Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ISSUE: Whether or not a creditor is barred by prescription in his attempt to collect on a promissory note executed more than
fifteen years earlier with the debtor sued promising to pay either upon receipt by him of his share from a certain estate or upon
demand.
HELD: YES, the creditor is barred from collecting. The SC ruling is based on Article 1179 of the Civil Code, which provides:
"Every obligation, whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain event, or upon a past event unknown to the
parties, is demandable at once." The obligation being due and demandable (payable on demand), it would appear that the
filing of the suit after fifteen years was much too late. For again, according to the Civil Code, which is based on Section 43 of
Act No.190, the prescriptive period for a written contract is that of ten years.
ISSUE:
1) WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of petitioners certificate of title without a
fixed period when to comply with such conditions? YES
2) WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO
HELD:
1) Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the extinguishment or loss of those already
acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to
another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is such a resolutory one. The donation had to be
valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case,
the donation may be revoked & all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.
More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to
comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed
to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere
technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of
suits.
Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of
the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an
unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and,
for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private
respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
2) Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature & circumstance it can be inferred that
the period was intended, the court may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be de-
manded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith & such period has arrived. However, this general
rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different set of circumstances existing more than a reasonable period of
50yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence,
there is no need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality & would serve no purpose than
to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek
rescission before the court unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the
court to determine the period of compliance there is no more obstacle for the court to decree recission.
ISSUE: Was the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee to stay on the premises as long as
he needs it and can pay rents is valid?
- No, since the stipulation for as long as the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay said increases is a purely
potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will
of the lessee.
- The continuance, effectivity, and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and
uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say
in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the
lessee.
HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Benito Dy is ordered to immediately vacate
and return the possession of the premises and pay the monthly rentals due thereon in accordance with the compromise agree-
ment until he shall have actually vacated the same. This Judgment is immediately executory.
Potestative Condition- This can be found in Art 1182 of the NCC. A potestative condition speaks of fulfillment of an
obligation rests solely upon the will of the debtor. An obligation which is subject to a suspensive potestative condition
is non- demandable, hence it is void. If it is the debtor himself who determines the fulfillment of the condition, such an
agreement produces no juridical effect that can be enforced, and thus null
ISSUE: Whether or not the condition that herein defendant relied upon the payment of the obligation
is valid and would thereby preclude her from payment.
HELD: If that statement found in her acknowledgment of the indebtedness should be regarded as a condition, it was a condition
which depended upon her exclusive will, and is therefore, void. (Art. 1115, Civil Code)
The acknowledgment, therefore, was an absolute acknowledgment of the obligation and was sufficient to prevent the
statute of limitation from barring the action upon the contract.
5. Parks v. Province of Tarlac 49 Phil 142
FACTS: In 1910, Concepcion Cirer and James Hill donated parcels of land to the municipality of Tarlac on the condition that it
be used absolutely and exclusively for the erection of a central school and public parks, the work to commence within six
months. The president of the municipality of Tarlac accepted and registered the donation.
In 1921, Cirer and Hill sold the same property to George L. Parks.
Later on the, the municipality of Tarlac transferred their rights in the property to the Province of Tarlac.
Parks filed a complaint seeking the annulment of the donation and asking that he be declared the absolute owner of
the property. Parks allege that the conditions of the donation were not complied with.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was coupled with a condition precedent? W/N the action to revoke has prescribed?
HELD: No. The condition to erect a school within six months is not a condition precedent. The characteristic of a condition
precedent is that the acquisiito of the right is not effected while said condition is mot complied with or is not deemed complied
with. Meanwhile nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy of a right. Consequently, when a condition is imposed,
the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition
precedent. In the present case the condition that a public school be erected and a public park be made of the donated land
could not be complied with except after giving effect to the donation.
The action to revoke the donation has prescribed. The prescriptive periods are: 5 years for the revocation by the
subsequent birth of children, 1 year if by reason of ingratitude. If no special period is prescribed, 10 years, for an onerous
donation following the law of contracts and general rules on prescriptions. The donation was made in 1910, the cause of action
accrued in 1911, while the action to revoke was filed 1924, twenty three years later.
RULING: No. Rescission by judicial action under Article 1191 will be ordered only where the breach complained of is substantial
as to defeat the object of the parties in entering into the agreement. It will not be granted where the breach is slight or casual.
The defendants asked the plaintiff to retrieve its phonograph, claiming that there were times when the coins dropped into the
slot would get stuck, resulting in its failure to play the desired music. But apart from this bare statement, there is nothing in the
evidence which shows the frequency with which the jukebox failed to function properly. The expression "there are times" con-
notes occasional failure of the phonograph to operate, not frequent enough to render it unsuitable and unserviceable.
7. UP v. De Los Angeles 35 SCRA 102
FACTS: On November 2, 1960, UP and ALUMCO entered into a logging agreement whereby the latter was granted exclusive
authority to cut, collect and remove timber from the Land Grant for a period starting from the date of agreement to December
31, 1965, extendible for a period of 5 years by mutual agreement.
On December 8, 1964, ALUMCO incurred an unpaid account of P219,362.94. Despite repeated demands, ALUMCO
still failed to pay, so UP sent a notice to rescind the logging agreement. On the other hand, ALUMCO executed an instrument
entitled Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments. It was approved by the president of UP, which stipulated
the following:
3. In the event that the payments called for are not sufficient to liquidate the foregoing indebtedness, the balance outstanding
after the said payments have been applied shall be paid by the debtor in full no later than June 30, 1965.
5. In the event that the debtor fails to comply with any of its promises, the Debtor agrees without reservation that Creditor shall
have the right to consider the Logging Agreement rescinded, without the necessity of any judicial suit
ALUMCO continued its logging operations, but again incurred an unpaid account. On July 19,1965, UP informed
ALUMCO that it had, as of that date, considered rescinded and of no further legal effect the logging agreement, and that UP
had already taken steps to have another concessionaire take over the logging operation. ALUMCO filed a petition to enjoin UP
from conducting the bidding. The lower court ruled in favor of ALUMCO, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Can petitioner UP treat its contract with ALUMCO rescinded, and may disregard the same before any judicial pro-
nouncement to that effect?
RULING: Yes. In the first place, UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated that upon default by the debtor, UP has the right
and the power to consider the Logging Agreement of December 2, 1960 as rescinded without the necessity of any judicial suit.
As to such special stipulation and in connection with Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court, stated in Froilan vs.
Pan Oriental Shipping Co:
There is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into agreement that violation of the terms of the
contract would cause cancellation thereof, even without court intervention. In other words, it is not always necessary for the
injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract.
ISSUE: Has the Contract to Sell been automatically and validly cancelled by the defendants-appellants?
RULING: No. While it is true that par.2 of the contract obligated the plaintiffs-appellees to pay the defendants the sum of P3,920
plus 7% interest per annum, it is likewise true that under par 12 the seller is obligated to transfer the title to the buyer upon
payment of the said price.
The contract to sell, being a contract of adhesion, must be construed against the party causing it. The Supreme Court
agree with the observation of the plaintiffs-appellees to the effect that the terms of a contract must be interpreted against the
party who drafted the same, especially where such interpretation will help effect justice to buyers who, after having invested a
big amount of money, are now sought to be deprived of the same thru the prayed application of a contract clever in its phrase-
ology, condemnable in its lopsidedness and injurious in its effect which, in essence, and its entirety is most unfair to the buyers.
Thus, since the principal obligation under the contract is only P3,920.00 and the plaintiffs-appellees have already paid
an aggregate amount of P4,533.38, the courts should only order the payment of the few remaining installments but not uphold
the cancellation of the contract. Upon payment of the balance of P671.67 without any interest thereon, the defendant must
immediately execute the final deed of sale in favor of the plaintiffs and execute the necessary transfer of documents, as pro-
vided in par.12 of the contract.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in not holding the respondents act of forfeiting all previous payments made by petitioners is
CONTRARY TO LAW, highly iniquitous and unconscionable.
Ruling: In obligations with a penal clause, the judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been
partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor [Art. 1229; Hodges v. Javellana, G.R. No. L-17247, April 28, 1962, 4SCRA
1228].
In this connection, the Court said:
It follows that, in any case wherein there has been a partial or irregular compliance with the provisions in a contract for special
indemnification in the event of failure to comply with its terms, courts will rigidly apply the doctrine of strict construction and
against the enforcement in its entirety of the industry.' where it is clear from the terms of the contract that the amount or
character of the indemnity is fixed without regard to the probable damages which might be anticipated as a result of a breach
of the terms of the contract; or, in other words, where the indemnity provided for is essentially a mere penalty having for its
principal object the enforcement of compliance with the corporations; (Laureano v. Kilayco, 32 Phil. 194 (1943).
This principle was reiterated in Makati Development Corp. v. Empire Insurance Co. [G.R. No. L-21780, June 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 557] where the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance reducing the subdivision lot buyer's liability
from the stipulated P12,000.00 to Plaintiffs after finding that he had partially performed his obligation to complete at least fifty
percent (50%) of his house within two (2) years from March 31, 1961, fifty percent (50%) of the house having been completed
by the end of April 1961.
ISSUE:Do the circumstances of the case warrant rescission of the Offsetting Agreement as prayed for by Seneca Hardware?
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled in favor of Seneca Hardware. There is no controversy that the provisions of the Offsetting
Agreement are reciprocal in nature. Reciprocal obligations are those created or established at the same time, out of the same
cause, and which results in a mutual relationship of creditor and debtor between parties. In reciprocal obligations, the perfor-
mance of one is conditioned on the simultaneous fulfillment of the other obligation Under the agreement, Seneca Hardware
shall deliver to Vermen Realty construction materials. Vermen Realty's obligation under the agreement is three-fold: he shall
pay Seneca Hardware P276,000.00 in cash; he shall deliver possession of units 601 and 602, Phase I, Vermen Pines Condo-
miniums (with total value of P276,000.00) to Seneca Hardware; upon completion of Vermen Pines Condominiums Phase II,
Seneca Hardware shall be given option to transfer to similar units therein.
Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides the remedy of rescission in (more appropriately, the term is "resolution") in
case of reciprocal obligations, where one of the obligors fails to comply with what is incumbent upon him.
In the case at bar, Vermen Realty argues that it was Seneca Hardware who failed to perform its obligation in the
Offsetting Agreement.
Seneca Hardware, on the other hand, points out that the subject of the Offsetting Agreement is Phase II of the Vermen
Pines Condominiums. It alleges that since construction of Phase II of the Vermen Pines Condominiums has failed to begin it
has reason to move for rescission of the Offsetting Agreement, as it cannot forever wait for the delivery of the condominium
units to it.
It is evident from the facts of the case that Seneca Hardware did not fail to fulfill its obligation in the Offsetting Agree-
ment. The discontinuance of delivery of construction materials to Vermen Realty stemmed from the failure of Vermen Realty
to send purchase orders to Seneca Hardware.
The impossibility of fulfillment of the obligation on the part of Vermen Realty necessitates resolution of the contract
for indeed, the non-fulfillment of the obligation aforementioned constitutes substantial breach of the Offsetting Agreement.
12. Alfonso L. Iringan v. CA 366 SCRA 41
FACTS: On March 22, 1985, private respondent Antonio Palao sold to petitioner Alfonso Iringan an undivided portion of Lot
No. 992 of the Tuguegarao Cadastre, located in Poblacion of Tuguegarao.
Parties executed a Deed of Sale on same date with the purchase price of 295K, payable as follows:
a) 10K upon execution of this instrument, and vendor acknowledges having received the amount.
b) 140K on or before April 30, 1985
c) 145K on or before Dec. 31, 1985
When second payment was due, Iringan paid only 40K. On July 18, 1985, Palao sent a letter to Iringan stating that
he would not accept any further payment considering that Iringan failed to comply with his obligation to pay full amount of
second installment.
On August 20, 1985, Iringan replied that they were not opposing the revocation of the Deed of Sale, but asked for the
reimbursement of the ff:
a) 50K - cash received
b) 3,200 - geodetic engineers fee
c) 500 - attorneys fee
d) Interest on 53,700
Palao declared he was not amenable to the reimbursements claimed by Iringan. Iringan then proposed that the 50K
which he paid Palao be reimbursed, or Palao could sell to Iringan an equivalent portion of the land.
Palao replied that Iringans standing obligation had reached 61,600 representing payment of arrears for rentals from
Oct. 1985 to March 1989. Spouses Iringan alleged that the contract of sale was a consummated contract, hence the remedy
for Palao was for collection of the balance of the purchase price and not rescission. In addition, they declared that they had
always been ready and willing to comply with their obligations to Palao.
RTC ruled in favor of Palao and affirmed the rescission of the contract.
Petitioners Claim: That no rescission was effected simply by virtue of the letter sent by respondents stating that he
considered the contract of sale rescinded. That a judicial or notarial act is necessary before one party can unilaterally effect a
rescission.
Respondents Comment: The right to rescind is vested by law on the obligee and since petitioner did not oppose teh
intent to rescind the contract, Iringan in effect agreed to it and had the legal effect of mutually agreed rescission.
HELD:
1. The Contract of Sale between the parties as far as the prescriptive period applies, can still be validly rescinded.
Art. 1592 requires the rescinding party to serve judicial or notarial notice of his intent to resolve the contract. A judicial
and notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission can take place, whether or not automatic rescission has been stipulated.
The phrase even though emphasizes that when no stipulation is found on automatic rescission, the judicial or notarial re-
quirement still applies.
The right to resolve reciprocal obligations (Art. 1191) is deemed implied in case one of the obligors shall fail to comply
with what is incumbent upon him. But the right must be invoked judicially. Even if the right to rescind is made available to the
injured party, the obligation is not ipso facto erased by the failure of the other party to comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The party entitled to rescind should apply to the court for a decree of rescission. The operative act is the decree of the court.
Issue: Whether the rescission of contract made by the private respondent is valid.
Held: There is a breach of contract because the petitioners did not merely stopped paying the mortgage obligations but they
also failed to pay the balance purchase price. Their conditional offer to Mr. Raymundo cannot take the place of actual payment
as would discharge the obligation of the buyer under contract of sale.
Mr. Raymundos source of right to rescind the contract is Art. 1191 of the Civil Code predicated on a breach of faith
by the other party who violates the reciprocity between them. Moreover, the new obligations as preconditions to the perfor-
mance of the petitioners own obligation were repudiation of an existing obligation, which was legally due and demandable
under the contract of sale.
The breach committed by the petitioners was the non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. The mutual restitution
is required to bring back the parties to their original situation prior to the inception of the contract. The initial payment and the
mortgage payments advanced by petitioners should be returned by private respondents, lest the latter unjustly enriched at the
expense of the other. Rescission creates the obligation to return the obligation of contract. To rescind, is to declare a contract
void at its inception and to put an end to it as though it never was.
The decision of the CA is affirmed with modification that private respondents are ordered to return to petitioners, the
amount they have received in advanced payment.
14. Palay, Inc. v. Clave 124 SCRA 638
Facts: That Palay, Inc., through its President, Albert Onstott executed in favor of private respondent, Nazario Dumpit, a Con-
tract to Sell a parcel of Land payable with a downpayment and monthly installments until fully paid. Paragraph 6 of the contract
provided for automatic extrajudicial rescission upon default in payment of any monthly installment after the lapse of 90 days
from the expiration of the grace period of one month, without need of notice and with forfeiture of all installments paid. Private
respondent Dumpit paid the downpayment and several installments. However, Dumpit failed to continue paying the installments
for almost 6 years. Thereafter, Dumpit wrote petitioner offering to update all his overdue accounts with interest, and seeking
its written consent to the assignment of his rights to a certain Lourdes Dizon. Petitioners replied that the Contract to Sell had
long been rescinded pursuant to paragraph 6 of the contract, and that the lot had already been resold. Consequently, Dumpit
filed a complaint questioning the validity of the rescission with the National Housing Authority (NHA) for reconveyance with an
alternative prayer for refund. The NHA found the rescission void in the absence of either judicial or notarial demand. Thus, it
ordered Palay, Inc. and Alberto Onstott in his capacity as President of the corporation, jointly and severally, to refund immedi-
ately to Dumpit the amount paid with 12% interest from the filing of the complaint. On appeal, respondent Clave, the Presidential
Executive Assistant affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Ruling: As held in previous jurisprudence, the judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract
provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. However, even in the cited cases,
there was at least a written notice sent to the defaulter informing him of the rescission. A written notice is indispensable to
inform the defaulter of the rescission. Hence, the resolution by petitioners of the contract was ineffective and inoperative against
private respondent for lack of notice of resolution (as held in the U.P. vs. Angeles case). The act of a party in treating a contract
as cancelled should be made known to the other.
Later, RA 6551 6551 entitled "An Act to Provide Protection to Buyers of Real Estate on Instalment Payments, em-
phasized the indispensability of notice of cancellation to the buyer when it specifically provided:
Sec. 3(b) ... the actual cancellation of the contract shall take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full payment of the cash surrender value
to the buyer. (Emphasis supplied).
Moreover, there was no waiver on the part of the private respondent of his right to be notified under paragraph 6 of
the contract since it was a contract of adhesion, a standard form of petitioner corporation, and private respondent had no
freedom to stipulate. Finally, it is a matter of public policy to protect buyers of real estate on instalment payments against
onerous and oppressive conditions. Waiver of notice is one such onerous and oppressive condition to buyers of real estate on
instalment payments.
As a consequence of the resolution by petitioners, rights to the lot should be restored to private respondent or the
same should be replaced by another acceptable lot but since the property had already been sold to a third person and there is
no evidence on record that other lots are still available, private respondent is entitled to the refund of instalments paid plus
interest at the legal rate of 12% computed from the date of the institution of the action. It would be most inequitable if petitioners
were to be allowed to retain private respondent's payments and at the same time appropriate the proceeds of the second sale
to another.
FACTS: On Dec. 12, 1957, a Contract to Sell covering 5 parcels of land in Barrio Dolores, Taytay was executed between
Sarangaya (vendor) and Roman, Belgica, and Yangco (Vendees).
The Contract provided that Sarangaya must, within 1 year secure titles to the lands in his name otherwise the vendees
would be relieved from buying the same; that within 60 days from the issuance of titles, the vendees would pay Sarangaya
P116,243 and in event of failure to comply with the condition, the vendees would be jointly liable to Sarangaya.
On Aug. 5, 1958, Sarangaya was able to obtain titles to the land in his name. On Aug. 12, a notice was received by
Belgica. The contract between parties states that notice served on any of the 3 vendees shall be notice to all of them. On Oct.
11, vendees became obligated to pay the agreed purchase price.
Vendees having defaulted, Sarangaya filed a suit. His complaint was predicated on the tacit rescission of the recipro-
cal obligations to sell and to buy.
Belgica and Yangco was served summons but was declared default. Roman had answered but failed to appear in
trial.
The TC ordered the 3 vendees to pay plaintiff.
Roman filed a Motion for Reconsideration and stated that he had not received a notice that Sarangaya had secured
titles and asked the Court to grant him extension of time under Art. 1191. The Court granted his MR. Sarangaya appealed the
decision to the CA. CA reversed it and ordered Roman to pay.
HELD: Considering that the settlement offer and counter offer of the parties were subsequently abandoned by them, the
adjudication of the controversy between Sarangaya and Roman on the basis of those offer and counter offer, was improper.
Also, conceding that the complaint was for rescission and damages under Art. 1191, the TC did not fix a period within
which Roman can comply with his obligation under contract to sell.
Petition is denied.
16. Gregorio Araneta, Inc. v. Phil. Sugar Estates Development Co. 20 SCRA 330
FACTS: J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is the owner of Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision. Through Petitioner Araneta, it sold a portion
thereof (43, 034.4 sq.m) for the sum of Php 430, 514.00 to respondent on July 28, 1950. They agreed on the following stipula-
tions:
1. Respondent will build on the Parcel land the Sto. Domingo Church and Convent; and
2. The seller will construct streets on the NE and NW and SW sides of the land herein sold so that the latter will be a block
surrounded by streets on all four sides; and the street on the NE side shall be named Sto. Domingo Avenue.
The buyer finished constructing the church and a convent but the seller, Gregorio Araneta, Inc. was unable to finish
constructing the street in the NE side because of Manuel Abundo, who was physically occupying the middle part thereof and
refused to vacate the same.
On May 7, 1958, Respondent filed a complaint against J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. seeking to compel the latter to comply
with their obligation and/or to pay damages in the event they failed or refused to perform the obligation. Both defendants J. M.
Tuason and Co. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. answered the complaint, the latter particularly setting up the principal defense that
the action was premature since its obligation to construct the streets in question was without a definite period which needs to
be fixed first by the court in a proper suit for that purpose before a complaint for specific performance will prosper.
The lower court and the Court of Appeals decided in favor of Respondent, giving Petitioner two years from the date
of finality of the decision to comply with the obligation of constructing and completing the streets.
ISSUE: W/N the fixing of the period by the Trial Court and tha CA was proper
RULING: NO. The application of Art. 1197 of the Civil Code requires a two-step process:
1. The Court must first determine that the obligation does not fix a period (or that the period is made to depend upon the
will of the debtor). but from the nature and circumstances, it can be inferred that a period was intended (Art. 1197 pars.
1 and 2).
2. Once the preliminary point is settled, the Court must then decided what period was probably contemplated by the
parties
Ultimately, the Court cannot fix a period merely because in its opinion, it should be reasonable, but must set the time
that the parties are shown to have intended. In the case at bar, the Trial Court appears to have pulled the two-year period set
in its decision out of thin air, since no circumstances are mentioned to support it. Plainly, this is not warranted by the Civil
Code.
The parties were fully aware that the land described therein was occupied by squatters, because the fact is expressly
mentioned in their pleadings. As the parties must have known that they could not take the law into their own hands, but must
resort to legal processes in evicting the squatters, they must have realized that the duration of the suits to be brought would
not be under their control nor could the same be determined in advance. The conclusion is thus forced that the parties must
have intended to defer the performance of the obligations under the contract until the squatters were duly evicted, as contended
by the petitioner Gregorio Araneta Inc. The time for the performance of the obligations of petitioner was fixed at the date that
all the squatters on affected areas are finally evicted therefrom.
17. Ace-Agro Development Corp v. CA 266 SCRA 429
FACTS: Ace-Agro had been cleaning soft drink bottles and repairing wooden shells for Cosmos within its company premises
in San Fernando, Pampanga.
On Apr. 25, 1990, fire broke out in the Cosmos plant. As a result, Ace-Agros work was stopped. On May 15, 1990,
Ace-Agro requested Cosmos to resume its services but they were advised that on account of the fire destroying nearly all the
bottles and shells, Cosmos was terminating their contract. Ace-Agro requested Cosmos to reconsider its decision but upon
receiving no reply, they informed its employees of the termination of their employment, which led the employees to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter against both Ace-Agro and Cosmos. Ace-Agro sent another letter for
reconsideration to Cosmos, to which they replied that they could resume work but outside company premises. Ace-Agro re-
fused the offer, claiming that to work outside would make them incur additional costs for transportation. Cosmos then advised
Ace-Agro that they could resume work inside the company premises which Ace-Agro rejected citing the pending labor case.
Ace-Agro brought a case against Cosmos for breach of contract and damages in the RTC, complaining that termi-
nation was illegal and arbitrary and stood to lose profits and be held liable to its employees for backwages, damages and
separation pay.
The labor court found Ace-Agro liable for the claims of its employees and they were ordered to reinstate the employ-
ees and pay them backwages. The RTC, however, found Cosmos guilty of breach of contract and ordered it to pay damages
though Ace-Agros claim for reimbursement of what it had paid in the labor case was denied. Cosmos appealed to the CA
which reversed the trial courts decision, finding that the petitioner had been the one to refuse to resume work after failing to
secure an extension of its contract.
Issue: W/N there was valid cause for the termination for Cosmos unilaterally terminating the contract on account of a force
majeure.
Held: The reason given by Cosmos for unilaterally terminating its contract was that the prestation or the object of their
agreement had been lost and destroyed in the fire. What they wanted was for this situation to fall within obligations extin-
guished by the happening of unforeseen events, under whose influence the obligations would never have been contracted,
because in such cases, the very basis upon which the existence of the obligation is founded would be wanting.
However, there were still other bottles and shells; therefore, the suspension of the work is at best temporary. Cos-
mos reconsidered its decision to terminate the decision by trying to accommodate the petitioner albeit outside the company
premises.
However, Ace-Agro unjustifiably refused because it wanted an extension of the contract to make up for the period of
inactivity. They were without legal ground to refuse resumption of work on the basis of it being outside the company premises
and could not legally insist to work inside property it did not own or lease. The second time they refused resumption of work,
in spite of it being inside company premises, was not because of the pending labor case but because Ace-Agro really wanted
an extension of the period or duration of the contract to cover the period of inactivity.
But the suspension of work due to the fire does not merit an automatic extension. The stipulation that in the event of
a fortuitous event or force majeure the contract shall be deemed suspended during the said period does not mean that it
stops the running of the period the contract has been agreed upon to run. It only relieves the parties from the fulfillment of
their respective obligations during that time. Cosmos withdrew its unilateral termination of its agreement but Ace-Agros re-
fusal to work was a unilateral termination an act without legal basis, which must be construed as a breach of contract.
While Cosmos made efforts towards accommodation, Ace-Agro was unwilling to make adjustments. While the job-
out offer had the effect of varying the terms of the contract, what petitioner does not seem to realize is that the change was
brought about by circumstances not of Cosmos making. When Cosmos advised Ace-Agro that they could work inside the
premises, the latter only thought of its interest by insisting that the contract be extended. Cosmos was justified in insisting
that after the expiration of the contract, the parties must negotiate a new one as they had done every year.