prevention, reduction and
control of pollution;
- Marine scientific research and
hydrographic surveys;
- Prevention of infringement of
the customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary laws and regulations
- Other laws in conformity with
other rules of international law,
relating to the aforementioned
(Art. 21 (1) , LOSC)
Shall give due publication to all
such laws and regulations (Art. 21
(3) , LOSC)
Shall not impose requirements
having practical effect of denying
or impairing the right of innocent
passage; (Art. 24 , LOSC)
Shall not discriminate any State or
against ships carrying cargoes to,
from or on behalf of any State
(Art. 21 (3) , LOSC)
MARITIME POLLUTION- adopt
laws and regulations for:
- Prevention;
- Reduction; and
- Control (Art. 211 (4) , LOSC)
Has the right to permit, regulate
and control dumping (Art. 210 (5)
, LOSC)
Shall comply with all such laws and
regulations on the prevention of
collisions at sea (Art. 21 (4) , LOSC)
During transit and innocent
passage should not:
- Threat or use force against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of the
coastal State;
- Exercise or practice with
weapons of any kind;
- Collect information to the
prejudice of the defence or
security;
- Provide propaganda aimed at
affecting the defence or
security of the coastal State;
- Launch, land or take on board
any aircraft or any military
device;
- Load or unload any commodity,
currency or person contrary to
the customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary laws and
regulations;
- Conduct any fishing activities;
- Carry out of research or survey
activities;
- Interfere with any systems of
communication or any other
facilities or installations of the
coastal State;
- Conduct any activity not having
a direct bearing on passage.
(Art. 19 , LOSC)
Submarines and other underwater
vehicles must:
- Navigate on the surface ; and
- Show their flag Passage (Art. 20
, LOSC)
Should not violate any maritime
pollution control regulations
28
 Require foreign ships in transit and
passage to:
- Use designated sea lanes; and
- Prescribed traffic separation
schemes (Art. 22 (1) , LOSC)
In designating sea lanes and traffic
separation scheme, the ff must be
taken into account:
- IMO recommendation;
- Any channels customarily used
for international navigation;
- Special characteristics of
particular ships and channels;
and
- Density of traffic. (Art. 22 (3) ,
LOSC)
Shall clearly indicate such sea
lanes and traffic separation
schemes on charts and publish the
same (Art. 22 (4) , LOSC)
Must give notice of known
navigational hazards(Art. 24 (2) ,
LOSC)
Regulate, authorize and conduct
marine scientific research (Art.
245, LOSC)
Should not stop or divert a foreign
ship passing in exercising civil
jurisdiction in relation to a person
on board the ship.
May levy execution against or
arrest the ship:
- For obligations; or liabilities
assumed or incurred in the
course or for the purpose of its
voyage. (Art. 28, LOSC).
Require warship to leave TS
immediately for:
- Not complying with the laws
and regulations; or
- Disregarding any request for
compliance therewith (Art. 30,
LOSC)
Nuclear-powered ships and ships
carrying nuclear or other
inherently dangerous or noxious
substances or materials may be
required to:
- Confine their passage to
designated sea lanes (tankers
included) (Art. 22 (2) , LOSC);
- Shall carry documents; and
- Observe special precautionary
measures established for such
ships by international
agreements (Art. 23, LOSC).
No charge by reason of passage
except for specific services
rendered (Art. 26, LOSC).
Not subject to the jurisdiction of
the coastal state except:
- When peace or tranquility is
disturbed;
- When ship Captain or consul
request for intervention;
- When non-crew member is
involved (Art. 27, LOSC).
Flag State shall bear responsibility
for any loss or damage from the
non- compliance by a warship or
other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes.
(Art. 31, LOSC).
29

C. Contiguous Zone:
24 NM from Baseline
(TS+12 NM)
(Art. 33 (2) , LOSC)
D. Continental Shelf
(Art. 76, LOSC)
Comprises the sea bed; and
Subsoil of the submarine
areas;
Extend beyond its territorial
sea
Throughout the natural
prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of
the continental margin, or
to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines
Must provide navigational services
such as lighthouses and rescue
facilities
COASTAL STATE FOREIGN SHIPS (Civilian)
Fiscal Authority(Art. 33, LOSC) Transit and Innocent Passage
- Anti-illegal drugs - Not allowed to explore
- Anti-human trafficking resources
- Taxation - Should not violate the laws
pertaining those mentioned in
Custom (Art. 33, LOSC) the opposite
- Anti-smuggling
Immigration (Art. 33, LOSC)
Sanitation (Health)(Art. 33, LOSC)
Marine Environmental Protection
Punish infringement of the above
laws and regulations (Art. 33,
LOSC)
Authority over removal of
archaeological and historical
objects from the seabed in the
contiguous zone (LOSC 82, Art.
303(2))
COASTAL STATE FOREIGN SHIPS (Civilian)
Exercises sovereign rights for
exploring and exploiting its
natural resources (Art. 77, LOSC)
The establishment of offshore
installations (artificial islands,
structures, and installations) is
expressly permitted (Arts. 60 and
80 LOSC)
Adopt laws, regulations and other
measures to:
- Prevent, reduce and control
pollution ;
- Arising from seabed activities
from artificial islands,
installations and structures
(Art. 208, LOSC)
Must permit, other states to lay
30
 down and maintain submarine
cables and pipelines subject to
measures necessary to protect
rights of exploration and other
conditions (e.g. pollution
prevention),. (Art. 79;CSC, Art. 4
LOSC)

- Shall deposit with the

Secretary-General of the United
Nations charts and relevant
information, including geodetic
data, permanently describing
the outer limits of its
continental shelf. (Art. 76 (9),
LOSC)

Charts and lists of geographical

coordinates shall be deposited to
Sec Gen U.N. (Art 84, LOSC)

Shall have the exclusive right over:

- Artificial islands;
- Installations and structures for
economic purposes;
- Installations and structures
which may interfere with the
exercise of the rights of the
coastal State in the zone. (Art.
60 (1) LOSC)
- Establish reasonable safety
zones not to exceed 500 meters
around such artificial islands,
installations and structures (Art.
60 (4&5) LOSC)

Take appropriate measures to

ensure the safety both of
navigation and of the artificial
islands, installations and
structures. (Arts. 80 & 60 (4) LOSC

Have exclusive right to authorize

and regulate drilling (Art. 81,
LOSC)

Have right toexploit the subsoil by

means of tunneling (Art. 85, LOSC)

Has the right to permit, regulate

and control dumping (Art. 210 (5)
, LOSC)
Shall deposit with Sec Gen U.N.
relevant info describing outer limit
Art 76 (9)
31

E. Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ): 200 NM from
baselines
Exploration of resources
The specific or sui generis(Art.
55, LOSC)
COASTAL STATE
Sovereign rights for the purpose
of:
- Exploring and exploiting;
- Conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether
living or non living
- Other activities for the
economic exploitation and
exploration such as the
production of energy from the
water, currents and winds
(Art. 56 (1) (a), LOSC)
Jurisdiction with regard to:
- the establishment and use of
artificial islands, installations
and structures;
- right to establish safety zones
(not to exceed 500m in breath),
around them
- the protection and preservation
of the marine environment;
(Art. 56 (1) (b), LOSC)
May board, inspect, arrest and
conduct judicial proceedings to
ensure compliance with the laws
(Art. 73 (1) LOSC)
Release arrested vessels and
crews upon the posting of
reasonable bond or other security
(Art. 73 (2) LOSC)
Notify the flag State of the action
taken and of any penalties
subsequently imposed in cases of
arrest or detention of foreign
vessels. (Art. 73 (2) LOSC)
Shall have the exclusive right over:
- Artificial islands;
- Installations and structures for
economic purposes;
- Installations and structures
which may interfere with the
exercise of the rights of the
coastal State in the zone. (Art.
60 (1) LOSC)
- Establish reasonable safety
FOREIGN SHIPS (Civilian)
Art 58 in relation to Art 87
Freedom of Navigation
Unhampered navigation
guaranteed
Freedom of over flight (aircraft)
Laying f submarine cable and
pipelines
Can be affected by the presence of
artificial islands and installations
All ships must respect these safety
zones
Shall comply with generally
accepted international standards
regarding navigation in the vicinity
of artificial islands, installations,
structures and safety zones.
Not allowed to explore resources
nor conduct scientific research
unless allowed by coastal state
Must respect safety zones; and
Shall comply with generally
accepted international standards
regarding navigation in the vicinity
of artificial islands, installations,
structures and safety zones.
(Art. 60 (6) LOSC)
- Conduct fisheries research
programmes (under the
authorization and control of the
coastal state), including the
sampling of catches, disposition
of samples and reporting of
associated scientific data ; ( Art.
62 (4f))
- Transfer of fisheries technology,
including enhancement of the
coastal State's capability of
undertaking fisheries research;
(Art. 62 (4j), LOSC)
32
 zones not to exceed 500 meters
around such artificial islands,
installations and structures (Art.
60 (4&5) LOSC)

Take appropriate measures to

ensure the safety both of
navigation and of the artificial
islands, installations and
structures.

- (Art. 60 (4) LOSC)

MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

- Right to regulate, authorize,
and conduct scientific research
by other states
- But withhold its consent to
resource oriented research
( Art. 246 (3)(5))

MARINE POLLUTION CONTROL : Subject to the coastal States

powers of pollution control
- Dumping of waste; ( Arts. 210
(5), 216)
- Other forms of pollution from
vessels ( Arts. 211, 220,234);
and
- Pollution from sea-bed
activities.
( Arts. 208, 214)

After consulting the IMO , shall

designate special areas and
identify Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas (PPSA) (IMO Res A. 720 (17)

Measures to be taken in
designating special areas and
PPSA:

- Designation as a special area

under MARPOL;
- The adoption of routing
measures including designation
as an area to be avoided;
- Compulsory pilotage;
- The adoption of a traffic
management system;
- Special construction
requirements; and
- Speed restrictions
- (IMO Res A. 720 (17), Article
2116, LOSC)

CONSERVATION OF LIVING Compliance with the conservation

33
 RESOURCES: (LOSC ART 62)
- Determine the allowable catch;
- Ensure that no over-
exploitation;
- Design measures to production
on the maximum sustainable
yield;
- Maintaining or restoring that
their reproduction may not
seriously threatened.
- Exchange information through
IMO and other states
concerned on the following:
Available scientific
information;
Catch and fishing statistics;
and
Other data
- Promote optimum utilization;
- Determine its capacity to
harvest, otherwise it shall give
other States access to the
surplus of the allowable catch
through an agreement or other
allowable arrangements;
Shall give due notice of
conservation and management
laws and regulations (LOSC Art 62
(5))
STRADDLING STOCKS ,
MIGRATORY SPECIES ,
CATADROMOUS SPECIES
( Arts. 63, 64, 67)
- Shall coordinate, cooperate
and ensure theconservation
and development of such stocks
/species
Lay down conditions and establish
jurisdiction over submarine cables
and pipelines
measures and other terms and
conditions relating to:
- Licensing of fishermen, fishing
vessels and equipment;
- Payment of fees and other
forms of remuneration;
- Adequate compensation in the
field of financing, equipment
and technology relating to the
fishing industry;
- Determining the species which
may be caught;
- Fixing quotas of catch
(particular stocks or groups,
stocks or catch per vessel over a
period of time or to the catch
by nationals of any State during
a specified period);
- Regulating seasons;
- Areas of fishing, the types, sizes
and amount of gear, and the
types, sizes and number of
fishing vessels that may be
used;
- Fixing the age and size of fish
and other species that may be
caught;
- Specifying information required
of fishing vessels, including
catch and effort statistics and
vessel position reports;
- Placing of observers or trainees
on board by the coastal State;
- Landing of catch in the ports of
the coastal State;
- Subject to terms and conditions
relating to joint ventures or
other cooperative
arrangements;
- Requirements for the training of
personnel; (Art. 62 (4), LOSC)
They are allowed to fish in case of
overlapping on boundary e.g. EEZ
when no overlapping boundary,
they are allowed to fish subject to
rules and regulations established
by the coastal state (LOSC 62 (2))
subject to Art 62 (4)
Freedom of laying submarine
cables and pipelines (LOSC Art 58)
34
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