Nolasco v COMELEC

FACTS

A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged
performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code giving money to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts
of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is
allowed by the law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided
against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as
intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him.
The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolascos motions thus this
petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor

Held:

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to
prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blancos contention that the minimum
quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require
is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates
proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case
of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer
would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be
assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the
disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.

Marquez v COMELEC

Facts:

Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition
praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification
under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad.)

Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud in the United States and that his arrest is yet
to be served because of his flight from the country.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquezs Petition.

Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issues:

WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive from justice as
provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.

Held:

Fugitive from justice does not mean a person convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after
being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in
conformity of the given clarification with the term fugitive from justice.

Domingo vs. COMELEC

313 SCRA 311/ G.R. No. 136587
August 30, 1999

FACTS:

Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari are the En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC and the
Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division, which dismissed, for lack of merit, the petition for disqualification
filed by Domingo against herein private respondent, the incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong City.

In May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr.
(Benhur) were both mayoralty candidates of Mandaluyong City. After private respondent's proclamation,
Domingo filed the instant petition for disqualification, on the ground that, during the campaign period,
private respondent "prodded" his father, then incumbent Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr., to
give "substantial allowances" to public school teachers appointed as chairpersons and members of the Boards
of Election Inspector (BEIs) for Mandaluyong City.

Petitioner's allegations obtain from the Pasyal-Aral" outing for Mandaluyong City public school teachers,
then Mayor Abalos, Sr. announcing that the teachers appointed to the BEIs will each be given substantial
allowances. Petitioner alleged that it was done so as to influence them into voting for him (Benhur) and
ensuring his victory. Petitioner presented as evidence photographs and of the said activity, affidavits of 3
public school teachers, and videotapes showing Mayor Abalos Sr. announcing Benhur as the one responsible
for such release.

Petitioner alleges that private respondent's act of "prodding" his father constitutes a violation of Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by
final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; . . . shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. . . .

In dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, the COMELEC
1st Division admonished petitioner and his counsel for attempting to mislead the COMELEC by making false
and untruthful statements in his petition.

On reconsideration, the COMELEC, En Banc, affirmed the findings and conclusions of its 1st Division.
ISSUE:

1. Did Mayor Abalos Jr. violate Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?

2. Did the COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion in its act of dismissing the petition for disqualification
for insufficiency of evidence, despite the "overwhelming" pieces of evidence of petitioner, consisting of the
video cassette, pictures and affidavits, which were "not denied" by private respondent and presented "no
evidence" to substantiate his defense

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions dismissing the petition and affirming the
proclamation of private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. as duly elected mayor of Mandaluyong City, are
hereby AFFIRMED

1. Nothing in the affidavits suggests knowledge on any degree of participation of private respondent in the
grant of these allowances. The name of private respondent was not even mentioned or alluded to by any of
the three affiants. The videotapes did not prove his participation therein either.

2. The burden of proving that private respondent indirectly influenced the public school teachers of
Mandaluyong City, through his father, Abalos, Sr., was a burden that petitioner failed to meet. Neither is
this burden overcome by the argument that private respondent, for himself, had "no evidence" to rebut
petitioner's allegations, since the burden of proving factual claims rests on the party raising them

Besides, it is not true that private respondent gave only denials and did not present any evidence to his
defense. Benhur presented in evidence a certified true copy of Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1998, issued by
the DECS, DBM and DILG, which authorized the payment of allowances of public school teachers chargeable
to local government funds. The Joint Circular provided the basis for private respondent's argument that the
disbursement of funds by then mayor Abalos, Sr. was valid as having been made pursuant to administrative
circular, and was not an unlawful attempt made in conspiracy with private respondent to secure the latter's
victory in the elections.

In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's decision to dismiss the petition for
disqualification. The conclusion that petitioner's evidence is insufficient to support the charge of violation of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code was arrived at only after a careful scrutiny of the evidence at hand,
especially of the videotapes of petitioner.

NOTES:

Other issues:

1. Is the Resolution of COMELEC violative of his right to due process, and thus, issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

- It is petitioner's argument that the dismissal of his petition for disqualification on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence was unfounded, considering that no hearing on the merits was conducted by public
respondent on the matter.

Well-established is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Where
opportunity to be heard is accorded, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of
procedural due process. Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given
the chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration.

2. Private respondent (COMELEC) contends that, inasmuch as the petition for disqualification and the
complaint for election offense involve the same issues and charges, (i.e., vote-buying, exerting undue
influence on BEI members), petitioner (Domingo) should be held liable for forum-shopping.

We rule to the contrary. Forum-shopping exists when the petitioner files multiple petitions or complaints
involving the same issues in two or more tribunals or agencies.

The issues in the two cases are different. The complaint for election offense is a criminal case which
involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate and, like any other criminal
case, requires a conviction on proof beyond reasonable doubt. A petition for disqualification, meanwhile,
requires merely the determination of whether the respondent committed acts as to merit his disqualification
from office, and is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character and requires
only a clear preponderance of evidence

3. In the Petition, petitioner's counsel admitted that the assailed quotation in the petition for
disqualification (admonished by COMELEC) was based on "erroneous transcript" of the speech which was
prepared by somebody else, and which he in turn failed to verify for errors. However, he denies having
intended to mislead the COMELEC with the inclusion of this statement, but instead submits that the word
"Benhur" was "derived" from the succeeding pronouncement of Abalos, Sr., "not because he is my son", which
may in turn be inferred to refer to private respondent, who was a mayoralty candidate at the time.

-We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's finding that Abalos, Sr.'s controversial statement,
effectively reduced to this:

Your President, together with Lito Motivo, walang tigil yan kakapunta sa akin at not because he is my son
siya ang nakikipag-usap sa kanila and came up with a beautiful compromise. . . .

was seriously insufficient and vague to prove violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

It is upon the videotape recordings that petitioner lays much reliance on, in proving his case for
disqualification. The recordings are supposed to document how former mayor Abalos, Sr. announced that his
son, private respondent herein, prodded his father to release substantial allowances to teachers who will act
as members of the BEIs. As found by the COMELEC 1st Division, the name uttered in the announcement was
not "Benhur", private respondent's nickname and what petitioner alleged was uttered, but "Lito Motivo", a
name which truly sounded unlike "Benhur". Also, when the COMELEC, through its 1st Division, viewed the
videotape submitted by petitioner, "the speech of Mayor Abalos, Sr. was cut and so (they) also did not see
and hear that part of Mayor Abalos, Sr.'s speech allegedly uttered by him."

4. Where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned
Resolutions, the Court may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on
the sufficiency of evidence.

5. By law, the mayor is a co-chairman of the City School Board, there is nothing unusual in his (Abalos sr.)
having co-sponsored the said event.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national
elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the
Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office
after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a
special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987.
The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when
the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office
ten (10) days after his proclamation.

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that
the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for
the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his
office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the
elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10
votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have
turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be
truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue
more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through
their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

CONQUILLA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 139801
May 31, 2000

FACTS:

ROBERTO CONQUILLA assails in this special civil action for certiorari the En Banc Resolution of COMELEC
which affirmed the Resolution of its First Division dismissing his Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy and Disqualification (SPA No. 98-132) against private respondent EDUARDO A. ALARILLA for lack of
merit.

EDUARDO A ALARILLA filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the Municipal Election Officer of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, without however indicating the elective position which he was aspiring for. However, attached
thereto and filed with his Certificate of Candidacy was ALARILLAs Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance,
which states:

I , JOSE DE VENECIA, JR. ... (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP) as its Secretary-General, hereby nominate: EDUARDO A.
ALARILLA as the Partys official candidate in the May 11, 1998 elections for the position of MUNICIPAL MAYOR
of the Municipality of Meycauayan in the Fourth District of Bulacan.
On 14 April 1998 CONQUILLA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for docketed as SPA No. 98-132, praying that
private respondent ALARILLA's Certificate of Candidacy be expunged and cancelled on the ground that it was
null and void for failing to specify the elective position he was running for and, consequently, he be
disqualified to run for any position n Meycauayan, Bulacan.

During the pendency of SPA No. 98-132 the Board of Canvassers proclaimed ALARILLA as the Mayor-elect of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Thereafter, the First Division of COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 98-132.

ISSUE:

CONQUILLA contends that public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion:

1. in affirming in toto the Resolution of the First Division dismissing SPA No. 98-132 for lack of merit and in
ruling that the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance attached to private respondents Certificate of
Candidacy could be used as basis in determining the elective position private respondent was seeking; and,

2. In not resolving the motion to suspend private respondents proclamation as Mayor-elect of Meycauayan,
Bulacan.

3. Additionally, CONQUILLA contends that COMELEC erred in dismissing his appeal for late filing

HELD:

1. It is correctly observed by the First Division of COMELEC and affirmed by COMELEC En Banc that the
information omitted in the Certificate of Candidacy was supplied in the Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance attached thereto. As the COMELEC itself has clarified, certificates of nomination and acceptance
are procedurally required to be filed with, and form an integral part of, the certificates of candidacy of
official candidates of political parties. Additionally, the First Division ruled that ALARILLA was able to
correct his omission by filing an Amended Certificate of Candidacy on 21 April 1998 (after the filing and
before the dismissal of SPC no. 98-132) clearly indicating therein that he was running for the position of
Municipal Mayor, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

2. It cannot be denied that ALARILLA was elected Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the 11 May 1998
elections. If substantial compliance with the Election Law should give way to a mere technicality, the will of
the electorate, as far as ALARILLA is concerned, would be frustrated

3. However, CONQUILLAS motion for reconsideration was not filed late on 1 June 1998 considering that 31
May 1998 was a Sunday, hence, he had until the next working day, which was 1 June 1998, within which to
ask for reconsideration

NOTES:

-The purpose in requiring a certificate of candidacy (which is to enable the voters to know before the
elections the candidates among whom they are to make a choice) was deemed satisfied not only by the
Amended Certificate of Candidacy filed before the elections but also by the Certified List of Candidates
issued by the Office of the Election Officer, Meycauayan, Bulacan, indubitably listing therein EDUARDO A.
ALARILLA as candidate for the position of "mayor" of said municipality

- x.....x.....x.....when the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be
fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the
part of him who was obligated to observe it, and that such departure has not been used as a means for
fraudulent practices x x x the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless
irregularity (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521, cited in the De Guzman v. Bd. of Canvassers of La Union and
Lucero, 48 Phil. 211, 214-215).
De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union
48 Phil 211

Facts:

Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to compel the Board of
Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly
elected governor of La Union based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not
made under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition
failed to state a cause of action.

Issue:

WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his proclamation as
the duly elected governor of La Union

Held:

No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Luceros certificate of candidacy does not invalidate his election
for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had
obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality
consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs.
Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an
election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of
the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory.
When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such
departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him
who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices
or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the
popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity.
And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are
mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be
directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be
deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election
Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to
defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply
because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have
not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be
prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected
and upheld.

Hence, even if the legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the
election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate but because
the people have already expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the
fact that Lucero who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of
provincial governor has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.
VICTORINO SALCEDO II vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO
August 16, 1999

Facts:

This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the earlier
Resolution issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998.

Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true copy of the
marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having
been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days
later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage
certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.

Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of
mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their
respective certificates of candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the
cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false
representation therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private
respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private
respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.

In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married
Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she
encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had
abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which
was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since
1986 up to the present she has been using the surname "Salcedo" in all her personal, commercial and public
transactions.

Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and
Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently,
the use by private respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a
ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.

However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private
respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review
such promulgation.

Issue:

1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes
material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Held:

Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in
her certificate of candidacy.

A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide
a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive
the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to
mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is
absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by
private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for
when they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into voting for
someone else by the use of such name.

The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel
private respondent's certificate of candidacy.

GADOR vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-52365
January 22, 1980

This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on January 21, 1980
at 4:47pm asking the Supreme Court to immediately order the respondent COMELEC to include the name his
name in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz.

Facts:

The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as
Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the
Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said
news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC.
However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that
his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this
petition.

ISSUE:

WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

NO. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void.

Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in
triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not
extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4,
1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN

G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No.
01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as
Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the ranking
of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on
February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election
to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term
each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the
elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to
serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for
prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued
Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be
filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial
candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or
regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify
in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial
elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that
because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14
May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica
sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing
any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan
questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because
they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal
injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue:

WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some
authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on
the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the
special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would
change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who
wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters
would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special
Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in
our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of
election, if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001
merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft
of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the
seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul
Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial
cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

LCP vs COMELEC
November 18, 2008

Facts:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th
Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the
House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt
from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No.
29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed
to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On
December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood
bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed
the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all
cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:

1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the
level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even
have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the
classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to
the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso
facto resigned from their positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of
candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied
the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:

NO.

In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally,
the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of
the equal protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter
dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a
valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote
ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is
further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to
the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty
because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether
they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be
considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is
absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in
the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in
character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling
state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.

Go v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will
expire at noon on 30 June 2001.
On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay,
Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.

On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with
office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte.
Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of
withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. Hiowever, the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a
COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed
her certificate of candidacy for mayor.

At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or
withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours,
petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax4 to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter
submitted the same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001.5 On
the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of
withdrawal.6

On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City
a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner. Respondent
Antoni filed a similar petitions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte,
thus, making her ineligible for both.

On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, by 1st indorsement,
referred the cases to the Commission on Election, Manila, Law Department, on the ground that he was
inhibiting himself due to his prior action of refusing to receive the petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal
tendered simultaneously with the filing of the certificate of candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001.

In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the
cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings. On 05 April
2001, they submitted a report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc.

"Petitioners' ground to deny due course and/or to cancel the said certificate of candidacy is anchored on
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code

"Moreover, petitioners contended that CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-Go is ineligible to run either Mayor of
Baybay, Leyte or Governor of Leyte Province.

"Based on the certified list of candidate for the provincial candidates of Leyte on March 7, 2001, the
certificate of candidacy of Catalina Lopez Loreto-Go for the position of Governor of Leyte was filed with the
Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor on February 28, 2001 at 11:47 p.m., the last day for filing
certificates of candidacy.
"In support of the petitions of Atty. Montejo and Atty. Antoni, is a certified machine copy of the affidavit of
withdrawal of Catalina L. Loreto-Go, which was filed on march 01, 2001 at the Office of the Election Officer
of Baybay, Leyte, which she filed on February 28, 2001.

"The affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina Loreto-Go, a portion of which reads:

"1. That last February 27, 2001 I filed my certificate of candidacy for mayor for the MUNICIPALITY OF
BAYBAY, LEYTE;

"2. That due to political exigency and influence form my political leaders urging me to run for mayor of the
Municipality of baybay, leyte, I have no other recourse but to follow desire of my political constituents;

"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my certificate of candidacy for Mayor of the Municipality of
Baybay, leyte and in it stead I am formally filing my certificate for Governor of Leyte.

"A careful scrutiny and examination of Catalina Loreto-Go certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte
Province although filed on the last day of February 28, 2001, her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of
Baybay, Leyte, was filed only on March 1, 2001 or one (1) day after the February 28, 2001 deadline. In other
word, there are two (2) certificates of candidacy filed by Catalina Loreto-Go, one for governor of Leyte and
the other for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte.

"Clearly, on March 1, 2001 when she filed her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of baybay, Leyte, both her
certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, leyte and Governor of Leyte were still subsisting and effective
making her liable for filing two certificates of candidacy on different elective positions, thus, rendering her
ineligible for both positions, in accordance with Section (1) (b) of Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A.

On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the Director, Law Department and
adopted the resolution in question as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she
filed certificates of candidacy for both positions?

II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte?

(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place where the certificate of
candidacy was filed?

(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?

III. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law?

HELD:

We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions
of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of
withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial
compliance with the requirement of the law.14 We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her
certificate of candidacy for governor.
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that:

"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by
submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before
the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one
certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same
office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the
main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the
provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the
municipal election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000,
requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of
candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not
mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a
law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy
for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such
candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner ineligible for
both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.
There is another important moiety that affects the validity of the COMELEC resolution canceling petitioner's
certificates of candidacy. It is that petitioner was deprived of procedural due process of law. The petition to
cancel her certificate of candidacy or to deny due course to both were filed before the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte who inhibited himself and referred the cases to the Law Department, COMELEC, Manila.
On 11 April 2001, the COMELEC, First Division, acting on the first indorsement of Atty. Villegas approved his
inhibition and required the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to immediately forward his copy of the
records of these cases to the Regional Election Director, Region 08, at Tacloban, Leyte, for hearing. On 18
April 2001, Regional Election Director, Region 08, Atty. Adolfo A. Ibaez issued summons/subpoena to
petitioner Go to submit her consolidated answer to the petitions and counter-affidavits including position
paper within three (3) days form notice. On 23 April 2001, petitioner submitted her consolidated position
paper. On 25 April 2001, at 9:00 a.m., Director Ibaez set the cases for hearing for reception of evidence of
the parties

In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELEC conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did
not give petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit a comment or
opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did
not set the cases for hearing. It was not even aware of the proceedings before Director Ibaez in Tacloban.
After an ex-parte study of the cases, on 05 April 2001, the Law Department submitted its report and
recommendation, approved by Director Balbuena, to the COMELEC en banc.

During the oral argument on 07 May 2001, Director Balbuena candidly admitted that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure requires that notice be given to the respondent . Indeed, Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly provides:

"Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy

"xxxx
"Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
Buac v. COMELEC

FACTS:

On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this
municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The residents of Taguig
were asked this question: Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a
highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act No. 8487?

On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four
(64) other election returns, declared that the No votes won, indicating that the people rejected the
conversion of Taguig into a city.

However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the
plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.

Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed
with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer
for revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed
as EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.

Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite
cannot be the subject of an election protest.

The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioners motion and dismissing the petition to
annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this
Resolution.

Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102 constituting
the committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.

On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its termination, the Committees
on Revision submitted their complete and final reports.

Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no witnesses were presented by
petitioner, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which they did.

Petitioner contends that the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the determination
of the will of the electorate because the revision is incomplete. He claims that:

Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision Committees, the
revision of ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for Yes and a total of 12,602 votes for No. The revision
committee thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.

As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the total number of votes reflected in the Final
Canvassing Report of the Taguig PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the physical count of the
ballots; (2) the returns of the uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots, all
summed up and tallied as follows:
Affirmative Negative
Total Number of Votes Per PBOC Canvassing Report 19,413 21,890
Minus: Number of Invalid Votes 253 419
Minus: Number of Votes Deducted from the
Plebiscite Returns After Physical Count (Table D) 0 2,024

Plus: Number of Votes Added After Physical Count 1,936 0

(Table D)
Plus: Credited Claimed Ballots 9 13
Total 21,105 19,460

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.

HELD:

Petitions dismissed for lack of merit.

The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but
finality. This is so because the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is
best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and
related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order in these twin petitions, the COMELEC did
not gravely abuse its discretion.

Nolasco v COMELEC

FACTS

A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged
performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code giving money to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts
of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is
allowed by the law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided
against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as
intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him.
The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolascos motions thus this
petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor

Held:
1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to
prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blancos contention that the minimum
quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require
is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates
proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case
of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer
would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be
assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the
disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.

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Posted by roni diazat 4:55 AMNo comments:

marquez vs. comelec

Marquez v COMELEC

Facts:

Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition
praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification
under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad.)

Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud in the United States and that his arrest is yet
to be served because of his flight from the country.

The COMELEC dismissed Marquezs Petition.

Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issues:

WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive from justice as
provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.

Held:

Fugitive from justice does not mean a person convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after
being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in
conformity of the given clarification with the term fugitive from justice.

FLORES vs. COMELEC Case Digest

FLORES vs. COMELEC
184 SCRA 484
Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest
number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and
thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election
was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less
than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him
as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latters total.
Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the
four votes cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been
considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores,
another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2,
demoting him to second place.

The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power
to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a
protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be
final and non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking
cognizance of the petitioners appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests
are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No.
6679?

Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground,
to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of
limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the
RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the
municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be
declared unconstitutional.
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Occena vs COMELEC Digested

Occena vs COMELEC

Facts:

The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as
taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is
not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:
Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions
and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held:

It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to
declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded:
"This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there
was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the
present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and
with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to
respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all
doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot
be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As
was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well
as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may
also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be
stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the
meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the
present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During
the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

Imbong vs COMELEC Digested

Imbong vs COMELEC

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales:
Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE:

Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by
such a call is constitutional.

HOLDING:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly.
Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for
convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4

- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for
such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted
more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to
the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.

- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof.
Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures
from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.

- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political
parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all
organizations.

Peralta vs COMELEC Digested

Peralta vs COMELEC

Facts:

Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. He, along
with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-
paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual
candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to
vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space
provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot).
Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this provision of
the Constitution: Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination. He sought the shelter of its protection for himself and other independent candidates
who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially,
in terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection question. The main
objection of Peralta against the optional straight party voting provided for in the Code is that an
independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name
of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the
independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a party-
member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec
9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection.

HELD:

The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able
to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted
individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual
candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do
otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to
join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his
certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a
political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of
a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is
his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered
the relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule
depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was
the victim of discrimination.

Javier vs COMELEC Digested

Javier vs COMELEC

Facts:

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in
May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress,
vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation,
snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the
complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed
the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division
ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome
of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of
canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal,
which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first
be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit
himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd
Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during
pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being
moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter
calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a
suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and
waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Jardiel vs COMELEC Digested

Jardiel vs COMELEC

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Comelec, Second Div., dated 10 December
1980 (P. P. Case # 214), wherein it resolved:

1. to annul the result of the January 30, 1980 elections in the municipality of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija; and

2. to order the holding of a special election thereof for the positions of Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and
Sangguniang-Bayan Members, on a date to be set by the Commission.

In the local elections of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, held on 30 January 1980, petitioner Jardiel prevailed
over private respondent Aves and was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on the same date.

The day after the elections, the COMELEC received a telegraphic report from its Special Action Team
recommending the immediate suspension of the canvass of results of elections for Mayor, Vice-Mayor and
Councilors in all voting centers of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija due to rampant election offenses.

After proper observance of due process, the COMELEC resolved to declare the elections or the results
thereof annulled, as above quoted.

Subsequent motion for reconsideration by the petitioner was also denied by the Comelec.

Hence, this petition for the Reversal of the Comelec resolution.

Issue:

1. Whether Comelec resolution constitutes a denial of due process on the petitioner.

2. Whether reports of COMSAT is deserving of serious consideration.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled on the two issues in the negative.

On the first issue, the Supreme Court stated that petitioner's contentions were not well taken. The
COMELEC had weighed the conflicting pleadings, certifications and affidavits before it and concluded
that the case was ripe for resolution on the merits. The procedural step taken by COMELEC finds support
in the case of Demetrio vs. Lopez, 50 Phil 45 (1927).

As to the second issue, the Court stated that report of COMSAT No. 9 is deserving of serious consideration
because COMSAT 9 was the COMELEC Special Action Team. Hence, it may be said to have been an
extension of the COMELEC itself. In addition to which the COMELEC gave full faith and credit
considering that COMSAT 9 was its Special Deputy and implementing arm in the critical area or areas
which were expected to become trouble spots in the last elections.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied.

Sanchez vs COMELEC Digested

Sanchez vs COMELEC

FACTS:

The Resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated May 15, 1980, in Pre-Proclamation Case No. 41
entitled Virgilio Sanchez vs. Mayor Armando P. Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Fernando, Pampanga.

In the local elections held on January 30, 1980, Virgilio Sanchez was the official candidate of the
Nacionalista Party (NP) for Municipal Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga, while Armando Biliwang was
the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan,s (KBL) official candidate for the same position.

On February 1, 1980, Sanchez filed with the Commission on Elections a Petition to declare null and void
the local elections in San Fernando, Pampanga due to alleged large scale terrorism. On the same day, the
COMELEC denied the Petition for lack of merit. Sanchez moved for reconsideration. On February 8, 1980,
the COMELEC recalled its Resolution and required Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
answer. Hearings were conducted thereafter.

On November 19, 1980, Sanchez filed a petition for Certiorari with this court, docketed as G.R. No. 55513,
wherein he seeks a modification of the portion of the COMELEC Resolution of May 15, 1980 refusing to
call a special election.

On December 6, 1980, Biliwang instituted, also with this Court, a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 55642, assailing the same COMELEC Resolution and alleging that same
body has no power to annul an entire municipal election.

These two Petitions were ordered consolidated and were heard by the court en banc on July 28, 1981.

ISSUES:

Does the COMELEC have the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post-election
terrorism?
Does the COMELEC have the authority to call for a special election?

HELD:

Biliwang Asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials particularly so
because, under Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests relative to elective
municipal officials is vested in Courts of First Instance.

Be that as it may, it should be recalled that what COMELEC actually rejected were the sham and illegal
returns in San Fernando, and that kind of fraud and terrorism perpetrated thereat was sufficient cause for
voiding the election as a whole. Besides, COMELEC is empowered motu proprio to suspend and annul any
proclamation as, in fact, it did annul Biliwangs proclamation.

It may be true that there is no specific provision vesting the COMELEC with authority to annul an
election. However, there is no doubt either relative to COMELECs extensive powers. Under the
Constitution, the COMELEC is tasked with the function to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections. The 1978 Election Code accords it exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and
honest elections.

In other words, in line with the plenitude of its powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections,
the COMELEC must be deemed possessed of authority to annul elections where the will of the voters has
been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. It would be unreasonable to state that the COMELEC has
a legal duty to perform and at the same time deny it the wherewithal to fulfill that task.

On this issue, the COMELEC opined that it had no power to order the holding of new or special election.

Thus, the COMELEC deemed it imperative to certify to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang
Pambansa the failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga, so that remedial legislation may be enacted.

Again, the foregoing Opinions were rendered under the regime of the 1935 Constitution and the former
Revised Election Code, whereby there was no constitutional nor statutory precept that empowered the
COMELEC to direct a new election after one had already been held. Under Section 8 of that former
statute, authority was given to the President to postpone the election upon the recommendation of the
COMELEC. And Section 21 (c) of the same law authorized the President to issue a proclamation calling a
special election whenever the election for a local office failed to take place on the date fixed by law. In
other words, the prerogative to postpone an election or call a special election, was formerly lodged with
the President.

As the laws now stand, however, COMELEC has been explicitly vested with the authority to call for the
holding or continuation of the election.

Clearly, under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, when the election results in a failure to elect, the
COMELEC may call for the holding or continuation of the election as soon as practicable. We construe
this to include the calling of a special election in the event of a failure to elect in order to make the
COMELEC truly effective in the discharge of its functions. In fact, Section 8 of the 1978 Election Code,
supra, specifically allows the COMELEC to call a special election for the purpose of fillinf the vacancy or a
newly created position, as the case may be. There should be no reason, therefore, for not allowing it to call
a special election when there is a failure to elect.

RULING OF COURT:

WHEREFORE. 1) in G.R. No. 55513, the challenged Resolution of May 15, 1980 is hereby modified, and
the Commission on Elections hereby held empowered to call a special election where there has been a
failure to elect. That portion which certifies the failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga, to the
President and the Batasang Pambansa for the enactment of remedial measures, is hereby set aside.
2) In G.R. No. 55642, the Petition is hereby denied for lack of merit, and the authority of the Commission
on Elections to annul an election hereby upheld.

Aratuc vs Comelec Digested

Aratuc vs Comelec

G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979

Facts:

Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of respondent Comelec.A
supervening panel headed by Comelec had conducted hearings of the complaints of the petitioner therein
alleged irregularities in the election records. In order for the Commission to decide properly. It will have
to go deep into the examination of the voting records and registration records and it will have to interview
and getstatements from persons under oath from the area to determine whether actual voting took place.
The Comelec then rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the
canvass.

Issue:

Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

Ruling:

No.Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 the commission on elections shall have
direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers. In administrative law, a superior body or
office having supervision or control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or
ought to have done. The petition is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit.

ALVAREZ vs. COMELEC Case Digest

ALVAREZ vs. COMELEC
GR No. 142527 March 01, 2001

Facts: On May 12, 1997, petitioner Arsenio Alvarez, with 590 votes, was proclaimed Punong Barangay
of Doa Aurora, Quezon City, his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes.
Private respondent filed an election protest in the Metropolitan Trial Court claiming irregularities in the
reading and appreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After a recount of the ballots
in the contested precincts, the Trial Court ruled that the private respondent won the election, garnering
596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes. On appeal, the COMELECs Second Division ruled that
private respondent won over petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile,
private respondent filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. The
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second
Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal. Petitioner brought before the Supreme
Court this petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, denying the Motion
for Reconsideration of herein petitioner and affirming the Resolution of its Second Division alleging
that the COMELEC En Banc granted the respondents Motion for Execution pending appeal when the
appeal was no longer pending, thus the motion had become obsolete and unenforceable.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it prematurely acted
on the Motion for Execution pending appeal?

Held: We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a motion
for reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending motion for reconsideration suspended
the execution of the resolution of the Second Division. Appropriately then, the division must act on the
motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second Division resolved both petitioners motion for
reconsideration and private respondents motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in the exercise
of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Correspondingly, we do not find that the COMELEC abused its
discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal. Petition is DISMISSED, and the En Banc
Resolution of the COMELEC is AFFIRMED.
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Cua vs COMELEC Digested

Cua vs COMELEC

Facts:

1. The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1 decision favoring the petitioner but nevertheless suspended
his proclamation as winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous
vote required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No. 1669.

2. Section 5 of the said resolution states that, A case being heard by it shall be decided with the
unanimous concurrence of all three Comissioners and its decision shall be considered a decision of the
Comission. If this required number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may be
appealed to the Commission En Banc, in which case the vote of the majority thereof shall be the decision
of the Commission.

3. Petitioner contends that the 2-1 decision of the first division was a valid decision despite the resolution
stated above because of Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. He argues that this applies to the votings
of the Comelec both in division and En Banc.

4. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that no decision was reached by the first division because the
required unanimous vote was not obtained. It was also argued that no valid decision was reached by the
Comelec En Banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did not constitute
the majority of the body.

Issue: W/N the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid.

Held: The 2-1 decision by the first division was a valid decision under Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the
Constitution.

Ratio: The three members who voted to affirm the first division constituted a majority of the five
members who voted and deliberated thereon (Note: This is the part of the decision which Fr. B criticized
in the Reviewer. See second column.) En Banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited
constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a
valid act that entitles him to assume his seat in the House of Representatives.

Lidasan vs COMELEC Digest

Lidasan vs COMELEC

G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

Facts:

Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan came to know later on
that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also
in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato
voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be
including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.

Issue:

Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato
to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

Held:

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns
of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept
the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own
province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

DIGESTED CASES ON ELECTION LAWS

1. PARAS V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The
recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no
recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year
immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was
set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SK Election is a local election.
HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be
considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b).
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase
regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never
be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
2. G.R. No. 113107. July 20, 1994.*
WILMAR P. LUCERO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE L. ONG, JR.,
respondents.
3. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996
FACTS: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to
implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative
productive uses. On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation
of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang
10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA
7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 199.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of
the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the
conduct of the referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No.
2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an
amendment of a national law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10.
2. Whether or not the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of
Morong to enact; whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by private
respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent COMELEC made preparations for a
REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the
word "referendum" is
repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The COMMISSION labeled the
exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the
documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers"
and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word
"initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact
or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is
the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the COMELEC exercises administration and supervision of the process
itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control
or change the substance or the content of legislation.
The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage
and not yet an approved law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an
approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate.
It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution
that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility.
Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution
No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the
same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or
passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on
Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings.
The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence,
there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could
take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
4. PERALTA vs. COMELEC
82 SCRA 30
FACTS: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period
of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the
day before and the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality
of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the
Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period should cover at
least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that the
election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional
HELD: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in
the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is
less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as
provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate the Constitution,
because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the interim Batasang
Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent President under
Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been
lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state
of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority and means
of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the country within which an electoral
campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the nation. But even assuming that it
should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period of campaign, the constitutional
mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period
fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978 Election Code
5. SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981
FACTS: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang
Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing
their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the
Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present
Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion
that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding.
ISSUE: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang
Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.
HELD: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In
the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition
and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to
four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the
new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It
could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest
that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what
the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for
instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973
Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is
that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly
demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate.
In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also
sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be
stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That
is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably
applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two
weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases
may be cited.
6. LABAN V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 161265. FEBRUARY 24, 2004
FACTS: Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been
divided because of a struggle of authority between Party Chair Edgardo Angara and Party Secretary
General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two different sets of candidates under the same
party, LDP.
The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The Commission in its resolution, has recognized the
factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two
sets of nominations and endorsement by the same party.
HELD: The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by
the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized.
7. BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC
404 SCRA 719
FACTS: Bagong Bayani and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a petition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC.
This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or over represented.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors
and organizations.
HELD:
1. Yes. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the
Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides
that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. "Furthermore, under Sections 7
and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list
system. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states
that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
2. No. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that
any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter may do so. The requisite character
of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The provision on the
party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with
law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.
8. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)
G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his
citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to
take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen. However, on the day that he got his citizenship,
the Court had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire
citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly
elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
HELD: The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of
Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to
run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential
Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath
of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the
applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended
the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly
provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
9. LABO VS. COMELEC
GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989
(Constitutional Law Loss of Citizenship)
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who,
through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as
an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled.
Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost
through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of
allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner
10. CAASI vs. COMELEC
191 SCRA 229, 1990
FACTS: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan
during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein
petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private
respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the
United States of America, not of Bolinao.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.
2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the
U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear
evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to
the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January
18, 1988, the Courts conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his
election thereto was null and void
11. DELA TORRE VS COMELEC
258 SCRA 483
FACTS: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from running for the
position of Mayor of CAvinti, Laguna in May 8, 1995 elections on the grounds that he was convicted
by the MTC of violation the Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code of
1991 which provides
Sec 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
positions:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offencse involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence.
Petitioner contended that the provisions is not applicable to him because he was granted probation
by the MTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)s applicability.
HELD:
1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals.
The elements of the crime of fencing which are:
1) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2) The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals
in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of the
said crime;
3) The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object of anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and;
4) There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioners
conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto finality when the accused applies for
probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.
12. GREGO vs. COMELEC 274 SCRA 481, 1997
FACTS: On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, private
respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than the
Supreme Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila in
the January 18, 1988 local elections. He won and assumed office. He was successfully re-elected in
1992 and 1995.
It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition on the ground that he is
disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under said section, those removed from office
as a result of an administrative case are disqualified to run for any elective local position.
ISSUE: Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply retroactively to those
removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of
Section 40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reason for the Court to depart
therefrom. That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates
removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from applying
the law prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as
to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage.

Aquino v COMELEC
Facts:
Agapito Aquino filed a Cert. of Candidacy to run for Rep in the 2 nd district of Makati. However, Mateo
Bedon ( Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the grounds that he
lacked the residence qualification under Sec 6, Art 7 of the 1987 Consti. Hearings were conducted by the
COMELEC and dismissed Bedons petition to disqualify.

During the counting of votes, Aquino garnered more votes against Agusto Syjuco. Bedon then filed an
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Aquino to which COMELEC agreed by issuing an Order.
COMELEC then again issued another Order declaring Aquino to be disqualified due to the lack of
constitutional qualification of residence.

Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
W/N COMELEC erred in deciding that petitioner lacked the constitutional reqts for residence.

Held:
No! Aquino failed to prove that he was a resident of the 2 nd Legislative District of Makati for a period of
one year at the time of election. His domicile of origin was in Concepcion, Tarlac. COMELEC said that the
intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati is evident in his leasing a condo unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract may give an indication that he intends to reside in Makati, it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones domicile. Aquino himself
testified that his intention was really for a year because he has other residences in Manila or Quezon
City.

Residence is synonymous with domicile -> place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home where he, no matter where he may be found eventually intends to return and
remain (ruling in Co V Electoral Tribunal of House of Rep)

Grio vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 105120 September 2, 1992

FACTS:

Grio and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in relation to the May 11, 1992 election. Grio is a
candidate for Governor of Iloilo where the sub-province of Guimaras is located. LGC of 1991 took effect requiring the
conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and Guimaras is one such sub-provinces, upon approval by
majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The plebiscite favored the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but
petitioner questioned the COMELEC that ballots should have contained spaces to allow voting for Gov, Vice Gov and members
of the Sanggunian of Iloilo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras.

HELD:

The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under the LGC of 1991, whether or not the conversion
of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the President will appoint provincial officials. However,
the voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province so there was need to undo what COMELEC has
done in plebiscite. There ballots in Guimaras should have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now
considered the case moot and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for the conversion of Guimaras.