1. San Miguel Corp. v.

NLRC
Case No. 272

G.R. No. 80774 (May 31, 1988)

Chapter V, Page 211, Footnote No. 138

FACTS:

Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash to SMC employees
who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the corporation. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal
entitled Modified Grande Pasteurization Process and claimed entitlement to the cash award. SMC denied
utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the NLRC which arbitrated
against the Petitioner.

ISSUE:

W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

HELD:

No, said money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. The jurisdiction of the NLRC is
outlined in Art. 217 of the Labor Code which includes in par. 3 all money claims of workers, including those
based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement While par. 3 refers to all money claims of workers, it
is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims has been absorbed into the jurisdiction
of the NLRC. Par. 3 should not be read in isolation with the context formed by par. 1 (unfair labor practices),
par. 2 (terms and conditions of employment), par. 4 (household services), par. 5 (prohibited activities). The
unifying element of pars. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an
employer-employee relationship. The scope of par. 3 is clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money
claims falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reasonable
causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.

LATIN MAXIM:

28, 36b, 36e

Motoomull v. dela Paz

Case No. 180

G.R. No. L-45302 (July 24, 1990)

Chapter V, Footnote No.73, Page No. 195

FACTS:

The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading Corporation. The
Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its
stockholders. The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two
is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug. 31, 1974. Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary
injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the
appeal. The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall
not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the
court, on motion, after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem just, should provide otherwise. The
propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment
may be raised only by motion in the main case.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the word court refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals

2. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision.

HELD:

Yes, the word court refers to the trial court. The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that
appeal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, order. The exception is given where the officer or body
rendering the same, or the court on motion, after hearing should provide otherwise. The law provides further
that the propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, decision or ruling may
be raised only by motion in the main case. More importantly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous
in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to
associate words. Accordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not
in accordance with the legislative intent.

LATIN MAXIM: Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum.

The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself.

9a, 12a, 36a

11. Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals

G.R. No. L-33471 January 31, 1972

FACTS:

Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and the articles thus
imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The
foodstuffs in question being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond.

ISSUE:

W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband, and are not as stated by Respondent
Court, among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore
these foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in Sec. 2301 of the same code.

HELD:

Yes. The imported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. 102 (k) of the Tariff and
Customs Code.

LATIN MAXIM: Ejesdem generis.

Of the same kind or specie.

21. AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

Reddendo singula singulis

Referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object; or let each be put in its
proper place

Facts:

A few days before graduation, Alfredo Amadora was shot and killed when his classmate, Pablito Daffron
fired a gun in the auditorium of their school. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Additionally, the petitioners filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint
against the students was later dropped.

Issue:

Can the school be held liable?

Ruling:

No, the school cannot be held liable.

In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout,
attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded
a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its
passengers. Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil
action filed against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now
Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.

This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29, 1957, exculpated the school in an
obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it
was the school authorities who should be held liable under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in
general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of
arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in
question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the
case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students"
and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

The Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced
that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that
resulted in the latter's death.

9. Vera v. Cuevas

ejusdem generis

Facts:Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk
products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are
marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company
(Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand
"Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a
corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of
local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.CIR required the
respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription
required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days fromreceipt of the order. Failure to comply
will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in skimmed milk wherein all
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally
or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate
containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.The CFI
Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the labels of their
product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.". Also, it
ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents related to the
manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

Held: No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying
terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would
restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been
removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed
milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that
general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.The
difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been
removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or
corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk
and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk
and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private
respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and
that "up to the present,Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or
disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause
a deprivation of property without due process of law

13. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. American Express International, Inc. - G.R. No. 152609,
June 29, 2005

Facts:

Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with servicing a unit of
AMEX-Hongkong Branch and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK receivables from card members
situated in the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines.
It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section 110B of
the 1997 Tax Code, which held that xxx Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or to
zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal
revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of Section 112.

In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, In Reply, please be informed that, as
a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is remitted inwardly
to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, your service income is automatically zero rated xxx

Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against the claimant
as they partake of the nature of tax exemption.

CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA
affirmed this decision and further held that respondents services were services other than the processing,
manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines and paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of BSP.

Issue:

W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund

Held:

Yes. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
Section 102B particularly provides for the services or transactions subject to 0% rate:

(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside the
Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP;

(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by hotels and
other service establishments, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and
accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP
Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the
processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines),
when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP, are
zero-rated. Respondent renders service falling under the category of zero rating.

As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the
tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated,
while imports are taxed.

In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is different from the utilization of
consumption of the outcome of such service. While the facilitation is done in the Philippines, the
consumption is not. The services rendered by respondent are performed upon its sending to its foreign client
the drafts and bulls it has gathered from service establishments here, and are therefore, services also
consumed in the Philippines. Under the destination principle, such service is subject to 10% VAT.

However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is 0% VAT rate for
services that are performed in the Philippines, paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in
accordance with the R&R of BSP. The respondent meets the following requirements for exemption, and
thus should be zero-rated:

(1) Service be performed in the Philippines

(2) The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of the Tax Code

(3) It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP R&R.

18. Coconut Oil Refiners Association vs Torres

expressio unius estexclusio alterius,

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs TORRES

[G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005]
Facts:
This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and prohibit the Executive Branch, through
the public respondents Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary, the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA), the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) and the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), from allowing, and the private respondents from continuing with, the
operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark
Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), and to declare the following issuances as unconstitutional, illegal, and void.
The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring
free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic
Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic
Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the
Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)].

Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to the
importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A for being violative of their
right to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different
from the retail establishments located outside.

The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal standing and unreasonable delay
in filing of the petition.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection clause.

Held:
The SC ruled in the negative. The phrases tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the
zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on
which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are
mentioned by way of example.

The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A cannot be,
likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial
distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court
finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying
between the establishments inside and outside the zone. There are substantial differences in a sense that,
investors will be lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called secured area and the present
business operators outside the area. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits
and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of
BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are accordingly declared
of no legal force and effect. Respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void
provisions. All portions of Executive Order No. 97-A are valid and effective, except the second sentences in
paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of said Executive Order, which are hereby declared INVALID.